Israeli weapon station against Iranian nuclear program
Mohsen Fakhrizadeh's car after the attack. It can be seen that several bullets were enough for the murder. Photo Farnews.ir
Remotely controlled combat modules for ground vehicles have already become widespread and do not surprise anyone. Israel is one of the world leaders in this area. At the same time, he not only creates new designs, but also offers unusual ways of using them. So, it became known that modern DBMS can be used for sabotage and special operations.
Under unclear circumstances
On November 27, 2020, an attempt was made on the life of physicist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, one of the leaders of the Iranian nuclear program, in Iran. As it was reported in the wake of these events, unknown persons fired at the physicist's car, killing him and his bodyguard. The guards responded by liquidating several of the attackers. Activities began to investigate and search for those involved. Almost immediately, Iran announced that the assassination attempt was organized by the Israeli special services.
Soon, new details of the incident appeared in the Iranian and foreign media, incl. contradicting the first messages. The attackers were said to have used a "remote-controlled machine gun" on a civilian pickup truck. First, he opened fire on the car with M. Fakhrizadeh, and then exploded.
However, other versions were also cited. The participation of machine gunners and snipers, the use of explosive devices, etc. was mentioned. At the same time, the official structures of Iran claimed that they had managed to establish all the circumstances of the assassination attempt and identify its participants. In addition, official accusations against Israel were constantly heard.
Funeral of M. Fakhrizadeh, November 30, 2020 Photo by Iranian Ministry of Defense
According to new data
On September 18, the New York Times published an article entitled "The Scientist and the AI-Assisted, Remote-Control Killing Machine" on last year's assassination attempt. Its authors talked with representatives of various structures and special services of several countries, incl. from the organizations that carried out the operation.
It is alleged that M. Fakhrizadeh was indeed killed with the use of a remotely controlled weapon system. In addition, an approximate appearance and capabilities of such a system, as well as the general course of events, are given.
It is noteworthy that the Iranian Foreign Ministry almost immediately denied this information. At the same time, the Iranian side recalled that the investigating authorities established all the circumstances of the incident and all those involved. However, the Foreign Ministry did not disclose such information.
Sabotage funds
According to the NYT, two modified civilian vehicles were used in the operation. One of them was in charge of reconnaissance, for which he received a video camera and communication equipment. He had to stand on the route of movement of the target cortege. For camouflage, the car was put on a jack and the wheel was removed.
The second car is of more interest. It was the usual closed-body Zamyad pickup in Iran. A DBM with an FN MAG machine gun was placed under the awning. According to NYT, the design of the module is similar to the Spanish serial Escribano Sentinel 20. The car was also equipped with a set of video cameras for review, communication and control facilities. Provided and an explosive charge for self-destruction after the attack.
The scheme of the assassination attempt. The blue and arrow shows the target's route. The top-left square is the position of the scout vehicle. Below is the position of the pickup truck with the DBM. NYT graphics
The operator of the complex and the control panel were at a distance of hundreds of kilometers from the place of operation. Two-way communication between the remote control and the DUBM went through the satellite, and there was a signal delay of the order of 0,8 seconds. one way. In this regard, the fire control system software has been improved. Elements of artificial intelligence were introduced into it, capable of compensating for the delay and ensuring effective shooting at the designated target.
Allegedly, the complex weighing about a ton was disassembled into separate components and assemblies that did not cause suspicion. For some time, the Mossad transported them through various channels to Iranian territory. There, the operatives acquired two vehicles and converted them into means of sabotage. On the appointed day, they were taken to positions, prepared for work and left. Further, all the work fell on remote operators.
The reconnaissance vehicle was filming passing vehicles. With his help, the saboteurs learned about the approach of M. Fakhrizade's motorcade. In addition, it was possible to determine in which vehicle and where the target is. Then the car with the DBM was included in the work. Its operator timely detected approaching vehicles and aimed weapon... The fire was opened from a distance of approx. 100 m.Only fifteen cartridges were spent on hitting the intended target. The successful shooting was followed by a team to self-destruct a pickup truck with all the "evidence".
The modern approach
The main field of application of the DBM at the moment is ground armored vehicles, manned and robotic. Also, similar systems are used on modern ships and boats. There is a fundamental possibility of using the modules at stationary firing points, for example, in the security contours of objects.
Active module Sentinel 20 of Spanish production. Photo Escribano Mechanical & Engineering
In all these areas, the combat module is located openly and has a direct connection from the operator's console, wired or radio. The operator himself is in the immediate vicinity of the DBMS or at a limited distance from it. All this makes it possible to obtain the desired level of human protection with high combat qualities and to provide an effective solution to the assigned tasks.
The alleged Israeli sabotage DBM project, being similar to other developments, has a number of characteristic differences. First of all, it is a secretive placement and maximum autonomy. In addition, an interesting feature was the ability to disassemble and secretly transport a hostile state across the border.
With all this, the authors of the project from the Mossad or another organization faced difficulties and limitations. Converting the finished DBM into a disguised system was hardly easy. The improvement of the LMS and software with the introduction of new solutions that neutralize negative factors and ensure that the required characteristics are obtained should be considered no less difficult.
It is necessary to pay attention to the operational and economic features of the project. Thus, Israeli operatives prepared an assassination attempt, but did not participate directly in the attack. This made it possible to eliminate losses, and also sharply reduced the likelihood of identifying and arresting participants. Israeli intelligence services always emphasize the humane treatment of their employees - and the "remote-controlled machine gun" perfectly fits this policy.
Infantry FN MAG machine gun. Photo by FN Herstal
At the same time, the development of a new complex of weapons, as well as the preparation and conduct of the operation turned out to be very difficult, lengthy and expensive. The fact that a pickup truck with a DBM has been used only once so far makes the original project not the most economically profitable. However, the assassination of M. Fakhrizadeh seriously hit the Iranian nuclear program. Probably, the Israeli leadership believes that the elimination of the military-political risks associated with it fully justifies all the costs.
A forward-looking approach
The creation of a remotely controlled reconnaissance and combat complex used in Iran can be considered a natural event. In recent years, there has been an active development of the DBMS and various unmanned systems with the ability to work at a great distance from the operator. It was actually a matter of time to unify these two directions - and Israel did it.
Last year's operation in Iran clearly shows that such equipment is capable of solving the assigned combat missions. However, due to its special role, the creation and use of such a sample is associated with a lot of difficulties. In addition, now the successful use of the disguised DBM is not guaranteed. Intelligence agencies of different countries will take into account the failure of their Iranian colleagues and take the necessary measures. On the routes of important persons, they will look not only for explosive devices, but also remote-controlled machine guns, as well as radio channels to control them.
Thus, with all its strengths and advantages, the original sabotage complex of the Israeli special services risks being left without tasks and falling into the category of technical curiosities. However, this curiosity has already solved an important combat mission in the interests of Israel's security and, perhaps, more is no longer required of him.
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