Raiders. Finest hour of "Admiral Hipper"

74

When you hear or read the word "raider", something Germanic immediately pops up in your memory. Either the muddy silhouette of the Tirpitz somewhere in the North, by its mere presence causing the relaxation of organisms among the British, or an auxiliary cruiser converted from a civilian ship with a team of selected cutthroats like the Penguin or Cormoran.

In fact, where did the Germans go? The high seas fleet remained in the past, and what they managed to build by the beginning of the war they started, in no way could compare with the British fleet... Therefore, the Germans did not even dream of any squadron battles such as Jutland, since they no longer had squadrons.



And it was what it was. 4 battleships, 6 heavy and 6 light cruisers. Of these, during the first year and a half of the war, the Germans managed to lose a battleship, 2 heavy and 2 light cruisers.

Hence, it is quite a reasonable raiding tactics, especially considering that even without taking into account the help of the allies, the British fleet consisted of 15 battleships and battle cruisers, 7 aircraft carriers, 66 cruisers and 184 destroyers. And about 30% of this amount was still under construction at British shipyards.

Raiders. Finest hour of "Admiral Hipper"

Of this number, 13 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers and almost 40 cruisers were concentrated in the Atlantic alone. True, all this power was dispersed from Greenland to Antarctica, but nonetheless.

In general, the Germans had nothing to oppose to British power, except, perhaps, the tactics used in the First World War. That is, to try to arrange a blockade of the British Isles, making the delivery of everything necessary from the colonies as difficult as possible.

Two ways: submarines and surface ships, since the Germans did not have enough long-range aircraft capable of inflicting real damage. I have already written about the Condors, FW.200, which sank more than one ship with bombs, but there were too few of them to seriously strain Britain.

So the actions of the submarine fleet and surface raiders remained. If the Germans were more or less good with submarines, then everything that could be used in this regard, from a battleship to a passenger liner, was used as surface raiders.

Generally, in stories World War II still leaves many blank spots. Some are simply not of interest, some are simply not left with eyewitness testimonies to our days, but there are some that you can think of. As, for example, the case cited, in which, on the one hand, there is nothing special, and on the other, there is a historical mystery.

February 1941. The German High Command is struggling to complicate the supply to Britain by intercepting Atlantic convoys.

Operation "Nordzeetur" was planned, within which the already familiar "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" were to go to sea with the support of "Hipper" and destroyers. But the Gneisenau was still being repaired after being damaged in a storm in December 1940, but the Scharnhorst was strange. The seemingly intact ship remained in the port, which can be attributed to riddles, because the situation turned out to be strange: the Scharnhorst and Hipper in a pair could have done quite serious things. But in fact, only the Admiral Hipper went into action with an escort from a destroyer and three destroyers.


The cruiser left Brest and went to the Atlantic. The fact that the operation was conceived in a hurry is evidenced by the fact that the Spichern tanker was sent to supply the Hipper with fuel, urgently converted from an ordinary merchant ship and with a crew that, to put it mildly, was not trained in such maneuvers as refueling cruisers in the open ocean.

The cruiser and the tanker met, and the Hipper refueling show lasted for three whole days. This, of course, shows the sailors from "Spichern" not from the best side in terms of training, but the main thing is that the cruiser was fueled and he finally went out hunting.

The plan was very simple: "Hipper" was to "make noise" south of the main convoy routes, at the latitude of Spain and Morocco, in order to divert attention from "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau", which, after the completion of the repair of the latter, were supposed to go out north and attack the convoys that from Canada. On the whole, a very good idea, but for such a thing it would be better to send more independent in terms of range "Deutschlands".

"Hipper" during the week diligently pretended to be looking for someone in the south, however, especially trying not to catch the eye of the British. A sort of "ghost cruiser" that was seen everywhere.

On February 10, the news came from the commander of the northern detachment, Admiral Lutyens, who was flying the flag on the Gneisenau, that the battleships had been discovered by the British. The commander of the Hipper, Captain Meisel, decided not to seek adventure on the aft towers and moved southeast, towards the Azores. This turned out to be not only the right one, but a very happy (for the Germans) decision.

The next day, February 11, 1941, the steamer Iceland was unlucky, which lagged behind convoy HG-53. The captain of "Iceland" did not play the hero and during interrogation in the cabin of the captain of the "Hipper" told everything: the route of the convoy, the number of ships, what kind of security.

The security of the convoy was such that the Germans perked up and rushed to catch up. Two destroyers, which were new before the First World War, and an armed trawler that could be called a gunboat - this was not a threat to the Hipper at all.

And the raider at full speed went in the direction indicated by the captain of "Iceland". And then at night the marks of the ships appeared on the radar. Without giving themselves away, the Germans decided to wait until morning to start a battle in the light of the sun.

However, in the morning it turned out that everything is even more beautiful (again from the point of view of the Germans), for they did not come across the convoy HG-53, but on the SLS-64, heading from Freetown. The convoy consisted of 19 ships that crawled at a speed of 8 knots and were not guarded at all!

With the first rays of the sun, the German sailors began to count with surprise the ships of a completely different convoy, which were passing by on a parallel course. Moreover, it did not occur to anyone in the convoy that it was a German raider. "Hipper" was mistaken for "Rhinaun" due to the good work of the German radio operators who broadcast callsigns similar to those of "Rhinaun".


"Admiral Hipper"


"Rhinaun"

But when it finally dawn, that is, at 6 am, the Germans stopped playing hide and seek, lowered the British flag and opened fire on the almost defenseless ships. Yes, some of the ships in the convoy had some weapons, but what could the 76mm and 102mm cannons do against the Hipper? So they didn't do anything.

Having reached a maximum speed of 31 knots, the Hipper caught up with the convoy and went on a parallel course, opening fire from all her weapons and firing torpedoes from the vehicles on the starboard side. Then, having overtaken the convoy, the cruiser turned around and opened fire from the armament of the left side, emptying the torpedo tubes and the left side. 12 torpedoes are 12 torpedoes. And eight 203-mm guns, twelve 105-mm guns, twelve 37-mm machine guns, ten 20-mm machine guns. And all this was shooting.


According to the gunners' reports, a total of 26 ships were fired upon. The Germans had two senior artillery officers on the Hipper, on the port and starboard sides. The senior artillery officer directed the firing of both calibers, and the chief torpedo operator did the same with regard to his torpedo tubes.

So the figure of 26 targets is not invented, it is clear that some ships received from the Hipper twice, or maybe three times.

The battle, which began at a distance of about 3 miles, turned into a massacre at a distance of 5 cables, and at the very end the distance from the cruiser barrels to the targets was about 2 cables. Even anti-aircraft guns were used.

In such conditions, to sink the transport, it was enough to hit one large-caliber shell in the waterline area. As the results show, the Germans coped with this task.

The main-caliber guns fired in volleys of four guns, in fact, without zeroing, which at such distances was not necessary, each projectile was already flying at the target. During the first hour of the battle, more than 200 main caliber shells were fired. The fire was carried out by high-explosive shells with a head fuse, which was quite effective when firing completely unarmored targets.

Further, the main caliber was fired at the waterline, with the most accurate aiming. 105-mm "station wagons" fired in the same direction, and anti-aircraft guns fired at the bridges and wheelhouses of ships. The 105mm guns fired a reported 760 rounds.

The fired torpedoes also did not miss such a target as a convoy in a dense formation. According to observation data, of the 12 torpedoes fired, 11 hit the target, but one did not explode. 6 ships sank due to being hit by torpedoes.

Naturally, in such conditions it would be reasonable to recharge the devices, but the seas were disturbing. However, an attempt was made to reload the torpedo tubes. Two torpedoes were prepared, but the third miraculously did not fly overboard, falling off the transport cart. They gave the command "the smallest" and at this speed the crews were able to load 2 more torpedoes. True, by that time the battle had already ended.

At 7.40 am, that is, an hour and a half after the start of ... the battle, the SLS-64 convoy ceased to exist as such.

It cannot be said that everything went so smoothly, because such intense firing with the main caliber could not but affect the components and mechanisms of the ship.


In fact, the German artillerymen demonstrated not only the ability to conduct accurate fire (although, okay, everyone knows how to shoot at point-blank range), but also get out of emergency situations.

In turret "A" fuses have blown and the projectile supply system is out of order. While the fuses were changing, the crews fed charges and shells manually.

In tower "B" during the first volleys the tray for supplying shells was out of order. He stopped dropping to the bottom position. While the repairmen were bringing the mechanism to life, the crew fed the shells with the help of mechanical hoists.

The crew of the "C" tower was lucky: they only had a breakdown of the hydraulic breaker and they had to send shells manually during the whole battle.

It was noted in the ship's log that all malfunctions were eliminated "without prejudice to the rate of fire." Which only confirms the good training of the German artillerymen.

In addition to problems with the main caliber guns, we also suffered with the 105 mm universal guns. The fuses were burning, especially those in charge of the circuits of the projectile supply and guidance electric motors. Installations were out of order systematically and regularly, both from shocks when firing main guns and from the effects of powder gases.

In principle, only torpedo tubes were fired without problems.

It is necessary to summarize, but this is where miracles begin.

In general, the massacre that Hipper staged is a record. Moreover, the performance record for a single ship in two world wars.

According to the German side, the crew of the "Admiral Hipper" sank 13 or 14 vessels with a displacement of about 75 tons.

The opinion of the British side is somewhat different.

The British recognized 7 ships sunk:
- "Worlaby" (4876 reg. Tons);
- Westbury (4712 reg. T);
- "Owsvestry Grange" (4684 reg. Tons);
- "Shrewsbury" (4542 reg. Tons);
- "Derrynein" (4896 reg. Tons);
- "Perseus" (5172 reg. T, belonged to Greece);
- "Borgestad" (3924 reg. T, belonged to Norway).

I managed to get to the ports:
- "Lornaston" (4934 reg. T, Britain);
- "Kalliopi" (4965 reg. T, Greece);
- "Aiderby" (4876 reg. T, Britain);
- "Klunparku" (4811 reg. T, Britain);
- "Blayratoll" (4788 reg. T, Britain).

It turns out 12 ships. But in all reports, the number of ships in the convoy is indicated at 19. Where 7 more ships have gone is not clear.

The Germans, of course, consider them (and not without reason) to be sunk.

Actually, here's another list:
- "Volturno";
- "Margot";
- "Poliktor" (Greece);
- "Anna Mazaraki" (Greece).

These ships were gathered around the Margo by Vice Commodore Ivor Price and brought to the port of Funchal in Madeira.


"Margot"

"Varangberg" (Norway) (together with the Greek "Kalliopi") arrived in Gibraltar.

That is, 10 ships (three heavily damaged) survived.

In general, the picture of the SLS-64 convoy turned out to be as follows: 19 ships left Freetown. 7 sank "Hipper", 10 reached ports. 2 more ... No data.

But not 14. That is, there are already 7 and 2.

Although, stopping the carnage and starting a retreat to the north, Meisel wrote in the report: "I decide to interrupt the fight, although six more ships are visible.".

The entry in the ship's log also applies to this time:

So far 12 ships have been sunk, six more are afloat, and two of them are underway. Two or three of the four were badly damaged. One of them is drowning and, possibly, another will drown. We sank 13 ships with a displacement of 78 tons. Due to the possibility of enemy heavy ships spawning, I can no longer stay here. It would take several hours to collect all the scattered lifeboats.

And here a logical question arises: why did not Captain Meisel turn the victory into a final and irrevocable one?


I would say this: eternal German caution and reluctance to take risks. This the Germans sinned throughout the war, while the Kriegsmarine fought.

Langsdorf, after a brilliant battle at La Plata, floods the "Admiral Count Spee" and ineptly shoots a bullet in his forehead. Although one could easily resist provocations and scatter the British cruisers.

Lutyens on "Bismarck" did not allow the rudders to be wedged by the explosion, fearing to damage the shafts, and the battleship sank to the bottom with balanced propeller shafts, but to the bottom.

Meisel, obviously, did not differ much from his colleagues, therefore he simply did not show the due determination. Until the very end, he apparently did not believe that the convoy was going without an escort, and therefore constantly expected the appearance of British cruisers. Hence, leaving after an hour and a half of the battle.

In addition, 2/3 of the high-explosive shells and torpedoes in the vehicles were used up, and reloading turned out to be difficult in conditions of rough seas. But torpedoes are not the main thing weapon heavy cruiser. The fact that Meisel decided to leave a third of the high-explosive shells intact is normal. The appearance of British destroyers or light cruisers could make life very difficult for the Hipper, since firing armor-piercing and semi-armor-piercing shells at lightly armored ships is not the best way out.

But in this case, the heavy cruiser has very clearly demonstrated what it can do when used as a raider. And, it should be noted, demonstrated more than excellent.

High speed, powerful armament - these were definitely the cruiser's strengths. That's why he is a cruiser, all the more heavy. However, there were also disadvantages in the form of a short range and hence the constant need for refueling.

The expenditure of shells was also high: 247 shells with a caliber of 203 mm and 760 shells of 105 mm plus 12 torpedoes for seven sunken ships - this is a bit too much.

Apparently, this is precisely why the "Admiral Hipper" was not used constantly as a raider.


In general, it is the commander of the Hipper who is fully responsible for the current confusion. It is clear that Meisel was constantly waiting for the escort ships, with which he would also have to fight. Therefore, the Veda cruiser is a rather chaotic shelling, especially since both sides fired at different times.

So the Hipper maneuvered at high speed, covered and struck ships, which also maneuvered, trying to get away from the cruiser. Some fell under fire more than once, which, in fact, allowed Meisel to record the sinking of 13 ships.

But even such a result as the sinking of 7 ships and the sending to the bottom of more than 50 tons of cargo needed by the British is already an achievement. So the Hipper team's actions were quite good.

And the last question. The most interesting. How did it happen that the British fleet, numbering so many ships, could not provide a pair of destroyers to defend the convoy? Yes, they would not have done the weather, but torpedoes and smoke screens could already be a good help against the Hipper.

Raider is an interesting concept. As well as its application. If wisely, this guarantees inflicting enormous damage on the enemy.
74 comments
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  1. +8
    11 October 2020 02: 36
    I read Roman's articles with pleasure, as an exciting story.
    Your writing, coupled with a good sense of humor, turns articles into stunningly interesting stories! hi
    I'll add a little bit from myself. Everything is clear from the article on armament.
    Cruiser "Admiral Hipper":
    Displacement Standard 14 250 t,
    full - 18 210 t
    Cruising range 6800 miles at 15 knots
  2. +2
    11 October 2020 03: 31
    Thanks, interesting article
    1. +4
      11 October 2020 18: 25
      I recommend that you familiarize yourself with:
      Pocket battleship. Admiral Scheer in the Atlantic [HL]
      Brenneke Johan
      Chapter 4 ATTACK ON CONVOY NH-84
      https://biography.wikireading.ru/140129
      The Scheer first sank the convoy escort auxiliary cruiser, and then, at night, fired more tonnage than the Hipper.
      1. +2
        11 October 2020 18: 27
        I do not argue, interesting facts from the actions of the Navy of other countries should be studied and learned from other people's mistakes))
      2. +1
        11 October 2020 20: 36
        Quote: Captain Pushkin
        The Scheer first sank the convoy escort auxiliary cruiser, and then, at night, fired more tonnage than the Hipper.

        Including Jervis Bay, six transports with a capacity of 47495 GRT were sunk
        1. +1
          11 October 2020 20: 50
          Quote: Macsen_Wledig
          Including Jervis Bay, six transports with a capacity of 47495 GRT were sunk

          This is who thinks it. According to Brenneck, if together with Jervis Bay, there will be 8 vessels with a total tonnage of about 73 thousand tons (too lazy to calculate up to a ton).
          Plus, 5 transports with a tonnage of about 30 thousand tons were damaged.
          1. +1
            11 October 2020 21: 02
            Quote: Captain Pushkin
            According to Brenneck, if together with Jervis Bay, there will be 8 ships,

            Brennecke believes the Mopan, which was sunk earlier in the day, was not part of the convoy.
            73000 brt? Famously lied ...
  3. +6
    11 October 2020 03: 44
    As far as I remember, "Hipper" had constant problems with cars. The article is really interesting and is written in a "dashing" language. Thanks to the author. hi
    1. +2
      11 October 2020 07: 41
      Problems with cars? Did not know. I read about the carnage in my youth, but such nuances were not indicated there. Live and learn. Thank you and the author.
  4. +10
    11 October 2020 05: 27

    And the last question. The most interesting. How did it happen that the British fleet, numbering so many ships, could not provide a pair of destroyers to defend the convoy?

    There would be enough destroyers from the Britons, they would not have exchanged 1940 old troughs from the Amers in 50 for their military bases around the world.
    1. +6
      11 October 2020 14: 09
      Quote: Boris ⁣Razor
      There would be enough destroyers from the Britons, they would not have exchanged 1940 old troughs from the Amers in 50 for their military bases around the world.

      The meaning of the deal, the destroyers - the bases - is in clearing Britain's debts for PMA. Old debts prevented the Americans from selling weapons to the British on credit. The destroyers themselves were a bonus.
      1. -2
        11 October 2020 23: 19
        Quote: Cherry Nine
        Old debts prevented the Americans from selling weapons to the British on credit. The destroyers themselves were a bonus.

        Then 10 corvettes (sloops) went as a bonus. And these destroyers were brits from the Amers exactly what they were begging from the very beginning of the batch, fearing, not without reason, for their sea communications. The fact that the Britons got them at such a high price is justified precisely by the need for the Britons in them, as well as by the position of the Amer Congress, which then explicitly refused to support one of the belligerent parties, but a deal that strengthens its own defenses (base, sir) was ready lead past such a position.
        The concessions of the Britons to receive any other aid from the states (including the supply of weapons and raw materials) were later formalized by the Atlantic Charter, and there were by no means only bases here. These bases went exactly in exchange for destroyers.
  5. +4
    11 October 2020 08: 20
    "Ferret in a chicken coop", otherwise you cannot say ... Once again confirmation that the war at sea is not a simple computer shooter. This is luck, skill, and the weather factor ...
  6. +4
    11 October 2020 08: 41
    Good, efficient article.
    Causes a grin - the famous "German quality" - none of the main caliber turrets, shooting in fact in the range conditions did not work as it should ... maybe that's why Meisel stopped the fight ...
    1. +4
      11 October 2020 18: 32
      "The consumption of projectiles was also high: 247 shells with a caliber of 203 mm and 760 shells of 105 mm, plus 12 torpedoes for seven sunken ships - this is a bit much."

      "Too much" is not the right word. Of the 7 targets, 6 were sunk by torpedoes and only 1 by artillery. 1007 shells and 1 sunken vehicle !!!
      How many of them hit the mark at all?
      1. +2
        11 October 2020 19: 01
        Quote: Captain Pushkin
        How many of them hit the mark at all?

        Neither Wegener nor Busse write this in their reports ...
        As for accuracy, Maisel writes in his report that one or two shells hit the target from a four-gun salvo.
        By the way, it is not entirely clear where the number 247 shells came from: it is not in Meisel's report, in Wegener's report it is not directly indicated, from the number of shells fired on individual ships, the figure is 230 shells.
      2. +6
        12 October 2020 06: 53
        Quote: Captain Pushkin
        247 rounds with a caliber of 203 mm and 760 rounds of 105 mm plus 12 torpedoes for seven sunken ships is a bit too much. "

        Um. what It's one thing when you shoot at a steamer that did not manage to pass "Attacked by a Raider", when you can see whether you hit the waterline with a single projectile or not, when you can see for half an hour or an hour whether the ship has begun to sink or you need "additional" ...
        And it is quite another matter when there are a lot of targets, they all start scattering, you do not know if there are warships in the guard that can inflict fatal damage on you, that can affect the course of the operation. Then you work in the mode of maximum fire performance, in order to be sure that the ship is guaranteed to sink wink
        Everything is relative, and before you reproach someone after the fact, you just need to put yourself in his place and try to calculate all the risks.
        It seems to us all that we are great admirals with generals, sitting on sofas and knowing much more than the heroes of the events themselves ... hi
  7. +10
    11 October 2020 10: 35
    And it was what it was. 4 battleships, 6 heavy and 6 light cruisers
    At the beginning of the war, 1939, there were five heavy cruisers. Prinz Eugen was completed a year later.
    1. +6
      11 October 2020 12: 04
      Quote: Undecim
      At the beginning of the war, 1939,

      For that matter, on September 39th there are 2 nedolinkors. Bismarck August 40th, Tirpitz February 41st.
  8. +10
    11 October 2020 11: 10
    Hipper returned to Brest on 14 February. There were only 250 tons of fuel left in the tanks.
    We can recall once again that the Germans did not have a meaningful shipbuilding, subordinate to a common goal. Their ships were not sharpened for raider operations and were forcedly used. However, even from such improvisations, the limes got sick very much. It suddenly emerged that their fleet could not effectively counter the raiders, especially the LOCs as raiders. The Metropolitan Fleet missed Bismarck twice and only hastily summoned from Gibraltar by an accidental hit saved the Britons from another shame.
    The British fleet allowed the concentration of a strong grouping in Brest, an ideal point for attacking Atlantic convoys. Hipper's success could well be repeated more than once. But then the swearing stupid Bomber Command intervened. With ineffectual, costly attacks, they forced the Germans to leave for Germany. The RAF did the job of the vaunted British Navy, effectively ending the Atlantic raider war
    1. +6
      11 October 2020 14: 43
      Quote: Engineer
      The RAF did the job of the vaunted British Navy, effectively ending the raider war in the Atlantic

      It is also worth considering that the "artist" somewhat shifted his views on the place of application of surface ships: "Russian convoys" appeared ...
      1. +3
        11 October 2020 15: 04
        Yes, this is the second factor
        Meeting of December 29, 1941 and the decision to concentrate in Norway.
        And so, I repeat, I would like to look at the attempts of enlightened sailors if the Germans had only a third Bismarck instead of a couple of Hippers.
        1. 0
          11 October 2020 15: 20
          Quote: Engineer
          if the Germans had only a third Bismarck instead of a pair of Hippers.

          Strongly deep alternative: he just had nowhere to come from.
          1. +2
            11 October 2020 15: 29
            Maybe so.
            I myself do not like alternatives, so I did not go deep
            Like Deshimag in Bremen could fit in.
            1. +2
              11 October 2020 15: 48
              Quote: Engineer
              Like Deshimag in Bremen could fit in.

              The question is that it would be the battleship H, which the Germans would have built either as the 3rd Bismarck, or, more likely, as a Bismarck variant with a 350-mm main battery (in accordance with the contract).
              They would not have had time to the real start of the war: the laying was planned in the 38th, the descent in the 39th, commissioning in the 41-42th ... That is, for the raider Battle of the Atlantic, he would not have time ...
              1. 0
                11 October 2020 20: 02
                With some luck, they could have used the French.
                1. +1
                  11 October 2020 20: 10
                  Quote: Saxahorse
                  With some luck, they could have used the French.

                  Even if luck will need trained crews and powerful basic air defense, otherwise "Fortresses" and Liberators "will bomb trophies in the Stone Age.
                  And how to get past the Rock?
                  1. +1
                    11 October 2020 20: 48
                    Quote: Macsen_Wledig
                    And how to get past the Rock?

                    Past the cliff? Just go through and that's it. There was no anti-ship missile then and only a couple of battleships can stop the battleship, and even then not always. Just the French, in addition, were distinguished by a fair amount of agility.
                    1. 0
                      11 October 2020 21: 03
                      Quote: Saxahorse
                      Just go through and that's it ..

                      Operation Torch? No, have not heard. :)
                      1. 0
                        11 October 2020 23: 47
                        What's the connection? Well, again, the Torch is the end of 1942 only ..
                      2. 0
                        12 October 2020 17: 50
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        What is the connection?

                        And what, the Germans took the south of France in the spring and summer of 40?
                      3. 0
                        12 October 2020 23: 12
                        Quote: Macsen_Wledig
                        And what, the Germans took the south of France in the spring and summer of 40?

                        With the right approach, they could get by with an affectionate word :)

                        You asked where the Germans could find another battleship? I remembered a variant with a non-zero reality. The British got in with their Catapult for a reason. Anything could be ..
  9. +8
    11 October 2020 11: 27
    If the Germans were more or less good with submarines
    By the time the Second World War broke out, by September 1939, the Germans had 57 submarines, of which 26 were capable of sailing into the Atlantic. The British had 58.
  10. +8
    11 October 2020 12: 08
    Operation Nordzeetur was planned, within which the already familiar Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were to go to sea with the support of the Hipper and destroyers. But the Gneisenau was still being repaired after being damaged in a storm in December 1940, but the Scharnhorst was strange. The seemingly intact ship remained in the port, which can be attributed to riddles
    There are no riddles here. Unternehmen Nordseetour began with the Admiral Hipper breakout into the Atlantic on November 30, 1940. At this time Scharnhorst was not in the port. and was undergoing sea trials in the Baltic after a long repair, therefore he could not participate in Nordseetour in any way.
    1. +4
      11 October 2020 12: 34
      But in fact only "Admiral Hipper" with an escort from a destroyer and three destroyers went into action. The cruiser left Brest and went to the Atlantic.
      Here the author is completely confused. To participate in the Unternehmen Nordseetour, the Admiral Hipper sailed from Kiel on November 30, 1940. And he went out alone.
      And leaving Brest on February 1, 1941 is a completely different operation.
  11. +5
    11 October 2020 13: 34
    The question is simple - how many ships during the entire WWII left the ports of North America with a destination in Britain and how many of them were sunk by the dead German raiders? laughing
    1. +4
      11 October 2020 16: 03
      Quote: Operator
      The question is simple - how many ships during the entire WWII left the ports of North America with a destination in Britain and how many of them were sunk by the dead German raiders? laughing

      And the raider's task is not to sink everything that floats, it is physically impossible.
      The task of the raider is to destabilize the routes ... And this leads to changes in the delivery schedules of strategic resources, the diversion of warships to search for the raider (a good example is the Bismarck), etc.
      1. -2
        11 October 2020 16: 07
        So how did the German raiders destabilize the North America - British Isles route?
        1. +3
          11 October 2020 16: 19
          Quote: Operator
          So how did the German raiders destabilize the North America - British Isles route?

          They destabilized as best they could ... :)
          As I wrote before, Reynyubung is a good example.
          If he went according to plan, I would like to see the actions of the British. :)
          1. +5
            11 October 2020 16: 32
            Mass shipping during WWII could only be destabilized by massive raiding, but then the Third Reich would have been left without an army and aviation. Therefore, the Germans relied heavily on submarines - both cheaper and more combat-resistant.

            Another thing is that the many times richer USA and BI have outplayed them here too with the massive construction of anti-submarine fleet and aviation. But this is already a question of cockroaches in the head of the Fuhrer of the German nation, who, instead of occupying the British Isles and thereby closing the question of the war at sea, climbed to butt with the USSR - such as a victory over the Russians would cause the automatic annexation of the British Empire to the Third Reich of the German nation (so Hitler explained to his generals the need to develop the "Barbarossa" plan).

            After that, the creation of an anti-Hitler coalition with an order of magnitude greater military-economic potential was only a matter of time.
            1. +2
              11 October 2020 16: 39
              Quote: Operator
              Mass shipping during WWII could only be destabilized by massive raiding, but then the Third Reich would have been left without an army and aviation.

              Plan Z (at least in its project) did not seem to interfere with either the development of the Wehrmacht or the development of the Luftwaffe ...

              Quote: Operator
              Therefore, the Germans relied heavily on submarines - both cheaper and more combat-resistant.

              Naturally...
              Building submarines is faster and easier.
              1. +1
                11 October 2020 16: 45
                Plan Z did not get in the way for a simple reason - it was tightly limited in funding.

                A typical case - in the same Karabakh, until the Armenians receive funding from their foreign diaspora at the level of the Azerbaijani army, they will not be able to fight it on equal terms.
                1. 0
                  11 October 2020 17: 15
                  Quote: Operator
                  Plan Z did not get in the way for a simple reason - it was tightly limited in funding.

                  And where does the funding limit?
                  The Germans figured out what they needed (according to their tactical groundwork) and began to build.
              2. +1
                12 October 2020 11: 01
                Sorry, Maxim, but the notorious plan Z is one of the fatal mistakes of the leadership of the Third Reich.
                This trip to "Uncle Alfred's old rake" disoriented the entire systematic preparation for war.
                The first colossal mistake - the deadline for 1944. And before that, everyone will humbly wait until Germany unfolds in full force?
                The second, following from the first, is the impossibility of concealing such large-scale preparations for a global war, which leads to an elementary countering by Great Britain and the United States of the threat from Germany.
                The third is the reorientation of industry and personnel training to a large surface fleet instead of light forces, submarine fleet and strategic aviation. As a result, neither a strategic air command with the appropriate infrastructure, nor a naval aviation was created. And Deinitz's initiative was clearly late.
                And fourth, perhaps most importantly, the capabilities of the Anglo-Saxons in waging a modern war against the Reich itself were not analyzed (only the blockade of the First World War was meant).
                I understand that the scale of Plan Z captures, and ship projects conquer shipbuilding enthusiasts (including your humble servant), but in the historical realities of the late 30s of the twentieth century, this plan was in fact a utopia, mortally dangerous for the state implementing it ...
                1. +1
                  12 October 2020 19: 03
                  Quote: Victor Leningradets
                  This trip to "Uncle Alfred's old rake" disoriented the entire systematic preparation for war.

                  No rake: the enemy has changed - the fleet development strategy has changed.

                  Quote: Victor Leningradets
                  The first colossal mistake - the deadline for 1944. And before that, everyone will humbly wait until Germany unfolds in full force?

                  Excuse me, but that all ships can appear "on click" on January 1, 1939, when the plan was nominally launched?

                  Quote: Victor Leningradets
                  The second, following from the first, is the impossibility of concealing such large-scale preparations for a global war, which leads to an elementary countering by Great Britain and the United States of the threat from Germany.

                  What kind of war are you talking about? At the end of 38, no one was going to fight on a global scale.

                  Quote: Victor Leningradets
                  The third is the reorientation of industry and personnel training to a large surface fleet instead of light forces, a submarine fleet and strategic aviation.

                  This is the afterthought in you ... :)

                  Quote: Victor Leningradets
                  As a result, neither a strategic air command with the appropriate infrastructure, nor a naval aviation was created.

                  What does the Navy have to do with the Luftwaffe?

                  Quote: Victor Leningradets
                  And fourth, perhaps most importantly, the capabilities of the Anglo-Saxons in waging a modern war against the Reich itself were not analyzed (only the blockade of the First World War was meant).

                  It seems to me that there were ...
                  Or do YOU ​​think the Plan Z lineup came out of thin air?
                  1. +1
                    13 October 2020 15: 46
                    Correct in form, but in essence ...
                    The strategy essentially remained the same = land-based. They only took into account the impossibility of waging a war on two fronts. And so, the same surface fleet, planned for 1944 from 10:16 to 3: 4 British. And again, who will push whom on land (well, they learned how to sweep in the form of a blitzkrieg).
                    Until 1944 the fleet will NOT be built, they will be preempted, which is what happened in the "Polish trap". But the deployment of the submarine fleet takes two years, and by 1940 you can have 300 or more submarines, plus one "seven" per day, as Deinitz suggested.
                    At the end of 1938, only the London madman Neville Chamberlain was not going to fight. The rest fully understood that it was a year and a half before the war.
                    The Luftwaffe is not a strategic command, but, in fact, front-line aviation involved in solving strategic bombing and naval operations that are not characteristic of it. Hence the natural failure in these two forms. Strategic aviation is planning, and the Luftwaffe is operational response, nothing more.
                    They were not analyzed, it was simply simulated the conduct of the war by the enemy according to the patterns of the First World War. This was shown by the war, both in relation to the war in Europe and in relation to the war with the USSR. Only in France, which followed precisely these patterns, was success achieved. And Plan Z was not born out of thin air, but out of a desire to promote the military industry and related industries at the expense of a huge military order.
                    These are, of course, my thoughts. When I get to one book, I'll throw off the link.
  12. BAI
    +6
    11 October 2020 14: 12
    Speaking of the English navy, the author cites a photograph of the 1937 naval parade at Spithead roadstead. But it was an international parade. There, in addition to the British - the French, Argentines, the USSR, Germany and others (12 countries).
    In particular, the Soviet battleship Marat and the German battleship Admiral Graf Spee took part in the parade. Why an armadillo? The answer is given by the despised VIKI:
    The Admiral Graf Spee was the third and most advanced German heavy cruiser of the Deutschland class during World War II. In the pre-war German fleet was listed as an battleship

    Spithead, of course, is England, but the fleet shown in the photo is not all English.
    Somewhere in the photo, the parade participants:



    The battleship "Marat", the former and future "Petropavlovsk", will finish service immobilized, under the new name "Volkhov". He had four years, one month and two days before the war. Before cutting into metal - 16 years.

    "Admiral Graf Spee". Another two and a half years - and after the well-known events it will be flooded at the mouth of La Plata.

    Armored cruiser "Georgios Averof". Greece. Interesting in that he is still alive.
  13. +8
    11 October 2020 14: 39
    The cruiser and the tanker met, and the Hipper refueling show lasted for three whole days. This, of course, shows the sailors from "Spichern" not from the best side in terms of training,

    As usual, the author omits details of the type of wind 5-6 points and waves of 5-6 points.
    It would also not hurt for him to watch a video of how the bakshtov was loaded from the stern of the tanker to the ship being refueled.

    The Germans had two senior artillery officers on the Hipper, on the port and starboard sides. The senior artillery officer directed the firing of both calibers,

    1. The author is a little unaware of the staffing of the German KRT, on which the senior artillery officer was alone, on the Hipper in February 1941 it was the corvette captain Wegener.
    2. The fire of the universal caliber and MZA was led by the 2nd artillery officer, corvette-captain Busse.

    According to the German side, the crew of the "Admiral Hipper" sank 13 or 14 vessels with a displacement of about 75 tons.

    Maisel clearly wrote in his report: 13 vessels with a displacement of 78000 tons.


    Langsdorf, after a brilliant battle at La Plata, floods the "Admiral Count Spee" and ineptly shoots a bullet in his forehead. Although one could easily resist provocations and scatter the British cruisers.

    Again, the author climbs into the jungle, which he does not understand ... :)


    Lutyens on "Bismarck" did not allow the rudders to be wedged by the explosion, fearing to damage the shafts, and the battleship sank to the bottom with balanced propeller shafts, but to the bottom.

    And again there ...
    Is it difficult to read the memoirs of Baron Müllenheim-Regberg? There is a whole chapter about rudders ...

    The appearance of British destroyers or light cruisers could make the life of the Hipper very difficult, since firing armor-piercing and semi-armor-piercing shells at lightly armored ships is not the best way out.

    And again, the author draws conclusions based on ignorance of the materiel ... :)
    According to the German instructions for cruisers, whether light or heavy, it was necessary to fire either armor-piercing or semi-armor-piercing shells (land mines with a bottom fuse).

    However, there were also disadvantages in the form of a short range and hence the constant need for refueling.

    Refueling was not due to a short cruising range - if the author read Kranke's memoirs, he would certainly ask the question: why does the commander of a "pocket battleship" constantly refuel. Everything is much more banal: the raider commanders tried to keep the maximum possible supply of fuel "at hand" in order to always be able to give full speed and escape from pursuit ... And not to count the liters of diesel fuel, as Langsdorf did, albeit for another reason ...

    Apparently, this is precisely why the "Admiral Hipper" was not used constantly as a raider.

    What wonderful speculations ... :)


    How did it happen that the British fleet, numbering so many ships, could not provide a pair of destroyers to defend the convoy?

    Tankers are in short supply ...

    ZY And the author could have referred to the article from Varspot. It was written by a person much more "in the subject" than the author of this opus.
    1. +6
      11 October 2020 15: 00
      Quote: Macsen_Wledig
      to the article from Warspot, the author could have referred. It was written by a person much more "in the subject" than the author of this opus.

      The buffoon chamomile has already been caught on plagiarism more than once, to which it adds only its gopnic-cheeky manner of retelling.
      1. 0
        11 October 2020 16: 12
        And I like it - you don't have to look through a lot of sites.

        Still, in the section "History" VO with Warspot'a would have invited or retold Alexei Kozlenko and it would have been possible to limit only VO.
        1. +3
          11 October 2020 17: 13
          Quote: Operator
          And I like it - you don't have to look through a lot of sites.

          Everything would be fine if the articles were not at the level of an essay on history in elementary school. :)
        2. +1
          11 October 2020 17: 59
          Quote: Operator
          And I like it - you don't have to look through a lot of sites.

          Still, in the section "History" VO with Warspot'a would have invited or retold Alexei Kozlenko and it would have been possible to limit only VO.

          Do you like stealing? Nu-nu ...
  14. +3
    11 October 2020 17: 24
    The question arises, whether the Germans shamelessly smeared even when shooting at close range, or the survivability of the "trump" is much higher than is commonly believed.
    Three dozen eight-inch suitcases for each victim, not counting "hundred parts" and torpedoes, and nevertheless half of the convoy leaves ... This is at a direct fire distance where centralized fire control is generally not needed (unless the targets are distributed)
    1. 0
      11 October 2020 17: 35
      Quote: Taoist
      The question arises, whether the Germans shamelessly smeared even when shooting at close range, or the survivability of the "trump" is much higher than is commonly believed.

      They smeared and, I think, the shells flew not only into the waterline ... :)
      Wegener's report is about "Schuss" (shots), not "Treffer" or "Schlag" (hits).
      Still, in a mess without centralized fire control, it was difficult for the Germans to hit.
      Especially when you consider that the towers were not designed for self-firing, only with plutongs and then in the most extreme cases.
    2. 0
      12 October 2020 10: 34
      Quote: Taoist
      The question arises, whether the Germans shamelessly smeared even when shooting at close range, or the survivability of the "trump" is much higher than is commonly believed.
      Three dozen eight-inch suitcases for each victim, not counting "hundred parts" and torpedoes, and yet half of the convoy leaves ...

      And this is not the limit - remember "Lyuttsov" in the New Year's battle. smile
      1. +1
        12 October 2020 18: 09
        Quote: Alexey RA
        And this is not the limit - remember "Lyuttsov" in the New Year's battle.

        And what about "Luttsov"?
        The icy optics "did not work", the radar did not provide normal fire adjustment.
        1. +1
          12 October 2020 18: 40
          Quote: Macsen_Wledig
          And what about "Luttsov"?
          The icy optics "did not work", the radar did not provide normal fire adjustment.

          But at least once was it possible to get in? smile
          Moreover, this was the second time. In the first outing of "Lyuttsov" on the KON the conditions were generally range: the distance to the ships was 30-70 cables, 1 panzerschiff and 3 EM against the "naked" KON, the cover of which was connected by the battle with the group of "Hipper". But Shtange, instead of rapprochement with the KOH and a torpedo-artillery attack, began to maneuver-maneuver - and maneuvered so that he practically merged with the Hipper's distracting group and was cut off from the KOH by British EMs. After that, apparently out of grief, he opened fire in the least favorable conditions for himself - from 90 kbt, practically at the border of visibility of the KON ships. Not only did he never hit, he also got in the way of Barnett's cruisers, who finally drove the Panzerschiff away from the convoy.
          1. 0
            12 October 2020 18: 53
            Quote: Alexey RA
            But at least once was it possible to get in?

            Hmm ...

            Quote: Alexey RA
            In the first outing of "Lyuttsov" on the KON the conditions were generally range: the distance to the ships was 30-70 cables, 1 Panzerschiff and 3 EM against the "naked" KON, the cover of which was connected by the battle with the Hipper group.

            The bar in the ZhBD remembers differently ...
            At least in the context of the fact that the visibility sometimes dropped to 14 hectometers.
      2. 0
        12 October 2020 19: 06
        So it was always interesting for me ... the Germans were always famous as excellent artillerymen ... again, the percentage of "golden hits" when meeting with Royal Navi ... (that Jutland, that Bismarck) but with the sinking of the tramp artillery fire as it is not it went well ... The same fight of Sibiryakov ... Scheer fired 64 shells with 27 cables and only 4 hits ... And if it were not for the barrels of gasoline on the deck of Sibiryakov, then in general it is not a fact that it would have come to sinking.
        1. +1
          12 October 2020 19: 13
          Quote: Taoist
          but with the sinking of the tramp artillery fire as it did not work out.

          Again, we are talking about uncontrolled fire, by eye, when all the parameters of the target's movement were considered "by the sea's eye", that is, from the word nothing ...
          1. +1
            12 October 2020 19: 17
            Let's just say ... At least optics were always present ... Yes, and no one took off the tower rangefinders either ... Well, at a "direct fire" distance, despite the fact that the "parade" of the target is 10 nodes and it itself is the size of "very large barn" so smear ...?
            1. 0
              12 October 2020 19: 32
              Quote: Taoist
              So to speak...

              Let's just say in this book you can find what it takes to hit. :)
              Author: Yu.N. Mordashev, I.E. Abramovich, M.A.Mekkel
              Title: Manual of the deck artillery gunner
              Publisher: Military Publishing
              Год издания: 1947
              Search the net for fun reading.
              1. 0
                12 October 2020 19: 49
                This is all clear ... I have also read not such textbooks ... I am talking about the "glory of the German artillerymen" ... And the real level of their training. It is not necessary to combine arrows on the directors of the mind ... However, the same Bismarck, after hitting the artillery post, did not get anywhere at all ... which seems to prove.
                1. +1
                  12 October 2020 19: 58
                  Quote: Taoist
                  It is not necessary to combine arrows on the directors of the mind ...

                  :)
                  Behind this, the SUAO exists.

                  Quote: Taoist
                  However, the same Bismarck, after hitting the artillery post, did not get anywhere at all ... which, as it were, proves.

                  This proves nothing. :)
                  "Bismarck" at night and in the morning of May 27, and with Schneider alive, did not get somewhere ...
                  In addition to the fact that you modestly kept silent about the fact that the steering did not work, that practically the affairs of the CAC were incapacitated ...
                  1. 0
                    12 October 2020 20: 14
                    Well, for some reason he got into Hood and the Prince ... And he got so good ... And the inoperative steering made Bismarck himself an easy target, but the accuracy of his shooting should not have been affected ...
                    1. +1
                      12 October 2020 20: 43
                      Quote: Taoist
                      Well, for some reason he got into Hood with the Prince ... And he got so well ...

                      Because all the equipment was working normally.

                      Quote: Taoist
                      А inoperative steering made Bismarck himself an easy target but the accuracy of his shooting should not have been affected...

                      I have no more questions for you: you need to learn materiel ...
  15. +1
    11 October 2020 17: 58
    in fact, it is strange that a well-trained crew, a ship that has a cloud of fire control posts, has fairly accurate guns and shells, tested back in WWII, could not better shoot weakly resisting ships almost point-blank.
    1. +1
      11 October 2020 18: 19
      Quote: yehat2
      having a cloud of fire control posts,

      The fact of the matter is that the Civil Code fired at the self-government, for which it was not intended.

      Quote: yehat2
      proven back in PMV

      The Germans did not have 8 "in WWI. :)
      1. -1
        11 October 2020 21: 22
        hipper shot not only 8 ", in addition, there were 210mm guns on Blucher, 240mm on Prince Heinrich.
        if we assume that 8 "is 232, it was more likely than not.
        I'm not talking about the more serious weapons of battle cruisers and battleships.
        1. +2
          11 October 2020 21: 31
          Horses, people mixed in a heap ... (c) :)
  16. +4
    11 October 2020 20: 36
    The commander of the Hipper, Captain Meisel, decided not to seek adventures on the aft towers and moved southeast, towards the Azores. This turned out to be not only the right decision, but a very happy (for the Germans) decision.
    ,,, so he was sent there.

    February 8, 1941. U-37
    discovered convoy HG 53 late in the evening on 8 February 1941. During the attack on the 9th, she sank three ships. During the next two days, also summoning Fw Condor aircraft from 2 / KG 40, which sank five more ships. The heavy cruiser Hipper was also relocated to this position, but by the time it arrived on the 11th there was only one ship left behind.
    1. +2
      11 October 2020 21: 05
      2 more ... No data

      ,, SS Gairsoppa On January 31, 1941 in the African port of Freetown (Sierra Leone), the ship joined the SL 64 convoy.
      After the defeat, the escort went alone to the port of Galway in western Ireland.

      On February 16, 1941, at 8 am, the ship was spotted from the air by a Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor, a German air force. At half past ten in the evening, the German submarine U-101, commanded by Captain Ernst Mengersen, came out to intercept it. The submarine attack took place on February 17 at 00:08. The ship was sunk, of the 85 crew members, only the second mate Richard Ayres managed to survive.
      There was a significant cargo of steel on board the transport, as well as belay silver bars totaling £ 600 at the time. feel
  17. -1
    12 October 2020 14: 41
    Langsdorf, after a brilliant battle at La Plata, floods the "Admiral Count Spee" and ineptly shoots a bullet in his forehead. Although one could easily resist provocations and scatter the British cruisers.

    Meisel, obviously, did not differ much from his colleagues, therefore he simply did not show the due determination. Until the very end, he apparently did not believe that the convoy was going without an escort, and therefore constantly expected the appearance of British cruisers. Hence, leaving after an hour and a half of the battle.


    How "couch" admirals, who did not even command a harbor tug, love to criticize commanders of warships :)
    What are you fools!
  18. +1
    19 October 2020 16: 35
    It seems to me that there is no "sea feat" Hipper simply shot defenseless transports - in fact, people associated with the Navy understand that this does not make him great fame !! And mind you it looks just like an accident and a lot of luck for the Germans and vice versa a rare mistake of the British !!!

    Germany unsuccessfully entered the 2nd World War at sea - having lost one of its largest ships, simply by falling for a British radio deception !!!
    German battleships and cruisers are famous for the fact that they sank gloriously throughout the war - and the largest sank especially effectively ...
    I think that the Fuhrer wasn’t just mad - and if he was, then there were serious reasons !!! Britain was cooler at sea and what was especially damaging for Nazi Germany - it was steeper in quality - more experienced than the Fritzes !!!