Reconnaissance about German infantry and cavalry near the border of the USSR

The following abbreviations are used in the article: IN - military district, GSh - General base, Spacecraft - Red Army, cd (kbr, kn) - cavalry division (brigade, regiment), md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), one - security division, pd (pp) - infantry division (regiment), Goals Difference - intelligence materials, Ro - intelligence department of VO, RU - Reconnaissance GSh KA, td (mn) - tank division (regiment).

In the previous part it was shown that our intelligence services did not have sources of information in the German large headquarters. Therefore, intelligence could collect information about the troops concentrated near the border of the USSR, only through visual observation and tracking rumors among the local population. The reliability of RMs obtained by such methods was low.

When obtaining information using visual observation, the main emphasis was on insignia and insignia that were placed on shoulder straps. According to sources, in May 1941, the German command decided to withdraw the reconnaissance mark, which was associated with the marks on the shoulder straps. The numbers were spore, but on the faded shoulder straps, traces of marks were clearly visible. There were some stupid Germans! However, after the start of the war, all their stupidity for some reason disappeared at once. Until the beginning or mid-June, our scouts did not even think that the signs could be used by the German command for misinformation.

Time of information passage before being included in the RC reports

On May 31.5.41, 1, another report of RU is published, which provides data on the distribution of the German armed forces by theaters and military fronts as of June 15. On June 1.6.41, the last pre-war report of the RU was prepared, which contains the same data as in the previous report. Additionally, the summary includes the document "Dislocation of German units and formations by groupings in the border strip with the USSR on XNUMX (according to intelligence and data from RO PribOVO, RO headquarters ZAPOVO, RO headquarters KOVO". in this article... Upon further reference, the document will be called "Dislocation of German units ..."

The data on the deployment of German troops near the border, which are given in the report of the RU of June 15, can be compared only with the map of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces dated May 27.5.41, XNUMX. Therefore, it is necessary to understand what the latest date can correspond to the RM, which were included to the document "Dislocation of German units ..."

The report of May 31 was signed by the head of the RU on the same day. Consequently, RMs for this report could arrive until the evening of May 31.

RM for reports came to RU from their agent sources (including military attachés in different countries), from the RO of the border western military units, from the NKGB intelligence services and the NKVD border troops.

The fastest way to reach the Republic of Moldova could come from undercover sources that had radio communications. The author reviewed the published materials from the RU agent sources from January 1941 until the beginning of the war. These reports provide information on the total number of German divisions at the border, in the Balkans, in France (with deployment sites) and in other theaters of military operations, and on the transport of German troops. But in these messages there is no information about the places of deployment at the border of German divisions or their headquarters, regiments and smaller units. As an example, excerpts from some spy messages are given:

"Eshchenko" (28.5.41): "The message of the" Combat "... 27.5.41 ... German troops, artillery and ammunition are continuously transported from Bulgaria to Romania through the Feribot bridge near Ruse, across the bridge near Nikopol and on barges near Vidin. Troops are marching to the Soviet border ... "Resolution in RU on the message of May 29.

"Mars" (15.6.41): “The Slovak reported: In addition to the five German divisions deployed 3 weeks ago from the Presov region to Poland, from June 9 in the Presov - Vranov region [Slovakia, 34-88 km to the border. - Approx. auth.] 4 new divisions have appeared, of which 2 are motorized mechanized divisions ... ”Resolution in RU on a communication dated June 16.

"Dora" (17.6.41): “On the Soviet-German border there are about 100 infantry divisions, of which one third are motorized ... In Romania, there are especially many German troops near Galati. At present, selected special-purpose divisions are being prepared, these include the 5th and 10th divisions stationed in the General Government ... "Information on the date of admission to the RU is not given.

The minimum time for information to pass from sources through residents and radio operators in the RU is about three days: the source saw the movement of troops, the next day the information reached the resident, who, having compiled a message, transmits it to the radio operator, and on the third day of the RM, it goes to the head of the RU. Further, the spy message is addressed, sometimes a report with a map to the head of the RU and the receipt of this information to the performer for inclusion in the report. In this case, the troops or transport could see no later than May 28. It is very likely that undercover sources in East Prussia and former Poland were transferred to the communications of the RO PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO.

The RO of the headquarters of the border western military units received information from their intelligence sources, from operational points, from radio intelligence, from intelligence agencies of subordinate armies, the NKGB and the NKVD border troops.

In the intelligence reports of RO VO there is a lot of information about the locations of the German troops, about the numbers of units, formations, army corps and armies. The transit time of undercover messages from the source to the RO using communication means can also be about 3 days. Further, these RMs are included in the summary of the RO of the district, which will later be sent to the RO. In this case, information on the deployment of German troops as of May 26-27 will be included in the report of the RU. When transferring information from sources using a mailbox system or messengers, the transit time of the RM may increase.

A lot of intelligence messages also passed through the operational intelligence points, a survey of border trespassers was conducted, perhaps a survey of railway employees who arrived from the adjacent territory was conducted. Since an extra link appeared in the information transmission chain, the transit time of the RM could increase.

The time of passage of the RM through the intelligence agencies of the NKGB and the border troops of the NKVD can be comparable:
- to RU - with the time of receipt of information from RO VO;
- before RO VO - with the time of receipt of information from operational points.

Therefore, we can say that a significant part of the RM, which were used in drawing up the document "Dislocation of German units ...", reflected the situation not earlier than 27.5.41.

German divisions in Romania, Hungary and Slovakia

In accordance with the report of RU from 31.5.41 or 15.6.41, the German troops were: "In Slovakia (district Zborov, Presov, Vranov [from 50 to 104 km to the Soviet border - Approx. Auth.]) - 5 mountain divisions; in the Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions; in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja - 17 divisions, including 10 infantry, 4 motorized, one mountain and two others ... "

Below in the picture you can see that only the 97th light front line from near Munich will be redeployed to Slovakia. There are no five German mountain divisions in Slovakia. They can only be portrayed by certain groups of military personnel dressed in the uniform of mountain shooters.

There are no four German divisions in the Carpathian Ukraine. They also do not exist throughout Hungary. And again, someone depicts these divisions, since we are talking about rechecked RM. As of June 22, the number of mythical divisions in these territories will even increase ...

Below on the map the locations of the deployment of six German infantry divisions in Romania as of 27.5.41 are presented. The remaining 11 German divisions, which are listed in the summary, are the result of misinformation by the German command ...

It can be seen that there is a gross error of our intelligence in determining the number of German divisions on the territory of Romania, Slovakia and Hungary. The presence of up to 20 mythical German divisions in these territories testifies to the scale of the disinformation measures carried out by the German command ...

German divisions in East Prussia and the former Poland

In accordance with by a summary of RU from 31.5.41 or on 15.6.41: 72-74 German infantry divisions are concentrated on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland (including the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn). In fact, there are 70 infantry and security divisions on this territory, two of which are redeployed from France and Germany. We can say that RM on infantry divisions are fairly accurate. The figure shows a fragment of the map of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces (27.5.41) with the locations of the divisions in the territory of East Prussia and the former Poland.

The tables below show the numbers of infantry and security divisions, as well as infantry regiments actually located at the border (including redeployed troops), as well as divisions and regiments that are mentioned in the document "Dislocation of German units ..." Some of the numbers of divisions and regiments are not defined in the document and therefore it is not presented in the tables. Matching numbers are highlighted in red. On the right is the percentage of reconciliation data with the numbers of units and formations actually located at the border.

The coincidence is between 19 and 44%. We can say that this is a fairly good coincidence, since for other divisions and regiments, which will be considered below, the coincidence will be much lower.

What should the German command have done to hide their plans for a blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union until June 21-22?

1. To show our intelligence services near the border the presence of large infantry groupings with artillery units, which are nevertheless stationed far enough from the border. Infantry groupings are incapable of a lightning attack to great depths. Therefore, these groups will not alert the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union. Simulate the preparation of fortifications and defensive lines by the infantry forces, carry out the withdrawal of anti-tank artillery into positions. Implemented.

2. Large infantry groupings may have cavalry, separate armored units, and possibly even armored divisions for reinforcement. At the same time, the deployment of tank forces should not give rise to the thought of the presence of undetected mobile strike groups or tank groups. Implemented.

3. Conceal the redeployment to the border of the tank and motorized divisions of the motorized corps when they are concentrated near the border. Implemented.

4. Lack of large forces aviation at airfields near the border until the end of the concentration of ground forces. The absence of a large number of parachute and airborne divisions at the border. Since the German command in every possible way showed the presence in the Wehrmacht of a large number (8-10) of non-existent indicated divisions, the presence of less than two of them near the border should not have alerted the command of the spacecraft. Implemented.

Wehrmacht cavalry

The 1st cbr existed in the Wehrmacht since 1936. There were also 13 Reitar (cavalry) regiments. The successes of the 1st cd in the war with Poland led to the fact that on 25.10.39 the 1st cd was formed on its basis. In May 1940, the division includes: 1st, 2nd, 21st and 22nd regiment, 1st cavalry artillery regiment, 1st scooter battalion, 40th anti-tank battalion, 40th sapper battalion, 86th communications battalion. It should be noted that in the structure of the 1st cd It never happened cavalry brigade.

In September 1940, the division was redeployed to the territory of the General Government. It is known that since November 2, the 1st cd was in the region of Brest. The division headquarters was stationed in the city of Miedzyrzec. The division was in the area until mid-June.

In September 1939, an SS Cavalry Regiment was formed in Berlin, which arrived at the General Government at the end of the month. On 21.5.40 the regiment was reorganized into two SS cavalry regiments: 1st and 2nd. The 1st SS CP was stationed in Warsaw, and the 2nd - in Lublin. On 24.2.41, the formation of the 1st SS brigade began as part of the indicated regiments. The brigade's headquarters was in the city of Lukov. The 1st SS CP crossed the border with the USSR only at the end of June 1941. The 2nd SS CP until July was in the territory of the General Government.

Thus, by the beginning of the war, six CPs were deployed near the border on the territory of former Poland, consisting of one cavalry division and one cavalry brigade.

Before mobilization began in the summer of 1939, the infantry divisions did not have their own reconnaissance battalions. The reconnaissance battalions began to form on the basis of 13 cavalry regiments (Reitarsky), which ceased to exist. The total strength of the battalion was 623 people. It consisted of a cavalry squadron (three platoons of 42 people each), five horse-drawn guns, 50 motorcycles, 49 cars, 3 armored vehicles and 260-300 horses.

Some of the infantry regiments included a cavalry reconnaissance platoon.

Troop colors of German troops and services

The golden yellow color was the Waffenfarbe of cavalry formations and units, as well as reconnaissance units of infantry divisions. Waffenfarbe infantry units, cavalry reconnaissance platoons, infantry regiments were white. If our scouts knew about this, then they could easily distinguish cavalry units from other units and subunits. Difficulties arose in the event that our intelligence did not know about this ...

Mention of cavalry in reconnaissance materials

According to the author, one of the measures to misinform our command was the excessive increase by the German command of the number of cavalry units concentrated at the border. This misinformation found its place in the RM, which came from various departments. For example:

The NKGB of the USSR ... sends intelligence information about the military preparations of Germany on the territory of the Governor-General, received from the resident of the NKGB of the USSR in Warsaw ...
1.5.41 ... According to data received from various sources, Germans concentrated on the border with the USSR about 4 million troops, about 800 thousand cavalry and 4000 planes ... "

The book M. I. Meltyukhova "Stalin's Lost Chance" states that "For the attack on the Soviet Union, the German command allocated 4050 thousand people" (in the land army and the Waxes of the SS, in the Air Force and the Navy).

On 1.5.41, there were about 51 German divisions near the border, which accounted for 38% of the number of formations that will be concentrated on June 22. By May 1, there was a small amount of Luftwaffe forces at the border ... Therefore, we can say that by May 1, there were about 2 million German soldiers at the border.

A fairly large number of cavalry divisions are noted in the NKVD Certificate (not earlier than 23.5.41):

In April-May of this year. the concentration of German troops continued near the Soviet-German border. During this period, a concentration of ... 68-70 infantry, 6-8 motorized, was established on the territory of East Prussia and the Polish governorship-general, 10 cavalry and 5 tank divisions ...
Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Lieutenant General Maslennikov.

Some reconnaissance agencies determined the German cavalry regiments by the number of horses: “[29.5.41 g.] ... The presence of cavalry in the Ostrov region up to 1,5 thousand horses can be considered in this region for the deployment of a cavalry regiment ... " It turns out that herds of horses of infantry divisions, each of which had 1743 riding horses and 3632 draft horses, could be mistaken for cavalry regiments.

The document "Dislocation of German units ..." mentions one cavalry division headquarters, four cavalry brigade headquarters and 23 cavalry regiments. The numbers of the cavalry division, three cavalry brigades and 13 cavalry regiments were known to intelligence. Subsequently, before the start of the war, intelligence learns about three more regiment numbers: 12th, 110th and 537th. Below are the numbers of the regiments according to intelligence data and the numbers of the regiments that were actually located at the border. The coincidence in the numbers is only 6%. The rest of the numbers are probably bogus ...

The determination of the numbers of the 1st and 2nd kp were counted as a reconnaissance error, since these regiments were never stationed in East Prussia. In addition, the presence of these regiments in East Prussia was confirmed by intelligence on the eve of the war, which is a clear consequence of disinformation ...

You might think that the scouts simply confused the cavalry squadrons from the reconnaissance battalions with cavalry regiments, but this is not the case ... Below on the fragments of the maps are marked the locations of the cavalry units in accordance with the RM. When considering the intelligence data, the conclusion suggests itself not entirely disingenuous ...

The table below provides information on the deployment of cavalry units in accordance with the document "Dislocation of German units ..." and intelligence data on units as of June 21. Possible redeployment sites are marked in blue.

The table shows that:

- the headquarters of the 1st cd was in Warsaw from the end of May to 21 June, which was not true. For 7,5 months, intelligence was unable to establish that this headquarters was located in the city of Miedzyrzec;

- reconnaissance found four mythical headquarters of the cavalry brigades as of May 31 and confirmed the presence of three of them in the same places as of June 21. This can also only indicate the misinformation of our command;

- Many cavalry regiments disappeared from the places of deployment, where they were by May 31, but many regiments appeared in new places. The appearance of new cavalry regiments at the border, which could not be there, does not indicate a good work of intelligence.

By June 21, according to the RO of the headquarters of the Western Military District, the number of cavalry formations in the district zone reached a significant value - up to 5,7 divisions:

1. East Prussian direction ... up to four kp.
2. Mlavskoe direction ... kp - three.
3. Warsaw direction ... one cd;
4. Demblin direction ... up to three cd ...

We can draw the following conclusion: at the end of May, the presence of infantry divisions at the border of the German command did not particularly hide. The intelligence data turned out to be close to reality. However, the true numbers of most of these divisions were hidden or distorted.

The number of cavalry formations and units was deliberately overstated by the German command. Many of them turned out to be fictitious. This is evidenced by the exact knowledge of their numbers by our intelligence, although the overwhelming majority of these formations and units never existed.

To be continued ...

Comments

[AsmyppoL]

I'm sorry, but I forgot to clarify the next point.
In the tables, divisions and regiments with exact numbers that simply did not exist are highlighted in gray ...

[polpot]

Thank you, as always very interesting, we look forward to continuing.

[Dr. Frankenstucker]

Interesting, thanks.

If our scouts knew about this, then they could easily distinguish cavalry units from other units and subunits. Difficulties arose in the event that our intelligence did not know about this ...

so the main external difference of the Wehrmacht reiters were cavalry breeches and high boots.

[Operator]

"... there is a gross error of our intelligence in determining the number of German divisions on the territory of Romania, Slovakia and Hungary. The presence of up to 20 mythical German divisions in these territories testifies to the scale of the disinformation measures carried out by the German command."

Like the German command, according to the author, jumped out of his pants in order to create an impression from the Soviet command about as many of its troops as possible along the entire length of the Soviet border - and how else could Stalin be assured of the exclusively peaceful intentions of the Third Reich. USE victims approve

[AsmyppoL]

Again, you stated your point of view without citing links to materials ... And again it turned out to be wrong ...
And what can you refer to here if you do not know the main documents ...
For example, Barborossa's plan said: "..Within the framework of this general task, the armies, as well as the tank group, in accordance with the detailed instructions of the headquarters of Army Group South, carry out the following tasks:

11th Army to cover the territory of Romania, vital for the conduct of a real war by Germany, from the invasion of Russian troops. To ensure the success of the offensive of Army Group South, the army must, by demonstrating the deployment of large forces, pin down the opposing enemy, and in the future, as the offensive develops in other directions, in cooperation with aviation, to prevent the organized withdrawal of the Russians beyond the river. Dnieper, pursuing their retreating troops on their heels ... "

As part of this task, the German command tried in every possible way to overestimate the number of its troops in this direction ...

[Operator]

Quote: AsmyppoL

You have stated your point of view

Don't break the bottom - pay attention to the quotes and re-read your own article.

[BAI]

German cavalry is difficult to track as the Wehrmacht had more horses than the Red Army.
The German infantry division in the state had 6358 horses, and in the RKKA rifle division - 3039 (at the beginning of the war).

[Dr. Frankenstucker]

The German infantry division had 6358 horses per state

Are you talking about cavalry or horse artillery?
In the light PD of the Wehrmacht, 90% of the artillery had horse traction in the 41st.

[ccsr]

Quote: BAI

The German infantry division in the state had 6358 horses, and in the RKKA rifle division - 3039 (at the beginning of the war).

If you give such data, then at least give a link where this figure is taken from, because according to RU data, in 1941 there were 3500 horses in the Wehrmacht infantry division.

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: Operator

Quote: AsmyppoL

You have stated your point of view

Don't break the bottom - pay attention to the quotes and re-read your own article.

In quotation marks, you quoted from the article: "... there is a gross mistake of our intelligence in determining the number of German divisions on the territory of Romania, Slovakia and Hungary. The presence of up to 20 mythical German divisions in these territories testifies to the scale of the disinformation measures carried out by the German command."

The keywords in this phrase are "Romania", "Slovakia" and "Hungary". These are the territories where it was required to simulate the presence of military units, because blows were delivered in other directions.

Dear Operator, you just distorted the meaning of the phrase by writing: "Like the German command, according to the author, jumped out of his pants to create an impression on the Soviet command about as many of its troops as possible along the entire length of the Soviet border - and how else could Stalin be assured of the exclusively peaceful intentions of the Third Reich. "

There are no words in the article about creating an impression "about a large number of troops all over the border".
The article says that from Slovakia and to the north, the German command tried to create the impression of large infantry groupings, supported by cavalry and tank units ...

For the readers, I inform you that in the next couple of days a new part about tank and motorized divisions will be released. There will also be a link to the maps.
Unfortunately, further continuation will be somewhat delayed.

[Operator]

Speech in my first comment was about something completely different - Hitler, even having a smoke on his head, would not have thought of concocting disinformation (which you ascribe to him) aimed at overstatement the number of their divisions on the border with the USSR.

[VIP]

"there is no information about the locations of the German divisions at the border." Author, you want: "honey and immediately with a big spoon." For this, agents, "combat", "Slovak" must be in the headquarters of these divisions and preferably a liaison officer or intendant. They are the best informed.
By the way, "Dora" is the pseudonym of Sandor Rado

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

On 31.5.41 May 1, another report of the RU is published, which provides data on the distribution of the German armed forces in theaters and fronts of military operations as of June 15. On June XNUMX, the last pre-war report of the RU was prepared, which contains the same data as in the previous report.

This is a lie, because the author is talking about a monthly MAY intelligence report for the districts with a two-week delay, but does not take into account that 14 intelligence reports on the troops of Germany and their allies were published before the start of the war. Moreover, all the speculations around the monthly intelligence report do not deserve attention, as well as the above map of May 25, because before the start of the war, the German grouping changed, and these data cannot reflect the true situation on June 22.

The data on the deployment of German troops near the border, which are given in the RU summary of June 15, can only be compared with the map of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces dated 27.5.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.

The author again slips a document that has not been signed by anyone and could be a working card of some senior officer, moreover, created after the start of the war. The author of the article has already slipped one such card according to the ZAPOVO, which, in his own words, was created after the start of the war, it is not clear by whom and for what purpose. Therefore, I recommend to all admirers of this verbiage to demand from him, first of all, a link to the source of information, because he pulls here various materials from the site of alternative history, and there it is generally not clear who and what is drawing.

The minimum time for information to pass from sources through residents and radio operators in the RU is about three days:

I don't even want to comment on this lie, but I recommend that everyone just carefully study Vorontsov's report, which, less than 12 hours after meeting with the agent, lay on Golikov's desk:

All time intervals of encryption up to typing are available in the document.

[AsmyppoL]

Viewpoint presented СЃcsr is a typical example of a person who has no idea about the work of intelligence. He doesn't even want to read the text in the article. He grabbed, speculated something and angrily began to seek a refutation. And all that was required was to understand what was written ...

What did the specified user bring? He took the phrase out of context: "I don't even want to comment on this lie, but I recommend everyone to just carefully study Vorontsov's report, which, less than 12 hours after meeting with the agent, lay on Golikov's table."

This is the naval attaché at the Soviet embassy in Berlin. The user ccsr naively believes that all sources or intelligence officers come to the Soviet embassy and send their reports through the encryption body of the embassy ...

From the scan presented by him, it is only clear that the encryption was sent at 22-30 5.5.41 and printed at 00-00 on May 6. It is not clear from the scan: when it was written, when it was handed over to the ciphering authority, when it was reported to the head of the Intelligence Directorate.

Information about the possible start of the war seemed urgent at the time and was sent by an emergency channel. This case does not apply to the transmission of information about the deployment of German troops.

How did you distort the meaning of ccsr? The author wrote: "The minimum time for passing information from sources through residents and radio operators in RU is about three days: the source saw the movement of troops, the next day the information reached the resident, who, having compiled a message, transmits it to the radio operator, and on the third day of the RM go to the head of the RU. Next, the spy message is addressedme, sometimes a report with a map to the head of the RU and the receipt of this information to the performer for inclusion in the summary... In this case, the troops or transport could see no later than May 28. "

What did ccsr not understand? Arnold is not Vorontsov's agent. He was in Berlin, found out urgent information (in his opinion) and therefore used the communication channel through the embassy.
In fact, Arnold - this is a scout who is in touch with the intelligence department of the ZapOVO... When gathering information in former Poland, Arnold collects intelligence materials from several sources. He himself visits places located far from Warsaw, prepares messages that he sends to Minsk.

[AsmyppoL]

Here is part of his message, information from which was included in a later intelligence report: «From the intelligence message of the source of the RO of the headquarters of the ZapOVO "Arnold" 30.5.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX

“... In Vulka near Mlawa ... the commandant's office of the garrison and the administrative company are located;
in Mlawa itself - 1 battalion of assault detachments "SA" and a police battalion ...

In Klyushevo - 9 km from Mlawa, near the Mlava-Grudusk highway troops - about 20 thousand people, mainly infantry 4, 6, 11, 13 infantry regiments, 103 art. regiment, regiment of cavalry (could not establish numbers) 2 companies of tanks ...
This information was obtained from Sligitsky and based on a conversation with local Germans and those who have contact with them, and based on my own observations.

Prasnysh: 2nd artillery regiment - 108th and 109th ...
This information was obtained from officer b. Polish armyliving in Prasnysh, from my old friend M. Schultzwho works in a German store, and my own observations.

Ciechanow: Battalion of assault detachments of the SA, 239 infantry. regiment, 104 art. regiment, 2 companies of tanks, 2 companies of cavalry ...
I received this information from Elsa and Sligitsky.

Ostrolenka - In Ostrolenka itself there are 108, 903 infantry regiments and an artillery regiment. In the Ostrolenka area there are about three infantry divisions, a battalion of tanks ... Information received aboutt old friend and a schoolmate - an engineer working in Ostrolenka, in a German company.

Rojan - in the military barracks, 2 km east. the city hosts 203 infantry regiment, 7 artillery regiment, a company of tanks ...

In Yelenki, 1,5 km from the border, 8 anti-tank guns were installed in the stone wall of the cemetery, with soldiers standing day and night. The civilian population is prohibited from approaching.
On a hill 1 km from Yelenka near the village. Pshiborove - several anti-tank guns in positions. Field aerodromes: Zbrzeжno estate - 3 km from Govorov, Rybno - 3 km from Vyshków, stationary and well-equipped airfield in Zavishin, near Lochów.

Based on information obtained from two sources: 1) county office workers (Landrat) in Mlawa, who is constantly among the German military; 2) former officer Polish army, having a connection with the Germans, the Germans concentrated in the vicinity of Suwalki 2 selected SS armored divisions ...

... I spoke in Warsaw with one friend, he told me that he was talking with one Ukrainian and that he told him that there would soon be a war with the USSR ... ”.

From the summary it is clear that the scout talked to at least 8 people. I myself have visited several settlements. The message also contains a third of the page text about warehouses, military units, and fortifications. Whether the intelligence officer himself observed this or received information from someone else is unknown ...

Only ccsr can think that the sources who spoke to Arnold saw German troops an hour before talking to our scout. The author suggested that at best all these sources were seen by German troops the day before Arnold's arrival. This information could be older and wait for the scout for several days.

To come from Warsaw, talk to people in different settlements and return to the radio operator, he had to overcome more than 270 km. On the roads of that time and without a vehicle. Logically, it takes more than a day, but let it be one day.
The message in question was sent to the intelligence department of the ZapOVO not through a radio station. It included photographs that still needed to be taken and developed. This message was sent through a contact or mailbox system. In the first case, it would have come faster.

[AsmyppoL]

Suppose the message is directed directly to the Intelligence Agency via radio. The text of the report is two sheets of typewritten text. This message must be encrypted by one person for several hours using a manual cipher. It will take him more than 65 minutes to transmit a telegram (if you count the number of characters at a transmission rate of 90 characters per minute). It takes several hours to encrypt such an array of information. The same amount is required to decipher it.

It took about 4,5 hours of continuous work to encrypt this array of text on a cipher machine. With manual encryption, the time increases significantly. But let the resident spend 6 hours on encryption. The same amount of time will be required for decryption - already 12 hours and an hour of text transmission.

Further, the document must be printed, reported to the head of the RU (if it is in place). The document is addressed to the deputies and the head of the department (maybe more than one), the head of the department, and only then can it get to the executor who prepares the summary of the RU.
So from Arnold's arrival at the place of residence, encrypting the message, delivering it to the radio operator, waiting for the radio operator for the time of transmission, and then to the executor of the RC report, the author put one day.
This is much closer to the truth than 12 hours taken from the air by ccsr ...

[AsmyppoL]

There is a typo in the text. According to ransomware estimates, the time for encrypting text on a typewriter at that time would have been about 1,5 hours

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

And all that was required was to understand what was written ...

Most likely, it was simply required to refute another lie of the would-be researcher Eugene, and this was done.
How deceitful and illiterate the author of the articles can be seen from his statement:

What did ccsr not understand? Arnold is not Vorontsov's agent. He was in Berlin, found out urgent information (in his opinion) and therefore used the communication channel through the embassy.
In fact, Arnold is an intelligence officer who is in contact with the intelligence department of the ZapOVO.

Only an amateur could come up with such nonsense, because "Arnodd" is the pseudonym of Major General Tupikov, who was a resident of strategic intelligence in Berlin and had nothing to do with ZAPOVO:

Military attachés were also involved in collecting information about Germany: in Berlin, Major General V. I. Tupikov ("Arnold"); in Paris - Major General I. A. Susloparov ("Maro"); in Stockholm - Colonel N. I. Nikitushev ("Akasto"); in London, Major General I. A. Sklyarov ("Brion"); in Tehran - Colonel B. G. Razin. In accordance with the Vienna Convention, they had the right to collect information about the armed forces of the host country, using all legal possibilities, as well as receive data on the armed forces of neighboring states. For most of the Soviet military attaches, the main task was to collect information about Nazi Germany..

Quote: AsmyppoL

From the scan presented by him, it is only clear that the encryption was sent at 22-30 5.5.41 and printed at 00-00 on May 6. It is not clear from the scan: when it was written, when it was handed over to the ciphering authority, when it was reported to the head of the Intelligence Directorate.

Stop deceiving people, because on the second sheet of the encryption there is a note that it was deciphered at 23.50 on May 5, and printed in three copies at 06.20 on May 6, with one copy to the head of the RU, one to Zuikov from the NKVMF intelligence, and the third to the case. All ciphers from the residents of the intelligence department are reported immediately to the head of the RU upon his arrival, so taking into account the fact that the head of the RU himself arrives at the NSG to report to his arrival, it is quite obvious that by 07.00 Golikov was already familiar with this document.

Here is a part of his message, information from which was included in a later intelligence report: “From the intelligence message of the source of the RO of the headquarters of the ZapOVO“ Arnold ”on May 30.5.1941, XNUMX.

Stop lying if you still don't understand that different people had the call sign "Arnold", and one of them worked in Berlin for strategic intelligence as a resident, and the other for operational intelligence of the district as an agent. And this amateur is trying to prove to everyone that he is the best versed in the affairs of military intelligence, in the hope that everyone on the forum is a simpleton and any lie will be perceived as truth.

Only ccsr can think that the sources who spoke to Arnold saw German troops an hour before talking to our scout. The author suggested that at best all these sources were seen by German troops the day before Arnold's arrival. This information could be older and wait for the scout for several days.

Only the illiterate Eugene still does not know that there was a RU resident in Berlin with the pseudonym "Arnold", and an ordinary operational intelligence agent with the same pseudonym, which once again proves that this liar cannot be trusted.

Suppose the message is directed directly to the Intelligence Agency via radio. The text of the report is two sheets of typewritten text. This message must be encrypted by one person for several hours using a manual cipher. It will take him more than 65 minutes to transmit a telegram (if you count the number of characters at a transmission rate of 90 characters per minute). It takes several hours to encrypt such an array of information. The same amount is required to decipher it.

Leave your assumptions for different amateurs, since I still don't understand who and what documents were sent directly to the RU, what are the standards for the passage and processing of materials, and who worked with the ZAPOVO intelligence department so that the professionals do not laugh at you.

There is a typo in the text. According to ransomware estimates, the time for encrypting text on a typewriter at that time would have been about 1,5 hours

This misprint did not change the essence of the lie - the entire text of Eugene is a complete lie of an amateur who does not understand military intelligence issues.

[kloss]

If military professionals like you laugh, it means nothing.
You yourself do not have the necessary knowledge, but there is a lot of aplomb
So how long does it take for Arnold from Poland to get a message from the people he spoke to before the report?
Prove your 12 hours

[ccsr]

Quote: kloss

If military professionals like you laugh, it means nothing.

Can you refute what I wrote about, or prove that the author is right about "Arnold", the encryption of which I gave?

Quote: kloss

So how long does it take for Arnold from Poland to get a message from the people he spoke to before the report?
Prove your 12 hours

I just proved that the statement of the author of the article that

The minimum period for information passage from sources through residents and radio operators in RU is about three days:

is a malicious lie, because the time for delivery of messages from agents to the head of the RU could not be regulated at all in principle. So, for example, after meeting with an agent from the German Embassy on June 21 at about 19:20.00, a report on this was submitted at XNUMX:XNUMX and immediately owes Stalin - this proves that the author will remain true in his statements, and people like you believe him.
Educate yourself, dreamers about "three days":

[kloss]

And you yourself have not refuted the author. Its layout according to the message is logical.
You pulled in a message from Tupikov, which has already arrived at the embassy's cipher department. How much time passed from the receipt of information by a person who found out about the attack, then told Tupikov how much encryption was written and how much was encrypted - you did not write. So you don't know. When, after 6 o'clock, the cipher was reported to Golikov, you do not know. Therefore, they did not write.
They took 12 hours from the lantern. The figure is not valid.
The message does not mention troops at the border. The author wrote that he had not seen such reports among the intelligence officers. And if such messages went through the districts, then I am inclined to believe the author it takes about 4-5 days.

[ccsr]

Quote: kloss

And you yourself have not refuted the author. Its layout according to the message is logical.

It is not only not logical, but also confirms that the author does not know the standards for decryption at all, because he spit that

According to ransomware estimates, the time for encrypting text on a typewriter at that time would have been about 1,5 hours

, but in fact the cipher telegram was decrypted in 35 minutes - this can be seen on my scan.

Quote: kloss

You pulled in a message from Tupikov, which has already arrived at the embassy's cipher department. How much time passed from the receipt of information by a person who learned about the attack, then told Tupikov how much encryption was written and how much encrypted - you did not write.

You didn’t understand at all that Tupikov had nothing to do with it, because it was Vorontsov’s report, a resident of the NKVMF intelligence, who was himself a naval attaché at the embassy. So first sort out the text of the cipher telegram yourself, before you demonstrate your illiteracy.

Quote: kloss

They took 12 hours from the lantern.

Relax, smart guy - I even overestimated it, since most likely Vorontsov received the information between 20 and 21 o'clock, after meeting with the agent, and urgently drew up the text of the report, which was received by the intelligence department at 22.30, signed by Tupikov-Arnold. If he received information from the agent in the afternoon, then the text would go to Golikov not in 12 hours, but in 4-6 hours.

Quote: kloss

The message does not mention troops at the border.

Actually, we were talking about different agents with the same pseudonyms - it looks like you did not enter this, and only let bubbles ..

[icant007]

Therefore, intelligence could collect information about the troops concentrated near the border of the USSR, only through visual observation and tracking rumors among the local population. The reliability of RMs obtained by such methods was low.

I didn’t even read.
The first paragraph - and already propaganda and the imposition of their wretched point of view.
Well, how do you know how information was collected in the border strip?

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

Well, how do you know how information was collected in the border strip?

He does not even know what the depth of the border strip was, and whether it was possible to observe everything that was in it visually, if only because of the curvature of the Earth and the presence of vegetation in the adjacent territory.

Quote: icant007

I didn’t even read.
The first paragraph - and already propaganda and the imposition of their wretched point of view.

I completely agree with you that I have not yet met such a miserable idea of ​​the work of military intelligence at the VO forum. One lie about how the entire "district intelligence school" was thrown into Iran is beyond common sense, but this visionary and graphomaniac does not seem to rest on this. And I am not even talking about the "minimum" three-day norm for the passage of intelligence information from an agent to the head of the RU - this is just a primitive lie of our would-be researcher, who has no idea how all this was organized.
Moreover, he writes that

In the previous part it was shown that our intelligence services did not have sources of information in the German large headquarters.

, and does not indicate in what "large headquarters", but the point is not even that, but that the Germans did not have sources in our "large headquarters". This only proves that the author of the statics has no idea what difficulties and costs the intelligence agencies of any country face when they try to get operational information from an agent in the field headquarters of the corps-army level and above. In a word, this author of tales about intelligence is dominated by dilentanism, and it is already obvious that this graphomaniac is squeezing more than a dozen of similar articles according to a knurled pattern - "a penknife - a penknife", where it will prove how the Germans "deceived" our intelligence by changing the buttonholes or shoulder straps from the military. How, in doing so, they could deceive radio intelligence, our dreamer of course will not tell - he is clearly not in the subject, but he will lie that he is the best versed in the work of military intelligence.

[kloss]

Challenge Arnold's message about rumors and data collection on moget epaulettes?
Or have you posted a custom message and the job is done?

[ccsr]

Quote: kloss

Challenge Arnold's message about rumors and data collection on moget epaulettes?

And why should I dispute any stupidity, if the radio intelligence does not care what shoulder straps and buttonholes the servicemen have, tk. Do they constantly monitor test, training and service radio exchanges of enemy formations and units, and make direction finding of large headquarters?

Quote: kloss

Or have you posted a custom message and the job is done?

This is not my work, but the author of the articles by the name of Eugene, who specifically decided to show how stupid our military intelligence was on the eve of the war. And amateurs like you have bought into this, and continue to broadcast various nonsense - however, this is the lot of all amateurs in military affairs.