The future of network-centric wars
Some time ago, the domestic media gave a sensation: "The Americans stole the Doctrine of Marshal Ogarkov." It turns out that, having borrowed ideas from our Chief of the General Staff (in 1977 – 1984), they made a revolution in military affairs. It was after this that the role of control and automation systems was re-evaluated at the Pentagon and the concept of network-centric war was born. The revolutionary changes reached the Russian army almost late in 30 years, but even now a number of Russian experts reject a similar path of development, sometimes even speaking about large-scale misinformation from the United States.
100 years after the invention of radio, which almost immediately was adopted by the armies of leading countries of the world, began the next stage of the introduction of information technology in military affairs. Currently, a transition is underway to the combined use of advanced achievements in combat control, communications, computing, reconnaissance and surveillance systems (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance - C4ISR), high-precision weapons long-range (WTO DB), unmanned and robotic means of warfare. The difference is only in the scale of what is happening. In fact, there is another revolution in military affairs, the main purpose of which was the widespread informatization and automation of the processes of warfare, under the name “network centrism”.
PROSPECTS FOR THE US ARMED FORCES
As is known, the term “network centrism” first appeared in the American computer industry and was the result of a breakthrough in information technologies that allowed organizing interaction between computers, even despite the use of different operating systems in them. It is only natural that the Americans became the ideologists of the military application of this term. In the annex to military science, network-centrism means the informatization of warfare, which includes a purposeful process of system integration of computer tools, information and communication technologies in order to obtain new system-wide properties that allow you to more effectively plan, organize and conduct operations (combat operations).
The main feature of network-centricism as a revolution in military affairs is that, first of all, it is connected not with new models of weapons and military equipment, but with their software, that is, with information technology. Nevertheless, as American political analyst Richerson emphasized, “technology alone does not make a revolution in military affairs: the latter needs to be effectively fed by a new doctrine.” It is the absence of the official network-centric doctrine in the US Armed Forces that sometimes gives opponents of such a direction in the development of the RF Armed Forces a basis to speak of network-centrism as just another expensive horror story of the Cold War.
Indeed, there is no official doctrine. Nevertheless, approaches to the network-centric war (operations) were proposed at the end of the last century by the Vice-Admiral of the US Navy Arthur Tsebrovski and an expert of the Ministry of Defense John Garstka, and later legally issued as a series of official concepts. They are guidelines for the creation and use of future armed forces, while doctrines are a set of rules for existing combat formations. Therefore, we can confidently say that the American concept of network-centric warfare (NCW) or network-centric operation (CTS) exists and reflects innovative views on the formation of a promising network space of warfare, the introduction of modern information technologies in military affairs, as well as their influence on the performance of combat tasks in fundamentally new and more efficient ways.
Moreover, one should not expect the appearance of a separate official document called "The Doctrine of Network-Centric War". Unlike, for example, the evolution of the concept of an air-ground operation, which grew at the end of the 80s into an official doctrinal document with the same name, the concept of SCW (SCO) primarily defines new principles that will be implemented in the implementation of operational (combat ) functions of troops. This process is already reflected in the current doctrinal documents of the US Armed Forces, for example, in the charter of the Air Force AFDD 2-0 "Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance Operations", published on January 6, 2012 ... One of the main tasks spelled out in the charter is the formation of a network-centric intelligence system in the interests of effective reconnaissance support of the US Armed Forces in modern and future wars and armed conflicts.
Thus, to say that the concept of a network-centric operation (war), which is a military operation, uses modern information and network technologies for the integration of geographically dispersed controls, reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting equipment, as well as groups of troops and weapons of destruction. highly adaptive, global system, has died, not having passed into the category of doctrines, not only prematurely, but also unscientific. Moreover, this is the trouble of technophobes who, in principle, cannot see all the preferences from the introduction of new information technologies and the process of informatization itself. Meanwhile, informatization allows you to move to a unified planning system, to form a unified picture of situational awareness, to develop modern measures for monitoring and controlling means of warfare, including unmanned and robotic complexes. In addition, it allows to increase the transparency and efficiency of the work of the rear and reduce the level of advanced presence through the formation of virtual remote headquarters and other controls.
At the same time, it should be noted that, being at the moment a real tool for enhancing the combat capabilities, the network-centrism from this does not become a panacea for solving all problems. This is confirmed by the state of the community of military experts in the United States, which is divided into supporters who seriously doubt and oppose such a concept. The latter believe that technology occupies too much space in the American military strategy, wrongfully imposing its own logic on it. Moreover, as Dr. Alexander Kopylov, Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor Alexander Kopylov, noted in his work “On the Weaknesses of the American Concept of Network-centric Wars (Operations), Pentagon hopes that innovation will bring victory to the battlefield just as they make a profit in business. , untenable. The dominance of technocratism in the form of the concept of network-centric war leads to a number of mistakes. Among them: reassessment of a person’s ability to adequately process a large amount of conflicting information; simplified vision of the enemy through the reduction of his strategy to asymmetric actions; the unjustified bureaucratization of the command and control process and the insufficient consideration of the changing nature of the battle finally, an explicit or implicit premise that a military victory is the self-sufficient goal of the entire campaign.
There are really enough problems at the present stage, and one of the burning issues discussed by specialists is what will happen if the adversary uses electronic countermeasures to disable lines, communication networks and transfer data. The article “Network-centric front” cited an example of network-centricism in the civil sphere and its subsequent effect, when the heads of two families were given the task of paying for utilities. To do this, each of them had the same potential in the amount of 5000 rubles. One task was performed in the old manner, filling out receipts, going to the bank and defending the queue. Another, an advanced user of information technology, put his potential (5000 rubles) on a bank card and made a payment at any convenient time without leaving home and, most importantly, quickly. It turns out that both subjects with the same potentials and all other things being equal ideal conditions performed the same task, but with different effectiveness, that is, with different degree of realization of potential possibilities. At the same time, the second test subject also saved on interest for a commission.
So what can happen if an advanced user loses his advantage in information technology? As a matter of fact, nothing, since he will simply switch to the fulfillment of the tasks by the old, grandfathering methods, comparing in possibilities with his unmoved opponent. A confirmation of this was the incident that occurred in August 2011 of the year while working out issues of repelling aggression from North Korea at the joint US-Korean command and staff exercises. During the exercise, problems arose in the operation of the equipment of the advanced DCGS information collection, processing and distribution system. The reason was a failure in the software. The officers participating in the exercises lost contact with the battlefield, ceased to control their troops and could not see the enemy. The computer screens went out. Tragedy? Definitely not!
Americans are pragmatic and understand all the advantages of this approach. This incident was for them only an additional opportunity to work out emergency actions of personnel in a difficult radio-electronic environment. This means that our military specialists should not make the tragedy out of a possible opposition of the enemy, refusing the real preferences of the informatization process of warfare.
PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES
Despite the fact that the author of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Ogarkov was the author of the idea of another revolution in military affairs, the large-scale implementation of information technologies in the military sphere began in the United States. New regulations, equipment and weapons have been repeatedly tested by the Americans in various wars and armed conflicts. We have a little bit of change after more than 25 years. For example, according to foreign analysts, during the war with the Georgian aggressors, the "good old" flaws were once again revealed in the Russian Armed Forces.
Technically and morally outdated complexes or difficult-to-target reconnaissance means without the ability to quickly transfer the collected information. Problems with communication and data transmission systems, which led to the impossibility of effective management of subordinate formations. It is a well-known fact that Russian officers had to resort to the help of correspondents who had cell and satellite telephones. The lack of any coordination and interaction between the air force and ground forces, which did not allow the formation of a truly united group of forces. Lack of high-precision weapons, which were hardly used in that war, since there were only a few copies. Another problem was the insufficient number of carriers capable of using such weapons. On airplanes, helicopters, tanks sometimes there were no infrared cameras, no night vision devices, no friend or foe recognition systems, or navigation equipment. Inconsistency with the modern realities of the theory of operational art, which is still based on the old views of traditional large-scale ground operations, and not on modern concepts involving the massive use of high-precision weapons of warfare.
Similar problems were highlighted in the works of domestic experts, who indicated that the effectiveness of the actions of the units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was sometimes reduced to zero due to the lack of a secretive stable link, and in some cases - a link in general.
At present, the first movements in the form of an attempt to “digitize” the control system are already occurring. But this is only the beginning. An integral condition for the implementation of the new concept is the deployment of computer networks and the introduction of information technologies, that is, modern hardware and software systems, tools for automating the processes of preparing and making decisions, storing, processing and bringing information, and much more. But the most important thing is to understand what we generally expect from network centrism.
Perhaps we are waiting for new ways to use the forces and means of warfare, which seem to have not yet been developed, and the reason lies in the fact that there is often a lack of not only an understanding of the essence of the phenomenon, but also its necessity and importance. Nevertheless, practical proposals that require close attention and study are already being received. For example, specialists from one of the institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences developed the model of “Network-centric control of group motion of objects through configuration of quasi-force fields”. The model substantiates the possibility of transition from remote control to automatic fulfillment of missions through network-centric self-organization of all vehicles in a complex and rapidly changing environment (taking into account active opposition from both traditional air defense systems and enemy UAV groups).
What are the advantages of such an application of UAVs or other robotic means of warfare in a single space of network-centric control? According to the developers, they are as follows:
- distributed placement on the means of warfare a lot more and variety of means of multi-channel information gathering, counteraction and destruction;
- a significant increase in the accuracy of determining the coordinates of moving targets (due to their multiple determination by remote from each other aircraft (robots) and subsequent processing of information in a single algorithmic space (the effect of sounding with a large base);
- the possibility of concentrating distributed multi-channel means of detection, high-precision targeting and destruction by means of dynamically self-organizing accumulation of them at a certain place and point in time;
- dramatically increase the likelihood of successful completion of the mission while minimizing the consumption of ammunition, its own losses, which is achieved due to high quality control and maximum coordination of the combat capabilities of the means of warfare.
In addition, the institute's specialists have solutions related to the development of a new element base and its architecture, which provides qualitatively new opportunities for the full-scale solution of network-centric control problems in globally connected network resources. At the same time, such solutions, according to scientists, do not require new technologies for designing and manufacturing ultra-large integrated circuits (VLSI). According to them, an experimental batch of a prototype of the element base with a fundamentally new “control computer on chip” architecture supporting a single network of network-centric control can be implemented on available technologies for designing and manufacturing VLSI with design standards 65 – 45 nm for two to three years relatively low cost.
COLLECTING OTHERS HARD, BUT NEED
In order to create opportunities and the very prerequisites for the implementation of the network-centric concept in the Russian army, it is necessary to solve a complex task within the framework of both the Armed Forces and the country as a whole. This includes the search for new technological solutions, the transfer of the military-industrial complex to an innovative development path, the clarification of charters and manuals, the development of new forms and methods of using groups of troops, and training of personnel to work with modern hardware and software.
First of all, it is advisable to step up work on creating truly unified control bodies, developing modern algorithms for their work in solving various combat missions, forming a list of means that we plan to link into a network, understanding why and, most importantly, why it is needed. Otherwise, we will spend a lot of money on the fashionable trend and eventually we will step on the American rake, when “unexpectedly” the unsolvable problem of combining these separate, independent networks and reticulums will arise. Unfortunately, the fears are already coming true. This was reflected in the report of Colonel-General Arkady Bakhin, commander of the troops of the Western Military District, “The organization of command and control of the military district of the new organization”, announced at the general meeting of the 28 Academy in January 2012. According to the speaker, 17 ACS equipment has been deployed at the command center of the Joint Strategic Command, which are not related to each other.
In addition, it is necessary to understand that for the informatization of warfare to put the equipment a little, we must also learn how to competently use it. That is why it is advisable to continue the active implementation of information technology in the daily activities of the Armed Forces. Forcibly introduce an electronic document management system so that commanders, as well as all personnel, receive the necessary knowledge and experience in working with modern information systems. Their actions should be worked out to automatism - as with a TV, cell phone, computer. Only in this case, information systems and tools will turn from unknown expensive equipment into a real helper in solving combat missions.
There is a lot of work in this direction, as there is a clear lag in the level of informatization of our Armed Forces from similar processes in the American army. There is not even a full-fledged military-scientific library. At the same time, not only is the digitization of the works of military scientists from previous years not taking place, but new materials are not being introduced, which only aggravates the situation. For example, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov did not find a single work on numerous domestic military-oriented resources (including the official website of the Ministry of Defense). At the same time, translations of most of our marshal's works are posted on the websites of military-scientific institutions of foreign countries. Use, American military scientists, promote your science, ensure the development of innovative of your Armed Forces!
In the interest of accelerating the processes of informatization and the implementation of network-centric principles in the RF Armed Forces, it is advisable to intensify work in the following key areas:
- clarification of the essence of the studied phenomena and the formation of a unified terminological base;
- the search for ways of practical implementation of the network-centric principles, the development of new methods of using groups of forces, as well as the development of modern tools to increase the effectiveness of information and analytical activities;
- development and approval of a family of conceptual documents on informatization of types and types of troops;
- transition to an electronic document management system, as well as popularization of informatization in the Armed Forces;
- engaging specialists from industry and research organizations of the Russian Academy of Sciences who themselves come out with practical suggestions;
- the creation of modern discussion platforms, as well as the formation of constantly working groups from representatives of the Ministry of Defense, science and industry in promising areas of research.
There is no doubt that we will not receive a ready-made short-term solution. Nevertheless, the forward movement will finally begin.
100 years after the invention of radio, which almost immediately was adopted by the armies of leading countries of the world, began the next stage of the introduction of information technology in military affairs. Currently, a transition is underway to the combined use of advanced achievements in combat control, communications, computing, reconnaissance and surveillance systems (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance - C4ISR), high-precision weapons long-range (WTO DB), unmanned and robotic means of warfare. The difference is only in the scale of what is happening. In fact, there is another revolution in military affairs, the main purpose of which was the widespread informatization and automation of the processes of warfare, under the name “network centrism”.
PROSPECTS FOR THE US ARMED FORCES
As is known, the term “network centrism” first appeared in the American computer industry and was the result of a breakthrough in information technologies that allowed organizing interaction between computers, even despite the use of different operating systems in them. It is only natural that the Americans became the ideologists of the military application of this term. In the annex to military science, network-centrism means the informatization of warfare, which includes a purposeful process of system integration of computer tools, information and communication technologies in order to obtain new system-wide properties that allow you to more effectively plan, organize and conduct operations (combat operations).
The main feature of network-centricism as a revolution in military affairs is that, first of all, it is connected not with new models of weapons and military equipment, but with their software, that is, with information technology. Nevertheless, as American political analyst Richerson emphasized, “technology alone does not make a revolution in military affairs: the latter needs to be effectively fed by a new doctrine.” It is the absence of the official network-centric doctrine in the US Armed Forces that sometimes gives opponents of such a direction in the development of the RF Armed Forces a basis to speak of network-centrism as just another expensive horror story of the Cold War.
Indeed, there is no official doctrine. Nevertheless, approaches to the network-centric war (operations) were proposed at the end of the last century by the Vice-Admiral of the US Navy Arthur Tsebrovski and an expert of the Ministry of Defense John Garstka, and later legally issued as a series of official concepts. They are guidelines for the creation and use of future armed forces, while doctrines are a set of rules for existing combat formations. Therefore, we can confidently say that the American concept of network-centric warfare (NCW) or network-centric operation (CTS) exists and reflects innovative views on the formation of a promising network space of warfare, the introduction of modern information technologies in military affairs, as well as their influence on the performance of combat tasks in fundamentally new and more efficient ways.
Moreover, one should not expect the appearance of a separate official document called "The Doctrine of Network-Centric War". Unlike, for example, the evolution of the concept of an air-ground operation, which grew at the end of the 80s into an official doctrinal document with the same name, the concept of SCW (SCO) primarily defines new principles that will be implemented in the implementation of operational (combat ) functions of troops. This process is already reflected in the current doctrinal documents of the US Armed Forces, for example, in the charter of the Air Force AFDD 2-0 "Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance Operations", published on January 6, 2012 ... One of the main tasks spelled out in the charter is the formation of a network-centric intelligence system in the interests of effective reconnaissance support of the US Armed Forces in modern and future wars and armed conflicts.
Thus, to say that the concept of a network-centric operation (war), which is a military operation, uses modern information and network technologies for the integration of geographically dispersed controls, reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting equipment, as well as groups of troops and weapons of destruction. highly adaptive, global system, has died, not having passed into the category of doctrines, not only prematurely, but also unscientific. Moreover, this is the trouble of technophobes who, in principle, cannot see all the preferences from the introduction of new information technologies and the process of informatization itself. Meanwhile, informatization allows you to move to a unified planning system, to form a unified picture of situational awareness, to develop modern measures for monitoring and controlling means of warfare, including unmanned and robotic complexes. In addition, it allows to increase the transparency and efficiency of the work of the rear and reduce the level of advanced presence through the formation of virtual remote headquarters and other controls.
At the same time, it should be noted that, being at the moment a real tool for enhancing the combat capabilities, the network-centrism from this does not become a panacea for solving all problems. This is confirmed by the state of the community of military experts in the United States, which is divided into supporters who seriously doubt and oppose such a concept. The latter believe that technology occupies too much space in the American military strategy, wrongfully imposing its own logic on it. Moreover, as Dr. Alexander Kopylov, Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor Alexander Kopylov, noted in his work “On the Weaknesses of the American Concept of Network-centric Wars (Operations), Pentagon hopes that innovation will bring victory to the battlefield just as they make a profit in business. , untenable. The dominance of technocratism in the form of the concept of network-centric war leads to a number of mistakes. Among them: reassessment of a person’s ability to adequately process a large amount of conflicting information; simplified vision of the enemy through the reduction of his strategy to asymmetric actions; the unjustified bureaucratization of the command and control process and the insufficient consideration of the changing nature of the battle finally, an explicit or implicit premise that a military victory is the self-sufficient goal of the entire campaign.
There are really enough problems at the present stage, and one of the burning issues discussed by specialists is what will happen if the adversary uses electronic countermeasures to disable lines, communication networks and transfer data. The article “Network-centric front” cited an example of network-centricism in the civil sphere and its subsequent effect, when the heads of two families were given the task of paying for utilities. To do this, each of them had the same potential in the amount of 5000 rubles. One task was performed in the old manner, filling out receipts, going to the bank and defending the queue. Another, an advanced user of information technology, put his potential (5000 rubles) on a bank card and made a payment at any convenient time without leaving home and, most importantly, quickly. It turns out that both subjects with the same potentials and all other things being equal ideal conditions performed the same task, but with different effectiveness, that is, with different degree of realization of potential possibilities. At the same time, the second test subject also saved on interest for a commission.
So what can happen if an advanced user loses his advantage in information technology? As a matter of fact, nothing, since he will simply switch to the fulfillment of the tasks by the old, grandfathering methods, comparing in possibilities with his unmoved opponent. A confirmation of this was the incident that occurred in August 2011 of the year while working out issues of repelling aggression from North Korea at the joint US-Korean command and staff exercises. During the exercise, problems arose in the operation of the equipment of the advanced DCGS information collection, processing and distribution system. The reason was a failure in the software. The officers participating in the exercises lost contact with the battlefield, ceased to control their troops and could not see the enemy. The computer screens went out. Tragedy? Definitely not!
Americans are pragmatic and understand all the advantages of this approach. This incident was for them only an additional opportunity to work out emergency actions of personnel in a difficult radio-electronic environment. This means that our military specialists should not make the tragedy out of a possible opposition of the enemy, refusing the real preferences of the informatization process of warfare.
PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES
Despite the fact that the author of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Ogarkov was the author of the idea of another revolution in military affairs, the large-scale implementation of information technologies in the military sphere began in the United States. New regulations, equipment and weapons have been repeatedly tested by the Americans in various wars and armed conflicts. We have a little bit of change after more than 25 years. For example, according to foreign analysts, during the war with the Georgian aggressors, the "good old" flaws were once again revealed in the Russian Armed Forces.
Technically and morally outdated complexes or difficult-to-target reconnaissance means without the ability to quickly transfer the collected information. Problems with communication and data transmission systems, which led to the impossibility of effective management of subordinate formations. It is a well-known fact that Russian officers had to resort to the help of correspondents who had cell and satellite telephones. The lack of any coordination and interaction between the air force and ground forces, which did not allow the formation of a truly united group of forces. Lack of high-precision weapons, which were hardly used in that war, since there were only a few copies. Another problem was the insufficient number of carriers capable of using such weapons. On airplanes, helicopters, tanks sometimes there were no infrared cameras, no night vision devices, no friend or foe recognition systems, or navigation equipment. Inconsistency with the modern realities of the theory of operational art, which is still based on the old views of traditional large-scale ground operations, and not on modern concepts involving the massive use of high-precision weapons of warfare.
Similar problems were highlighted in the works of domestic experts, who indicated that the effectiveness of the actions of the units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was sometimes reduced to zero due to the lack of a secretive stable link, and in some cases - a link in general.
At present, the first movements in the form of an attempt to “digitize” the control system are already occurring. But this is only the beginning. An integral condition for the implementation of the new concept is the deployment of computer networks and the introduction of information technologies, that is, modern hardware and software systems, tools for automating the processes of preparing and making decisions, storing, processing and bringing information, and much more. But the most important thing is to understand what we generally expect from network centrism.
Perhaps we are waiting for new ways to use the forces and means of warfare, which seem to have not yet been developed, and the reason lies in the fact that there is often a lack of not only an understanding of the essence of the phenomenon, but also its necessity and importance. Nevertheless, practical proposals that require close attention and study are already being received. For example, specialists from one of the institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences developed the model of “Network-centric control of group motion of objects through configuration of quasi-force fields”. The model substantiates the possibility of transition from remote control to automatic fulfillment of missions through network-centric self-organization of all vehicles in a complex and rapidly changing environment (taking into account active opposition from both traditional air defense systems and enemy UAV groups).
What are the advantages of such an application of UAVs or other robotic means of warfare in a single space of network-centric control? According to the developers, they are as follows:
- distributed placement on the means of warfare a lot more and variety of means of multi-channel information gathering, counteraction and destruction;
- a significant increase in the accuracy of determining the coordinates of moving targets (due to their multiple determination by remote from each other aircraft (robots) and subsequent processing of information in a single algorithmic space (the effect of sounding with a large base);
- the possibility of concentrating distributed multi-channel means of detection, high-precision targeting and destruction by means of dynamically self-organizing accumulation of them at a certain place and point in time;
- dramatically increase the likelihood of successful completion of the mission while minimizing the consumption of ammunition, its own losses, which is achieved due to high quality control and maximum coordination of the combat capabilities of the means of warfare.
In addition, the institute's specialists have solutions related to the development of a new element base and its architecture, which provides qualitatively new opportunities for the full-scale solution of network-centric control problems in globally connected network resources. At the same time, such solutions, according to scientists, do not require new technologies for designing and manufacturing ultra-large integrated circuits (VLSI). According to them, an experimental batch of a prototype of the element base with a fundamentally new “control computer on chip” architecture supporting a single network of network-centric control can be implemented on available technologies for designing and manufacturing VLSI with design standards 65 – 45 nm for two to three years relatively low cost.
COLLECTING OTHERS HARD, BUT NEED
In order to create opportunities and the very prerequisites for the implementation of the network-centric concept in the Russian army, it is necessary to solve a complex task within the framework of both the Armed Forces and the country as a whole. This includes the search for new technological solutions, the transfer of the military-industrial complex to an innovative development path, the clarification of charters and manuals, the development of new forms and methods of using groups of troops, and training of personnel to work with modern hardware and software.
First of all, it is advisable to step up work on creating truly unified control bodies, developing modern algorithms for their work in solving various combat missions, forming a list of means that we plan to link into a network, understanding why and, most importantly, why it is needed. Otherwise, we will spend a lot of money on the fashionable trend and eventually we will step on the American rake, when “unexpectedly” the unsolvable problem of combining these separate, independent networks and reticulums will arise. Unfortunately, the fears are already coming true. This was reflected in the report of Colonel-General Arkady Bakhin, commander of the troops of the Western Military District, “The organization of command and control of the military district of the new organization”, announced at the general meeting of the 28 Academy in January 2012. According to the speaker, 17 ACS equipment has been deployed at the command center of the Joint Strategic Command, which are not related to each other.
In addition, it is necessary to understand that for the informatization of warfare to put the equipment a little, we must also learn how to competently use it. That is why it is advisable to continue the active implementation of information technology in the daily activities of the Armed Forces. Forcibly introduce an electronic document management system so that commanders, as well as all personnel, receive the necessary knowledge and experience in working with modern information systems. Their actions should be worked out to automatism - as with a TV, cell phone, computer. Only in this case, information systems and tools will turn from unknown expensive equipment into a real helper in solving combat missions.
There is a lot of work in this direction, as there is a clear lag in the level of informatization of our Armed Forces from similar processes in the American army. There is not even a full-fledged military-scientific library. At the same time, not only is the digitization of the works of military scientists from previous years not taking place, but new materials are not being introduced, which only aggravates the situation. For example, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov did not find a single work on numerous domestic military-oriented resources (including the official website of the Ministry of Defense). At the same time, translations of most of our marshal's works are posted on the websites of military-scientific institutions of foreign countries. Use, American military scientists, promote your science, ensure the development of innovative of your Armed Forces!
In the interest of accelerating the processes of informatization and the implementation of network-centric principles in the RF Armed Forces, it is advisable to intensify work in the following key areas:
- clarification of the essence of the studied phenomena and the formation of a unified terminological base;
- the search for ways of practical implementation of the network-centric principles, the development of new methods of using groups of forces, as well as the development of modern tools to increase the effectiveness of information and analytical activities;
- development and approval of a family of conceptual documents on informatization of types and types of troops;
- transition to an electronic document management system, as well as popularization of informatization in the Armed Forces;
- engaging specialists from industry and research organizations of the Russian Academy of Sciences who themselves come out with practical suggestions;
- the creation of modern discussion platforms, as well as the formation of constantly working groups from representatives of the Ministry of Defense, science and industry in promising areas of research.
There is no doubt that we will not receive a ready-made short-term solution. Nevertheless, the forward movement will finally begin.
Information