The aircraft carrier is not the first in line. We need to solve the problems of the fleet as a whole
In a previous article “Another 5 kopecks for the discussion about aircraft carriers. AUG or MRA? " there was a discussion about how to solve the main tasks of the Russian Navy. According to the author's estimates, it turned out that the construction of one AUG for the Pacific Fleet and one for the Northern Fleet would cost a total of at least 1,5 trillion rubles, including the price of air wings of 60 aircraft each. However, these AUGs may not perform the entire set of tasks. It is dangerous for them to go to the far sea zone (DMZ) to confront the US AUG, since the Americans will easily put up their 2-3 against one of our AUG. In other cases, our AUG can solve all the standard tasks of an aircraft carrier.
The MPA construction program turned out to be cheaper. The cost of 50 Tu-160m2 and 10 AWACS A-100 will be 0,9 trillion rubles, but the capabilities of the MRA are much less. Due to the increased visibility of the Tu-160 airframe, they cannot attack the US AUG in the DMZ due to the impossibility of giving a control center for anti-ship missiles. The Tu-160 is capable of attacking the KUG in the DMZ, but only from a long range - 450 km. Aegis air defense missile systems will not be allowed to approach a shorter range with their SM6 missiles, and from 450 km it will not be possible to open the KUG composition due to the REP KUG. The accuracy of the control center will be low, and a significant part of the anti-ship missile system will aim at decoys. It is possible to significantly improve the quality of the control center for the KUG if you use a pair of spaced A-100 AWACS.
In BMZ (500-mile zone), it makes no sense to use either AUG or MRA. The most effective tasks are solved by tactical aviation... To attack the AUG aviation will need the help of two AWACS. KUG can be attacked without the help of AWACS (see previous article).
As a result, we find ourselves almost at a dead end - AUG can solve some problems, but they are very expensive. MRA is cheaper, but due to the obsolescence of the Tu-160m2 airframe, it can do little.
Both AUG and MPA do not fulfill their tasks in full for the same reason - there is no money. Two AUG is not enough, and for the MRA it is necessary to develop a new aircraft, and not to reproduce the Tu-160 / Tu-22m3 - its technical backwardness.
The only way out is to limit the scope of the Navy's tasks. It's time to stop dreaming about dashing actions in the Persian Gulf, bases in Cam Ranh and Sudan, campaigns in Cuba and Venezuela ...
It's time to wake up and see what our surface fleet has sunk to.
1. Brief assessment of the capabilities of the air defense systems of ships under construction today
In the United States, the Aegis air defense system simultaneously solves both air defense and missile defense tasks. We do not have a destroyer, not even its Leader project. Therefore, it makes no sense to talk about solving the problem of ABM KUG.
During the period of GPV 2011–2020, only 2 more or less decent ships were built - frigates 22350 "Admiral Gorshkov". The stealth technology was not observed in them, but the S-350 air defense system, although it does not have an AFAR, but also with passive PARs allows it to reflect medium-intensity raids. Other ships - frigate 11356 and corvette 20380 - do not solve such problems either. They are designed as if on purpose so that they could not be overlooked even by a completely blinded anti-ship missile system. 11356 is especially monstrous - it is good that the Indians did not require a modern ship. Their air defense system is equipped with a bunch of single-channel target illumination radars and is 40 years behind the current level.
Corvette 20380 was initially equipped with an ugly air defense system with "Furke" radar. Now they promise to deliver the Zaslon radar. If it is brought to the requirements of the TTZ, then the desired quality of the air defense system will turn out, but the visibility of the corvette itself cannot be avoided. Only a small part of the anti-ship missiles will fly past 20380 and fall into traps, and the ammunition load of the anti-aircraft missiles is very small. The price of the Zaslon has not been announced, but if the Zaslon radar has the same characteristics as the MF radar, then, according to rough estimates, the Zaslon price will exceed 6 billion rubles. So the declared advantage of the 20380 - cheapness - is quickly disappearing.
There is often an opinion that 11356 and 20380 should not solve air defense problems. And what should they decide - to show the flag? Let the experts say: can they effectively solve at least the PLO tasks, and name how much of the area they are able to control? Wouldn't it be better to construct a UAV with a magnetometer, thermal imager and airborne radar instead of them?
Auxiliary air defense systems have not been developed either.
There are no UAV jammers, passive jamming is reduced to obsolete clouds of dipoles. There are no A-100 AWACS planes either. Even if a dozen A-100s appear, they will hardly be able to maintain round-the-clock support of the KUG. The flight time of the A-100 is only 10 hours, so the fleet counting on his duty at the DMZ is not necessary.
We also do not have small helicopter UAVs of AWACS that would allow detecting anti-ship missiles at ranges of at least 100 km from the ship.
As a result, we come to a sad conclusion: in the coming years, our fleet will be able to operate only where no one attacks it, for example, in Syria. If there is a conflict with Turkey, as a NATO member, then we will not get to Tartus either through the Bosphorus or through Gibraltar. It will not be possible to supply Khmeimim by air for a long time.
The situation in the Pacific is even worse. There we are inferior not only to the United States and China, but also to Japan.
Of course, we can operate in BMZ under the cover of our aviation. Some experts say that it is enough for us to protect our shores. For some reason, such a way out does not reassure. The BMZ neighbors are not our allies, but we want to go to the DMZ at least.
2. Searching for a way out
If we continue to build flag demonstrators, then the use of the fleet will be reduced to the patrol service. It is time to admit that it is impossible for us to build a fleet according to the American, Chinese or Japanese model - they don’t give money. It is impossible to modernize existing projects to bring them up to modern requirements.
A lot of money was invested in "Admiral Nakhimov", but it did not become a ship of even moderate visibility. Strengthening its air defense is ensured not only by improving the air defense system, but also mainly by placing a huge ammunition load of the air defense missile system. Of course, this can be done on a ship of 25 thousand tons, but where to get money for such ammunition on other ships and where to place it? Wouldn't it be better to build a full-fledged destroyer instead of modernizing the 30-year-old Nakhimov?
The only opportunity remains is to open new R&D projects for the development of new ships of all classes. They must combine high combat effectiveness with a moderate cost. It is impossible to demand from them the ability to act in the ocean against US AUGs, it is enough to win against AUGs in BMZ, and against KUGs and in DMZ. The dubious joy of winning a war somewhere in the Falklands will be left to others.
Naturally, the development of new ships will have to reduce the cost of building existing projects. The mortgaged ships must be completed, but then only prototypes of the new series must be laid. Then, by 2035, you can get a new fleet for real tasks. If significant funds are not allocated for R&D, then we will lag behind more and more. At the same time, at the parades on the day of the Navy, congratulations on the remarkable successes in the construction of the fleet will sound more and more optimistic.
Without taking the liberty of judging the appearance of promising ships as a whole, further we will consider only the problem of air defense and obtaining a central control unit for anti-ship missiles.
3. Lack of control center is a critical problem of our fleet
In the previous article it was indicated that in cases where there is no exact control center, then in conditions of interference, the anti-ship missiles will be able to independently find the target only by accidentally stumbling upon it.
The development of electronic warfare, the emergence of small UAVs for jammers and towed decoys, leave the anti-ship missiles with little chance of reaching the true target. Even if an IR channel is also introduced into the GOS of the anti-ship missile system, but the radio trap is located at a distance of several kilometers away from the ship, the IR channel will still not detect the target. In addition, ship lasers can disable optics, etc. Therefore, the problem of an accurate control system is the main one for assessing the effectiveness of launching anti-ship missiles. Of course, one can dream that all anti-ship missiles of the salvo will be combined into a group with artificial intelligence. They tried to carry out such developments in the USSR, but now they do not even hear about them.
The most powerful radar stations are possessed by AWACS aircraft, but we will most likely have only a dozen A-100s. The Il-76 carrier chosen for them is extremely unsuccessful precisely for AWACS (see "The concept of an unmanned aircraft for early warning radar"). The cost of AWACS is very high, probably at least 15 billion rubles. High fuel consumption (over 6 t / h) is associated with a large take-off weight of 190 t and an overly wide fuselage. At the same time, the working conditions of the operators inside the transport vehicle are much more difficult than in the passenger Boeing-707 AWACS. The high position of the stabilizer on the keel significantly impairs the operation of the radar in the tail sector of the view. These shortcomings will not allow to count on the fact that the A-100 will be produced in a large series, will be competitive in the world market and will be constantly operated in the interests of the Navy.
The combined-arms high-altitude UAV-RLO proposed by the author is built using the technology of radiating skin, that is, it does not have a "mushroom". The mass of such an AWACS is 45 tons, which is 4 times less than the A-100, and the watch time - 20 hours allows it to be on duty at a distance of up to 2500 km.
The detection range of the fighter-bomber (IS) is 900 km, and the detection range of the ship to the horizon range is 500 km. These ranges are 1,5 times greater than those of the A-100. The moderate prime cost of a serial AWACS of 5 billion rubles and low fuel consumption - less than 1,5 t / h - make it possible to make it massive and operate on a regular basis. Export deliveries will compensate for the cost of R&D.
For aircraft carriers, it is proposed to develop a high-altitude shipborne AWACS with a mass of 6 tons with a detection range of both aircraft and ships - 500 km with a duty time of 10 hours (see "Concept of a shipborne AWACS unmanned aircraft ..."). This AWACS is designed not only to detect air and sea targets, but also to control the actions of shipborne UAVs and precise missile guidance.
The third, smallest version of AWACS, is located on a UAV helicopter and is designed to protect conventional ships. Radar with AFAR provides a detection range of IS 150-200 km, ships - 250 km. The weight of the UAV is about 1 ton.
Thus, the combined arms and aircraft carrier AWACS can provide a control center for anti-ship missiles in almost all cases.
High-altitude AWACS can detect KUG from a range of up to 500 km, without fear of being hit by Aegis air defense missile systems SM6. If the area where the KUG is roughly known from the satellites, then, assuming that the maximum combat radius of the combined-arms AWACS will be 4500 km, the KUG can be detected at distances of up to 5000 km from the airfield.
To ensure the fight against interference, it is necessary to have a pair of AWACS separated by hundreds of kilometers. If the KUG does not comply with the radio silence mode, then a pair of AWACS will be able to use RTR to determine the exact bearing to the operating radar and roughly estimate its range. This will be enough to highlight the coordinates of the radar carrier ship among the false marks.
When reconnaissance of the AUG for AWACS, 4–8 IS escorts will be required, which will ensure the AWACS exit to the line of 500 km. If we assume that the maximum radius of the accompanying IS is 1000 km, then the maximum range of the control center according to the AUG will be 1500 km from the airfield. To increase the range, you will have to refuel the IB.
The advantage of AWACS over IS reconnaissance is also that the shipborne REB systems are designed to suppress IS radars, which operate in the 3-centimeter wavelength range. AWACS operate in longer wavelength ranges, and their ships can only suppress them with the help of electronic devices installed on aircraft, which create an order of magnitude less power.
If it is necessary to obtain a control center by AUG, and there are no AWACS, then it is possible to use IS from a range of 450-500 km. However, the IS radar at such large distances will be completely suppressed by interference, and the control center will only indicate the coordinates of the interference spot. CU for KUG IS can be received from a range of 150 km, and its accuracy will be much higher than from 450 km.
4. The need to develop a new air defense system for ships
Possibilities of reducing the cost of ships are largely determined by measures to reduce the cost of the air defense complex, consisting of air defense missile systems and KREP. For example, on the destroyer Arleigh Burke, the cost of the air defense complex is estimated at 25% of the total cost of the destroyer, that is, it is close to the cost of the hull. But the effectiveness of air defense, in turn, depends on the visibility of the ship. Visibility affects both the number of attacks, and the effectiveness of the REB, and the effectiveness of the radio silence mode.
The contribution of UAVs to air defense is also great. The opinion that it is necessary to have one universal helicopter that would provide both its own air defense, and the ship's air defense, and the KUG's PLO, and could carry an anti-ship missile, seems unscientific fantasy. The Ka-27 helicopter weighing 11 tons has a very weak FHA radar, which is not capable of solving air defense missions. Theoretically, it can solve PLO tasks provided that the magnetometer is suspended, but the Kh-35 anti-ship missile system can only carry one. The very short flight time - less than 3 hours - does not allow even the PLO problem to be fully solved. Its main drawback is that only one Ka-27 can be placed on the ship.
If a universal UAV with a mass of about 1 ton was developed, on which it would be possible to place replaceable AWACS / KREP / magnetometer modules, then 3-5 UAVs could be placed on the ship and provide round-the-clock watch in the air.
4.1. Decreased visibility of ships
Currently, we have a ship, the hull of which is approaching the requirements of the Stealth technology, this is the corvette 20386 hull. In it, the superstructure needs to be altered - to remove the triangular cuts at the corners of the superstructure, due to which the radar antennas were displaced downwards, that is, it is required to restore its four-sided shape. To save money, the superstructure should be made of steel. It should be recalled that in order to combat low-altitude aircraft detecting the ship, it is important to make the upper part of the superstructure unobtrusive. It is necessary to remove all protruding structures and even more so not to place the AK-630 ZAK there. Even the glass of the bridge should be made according to the model of an aircraft cockpit - with a metal spraying on the inside. The walls of the turret must be tilted inward, not less than the tilt of the superstructure. It is important to cover the edges of the superstructure, gun turret and, in general, all protruding parts on the deck, for example, handrails and their racks, with radio-absorbing material.
It is advisable to make the angle reflector of sea waves on the bow 20386 lower and lower it, in case of detection of radiation from an enemy radar located in the front hemisphere.
A shipborne radar must have 4 fixed AFARs. Passive HEADLIGHTS, such as the HEADLIGHTS at 22350, have a greater EPR than the AFAR, since at the moment the beam is directed to the enemy's IS, all phase shifters are phased towards the IS and, as it were, turn the PAA plane towards IS, that is, they create a large EPR in this direction. Mechanical antennas, for example, at the Pantsir-M guidance radar, are especially bad.
Corvette 20386 has a displacement of 3600 tons, that is, it should be considered, rather, a frigate. For service in BMZ, we need corvettes, cheap to operate, no more than 2000 tons. Their shape should be the same as 20386, but the Stealth measures on the smaller ship should be even stricter, since their air defense systems are weaker.
It is not uncommon for a KUG to observe the radio silence mode and switch to passive methods of detecting enemy radiation. To determine the distance to the enemy, it is required to process his signals received by ships separated by several kilometers. This requires a covert intra-group communication line. It can be accomplished by transmitting messages over a narrow AFAR beam of one MF radar to the AFAR of a neighboring ship. Even at distances of up to 30 km, to transmit information at a speed of 1 Mbps, less than 1 mW of power is required. Consequently, the enemy simply will not hear such a transmission.
The disadvantage of the complete stealth mode is that the enemy, having received the control center from the satellite, can organize a stealth raid, which can only be detected by an active radar. However, the included radar is the most unmasking factor of the ship.
We will offer the most natural, although not the simplest, way out: an AWACS UAV should be emitted from a distance, and the signal reflected from targets must be received together: both the AWACS radar and the shipborne MF radar.
The parameters given in this section are approximate and require clarification by aircraft designers.
Suppose that on the above-mentioned shipborne UAV weighing 1000–1200 kg, a replaceable module is installed, which has a radar with AFAR measuring 1,4 * 0,7 m with a module mass of 130–150 kg. The cost of the module is estimated at 200 million rubles. The operating frequency range should coincide with the range of the ship's MF radar. AFAR is installed on a horizontal rotatable axis and simultaneously serves only one of the side sectors with a width of 120 °.
Let's consider a specific example of AWACS application. Let the KUG, consisting of three corvettes, carrying three UAVs, go to the DMZ. To illuminate the air and surface situation, one UAV is lifted from each corvette and scattered in an equilateral triangle at a distance of 60–80 km from the KUG. At the end point of the route, they should be at an altitude of 3-4 km. Then they can hover and move parallel to the KUG, or they can operate in a more economical mode in terms of fuel consumption - synchronously fly around a circle of a given radius at a speed of 100–150 km / h. Each of the AWACS scans its sector with a width of 120 °, and if the AWACS hovers, then the sector is fixed in space, and if the AWACS moves in a circle, then the sector rotates with it.
The AWACS detects targets that are below the horizon for the shipborne MF radar, and the AWACS detects targets above the horizon together with the MF radar of all three ships at the same time. Since three AWACS irradiate the entire 360 °, then each MF radar must also view the entire circular area, albeit in a passive mode. Consequently, each of the three MF radars will simultaneously use all of its 4 AFARs. As a result, the detection zone of low-altitude IS and ships will have a radius of 230 km, and for targets above the horizon - 350 km. Determining bearings of targets above the horizon, jointly with three MF radars, will increase the accuracy by 3 times. The immunity to interference will become almost complete.
If a licensed aviation diesel RED-03 is installed on the UAV, then the fuel consumption will be only 80 kg / h and the duration of duty of 5 hours is fully ensured. Consequently, two UAVs from each corvette will provide round-the-clock watch. The remaining third UAV can be used for PLO.
5. Reducing the cost of shipborne air defense systems
Note. The parameters of the air defense missile system are associated with the class of the ship, and there is confusion with the names of the classes. They want to call a ship 7000 tons a frigate, and a destroyer, at least in the USSR - 5000 tons.Since here we are talking about the concept of completely new ships, we will accept the following classification: MRK / MPK - 1000 tons, corvette - 2000 tons, frigate - 4000 tons, destroyer - 8000 tons.
The general principle of reducing the cost of the air defense complex is to abandon the use of several specialized radars in favor of one, unified for all classes of ships, multifunctional (MF). In addition, it is necessary to use cheaper missiles. This is possible, given the increased guidance accuracy provided by the MF radar. The requirements for the GOS SAM are then significantly reduced.
5.1. Reducing the cost of the MF radar (special point for those interested)
Currently, only one shipborne radar is equipped with AFAR - the Zaslon radar. Neither its detection range nor its cost is published. Therefore, we have to compare the cost of the MF radar and the Zaslon radar: as if the Zaslon radar had the same detection range as the corvette MF radar - 300 km by IS. Then the cost of the Zaslon radar, consisting of a surveillance radar and a guidance radar, excluding the cost of KREP, may exceed 3,5 billion rubles.
The design of the MF radar is discussed in the article "Possibilities for improving the air defense of corvettes". The essence of the proposal is based on the following radar provisions:
- The target detection range is determined by the transmitter power and the area of the receiving antenna, but does not depend on the shape of the antenna.
- The detection range does not depend on the area of the transmitting antenna. The dimensions of the transmitting antenna should be such that the resulting radar beam does not exceed the width of the specified radar coverage area.
- The accuracy of determining the angular coordinates, on the contrary, depends on the shape of the antenna, namely: on its maximum horizontal and vertical dimensions. The narrower the radar beam is obtained, the smaller the angle measurement error.
- The cost of AFAR is determined by the number of transceiver modules (TPM) in the AFAR. PPMs are installed with a step equal to half the wavelength. Therefore, the number of PPM in the AFAR of a given area turns out to be inversely proportional to the square of the wavelength.
- It is impossible to significantly increase the wavelength used by the MF radar. First, the size of the antenna can grow so much that the AFAR cannot fit on the superstructure. Secondly, the longer the wavelength, the more radio waves are squeezed up from the sea surface, and the detection range of low-altitude targets is significantly reduced.
For the unified MF radar, the selected wavelength range is 5,5 cm. The AFAR radar for ships of any class is made up of unified sublattices - "clusters", measuring 0,22 * 0,22 m and containing 64 PPMs each.
The most difficult task of air defense is the defeat of low-altitude anti-ship missiles. Therefore, the AFAR beam should be narrower vertically than horizontally in order to reduce the reception of signals reflected from the sea. Therefore, the height of the APAR must be greater than the width.
AFAR consists of three main parts. To irradiate targets in the center of the AFAR, there are clusters containing PPMs in the form of a traditional AFAR - a rectangle with cut corners.
Figures 1 - 3 show the location of clusters in AFAR designed for light, medium and heavy ships - MRK / MPK, corvette / frigate and destroyer / aircraft carrier. The transceiver clusters of these APARs are highlighted in orange.
Fig. 1
Ris.2
Ris.3
We will assume that the superstructures of these classes of ships allow the installation of AFAR centers at altitudes of 15, 20 and 25 m.
During the reception of the signal reflected from the target, clusters containing purely receiving modules (PRM) are added to the clusters containing PPM. PRM clusters are grouped into two narrow "beams", forming a cross together with PPM-clusters. The cross shape is optimal for working on airplanes, however, the specific dimensions of the superstructure may force the use of a different arrangement of the rungs. For example, if a destroyer has almost the entire superstructure occupied by the missile defense radar antenna. Then for the MF radar it is necessary to arrange the crossbars in the form of the letter “G” (Fig. 4).
Ris.4
5.2 MF radar characteristics
The table shows estimates of the parameters of the MF radar for three classes of ships. When assessing the cost of the radar, it was assumed that a single PRM costs $ 700, and a PPM - $ 1000.
The width of the beams of the receiving beams is about 4 times smaller than the beam of the transmitting part. Therefore, to cover the entire area of the transmitting beam, the receiving crossbar must simultaneously form a fan of four receiving beams shifted relative to each other by the beam width. The azimuth of the target is measured with a horizontal bar, and the elevation is measured with a vertical bar. Since the target simultaneously hits only one of the horizontal beams of the horizontal fan and one of the vertical ones, the equivalent width of the receiving beam is determined by the size of the intersection zone of the horizontal and vertical beams. For example, the equivalent receiving beam for a corvette has a width of 1 * 0,75 °.
Warning: The table shows the detection range of low-altitude anti-ship missiles. Many authors believe that the detection range can be calculated using the radio horizon range formula:
Drg = 4,12 * (root of h1 + root of h2)
This is not true.
Drg, on the contrary, determines at what distance the target will not be guaranteed to be detected, regardless of any radar power. The authors here do not take into account the phenomenon of "squeezing" the radar beam upward by the sea surface. Accurate range calculation is difficult and requires consideration of the vertical radar beam width, radar wavelength, and transmitter power.
Therefore, the actual detection range turns out to be 1,5–2 times less than Dgr. The error turns out to be the greater, the longer the radar wavelength and the lower the target flight altitude. It is also necessary to remember that in cases where the target is at a distance equal to Dobn, it is possible to measure only the target's range and azimuth. An estimate of the height of the target can be obtained at ranges that are two times less than the Dobn. Therefore, a missile defense system with a seeker is much better than a radar in measuring the height of an anti-ship missile.
In a specific example with the Zaslon radar, releasing the beam will result in its 10-centimeter surveillance radar detecting anti-ship missiles at ranges that are 1,2-1,3 times less than those indicated in the table for the MF radar. Then, to detect anti-ship missiles, "Zaslon" will have to use a 3,3-cm missile guidance radar. The advantages of such a radar should include the fact that it will ensure the detection of anti-ship missiles at ranges 1,1 times greater than the tabulated ones.
The disadvantage of the 3,3 cm range is that it uses the enemy's IS radar. Modern radars with AFAR are designed to be used as jammers of enormous power. Such directors are capable of suppressing the Zaslon's guidance radar not only along the main beam of the radar, but also along the side lobes. Moreover, the re-reflection of the interference signal from the sea surface creates an illuminated lunar-type track on the surface. Then the interference comes from different angular directions, which sharply worsens the capabilities of the interference compensators in the radar. The enemy does not have powerful directors working in the 5,5-cm range of the MF radar.
5.3. Reducing the cost of ammunition SAM
According to the cost / efficiency criterion, it is best to destroy anti-ship missiles with short-range missiles (MD) at ranges of no more than 10 km. Despite the fact that MD SAMs can fly 1,5-2 times further, this should not be done, since the probability of hitting the target of one SAM will decrease.
Subsonic anti-ship missiles fly at altitudes of 3-5 m. MF radar can reliably measure their azimuth and range immediately after detection, but the exact value of their height is very difficult to measure due to signal reflections from the sea surface. Only MD missiles with 9M100 seeker can successfully aim themselves at a distance of 10 km. For "headless" missiles, the launch range should be reduced to 5 km. This reduction in range should not be of concern. In the event of a miss with the first missile defense system, re-launching another pair of missiles is quite real. At a distance of 2-3 km, the miss will be less than a meter, even if the target maneuvers with an overload of 3 g.
Supersonic anti-ship missiles fly at altitudes of about 10 m and can maneuver with an overload of up to 10 g. The required guidance accuracy is ensured at ranges of 7 km. Non-maneuvering anti-ship missiles can also be hit at a distance of 10 km.
Despite the seemingly small launch range of missiles, the reflection of massive raids is quite possible. MF radar is capable of simultaneously aiming up to 20 MD missiles. In such cases, it is necessary to provide a start-up rate of at least one start-up per second.
To provide a large ammunition load of missiles on small ships, the Pantsir-M missiles are best suited, especially if they are modified and a simple IR seeker is installed. The launcher can be placed, for example, on the roof of the gun turret. To ensure the ability to quickly launch missiles both forward and towards both sides, the TPK missiles should be positioned in three directions, located at an angle of 90 °.
To combat IS, it is necessary to use the 9M96E2 missile defense system, which will not allow the enemy's IS to fly up to a distance of less than 100 km, open jamming conditions, determine the exact coordinates of the ship, launch gliding bombs at it, etc. Medium-range missiles turn out to be ineffective, since they cost almost the same as the DB missiles, and they cannot prevent the approach of IS.
The number of air defense missiles can be quite small, for example, 2 - for RTOs, 4 - for a corvette, 8 - for a frigate, 16 - for a destroyer. That is, anti-missile guided missiles should mainly play the role of a "scarer" for information security.
6. Methods for suppressing over-the-horizon radars
The methods of REB and the organization of passive decoys were described in the previous article. Here we will only point out that it is possible to fight against over-the-horizon systems for detecting ships of the Mineral-M type.
It should be borne in mind that an active over-the-horizon radar does not always work, but only in such weather when a "drive waveguide" is formed above the surface, that is, when the horizontal beam of this radar follows the sea surface. It is suppressed in the same way as a conventional radar.
A passive over-the-horizon radar receives a signal from an enemy radar located beyond the horizon, due to the fact that the radar probe beam is scattered on random irregularities that arise in the troposphere. Naturally, the scattered beam has negligible power and is received only due to the high sensitivity of the passive radar.
For such a radar, you can create false targets by launching a balloon to an altitude of 5–8 km. A disposable radar signal simulator is suspended under the ball, the power of which is units of W. The simulator is launched when the wind blows the ball tens of kilometers away from the ship, and the ball is in the line of sight of the passive radar. To simplify, instead of the simulator, you can hang the signal repeater of the ship's radar. When the repeater is irradiated, the power of the ship's radar should be reduced by tens of thousands of times, that is, the passive radar will not detect the radiation of the ship's radar.
7. findings
- The development of the surface fleet has reached a dead end. Further construction of "flag demonstrators" will lead to the fact that the fleet will not be able to operate even on the outer border of the BMZ.
- With negligible modern funding for R&D, it is possible to develop new ships only by reducing the construction of the current series.
- Contrary to popular belief, the fleet after the commissioning of the next generation of ships is quite capable of carrying out its air defense in the DMZ.
- The opinion about the need to replace the fleet with MPA is groundless. Tu-160m2, as the only candidate for participation in the MPA, is outdated and will not be able to carry out raids on either the AUG or the KUG. The development of a new PAK DA aircraft will cost the price of a new aircraft carrier, and each bomber will cost the price of a frigate.
- When designing new ships, the customer is obliged to monitor compliance with the requirements of the Stealth technology.
- Reducing the cost of the air defense system is achieved due to the use of only one MF radar on the ship. The AFAR of this radar operates in the 5,5 cm range. The AFARs for ships of different classes are unified and differ only in size.
- The cost of the MF radar is 3 times less than the cost of the Zaslon radar with the same parameters. The benefit is achieved by making an AFAR in the shape of a cross.
- Reducing the cost of ammunition for the SAM is due to the abandonment of expensive SAMs in favor of MD SAMs and increasing the accuracy of their guidance using the MF radar.
- It is necessary to abandon the heavy Ka-27 helicopter and develop a UAV helicopter weighing 1–1,2 tons with a replaceable composition of equipment.
- To improve the efficiency of the REB, lightweight UAVs and inflatable corner reflectors should be developed.
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