The problem of increasing the effectiveness of air defense. AA defense of a single ship

1. Introduction

On the "Voennoye Obozreniye" there are many works devoted to the comparison of the combat effectiveness of the Russian and foreign fleets. However, the authors of these publications usually use a purely arithmetic approach, which compares the number of ships of the first and second class and the number of missiles for various purposes on them. This approach does not take into account that the probability of hitting an enemy ship is determined not only by the number, but also by the effectiveness of anti-ship missiles and missile defense systems used, the quality of electronic countermeasures (EW) systems, the tactics of using ships in a group, etc. If the result of a duel between two snipers were assessed with such a technique, then such experts would define it as 50/50 on the basis that each of them has one rifle, and would not be interested in the quality of rifles, cartridges and training of snipers.

Next, we will try to outline simplified ways to take into account the above factors. The author is not an expert either in the field of shipbuilding or in the field of submarine use, but in Soviet times he participated in the development of shipborne air defense systems, and then in the development of raid methods aviation on groupings of enemy ships. Therefore, here he will only consider issues related to the methods of attacking ships with enemy missiles, as well as methods of defending ships. The author has been retired for the last seven years, but his information (albeit somewhat outdated) could be useful for the “sofa” examination. The underestimation of the enemy was already letting us down, when in 1904 we were going to shower the Japanese with hats, and in 1941 the Red Army was the strongest from the taiga to the British seas.

For waging a nuclear war, the last war of mankind, Russia has more than enough forces and means. We can repeatedly destroy any enemy, but for conducting a conventional war using a surface fleet strength is not enough. During the post-Soviet period, only two (!) Ships were built in Russia, which can rightfully be considered first class ships. These are frigates of project 22350 "Admiral Gorshkov". The frigates of the project 11356 "Admiral Makarov" cannot be considered as such. For operations in the ocean, their displacement is too small, and for operations in the Mediterranean, they have too weak air defense. Corvettes are suitable only for the near sea zone, where they must operate under the cover of their own aircraft. Our fleet, with a clear advantage, loses to the fleets of the USA and China. The division of the Navy into four separate fleets led to the fact that we are inferior to other countries: in the Baltic Sea - Germany, in the Black Sea - Turkey, in Japan - Japan.

2. Methods of attacking enemy ships. RCC classification

RCC are divided into three classes, which differ significantly in the method of application.

2.1. Subsonic anti-ship missiles (DPKR)

The survival of the DPKR is ensured by flying at extremely low altitudes (3-5 m). The enemy ship's radar will detect such a target when the DPKR approaches a distance of 15-20 km. At a flight speed of 900 km / h, the DPKR will fly up to the target in 60-80 seconds. after discovery. Taking into account the reaction time of the air defense missile system, equal to 10-32 seconds, the first meeting of the DPKR and the missile defense system will occur at a distance of about 10-12 km Consequently, the DPKR will be fired upon by the enemy mainly using short-range air defense systems. At ranges of less than 1 km, the DPKR can also be fired upon by an anti-aircraft gun, therefore, when approaching at such ranges, the DPKR will conduct anti-aircraft maneuvers with overloads of up to 1g. Examples of DPKR are Kh-35 (RF) and Harpoon (USA) missiles with launch ranges up to 300 km and masses of 600-700 kg. "Harpoon" is the main anti-ship missile of the USA, more than 7 thousand of them were produced.

2.2. Supersonic anti-ship missiles (SPKR)

SPKR usually has two flight sections. On the marching section, the SPKR flies at altitudes of more than 10 km at a speed of about 3 M (M is the speed of sound). In the final flight segment, at a distance of 70-100 km from the target, the SPKR drops to an extremely low altitude of 10-12 m and flies at a speed of about 2,5 M. When approaching the target, the SPKR can perform anti-missile maneuvers with overloads up to 10g. The combination of speed and maneuverability provides an increased survivability of the SPKR. As an example, we can cite one of the most successful SPKR - "Onyx" with a mass of 3 tons and a launch range of up to 650 km.

The disadvantages of the SPKR are:

- increased weight and dimensions, which do not allow the use of SPKR on fighter-bombers (IB);
- if immediately after launch the flight to the target takes place at low altitudes, then due to the increased air resistance, the launch range is reduced to 120-150 km;
- the high temperature of the hull heating does not allow applying a radio-absorbing coating on it, the visibility of the SPKR remains high, then the enemy's radars can detect the SPKR flying at high altitudes at ranges of several hundred km.

As a result, and also due to the high cost in the United States, there was no rush to develop the SPKR. SPKR AGM-158C was developed only in 2018, and only a few dozen of them were produced.

2.3. Hypersonic anti-ship missiles (GPCR)

At present, the CCP has not yet been developed. In Russia, the development of the Zircon GPCR has entered the testing stage, nothing is known about it, except for the speed of 8 M (2,4 km / s) and range (more than 1000 km) announced by the president. However, the world community of "sofa" experts hastened to dub this missile "the killer of aircraft carriers." At the present time, judging by the tone of the messages, the required speed has already been reached. How can you ensure that the remaining requirements are met? One can only guess.

Next, we will consider the main difficulties that prevent obtaining a full-fledged rocket:

- to ensure flight at a speed of 8 M, the flight altitude has to be increased to 40-50 km. But even in rarefied air, heating of various edges can reach up to 3000 degrees or more. Consequently, it turns out to be impossible to apply radio-absorbing materials to the hull, and the radar stations of the ships will be able to detect the Zircons at ranges of more than 300 km, which is enough to perform three missile launches on it;
- when the nose cone is heated, plasma forms around it, which impairs the transmission of radio emission from its own radar homing head (RGSN), which will reduce the detection range of ships;
- the nose cone will have to be made of thick ceramics and make it strongly elongated, which will cause additional attenuation of radio emission in the ceramics and increase the mass of the rocket;
- to cool the equipment under the nose cone, it is required to use a complex air conditioner, which increases the mass, complexity and cost of the rocket design;
- the high heating temperature makes the "Zircon" an easy target for short-range missiles of the RAM SAM, since these missiles have an infrared homing head. The indicated shortcomings cast doubt on the high efficiency of the Zircon state-of-the-art production facility. It will be possible to call it an "aircraft carrier killer" only after a comprehensive set of tests. The developments of the United States, China and Japan are also at the stage of experiments; they are still very far from being adopted.

3. Defense of a single ship

3.1. RCC attack preparation methods

Suppose that an enemy reconnaissance aircraft is trying to detect our ship in the open sea using an airborne radar (BRLS). The scout himself, fearing defeat from the missile defense of the ship, will not approach him at a distance of less than 100-200 km. If the ship does not include interference for the radar, then the radar measures its coordinates with a sufficiently high accuracy (about 1 km) and transmits its coordinates to its own ships. If the scout manages to observe our ship for 5-10 minutes, then he can also find out the course of the ship. If the ship's electronic countermeasures (KREP) complex detects radiation from the reconnaissance radar, and the KREP can turn on high-power interference that suppresses the signal reflected from the target, and the radar cannot receive a target mark, then the radar will not be able to measure the range to the target, but will be able to find the direction to source of interference. This will not be enough to issue target designation to the ship, but if the scout flies some more distance sideways from the direction to the target, then he will be able to once again find the direction to the source of interference. With two directions, it is possible to triangulate the approximate range to the source of interference. Then it is possible to form an approximate target position and launch anti-ship missiles.

Next, we will consider RCCs using RGSN. Target attack tactics are determined by the RCC class.

3.1.1. The beginning of the DPKR attack

The DPKR flies to the target at an extremely low altitude and turns on the RGSN 20-30 km from the meeting point. Until the moment it leaves the horizon, the DPKR cannot be detected by the ship's radar. The advantages of DPKR include the fact that it does not require exact knowledge of the target position at the time of launch. During the flight, its RGSN can scan a strip of 20-30 km in front of itself, if several targets are encountered in this strip, then the RGSN is aimed at the largest of them. In the search mode, the DPKR can fly very long distances: 100 km or more.

The second advantage of the DPKR is that during low-altitude flight, the sea surface in the distance for the RGSN seems almost flat. Consequently, there are almost no back reflections of the signals emitted by the RGSN from the sea surface. On the contrary, reflections from the side surfaces of the ship are large. Therefore, the ship against the background of the sea is a contrasting target and is well detected by the RGSN DPKR.

3.1.2. The start of the SPKR attack

The SPKR on the cruising leg of the flight can be detected by the radar and, if the air defense system has a long-range missile defense system, it can be fired upon. After the transition to a low-altitude flight segment, which typically begins 80-100 km from the target, it disappears from the zone of visibility of the air defense system radar.

The disadvantage of SPKR ramjet engines is that when the rocket body rotates during intense maneuvers, the air flow through the air intakes is noticeably reduced, and the engine can stall. Intense maneuvering will be available only in the last few kilometers before hitting the target, when the missile can reach the target and with the engine stalled by inertia. Therefore, intensive maneuvering is undesirable on the cruising leg of the flight. After approaching the target at a distance of 20-25 km, the SPKR emerges from the horizon and can be detected at ranges of 10-15 km and fired upon by medium-range missiles. At a distance of 5-7 km, an intensive shelling of short-range missiles by SPKR begins.

The SPKR detects the target in the same favorable conditions as the DPKR. The disadvantage of the SPKR is that at some point in time it must complete the cruising segment of the flight and, having dropped down, go to the low-altitude segment of the flight. Therefore, to determine this moment, it is necessary to know more or less accurately the range to the target. The error should not exceed several kilometers.

3.1.3. The beginning of the attack of the PCR

The GPKR emerges from the horizon immediately after the ascent to the height of the marching section. The radar will detect the PCR when it enters the radar detection area.

3.2. Completing a single ship attack

3.2.1. GPCR attack

The ship's radar station should strive to detect the target immediately after it leaves the horizon. Few radars have sufficient power to perform such a task, only the American Aegis air defense missile system, deployed on the Arleigh Burke destroyers, is apparently capable of detecting GPCR at ranges of 600-700 km. Even the radar station of our best ship, the frigate of the project 22350 "Admiral Gorshkov", is capable of detecting the GPCR at ranges of no more than 300-400 km. However, long ranges are not required, since our air defense missile systems cannot hit targets at altitudes of more than 30-33 km, that is, the GPKR is not available on the marching sector.

The characteristics of the GVKR are unknown, however, from general considerations, we will assume that the GVKR airships are small and cannot provide intensive maneuvers at altitudes of more than 20 km, while the SM6 missiles retain the ability to maneuver. Consequently, the likelihood of damage to the Zircon HPCC in the area of ​​descent will be quite high.

The main disadvantage of the GPCR is that it cannot fly at low altitudes for any length of time due to overheating. Consequently, the descent section must pass at steep angles (at least 30 degrees) and hit the target directly. For the RGSN GPKR, such a task is excessively difficult. At a flight altitude of 40-50 km, the required target detection range for the RGSN should be at least 70-100 km, which is unrealistic. Modern ships are less visible, and reflections from the sea surface at steep angles increase dramatically. Therefore, the target becomes low-contrast, and it will not be possible to detect the ship on the marching sector. Then you will have to start the descent in advance and use the GPCR only for firing at sedentary targets.

With a decrease in the GPCR to an altitude of 5-6 km, it will be met by a short-range SAM missile system RAM. These missiles were designed to intercept the SPKR. They have an infrared seeker and provide overload up to 50g. In the event of the actual appearance of the GPCR in service with other countries, the SAM software will have to be finalized. But even now they will intercept the GPKR if they fire a salvo of 4 missiles.

Consequently, even during the attack of a single destroyer, the Zircon-class GPKR does not provide high efficiency.

3.2.2. Completion of the SPKR attack

Unlike GPKR, SPKR and DPKR belong to the class of low-altitude targets. It is much more difficult for a shipborne air defense system to hit such targets than high-altitude ones. The problem lies in the fact that the radar beam of the air defense missile system has a width of one degree or more. Accordingly, if the radar exposes a beam to a target flying at a height of several meters, then the sea surface is also hit the beam. At small beam angles, the sea surface is seen as mirror-like, and the radar simultaneously with the true target sees its reflection in the sea mirror. In such conditions, the accuracy of measuring the height of the target drops sharply, and it becomes very difficult to aim the missile defense system at it. The air defense missile system achieves the highest probability of hitting the SPKR when the radar is used for azimuth and range guidance, and the altitude guidance is carried out using the IR seeker. SAM short-range RAM use just such a method. In Russia, they preferred not to have short-range missiles with a seeker and decided to direct the missiles using the command method. For example, the "Broadsword" air defense missile system guides the missile defense system using an IR sight. The disadvantage of targeting with this method is that at long ranges, targeting accuracy is lost, especially for maneuvering targets. In addition, in the fog, the sight stops seeing the target. The sight is, in principle, single-channel: it fires only one target at a time.

To reduce the likelihood of hitting the ship, passive protection methods are also used on it. For example, the radiation of interference by the REB complex allows suppressing the RGSN range channel and thereby making it difficult for the RCC to determine the moment at which it is necessary to start anti-zenith maneuvering. In order to prevent the anti-ship missile from aiming at the source of interference, one-time fired jamming transmitters are used, which should divert the anti-ship missile to the side for several hundred meters. However, due to their low power, such transmitters effectively protect only ships made using stealth technology.

Towed false targets can also be used, usually a chain of small rafts on which small metal corner reflectors (up to 1 m in size) are installed. The effective reflecting surface (EOC) of such reflectors is large: up to 10 sq. m, which is more than the image intensifier of the ship, and the anti-ship missile system can re-target them. Artillery shells are also used, forming clouds of dipole reflectors, but modern RGSN are able to eliminate such interference.

At the beginning of the flight at low altitude, the SPKR must deviate from the direct course in order to get out of the horizon at a point unexpected for the enemy. The first meeting of the SPKR and medium-range missiles will take place at a distance of 10-12 km. The air defense missile system will not have enough time to evaluate the results of the first launch, therefore, a few seconds after the first launch, a short-range missile defense system will be launched.

3.2.3. Completion of the DPKR attack

The guidance of the DPKR occurs in the same conditions as the guidance of the SPKR, the main difference is that the DPKR is in the firing zone 2-3 times longer than the SPKR. This disadvantage can be compensated by the fact that the DPKR is significantly cheaper, and its mass is several times less than that of the SPKR. Accordingly, the number of launched DPKR can be many times greater than the SPKR. The result of the attack will be determined by what capabilities the ship's air defense system has for simultaneously firing at several targets. The disadvantage of Russian short-range air defense systems is that most of them are outdated and remain single-channel, for example, the Kortik or Palash air defense systems. American SAM RAM is multi-channel and can simultaneously fire at several DPKR.

3.3. Features of the launch of aviation anti-ship missiles

If the ship is attacked by several fighter-bombers (IS), then usually IS have very approximate target designation by the coordinates of the target, that is, when entering the target detection zone, they must perform an additional search, namely, turn on their own radar and determine the coordinates of the target. At the moment of turning on the radar, the ship's KREP must record the presence of radiation and turn on the interference.

If a pair of ISs has dispersed along the front over a distance of more than 5 km, then they can measure both the bearing of the interference source and the approximate distance to the source, and the more accurate the longer the interference source is observed. The IS continue to monitor the source of interference after the launch of the DPKR and can correct the coordinates of the target during the flight, transmitting the updated coordinates to the DPKR along the radio correction line. Thus, if the DPKR was launched and its flight time is 15-20 minutes, then the DPKR can be redirected to the specified target position. Then the DPKR will be accurately displayed on the target. As a result, it turns out that jamming is not very beneficial for a single ship. In this case, the ship will have to pin all hopes on the defense against anti-ship missiles in the final phase of the attack. After the position of the ship became known accurately enough for the IS, they can organize a salvo attack of several anti-ship missiles. The salvo is organized in such a way that anti-ship missiles fly up to the ship from different sides and almost simultaneously. This significantly complicates the work of calculating the air defense system.

3.3.1. Bombers attack

If the ship is so far from airfields that the IS range is not enough for an attack, the attack can be carried out by long-range aircraft. In this case, it is possible to use SPKR in order to avoid attacks by SPKR by missiles on the marching sector. A bomber, usually moving into the attack area at altitudes of about 10 km, should begin to descend at a distance of about 400 km, so that it is always below the horizon for the ship's radar. Then the SPKR can be launched from a distance of 70-80 km immediately along a low-altitude trajectory and turn around on the opposite course. This ensures the stealth of the attack.

4. Conclusions on the part

Depending on the ratio of the effectiveness of anti-ship missiles and the ship's air defense systems, the results of the attack turn out to be completely different:

- in a duel situation "single ship - single anti-ship missile", the ship has the advantage, since several missiles will be launched at anti-ship missiles;
- with a salvo of several anti-ship missiles, the result depends on the variety of air defense capabilities. If the ship has a multi-channel air defense system and passive defense means, then the attack can be successfully repulsed;
- the probabilities of a breakthrough for anti-ship missiles of various classes also differ. The best probability is provided by the SPKR, since it is under fire for the shortest time and can perform intensive maneuvers.

DPKR should be applied in one gulp.

Air defense will successfully hit the GPCR if long-range missiles are used in the descent section, and the short-range air defense system will be modified for these purposes.

In the following parts, the author intends to consider ways to organize group air defense and methods to improve the effectiveness of air defense.

Comments

[Lexus]

The moral of this fable is as follows: one "rickets" (tug / communication boat / MRK) is not a warrior at sea. The Russian Navy does not have any other in proper quantities. Therefore, he hastily builds hydrographic boats / ships in order to find the "bottom".

[veritas]

If, with this methodology, the result of a duel between two snipers would be assessed, then such experts would define it as 50/50 on the basis that each of them has one rifle, and would not be interested in the quality of rifles, cartridges and training of snipers.

If we allow "would" in this situation, then we get an impartial picture, against our one sniper, a whole battalion is working.

[Stalllker]

A whole regiment of ICBMs is working behind our sniper

[3danimal]

You have forgotten, behind the "battalion" there is its own ICBM regiment.

[Gavrohs]

What a crap I just read

Could you clarify. what exactly is nonsense? As it seems to me, the article is logical and I generally agree with the author's arguments! (Minus mine if something for nonsense)

[sergo1914]

Quote: Gavrohs

What a crap I just read

Could you clarify. what exactly is nonsense? As it seems to me, the article is logical and I generally agree with the author's arguments! (Minus mine if something for nonsense)

In everything. Starting with the detection and ending with the description of the RCC. Back in the 90s, everything was chewed up and explained. Where do such authors come from? Minus you can shove yourself you know where.

[Gavrohs]

In everything. Starting with the detection and ending with the description of the RCC. Back in the 90s, everything was chewed up and explained. Where do such authors come from?

And that's all - what is it just emotions ?!

[Revival]

Starting to read your answer as a developer ... "
Starting with the discovery and ending with the description of the RCC. "
I thought something sensible, but in the end you again put forward some "indignation", can you do something more specific?
I am a complete dilettante in this matter, and for me the article will look whole, and your review is "about nothing."

[T-73]

Is it all about combat effectiveness? Here are the nuances of the perception of the results

[Stalllker]

He most likely meant that this is a subjective judgment.

[mvg]

what exactly is nonsense

I will answer for the person. In short: The author does not understand either the topic or the characteristics. If he also built a dash and designed a radar, then it is very sad. Further on the topic there are many errors.

[Boris ⁣ Shaver]

Quote: mvg

I will answer for the person. <...> there are many errors indicated on the topic

Sorry, but there are already several posts asking for specifics. Do you see the mistakes? List. No one with hostility to anyone. We just ask for specifics. Give. And then we will discuss whether you are 100 percent right. But for now - you and he just showed up at 0. Do you understand?

[Earthshaker]

Constructive criticism, write more.

[Oleg123219307]

It is strange that the author has bypassed some of the possibilities of the GPCR, which can neutralize the indicated disadvantages. First - why should she fly the entire trajectory at 8 swings? Suppose the same zircon, at a subsonic speed and an altitude of about 3-5 meters, approaches the target at 50-70 km, after which it launches accelerators and leaves the radio horizon at 8 swings and 15 seconds from the target? Then you don't need to aim at hypersound - well, where the ship will go in 15 seconds, and you don't need to keep heating for a long time - again, almost any skin will withstand 15-20 seconds. Second, what prevents, apart from the radar station in the seeker, from using other guidance methods? Radio command or laser from a satellite, inertial, if the course and speed of the target are known, and the flight time is seconds, or, for example, an optical seeker, which has a side of the plasma? Third, what prevents the GPCR from using a ballistic trajectory with descent angles of 85 degrees or more? On a collision course, at a speed above Mach 8, the chance even for the SM6 is so-so, and the overhead view of all radars is sad. And so that it was impossible to get it on the marching section, it can be raised by 120-150 km at such speeds. MRBMs could well, why can't an anti-ship missile system comparable in size, range and speed?

[Vlad.by]

Basically on the case, but:
Optical seeker of which the side plasma is, excuse me, how? Doesn't heat affect the lens?
As for the attack from a dead funnel at angles close to 90 degrees. - it is quite effective, but the author is right in reducing the range and resolving the seeker of the hypersonic anti-ship missile system at such angles of attack. Again, nothing is known about the flight characteristics of the Zircon, and there is nothing more to appeal to.
Although, for the same X-32, a mode of attack from a dead funnel from a height of 30-40 km was considered, but at high supersonic and the possibility of its defeat by the same Aegis was recognized as quite small. How will Zircon be worse?
Here, rather, a question about the carrier and control center. For the "enemy" with its E-2S, the task of the central control unit and the delivery of the missile to the launch range is solvable, but it seems that he does not have missiles of the X-32, Zircon type.
We have missiles, but there are questions about the control center and launch vehicles capable of sneaking up to the same AUG at the launch range without the influence of air defense.

[Revival]

Yes, apart from everything else, from all the publications on this topic, I learned for myself that we have a main problem with tsu.
Excuse me, outsider opinion, on the topic technically ~ 0

[Oleg123219307]

Quote: Vlad.by

Optical seeker of which the side plasma is, excuse me, how? Doesn't heat affect the lens?

It works. Only there are optically transparent materials, such as diamond or some types of quartz glass, which can withstand heating over 2 thousand degrees without loss of properties. If the lens is cooled, then the plasma cloud in front of it during the time that the rocket is at full speed will not have time to heat it before destruction, as it does not have time to heat the radome of the seeker, with the only difference that the plasma itself interferes with the operation of the radar due to high ionization in no way will not affect the operation of the optical head.

Quote: Vlad.by

but the author is right in reducing the range and resolving the seeker of a hypersonic anti-ship missile at such angles of attack.

If we are talking about the defeat of a small-sized, low-contrast target against the background of difficult terrain, with previously unsettled coordinates and speed that allows the missile to leave the aiming cone during the flight, then I understand what the problem is. But here we are not talking about catching enemy tanks in a hurricane and snowfall in mountainous terrain ... The GPCR is designed to defeat strategic targets - AUG, large surface ships, possibly well-protected ground bases. Where will such a target go from its coordinates, if, for example, they were installed by the GOS from an altitude of 50 km, where there is practically no air, plasma and interference? Or were they transmitted to it from a satellite / ground in the same place where nothing interferes with reception? The aircraft carrier, at all desire, will not change course and speed in 5 seconds in such a way that the aiming point set in its geometric center from the CEP of 2 meters goes beyond the dimensions of its hull, even if no correction is made at all. As well as I do not understand why everyone omitted the topic of a special warhead in a missile solving strategic tasks. In theory, I also understand how to strain all forces to prevent a single GPCR from entering an aircraft carrier. But how to prevent it from approaching 5-10 km? After all, even tactical special ammunition at such a distance will smear the AUG into small debris on the water ...

[Sasha_rulevoy]

Quote: oleg123219307

the seeker was installed from a height of 50 km,

The radar angular resolution is determined by the formula K x antenna wavelength / aperture. In the case of a parabolic antenna (which is in most radar guidance systems), the factor is 60. roughly speaking, for the resolution to be equal to one degree, the aperture must be 60 times the wavelength. The attenuation of the radio signal in the atmosphere is the greater, the more oscillations occur per unit distance. Those. with a wavelength of 1 meter at a distance of 1 meter, this is just one vibration, and the same distance for a wave of 1 millimeter is already a thousand vibrations. Thus, the attenuation of a meter wave in the atmosphere is a thousand times less than that of a millimeter wave. For target detection hundreds of kilometers away, millimeter or even centimeter ranges are not suitable. Suitable only meter-decimeter, while the power of the radar should be comparable to the power of the radar on the AWACS aircraft. In contrast to the Awax, which has an aperture of ten meters, in the Zircon rocket launched from a standard UVP, the aperture is limited by the size of this UVP, i.e. about 0.6 m. For a range of 10 cm, we have an angular resolution of 60 x 0.1 / 0.6 = 10 degrees. Let the detection distance be 300 km. At this distance, the terrain resolution is 300 x 2pi x 10/360 = 52 km. That is, if there is some other ship 50 km from the aircraft carrier, then for the rocket it will be a single spot, and it will aim at a piece of water in the middle between them.

[Oleg123219307]

Quote: Sasha_rulevoy

Quote: oleg123219307

the seeker was installed from a height of 50 km,

The radar angular resolution is determined by the formula K x antenna wavelength / aperture. In the case of a parabolic antenna (which is in most radar guidance systems), the factor is 60. roughly speaking, for the resolution to be equal to one degree, the aperture must be 60 times the wavelength. The attenuation of the radio signal in the atmosphere is the greater, the more oscillations occur per unit distance. Those. with a wavelength of 1 meter at a distance of 1 meter, this is just one vibration, and the same distance for a wave of 1 millimeter is already a thousand vibrations. Thus, the attenuation of a meter wave in the atmosphere is a thousand times less than that of a millimeter wave. For target detection hundreds of kilometers away, millimeter or even centimeter ranges are not suitable. Suitable only meter-decimeter, while the power of the radar should be comparable to the power of the radar on the AWACS aircraft. In contrast to the Awax, which has an aperture of ten meters, in the Zircon rocket launched from a standard UVP, the aperture is limited by the size of this UVP, i.e. about 0.6 m. For a range of 10 cm, we have an angular resolution of 60 x 0.1 / 0.6 = 10 degrees. Let the detection distance be 300 km. At this distance, the terrain resolution is 300 x 2pi x 10/360 = 52 km. That is, if there is some other ship 50 km from the aircraft carrier, then for the rocket it will be a single spot, and it will aim at a piece of water in the middle between them.

However, there are optical and radio-photonic systems. Even on high-orbit satellites. In the range of visible light, the atmosphere is known to be almost transparent. Plus, if everything is as sad as you wrote, how do the tracking radars of the same С400, Patriot and THAAD work? There is more distance, and the size of the target is orders of magnitude smaller.

[Sasha_rulevoy]

Quote: oleg123219307

How do the tracking radars of the same С400, Patriot and THAAD work?

For long-range air defense, they work in the centimeter range. For missile defense, long range is provided by large, tens of meters, antenna sizes, usually AFAR, which narrow the beam size to less than half a degree and a huge transmitter power. In addition, most of the path of the missile defense radar signal passes in space, where there is no atmospheric attenuation.

[Oleg123219307]

Quote: Sasha_rulevoy

For long-range air defense, they work in the centimeter range. For missile defense, long range is provided by large, tens of meters, antenna sizes, usually AFAR, which narrow the beam size to less than half a degree and a huge transmitter power. In addition, most of the path of the missile defense radar signal passes in space, where there is no atmospheric attenuation.

Can't a similar antenna or reflector be placed on the GSO? A rocket to use an essentially passive seeker?

[Avior]

First - why should she fly the entire trajectory at 8 swings?

probably, before the sound and hypersonic, the aerodynamics are completely different and, accordingly, the forms of the anti-ship missile system.

Suppose the same zircon, at a subsonic speed and an altitude of about 3-5 meters, approaches the target at 50-70 km, after which it launches accelerators and leaves the radio horizon at 8 swings and 15 seconds from the target?

he will detect the ship only when he himself leaves from behind the radio horizon. Or it will not find out if the ship had a head start in time before launch, and it left the zone of action of the seeker - at 3-5 meters it is 20. kilometers at 8 swings at an altitude of 3-5 m is cool. The sonar will be the first to discover. Have you seen a flight at such a speed at such an altitude?
But what if the target shoots the traps before the seeker has time to lock the target and the head captures the trap?

Second, what prevents, apart from the radar station in the seeker, from using other guidance methods? Radio command or laser from a satellite, inertial, if the course and speed of the target are known, and the flight time is seconds, or, for example, an optical seeker, which has a side of the plasma?

"Radio command or laser from the satellite" - do you know such?
"inertial, if the course and speed of the target are known" - and if they are known inaccurately or the target changed them?
and so on ...

[Oleg123219307]

Quote: Avior

probably, before the sound and hypersonic, the aerodynamics are completely different and, accordingly, the forms of the anti-ship missile system.

Various. And subsonic flight will require different aerodynamics to achieve maximum efficiency. For example, wings and turbojet engines. Which are simply fired back after the end of the cruising section, as the starting boosters of the same calibers are fired back, and then the cruise engine of the hypersonic section is launched and the rocket, which no longer has planes interfering with hypersound and the excess mass, begins to accelerate. For example like this.

Quote: Avior

he will detect the ship only when he himself leaves from behind the radio horizon. Or it will not find out if the ship had a head start in time before launch, and it left the zone of action of the seeker - at 3-5 meters it is 20. kilometers at 8 swings at an altitude of 3-5 m is cool. The sonar will be the first to discover. Have you seen a flight at such a speed at such an altitude?
But what if the target shoots the traps before the seeker has time to lock the target and the head captures the trap?

The ship has one drawback. It is perfectly visible from the coastal radar and from satellites, at great distances, the benefit is great. On the marching section, the correction may well be radio command, and if your own seeker is needed, then it is already only in the final section of the trajectory. Nobody has ever flown at Mach 8 at such altitudes. But what is impossible over the sea I do not see. Between 5 and 40 meters there is not a very big difference in air density, and it is unnecessary to bend around the folds of the terrain above the water ... About traps - well, this concerns any type of rocket. The question of choosing the optimal GOS, perhaps some kind of combined. It makes no sense to make it cheap in the GPCR.

Quote: Avior

"Radio command or laser from the satellite" - do you know such?
"inertial, if the course and speed of the target are known" - and if they are known inaccurately or the target changed them?
and so on ...

One-way satellite communication systems, both radio and laser have been known for a long time, look at the same television. Yes, transmitting data from a rocket to a satellite is unrealistic - shaking, plasma, clouds. But what prevents a simple HF transmitter from being placed on a satellite? To transmit the coordinate correction, neither a gigabit bandwidth, nor a complex signal form, nor an antenna is needed in the rocket fairing. The proinertial system is all about flight time, the accuracy of primary target designation and the type of warhead used. It is fantastic to get into a ship in a purely inertial manner 1000 km away. But in 20 - 30 km where the interfering seeker starts acceleration is already more real. When using a special warhead, you can completely abandon other guidance systems other than inertial guidance. KVO even in a kilometer, together with all the changes in rates and speeds, will not help anyone there.

[Kalmar]

Quote: oleg123219307

First - why should she fly the entire trajectory at 8 swings? Let's say the same zircon, at a subsonic speed and an altitude of about 3-5 meters, approaches the target at 50-70 km, after which it launches accelerators and leaves the radio horizon already at 8 swings and 15 seconds from the target

A similar principle is implemented in the ZM-54, only the second stage is supersonic. The need to drag the boosters all the way clearly did not benefit the range - only 220 km, but for the Zircon, 1000 is still declared. Well, a subsonic flight to such a range will take a lot of time - the control center may need to be adjusted, which there is simply nothing to do now.

Quote: oleg123219307

what prevents the use of other guidance methods in addition to the radar in the seeker? Radio command or laser from satellite

Radio command - from where? Satellite laser is not at all serious.

Quote: oleg123219307

Third, what prevents the PCR from using a ballistic trajectory with descent angles of 85 degrees or more?

The Chinese are trying to implement something like this in their DF-21D. But here it was already noted that the idea rests on the capabilities of the missile's seeker, and this toughens the requirement for reconnaissance and target designation means (with which everything is not easy for us). Well, information that someone managed to hit a moving target (even the size of an aircraft carrier) with a ballistic missile has not yet been met.

[Oleg123219307]

Quote: Kalmar

A similar principle is implemented in the ZM-54, only the second stage is supersonic. The need to drag the boosters all the way clearly did not benefit the range - only 220 km, but for the Zircon, 1000 is still declared. Well, a subsonic flight to such a range will take a lot of time - the control center may need to be adjusted, which there is simply nothing to do now.

I myself have vague doubts about the range. The speed and range declared for zircon can be achieved only when using a ballistic trajectory or a scramjet engine. And the first is more believed than the second.

Quote: Kalmar

Radio command - from where? Satellite laser is not at all serious.

Radio command from the carrier ship or from the same satellite in the HF range. Laser - only from the satellite, although I agree here, there are a number of difficulties with stabilization and weather.

Quote: Kalmar

The Chinese are trying to implement something like this in their DF-21D. But here it was already noted that the idea rests on the capabilities of the missile's seeker, and this toughens the requirement for reconnaissance and target designation means (with which everything is not easy for us). Well, information that someone managed to hit a moving target (even the size of an aircraft carrier) with a ballistic missile has not yet been met.

What is there to get in? If there is a present in the warhead of 100-150 CT, then it is not difficult to get into a circle with a diameter of 5 km around the AUG ...

[Kalmar]

Quote: oleg123219307

The speed and range declared for zircon can be achieved only when using a ballistic trajectory or a scramjet engine. And the first is more believed than the second.

So far, the Zircon's range exists only in the bold speeches of our constitutional guarantor. When you can see a real sample, then there will be something to talk about.

Quote: oleg123219307

Radio command from the carrier ship or from the same satellite in the HF range.

Hard. It turns out that the ship must somehow see the target, which, of course, is unrealizable: who will let it go 20 km? From the satellite, in principle, it is possible, but only where to get that satellite, so that at the right time in the right place "hangs" ... Well, there will be questions with noise immunity.

Quote: oleg123219307

Laser - only from the satellite, although I agree here, there are a number of difficulties with stabilization and weather.

It’s not even a matter of the weather: will the satellite be able to provide a powerful and narrow beam enough to illuminate the ship, and not just some area in which it (the ship) is located? The second question: how realistic it will be from the side of the ship to "light up" the receiver of laser radiation at the seeker of the anti-ship missile system with its laser or IR-searchlight.

Quote: oleg123219307

What is there to get in? If there is a present in the warhead of 100-150 CT, then it is not difficult to get into a circle with a diameter of 5 km around the AUG ...

100 kt in 5 km is not enough. It will spoil the skin, but will not cause fatal damage. Anyway, the use of a peaceful atom in military conflicts is a delicate matter. If it were otherwise, no one would have suffered so much with these anti-ship missiles: take and release a couple of ballistic missiles with MIRVs on the AUG, and the "plus or minus tram stop" accuracy will be quite sufficient.

[Oleg123219307]

Quote: Kalmar

So far, the Zircon's range exists only in the bold speeches of our constitutional guarantor. When you can see a real sample, then there will be something to talk about.

I do not argue. The normally declared combination of characteristics does not fit in my head myself. Wait and see.

Quote: Kalmar

Hard. It turns out that the ship must somehow see the target, which, of course, is unrealizable: who will let it go 20 km? From the satellite, in principle, it is possible, but only where to get that satellite, so that at the right time in the right place "hangs" ... Well, there will be questions with noise immunity.

Well, how did the same ship see a target for making a decision on the launch of a rocket ... Why this channel (its own radar, an AWACS aircraft, data from a satellite system or coastal over-the-horizon radar, on the basis of which the decision was made on the direction of launch, cannot be transmitted from the carrier ship to missile to clarify target designation? I do not argue about noise immunity, but they will in any case, even for a subsonic anti-ship missile with a radar in the seeker. Decide something like ...

Quote: Kalmar

It’s not even a matter of the weather: will the satellite be able to provide a powerful and narrow beam enough to illuminate the ship, and not just some area in which it (the ship) is located? The second question: how realistic it will be from the side of the ship to "light up" the receiver of laser radiation at the seeker of the anti-ship missile system with its laser or IR-searchlight.

Depends on the orbit of the satellite and its power plant. The technologies available to us allow us to create such a system, but whether it really exists I do not know.

Quote: Kalmar

100 kt in 5 km is not enough. It will spoil the skin, but will not cause fatal damage. Anyway, the use of a peaceful atom in military conflicts is a delicate matter. If it were otherwise, no one would have suffered so much with these anti-ship missiles: take and release a couple of ballistic missiles with MIRVs on the AUG, and the "plus or minus tram stop" accuracy will be quite sufficient.

That according to the first point - 100 KT of a ground explosion, it will create such a shock wave in the water and a cloud of radioactive vapor under high pressure that it will tear the underwater parts of the hulls, and even if something does not sink, there will be radiation so that such a ship will pose a danger to its own crew more than others. Not to mention the fact that after such a gift you can forget about all the electronics, radars and, accordingly, air defense / missile defense. Here is the time to fly up to another ten subsonic anti-ship missiles. What about the peaceful atom. Do you really think that a situation is possible when our fleet sinks the US AUG not within the framework of World War III?

[Kalmar]

Quote: oleg123219307

Well, how did the same ship see a target for making a decision to launch a rocket?

The ship itself did not see her; he received control from the outside. There are not many options: an AWACS aircraft / helicopter, a satellite, a ground-based ZGRLS.

With ZGRLS everything is ambiguous. As I read somewhere, control units can only issue surface wave stations, but they operate at relatively short ranges (within 400 km). Skywave stations do not provide the required accuracy (here, of course, I would like to hear from a specialist).

The aircraft / helicopter gives an accurate command control, but it is unlikely that it will be allowed to remain in the AUG's field of view long enough to coordinate a missile strike. Those. possible, but not always.

We have one satellite system - "Liana". Normally, its satellites scan every part of the earth's surface about once every 6 hours. You can correct the orbits so that they fly over a certain place about once every hour and a half. Considering that the probable enemy is surely tracking these satellites, it is extremely difficult to ensure their presence over the target at the moment the missiles arrive.

As a result, in the general case, the ship launches missiles, in fact, not at the target, but in a certain area, where, according to intelligence, the target should be located. And then the missiles should orient themselves on the spot, find the goal and attack.

Quote: oleg123219307

Depends on the orbit of the satellite and its power plant

The dimensions of the laser systems used for laser satellite location suggest that it will not be easy to put such a structure into orbit, let's say. Plus the problems traditional for satellites: you can't just throw it into the right point in space.

Quote: oleg123219307

That according to the first point - 100 KT of a ground explosion, it will create such a shock wave in the water and a cloud of radioactive vapor under high pressure that it will tear the underwater parts of the hulls, and even if something does not sink, there will be radiation so that such a ship will pose a danger to its own crew more than others.

Somewhere here on VO there was an article about American nuclear tests: they detonated a 50-kt charge near decommissioned warships, placed at different distances from the epicenter. It was argued that the military tests were disappointing: already at a distance of 1 km, the ships did not receive much damage. I didn't even start to glow too much; in any case, there was no question of the rapid incapacitation of the crews.

Quote: oleg123219307

Not to mention the fact that after such a gift you can forget about all the electronics, radars and, accordingly, air defense / missile defense. Here is the time to fly up to another ten subsonic anti-ship missiles.

In general, ship electronics are being developed with an eye on the possible use of nuclear weapons against the ship, so no, it just won't go out. And, by the way, the radars of subsonic anti-ship missiles through the air "charged" with a nuclear explosion will also not see very well.

Quote: oleg123219307

Do you really think that a situation is possible when our fleet sinks the US AUG not within the framework of World War III?

War is war strife. In theory, different levels of conflict are possible. And if you follow the principle "the barn is burned down - burn and hut," then there is no point at all to talk about the RCC and the AUG: the strategic nuclear forces and the global apocalypse will already be used.

[Oleg123219307]

Quote: Kalmar

As a result, in the general case, the ship launches missiles, in fact, not at the target, but in a certain area, where, according to intelligence, the target should be located. And then the missiles should orient themselves on the spot, find the goal and attack.

And how is the selection of targets done in this case? So that, for example, during a salvo launch, all the missiles would not hit one ship from the group. Or, on the contrary, concentrated fire on some specific dangerous ship, for example, an aircraft carrier or a carrier of strategic weapons, covered by an order from other ships?

Quote: Kalmar

The dimensions of the laser systems used for laser satellite location suggest that it will not be easy to put such a structure into orbit, let's say. Plus the problems traditional for satellites: you can't just throw it into the right point in space.

There is no longer a question of size, but of nutrition and cooling. But all the same, lasers of the megawatt class are not needed for data transmission. As for the orbit - there is such a thing GSO. Quite high, but for normal optics a resolution of several meters from there is quite achievable. 10-12 such satellites can cover the entire surface of the earth without moving at all relative to it.

Quote: Kalmar

Somewhere here on VO there was an article about American nuclear tests: they detonated a 50-kt charge near decommissioned warships, placed at different distances from the epicenter. It was argued that the military tests were disappointing: already at a distance of 1 km, the ships did not receive much damage. I didn't even start to glow too much; in any case, there was no question of the rapid incapacitation of the crews.

Was reading. When these tests were carried out, the thinnest electronic device on board was an eggplant-sized radio tube. And even they felt bad from EMP. All modern (+ -30 years) electronics will burn out instantly. Including the vaunted AFAR / PFAR and all the elements of the BIUS, not to mention such a miracle of nature as LCD screens, without which computers cannot be controlled today and which will come unambiguously. This is a payment for the subtlety of the technical process.

Quote: Kalmar

In general, ship electronics are being developed with an eye on the possible use of nuclear weapons against the ship, so no, it just won't go out. And, by the way, the radars of subsonic anti-ship missiles through the air "charged" with a nuclear explosion will also not see very well.

Why would they fly 30 seconds after the explosion? After 15-20 minutes, the ionization drops almost to normal, but they are unlikely to have time to change all the electronics for a new one on AUG.

Quote: Kalmar

War is war strife. In theory, different levels of conflict are possible. And if you follow the principle "the barn is burned down - burn and hut," then there is no point at all to talk about the RCC and the AUG: the strategic nuclear forces and the global apocalypse will already be used.

and it will be so. If a SNF carrier is attacked, it is highly likely that it will use nuclear weapons before death, since it cannot know whether the attack was limited to a local conflict or whether it is a global disarming strike and an attempt to disable all nuclear forces. And AUG is just a carrier of strategic nuclear forces. I can't imagine a scenario that such an attack would be left without retaliation. Nua then you all wrote well about the apocalypse ...

[Kalmar]

Quote: oleg123219307

And how is the selection of targets done in this case?

Someone like. Light anti-ship missiles like "Harpoon" simply randomly select one target from the group. Well, the larger the goal, the greater its preference. As a result, a flock of missiles is distributed more or less evenly over a group of targets.

"Granites" are smarter: they exchange data in flight and, let's say, agree on the distribution of targets. Before the launch, the target type is entered into the rocket: AUG, convoy or something else, which is also taken into account.

Quote: oleg123219307

But all the same, lasers of the megawatt class are not needed for data transmission. As for the orbit - there is such a thing GSO

For the GSO, a laser will still be needed very, very. Especially if over the area of ​​application of difficult meteorological conditions (fogs, typhoons, dense clouds).

Quote: oleg123219307

When these tests were carried out, the thinnest electronic device on board was an eggplant-sized radio tube. And even they felt bad from EMP. All modern (+ -30 years) electronics will burn out instantly.

The lamps were bad, because protection from such influences was simply not provided for them. Now on the same "Berks" electronics are protected, including from EMP. In the end, these ships were built in the era when nuclear weapons were planned to be used everywhere and everywhere.

Quote: oleg123219307

If a strategic nuclear forces carrier is attacked, it is highly likely that it will use nuclear weapons before death.

AUG, for example, is not a carrier of strategic nuclear forces. The nuclear submarine is not in all cases able to understand what was attacked: a sudden explosion and flooding, what exploded is not clear (maybe an enemy torpedo, maybe something on the submarine itself). And even with serious damage and at depth, it is unlikely to be able to "shoot".

Then, of course, do not forget that we have enough enemies at sea even without the Americans: Turkey, Japan, potentially China, etc. To bring clashes with them to a global nuclear war would be, frankly, unwise.

[Oleg123219307]

Quote: Kalmar

Someone like. Light anti-ship missiles like "Harpoon" simply randomly select one target from the group. Well, the larger the goal, the greater its preference. As a result, a flock of missiles is distributed more or less evenly over a group of targets.

"Granites" are smarter: they exchange data in flight and, let's say, agree on the distribution of targets. Before the launch, the target type is entered into the rocket: AUG, convoy or something else, which is also taken into account.

That is, in the case of AUG, in any case, you need a salvo launch? For there is a chance of hitting a secondary ship with a single rocket.

Quote: Kalmar

For the GSO, a laser will still be needed very, very. Especially if over the area of ​​application of difficult meteorological conditions (fogs, typhoons, dense clouds).

I wrote about this above that weather conditions are not a gift. Power - units / tens of kW. Really, though not very simple, but with our Roscosmos it is very difficult ...

Quote: Kalmar

The lamps were bad, because protection from such influences was simply not provided for them. Now on the same "Berks" electronics are protected, including from EMP. In the end, these ships were built in the era when nuclear weapons were planned to be used everywhere and everywhere.

A lamp is more than a million times more reliable than a modern semiconductor crystal in terms of conductor thickness and withstand voltage induced. EMP of a nearby explosion is able to induce short-term pulses in megavolts on any conductors. I speak as a person related to working with modern electronics and its protection from interference and interference - no semiconductor electronics will survive EMP. Protection of the military is precisely based on the principle of using old but reliable technologies, and even they are shielded multilayer, but modern multichannel radars and CIUS cannot be built on lamps.

Quote: Kalmar

AUG, for example, is not a carrier of strategic nuclear forces. The nuclear submarine is not in all cases able to understand what was attacked: a sudden explosion and flooding, what exploded is not clear (maybe an enemy torpedo, maybe something on the submarine itself). And even with serious damage and at depth, it is unlikely to be able to "shoot".

Then, of course, do not forget that we have enough enemies at sea even without the Americans: Turkey, Japan, potentially China, etc. To bring clashes with them to a global nuclear war would be, frankly, unwise.

Aircraft AUG - are, cover submarines - too, which means that the whole AUG is. And the reaction will be appropriate. To repeat the part related to third countries - I do not argue that there may be situations that do not require a strategic solution. But the air defense / missile defense equipment there is not at all that level.

[Kalmar]

Quote: oleg123219307

That is, in the case of AUG, in any case, you need a salvo launch?

Of course. It is possible to hit an aircraft carrier with a single missile only with the total carelessness of the crews of all AUG ships, which I would not particularly count on.

Quote: oleg123219307

Really, though not very simple, but with our Roscosmos it is very difficult ...

Yes, in principle, it is not worth relying on our astronautics in this matter, alas ((

Quote: oleg123219307

no semiconductor electronics will survive EMP

The military is still convinced of the opposite. How they achieve this and to what extent - I cannot say. But still, I would proceed from the fact that as long as the ship is safe and afloat, it poses a threat and is capable of defending itself.

Quote: oleg123219307

Aircraft AUG - are

No, they only carry TNW - that's a slightly different story.

Quote: oleg123219307

Cover submarine - too

Not. These are attack nuclear submarines, nuclear weapons they do not carry at all now (only with us, perhaps).

Quote: oleg123219307

But the air defense / missile defense equipment there is not at all that level.

I wouldn't be so sure. There are analogues and derivatives of the same Burke in the fleets of Japan, South Korea and China. Against the background of our, frankly, not the freshest ships, the level of our potential adversaries is already quite the same.

[Oleg123219307]

Quote: Kalmar

The military is still convinced of the opposite. How they achieve this and to what extent - I cannot say. But nevertheless, I would proceed from the fact that as long as the ship is safe and afloat, it poses a threat and is able to defend itself

I was in Sevastopol at the bottom of the Navy at an exhibition of military equipment this year. Among other things, there were RChBZ vehicles. So this is what struck me very much - the extreme poverty of electronic equipment in comparison with the same armored personnel carriers and Lynxes standing next to them but for general purposes. In fact, everything there is not just duplicated with thick wires, but I have not seen any complex screens or computers either. All devices are very large and free-standing. This is just the same, in my opinion, a consequence of the approach to protection against some troubles affecting electronics. But in the same phased array there are hundreds / thousands of transceiver modules controlled independently. And the ship's BIUS is not the size of a gym. And if this is so, then at least several tens of minutes after the close flash, until the burned-out blocks are changed or the duplicate ones are turned on, and the ionization, including the antennas themselves, drops, I would not count on how confident the missile defense would be.

Quote: Kalmar

No, they only carry TNW - that's a slightly different story.

B61-10 is carried. TNW or not, science does not know this. They do not report to us about the capacities ...

Quote: Kalmar

Not. These are attack nuclear submarines, nuclear weapons they do not carry at all now (only with us, perhaps).

What class of submarine are you talking about?

Quote: Kalmar

I wouldn't be so sure. There are analogues and derivatives of the same Burke in the fleets of Japan, South Korea and China. Against the background of our, frankly, not the freshest ships, the level of our potential adversaries is already quite the same.

There are no analogues of AUG in general. There are no network-centric air defense / missile defense systems, no satellite early warning system, no early warning radar. A lot of things are missing. So yes, individual combat units are comparable, but in a complex it is not serious to compare.

[Kalmar]

Quote: oleg123219307

B61-10 is carried. TNW or not, science does not know this. They do not report to us about the capacities ...

According to Wikipedia, the B61 carriers are not on the list of carriers. And "strategic", as far as I remember, is determined not by power, but by range.

Quote: oleg123219307

What class of submarine are you talking about?

If we are talking about an AUG escort, then this is the SSAPL: Los Angeles and Virginia.

Quote: oleg123219307

There are no network-centric air defense / missile defense systems, no satellite early warning system, no early warning radar.

Like this? The same Japanese Atago, for example, carries the beloved Aegis and the same radars as the Burks. The Chinese with their 055s are also actively pumping in this direction, plus they are mastering the construction of aircraft carriers. In general, even if not now, then everything will be in the very foreseeable future. They have.

[Stalllker]

He did not bypass them (features), he did not know them

[Serg4545]

Quote: oleg123219307

And so that it was impossible to get it on the marching section, it can be raised by 120-150 km at such speeds.

You can't get it anyway!
The mentioned SM6 has a defeat height of about 33 km.
SM3 hits the target with a transatmospheric interceptor. If you try to use this interceptor at altitudes below 100 km, this interceptor will be instantly destroyed.
So at the moment a hypersonic missile at an altitude of 40-50 km is simply invulnerable.

[The eye of the crying]

Quote: oleg123219307

Let's say the same zircon, at a subsonic speed and an altitude of about 3-5 meters, approaches the target at 50-70 km

But he approaches the target at an altitude of 30-40 km and even slows down before the target.

[KCA]

I graduated from school for a long time, but the fact that ceramics does not have a crystal lattice and is radio-transparent, I remember that, VIAM has been developing high-temperature ceramics for a very long time and very successfully, and the phrase
"The nose cone will have to be made of thick ceramics and make it strongly elongated, which will cause additional attenuation of radio emission in the ceramics and increase the mass of the rocket."
I can't understand my little brain in any way

[Stalllker]

One friend wrote succinctly and succinctly - nonsense

[rocket757]

One conclusion can now be drawn. Both in attack and in defense, the one who practices an integrated approach to the performance of assigned tasks can effectively act.
Pirate raids of lonely ships are in the past when it comes to serious opponents.
The tactics of using special secrecy means, for example, nuclear submarines, are completely different and were not considered here.

[Volder]

The division of the Navy into four separate fleets led to the fact that we are inferior to other countries.

The author hints that the division of the fleet is an erroneous decision of the leadership of the Navy. After such a "presentation" I lost the desire to adequately and seriously perceive everything written by the author. Sorry.

[Earthshaker]

The author hints that it is foolish to compare the Japanese Navy and the Russian Navy, vlob, by the number of pennants.

[Stalllker]

This is your hint. But Japan does not have Bastion and Val and other PCRs on different media. So their pennants can be removed from the wall at the piers

[mvg]

But Japan does not have Bastion and Val and other PCRs on different media

Japan now has a self-developed anti-ship missile system, perhaps the best in the world. There are aviation and 40 destroyers, and 11 diesel-electric submarines. Only from space is not launched.

[Stalllker]

Everyone has the best on paper

[Earthshaker]

Just google ASM - 3. Japam don't care about bastions.

[Cyril G ...]

Quote: Earthshaker

Just google ASM - 3. Japam don't care about bastions. Japam don't care about the bastions.

Cool! Are they going to shoot down Onyx ASM-3?

[Stalllker]

Google the Ukrainian Neptune, so there is a miracle and not a rocket, it has no analogues in the world

[Momotomba]

Perhaps the author would like to combine all 4 fleets, divided according to geographical principle, into one Caspian flotilla
At least he doesn't consider her presence to be the cause of our weakness.

[Revival]

And if, consider this division with the word objectively forced (or at least objectively existing) without the assessment + -
I tried to cover up the author))

[Stalllker]

It "pricked" me too

[mvg]

I do not want to offend the pensioner, but I understand why we are lagging behind in the radar station. I agree with the first comment. I really didn't read it

[Stalllker]

The first comment is not about the radar, but about the article

[alstr]

In fact, the problem of breaking through the air defense of ANY object is solved in only two ways:
1. Sneaking. Those. work by stealth.
2. Overload of the air defense system.
So, you can overload ANY air defense system. The question is the cost of this event.
But sneaking is not always possible.

If we look at the ship as an air defense object, then, unlike land systems, the ship has serious limitations: first of all, it is the precision of detection systems and means of destruction of targets
At land complexes, these things can be seriously destroyed. Plus, all our domestic complexes can work independently from the Control Center of the system.

And the second serious problem is the significant limited ammunition. For almost all ships, reloading of ammunition is possible only in port, or a special supply vessel is required for this.

From the first point it follows that the ship is easier to detect by its own radiation. Plus the limited view (i.e. there is a significant period for scanning the entire horizon). Because of this, you can sneak up on a ship (solo) more discreetly.
Also, due to the limited space, air defense systems may have either too long a delay for targeting weapons (this is if launch from guides is used) or an increased dead zone (in the case of vertical launch cells).

As a result of all this, for each specific ship from each direction there is a strictly limited number of channels for destroying targets and a strictly defined reaction time. This leads to the fact that it is easier to overload the air defense system of a single ship than a similar land system.

And taking into account the fact that the number of means of destruction from the air of ships is rapidly growing, then we have to admit that with the presence of a control center, a single ship is doomed.

[Knell wardenheart]

An option would be to use the idea with MIRVs and tricks to push through missile defense?

[Vlad.by]

By and large, with the current state of the anti-ship missile fleet, with a good control center, not only a single ship, but also any AUG is doomed. It is quite possible to overload air defense from one specific direction, even if there are distracting actions from a couple of other directions.
Two - three regiments Su-34 or Tu-22M2 (3), or better with a simultaneous attack from under the water and the khan of any AUG.
But where to get those 2-3 regiments?
Is it possible to bring the Balov and Zircon range up to 3000 km or return to ekranoplans as carriers ...
But already now anti-ship missiles on ships of the near zone and submarines do not allow the AUG to approach our shores closer than 1500 km, and at such a distance they are practically harmless.

[Volder]

Quote: alstr

the task of breaking through the air defense of ANY object is solved in only two ways:
1. Sneaking. Those. work by stealth.
2. Overload of the air defense system.

There is a third way: speed breakthrough. Supersonic and hypersonic missile attacks cannot be deflected. There are no shipborne air defense systems capable of shooting down missiles at speeds exceeding Mach 3. Russia has Uranus and Caliber for sneaking up; for a high-speed attack - "Onyx" and "Zircon". These are ship missiles, but there are also aviation missiles.

[Kalmar]

Quote: Volder

Supersonic and hypersonic missile attacks cannot be deflected.

Like this? Modern air defense systems quite successfully cope with supersonic targets. It is not yet clear with hypersonic ones: after all, speed is not the only characteristic that plays a role, and, in fact, there is no other information about existing developments. Again, do not forget about electronic warfare, which can often be even more effective than air defense systems.

[Grazdanin]

Quote: Kalmar

It is not yet clear with hypersonic ones:

A hypersonic missile / aircraft has a high radar visibility, in fact, cannot maneuver. We have a "projectile" that is easy to notice and it cannot radically change the trajectory. How difficult is it to calculate the meeting point of a missile defense missile and a hypersonic missile? In my opinion, the task is more than solvable.

[Cyril G ...]

Quote: Grazdanin

In my opinion, the task is more than solvable.

In theory. In practice, everything is much worse.

[Grazdanin]

By the way. Somehow they discussed the use of converted into controlled NARs against UAVs. In the United States, a few days ago, they successfully tested the converted Hydra 70 (APKWS II) with the F16 to simulate a cruise missile. This was when the imitation of the CD was shot down with the Paladin SPG.

[Cyril G ...]

Yes, I paid attention. Everything is correct. After all, it is not the AiM-9 at the cost of half a million bucks, to shoot at the UAV weighing 30-100 kilograms of kilograms.

[Serg4545]

Quote: Grazdanin

The hypersonic missile / aircraft is highly visible to the radar,

Why do you think so? Radar visibility is given by:
Unit dimensions
Form of apparatus
Radio absorbing coating provides a slight increase in stealth. According to some reports, 15-20 percent. And even then in a small frequency range.
You don't know the shape and size of the device. So you're carrying a gag.

Quote: Grazdanin

and he cannot change dramatically the trajectory

Why would he make dead loops?
You just have no idea what speeds are in question!
Let's say Zircon changed course by only 10 degrees. Minor like? But as a result, in just 2 seconds, it deviates hundreds of meters from the original trajectory!
Now watch:
Any missile defense system has a certain reaction time. It is necessary to notice the anti-ship missile maneuver, calculate the new trajectory of the meeting, calculate the necessary maneuver with the rudders that should bring it to a new trajectory, carry out the rudder maneuver, wait for a while until the rudder maneuver overcomes inertia and the missile launcher will enter a new trajectory.
Moreover, all of the above must be done strictly sequentially. Nothing can be done in parallel. That is, the missile defense system will always have some delay in the reaction to the anti-ship missile maneuver.
Therefore, if Zircon, when approaching the target, will at least slightly change the trajectory, in an unpredictable way, every 2-3 seconds, no missile defense system will be able to hit it.

[The eye of the crying]

Quote: Serg4545

Why do you think so?

Plasma reflects radio waves well.

Quote: Serg4545

Let's say Zircon changed course by only 10 degrees. Minor like? But as a result, in just 2 seconds, it deviates hundreds of meters from the original trajectory!

SAMs are also able to change trajectories. And Zircon needs to hit the target, and he has no ability to write circles.

[Grazdanin]

Quote: Serg4545

You don't know the shape and size of the device. So you're carrying a gag.

From what? The shape and dimensions of real hypersonic missiles are known, Zircon is still a myth and cannot differ much from existing missiles, physics is the same for everyone. Most importantly, it is known that in hypersonic flight, a plasma cocoon is formed, which is perfectly visible for all frequencies of radar, IR devices, and simply visually.

Quote: Serg4545

Let's say Zircon changed course by only 10 degrees.

Not allowed. This is not a minuscule, at speeds of 6-8M with such a deviation, the rocket will be destroyed. 1-2 degrees maximum. Read about the physics of hypersonic flight.

Quote: Serg4545

if Zircon, when approaching the target, will at least slightly change the trajectory, in an unpredictable way, every 2-3 seconds,

It's impossible. All trajectory changes are extremely smooth and predictable. You assume that the physics of flight at transonic and hypersonic speeds is approximately the same, but this is not so.
Photos of real hypersonic missiles, if you do not know from the form:

[Serg4545]

Quote: Grazdanin

Not allowed. This is not a minuscule, at speeds of 6-8M with such a deviation, the rocket will be destroyed. 1-2 degrees maximum. Read about the physics of hypersonic flight.

What are you talking about!
Any guided missile can change the direction of flight at least 180 degrees, at least 360. Yes, the available overloads limit the time of these maneuvers, but do not cancel them!
1-2 degrees)))
And of course everything is relative.
If Zircon makes a small maneuver at a speed of Mach 8-10, then for a SAM with a speed of Mach 3,5, this maneuver will look like a lightning jump to which it is simply impossible to have time to react.

[Grazdanin]

Quote: Serg4545

Any guided missile can change the direction of flight at least 180 degrees, at least 360

In space at any speed, in the atmosphere depending on the speed.
Your statement in the atmosphere and in the presence of gravity is true for subsonic speeds, at supersonic speeds maneuverability is extremely limited, at hypersonic speeds there is practically no maneuvering. This is physics.

[Serg4545]

Quote: Grazdanin

In space at any speed

Ah, so they would immediately say that you are a schoolboy. Type in Yandex: maneuvers in space. And you will understand that space flights with atmospheric maneuvering cannot even be mentioned nearby. They are so different.

Quote: Grazdanin

at hypersonic speeds, maneuvering is practically absent. This is physics.

As I understand it, it is useless to wait for a link confirming this idea. Well, for lack of material this link could lead to.

[Volder]

Quote: Kalmar

Like this? Modern air defense systems quite successfully cope with supersonic targets.

No, they can't. Supersonic Mach 3-5 is not capable of intercepting any air defense system.

[Kalmar]

Quote: Volder

No, they can't. Supersonic Mach 3-5 is not capable of intercepting any air defense system.

I open the description of the S-400 right away: for the 48N6E2 rocket, the maximum target speed is 2800 m / s, for the 48N6E3 - 4800. This is, apparently, for ballistics, but no one has CRs flying faster than 3M.

[Aag]

"As a result of all this, for each specific ship from each direction there is a strictly limited number of channels for destroying targets and a strictly defined reaction time. This leads to the fact that it is easier to overload the air defense system of a single ship than a similar land system."
Maybe that's why, "one in the sea is not a warrior"? And, among other things, why are orders being built?

[antivirus]

naked physics ("no panties") - and this abyss swallowed them ...
there is no chance of building a new ocean-going fleet. you need a lot of money for an "integrated approach".
It's easier to rivet Barguzin and Yars. and to revive stud farms - for the delivery of ATGM-RPGs and Kornets SDR portable (and in rubber boats)
well done kokhly - the correct conclusion (about the fleet) was made from their poverty

[Revival]

+ for "no panties", originally))

[Earthshaker]

Thanks for the article, everything is clearly described, easy to read. I look forward to the next publications. Of particular interest is the review of domestic air defense systems of ships.

[Knell wardenheart]

Interesting thoughts, well, in principle, I assumed that hypersonic monsters are too expensive for us to be a really effective and massive weapon, and not a bogeyman (or a means of driving the enemy into an arms race).
Why are they not considering optical guidance on anti-ship missiles? I’m not an expert on this, but if we are talking about big goals, it may not be such a bad option.

[Avior]

many different types of interference for optics, both natural and artificial.
less detection range, problems with target recognition.
The Americans on the lrasm and new Tomahawks only now came to the possibility of attacking mobile targets, and then they added a millimeter-wave radio system.

[Volder]

Quote: Knell Wardenheart

I assumed that hypersonic monsters are too expensive for us to be really effective and massive weapons

1. Nobody knows the cost.
2. Hypersonic missiles are really effective weapons.
3. Mass production is not required, small-scale enough. Why? It's simple: it's impossible to shoot down, 1 ship requires 1 rocket to take it out of battle. For example, we have 11 Daggers in service for 11 American aircraft carriers. If you load 8 "Zircons" into a corvette, then one corvette will hit 8 ships of any class.

[Avior]

or one ship 8 times

[Revival]

The look is amateurish, but in your opinion, it seems to me too much, vanderwaffe

[The eye of the crying]

Quote: Volder

2. Hypersonic missiles are really effective weapons.

Has this been tested in practice at least once?

[postum]

Can zircons be installed on a motor boat or on a tug, and what is less cost, the EPR of a rubber boat is generally tiny

[D16]

During war, ships usually do not go one by one. .

[Avior]

an interesting article, but a lot has been omitted, but on the other hand, there are also new views on the problem.
I would like to note, without affecting the attacks of several ships
The problem of reconnaissance of over-the-horizon targets.
It's good if the target has direct radio visibility. The Americans, and not only the Americans, in this case, shoot first with anti-aircraft guns - their speed can be Mach 3-4 at the range of the radio horizon, and the flight time is very short, like the preparation time for the launch, and then they shoot anti-aircraft missiles at the enemy who has lost combat capability or finish off from the gun.
And if there is no direct radio visibility?
Many imagine that they launched the RCC approximately in the direction of the target, and it will find everything by itself.
In fact, there are difficulties.
1. To begin with, if you shoot at an over-the-horizon range, then between you and the target there may be an outsider or another ship or enemy ship, or simply neutral. Missiles, if their volley, will go into it - if it does not sink instantly, but this depends on the type of anti-ship missile, the time of the volley, and the size of the target.
If you turn on the seeker 20-30 km before the target in order to weed out strangers, there is a possibility that another enemy warship will be on the way, knocking your anti-ship missiles in pursuit in greenhouse polygon conditions, or, a combat ship, the target will swap places for some reason with another ship or vessel with a similar outcome.
At full speed - and the target will increase its speed and change course when it detects the activity of the scout - the warship will leave in an hour for a distance of 50 km - that is, half an hour is enough for it so that the GOS anti-ship missile system does not detect it when flying at ultra-low altitudes, even if they fired as much as possible exactly, and a head start so that the anti-ship missile system does not detect the ship even at high altitude - the range and angle of detection for the seeker is limited, and from a high altitude, the conditions of irradiation must also be taken into account.
Thus, we need not just information about a specific target, but information about the presence of targets on the flight path of the anti-ship missile system, and as fresh as possible, immediately before launch. The task is not easy - your ship or aircraft, the submarine needs to reach the launch line, this time and all this time you need to track not just the target, but the entire area. And if the target is an aircraft carrier or aircraft carrier, how much do you think the scout will be able to follow the target with impunity?
I specifically looked for cases of real combat launches at over-the-horizon range - I did not find a single one, although most modern anti-ship missiles are quite capable of this.
2. the problem of evaluating results.
If the target was not observed at the time of the attack, then the problem arises - how do you know if you hit or not? and an air reconnaissance aircraft at the radar range will not help much - the target may not sink right away, and the damaged ship and the undamaged one on the radar will look identical. And what to do next - to make more launches on the target, is this the consumption of ammunition, or to assume that the target is hit and safe and will sink itself? or amazed, but capable of shooting back? Or is it now incapable, and in half an hour the damage will be eliminated and will be combat-ready?

[sergo1914]

A question to all commentators and the afftor. Have you ever seen an RCC on your locator screen? At least subsonic? And I didn't see. Although I tried very hard. The thermal imager is visible. But not for long. The problem is the height of the approach trajectory. The radar does not see. All in hindrances. And in the thermal imager you can see when she is already flying into the lobshnik. Zipper - that's all. But even so they managed to shoot down.

[The eye of the crying]

Quote: sergo1914

Have you ever seen an RCC on your locator screen? At least subsonic? And I didn't see. Although I tried very hard.

Why should you see her? It must be seen by the radar control software.

[aagor]

The fact that the target is not visible on the radar screen means only that the locator was old or the beam width was more than 1,5-2 °. In the presence of a specular re-reflection of the target signal from the sea surface, which, moreover, comes in antiphase with the direct signal, the final received power can drop by 10 and 100 times. But the closer to the ship, the less this effect becomes, since the available beam width is sufficient for the angular resolution of the direct and reflected signal. It is especially effective if the radar beam is raised above the horizon by at least half the beam width, then the attenuation of the mirror signal caused by the beam raising will reduce the mutual compensation of signals. Modern radars with AFAR are especially good for this. But in our Navy there are no such ones even on Admiral Gorshkov. Author

[sergo1914]

Quote: aagor

The fact that the target is not visible on the radar screen means only that the locator was old or the beam width was more than 1,5-2 °. In the presence of a specular re-reflection of the target signal from the sea surface, which, moreover, comes in antiphase with the direct signal, the final received power can drop by 10 and 100 times. But the closer to the ship, the less this effect becomes, since the available beam width is sufficient for the angular resolution of the direct and reflected signal. It is especially effective if the radar beam is raised above the horizon by at least half the beam width, then the attenuation of the mirror signal caused by the beam raising will reduce the mutual compensation of signals. Modern radars with AFAR are especially good for this. But in our Navy there are no such ones even on Admiral Gorshkov. Author

Again. For the gifted. The surface of the sea is never (never, Karl, that means never). Any excitement, taking into account the flight height of the anti-ship missile system, makes the radar an expensive and useless toy. The detection radius of anti-ship missiles from any ship is infinitely small. I do not want to quote from memory TK on the Broadsword about the goals. Everything was confirmed in field trials (sea). I managed to shoot a simulator from it in Lvovka.

[Phoenix]

You did not mention the 3M54, it seems not deserved. Following your reasoning, 3M54 combines all the best from DPKR and SPKR. Does this mean that the 3M54 is the best anti-ship missile known?

[Avior]

Electronic warfare problem.
3. It just turned out to drown Eilat - they did not have time to deliver EW funds on it. This case is everywhere cited as an example of the effectiveness of RCC.
As soon as the Israelis placed electronic warfare and traps, the effectiveness of the Arabs' anti-ship missiles dropped to zero, which allowed the Israeli fleet to successfully use the Israeli Gabriels, who were formally noticeably inferior to the Soviet anti-ship missiles in terms of range.
Today, electronic warfare is very developed and diverse, both active and passive, and is improving as the GOS of the anti-ship missile system develops, and has long been able to work both in manual mode and in fully automatic mode, with a reaction time of up to 2-4 seconds.
The basis of the electronic warfare system is the RTR station, optical detection stations that detect the operation of the anti-missile missile target or their approach, then either active means are used - in the form of sighting, barrage in the range of interference, distracting interference, optical means of blinding anti-ship missiles with the seeker with infrared or optical guidance, and fired traps that also do not stand still - there are both infrared and passive - improved dipole with dipoles of various shapes, generally imitating the ship's RCS in different ranges, firing folding corner reflectors, various aerosols impenetrable not only in the optical range, smoke and others ...
There are also active traps - for example, the Australian-American Nulka, which is capable of setting a diversion, and which hangs in the air after launch, and is used in combination with dipole traps; there are European ones as well.
4. The main means of repelling an anti-ship missile attack in real combat conditions is just electronic warfare, not air defense.
And taking into account the fact that the electronic warfare acts on the seeker of an anti-ship missile system, the electronic warfare means have automatic modes with a short reaction time, for them the speed of the approaching anti-ship missile system does not really matter, if only the electronic warfare has time to trigger from the time the attack is detected. Of course, the high speed of anti-ship missiles and stealth approach increases the possibility of a surprise attack on the target and the likelihood of catching the enemy by surprise, but, unfortunately, as a rule, speed and stealth do not go well with each other, and the speed of modern electronic warfare stations is very high. But if you manage to catch the enemy by surprise, then the use of anti-ship missiles allows you to realize the advantage in surprise in hitting the target with a very high probability. And this happens - remember the English Sheffield, which was damaged due to the negligence of the destroyer commander, the American Stark for the same reason, the Israeli corvette due to the surprise of the attack and other cases.
5 Based on the foregoing, the most important element of an anti-ship missile system that increases the likelihood of destruction is not only the missile speed, but also the quality of the seeker, which is capable of finding a target and accurately launching a missile at it when the enemy uses electronic warfare. Now there are combined GOS with an optical and radar channel, they also make GOS based on AFAR with the ability to work in the synthetic aperture mode and mapping, with feedback via satellite and others, the complexity and cost of the GOS is growing, let's see what will give their application in real combat environment, as a rule, these results differ markedly from the polygon ...

[Pavel57]

EW reduce the likelihood, but not to zero.

[Avior]

Guarantee only in Gosstrakh
all hits with weapons are only probabilistic.
The anti-ship missile also hits the target not with probability 1.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Avior

As soon as the Israelis placed electronic warfare and traps, the effectiveness of the Arabs' anti-ship missiles dropped to zero, which allowed the Israeli fleet to successfully use the Israeli Gabriels, who were formally noticeably inferior to the Soviet anti-ship missiles in terms of range.

I will clarify: the export versions of the Soviet anti-ship missiles, which have "cut down" GOS.

[Avior]

Have non-exported people been shot at least once in a real combat situation in 50 years?

[Alexandra]

A bunch of factual errors.

The enemy ship's radar will detect such a target when the DPKR approaches a distance of 15-20 km.

Radar "Furke-E". The detection range of an anti-ship missile trajectory with an RCS of 0,02 m5 at a height of 21 m at an antenna post height of 1 m - "Furke-E" Option 10 - 2 km, "Furke-E" Option 12 - 14-3 km, "Furke-E" Option 12 - XNUMX km.

At a flight speed of 900 km / h, the DPKR will fly up to the target in 60-80 seconds. after discovery.

At a speed of 900 km / h (250 m / s), the subsonic anti-ship missile flies 10-14 km in 40-56 seconds.

At ranges of less than 1 km, the DPKR can also be fired upon by an anti-aircraft gun, therefore, when approaching at such distances, the DPKR will conduct anti-aircraft maneuvers with overloads of up to 1g.

The effective firing range of the ZAK is 1,5-2 km. Subsonic anti-ship missiles maneuver with an overload of up to 8 units.
Watch: Arapov O. L., Zuev Yu. S. On the issue of an anti-missile maneuver // Bulletin of MSTU im. N.E.Bauman. Ser. Instrumentation. 2015. No. 1. P. 34–46. Url:
http://vestnikprib.ru/articles/669/669.pdf

In the final flight segment, at a distance of 70-100 km from the target, the SPKR drops to an extremely low altitude of 10-12 m and flies at a speed of about 2,5 M. When approaching the target, the SPKR can perform anti-missile maneuvers with overloads up to 10g.

The flight altitude of the supersonic anti-ship missile "Moskit" in the final section is 7 meters, the supersonic anti-ship missile X-31A - 3-5 meters. The available overload of the Kh-31A anti-ship missiles is 15 units.

increased weight and dimensions, which do not allow the use of SPKR on fighter-bombers (IB)

The MiG-29K carrier-based fighter is capable of carrying up to four supersonic Kh-31A anti-ship missiles (AD). The maximum launch range of the Kh-31AD anti-ship missile system (carrier flight parameters: (H = 15 km, M = 1,5) - 120-160 km.

SPKR AGM-158C was developed only in 2018, and only a few dozen of them were produced.

RCC AGM-158C LRASM subsonic. Etc.

[Hermit21]

Note to the author and all the burialists of "Zircon". To hit an aerodynamic target, not only the condition for a two-fold excess of the SAM overload over the target overloads must be met, but also equality or greater speed than the target

[Serg4545]

Quote: Hermit21

but also equality or greater speed than the goal

That's it!
Many stupidly do not understand this! Like if the anti-ship missile system flies headlong at you, then the speed of your missile defense system is not important. The main thing is to calculate the lead correctly. This is not true!
If the speed of the missile is less than the speed of the target, the missile will not hit.
Whoever wants to argue with this, let him bring at least ONE case of special target shooting down, with a projectile that had a lower speed than the target.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Serg4545

If the speed of the missile is less than the speed of the target, the missile will not hit.

But what about the SM-3 and the BR warhead?

[Hermit21]

No way. Interception of a ballistic target has its own specifics. There, it is more important to correctly calculate the trajectory and issue the most accurate target command to the anti-missile. Anti-missile speed is not that important there

[Serg4545]

Quote: Alexey RA

what about the SM-3 and warhead BR?

We were talking about an aerodynamic target. That is, in the atmosphere.

Quote: Hermit21

To hit an aerodynamic target, not only the condition for a two-fold excess of the SAM overload over the target overloads must be met, but also equality or greater speed than the target

And the SM-3 hits targets with a kinetic interceptor in near space. In space, the rules are different.

[Aag]

Quote: Serg4545

Quote: Hermit21

but also equality or greater speed than the goal

That's it!
Many stupidly do not understand this! Like if the anti-ship missile system flies headlong at you, then the speed of your missile defense system is not important. The main thing is to calculate the lead correctly. This is not true!
If the speed of the missile is less than the speed of the target, the missile will not hit.
Whoever wants to argue with this, let him bring at least ONE case of special target shooting down, with a projectile that had a lower speed than the target.

Che-that barrage airships came to mind ...

[Serg4545]

Quote: AAG

I remembered the barrage airships ..

Well, I wrote: special target shooting.
That is, they wanted to shoot down a specific plane. And it was he who was shot down.
Otherwise, one could say:
Since most of the aircraft were finally destroyed from collision with the ground, it turns out that our Planet shot down most of the aircraft)

[Aag]

Quote: Serg4545

Quote: AAG

I remembered the barrage airships ..

Well, I wrote: special target shooting.
That is, they wanted to shoot down a specific plane. And it was he who was shot down.
Otherwise, one could say:
Since most of the aircraft were finally destroyed from collision with the ground, it turns out that our Planet shot down most of the aircraft)

Plus for humor.)) Birds also effectively landed airplanes ...
On the other hand, were the airships "accidentally" installed?))
They gave you an example with the ball and the goalkeeper ...
I cannot agree with your statement that a missile defense system with a lower speed than a target will not hit it if we are talking about a collision course ... Why?

[Serg4545]

Quote: AAG

On the other hand, were the airships "accidentally" installed?))

Yes, there is no difference on purpose or not. When buildings are being built, no one also expects that some will accept an airplane with their hull. However, such cases are not uncommon.
And the principle is the same. Everything depended on the pilot. He could fly around a building or an airship, but for various reasons he did not.
In fact, these are accidents during aerobatics)
And then I will quote my quote:
// special shooting down of a target, with a projectile //

The airship can hardly be called a projectile)

[Serg4545]

Quote: AAG

I cannot agree with your statement that a missile defense system with a lower speed than a target will not hit it if we are talking about a collision course ... Why?

I answered this question to a person below. So I'll just copy the answer to you.

If the attacking missile (AR) is faster than the anti-aircraft missile (SAM), then this gives the attacking missile almost total superiority!
And I'll prove it now.
Sorry, I will explain it very simply so that even a student can check.
So: take a sheet of paper. Put a dot at the top of the sheet. This will be an attack missile (AR).
Measure down 10 cm vertically and put the second point. It will be an anti-aircraft missile (SAM).
AR falls vertically downward. SAM, respectively, takes off vertically upward. The ideal trajectory for missiles, head to head.
But there is a nuance))
AR has a speed of 2 cm per second, and missiles 1 cm per second.
Let's say the AR made a maneuver and changed its trajectory by 45 degrees. You can mark the 45 degree angle with a protractor. It doesn't matter right or left. Then you need to draw a straight line from the AP point through the 45 degree mark. Straight to the edge of the sheet. This is now a new AR trajectory.
Let's say the SAM instantly changed its trajectory in order to intercept the AR.
For this, the trajectory of the missile defense system must intersect the trajectory of the AR. You can draw a straight line from the SAM point so that it intersects the AR trajectory at any point.
Then measure the distance from the SAM point to the point of intersection of the lines.
Then calculate how long this distance of the missile defense system will fly (speed 1 cm per second.)
And then measure how much AP will fly along its trajectory during the same time (speed 2 cm per second).
And you will see that the AR will pass the point of intersection of these trajectories long before the missile defense system arrives there.
And in fact, it does not matter where you lay the trajectory of the missile defense system and, accordingly, where the point of intersection of the trajectories will be.
SAM will always be late. ZUR WILL ALWAYS BE MISSING.
Therefore, it is ridiculous to read your statements:
// In fact, the possibility of intercepting a maneuvering target on a collision course is determined by the ratio of the permissible overload of the missile and the target. //

In this case, the missile defense system can have at least a million times more permissible overload than the AR.
But you can't compensate for the lack of speed with ANYTHING.

Like this:
2 minutes of time, a piece of paper and a pen and everything is clear and undeniable)

You may notice:
And if the AR changes its trajectory to a lesser degree. Well, let's say 5-6. Yes, then the missiles will have chances. Scanty, but they will be. This requires two prerequisites:

1) The trajectory of the meeting must be perfect. Forehead to forehead. (In reality, this is a huge rarity, almost always the trajectories intersect at some angle.)
2) The AR during the period of closest approach should not perform any maneuvers.

Like this. Chance, not a guarantee! appears at missiles only as a result of certain accidents. Almost nothing depends on the SAM itself. If the AR maneuvers at least a little with the required frequency, the missile defense system with a lower speed will never hit.

[Aag]

Quote: Serg4545

Quote: AAG

I cannot agree with your statement that a missile defense system with a lower speed than a target will not hit it if we are talking about a collision course ... Why?

I answered this question to a person below. So I'll just copy the answer to you.

If the attacking missile (AR) is faster than the anti-aircraft missile (SAM), then this gives the attacking missile almost total superiority!
And I'll prove it now.
Sorry, I will explain it very simply so that even a student can check.
So: take a sheet of paper. Put a dot at the top of the sheet. This will be an attack missile (AR).
Measure down 10 cm vertically and put the second point. It will be an anti-aircraft missile (SAM).
AR falls vertically downward. SAM, respectively, takes off vertically upward. The ideal trajectory for missiles, head to head.
But there is a nuance))
AR has a speed of 2 cm per second, and missiles 1 cm per second.
Let's say the AR made a maneuver and changed its trajectory by 45 degrees. You can mark the 45 degree angle with a protractor. It doesn't matter right or left. Then you need to draw a straight line from the AP point through the 45 degree mark. Straight to the edge of the sheet. This is now a new AR trajectory.
Let's say the SAM instantly changed its trajectory in order to intercept the AR.
For this, the trajectory of the missile defense system must intersect the trajectory of the AR. You can draw a straight line from the SAM point so that it intersects the AR trajectory at any point.
Then measure the distance from the SAM point to the point of intersection of the lines.
Then calculate how long this distance of the missile defense system will fly (speed 1 cm per second.)
And then measure how much AP will fly along its trajectory during the same time (speed 2 cm per second).
And you will see that the AR will pass the point of intersection of these trajectories long before the missile defense system arrives there.
And in fact, it does not matter where you lay the trajectory of the missile defense system and, accordingly, where the point of intersection of the trajectories will be.
SAM will always be late. ZUR WILL ALWAYS BE MISSING.
Therefore, it is ridiculous to read your statements:
// In fact, the possibility of intercepting a maneuvering target on a collision course is determined by the ratio of the permissible overload of the missile and the target. //

In this case, the missile defense system can have at least a million times more permissible overload than the AR.
But you can't compensate for the lack of speed with ANYTHING.

Like this:
2 minutes of time, a piece of paper and a pen and everything is clear and undeniable)

You may notice:
And if the AR changes its trajectory to a lesser degree. Well, let's say 5-6. Yes, then the missiles will have chances. Scanty, but they will be. This requires two prerequisites:

1) The trajectory of the meeting must be perfect. Forehead to forehead. (In reality, this is a huge rarity, almost always the trajectories intersect at some angle.)
2) The AR during the period of closest approach should not perform any maneuvers.

Like this. Chance, not a guarantee! appears at missiles only as a result of certain accidents. Almost nothing depends on the SAM itself. If the AR maneuvers at least a little with the required frequency, the missile defense system with a lower speed will never hit.

Thank you for your time with me! Sorry, I will answer, if possible, tomorrow (today) ...

[The eye of the crying]

Quote: Hermit21

To hit an aerodynamic target, not only the condition for a two-fold excess of the SAM overload over the target overloads must be met, but also equality or greater speed than the target

The only question is whether the hypersonic Zircon can be considered an aerodynamic target. The statement you made refers to missiles designed to engage actively maneuvering aircraft. What maneuvering Zircon is capable of is a mystery.

[Avior]

And why is this required on a collision course?

[dmi3x]

Imagine the ball and the goalkeeper. The faster the speed of the ball, the more difficult it is to catch, even if the goalkeeper jumps to the side rather than in the direction of travel. Now imagine a ball that maneuvers. The goalkeeper has already jumped to the left, and the ball flew to the right. Goal.

[Avior]

This requires a high overload capacity, observation means and speed of the trajectory estimation system.
Have you ever seen a goalkeeper take a ball, including a twisted one, with a change in direction?
Given that the speed of the ball, which reaches 150-200 kilometers per hour, is several times higher than the speed of the goalkeeper?
In hockey, the speeds are similar, and nothing, goalkeepers take the puck.
But to catch up with the puck or the ball, they definitely have no chance. The speed is far from the same.

[dmi3x]

That's all right. And here the main question is about the ability of the SM-3 to intercept maneuvering hypersonic targets in the atmosphere on a head-on course, and not ballistic objects in space that have a linear trajectory. Indeed, on the oncoming trajectory, the approach speed will be the sum of the speeds. How much it? 5 km / sec?

[Avior]

Think for yourself - the lower the speed of convergence, the easier it is to get. That is, the low speed of the anti-missile increases the probability of hitting. :))))

In fact, the ability to intercept a maneuvering target on a collision course is determined by the ratio of the permissible overload of the missile and the target.
It is usually considered that the ratio is twice sufficient to intercept a maneuvering target. And do not think that shooting down a ballistic target is simple and easy.

[Serg4545]

Quote: Avior

And why is this required on a collision course?

Quote: Avior

Think for yourself - the lower the speed of convergence, the easier it is to get. That is, the low speed of the anti-missile increases the probability of hitting. :))))

Well, you wrote nonsense.
If the attacking missile (AR) is faster than the anti-aircraft missile (SAM), then this gives the attacking missile almost total superiority!
And I'll prove it now.
Sorry, I will explain it very simply so that even a student can check.
So: take a sheet of paper. Put a dot at the top of the sheet. This will be an attack missile (AR).
Measure down 10 cm vertically and put the second point. It will be an anti-aircraft missile (SAM).
AR falls vertically downward. SAM, respectively, takes off vertically upward. The ideal trajectory for missiles, head to head.
But there is a nuance))
AR has a speed of 2 cm per second, and missiles 1 cm per second.
Let's say the AR made a maneuver and changed its trajectory by 45 degrees. You can mark the 45 degree angle with a protractor. It doesn't matter right or left. Then you need to draw a straight line from the AP point through the 45 degree mark. Straight to the edge of the sheet. This is now a new AR trajectory.
Let's say the SAM instantly changed its trajectory in order to intercept the AR.
For this, the trajectory of the missile defense system must intersect the trajectory of the AR. You can draw a straight line from the SAM point so that it intersects the AR trajectory at any point.
Then measure the distance from the SAM point to the point of intersection of the lines.
Then calculate how long this distance of the missile defense system will fly (speed 1 cm per second.)
And then measure how much AP flies along its trajectory during the same time.
And you will see that the AR will pass the point of intersection of these trajectories long before the missile defense system arrives there.
And in fact, it does not matter where you lay the trajectory of the missile defense system and, accordingly, where the point of intersection of the trajectories will be.
SAM will always be late. ZUR WILL ALWAYS BE MISSING.
Therefore, it is ridiculous to read your statements:
// In fact, the possibility of intercepting a maneuvering target on a collision course is determined by the ratio of the permissible overload of the missile and the target. //

In this case, the missile defense system can have at least a million times more permissible overload than the AR.
But you can't compensate for the lack of speed with ANYTHING.

Like this:
2 minutes of time, a piece of paper and a pen and everything is clear and undeniable)

You may notice:
And if the AR changes its trajectory to a lesser degree. Well, let's say 5-6. Yes, then the missiles will have chances. Scanty, but they will be. This requires two prerequisites:

1) The trajectory of the meeting must be perfect. Forehead to forehead. (In reality, this is a huge rarity, almost always the trajectories intersect at some angle.)
2) The AR during the period of closest approach should not perform any maneuvers.

Like this. Chance, not a guarantee! appears at missiles only as a result of certain accidents. Almost nothing depends on the SAM itself. If the AR maneuvers at least a little with the required frequency, the missile defense system with a lower speed will never hit.

[Avior]

Well, you wrote nonsense.

I brought your thought to its logical conclusion :))
And about your exercises with a piece of paper in the style of the story of Achilles and the tortoise, who will catch up with whom (have you heard of this one?) :)), I will tell you the following - you artificially changed the conditions of the problem.
if the missile flies away at an angle of 45 degrees from the target, then it will not hit anywhere, it will fly away from the target.
It is even more convenient for your task to prove the unprovable, it was necessary to turn it 180 degrees, and not 45 :)), then the anti-missile would never catch up
Naturally, if the trajectories are not oncoming, then the anti-missile missile can hit, maybe not, it depends on the specific initial data.
For your task, you need to consider that the anti-missile will fly perpendicular to the missile, thus forming a right-angled triangle with a hypotenuse of 10 cm, which requires the ratio of the legs - the length of the trajectories of the missile and the anti-missile for the same time - one to two.
A simple equation according to the Pythagorean theorem gives the result - the length of the trajectory of the anti-missile is the square root of 20 cm, this is about 4,5 cm, the trajectory of the rocket is 9 cm, at this point they will intersect.

A and B are the initial position of the missile and the anti-missile, c is the distance between them, c = 10 cm.
C - interception point.
a is the distance traveled before interception by an anti-missile, a = 4,5 cm,
b - the distance traveled before interception by the rocket is twice a, b = 2a = 9 cm.
the permissible deflection angle of the missile, at which there will be an interception under the given conditions, will be equal to the tangent of one second, that is, about 27 degrees.
45 degrees, as you asked, does not work, yes, 45 will turn out at the same missile and anti-missile speeds, the tangent is 1.
but I did not insist that any deviations in the course would be intercepted, as you remember.
and as for what you think

And in fact, it does not matter where you lay the trajectory of the missile defense system and, accordingly, where the point of intersection of the trajectories will be.
SAM will always be late. ZUR WILL ALWAYS BE MISSING.

then in control theory there is the concept of a steady-state error of the system.
it depends on changes in the disturbance in the system and the properties of the system itself.
in your case, the change in the disturbance is linear, therefore, for the error to be steady, the system must be first-order astatic.
the magnitude of the error will depend on the gain of the control system and will be inversely proportional to it.
if the system is second-order astatic, then the steady-state error will be zero.
Everything was invented long ago. Good luck!

[Serg4545]

Quote: Avior

then in control theory there is the concept of a steady-state error of the system.
it depends on changes in the disturbance in the system and the properties of the system itself.
in your case, the change in the disturbance is linear, therefore, for the error to be steady, the system must be first-order astatic.
the magnitude of the error will depend on the gain of the control system and will be inversely proportional to it.
if the system is second-order astatic, then the steady-state error will be zero.
Everything was invented long ago. Good luck!

Campaign you are a Jew.
More than once I came across such a Jewish feature:
When there is nothing to answer in essence, we give formulas. Lots of formulas. And we also quote an ancient Chinese thinker about the honesty of being. And similar rubbish that has nothing to do with the topic under discussion.
The main goal is to short-circuit a person's brains. And leave, victoriously leaving behind the last word (and it does not matter that this word is not in the topic, the main thing is the last)
Good luck!

[Avior]

no, i'm Russian, no Jewish roots either .
I didn’t mean to offend you.
the formulas that I gave you, they are from school mathematics, this is the answer in essence.
they describe mathematically what you were trying to show on your fingers.
The problem is that you are essentially wrong, the intuition is not always correct.
The ball flies much faster than the goalkeeper into the corner of the goal, many times faster, but the goalkeeper sometimes takes it, and sometimes not, if you want a visual analogy.

[Angry]

So ... It turns out that the most effective defense of the BNK is within the radius of the optical horizon. 20-30 km. You need something like a RAM. And about such a complex, it's not that there is no information, there is no hint that it is being done ...

[huntsman650]

If we open the primer on the tactics of the Navy, then there are no DBs for a single ship. Only AUG, KPUG, etc., etc. There may be one radar patrol ship, but its task is to timely detect and alert UG. This article is from the crafty one, there are few ships that they invent how to plug all the holes with one ship.

[iouris]

How does this "efficiency" change? Well, the efficiency will be high and the single ship will be destroyed.

[Pavel57]

The author writes: The disadvantage of SPKR ramjet engines is that when the rocket body rotates during intense maneuvers, the air flow through the air intakes is noticeably reduced, and the engine can stall. Intensive maneuvering will be available only in the last few kilometers before hitting the target, when the missile can reach the target and with the engine stalled by inertia. Therefore, intensive maneuvering is undesirable on the cruising leg of the flight.


It is unclear logic if intensive maneuvering does not make sense on the cruising leg of the flight.

[Bersaglieri]

AGM-158C - subsonic, not supersonic anti-ship missiles

[xomaNN]

The article was written by an undoubtedly competent radar specialist. This inspires confidence in the conclusions.

However, I think our NKs will rarely be near enemy zones, without the umbrella of our coastal air defense С300 / 400

[meandr51]

It is not clear that all these aircraft carriers hated so much? After all, they are harmless in essence, since they do not fit within the range of their aircraft at all. The most dangerous targets are Tomahawk and SLBM carriers. And here Zircons will not help much.

[d4rkmesa]

Well, this goes back to the history of WWII, where, for example, in the battle for the Philippines, the largest formation of aircraft carriers with 1000+ aircraft defeated the enemy with a numerical advantage. They still think in terms of oncoming battles of ships. Or maybe it is already worth, as with tanks, to accept the factor of more diverse threats.

[Maxim_ok]

Clarification. AGM-158C subsonic anti-ship missile.

The missile SAM RAM has a two-mode seeker. Infrared and passive radio-frequency (RF) seeker, two antennas of which are located at the head of the rocket. Since anti-ship missiles are radio-emitting targets (containing an active radar seeker or a radar radio altimeter), the presence of a passive seeker on missiles increases its effectiveness.

The article is very good. Everything is logically planned.

[Sckepsis]

Nice to see new authors. A short abstract on the article: everything American is super cool, all Russian shit.

[aagor]

I suggest you become an even newer author and write an article: All Russian is super cool, all American shit. When the ink in the article dries up, think about whether it's a pity to send our pilots to Aegis. Author

[Alex Rossky]

Question to the author.
What justification do you have for considering the frigates of Project 22350 "Admiral Gorshkov" ships of the first rank?