The birth of the Soviet missile defense system. Zelenograd and Leningrad

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Source: Retro Zelenograd / vk.com

History Strange as it may seem, Zelenograd began in Leningrad and was associated with those very punchy Americans - Staros and Berg, about whose adventures in the USA and the Czech Republic we have already written. This story is very complex, confusing, full of lies, grievances and omissions, we will try to reconstruct it in general terms.

American couple


We stopped at the fact that at the beginning of 1956 this couple flew from Prague to Leningrad, where they headed the SL-998 laboratory created in OKB-11 of the aviation industry (later SKB-2, then KB-2, LKB and, finally, Svetlana ). Ustinov himself (already known to us from active work in the field of missile defense) visited the laboratory and gave her carte blanche to develop new military computers.



Staros and Berg were highly educated engineers and, naturally, were aware of the work in the framework of Tinkertoy and the miniaturization of electronic components, and, as far as is known, they were the first in the USSR to begin domestic research in this direction. As a result, in 1959, a miniature computer, unique for the Union, was developed (not yet on hybrid circuits, but rather on miniature cards) - UM-1, intended, according to the creators, as a control machine or on-board computer.

The car did not go into the series for objective reasons - numerous improvements were needed, and the element base left much to be desired, nevertheless, it was the first attempt in the USSR to radically reduce the size of a computer (recall that at the same time in research institutes and ministries, lamp monsters BESM and "Strela", in the best case, there were samples of transistor machines of not particularly smaller dimensions).

Then a whole series of almost simultaneous and interconnected events happened, which is rather difficult to present in the correct chronological order.

Around the same time as Staros, but in Moscow, in OKB-1 Lukin (also a pioneer of Soviet machines already known to us, who was working at that time on a bunch of topics, including missile defense and modular computers), the bright idea of ​​miniaturizing a computer was visited. Lukin was one of three people in the country (along with Reimerov and Staros) who immediately realized the importance of integration. He started traditionally for the Union - he instructed his collaborator A. A. Kolosov (who speaks three languages) to study and generalize Western experience, which resulted in his monograph "Questions of Microelectronics", published in 1960 and became the primary source on the topic for the entire Moscow design school ... At the same time, Kolosov created in OKB-1 the country's first specialized laboratory of microelectronics, designed to study an area where miniaturization was more important than anywhere else - onboard computers of missiles and aircraft.

It is to this laboratory that an improved prototype of Staros is sent for review - the UM-2B vehicle, designed for a radar system for measuring the relative position of objects (as part of the project of a semi-automatic assembly complex in orbit for spacecraft under the code "Soyuz"). This is how Staros first appeared in Moscow and in the future it will play an important role.

In general, there is very little information on the topic of on-board computers of spaceships in the USSR - the topic was monstrously classified (even more than missile defense / radars and other military equipment), the primary source is perhaps the unique collection of memoirs "The first on-board computers for space applications and something from permanent memory »German Veniaminovich Noskin, who worked first with the father of Soviet artillery Grabin, and later with Korolev on the creation of modules for the study of Mars and Venus. The collection is available as pdf, we quote further several quotes from there.

The level of secrecy was prohibitive - in particular, the developers of the "Calculator" from OKB-1 initially did not even know about the existence of the Leningrad SKB-2 Staros!

Terms of reference for the creation of an on-board radar system of rendezvous and processing of on-board measurement data was issued by the design department in 1961 to one Leningrad enterprise, which included a fairly independent design bureau - KB-2, headed by FG ​​Staros. Moreover, at that time, our OKB did not know anything about the existence of this KB-2 (and about FG Staros) ...
Soon after sending the conclusion on the "Block" project, FG Staros came to us at OKB-1. We did not know anything about this man, except what was reported about him in the project, as the chief designer of the UM-2B. Before his arrival, they talked to us, put some fog on his personality (though the one who made this fog didn’t know anything, except that he was an American), warned us not to be very talkative. … We all made a very good impression from communication with this interesting person. Before us was not only a leader and a specialist in his field, but also an obsessed optimist of the victory of microelectronics in instrument making. Discussing technical issues on UM-2B, Philip Georgievich convinced us that in five years the computing part of UM-2B will be the size of a matchbox. Moreover, his whole appearance, dark burning eyes, correct, almost without an accent, Russian speech did not leave the interlocutors in doubt about his correctness.

Please remember this characteristic, which was also confirmed by the famous academician Chertok.

It will be useful to us when we describe the misadventures of Staros and his attempts to promote domestic microelectronics, as well as modern assessments of his role from some odious researchers. Note that this impression was formed not only by people from OKB-1. This is what Staros' student Mark Halperin, Doctor of Technical Sciences, professor, laureate of the USSR State Prize recalls (Control Engineering, May 2017).

I would like to note the absolutely amazing relationship that Philip Georgievich developed with a number of prominent people in Soviet science and the military industry. First of all, we are talking about Academician Axel Ivanovich Berg, General Designers Andrei Nikolaevich Tupolev and Sergei Pavlovich Korolev, as well as the President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR Mstislav Vsevolodovich Keldysh. All these people treated Philip Georgievich with great warmth and respect.

Returning to UM-2B, let us recall that the element base (in terms of how miniature it is possible to make hybrid circuits) in the USSR lagged significantly behind the American one, and OKB-1 was aware of IBM's work on an on-board computer for Gemini (we have already mentioned it in previous articles):

In 1961, there was no universal type onboard computer in the United States yet, but Burroughs IBM, North American Aviation developed and planned tests of experimental models of onboard computers ... I must say that UM-2B for solving practically the same tasks that were assigned to Gemini, according to computing capabilities was close to IBM, but significantly lost in weight and power. It can be assumed that, if the developer of the radar complex, which included KB-2, had not been abandoned, it could have been minimized in terms of operational parameters ... But, as has happened more than once in previous years, the personal ambitions of high-ranking leaders prevailed over technical expediency. As a result, in domestic spacecraft, the implementation of maneuvering and docking tasks until the end of the 70s was solved using analog devices.

It is about how Shokin, who pathologically hated the American Staros, made colossal efforts so that both him and the UM project would be forgotten forever, preferring cloning of microcircuits from TI to these developments (we will talk about this later).

Leaving a little aside from the main line of the narrative, we note that the UM-2B served as a prototype for the on-board computer "Calculator" E1963-1488 ordered in 21 by B. Ye. Chertok (as a result, which became the first serial computer in the USSR on GIS of its own design). Before him, OKB-1 built a prototype - "Cobra-1", which was long and persistently advertised to the military as a computer for missiles and aircraft. Standard Soviet-style PR was used: the car was loaded into a Volga and taken to officials, hitting them with a computer that fits into the trunk, and even hiding under a tablecloth and turning on a music-generating program when one of the high-ranking officials visited the laboratory. about which funny memories have been preserved.

To demonstrate the car, they put it in the hall on a table covered with a cloth tablecloth. Leading experts BV Raushenbakh, VP Legostaev and others came. The program was inserted, and the car began to play a merry march! The incredulous MV Melnikov came closer, lifted the tablecloth to see who was playing so well.


The father of all Soviet on-board computers is Vychisitel-1, 1964, a technological sample of the Ufa plant. Photo: 1500py470.livejournal.com


On-board computer "Salyut-1" with a control panel, developed for the L1 lunar mission, but never useful. Onboard computer "Argon-11S", which was on board a series of spacecraft "Zond", intended for exploration of the moon. Remains of the board from her in the museum of the plant
"Angstrem", GIS is clearly visible. This board belonged to "Zond-6", the first in the world to fly around the Moon in 1968 and took color photographs of the Earth and the Moon from space (which is funny - neither magnetic tape for telemetry, nor photographic film in the USSR was close in quality for such an application , so I had to use American Ampex and Kodak, respectively). Unfortunately, due to a whim of the management, changes were made to the design of the generally successful series of probes this time, which led to an emergency firing of a parachute at an altitude of more than 5 km; as a result, the Zond-6 fell and crashed, but the films miraculously survived. Photo https://1500py470.livejournal.com, Angstrem and GN Noskin.

However, neither Cobra nor Vychisitel got into the planes, but they became the founders of a whole series of domestic space on-board computers - "Argon", "Salyut" and others, whose history is still waiting for its researchers.

Having looked at such cases, Kolosov is overshadowed by the idea of ​​creating the country's first single large center for microelectronic development, with its own research institutes, factories, etc. With this idea, he goes to a completely amazing person, an angel and a demon of domestic computerization at the same time - the already mentioned Alexander Ivanovich Shokin.

Shokin


This is a completely cult personality - a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, later twice Hero of Socialist Labor, five-time laureate of the Order of Lenin, holder of as many as two Stalin and one Lenin prizes and the permanent minister of the electronics industry. Shokin is considered almost the second (after the notorious Beria) "best manager" of the USSR, the father of the domestic Silicon Valley - Zelenograd, the father of all domestic microelectronics and the man who literally dragged the lagging Union into a bright electronic future, on his shoulders, like an Atlas, carrying the whole burden of organizing the production of microcircuits.

The reality, as always, is not so unambiguous, he was a villain no less than a hero, and then we will try to figure out why.

Shokin was the son of a lieutenant; in 1927 he graduated from technical school with a degree in insurance, worked as a mechanic at the Precision Electromechanics Plant, in 1932 became a candidate member of the CPSU (b). It seems that in his youth Shokin was simply the embodiment of everything that was required in the USSR from a party official - in any case, his political career was faster than the commercial one - that of Steve Jobs.

Once in the party, he immediately ascends to the head of the workshop and already in 1934 for a year leaves for the United States on a business trip from the plant, and not just where, but to the Sperry Corporation! After his return, he was transferred to the shipbuilding region to a similar position as party boss, and in 1938 he became the chief engineer of the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry, a little later he was suddenly retrained from shipbuilders to an expert in radars and received the post of head of the industrial department of the Council for Radar under the State Defense Committee of the USSR, in 1946 he grew before the deputy chairman of Committee No. 3 under the USSR Council of Ministers, three years later he was already deputy minister of the USSR communications industry, then the first deputy minister of the USSR radio engineering industry and finally (not yet the pinnacle of his career!) Chairman of the USSR State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers on electronic technology.

Shokin did not rise alone, but with the support of a close friend - also already familiar to us Minister of Radio Electronics Kalmykov (the same one who wholeheartedly cut down the projects of all computers for missile defense, and about this and his role in the defeat of the scientific school of Kartsev and Yuditsky, we too let's talk later).

Kalmykov


The biography and career of Kalmykov is practically a copy of Shokin (they are even almost the same age). Exactly the same real proletarian family without admixture of enemies of the people, the same technical school (though the profession of an electrician). Exactly the same rapid advance along the party line - the head of the shop at Moskabel, a senior engineer, and 5 years later suddenly - the chief engineer of the Research Institute-10 of the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry (on this basis, they and Shokin agreed), in 1943 he also climbed into Council for Radar under the State Defense Committee, in 1949 - already head of the Main Directorate of Jet Armaments of the USSR Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry. And a very sudden career turn for an electrician: in 1954 - Minister of the USSR Radio Engineering Industry!

They did not offend him either, the Stalin Prize was given only one, like the Hero of Socialist Labor, but as many as seven were hung with the Orders of Lenin. However, this is not surprising, according to the old Soviet tradition, the chief received an order for any successful actions of any subordinate, because the main thing is not an invention, the main thing is a sensible party leadership! Hero of Socialist Labor Kalmykov was given, by the way, for Gagarin's flight, and one can only guess what, in general, he had to do with this.

In the State Committee for Radio Electronics, founded by him (where he immediately became chairman in addition to the ministerial chair), he brought his friend Shokin as a deputy, and it was to this couple that in 1960 the residents of Riga came to bow with their P12-2. Kalmykov and Shokin looked at the microcircuit, nodded their heads, graciously allowed to start mass production, and then they simply completely forgot about this project, never again interested in it. Something bigger was at stake - the creation of a new State Committee (and, in the long term, an entire ministry).

Shokin and Kalmykov, like invisible spirits, go through the entire history of domestic electronics - they are responsible for the attack of clones and the massive copying of Western microcircuits, for the removal of Yuditsky and Kartsev, the dispersal of their groups and the closure of all their developments, for the sad fate of Staros and Berg, and for many - a lot more. In addition, in themselves they were quite heavy people, with a hypertrophied sense of their own importance, and embodied the standard of the highest Soviet official. Party nominees who skillfully vacillated along with the party line and escaped all the repressions of the 1930-1950s, on the contrary, are rising higher every year.

A simple locksmith who became the minister of the electronics industry and an electrician who became the minister of radio industry is the embodiment of Lenin's thesis that even a cook can learn how to manage the state (alas, as we will see later, in order to manage something effectively, it is not bad to have at least basic knowledge in subject area).

Committee


Kolosov brings to Shokin the idea of ​​the need for a powerful full-fledged center for microelectronic research. Shokin clings to her with a stranglehold, as he realizes that the budget of a whole new industry is at stake, where he can be the sole owner (the rate, as we will see, was fully justified - as a result, he became a minister, entered the Central Committee and received a whole heap of orders , prizes and awards of all degrees, by the way, fate did not hurt Kolosov either, he became the owner of the rare in the USSR title of "chief designer of the first category", like S. P. Korolev, A. N. Tupolev and A. A. Raspletin).

Shokin, with the support of Kalmykov, pushes through the creation in 1961 of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on electronic technology and becomes its chairman, and the creation of the GKET was also not without purely Soviet incidents. The main and fierce opponent of the creation of the Committee was the well-known Anastas Mikoyan, the powerful First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. It got to the point that he personally discouraged Shokin from doing anything related to electronics at all:

"Why You Need It? Do you know you are tackling the impossible? This cannot be created in our country. Don't you understand that now everyone will blame their sins on your committee? "

- according to the recollections of Shokin himself.

Did Mikoyan really not believe so much in Soviet electronics?

No, just for the GKET, the government assigned a luxurious building in Kitaysky Passage, on the squares of the Institute of World Economy, and the IME was headed by Mikoyan's relative, A. A. Arzumanyan. Hearing about the eviction, he asked a relative to intervene and cover up the entire movement, but Shokin was an unyielding veteran of party battles with twenty years of experience and demolished Mikoyan's resistance like a house of cards.

As a result, the Committee was created, now it was necessary to knock out the funds, and this could only be done through the Secretary General Khrushchev himself. For this it was required not only to impress him, but to bring him into a state of complete delight. Fortunately, Khrushchev was an emotional person and was impressed quite easily, but he needed an effective presentation and people who were able to organize it. So Shokin's gaze fell on Staros and Berg, who had just appeared in OKB-1.

Shokin, as we have already mentioned, was a seasoned veteran and professional of the Soviet party PR, and he immediately began a siege of the secretary general in accordance with all the rules of the subtle Soviet game. First of all, at the beginning of 1962, he obtained the consent of Khrushchev to hold a small exhibition with a report during a break in the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The event took place, and Khrushchev agreed to consider the proposal more closely.

Then in March 1962, at the annual review of architectural projects in the Red Hall of the Moscow City Council, after a report on serious imbalances in the construction of Sputnik (the future Zelenograd, originally planned as a textile center), Khrushchev said: "We need to talk about microelectronics." The conversation took place and the main trump card of Shokin, Staros, came to Sputnik for reconnaissance. He, in turn, had his own trump card - finished and ready for the UM-1NX series (where “NH” meant Nikita Khrushchev, an innate American talent for advertising affected).

It was a kind of analogue of PDP machines - the first Soviet mini-computer, with an original architecture. It appeared, of course, 5 years later than the PDP-1 and was released in a small series, but the main computer unit easily fit on the table, and the entire machine with the periphery was in one standard 175x53x90 cm rack.In addition to this machine, developments were carried out in SKB-1 ultra-small for those times (placed in the ear or fountain pen) radios on micro-assemblies.

Considering all the factors - the authoritative aura of American developers (who in those years looked almost like living elves from unknown lands, and Khrushchev, of course, was aware of their origin), the presence of several good demo samples - a mini-computer, mini -radio, etc., the innate charisma of Staros and Berg and their truly American talent to promote anything to anyone, SKB-2 was chosen to demonstrate the prospects of integral technology.

A small touch to the Soviet historiography - the surviving witnesses of those events are still quarreling among themselves, trying to establish for certain - who should get the glory of Zelenograd's father, and the old academicians do not hesitate to water opponents, even the deceased, with selected mud. For example, as we have seen, those who worked with Staros and Berg had a great deal of respect and appreciation for their talents and contributions. However, as soon as we found out in 1999 that they were actually from the United States, several devastating patriotic articles appeared, popularly explaining that they, in general, did not know all their lives even from which end to take a soldering iron, not to mention development of electronics.

For the honor of the founding of Zelenograd in different sources, Staros and Berg themselves fought first, then Kolosov began to claim that he had invented everything, together with K.I. Martyushov, and Malin in his memoirs stated that all of the above are nobody and there is no way to call them , and everything was done by him and his colleagues from NII-35. Berg called B. Sedunov as a witness, about whom, in turn, B. Malashevich wrote that he did not see Zelenograd in general and did not know anything, but in fact Shokin invented everything alone, along the way once again doused Staros with slops and Berg.

As a result, it is no longer possible to establish anything for sure, and the last witnesses get heart attacks, foaming at the mouth, proving their case.

Staros himself was an ambitious man and hatched purely American plans to create a full-fledged research corporation like Bell Labs, non-state, unplanned, self-sufficient, developing computers and producing them in the millions a year. Naturally, such a seditious thought was nipped in the bud by the Soviet leadership. Some modern researchers have spent a lot of paper trying to show that this idea is indescribably flawed in nature, while stubbornly ignoring the fact that only such a concept allowed the United States to literally ascend to unattainable technical heights.

Microradio receiver in Khrushchev's ear


Be that as it may, Khrushchev's visit was organized and played out like clockwork. Vigorous preparation and rehearsals lasted for almost a month. In addition to the desktop computer named in his honor, which was carried in front of the secretary general and compared to the antediluvian lamp monster “Strela”, Staros, without any hesitation, deftly stuck the earpiece of a micro-radio receiver (the same prototype “Micro”) into Khrushchev's ear. He, however, barely caught only two local stations, but for comparison, Khrushchev was given an estimate of the dimensions of the ancient tube radio "Rodina".

The general secretary was indescribably delighted, studied everything, asked everyone, rejoiced at the presented mini-radio like a child. Wasting no time, they slipped him a decree on the organization of a scientific town in Zelenograd, and it was in the bag. The plan worked, four tons of gold were even allocated for the creation of the center for the purchase of foreign technological lines and scientific equipment.


The same UM-1NX and, presumably, modules from it. Photo: 1500py470.livejournal.com/, ru.bmstu.wiki and controlengrussia.com

This is how the entire remaining galaxy of our microcircuit factories was opened: in 1962 - NIIMP with the Komponent plant and NIITM with Elion; in 1963 - NIITT with Angstrem and NIIMV with Elma; in 1964 - NIIME with Mikron and NIIFP; in 1965 - MIET with the Proton plant; in 1969 - the Specialized Computing Center (SVC) with the Logika plant (completed in 1975).

By the beginning of 1971, almost 13 thousand people worked in the field of microelectronics in Zelenograd. In 1966, Elma produces 15 types of special materials (that is, raw materials for IP), and Elion produces 20 types of technological and control and measuring equipment (although most of them still had to be purchased abroad, bypassing numerous embargoes). In 1969 Angstrem and Mikron produced over 200 types of ICs, and by 1975, 1020 types of ICs. And they were all clones ...


Staros advertises Zelenograd to Khrushchev. In the photo on the right - the fathers of Zelenograd, Lukin stands out in his unchanged hat and next to the right is his friend Davlet Yuditsky. Photo: controlengrussia.com

What happened to the Americans?


You can build different theories about their purely scientific merits, but Staros and Berg were, like worthy sons of the United States, excellent, as they would say now as marketers - people who were sorely lacking in the Soviet industry at all times. Only narrow-minded people can think that there is nowhere to apply marketing without a free market - in fact, there was a market in the USSR, only in a perverted form: instead of advertising finished goods to the consumer and selling them for money, Soviet developers advertised not yet ready (and often not turning into ready-made) ) products to officials of the State Planning Commission, knocking out the same money. Staros and Berg fulfilled their role perfectly - they advertised the upcoming microelectronics center at the highest level to the country's chief official, and in such a way that Khrushchev did not hesitate for a second, signing everything that Shokin brought him, and this is what the reward awaited them.

Staros dreamed of his company (as his critics now slyly write, he “with his utopian projects did not fully understand the Soviet realities”), or at least the chair of the center's director, in the creation of which he played one of the main roles. But, naturally, after it was played, Shokin no longer needed him, and Zelenograd was headed by his protégé and protege - Fedor Viktorovich Lukin. Offended Staros in early October 1964 wrote a letter to Nikita Khrushchev, accusing Shokin of ingratitude, but on October 14, the Politburo made a small secret coup, and the violent leader who had finally gotten everyone was quietly removed in favor of the peaceful and docile Brezhnev. Shokin immediately took advantage of the fall of the mighty patron of Staros and literally four months later, by personal ministerial order, stripped him of all posts and dismissed him.

The unfortunate emigrant also made other powerful enemies, besides Shokin, who hated Staros' American individualism and once told him:

You are not creating, the Communist Party is creating!

In particular, the first secretary of the Deningrad city committee of the CPSU Romanov (for those who are not aware of the Soviet table of ranks, this roughly corresponds to the post of the mayor of St. Petersburg, a politically very significant figure).

Romanov took up arms against him because Staros (again, in the best traditions of the American school) took people into his design bureau not for their correct origin (that is, workers 'and peasants' strictly Russian nationality), but for their talents and even (oh, horror ) dared to recruit and promote Jews!

As a result, after several successful developments (for the implementation of which, however, we had to fight to the death - the ordered onboard computers "Knot" for the Navy were officially adopted almost ten years after their creation, when they had already become hopelessly outdated) SKB-2 was finally dispersed , and the disgraced development manager was exiled to Vladivostok, to the Institute of Automation and Control Processes of the Far Eastern Scientific Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences, where he stayed until his death. In addition to UM-1NKh, Staros created a family of magnetic drives KUB, an advanced machine UM-2 and a small computer "Electronics K-200" and K-201, which weighed only 120 kg. These computers were the only ones whose architecture the Americans later announced (Control Engineering, 1966 under the heading Desktop):

Remarkable for its size and power consumption ... It would not be considered original in the West, but the appearance of such machines in the USSR is extremely unusual ... The first Soviet-made computer, which can be considered well-developed and surprisingly modern.

Staros ran 4 times for a member of the Academy, but no one wanted hostility with Shokin, and all 4 times his candidacy was rejected almost unanimously, and a few hours before the 5th vote, the problem was resolved by itself - Staros died. Berg, on the other hand, completely disappeared from the horizon, no longer worked with computers, after the collapse of the USSR he left for the United States and tried to restore the history of events, telling it to reporters, for which he was repeatedly branded in domestic sources as the last liar and twice a traitor.

Berg, taking advantage of the boundless publicity, did not care about the reliability ... The fattest duck was an all-perverting film with Berg's participation ... deceitful and insulting for the country ... Sarant and Barr are not scientists, but electricians with negligible experience ... who also abandoned electrical engineering ... Sarant spent two years doing small construction hack [you might think he personally reported to the author of the book what kind of work he does in the USA], and Barr worked part-time wherever he had to ... Having lived most of their lives in the USSR, they were never able to realize their ambitions in it ...

And a few more pages of rather mild characteristics given by Malashevich to his colleagues. Other researchers sarcastically object:

Unfortunately, even now there are many individuals of various caliber, ill-wishers who are haunted by the thought that the founder of an entire industry of the Great Country of Victory Socialism can be considered someone with an incomprehensible past ...

So figure it out after someone who was doing what in the USSR.

Berg died in Moscow on August 1, 1998, and a year later his story finally became the property of Russian readers.

How did Zelenograd come to the idea of ​​total copying?

We will answer this question in the final part of our study of microelectronics, after which we will return to the works of Yuditsky.
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40 comments
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  1. -6
    July 14 2021
    Don't give a damn about the minus, the article contains half a word about missile defense, but far-fetched "partocrats, haters of computers and Stavros with Jews"! The author of the Mlechin-Radzinsky laurel is clearly not given peace.
    1. +12
      July 14 2021
      in order to manage something effectively, it is good to have at least basic knowledge in the subject area

      And now we have absolutely everything they rule - like deep professionals completely with specialized education ??
      1. +1
        July 14 2021
        Quote: paul3390
        And now we have absolutely everything they rule - like deep professionals completely with specialized education ??
        And it doesn't matter, the main thing for the author is that the "scoop" has become obsolete, competition and effective managers rule, just like in the "West" he adores.
      2. +4
        July 14 2021
        Of course! Roskosmos is an example for you!
        1. +2
          July 14 2021
          Quote: vadim dok
          Of course! Roskosmos is an example for you!

          And the furniture maker as the Minister of Defense sad
    2. +4
      July 15 2021
      "... Shokin and Kalmykov, like invisible spirits, go through the entire history of domestic electronics - they are responsible for the attack of clones and the massive copying of Western microcircuits, for ..."
      *
      I have read this, and I will not read further. There was a feeling, from the very beginning of the cycle of these articles, that the author would not understand the "essence" of the topic. Alas, that's how it happened ...

      Yes, the author "shoveled" a huge array of textures, and diligently laid it out for the reader. The chronology of the plot, too, is presented quite fully and in detail. Alas, this, albeit fascinating, is nothing more than a "description", that is, a listing of EXTERNAL manifestations, with a not very competent attempt, on their basis, to proceed to "broad generalizations" ...

      Now there is no time to oppose in detail and in detail, but I will say a couple of phrases ...

      The very phrase copying "Western microcircuits" is incorrect. Yes, there were, in fact, no "Western microcircuits" during the THAT period (and this is 7 - 9 years, for the future). And there were AMERICAN microcircuits, with UNDISPUTABLE American LEADERSHIP in the development and implementation of microelectronic TECHNOLOGIES OF SERIAL PRODUCTION of semiconductor devices and microcircuits. And the "copying" of American IP and PP, then the whole developed world was engaged, as well as the development of American technologies for their production. And not only the USSR and the "Soviet nomenklatura" involved in the process ...

      There was Feyerchild, which for a long time set the tone and pace in the field of new technological solutions, and there were Siemens, Philips, Seskosem, Motorola, etc., immediately adopting these innovations and launching them into series .. ...

      And thank God that in the USSR during THAT period there were "shokins" who did not miss the MAIN direction and PROVIDED Soviet parity with the West (here, to say "West", it is quite appropriate ...) in this area.

      In general, there was not a certain "copying" of microcircuits, but the DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEWEST, ADVANCED SERIAL TECHNOLOGIES of their production. WITH PARALLEL IMPROVEMENT of individual elements of the technical process.

      I repeat, THEN, the WHOLE world "followed the Americans," including the Japanese. Which, began to "separate", in terms of the organization of production and the produced nomenclature (about the reasons, it is necessary to write separately) only somewhere, in the late 60s - early 70s ...

      By the way, in terms of GIS, the Soviet manufacturers did not fail here, before the Americans, after the "warm-up" series "219" and "235", releasing in the mid-70s, a fairly expanded series "435", known as "Trill -Ruby". On the basis of GIS, a very extensive family of series of active filters was also created ...
      1. +2
        July 15 2021
        In short, Shokin understood perfectly well that in order for Zelenorgrad, the head in the field of development of technologies for the production of LSI and VLSI (based on MOS and CMOS technologies), to "work", ALL "rest" , which provided, in particular, I for control systems, storage and processing of information, including in the missile defense system, the entire "periphery" ...

        By the way, the "analog" direction has not gone anywhere either. And it won't go away ...
        1. +1
          July 15 2021
          For those who want to get an elementary, but fairly objective, idea of ​​the essence of the problem, I would recommend S. Murog, "System design of very large integrated circuits". And let the name not scare anyone far from technology. Further pages 19! Go "no need, but there is no need to read the main material either. But the PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD microelectronics (in dynamics, problems and without" formulas "...) the author outlined clearly and intelligibly enough. ...

          I will quote a paragraph ...

          "... the protection of the IS production method is not perfect due to the possibility of using the so-called" reverse engineering ". The latter consists in analyzing the competitor's IS, as a result of which any techniques can be identified that can improve the characteristics of the products under development. quite simple: it only requires a microscope, a small amount of acid to sequentially remove the layers of the circuit and a camera to shoot the layers.
          The existence of reverse engineering is very troubling for manufacturers who develop NEW LSIs and spend several million dollars on their development, since their competitors can produce copies of these crystals without corresponding royalties to the patent owner. In 1979, some firms tried to amend the copyright law to protect the way the IP was made. However, STRANGE as it may seem, this attempt MEETED ACTIVE OPPOSITION on the part of MANY SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING FIRMS, believing that they WILL LOSE MORE than they WILL ACQUIRE by adopting these amendments "In connection with what, in those days" "...) reverse engineering is a WIDE COMMON PRACTICE."

          Is everything clear? .. This "socket practice", allegedly "destroying domestic thought", THEN was engaged not only in the entire developed world, but MORE THAN, the Americans themselves competed with each other in "their own clearing" ...

          ALL "fought" from each other and did not "complain", because they understood well that today the idea and technology were "stolen" from you, and tomorrow (LITERALLY TOMORROW ...) YOU WILL HAVE to do the same. Otherwise, you will fly into the pipe ...

          By the way, the USSR produced, by the beginning of the 80s, its own original LSI and VLSI ...
          1. 0
            July 16 2021
            "But Osokin's group brilliantly solved the problem, and not at all the way the Americans did it, working not with silicon, but with germanium mezatransistors! Unlike Texas Instruments, Riga residents immediately created a real microcircuit and a successful technical process for it from three consecutive exposures , in fact, they did it simultaneously with the Noyce group, in an absolutely original way and received a product no less valuable from a commercial point of view. "
            ***************************************************************************
            It was from the "commercial" (or rather, from the point of view of PROFITABLE, SERIES production of HIGHLY RELIABLE microcircuits) the path taken by Yu.V. Osokin was ABSOLUTELY UNPROPECTIVE.

            He worked on germanium, and this material (the second, after silicon in terms of breadth of application in semiconductor technologies and until recently), is not bad for the production of diodes and transistors. Incl. and for high currents. But for the production of microcircuits, it is completely unsuitable ...

            How many transistors did Yu.V. Osokin's first IC based on germacnia have? .. If someone has forgotten, the author, I suppose, will remind ...

            So, germanium is not used for the production of IP for TWO PRINCIPAL PHYSICAL (and not at all "party") considerations ...

            The first is that germanium, as a material, and hence the parameters of the structures of ICs on germanium, created, are EXTREMELY SENSITIVE to TEMPERATURE CHANGES, as such, and to temperature in general. For the simple reason that the width of the so-called. The "band gap" of germanium is almost one and a half times narrower than that of silicon. What makes germanium unacceptable for IC production, in terms of such parameters as the "reverse currents" of the transitions of transistor structures formed on the crystal, as well as the extremely high temperature dependence of the transistor current transfer coefficients.

            SECOND - in Germany it is impossible to grow high-quality, so-called. "passivating" (or protective) layer.

            It grows easily on germanium, a hexagonal oxide lattice, but it is extremely difficult to grow a cubic one. Hexagonal is water-soluble, which makes its use as a passivating layer a pointless undertaking.

            In principle, this means that ALL germanium devices must be SEALED IN PRINCIPLE. But for silicon devices, on the surface of the crystal, an oxide film is easily grown, which has excellent protective properties against moisture vapor, sealing is often not required. In addition, a layer of silicon nitride will easily grow on silicon oxide and the resulting "sandwich" has super-excellent protective properties.

            And thank God that the "shokin nomenklatura" appreciated this timely and correctly, and focused on the "American" technological direction in the production of Soviet ICs.

            Those. chose silicon as the main material, not germanium ...

            The illustrated passages of the author about a certain "inaccessibility" to the Soviet developers of IS PP materials, we refer to the flight of the author's imagination. The given catalog "Feyerchild", for example, was available in every scientific and technical library of an enterprise for the production of IS PP. Moreover, it was regularly updated ...
  2. +8
    July 14 2021
    You know how to "twist the intrigue," it is interesting to read! From the photo that you post, I saw some modules and nodes live back in Soviet times, when old computers were replaced with newer models. Moreover, the removed parts were immediately destroyed under control, they broke the boards with sledgehammers ... And such a bed took place!
  3. 0
    July 14 2021
    I had a "Micro" ... I caught DV and SV.
    And so from below, ordinary citizens could not see all the battles of the governing bodies above.
    It is difficult to judge without having all the facts on hand. what
  4. +9
    July 14 2021
    the embodiment of Lenin's thesis that even a cook can learn to run the state
    You, Alexey, of course were mistaken about this thesis. The theme is chewed up everywhere ...

    The biography of Shokin and Kalmykov is an illustration of how the country's governing system was degenerating. Party functionaries have replaced the builders of communism with burning eyes and a thirst for knowledge. "No matter what happens ....".
    In a planned economy, without any competition, the struggle for resources was a serious one. Using all means. Yeah...
    1. +4
      July 14 2021
      Quote: tasha
      Party functionaries replaced the builders of communism with burning eyes and craving for knowledge

      In 1955, Khrushchev removed Malinkov and completely subordinated the Soviets to the party. From that moment on, everything reasonable in the country's economic activity began to be replaced by ideological expediency.

      Quote: tasha
      In a planned economy

      We had a wild market in the 90s.
      There is always a plan, in any social order. The approval of the budget by the parliaments is nothing more than planning: to whom to give, then to develop, and to whom not to give, then to cover.
      1. +8
        July 14 2021
        Even before Khrushchev, the Soviets were completely subordinate to the party. In the Soviet table of ranks and under Stalin from the late 20s-early 30s. until his death, both under Khrushchev and under Brezhnev, the first secretaries of regional committees, district committees, city committees occupied a higher position in comparison with the chairmen of regional executive committees, district executive committees, city executive committees. The transition from the post of the first secretary of the district committee to the post of the prerik was considered a demotion. Only structures directly subordinate to this Council, plus structures of the Council of a lower level, were directly subordinate to the chairmen of the executive committee. That is, utilities, trade, local industry, schools, hospitals, etc. Regional and district internal affairs bodies were from the mid-50s. formally under executive committees, but in reality they were subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOOP) and local party organizations. The influence of the chairman of the regional executive committee on the structures of republican and union subordination located in the region was very limited. And the first secretary of the regional party committee was a representative of a kind of integral power, and he personally and the bureau of the regional party committee (which always included the chairman of the regional executive committee) had a real impact on most organizations and enterprises of the republican and on a significant part of organizations and enterprises of union subordination, located in area. At meetings of regional executive committees, at sessions of regional councils, issues of the development of electronics, the aviation industry, heavy engineering, etc., or, say, the activities of the local prosecutor's office were not considered, since this was not within the competence of the regional council and the regional executive committee. But at plenums of the regional party committee, at meetings of the bureau of the regional party committee, the development of branches of republican and union subordination, or the activities of the prosecutor's office were often considered. By the way, often the leaders of the largest enterprises of union significance were themselves members of the regional committee, and sometimes the bureau of the regional party committee. If we take the military sphere, then the members of the military councils of districts and armies were the first secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the republics, the first secretaries of the regional and regional committees of the largest regions and the regional, and not the chairmen of regional executive committees and regional executive committees.
  5. +5
    July 14 2021
    just under the GKET, the government assigned a luxurious building in Kitayskiy proezd

    Kitaygorodsky passage.
  6. +3
    July 14 2021
    Quote: tasha
    Party functionaries have replaced the builders of communism with burning eyes and a thirst for knowledge. "No matter what happens ....".

    These guys, unlike modern ones, were aimed precisely at the result, though by any means.
    It's no joke, to create a whole new industry from scratch as soon as possible.

    https://vzpp-s.ru/company/history/
    The speed is amazing.
    But the microcircuit is only a small part of the top of a huge iceberg called the electronics industry.
    1. +1
      July 14 2021
      were aimed precisely at the result, though by any means.
      Yes, it cannot be taken away.
      It is sad that entire industries, scientific directions and developments depended on the ideological attitudes and views of individuals.
      1. 0
        July 14 2021
        It is sad that entire industries, scientific directions and developments depended on the ideological attitudes and views of individuals.

        Uh-huh. But now, with blessed capitalism - those who rule the country and the economy are not interested in anything but momentary profits. Extremely effective.
        1. -2
          July 14 2021
          Good observation. And a dog ran outside my window and, with a thoughtful look, wrote on the tree. hi
          1. +2
            July 14 2021
            And on our forum, strange personalities are always posting some kind of crap .. With the look of a thoughtful pissing dog ..
            1. 0
              July 14 2021
              I agree, it also happens. So what? And sometimes, you know, I want to blurt out something for any reason, I hold on as best I can and I advise you. hi
    2. +7
      July 14 2021
      These guys, unlike modern ones, were aimed precisely at the result, though by any means.
      A very controversial statement. And what is the result? To hand over something for the next Holiday? So this is not the result. Speed ​​up development timeframes? So here the technical features of the process will be at the core, and history shows that, as a rule, those who proved the "inconsistency" of this acceleration were right, and the timing of obtaining the result "did not accelerate." It was scary not that such people stood at the "top" of the administration, but that the very path to this "top" was "lined" with the same. And it rather interfered with acting according to the mind ...
      1. +2
        July 14 2021
        How long will it take to build a plant like VZPP (or Mikron, or Angstrem, etc.) from scratch (from the moment the decision on construction is made) to the release of the first products, taking into account the fact that there are no specialized specialists, as a class?
        1. +3
          July 14 2021
          What time is it from scratch
          So no one argues that they built it quickly. But life, especially in terms of military products, is much more complicated. And what will this plant produce? And in what systems will its products be used? Do these systems need such products, if the systems need to be made up-to-date, and even with a margin for the future? So it turns out that the "party acumen" is enough to build a plant, but this is not enough to understand the entire system. I understand that "the Chief Chief" himself does not need to understand this, his subordinates will help him, but as a rule those who understood were at the very bottom of the administrative chain, with all the ensuing consequences ...
          1. 0
            July 14 2021
            As if those who understand are now at the top of the administrative pyramid?
            Only the desire to do a specific thing at the top of the pyramid is not visible, so grab a quick one, and there the grass does not grow, that's all you want.
            1. +1
              July 14 2021
              As if those who understand are now at the top of the administrative pyramid?
              But remember the story! How was the space breakthrough organized, for example? There was a separate person in charge of EVERYTHING, and they would have asked him for the full program! And the whole system, it seemed to be parallel to it, seemed to contribute and help, but everything is on it, the only one! And not so "Polyburo-Central Committee-Committee of some Ministry-Civil Code" ...
              1. 0
                July 14 2021
                Yes, there was a Chief Designer, but a whole ministry of general mechanical engineering, as well as the electronics industry, was organized to "help" him. etc., without which the Chief Designer would not have done anything.
                Again, a rocket is a small tip of an iceberg called a mine. general mash.
                1. +1
                  July 14 2021
                  Who was responsible for the result? Ministry or what? That's it to help!
                  1. -1
                    July 14 2021
                    It is possible that the same. Moreover, these ministers were with generals' stars.
                    1. 0
                      July 15 2021
                      First Minister of General Machine Building - Goremykin Petr Nikolaevich, Major General, during the Second World War, People's Commissar of Ammunition, education - MVTU im. Bauman
                      Second Minister of General Machine Building - Sergey A. Afanasyev, education - MVTU im. Bauman, civilian.
                      BUT the head of the third main directorate (cosmonautics) - Kerim Kerimov - Lieutenant General, education - Artillery Academy named after Dzerzhinsky.
  7. 0
    July 14 2021
    The topic is interesting, the presentation, of course, is overly biased and anti-Soviet, but there is no other coverage of the issue yet.
    after the infamous Beria

    This is our notorious XX Congress, not Lavrenty Pavlovich.
  8. +5
    July 14 2021
    Thanks for the wonderful loop. By the way, who is interested in the topic - the story of Staros and Berg is reflected in the book "Flight to Russia" by Daniel Granin.
  9. +3
    July 14 2021
    And this series of articles "went" to me as they say. Thanks to the author hi I had to be on the first photo of Zelenograd)
  10. +2
    July 14 2021
    How did Zelenograd come to the idea of ​​total copying?

    1. -2
      July 14 2021
      Because copying is cheaper and easier, and most importantly, it saves a lot of time on R&D - in China, this is put on stream in all areas.
  11. -1
    July 14 2021
    ... according to the old Soviet tradition, the chief received an order for any successful actions of any subordinate, because the main thing is not an invention, the main thing is a sensible party leadership!


    So this, just like the story of the aforementioned Jobs. Who remembers about Wozniak? Who knows the inventors of the Macintosh or iPhone? But everyone knows who organized and sold all this))
    And so in almost all areas. Tesla was a genius, but Edison is much more famous in the world, who managed to establish production.
  12. 0
    July 15 2021
    Yes, this intersection "retro Zelenograd":
    you will go to the left, you will get to Micron, to the right-Proton, straight-hostel
    (1980-86 formation-detachment and practice, the most pleasant and memorable places and times)
    there and then dreamed of being in the "industry" until 2022, it was possible until 1992 = 6 years instead of 36)
  13. 0
    July 18 2021
    Reminds me of an article from Ogonyok in the late 80s. What cool Americans and what a "scoop." And the current, at least at the test level, the missile defense scoop was the first to make. And automata without electronic computers flew to the moon on cyclograms.
  14. 0
    August 16 2021
    It is sad when the intrigues and stubbornness of bosses not only slows down, but ruins progressive technical developments. In my practice, I learned what Soviet-style control devices are, working both in the fleets and in the aerospace p / y.
  15. 0
    30 September 2021
    Contradictory impression of the material. It seems to be written a lot and exciting, but ... there is a sediment.
    The author repeatedly mentions in a negative vein the USSR's tendency to copy American achievements. Well, yes, there must be "Soviet pride of their own ...". And from my point of view, the leadership of the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Radio Industry was absolutely right to choose the path of copying other people's achievements. This path was less costly and guaranteed to promise a positive result (IC in hardware, and not in the form of theoretical developments) in the foreseeable future. Yes, on this path the USSR was doomed to be in the role of catch-up, but at the same time it did not avoid the bumps on the unbeaten paths that were left to the pioneering Americans. Soviet ministers were not fools at all. I suppose they knew perfectly well the POSSIBILITIES of the Soviet research institutes and industry and took a bite in the teeth, and did not engage in projection (it is not enough to come up with it, it still has to be done !!!). In addition, copying someone else's technique does not at all cancel the development of one's own, if desired. And time helps to win great. And there is something to start from for their developments. There are plenty of examples in history, for example, both Japan and China and Korea began by copying other people's developments, but where did they go now?

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