Topic 5044: development of Soviet 45-mm and 76-mm APCR shells in 1941

44

The picture does not quite correspond to the time of the narration in the article, but it was the developments of the NII-48 that became one of the foundations for the development of Soviet sub-caliber anti-tank ammunition in the future. In the photo: the artillery crew of the 76,2-mm divisional gun ZIS-3 of the 1942 model under the command of Sergeant Major Nurmukhamedov is fighting on the territory of Pomerania. The fighter in the foreground (apparently the loader's assistant) is holding a UBR-354P unitary cartridge with a 53-BR-350P projectile (a reel-type tracer armor-piercing projectile). Source: waralbum.ru

French patterns


In the first months of the war in the hands of Soviet specialists were a captured sample of a 47-mm sub-caliber projectile of the then non-existent Polish army and a German memo on the use of cartridges with a 37-mm special armor-piercing projectile of the "40" model. It was not possible to get a real sample of the German subcaliber projectile, so the engineers had to use the translated manual. In it, in particular, German specialists wrote:

These ammunition are used to combat particularly heavily armored targets at a distance of 0 to 300 meters. At distances exceeding 300 meters, the use of these ammunition is useless; therefore, when shooting at distances exceeding 300 meters, normal armor-piercing shells should be used.


The calculation of the Soviet artillerymen fires from a 45-mm anti-tank gun model 1937 (53-K) in German tank on the street of the village. The crew number gives the loader a 45-mm sub-caliber projectile. Source: waralbum.ru

This thesis very clearly demonstrates the real advantage of sub-caliber shells, which some experts consider almost absolute. weapons against Soviet armored vehicles. Based on the data of the German training manual and the only captured 37-mm Polish shell, the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army proposed to develop its own analogues. At the end of August 1941, with this non-trivial task, they turned to NII-24 or, as it is better known, the Armored Institute.

For obvious reasons, the engineers were unable to restore the drawing of the 37-mm German sub-caliber projectile, but they were able to cope with the 47-mm Polish one. It turned out that the trophy sample of the sub-caliber projectile was an exact copy of the 47-mm similar projectile of the French company "Komissan". As a result, it was decided to develop domestic versions of armor-piercing sabot for 45-mm and 76-mm in full accordance with French patterns.



Top secret


At NII-24, the topic of the development of domestic subcaliber projectiles received the number 5044 and the name “45-mm and 76-mm armor-piercing subcaliber projectiles similar to those of the French company“ Komissan ”. It should be noted that the engineers managed to create and test prototypes by September 1941. I would like to emphasize that the ammunition was developed and manufactured in an experimental batch in just a few weeks!

The 45 mm projectile received the internal code 2-1742. The ammunition weighed 850 grams, of which 270 grams fell on the carbide core. For the 76-mm sub-caliber projectile, the index 2-1741 was dispatched, and it, of course, had a greater mass of 3,65 kg, of which a little more than one and a half kilograms fell on the core.

Topic 5044: development of Soviet 45-mm and 76-mm APCR shells in 1941
45-mm APCR projectile. Drawing 2-1742. Source: Report NII-48

The prototypes were made according to the drawings of the NII-24 in a pilot plant attached to the institute. A total of 40 sabot rounds, 20 of each caliber, were produced. As a core for 45-mm and 76-mm projectiles, a single tool alloy steel KHVG was used, which is an alloy of tungsten (1,49%), chromium (1%), sulfur (0,023%), phosphorus (0,011%), silicon (0,24%), manganese (0,24%) and carbon (0,97%). Everything else, naturally, was occupied by iron. The main alloying elements were chromium and tungsten. The sabot pan was made of st35 steel, and it was identical to the core material, with the exception of expensive chromium and tungsten.


76,2-mm APCR projectile. Drawing 2-1741. Source: Report NII-48

Briefly about the heat treatment of the core material of armor-piercing shells. In many ways, it was this process that determined the mechanical properties of steel. In accordance with the technology, the core workpiece was first hardened. Heat treatment technologies for 45 mm and 76 mm differed slightly. Initially, the products were heated to 600 degrees, then heated to 830 degrees for 50 minutes (the core of the 76-mm projectile was heated for 1 hour) and, finally, kept at a maximum temperature for 10-15 minutes. There were significant differences in the cooling procedure. The smaller billet was cooled in kerosene, and the larger one in water at a temperature of 45 degrees.

After hardening the core, tempering followed. The items were again heated to 220-230 degrees, held for an hour and a half, and slowly cooled in air.

Testing 45 mm caliber


Fire tests of subcaliber shells samples took place on September 6-7, 1941 at the Sofrinsky test site and turned out to be discouraging. The assignment to the testers was as follows:

According to the test program, it was necessary to determine the armor penetration of projectiles up to 300 meters and at the same time select normal charges by pressure with the determination of the initial speed and speed drop at a distance of 300 meters.

As a target were selected armor plates with a thickness of 50, 60 and 70 mm, installed at an angle of 30 degrees. They hit them with experimental shells from a distance of 100-200 meters from a 45-mm cannon of the 1932 model, a 76-mm regimental cannon of the 1927 model and a 76-mm divisional cannon of the 1902/30 model. The last two guns, frankly, are not the most anti-tank and not the freshest. The testers even counted the number of shots that the guns fired before testing the sub-caliber shells: for the 45-mm gun - 1717 shots, for the most worn-out 76-mm sample of 1927 - 3632 and for the 76-mm sample 1902/30 - 1531.


45-mm anti-tank gun model 1932, used to test prototype shells. Source: ru.wikipedia.org

The conclusions on the fire tests were disappointing. 45-mm APCR shells from a distance of 100-200 meters could not penetrate the 50-mm armor plate in four cases out of eleven. The testers recorded only one conditioned penetrating defeat and as many as six blinds. At the same time, the initial speed of the ammunition approached 950 m / s. The testers noted that firing 45-mm projectiles was accompanied by large dispersion, the cause of which was the unstable flight of the ammunition due to cutting off the belt or turning the core. A conventional armor-piercing or, as it was called, a 45-mm projectile of the "standard design" could not hit the same armor.

Unsuccessful conclusion


Subcaliber 76-mm shells were used to hit the armor plates from two guns. The short-barreled regimental gun, as expected, was unable to disperse the armor-piercing projectile to speeds above 535 m / s, which negatively affected the efficiency. Nevertheless, the 50-mm homogeneous armor was pierced by the experienced projectile, in contrast to the standard ammunition of a similar caliber. For a 50-mm cemented armor plate, out of three hits, only one was counted as conditional. Against a 60-mm cemented slab, the new sub-caliber projectile was powerless.

The divisional gun model 1902/30, due to the long barrel, reported the anti-tank projectile a much higher muzzle velocity - 950 m / s. The shell was not even tested on 50-mm cemented armor, obviously, there was an understanding of its excess power. They fired ten times at 60-mm cemented, of which nine were not counted, and only one shell pierced the target through and through. Against thicker 70 mm armor, 2 substandard defeats were recorded. In all test episodes, the shelling was carried out from 100-200 meters.


76-mm regimental gun model 1927, used in tests. Not the best example for fighting tanks. Source: ru.wikipedia.org

Now let's move on to the conclusions of the main developer of the NII-24 shells. The engineers decided that projectiles of this design did not show advantages over standard armor-piercing ammunition. Moreover, according to NII-24: "Further work in general on sub-caliber projectiles in the case of the manufacture of a core (active projectile) from instrumental or structural steel with a specific gravity of about 7,84 should be stopped." This is how the defense industry of the USSR almost lost the most progressive anti-tank type of projectile! NII-24 engineers stated in the report that they came to this conclusion, not only testing their own shells, but also examining captured samples. The German core contained up to 75% tungsten, had a specific gravity of 16,5 and a Rockwell hardness of about 70 units, but it could not impress domestic gunsmiths either. True, in a top secret report, the engineers did not reveal what exactly German ammunition did not please them.

Not so bad


The specter of hope for the further development of domestic subcaliber projectiles gives the last point in the conclusion of NII-24:

Work on the final clarification of the feasibility of using sub-caliber armor-piercing projectiles should be carried out in the case when the issue of producing a sufficient amount of hard alloys for the needs of the shell industry is positively resolved and the problem of the possibility of machining hard alloy cores for such shells in mass production is solved.

For March 1942, when the report was signed, a deadly wish, to put it bluntly. It was with difficulty that it was possible to organize production at the evacuated enterprises, and here the requirement to master the mass processing of tungsten alloys.


76-mm divisional gun model 1902/30. Source: ru.wikipedia.org

The Artillery Committee of the Main Artillery Directorate read the report with interest, and one of the military engineers wrote by hand on the title page:

The report does not indicate the resistance coefficients of the slabs used for testing. The speeds at which the tests were carried out are confused, and it is not clear what thickness of armor they correspond to. These data will be updated at NII-24. The conclusion of NII-24 is correct in terms of evaluating the results and in terms of using a core with a specific gravity of 7-8 in this design and incorrect in terms of refusing to search for new, more advanced designs of sub-caliber projectiles, which make it possible to replace the "heavy" core with its design. Take note of the report.

Perhaps it was this military expert, whose signature cannot be made out, that saved the domestic armor-piercing sub-caliber shells.
44 comments
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  1. +8
    15 December 2020 18: 06
    Thank you, very interesting topic.
  2. +12
    15 December 2020 18: 12
    Eugene, hi as they say, good, but not enough! Why not write how they solved the problem with alloys, when the troops received subcaliber shells, about the testing of shells before they were put into service! We are waiting for the continuation! !!!!
    1. +11
      15 December 2020 18: 51
      I support! The topic deserves further development. It is interesting, the author's style is excellent, but there is not enough material. As if I watched the trailer for the movie. We are waiting for the continuation. Yours faithfully!
  3. +6
    15 December 2020 18: 23
    It is always interesting to read articles about the opposition of armor and a projectile. Especially when they are accompanied by clear illustrations and photographs.
    Thank you author!
  4. +5
    15 December 2020 18: 28
    A specific setup with these weapons and ammunition occurred at 41.
  5. Kuz
    +27
    15 December 2020 18: 29
    Perhaps it was this military expert, whose signature cannot be made out, that saved the domestic armor-piercing sub-caliber shells

    It's just that the person took responsibility. Others simply unsubscribed.
    Thank you for the article good
  6. +7
    15 December 2020 18: 46
    :) Reading about the testers from NII-24, you come to the thought "Was Comrade Stalin wrong when he shot such" scientists "?" So are they real enemies of the people or not?
    PS: the same thing in production, which by the beginning of the war "provided" the Soviet artillery simple(caliber) armor-piercing shells at 0 - 30% of the norm (depending on the artillery system) ...
    1. +11
      15 December 2020 19: 29
      Quote: nespich
      But was Comrade Stalin wrong when he shot such “scientists”? "

      Shooting is not a way. To punish proportionately for every mistake is the way.
      In the case described in the article, it was necessary:
      1) Find the culprits of mistakes and establish the degree of guilt of each;
      2) Determine whether they admit their guilt or persist in a mistake;
      3) Punish those who admit their guilt in the administrative procedure: deprivation of bonuses, warning of incomplete official compliance, etc. depending on the degree of guilt;
      4) Remove the persistent from their posts, and for this
      5) Find those who offered, wanted, etc. done in good faith, but did not have the authority or ability; so put them in charge of the case further;
      6) Give a deadline for rework.

      In "Volokolamskoe Shosse" there is a good commandment of the commander: do not let the violation go. Never let it down, it's your responsibility. Not always a harsh punishment, even if just a word, but react to the violation, even to the proposal to violate the debt. The offender must understand and feel that he was seen, he was not approved.
      They have to shoot when long-term impunity leads to the fact that the violator "confuses the banks" and becomes really an enemy of the people.
      1. 0
        16 December 2020 12: 28
        recourse how is it "not a way to shoot"? - and how many thousands of soldiers for their games in the research institute paid with their lives, being reeled on the tracks of German tanks? - and you say "to deprive the prize" ...
        1. +1
          16 December 2020 15: 41
          Quote: nespich
          And how many thousands of soldiers for these games of theirs in the research institute paid with their lives, being wound on the tracks of German tanks?

          What games?
          NII-24 did not allow the people's money and time to be spent on the development of deliberately low-quality shells with ersatz cores. And he did not give the army to supply miracle shells with armor penetration worse than those already available.
      2. -1
        16 December 2020 23: 09
        Quote: Svateev
        Shooting is not a way.

        It is quite a way, if you shoot before the blooper, and not after.
    2. +3
      16 December 2020 11: 54
      Quote: nespich
      :) Reading about the testers from NII-24, you come to the thought "Was Comrade Stalin wrong when he shot such" scientists "?" So, should we consider them the real enemies of the people or not?

      Scientists demanding to stop working on useless projectiles with cores of tool or structural steel, of course, pests.
      Well, why does the Red Army need a sub-caliber projectile with armor penetration at the level of a conventional chamber with localizers?
      45-mm APCR shells from a distance of 100-200 meters were unable to penetrate the 50-mm armor plate in four cases out of eleven. The testers recorded only one conditioned penetrating defeat and as many as six blinds. At the same time, the initial speed of the ammunition approached 950 m / s.
      1. 0
        16 December 2020 12: 25
        Well, why does the Red Army need a sub-caliber projectile with armor penetration at the level of a conventional chamber with localizers?

        Well these are pests! I do not believe in such BPS indicators! - rigging of facts ...
        1. 0
          16 December 2020 13: 06
          Quote: nespich
          Well these are pests! I do not believe in such BPS indicators! - rigging of facts ...

          So this is not a BPS, but its copy with a core made of a substitute - tool or structural steel.
          Because the Motherland requires a projectile, but the Motherland has no tungsten for it. So they were perverted with ersatz materials for cores, until the tests and the report of the NII-24 did not cover up this futile business.
          1. 0
            16 December 2020 15: 57
            what When EMNIP is NECESSARY, the Motherland quickly found tungsten even for cermet (tungsten carbide) cores for PTDD / PTRS in the form of BS-41 bullets - so for anti-tank artillery himself ... Stalin ordered! Or, again, I didn't understand something?
            1. +2
              16 December 2020 16: 49
              Quote: nespich
              EMNIP when it is NECESSARY Homeland quickly found tungsten even for cermet (tungsten carbide) cores for PTRD / PTRS in the form of BS-41 bullets

              1. Compare the mass of the bullet and projectile cores.
              2. The release of BS-41 bullets was so "massive" that at the beginning of 1942 in one of the armies near Moscow there were 26 BS-100 anti-tank missiles on 41 PTRs.
              Quote: nespich
              so for the anti-tank artillery itself ... Stalin ordered!

              So Stalin ordered the production of the BR-350A. And they were released at such a rate that in July 1942 NII-48 stated with bitterness:
              In view of the lack of the required number of kamor armor-piercing shells in artillery units, the shooting of German tanks from 76,2-mm divisional guns with projectiles of other types is common ...

              Our military-industrial complex was generally a thing ... peculiar. The chief engineer of the plant in 1944 could easily move right the terms of production of 14,5 mm anti-aircraft machine guns agreed with GAU. Moreover, the release of these products was under the control of the LPB. And nothing - Well, I couldn’t, I couldn’t. ©
              1. 0
                18 December 2020 19: 16
                Quote: Alexey RA
                Our military-industrial complex was generally a thing ... peculiar.

                And then let me protect the workers. You can do better - come and show how. Because at the plant it is even more difficult than at the research institute.
                1. 0
                  19 December 2020 12: 41
                  Quote: Svateev
                  And then let me protect the workers. You can do better - come and show how. Because at the plant it is even more difficult than at the research institute.

                  He-he-he ... guess who was assigned to carry out the CPV?
                  In this case, the spice is added by the fact that Vladimirov was a designer from the factory design bureau of this very plant
                  © Ulanov
                  From and so.
                  The initial deadline for the delivery of the first batch of CPV was June 1944. Six months of correspondence between GAU, NKV and the "best manager" led to the GAU surrendering to the mercy of the chief engineer of the plant:
                  On the issue: the delivery of a series of 14,5 mm machine guns KPV-44 on anti-aircraft installations.
                  I am forced to agree with the deadline for the commissioning of KPV-44 at anti-aircraft installations, as defined by you on January 1, 1945.
                  However, there are fears that this period by Plant No. 2 will not be fulfilled as well as the previously appointed dates.
                  Inspection at the factory number 2 found that not all the installation details have been launched into production and the assembly of plants is extremely sluggish.
                  © GAU (Yakovlev) - NKV (Ustinov).
                  1. 0
                    24 December 2020 18: 03
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    Vladimirov was a designer from the factory design bureau of this very plant

                    In this case, I see nothing strange. On the contrary, it is logical to entrust production to where the designer works. In the course of development, he can correct the design.
                    Now the system is worse: you get a stupid conclusion from the Kh-Research Institute, drawn up by P.P. Pupkin. You write a complaint to the GUNID: check, because 2 * 2 = 4, and not 5, as pointed out by Pupkin! You get the answer: no way, checked, 5 will be. You turn over the piece of paper, and on the back the performer is P.P. Pupkin. He alone "understands" this topic in the entire Ministry of Defense ?!
                    1. 0
                      24 December 2020 18: 58
                      Quote: Svateev
                      In this case, I see nothing strange. On the contrary, it is logical to entrust production to where the designer works. In the course of development, he can correct the design.

                      Well, the plant with its design bureau was corrected before the deadlines agreed with GAU and Lavrenty Pavlovich were missed. ICHH, higher authorities wiped out - and adopted new terms.
                      Quote: Svateev
                      Now the system is worse: you get a stupid conclusion from the Kh-Research Institute, drawn up by P.P. Pupkin. You write a complaint to the GUNID: check, because 2 * 2 = 4, and not 5, as pointed out by Pupkin! You get the answer: no way, checked, 5 will be. You turn over the piece of paper, and on the back the performer is P.P. Pupkin. He alone "understands" this topic in the entire Ministry of Defense ?!

                      Reminds of an old miniature about letters from tenants with a complaint about a pipe running in the basement of a house - to all authorities, up to the UN. The answer to all their appeals invariably came from the head of the ZhEK. smile
                      From tenants to the Ministry of Public Utilities. Not everyone knows how to swim in our house! Although for some products we have to dive into the basement, where the pipe flows, which is why we are writing. Please put things in order!
                      Residents from the head of the housing office. In response to your letter to the Ministry of Public Utilities, I inform you that our country has the lowest rent. Great strides have been made in placing in different rooms what was previously combined in one. All the more worrisome is the fact that some of the residents of your house cannot swim. Observe precautions, do not go into the water while intoxicated, do not swim behind the buoys!
      2. 0
        28 February 2021 12: 42
        Can you read? It is about useless tool and structural steel cores. Hedgehog understands that no matter how hard you temper a bar of iron, it will remain an iron bar.
        They needed carbide materials, the ability to work with which was simply not there in 41-42.
  7. +12
    15 December 2020 19: 14
    These ammunition are used to combat particularly heavily armored targets at a distance of 0 to 300 meters. At distances exceeding 300 meters, the use of these ammunition is useless; therefore, when shooting at distances exceeding 300 meters, normal armor-piercing shells should be used.
    This thesis very clearly demonstrates the real advantage of sub-caliber projectiles, which are considered by some experts to be almost an absolute weapon against Soviet armored vehicles.
    This thesis clearly illustrates, first of all, the fact that the Germans were very well aware of the ballistics of these ammunition, in particular their property such as the drop in armor penetration and accuracy with distance.
    It all depends on the caliber and initial speed, therefore the thesis of "three hundred meters" is true only for the German 37 mm cannon.
    1. 0
      18 December 2020 19: 21
      Quote: Undecim
      It all depends on the caliber and initial speed,

      No, it all depends on the ballistic coefficient - on the intensity of air braking of projectiles of various shapes. In the then sub-caliber sabers, the pallet did not separate, but flew along with the projectile. And he slowed him down "not childishly." And the caliber had the correct aerodynamic shape and braked less. Therefore, the speed of the sub-caliber fell faster than that of the caliber, and penetration - along with it.
      Now the sub-caliber pallet flies off when it leaves the barrel.
      1. +1
        18 December 2020 19: 33
        I did not compare sub-caliber and caliber armor-piercing shells. And he was not going to dive into the subtleties of external ballistics, which few people understand.
        It was about a specific case - a 37 mm APCR shell.
  8. 0
    15 December 2020 20: 55
    Why couldn't we master the production of cumulative shells of such calibers?
    1. +6
      16 December 2020 00: 34
      Which ones? A rotating sub-caliber projectile with a steel lining of a conical shaped-charge notch could penetrate armor no more than its own caliber. Therefore, 45 mm HEAT shells did not make sense. 76 mm cumulative projectile ...:

      https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/kumulyativnye-boepripasy-istoriya-razrabotki-i-primeneniya-v-hode-velikoy-otechestvennoy-voyny

      "... In October 1941, at NII-6 engineers M.Ya. Vasiliev, Z.V. Vladimirova and NS Zhidkikh developed the first cumulative projectile with a conical steel lining of 76 mm caliber. Under test conditions, the projectile stably pierced 100 mm armor plate with a direct hit and 30 mm armor plate when hit at an angle of 30 degrees.In 1942, this cumulative ammunition goes into service and is supplied to the front in a set of 76 mm regimental cannon model 1927. Since May 1942, it has been mass-produced throughout During the war, about 1,1 million 76 mm cumulative ammunition was produced ... "
      1. +2
        16 December 2020 01: 00
        Well, I didn't know well. I thought we were able to establish the production of only 100mm cumulative shells. To be honest, I thought that the Germans in 1943 just for show-off were using cumulative screens on their tanks and self-propelled guns. It turns out they really had something to fear ...
        1. +2
          16 December 2020 01: 13
          These side screens were designed in 1943 to protect against 14,5 mm bullets from Soviet anti-tank rifles. However, they also protected more or less from contact detonation on the main armor of high-explosive steel fragmentation and from cumulative shells.

          https://zen.yandex.ru/media/yuripasholok/zascita-dlia-treshki-s-flangov-5faaa7819c3dc81f901f7677
    2. +2
      16 December 2020 11: 58
      Quote: Connor MacLeod
      Why couldn't we master the production of cumulative shells of such calibers?

      Because for two pre-war years, three specialized research institutes suffered with the design of the funnel, fuse and explosives. After receiving a trophy "kuma" in 1942, they were first able to achieve armor penetration equal to the caliber. Then more caliber. But the problem with fuses (triggering when fired directly in the bore) remained - so at first the regiments received the godfathers with a low initial velocity of the projectile. And only by 1944 the fuse was finalized for the guns with the divisional ballistics.
  9. +8
    15 December 2020 21: 26
    At the end of August 1941, with this non-trivial task, they turned to NII-24 or, as it is better known, Armored Institute
    Here the author was clearly mistaken. NII-24 NKOP, NKB, MSKhM, MM, MOP, Research Projectile Institute (NISI) NKTP, Research Order TKZ Institute No. 24 (NII-24) GKOT, Research Machine-Building Institute (NIMI) Rosboepripas, GP, FSUE, JSC "NIMI".
    NII - 24 is known as a shell. NII-48 was armored, but he did not develop shells.
  10. +1
    15 December 2020 22: 48
    Thank you Eugene! But you, as always, are an intriguer))) I always want an article more ... hi
  11. +2
    16 December 2020 02: 08
    The author should continue the topic ... After all, sub-caliber shells became the only ones effective against the reinforced armor of German tanks at a time when the "menagerie" acquired a thicker skin ... And the German "four" by 43 had significantly strengthened the skin.
  12. +3
    16 December 2020 11: 51
    Now let's move on to the conclusions of the main developer of the NII-24 shells. The engineers decided that shells of this design did not show advantages over standard armor-piercing ammunition. Moreover, according to NII-24: "Further work in general on sub-caliber projectiles in the case of the manufacture of a core (active projectile) from instrumental or structural steel with a specific gravity of about 7,84 should be stopped." This is how the defense industry of the USSR almost lost the most progressive anti-tank type of projectile!

    Not everything is so simple. ©
    NII-24 demanded to stop work not on sub-caliber shells in general, but specifically on projectiles in the case of making a core (active projectile) of tool or structural steel... The reason for this is described in the article - such cores did not provide armor penetration at the level of similar captured shells.
    The USSR was not able to make the core from a material similar to the trophy. The reason is trivial - there is no tungsten. Therefore, our design bureaus with structural steel were perverted. Therefore, work on sub-calibers slowed down.
  13. The comment was deleted.
  14. +2
    16 December 2020 12: 28
    Perhaps it was this military expert, whose signature cannot be made out, that saved the domestic armor-piercing sub-caliber shells.

    I wonder how this expert saved the domestic armor-piercing sub-caliber shells, if any
    new, more advanced designs of sub-caliber projectiles, making it possible to replace the "heavy" core with their design
    The USSR never invented it: it was the projectile with a heavy core ("coil") that went into production. Moreover, our developers had drawings of the German "coil" since 1941.
    Domestic subcalibers saved supplies from China and Lend-Lease.
  15. +1
    16 December 2020 13: 55
    Quote: Svateev
    4) Remove the persistent from their posts, and for this
    5) Find those who offered, wanted, etc. done in good faith, but did not have the authority or ability; so put them in charge of the case further;


    But if you do this at all levels at the same time, you will get a whirlwind of 3.14doras in leadership positions. Yes, it often happens.
    1. 0
      18 December 2020 19: 30
      Quote: Sancho_SP
      get a whirlwind of 3.14doras

      Bitingly, figuratively. But they did not explain their logic. Are you proposing to leave in office someone who could not do and persists, what cannot be done?
  16. -2
    16 December 2020 14: 03
    And no one thought that at that level of weapon technology, sub-caliber shells were simply not needed?

    Today's subcaliber rounds penetrate the same armor at a greater distance than similar caliber ones. And then what happened? That's right, get a small increase in penetration when fired at point-blank range. The very concept of firing from 200 metro is either an ambush (and then it is better to aim at the side), or these are tanks on a battery.

    The situation in 41-42 was fixed by zis-3.
    1. +1
      16 December 2020 15: 52
      Quote: Sancho_SP
      Today's subcaliber rounds penetrate the same armor at a greater distance than similar caliber ones. And then what happened? That's right, get a small increase in penetration when fired at close range.

      The ambush is that this small increase in armor penetration was just critical. Because the high-quality caliber BBS 45-mm cannon 50-mm frontal armor of German STs did not always penetrate the frontal armor "shtug" did not penetrate at all. And 76-mm did not penetrate 80-mm armor (despite the fact that the American 75-mm did penetrate it).
      Quote: Sancho_SP
      The very concept of shooting from 200 metro is either an ambush (and then it is better to aim at the side), or these are tanks on a battery.

      This is the standard firing range for the 45-mm anti-tank gun by 1944.
      Quote: Sancho_SP
      The situation in 41-42 was fixed by zis-3.

      Without armor-piercing shells? wink
      In view of the lack of the required number of kamor armor-piercing shells in artillery units, the shooting of German tanks from 76,2-mm divisional guns with projectiles of other types is common ...
      © From the report "The defeat of the armor of German tanks." July 1942 city NII-48
      1. -1
        16 December 2020 16: 17
        The ambush is that this small increase in armor penetration was just critical. Because the high-quality caliber BBS 45-mm cannon 50-mm frontal armor of German STs did not always penetrate the frontal armor "shtug" did not penetrate at all. And 76-mm did not penetrate 80-mm armor (despite the fact that the American 75-mm did penetrate it).


        All this is very conditional, for a meeting between tank units and anti-tank defense units is very rarely a duel on the runway. Any cannon penetrates any armor not always. :)

        This small increase gave an extra 50 meters of distance. And I definitely agree that these 50 are many hundreds of lives, if not thousands. But this is not an effective solution.

        Well, and again, since we started for forty-five, let's estimate the beyond-barrier effect of these shells.
        The layout of the German tanks was quite loose, so a cylinder the size of a toothbrush battery might not have done much harm after the first penetration. But forty grams of TNT here is a completely different matter.

        This is the standard firing range for the 45-mm anti-tank gun by 1944.


        This is the one that "Farewell, Motherland!" in dubious memoirs called?
        I, in fact, wrote to this about the ZIS-3 as a quality solution.

        Without armor-piercing shells?


        With standard caliber. And the fact that there were sometimes no shells - this has a very distant relation to the type of shell.
  17. +1
    16 December 2020 15: 58
    Brief description of the situation with tungsten in the USSR at the end of 1941:
    - There are no reserves of tungsten.
    - The processing of tungsten-based special alloy cores (similar to the German model) can only be carried out on a few grinding wheels.
    - For the manufacture of just one core for a 76-mm sub-caliber projectile, such an amount of alloy is needed that will simultaneously deprive 30 aircraft industry machines for the entire service life of these cutters.

    And it is precisely a special alloy based on tungsten that is needed, since:
    ... the core, even being made of high-carbon tool steel with a vanadium additive, disintegrates into tiny pieces when it hits the armor.
    © Letter from NII-24 to GAU
  18. -1
    16 December 2020 16: 25
    Quote: Alexey RA
    For the manufacture of just one core for a 76-mm sub-caliber projectile, such an amount of alloy is needed that will simultaneously deprive 30 aircraft industry machines for the entire service life of these cutters.



    What an interesting formulation. In fact, it is in one tungsten shell as in 30 cutters. And it sounds already on the execution article)
    1. +1
      16 December 2020 19: 23
      Quote: Sancho_SP
      What an interesting formulation. In fact, it is in one tungsten shell as in 30 cutters. And it sounds already on the execution article)

      Not only sounds, but also looks.
      The army has about 10 000 mm cannons with divisional ballistics. Even with 76 special shots per barrel, this is 2 rounds. Or 20 incisors.
      1. 0
        16 December 2020 21: 29
        That is, the orders of magnitude of the required tungsten are not comparable to cutters in general.
        1. 0
          17 December 2020 10: 28
          Quote: Sancho_SP
          That is, the orders of magnitude of the required tungsten are not comparable to cutters in general.

          That's all right. If you start making shells with a "German-style" core, the industry will be left without cutters at all. And other alloys for the core are not suitable - they crumble on the armor.

          And then the hitmen come and with a slight movement of the hand make a serial sub-caliber and godfather in 1941. laughing