1941. Intelligence on enemy corps headquarters

The following abbreviations are used in the article: AK - army corps, IN - military district, GraA - Army Group, Spacecraft - Red Army, u - motorized housing Goals Difference - intelligence materials, Ro - intelligence department of the headquarters RU - Reconnaissance of the General Staff of the spacecraft, TGr - tank Group.

In the previous part RM were examined about the headquarters of the field armies and TGr, which came to the leadership of the USSR and spacecraft in 1941. The reliability of these RMs was unsatisfactory. Intelligence was not able to detect a relocation to the border of the TGr headquarters in the same way as the deployment of the North, Center, and South GRA headquarters at the border. Information on the deployment of army headquarters on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland was also unreliable. Not all the headquarters were discovered by intelligence, and their relocation on the eve of the war directly to the border was not recorded. In this part, we will consider the Republic of Moldova on the headquarters of the corps, which arrived in 1941.

Is information about corps headquarters and corps groupings important at the border?

The absence of large headquarters at the border was likely to indicate that war was not expected in the near future. So they had to think in the upper echelons of spacecraft control. This point of view was reinforced by the absence of a significant number of troops at the border (according to intelligence), concentrated on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland. A detailed review of the Republic of Moldova on the enemy forces concentrated against PribOVO, KOVO and ZAPOVO was presented in the first 4 parts intelligence articles.

A version appeared that the top leadership of the spacecraft did not care about the RM about the presence of enemy fronts, armies, corps and motorized groups at the border. The main (allegedly) for our command was the number of enemy divisions. Only the German command needed information on the deployment of troops, headquarters and mechanized groups. As an example, below is a fragment of a German map with printed intelligence information about our troops.

The German command paid much more attention to the efficiency of command and control of its troops in an attack than the authors of this version. The two fragments of the German map below show that by the start of the war large headquarters of all levels moved closer to the border. The problem was that all our intelligence services did not record the movement of these headquarters.

Later, when intelligence data became more complete, not only German divisions began to appear on the maps of our army headquarters headquarters and fronts of the General Staff, but their affiliation with the corps (armies) was also indicated. Famous locations of large German headquarters began to be applied to maps.

Insufficiently complete and inaccurate RMs on the deployment of large German headquarters are likely to be associated with countering the leakage of information from the German command and carrying out mass misinformation of all possible sources of our intelligence.

Intelligence on the deployment of German troops

The most complete RM content on the deployment of German troops (to Slovakia), which are published, is Summary No. 5 of RU dated 15.6.41. It includes rather detailed data from the regional border military organizations as of 31.5.41. The reports often ask the question: "From which RM does the author cite data on the deployment of German troops and headquarters?"

I will provide information from the RU report dated 15.6.41 for readers interested in this topic.

The report was prepared according to RM, received on 31.5.41. Information in the RO for RU was to be prepared on May 29-30. Since a significant part of the materials came from time-delayed sources due to their transfer through the mailbox and messenger system, the RM actually reflected the situation somewhere on May 26-28. Check the reliability of these RMs in terms of information on the deployment of corps headquarters.

In accordance with the RU report, the headquarters were (verified information): the 7th AK in Tilsit, the 12th AK in Insterburg, the 8th AK in Koenigsberg, the 6th AK in Ciechanow, the 9th AK in Warsaw, the 32nd AK in Lublin, the 20th AK in Danzig, the 21st AK in Poznan.

AK headquarters with unknown numbers (reliable information) were located in the cities: Letzen, Allenstein, Miedzyzenec, Byala Podlaska, Lodz, Zamosc, Klemansuv, Rzeszow, Ivonic, Tarnow and Krakow.

Requiring verification by the RM about the headquarters of the AK: 24th (Lancut), 5th (Petrukov), 38th (Katowice). The RM also reported on the presence in Kielce of the headquarters of the 2nd AK. This data requires verification, as Earlier there was marked the headquarters of the 1st AK. In other words, the very location of the headquarters of the corps in Kielce is not in doubt. The only question is the number of this AK headquarters.

The reliability of information about the location of the headquarters of the 7th and 12th AK will be considered in the next part.

The RMs on the deployment of the headquarters of the 20th and 21st AKs were previously considered. Our intelligence confused them with the headquarters of the 20th and 21st HE. The VO headquarters, in contrast to the AK headquarters, could not be redeployed to the border and in their structure did not correspond to the AK headquarters. Observation of them did not reveal the fact of relocation to the border before the attack of these headquarters and their troops.

Reliability of RM about license plates

The figure shows data on the deployment of headquarters in the cities: Kielce, Ciechanow, Koenigsberg, Warsaw and Lublin. The information is used from the German map with the deployment of troops as of 27.5.41 and from the map of the ZAPOVO headquarters with the situation on 21.6.41 prepared on 23.6.41.

Information on AK numbers in four out of five cases is incorrect. Accurate data on the location of the 9th AK became unreliable a few days after the relocation of this headquarters closer to the border. RM remained unreliable until June 21. All five headquarters, according to intelligence, had not been relocated to the border by the start of the war. Just like army headquarters.

To understand how the German command acted, hiding the movement of its mobile troops, I propose to consider the data on the 32nd AK. Intelligence "saw" this headquarters, rechecked information about it, recorded its location from May 1940 (at least) until the outbreak of war. RM repeatedly checked and testified to the presence of the headquarters of a non-existent AK. This cannot be a mistake, because in the summer of 1940, the headquarters of the 3rd AK was redeployed to Lublin, which was not discovered by our intelligence before the war. Someone carefully portrayed the headquarters of the 32nd AK.

In March 1941, the headquarters of the 3rd AK was reorganized into the headquarters of the 3rd MK (III. Armeekops (mot.)). But for some reason not one headquarters of our intelligence was discovered. Intelligence obtained some data about the deployment of AKs, but there was no information at all about the presence of microns or TGr. There is a pattern in this matter. The German command was able to completely hide all information about the presence of large mobile groups from our intelligence.

At the end of May, the headquarters of the 3rd MK and the headquarters of the 55th AK are in Lublin. After 19.6, both headquarters will move to the border, but our intelligence will still be sure that there is some AK headquarters in Lublin before the war. This AK is present on the maps of the ZAPOVO and KOVO headquarters, with the situation on 21.6.41. As well as several other AKs, which are supposedly located in places of constant deployment. Intelligence data about this will pass through the RO VO, through the leadership of the spacecraft and the leadership of the USSR. Looking at these RMs, we can say that there is nothing terrible yet: after all, the enemy troops and headquarters for the most part are quite far from the border. The headquarters of large mobile strike groups have not yet arrived in Poland and East Prussia.

We continue consideration of the RM. Our intelligence reports on the presence of AK headquarters in the cities of Allenstein and Zamosc.

There is no AK headquarters in Allenstein itself. There is only the headquarters of the 4th TGr, which the Germans did not particularly hide, using its closed name in correspondence. In the correspondence for the other three TGr, their coded names were used. But the headquarters of the two mk near Allenstein were not again discovered by our intelligence. As well as the headquarters of the 3rd mk ... The same situation with AK in Zamosc. It is detected, but not found to be microns.

Of the five locations of the buildings, only information about the location of the 13th AK in Lodz is reliable.

Of the four locations for AK headquarters, only the headquarters in Krakow is reliable. However, this is an inferior corps: of a reduced composition and without troops.

Next, consider unverified information that has the right to be false. In two cases, it coincides with the locations of the corps headquarters. However, the 14th AK is MK.

Regarding the headquarters of the 7th and 12th AK, we can say for sure that the information on their location is false.

Thus, out of 23 AK headquarters locations, only in eight cases do the headquarters locations match intelligence data. In some cases, intelligence did not find that the headquarters belonged not to the AK, but to the army corps (motorized). As of 27.5.41, seven mk were located in East Prussia and former Poland: the 3rd, 14th, 24th, 39th, 41st, 48th and 57th.

In his memoirs, the former chief of RU mentions the presence of 22 corps and the knowledge of half of the numbers of corps headquarters.

The summary refers to the numbers of the twelve corps headquarters. The reliability of this information can now be judged by the readers themselves. In fact, by the 22.6.41 g. There were 43 corps headquarters near the Soviet-German border.

The locations of the corps headquarters in the East

Consider the information on the deployment of the corps headquarters of the Wehrmacht, which by 22.6.41 will be concentrated in the East.

1th AK - from 13.9.40 relocates to East Prussia. In Elbing, he will remain until mid-April. From 23.4 to 27.5 it is located in Koenigsberg, and on 16.6.41 it is noted in Tilsit.

2th AK - from March to the beginning of April 1941, is located in the city of Graudens. From April 5 to April 12 it is deployed in Rossel. From 23.4 to 27.5 it is located in Gumbinen, and 16.6.41 - in Otwock.

3th AK - from 5.7.40 to 19.6.41 it is deployed in Lublin.

4th AK - since May 1941 he has been in Poland (27.5.41 in Zadisniki), and 16.6.41 in Rata Rozlewicka.

5th AK - from 1 to 27.5.41 in Ortelsburg, and 16.6.41 - in Krasnopol.

6th AK - from 1 to 12.4.41 located in Ortelsburg. From 23.4 to 27.5 - in Treuburg, 16.6 - in the city of Rominter.

8th AK - Until April 1941, is in the West. From 23.4 to 16.6 - in the city of Likk.

9th AK - from September 1940 to the end of April 1941 - in Oppeln (Poland). 27.5 - in the city of Skalinov (near Warsaw), and 16.6 - is deployed east of Warsaw (Sokolov).

10th AK - since January 1941 he has been in Poland: from 6.2 to 1.4 - in Neideburg, 5.4 - in Bartenstein, from 12.4 to 23.4 - in Helsberg, from 27.5 to 16.6 - in Insterburg.

11th AK - from 6.6.41 located in Romania.

13th AK - since March 1941 he has been in East Prussia. From 22.3 to 27.5 in Litzmanstadt (Lodz). From June 1 to 3 - in Warsaw, 4.6 - in Yador, and 16.6 - in Lochow.

14th AK - from the fall of 1940 to 12.12.40 in Katowice. Further, the corps is located in Romania, in Serbia, in Germany (27.5.41 - in Koenigshütte). 16.6 - in Heudekrug (not far from the border of the Lithuanian SSR).

16th AK - From the autumn of 1940 to February 1941 he is in Allenstein. 17.6.41 the headquarters was used for the headquarters formations of the 4th TGr.

17th AK - from 4.7.40 to 12.4.41 located in Tarbrzeg (Poland). From 23.4 to 19.6 it is deployed in the city of Helm.

20th AK - until 2.11.40, he is in the city of Schneidemuhl, 12.12.40 - in the city of Stettin, from 22.3 to 27.5.41 - in the city of Thorn, 16.6 - in the city of Likk.

23th AK - until May 1941 (inclusive) is in the West. 27.5 is celebrated in Halesberg (East Prussia) and is deployed there until 19.6.41.

24th AK - From the autumn of 1940 to 23.4.41, it is located in Germany (Stuttgart). 15.5 - possibly located in Wibzyn. 27.5.41 the headquarters of the corps is celebrated in Konstancinek (near Warsaw). 16.6 he is stationed in Lukov.

26th AK - since July 1940 is in East Prussia. Until 12.4.41 - in Angerburg. From 23.4 to 27.5 - in Tilsit. 16-19.6 is stationed in Heidekrug.

28th AK - 27.5.41 is still located in Germany (Friedland). From the end of May, it begins relocation to East Prussia. 16.6 - deployed in Allenburg.

29th AK - since March 1941 arrives in Poland. From March 22 to May 27, it is deployed in Kielce. 16.6 he is in Dolkhobychuv.

30th AK - since the end of May 1941 he has been in Romania.

H. Kdo XXXIV - from the beginning of 1941 until April 23, is in Lancut. 27.5 is deployed in Krakow. From 16.6 is located near the city of Jaslo.

H. Kdo XXXV - From the autumn of 1940 until the start of the war he was in Minsk-Mozovetsky.

38th AK - 27.5.41 is located in Elbing (East Prussia). 16.6 - in Koenigsberg, from 19.6 - in the city of Russ.

41th AK - in May 1941 arrives in East Prussia. From 27.5 to 16.6 is deployed near Allenstein. 21.6 is located at Tilsit.

42th AK - from 13.6.41 began redeployment to Poland and by June 22 was at the border.

43th AK - since May 1941 he has been in Poland (27.5 - Tomaszow). Correspondence (2.5.41) refers to the location of the headquarters in Tomashov. 1.6 headquarters is located in Lukov, and 15-16.6 - 6 km south of Sartaki.

44th AK - since July 1940 he has been in Poland (Radom - until 23.4.41, 27.5 - Yanov, from 16.6 - Lubaczow).

46th AK - since June 1941 arrives in Poland. The correspondence noted that 13-16.6 the headquarters of the corps moves between the cities of Deblin - Pulawy. In Pulawy, the headquarters will be located before the outbreak of war.

47th AK - in June 1941 arrives in Poland. From 16.6 it is located in Siedlec, 19.9 - near Byala Podlaska.

48th AK. One of the sources of information refers to the arrival of the corps on the territory of the Governor General on 15.4.41. On the map of the German command 23.4.41 the corps is still absent in Poland. Only at the end of May does he appear in Zamosc. In this city, he will be located on 19.6.41.

49th Mountain Rifle Corps 27.5.41 is celebrated in Lanzug. The headquarters is there before the war.

52th AK - From the end of the 40th to April 1941, he is in Germany (Hanover). At the end of May it is located in Krimisia (Poland), and from 16.6 - in Iwonicz.

53th AK - since April 1941 he has been in Poland: 23.4 - Yastrov, 27.5 - Pabienice, 16.6 - Radom, 19-22.6 - Lukov.

54th AK - since June 1941 he was in Romania.

55th AK - from 29.4.41 located in Poland. From 27.5 to 19.6 - in Lublin.

56th AK - in June 1941, crosses Poland and 16.6 - noted in Insterburg. 19.6 is located at the border in the city of Lengweffen.

57th AK - at the end of May 1941 is located near Allenstein. 16.6. - in Nikolayken, 19.6 - in Ragnit.

The ending should ...

Comments

[Comrade]

Very interesting stuff, thanks!
But is there any similar information that the German special services knew about the deployment of our troops in the western military districts?

The summary refers to the numbers of the twelve corps headquarters. The reliability of this information can now be judged by the readers themselves. In fact, by the 22.6.41 g. There were 43 corps headquarters near the Soviet-German border.

It can be assumed that, given the Soviet specifics, the Germans knew much less than ours.

[AsmyppoL]

Comrade и Same Lech , Thanks for the kind words!
The absence of such words leads to the fact that it was simply not interesting to write. Thanks again!

Comrade, maps with German intelligence are. Only they are limited to the end of May 1941 and reappear only after the war. As with the intelligence reports of the General Staff of the Spacecraft ...

Another article is planned in spring (from 3 ... 4 parts) about the German mobile forces (cavalry, motorized infantry and tanks). There will also be many links to maps, correspondence, etc. There in the last part I will give links to sources in which there are archive maps. I apologize, but if you put them earlier, it will be uninteresting to read. Yes, and these materials can be used by those who write faster than me ... I will give a few fragments of maps.

[AsmyppoL]

Map drawn at the end of May 1941

[AsmyppoL]

Map with intelligence from Army Group Center for the same period

[Same lech]

Eugene split the topic into several articles ... the excess of information is detrimental to some comrades.
Maps are poorly viewed.

[AsmyppoL]

Thanks! I know it. I suggest in the future, after publishing links to dig into them ourselves.
The fact is that many maps are fully visible either on a very large scale (when it requires a lot of scans) or on the smallest - and there you can’t see anything ... Therefore, I reduce everything to small fragments. I apologize for this.

[antivirus]

like this in the summer of 45g they looked at each other (and at the captured archives) - "whom to repress for the failure of 41g" and forgave everyone - AMNESTY IN HONOR OF THE GREAT VICTORY

[ccsr]

Quote: antivirus

"whom to repress for the failure of 41g" and forgiven everyone - AMNESTY IN HONOR OF THE GREAT VICTORY

There was no general amnesty - some commanders were tried even in the fifties. True, not only for the outbreak of war, but also for later sins. By the way, even Sorge was under suspicion that it was he who, with his thoughtless actions, led to the failure of the group, and precisely because of this, he was not represented in the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Map with intelligence from Army Group Center for the same period

This is the only source that the author cited, and on which the coordinate grid is visible, but there is not a single link whose map this is and who made it. But this is not even the point, but the fact that it refutes the author’s lies, because it does not indicate the Wehrmacht’s compounds, and most importantly, the intelligence parts of the Abwehr are not indicated, i.e. the map alone cannot indicate that the General Staff of the General Staff submitted incorrect data about the Germans. So, by primitive manipulation of documents, the author tries to impress a gullible public that he has studied thousands of documents that he can be trusted, although a professional just needs to look at the map to understand that the author of the articles understands them as a well-known character in oranges. Not only that, this map could have been created not by Wehrmacht officers, but after the war for some historical research, as we did, for example:

[maidan.izrailovich]

Very interesting stuff, thanks!
But is there any similar information that the German special services knew about the deployment of our troops in the western military districts?

All of this can be found in Franz Halder's War Diaries.
Who read them, for this article is practically nothing new.

Franz Halder (German: Franz Halder; June 30, 1884, Würzburg, Bavaria - April 2, 1972, Aschau im Chiemgau, Bavaria) - German military leader, Colonel General (1940). Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht in 1938-1942.

[ccsr]

Quote: maidan.izrailovich

All of this can be found in Franz Halder's War Diaries.
Who read them, for this article is practically nothing new.

Not only is there nothing new, so the author simply perverts many facts for the sake of his version. For example, the author states that

Intelligence was not able to detect a relocation to the border of the TGr headquarters in the same way as the deployment of the North, Center and South headquarters at the border.

However, he cites the data for June 1, 1941, which he uses from report No. 5, and he ignores the whole array of information that the General Staff received three weeks before the war, as if nothing had been mined in intelligence at that time. Although any literate person understands that the head of the RU was personally reporting to Tymoshenko and Zhukov on a daily intelligence basis - such was the order in the General Staff always.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Comrade

But are there any similar information that the German secret services knew about our deployment troops in the western military districts?

Yes, they also had a far "no fountain", from the diary of the Chief of the General Staff Halder 22 June 1941:

Russian motorized Pskov group (operational reserve) discovered 300 km south of the previously assumed area of ​​its concentration. It is located south of the Western Dvina! It is only beneficial for us.

Nothing to imagine a mistake in ... 300 km!

From the same diary, an assessment of the correlation of forces (also errors) June 20, 41

.................................................. ..... Germ / USSR

Infantry divisions + mountain infantry 102*/154
Panzer divisions ................................19 /10
Motorized divisions ............... 14** / 37 mechanized brigades
Cavalry divisions .................... 1 / 25½

And here is what he remarked absolutely correctly (June 22):

In recent days the enemy completely passively watched behind all our activities

Which, among other factors, led to the tragedy of June 22, incl. to such crimes (in my opinion):

Halder: Border Bridges over the Bug and other rivers everywhere captured our troops without a fight and in complete safety.

There are no words ....

But in general, we knew the situation well, but the ASSESSMENTS were erroneous, from the TASS statement from 13 June 41 g:

The USSR allegedly rejected these claims in connection with which Germany began to concentrate its troops near the borders of the USSR with the aim of attacking the USSR

TASS states: Germany also adheres steadily the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, like the Soviet Union, which is why, in the opinion of Soviet circles, rumors about Germany’s intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are devoid of any soil, and the recent transfer of German troops freed from operations in the Balkans to the eastern and northeastern regions of Germany bound, presumably with other motives that have no relation to Soviet-German relations

And what motives ?!

It was impossible to make a more contradictory assessment of glaring facts.

And what a relaxing, instead of mobilizing, effect it had on the people and the army, there was no question: how much bitter bewilderment about this Statement is in the memoirs and front-line soldiers and others ...

Thanks to the author for the HARRY and meticulous work in the desire to sort out the situation on the eve of the war

[icant007]

Quote: Olgovich

But in general, we knew the situation well, but the ESTIMATES were erroneous, from the TASS statement of June 13, 41:

Vasilevsky A.M. "The work of a lifetime"

“Some readers are inclined to consider it a document that played an almost fatal role in our preparations for war, dulling the vigilance of Soviet people at the most important and critical moment in the life of our country.

If we consider this message in isolation from the foreign and domestic policies of the Communist Party, we can probably draw some negative conclusions. But to do so would be reckless.

The TASS report of June 14, 1941 is, on the one hand, a military-political probe, which has clearly shown that Germany is heading for a war against the USSR and the threat of war is approaching. This stemmed from the deathly silence of the fascist leaders on the request addressed to them by the Soviet government.

On the other hand, this statement showed the desire of our government to use every opportunity to delay the start of the war, to gain time to prepare our Armed Forces to repel aggression.

Thus, I believe it is correct to consider that the TASS report of June 14, 1941 is evidence of the concern of the party and government about the security of our country and its vital interests.

The fact that this message is a foreign policy action is evidenced by the continued implementation of organizational and mobilization measures, the transfer of military units to the west, the transfer of a number of enterprises to fulfill military orders, etc.

For us, the staff of the General Staff, as, naturally, for other Soviet people, the TASS message at first caused some surprise. But since no fundamentally new directives followed, it became clear that it does not apply to the Armed Forces, nor to the country as a whole. [110]

In addition, at the end of the same day, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General N. F. Vatutin, explained that the purpose of the TASS report was to test the true intentions of the Nazis, and it no longer attracted our attention. "

[Olgovich]

Quote: icant007

If we consider this message in isolation from the foreign and domestic policies of the Communist Party, we can probably draw some negative conclusions.

And the peasant, the worker, the Red Armyman, the commander, HOW to make out true meaning of TASS Messages?

After all, unlike also "surprised" Vasilevsky, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General N. F. Vatutin NOT clarified stated, "that the purpose of the TASS report was to test the true intentions of the Nazis, and it no longer attracted our attention ".

They took the "TASS message", naturally, at face value and brought irreparable harm.

Zhukov also testifies directly opposite to Vasilevsky:

13 June S.K. Timoshenko in my presence called I.V. Stalin and insisted on asking for permission on bringing troops of border districts on alert and deploying first echelons for cover plans.

I. V. Stalin said:

- Now this should not be done, we are preparing a TASS message and publish it tomorrow.

- Well? I asked.

— I ordered the newspapers to read tomorrow, - S.K. Timoshenko said irritably

On June 14, a TASS message was published in our press.

When the Soviet people read this optimistic TASS message, fascist generals, gathered in Hitler’s office, reported to him about the complete readiness of the German troops to attack the Soviet Union.

The next day, we visited JV Stalin and reported to him about the alarming mood and the need to bring troops into full combat readiness.

— We have a non-aggression pact with Germany- said I.V. Stalin. - Germany is head over heels bogged down in the war in the West, and i believe in that Hitler will not risk creating a second front for himself by attacking to the Soviet Union. Hitler not such a turak

Hitler was not a fool ... Konstantin Simonov book "Through the eyes of a man of my generation"

"In many memories about the first period of the war I read about the TASS statement of June 14, 1941 and that disorienting effectthat it had.

So it turned out in practice. .

And only after the war, another thing was thought:

Although nowWhen rereading this TASS statement, I think that it can be viewed as a document that, under other accompanying circumstances, could not only reassure, but also alert "

By the way, the TASS message was not at all lonely: Molotov at the 7th session of the USSR Armed Forces:

We can confirm that, in our opinion, at the heart of the existing good-neighborly and friendly Soviet-German relations non-random considerations of a opportunistic nature lie and fundamental state interests both the Soviet Union and Germany. ”

[icant007]

The fact that political agencies did not carry out explanatory work on the TASS Report directly in units with personnel is an omission. I agree.

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

And the peasant, the worker, the Red Armyman, the commander, HOW should they have discerned the true meaning of the TASS message?

And he is supposed to carry out daily official duties, and not look for the meaning of life in TASS reports. You personally explained a lot to your subordinates when the next editorial in Pravda came out what was its meaning? Yes nifiga you did not bother with this - at best, the political officer of the company will carry out extraordinary political information and that's it. Yes, at a party meeting, someone will make a speech on duty, and this will all end there.

Quote: Olgovich

After all, they, unlike the equally "surprised" Vasilevsky, the first Deputy Chief of the General Staff General N.F. Vatutin did NOT explain "that the purpose of the TASS report was to test the true intentions of the Nazis, and it no longer attracted our attention."

And why should he do this - have you ever thought about it? For this, there were political workers as a last resort, but certainly not the leadership of the General Staff.

Quote: Olgovich

They took the "TASS message", of course, at face value and caused irreparable harm.

Yes, to spit out to any commander, how this or that information from the newspaper was reflected in the soldier’s head - the main thing is for him to be able to carry out a combat mission at any moment and have the skills that allow him to win the battle. And here you decided to wave the censer - well, well, I understand that you most likely did not see a live soda and did not teach him military affairs, otherwise you would not bother with such garbage ...

[Olgovich]

Quote: ccsr

And he is supposed to carry out daily duties, and do not look for the meaning of life in TASS Messages.

1. Interesting, you would be spanked right away or given a chance to work. for the good of the motherland years, that way, 20 - for such words addressed to the government Message?

2. And why print it -millions of copies, huh? Not for tens of millions citizens?

Quote: ccsr

Yes spit out to any commander, as in the head of a fighter this or that information was reflected - the main thing for him is that he can carry out a combat mission at any moment and have the skills that allow him to win the battle.

you also deny the need for GlavpUR and political agencies in the Red Army, this is another "vyshak" for you ...

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

1. It’s interesting that you would be immediately slapped or allowed to work for the good of the Motherland for 20 years, for example, for such words addressed to the Government Message?

Is it not too early to try on Beria’s jacket? And if it’s very interesting, then at least study what kind of education the overwhelming number of the command staff of the Red Army had before the war, when not every regiment had at least one soldier with a higher education.

Quote: Olgovich

And why is it printed with millions of copies, huh? Not for tens of millions of citizens?

But not for the command staff of the Red Army - that's for sure. Maybe you were guided by newspaper articles, but for some reason I only executed orders and directives of the Ministry of Defense.

Quote: Olgovich

you also deny the need for GlavpUR and political agencies in the Red Army, this is another "vyshak" for you ...

You didn’t finish Simferopol’s hour - it’s painfully loving to fear heavenly punishment ....

[chenia]

Quote: Olgovich

Zhukov also testifies directly opposite to Vasilevsky:

Memoirs. Heh. And not Zhukov. Zhukov is the main culprit (or one of them). catastrophe of 1941
If you think. if we had deployed two weeks earlier, it would have been different. badly mistaken. Everything would be as it was in real life.

Zhukov and Vasilyevsky and a group of responsible comrades from the leadership of the Red Army failed to fill up the BP completely. assuming that the 41st (summer) will slip through (we will carry out organizational measures to create new formations). and in the fall we’ll take a tight BP.
Do not slip. The miscalculation is first of all GSh.
And then under Khrushchov they picked up the thesis about the unexpectedness and opposition to the deployment of Stalin (Kirponos started in two weeks, no one punished, but it didn’t help. Late.)

[Olgovich]

Quote: chenia

Zhukov the main culprit (or one of them). catastrophe of 1941

Nonsense

Fundamental issues, such as: putting into effect cover plans, declaring combat readiness, mobilization - NOT HE solved it. From the word at all.

And he never denied his share of guilt, but the main questions are not his.

Quote: chenia

If you think. if we had deployed two weeks earlier, it would have been different. badly mistaken. Everything would be like it was in real life.

Yeah, and thousands of those killed in the barracks in a dream, and hundreds of destroyed planes, and unoccupied foregrounds and URs, and unexploded bridges, and a liquid chain of divisions on the border, everything would be "the same"!

Quote: chenia

Zhukov and Vasilyevsky and a group of responsible comrades from the leadership of the Red Army failed to fill up the BP completely. assuming that the 41st (summer) will slip through (we will carry out organizational measures to create new formations). and in the fall we’ll take a tight BP.
Do not slip. The miscalculation is first of all GSh.

The GSh repeatedly requested and demanded permission to bring troops into combat readiness. The answer is see. above and here:

Zhukov: “We were it is strictly forbidden to make any advancement of troops to the forefront of the cover plan without Stalin’s personal permission

Quote: chenia

(here Kirponos began in two weeks, no one punished, but did not help. Late.)

On June 10, 1941, the commander of the Kiev district, Kirponos, arbitrarily ordered the troops to occupy the forefield, the front line of the fortified areas. On the same day Zhukov became aware of this, and he demanded that Kirponos cancel the order.

Only on June 13, 1941, the command of the Kiev district received an order from the General Staff to advance formations from a depth closer to the border. Their nomination has begun June 17-18.But they should have arrived in the designated areas already ... June 27-28.

Therefore, it did not help .-no one had time and reached

The cover plan was never introduced. neither in Kiev, nor in other districts. Cover troops did not occupy the foreground. AND the German army burst into the USSR without much difficulty.

PS I emphasize once again the obvious: before the war no one (even minor) question not decided by the General Staff Red Army and the People's Commissariat of Defense without the sanction of Stalin.

[chenia]

Quote: Olgovich

Nonsense

Fundamental issues, such as: putting into effect cover plans, declaring combat readiness, mobilization - NOT HE solved it. From the word at all.

And he never denied his share of guilt, but the main questions are not his.

Is always! And blamed on the Supreme. He began to form 30 MKs (he started it (shots began to spread, which were even catastrophically lacking at 9 MKs. You see how the Germans doubled the number of tank divisions, if you understand the difference, you don’t understand (but for a fee).

Quote: A1Lukno

Well, the troops of the first operational echelon of the front were defeated. 3-5% of the Red Army’s equipment is lost. but then there is no further surprise. The second strategic echelons arrived, and the same thing was a rout. with a huge number of prisoners.

WHY? Why was captured 40% of the total during the war years?
And not sports with a professional.

[Olgovich]

Quote: chenia

Is always! And blamed on the Supreme.

Yeah:

In the operational plan of 1940, which, after clarification acted in 1941provided in threat of war:

- bring all armed forces to full combat readiness;

- immediately carry out military mobilization in the country;

- deploy troops to the wartime states according to

Mobplanu;

- to concentrate and deploy all mobilized troops in the areas of the western borders in accordance with the plan of the border military districts and the High Military Command.

The implementation of the measures provided for by the operational and mobilization plans could be carried out only by special government decision. This special decision followed only on the night of June 22, 1941, and even then not completely.
(Memories and Reflections "

Everything is clear and understandable: there is a threat of war, but Government Decisions NO.
Nothing of the approved plan has been completed. The result is known.

And it’s NOT Zhukov’s competence to make decisions of this level.

WHAT is unclear here?

[chenia]

Quote: Olgovich

Do not understand explain (but for a fee).

Well, do not understand. So how are we going to act ?. That your analytical department is inhibited.
Find below my comment about the main cause of the defeats in 1941.

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

Is always! And blamed on the Supreme. He began to form 30 MKs (he started exactly (frames began to spread, which even catastrophically lacked at 9 MKs.

There are a lot of questions to Zhukov, but he just doesn’t need to hang up what he was least concerned with, if only because the 1941 plan, where these 30 mechanized corps were laid down, was developed long before his appointment, and not only that, based on opportunities of our industry, their formation should have ended in 1947, as one author correctly pointed out. And it was not Zhukov who pushed the foundations of the theory of motor-vehicle war, but the leadership of the Red Army’s ABTU, that's where the legs of this reorganization of the tank troops grew from. Therefore, the newly appointed Zhukov, without authority in the People’s Commissariat of Defense, could not quickly change something that other commanders had developed before him — you, as a professional, must understand.

[chenia]

Quote: ccsr

if only because the plan of 1941, where these 30 mechanized corps were laid, was developed long before his appointment,

In June 1940, it was finally decided to form the MK (so far 9). They ripped off the Germans (although we already had it). Well, in general, it’s right and commendable (after the French campaign, rip off to the winner). TG = Ud. Army, and mech.korpusa with them.
But having created (with a muddy OSh) in a year without having banished them to the exercises?
Who is to blame?
But with this we have gouged all the armored troops. All tanks were swept out of the SD and SC. Their brigades began to make divisions. And where to recruit personnel? And where is the structure for maintaining the equipment in the appropriate technical condition? Where is the base for the combat training of brigades that have doubled in size and the formation of new ones (tank training grounds, shooting ranges, training fields)? Yes, just where the barracks fund?
What could they do. commanders, often (and in most cases) recruited from other military branches. and how could they train troops?
The Germans, doubling their TDs, did not create more than one new tank regiment (they halved the armored brigade, and in principle divisions can only be called tank divisions). They understood that it was impossible to create. something working from scratch.

Quote: ccsr

And the fundamentals of the theory of motor-vehicle war were not pushed by Zhukov, but by the leadership of ABTU of the Red Army,

We had excellent approaches and understanding of the role of BT, and the Germans spied (though not completely). But run MK to work and everything would come out. No create nine MK, and only suggest in the fall of 1941. drive away on exercises and see how it works.
Yes, already a bunch of commanders (even after scanty exercises) said that the structure is worthless.
So. there is no triple increase. And it began, and again the frames swam.

Quote: ccsr

other commanders worked out before him - you, as a professional, must understand this.

Did he fall from the moon? And he hears about problems in the formation of such structures for the first time?
The only thing that justifies him is that the Germans were really not ready for war and we assumed only a major provocation.

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

In June 1940, it was finally decided to form the MK (so far 9). They ripped off the Germans (although we already had it). Well, in general, it’s right and commendable (after the French campaign, rip off to the winner).

You are mistaken - the first mechanized corps appeared much earlier, long before the French company:

March 11, 1932 The Revolutionary Military Council decided to form two mechanized corps.
In April 1932, the Defense Commission at the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, on the report of the Revolutionary Military Council, adopted a resolution on the formation of mechanized corps. The first mechanized corps was deployed in the LenVO on the basis of the 11th Red Banner Leningrad Rifle Division (SD) in the autumn of 1932. The 11th MK included 31, 32 ICBMs and the 33rd SPBR. At the same time, in the Ukrainian Military District, on the basis of the 45th Red Banner Volyn SD, the formation of the 45th MK (133, 134 ICBMs, 135 SPBRs) began.

https://topwar.ru/25578-zheleznyy-kulak-rkka-sozdanie-avtobronetankovyh-voysk.html

Quote: chenia

But having created (with a muddy OSh) in a year without having banished them to the exercises?

As a matter of fact, the structure itself was "banished" in the first half of the thirties, so your accusations do not correspond to reality. As for the newly created corps, in 1941, the exercises simply could not be physically carried out - there were no personnel or equipment, which is why we did not have time to do this by the beginning of the war.

Quote: chenia

Yes, already a bunch of commanders (even after scanty exercises) said that the structure is worthless.

If this structure were shitty, then they would not have returned to it during the war, and moreover, they even went on to create tank armies, naturally taking into account the experience of the war.

Quote: chenia

Did he fall from the moon?

And you carefully study his career, and then you will find out how long he spent in different positions. And then we will discuss what kind of experience he had as a commander at the beginning of the war.

Quote: chenia

the Germans were really not ready for war

Why did they then attack us in such a situation? They just thought that they were completely ready, and their plans would come true - how do you know that this was not so?

[chenia]

Quote: ccsr

You are mistaken - the first mechanized corps

Careful to be.

Quote: chenia

(although we already had it).

And the pre-war MK ripped off the Germans, and inattentively.

Quote: ccsr

In fact, the structure itself was "driven away" in the first half of the thirties,

This is another on the OSh MK. In the war (from 1942), there will also be a TK with a completely different OSH.

Quote: ccsr

they wouldn’t return to her during the war,

They didn’t return to her.
MK 40 is an unfinished formation. At the connection level, excellent.
But the regimental link failed. By the way, why?

Quote: ccsr

As for the newly created buildings, in 1941, indeed, the exercises simply physically could not be carried out

The first MK was created by the fall of 1940. We stamped such huge formations. not knowing how they fit on the map.
I am an officer 70-80, then. To introduce some sort of unit (company, battalion. Division) into the structure. it was necessary to protect a bunch of desserts., a kilometer of conclusions, signatures and a couple of years of experimentation. I have already given an example of DShBr (well, this is the largest formation).
And then 9 MK., And then 30. Stalin, come on tanks.
And for a year they did not break in. And they would start. immediately felt where it’s shitty. And there, a little, a little tweak and would immediately reduce the costs of both equipment and L / C MK.
How can the unknown be stamped in such quantities, even among the Germans they have not copied to the end?
But how many generals appear at once, what a career growth.
Question -Who whispered to Stalin about the need for such an amount of MK?
Not military by chance?

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

And the pre-war MK ripped off the Germans, and inattentively.

This, in principle, cannot be — there are no two identical armies, and therefore, if they take someone else’s structure, then basically when there is the same type of armament and the command staff is trained in the same science at higher educational institutions, as it was, for example, with the Warsaw Treaty countries, where all higher military men studied in the USSR.

Quote: chenia

They didn’t return to her.
MK 40 is an unfinished formation. At the connection level, excellent.

So the war was already going on - many of the shortcomings of the pre-war structure were revealed. Recently, the director of a furniture store with a brigade structure has been playing tricks on us - they even understood without war that this nonsense should be abolished. Do you think that everything was smooth before the war?

Quote: chenia

And then 9 MK., And then 30.

Do not confuse, because it was a long-term event of PEACEFUL time - in 1941 a new rearmament program for our army began, which was planned to be completed only in 1946-1947. based on the capabilities of industry and the country's budget.

Quote: chenia

But how many generals appear at once, what a career growth.

It doesn’t appear at once - only after the government decree on each concrete association comes out, and even that is not a fact that they will be appropriated to the general at once.

Quote: chenia

Question -Who whispered to Stalin about the need for such an amount of MK?
Not military by chance?

Of course the military - they also developed the theory:
Commander Triandafillov. The man who invented the blitzkrieg.

And in 1926 this experience of the Civil War was analyzed and summarized in the book "The Scope of Operations of Modern Armies". And, practically next, the ideas were developed in the book "The Nature of Operations of Modern Armies".
On the basis of these works, the theory of the Deep Operation was developed. The essence of the theory: "the simultaneous suppression of the enemy's defense with all available means of destruction to the full depth, a breakthrough in the chosen direction, followed by the rapid development of tactical success into an operational one by landing airborne assault forces. and the introduction of a powerful mobile group into the battle, the basis of which are tanks; the main condition for success is interaction between all means of struggle. "
The second half of the 20s. There are simply no tanks in Germany yet. The main mobile forces of the European armies, as before, are cavalry.
And the author writes about the breakthrough by airborne forces and the development of success by tank groups!
None of the headquarters of the world has ever worked anything like this before.
Vladimir Kiriakovich Triandafillov.

https://zen.yandex.ru/media/id/5aa8f12e9b403c50c355ec4a/komkor-triandafillov-chelovek-kotoryi-pridumal-blickrig-5b3f7b8889690700ab23c17b

[chenia]

Quote: ccsr

This basically cannot happen - there are no two identical armies,

And who argues. But formations of a certain rank (corps. Divisions, brigades. Regiments, etc.) roughly correspond in different armies of the world (proportional correspondence in the battle group to the main branch of the troops, formations of other arms, formations of combat and rear support. Well, there + -) .
Such a formation as MK were among the Germans. and were restored in our country, taking into account the experience (well, that intelligence could fish out) of the war in France. But the Germans' TPs are usually 2 battalions (less than 3), we have 4. The Germans after France TD consisting of 2 brigades (Tank and motorized rifle - exactly like that). halved the tank brigade., transferring the TP to other PDs and turning them into tank ones (immediately doubling).
Naturally, there in terms of subdivisions mat. technical support is also changing (but this is the level of units. And what. the staff is in place, the deployment is not changed (Headquarters, barracks, a park with all the attributes, training fields, shooting ranges - plan and arrange with your neighbors, as before), even those mistresses In addition, the Group of German Forces in Western Europe was very conveniently located in the garrisons of the occupied countries.

And we? Of the brigade, two, then two of them. Altogether, the cadres sprawled, the barracks, but here they tried to locate the former infantry or cavalry formations, but this was how it turned out. and then in a bare field a warehouse under the headquarters, a barracks shed. And the parks, maintenance sites, shooting ranges, tankodromes?
Well, what can you do?

Quote: ccsr

So the war was already going on - many shortcomings of the pre-war structure

In the fall of the 40th was the first MK. And then ...

Quote: chenia

If (after all they could) having driven MK, he would immediately notice that TP is not capable of performing raid tasks. It came to war, it would have reached landfills. And then the structure known to us would appear (it appeared in real life as well). TP-3 battalion, with 3 tank platoons. All. TP - 94-96 tanks. (like now). MK has 5 TP - about 475 main tanks + 120 combat support tanks. Total 600 tanks, and not more than a thousand. And instead of 20 TB, only 15

And so they paid a lot of blood.

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

And we? Of the brigade, two, then two of them. Altogether, the cadres sprawled, the barracks, but here they tried to locate the former infantry or cavalry formations, but this was how it turned out. and then in a bare field a warehouse under the headquarters, a barracks shed.

At that time, we couldn’t have done otherwise — and during the period of a large increase in the size of the Red Army, we had to sacrifice the quality of troops, otherwise there would be no one to teach the newly called up.

[A1Lukno]

Quote: A1Lukno
Well, the troops of the first operational echelon of the front were defeated. 3-5% of the Red Army’s equipment is lost. but then there is no further surprise. The second strategic echelons arrived, and the same thing was a rout. with a huge number of prisoners.

And where did I say that ???????

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

Fundamental issues, such as: putting into effect cover plans, declaring combat readiness, mobilization - NOT HE solved it. From the word at all.

Who told you this? Or maybe you are not aware that the chiefs of staff of all levels are PERSONALLY responsible for the combat readiness of units and formations, as well as for raising troops on alert - haven't you explained this to the army? I can’t assert that only Zhukov is to blame, because firstly Tymoshenko was his boss, and secondly Zhukov was only a few months the commander of the district and a few months of the NSS, as a commander of the scale of the armed forces, he was weak. That's who pushed him to this post - the question is certainly interesting, but no one in the memoirs mentions this.

Quote: Olgovich

The GSh repeatedly requested and demanded permission to bring troops into combat readiness. The answer is see. above and here:

As for the events of spring-early June 1941, it really could not be done here, because there was a hope that the war would not start this summer, and it could be postponed for next year. But what prevented Zhukov and Tymoshenko in the evening of June 21 at a meeting with Stalin to obtain permission to introduce a plan for covering the districts, at least for the border armies in the form of a short order, rather than give birth to a directive, is still the subject of controversy for military professionals, who, unlike various historians are well aware of what this led to later. This is what Zhukov will always be blamed by professionals, because it was he, as the NSS, who was personally responsible for the rise of the troops.

Quote: Olgovich

Their nomination began on June 17-18. But they were supposed to arrive in the designated areas already ... June 27-28.

The army in peacetime cannot rise in one day - they then paralyze all the economic activities of the nearby industrial areas, which is why this event lasts several days. So this issue must be considered in the light of when the combat units began to move, and when the support units in order to understand the picture.

Quote: Olgovich

The cover plan was never introduced either in Kiev or in other districts.

This is the direct fault of Timoshenko and Zhukov - they did not insist before Stalin that he should be introduced by the end of June 21, although the Dortmund signal was already known and Golikov announced a meeting with our agent from the embassy, ​​who warned that the war would begin on June 22.

Quote: Olgovich

The PS will emphasize once again the obvious: before the war, not a single (even insignificant) issue was decided by the General Staff of the Red Army and the People’s Commissariat of Defense without the sanction of Stalin.

He jerked - Stalin did not go into combat training at all, and even plans to cover the districts were prepared without any instructions from him. So Stalin can be blamed for something that the military could do, either ignoramuses or liars, because in fact, until June 22, the leader trusted everything in our military, and did not meddle in their affairs with petty tutelage, and this is a fact. And only the beginning of the war made him delve into the essence of all issues of military planning and providing troops - but that was already a completely different matter.

[Olgovich]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Olgovich
Fundamental issues, such as: putting into effect cover plans, declaring combat readiness, mobilization - NOT HE solved it. From the word at all.

Who told you this?

I am told this:

В operational plan 1940, which, after clarification, acted in 1941, was provided in case of threat of war:

- bring all armed forces to full combat readiness;

- immediately carry out military mobilization in the country;

- deploy troops to the wartime states according to

Mobplanu;

- to concentrate and deploy all mobilized troops in the areas of the western borders in accordance with the plan of the border military districts and the High Military Command.

The implementation of the measures stipulated by the operational and mobilization plans could only be carried out by special decision of the government..
.

..
the government is not Zhukov and Tymoshenko

Quote: ccsr

troops in combat readiness. The answer is see. above and here:

As for the events of spring-early June 1941, here really must not had to do this because there was hope the fact that the war does not begin this summer

Well, and how was the hope justified somehow?

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

I am told this:
In the operational plan of 1940, which, after clarification, acted in 1941, was provided in case of threat of war:

You were told sucks because the situation was completely different, and it did not develop through the fault of Zhukov, who on the eve of the war became the NSH, but completely different officials. You first understand what the "operational plan" was, and only then hang all the dogs on Zhukov:
1941 Lessons and Conclusions

One of the conditions for the timely and planned deployment of the Armed Forces was their reliable operational cover. The planning of all these activities was the basis for the development of the operational plan. The situation, however, was complicated by the fact that in the prewar years, among the leadership of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff there was no single approach to understanding the operational plan and the strategic deployment plan. Often these concepts were identified or replaced by one another. This situation eroded the focus of planning and, of course, reduced its quality.
Analysis of a large number of archival documents allows us to state that the operational plan, as the main document of the war plan, consisted of a set of documents ensuring, during their implementation, the organized deployment and engagement of the army and navy in accordance with the goals and objectives of the first [52] strategic operations. It included: a government directive on the basics of the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces; a note developed by the chief of the General Staff and approved by the USSR People’s Commissar of Defense on the procedure for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces (tasks of fronts and fleets) with an appendix of a map and a summary table of the distribution of military formations, aviation and units of the Red Army across fronts and armies; strategic transportation plan to concentrate the Armed Forces in theaters of military operations; strategic deployment cover plans; plan for the rear and material support of the army; plans for communications, military communications, air defense, etc. In contrast to the operational plan, the plan for the first operations and tasks of the fronts were not determined in terms of strategic deployment.

The operational plan is only part of the war plan, and we didn’t have it close. So what can we talk about if it wasn’t worked out before Zhukov, and at that time, what remained before the start of the war, if they even created such a plan, they still wouldn’t have time to implement it.

[VS]

Quote: ccsr

which prevented Zhukov and Tymoshenko in the evening of June 21 at a meeting with Stalin to obtain permission to introduce a plan for covering the districts, at least for the border armies in the form of a short order, rather than give birth to a directive, is still the subject of controversy for military professionals, who, unlike various historians well know what this led subsequently. This is what Zhukov will always be blamed by professionals, because it was he, as the NSS, who was personally responsible for the rise of the troops.

everything is simple - Stalin did not allow - AGAIN - to enter the PP as a separate order and did it CORRECTLY !!! He allowed ONLY to enter FULL b..g. - at 22.00:21 on June XNUMX !!!
And now, YOURSELF answer - WHAT activities are carried out in FIRST turn when entering FULL b.g and when entering PP?))
That's right - the troops raise the BATTLE alarm !!))
And if the package is not opened, and this prohibits making the b / n directive from 22.20 on June 21, then on - hang up))) Today, when you enter the full b ... g. mobilization begins and then - mobilization was not tied to the entry of the full bg))

Now look at the events of that night - FACTURE - by the clock:
At 1.00-1.15 EVERYONE receives this directive and at 1.30 EVERYONE knows the text of the directive b / n - to introduce FULL combat alertness and this is combat alert first of all !!
That is, at 1.30, ALL districts MUST play a combat alert !!

Was this done - to declare a BATTLE alarm and to raise troops with bringing to FULL BG? NO! EVERYONE CONTINUES to sleep except OdVO! and separate divisions in ZAPOVO!

And at 2.30 there is a command to OPEN FACTS !!))

What do you think - if EVERYTHING had been woken up at 1.30 by the BATTLE alarm and packets would have been opened at 2.30 - would it somehow matter that at 22.00:XNUMX Stalin would not have allowed to enter the PP yet ??)))

Quote: ccsr

Olgovich
Their nomination began on June 17-18. But they were supposed to arrive in the designated areas already ... June 27-28.

The army in peacetime cannot rise in one day - they then paralyze all the economic activities of the nearby industrial areas, which is why this event lasts several days. So this issue must be considered in the light of when the combat units began to move, and when the support units in order to understand the picture.

yes this one .... I am sure that ALL the troops SHOULD be on those directives GO DIRECTLY STEAD TO THE BORDER !! )) And since the dates were indicated to them on July 1, even that means they "did not have time to get out" to the BORDER)) But if they were instructed to go out on the PP by June 21, then they would definitely meet the Germans ON THE BORDER - all these troops 2- first echelon and reserves of districts and also the army of the RGK)))

Quote: ccsr

The cover plan was never introduced either in Kiev or in other districts.

This is the direct fault of Timoshenko and Zhukov - they did not insist before Stalin that he should be introduced by the end of June 21, although the Dortmund signal was already known and Golikov announced a meeting with our agent from the embassy, ​​who warned that the war would begin on June 22.

at 22.00 on June 21.06.41, XNUMX, there was SUFFICIENT an order for FULL bg. - in order to stupidly raise the troops on alarm))) and then followed by an order - either open the package and act on it or - hang up)) And you will enter the PP immediately and then something will change and the Germans will not attack - it will be difficult to enter the hang-up )))

Quote: ccsr

either Stalin or liars can blame Stalin for stopping the military from doing anything

or )))

[Lekz]

Probably you shouldn't retell the stories that have gotten in your teeth again. It is enough to read the orders 00229 and 0052 of the PribOVO of June 15 and 19, 1941 to understand that everything possible on the part of the General Staff and, if you insist, Stalin, was done. Everything puts everything in its place, in particular, the report (make a difference between the report of the executor and Zhukov's "memoirs") Colonel-General P.P. Poluboyarov of the Pokrovsky Commission (1953). Anticipating the question: why then ..., I will answer in prose - the numerical, fire and mechanized superiority of the Wehrmacht in the directions of its main attacks. It's not even 3: 1, but much more. To this should be added the carelessness (some consider it a betrayal) of the leadership of the ZAPOVO. However, the latter were punished in hot pursuit.

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

But since no fundamentally new directives followed, it became clear that it does not apply to the Armed Forces, nor to the country as a whole. [110]

The position of the country's military leadership to this Statement, as well as to everything of the kind that was published by Pravda in Soviet times, is absolutely precisely stated. And at a later time, any political events, such as the Helsinki conference or the signing of the START treaties, did not in any way affect the implementation of daily combat missions, if there were no directives to the troops from the Minister of Defense. And if they did, they usually consisted of general words - to increase, strengthen, achieve, etc.

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: Olgovich

And what a relaxing, instead of mobilizing, effect on the people and the army it had, and there is no question:

And you wanted TASS to declare that it was time to "prepare tomahawks and go out on the warpath" in order to provoke an attack by Germany?
The TASS statement of June 14th was indeed made in order to clarify the position of the German leadership. After it became known that Hess had flown to England.
And it should not have any relaxing effect on the army. The army should always be ready for reflection, and it should not respond to any statements, except direct directives.
A directive to all military districts and fleets on putting troops on combat alert was given on June 18, 1941. So do not put a shadow on the wattle fence.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexander Green

And you wanted TASS to declare that it was time to "prepare tomahawks and go out on the warpath" in order to provoke an attack by Germany?

Only a complete Dubuseum can think that world wars begin because of ... provocation-occasion.

Or, that the aggressor begins it at least one day earlier than he will completely ready..

So the Second World War-was launched by the Nazis even without bothering to come up with any reason: when prepared-then let's go-not a day before.

You and-THIS don’t understand ...

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: Olgovich

Only a complete Dubuseum can think that world wars begin because of ... provocation

I don’t know how you are - complete or incomplete, decide for yourself .... But:

Firstly, I want to remind you that the First World War began with a provocation - a shot at Sarajevo, for Russia the German war also began with a provocation - mobilization. And the Second World War began with a provocation - the defeat by the Germans of their own radio station, dressed as criminals in Polish uniform.

Secondly, the further fate of the USSR then depended on a factor: who will attack anyone? We were not going to attack, but they could have made us aggressors artificially. And if Stalin “went on the warpath,” then the anti-Hitler coalition might not have existed.

Quote: Olgovich

I have already asked you: do not bother with this RANGE - until you FIND this elusive "directive"

This is not nonsense, many historians and memoirists already mention it.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexander Green

A directive to all military districts and fleets on putting troops on combat alert was given on June 18, 1941.

I have already asked you: do not disturb this nonsense, - until you find this elusive "directive" her number, text, incoming and outgoing ..

And you all hollow, hollow, like this

[VS]

Quote: Comrade

Germans knew much less than ours.

what the Germans knew about tim WHAT forces of the Red Army are waiting for them - - this is generally laughter))

see - http://liewar.ru/knigi-o-vojne/348-1941-god-uroki-i-vyvody.html - Appendix 10)))

[Same lech]

Thank you Eugene for an interesting article ... it would be nice to supplement it with an article how information was collected by transcendental intelligence and specific names of intelligence officers and intelligence units.
I already said once that before the start of the war the Germans managed to confuse our command with their actions to misinform the enemy .. the further course of events after June 22, 1941 clearly showed the unavailability of the Red Army operational command, with rare exceptions, to repel the Wehrmacht’s strike ... contradictory orders to repulse and the attack on the enemy headquarters of the Red Army indicate the lack of command by the commanders of information about the real balance of forces in the main directions of the Hitlerite strike.
I look forward to continuing the cycle of such articles ... a lot of details ... very interesting for thought.

[ccsr]

Quote: The same LYOKHA

I already said once that before the start of the war the Germans managed to confuse our command with their actions to misinform the enemy.

Tell us more about this event and who you managed to confuse.

[Same lech]

Tell us more about this event and who you managed to confuse.

I won’t ... google yourself about the service of Canaris Abwehr in the pre-war years ... my opinion is just my opinion ... you can disagree with him.

[ccsr]

Quote: The same LYOKHA

I won’t ...

Those. essentially can’t say anything - I was expecting this.

Quote: The same LYOKHA

my opinion is just my opinion ...

You didn’t back it up with anything — how then can you agree with him?

[Lipchanin]

Admired
This is how much it was necessary to shovel archival materials ...
Thank you, very informative

[AsmyppoL]

Thank you, Sergey !!! I somehow tried to count. Significantly more than a million pages of electronic documents and two years of work in my spare time from my main job and business trips

[Lipchanin]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I somehow tried to count. Significantly more than a million pages of electronic documents

At one time, I tried to find information about my ancestors, the princes Martynov, like this in the archives of the Saratov region. He was young, stupid, and when it was possible to learn everything first hand, he was not interested in this.
And now ask the wicked one.
So I imagine what kind of work it is.
You get tired literally in an hour. Nothing gets into my head. I suffered for three months, found almost nothing, so, crumbs and finished this thing
After such publications, I want to go to the site.
There is something for the mind.
Yes, and interestingly simple.
Thanks again

[ccsr]

Quote: Lipchanin

This is how much it was necessary to shovel archival materials ...
Thank you, very informative

And the fact that they slip you a linden does not bother you?
Do you even pay attention to the cards or clippings from them - you will not find on anyone whose card this is, who developed it, and how much you can trust it, because even at the district headquarters, all the heads of the services of the card are different and may not reflect the details about the enemy.
For example, this false researcher states:

Comrade, there are maps with German intelligence data. Only they are limited to the end of May 1941 and reappear only after the war. As with the intelligence reports of the General Staff of the Spacecraft ...

If this is a map of GERMAN reconnaissance, then parts of the Wehrmacht cannot be printed there in detail — the map of the reconnaissance chief reflects only the general configuration of his troops, and only the positions of reconnaissance units on it are reflected in detail. It was from such mistakes that all his articles were created, but you are apparently not able to understand this. I'm not saying that all his speculation revolves around Intelligence Report No. 5, about which he said that these were supposedly the latest intelligence materials before the war. Although any literate person will find intelligence reports from June 21 and earlier, they are on the network, because intelligence reports are compiled in peacetime EVERYDAY, and they are reported to the country's top military leadership. Already on the basis of this, you can throw all his fantasies into the bin. Like his example with a map of the Reserve Front, created in September 1941 with the situation applied, any military specialist understands that the data on this map was not received by the front itself, but transmitted from other structures, because reconnaissance of this front could not fully conduct it. But it is noteworthy that he gives our details, but he is afraid to refer to foreign cards under a ridiculous pretext:

I apologize, but if you put them earlier, it will be uninteresting to read. Yes, and these materials can be used by those who write faster than me ... I will give a few fragments of maps.

I think that the reason is different - judging by one of the cards, it was made not before the war, but much later, and apparently specifically for the author, justifying the defeat of Germany.

[icant007]

The absence of large headquarters at the border was likely to indicate that war was not expected in the near future. So they had to think in the higher echelons of spacecraft control. This point of view was reinforced by the absence at the border of a significant number of troops (according to intelligence), concentrated on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland.

Protest!
Firstly, the author draws conclusions for our command, attributing to our leadership a methodology of thinking invented by himself (the author).
Secondly, the lack of information about the deployment of headquarters is not identical to their absence in principle. The presence of large divisions at the border automatically indicates the presence of higher-level headquarters over them. Such a conclusion will be made by any competent military man, and even more so, a military historian should know this.
Thirdly, the author’s claim about the absence of a significant number of German troops is not clear, while intelligence until the last day reported on the concentration of Wehrmacht troops near the border.

Only the German command needed information on the deployment of troops, headquarters and mechanized groups. As an example, below is a fragment of a German map with intelligence information about our troops.

For the Germans, this information was more important because they were planning an offensive operation. And the disorganization of the enemy’s controls is one of the important tasks coming.
For various reasons, we could not fully reveal the detailed location of the Wehrmacht controls. There are objective circumstances for this:
it’s always more difficult to find a headquarters than a combat unit;
it’s even more difficult to find out the level of headquarters (corps, army), and the attitude to a certain type of troops;
uneven agent density on the other side.

The two fragments of the German map below show that by the start of the war large headquarters of all levels moved closer to the border. The problem was that all our intelligence services did not record the movement of these headquarters.

This is quite natural, the author himself writes about the time delay when transmitting intelligence information. Given that the headquarters of the corps and armies began moving several days before the outbreak of war, there is no blame for intelligence.

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

Protest!
Firstly, the author draws conclusions for our command, attributing to our leadership a methodology of thinking invented by himself (the author).

I completely agree with you - the author of the statues is simply an amateur in military affairs, and his ideas about the work of military intelligence are rendered so dense that to trust him, not to respect himself.

[Lamata]

Thanks to the author and respect.

[Operator]

"The top management of the spacecraft did not care about the RM about the presence of enemy fronts, armies, corps and motorized groupings at the border. The main (supposedly) for our command was the number of enemy divisions.", - such as information about the deployment of 200+ enemy divisions near the border, this is complete garbage, the main thing is where it has the brain of the corps, army and group levels (on the Atlantic coast, of course)

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

such as information about the deployment of 200+ enemy divisions near the border, this is complete garbage, the main thing is where it has the brain of the corps, army and group levels (on the Atlantic coast, of course)

You correctly noticed that heresy that the author of statistics on the work of intelligence on the eve of the war has been carrying for many months. Naturally, it is more important for our command to know FIRST of all precisely the composition of the enemy’s combat potential, and not the command structure of these forces, which is why intelligence threw all its forces into identifying the presence of Wehrmacht connections at our borders in 1941 in order to understand the intentions of the enemy. No one denies that it is desirable to know where the headquarters are, but they themselves do not go into battle, and cannot pose a serious danger to our cover units. But the author of these fantasies is so far from a real understanding of military affairs that he imagined what data the intelligence MUST present in 1941, and on the basis of his stupid conclusions he decided to evaluate its effectiveness. Although any competent person understands that if Golikov was not punished after June 22, but on the contrary entrusted to work at a higher level, as a representative of the government of the country at the most important negotiations, it means that he coped with the duties of the head of the RU
GS in the pre-war period.

[Operator]

Between supposedly ignorance RU GSh RKKA headquarters of the Wehrmacht in June 1941 and by intent Germany to attack the USSR there is no causal relationship

Readers of the article are invited to believe in the stupidity of the military-political leadership of the USSR - like since we don’t know anything about the enemy’s headquarters, nobody will attack us

[Same lech]

Naturally, it is more important for our command to know FIRST of all precisely the composition of the combat potential of the enemy, and not the command structure of these forces,

Well, how ... did you find out? ... and what did you learn later helped a lot in repelling the attack of the Wehrmacht?

[icant007]

Quote: The same LYOKHA

Well, how ... did you find out? ... and what did you learn later helped a lot in repelling the attack of the Wehrmacht?

And if we knew everything, to the last soldier, staff clerk and wagon horse? Would that help us?

Information mining is not an end in itself. Intelligence is the basis for a solution.

In his articles, the author tries to evaluate the work of our intelligence, and not the level of our readiness for war.

Although I suspect that this soap opera will last for more than one year. And for sure, intelligence will soon be reproached for: the lack of data on engineering battalions, self-detachment units, hospitals, autorotations, business plots, etc. etc.
Then he begins to count the guns, rifles, sabers, footcloths.

[Magog]

The structure of the concentration of enemy troops should be known in two possible scenarios: the first is what you have designated ("to reveal the intentions of an attack on us"); the second is to inflict a correct preemptive strike ourselves, as Vatutin himself formulated in the latest version of the plan "Considerations ...", that is, "to forestall the enemy in deploying forces" to strike first.

[ccsr]

Quote: Magog

The structure of the concentration of enemy troops should be known in two possible scenarios: the first is what you have designated ("to reveal the intentions of an attack on us"); the second is to inflict a correct preemptive strike ourselves, as Vatutin himself formulated in the latest version of the "Considerations ..." plan, that is,

After the Great Patriotic War, for almost fifty years, we had deployed and concentrated five armies of ground forces and one air force in the GSVG, conducted active reconnaissance in all directions, and for some reason during this time, even during exercises, we did not practice the attack first - how does it fit with yours " scenarios "if a NATO group stood against us stronger than the Wehrmacht in 1941?

Quote: Magog

and formulated in the latest version of the plan "Considerations ...", that is,

It was only a draft, and in addition not signed and unapproved by anyone, i.e. do you think Vasilevsky’s personal opinion is higher than that of Stalin or Tymoshenko, who didn’t even bother to study this draft? So what to understand your interpretation of these words?

To understand correctly, in particular, my theses - I recommend reading: https://www.litmir.me/br/?b=82483&p=1

Do you think that Meltiukhov can be trusted in everything? Personally, having studied his work, I realized that this is a purely civilian historian who is poorly versed in military matters, that’s why you can’t believe in his conclusions, because there are too many ridiculous conclusions about the events of the Second World War.

[ccsr]

Quote: The same LYOKHA

Well, how ... did you find out?

They found out, and with an accuracy of 98-99% - this was confirmed not only after the start of the war, but also from the captured documents that came to us after the Victory.

Quote: The same LYOKHA

but what did you learn later greatly helped in repelling the Wehrmacht attack?

What does the work of intelligence of the Red Army on the eve of the war and the combat readiness of the district’s troops have to do with it - what are you talking about?
Or do not you understand what the author of the statues is crucifying here? By his ignorance, he decided that supposedly intelligence had not revealed something in the numbering of any associations, and because of this the tragedy of the first months of the war occurred. If you also think so, then it hardly makes sense to explain something to you based on the text of the Directive b / n, where, on the basis of the intelligence, the EXACT date of the attack on the USSR was June 22-23. And the approximate grouping of German troops on June 1 was brought to the entire highest military command of the USSR in the form of MONTHLY intelligence number 5 for the month of May. What intelligence information do you still need to evaluate what our commanders will have to face in the event of a war?

[VS]

over the buttocks - and THEIR understanders of military affairs - it is always useful to neigh)))

[Titus]

Thank you for the work, but surely my namesake noted that the work has been done a lot, and the efficiency is small. Critics are always easier for us ... the presentation is dry and not very easy to read. The most optimal thing is to break it down in parts, well, I would like to in a more digestible form in order to expand the audience.

[Magog]

Thesis. At the beginning of the Second World War, two points should be remembered: 1) the spacecraft was not preparing to repel aggression; 2) All our intentions in the upcoming campaign considered only one form of influence on the enemy: a SUDDEN ATTACK, which would begin the so-called. "border echelon", including directions, calendar dates and forces involved. The word "cover" should not lead anyone into thinking about strategic defense measures - there were none in our war plans! Obviously, the picture of the concentration of enemy troops was of greater interest to us than the location of his headquarters. By the way, in 1939, the plans of the Polish General Staff for the war with Germany also considered a line of surprise attack, and not an echeloned defense against an aggressor attack. Including, we have nothing to be ashamed of here!

[icant007]

Quote: Magog

KA was not preparing to repel aggression;

I object a little. The combat training plans were planned for the development of defensive operations. But according to the schedule, it was set aside for the second half of 1941.
As a matter of fact, it happened. June 22 began to sharply work out.

[Magog]

And what are the "objections"? The actions of the covering echelon assumed both types of military operations. In threatened sectors (on the flanks of the advancing troops) - defense (but not strategic!), Even with the use of URs.

[icant007]

You kind of wrote that the Red Army was not preparing to repel aggression. Or I misunderstood something.

[Magog]

I will assume that I really "did not understand", and not "you are fooling around" ... The repulsion of aggression involves the creation of an echeloned defense in the alleged directions of enemy strikes (remember the preparation for the Battle of Kursk - a vivid example of strategic deliberate defense), the evacuation of the population, values ​​(including factories, warehouses, museums, etc. in the pre-war period), support lanes, mining of roads and bridges, the creation of hidden bases for the deployment of partisan and sabotage activities in the supposed rear of the enemy, the creation of military reserves deep in the defended territory and the corresponding structure of the disposition of forces and means, armament and training of troops according to the nature of defense tasks, etc. Compare the map of the German-Polish border in 1939 and those given by the author of this article.

[icant007]

Quote: Magog

Repulsion of aggression involves the creation of a layered defense in the alleged areas of enemy attacks

The reflection of aggression involves not only the actions you have listed, but also measures for the combat training of troops and commanders of various levels for defensive operations.

That's why I wrote that I "object a little" that we were not preparing for defense.

[Magog]

"... arming and training troops according to the nature of the defense tasks" in my previous statement. Follow the link below. I have never seen a more fundamental and frank study of the issue of our readiness for war among historians. Particularly interesting is the section "Soviet military planning": this is where explanations are given of what should be understood by the terms "covering forces" and "active defense". The variants of our plans for waging war with Germany and her allies in the European theater are being analyzed in detail: the Northern, Northwestern, Western, Southwestern, Southern versions of this plan. Development began on September 29, 1939 and took its final form in mid-June 1941, moreover, the deployment of troops corresponded to the option chosen based on the results of the headquarters games in January 1941 (the South-Western version of our strike by the "cover echelon" forces). In general, read - everything is available.

[Magog]

To understand correctly, in particular, my theses - I recommend reading: https://www.litmir.me/br/?b=82483&p=1

[chenia]

Quote: Magog

1) The spacecraft was not preparing to repel aggression;

In 1941, definitely not. Definitely, the Germans were NOT READY, so ours were not too fussed, but already at the end of May. felt that a large-scale provocation is possible.

Quote: Magog

All our intentions in the upcoming campaign considered only one form of influence on the enemy: SUDDEN ATTACK,

Well yes! It’s straight to do cool, 30 MKs could be ready only by 1944-45. And the whole reform of the army was not earlier (naturally in peacetime, during the war there are other terms). MK race was planned for the fall of 1941, well, and large fees, too.
In the summer of 1941, "thanks to" the organizational itch of the General Staff, the Red Army was absolutely unprepared for hostilities.

[Magog]

Such as you listen, it’s generally possible to think that crowds of soldiers were gathered at the western borders to march with sticks and conduct maneuvers with simulators of armored vehicles on horse drawn trails! It is useless to you to prove something. Squint even more and rely on your congenial hunch ...

[chenia]

Quote: Magog

that crowds of soldiers were gathered at the western borders marching with sticks

They did not do this either. And they parked the parks and covered them with barbed wire.
I am an officer in the past, and assessing the scale of organizational activities of that time, I unequivocally declare that the BP was completely absent.
The nature of the hostilities in 1941 (when the number of prisoners was six months or 40% of the total during the war years) shows that the bosses didn’t miss (in 1942 they made no less than them, and there were less losses of this plan for the year), but the absence of platoons, mouth , and battalions, as combat units and collectives (and which, with a mild blow, crumbled).
As soon as the Siberian divisions appeared (and these formations were not less than 3-4 training), an offensive near Moscow occurred.

Judge for yourself. Well, the troops of the first operational echelon of the front were defeated. 3-5% of the Red Army’s equipment is lost. but then there is no further surprise. The second strategic echelons arrived, and the same thing was a rout. with a huge number of prisoners.

As an example, I will give the actions of 316 SD (8 gv.sd). 1073 joint venture after leaving Volokolamsk. was replenished by 50% (already much washed out, the original composition). 1 battalion (Momysh-Uly) only 30%. After the advance of November 16.11.41, 250, 3 people remained from the regiment. Momysh-ula didn’t move away (he held the defense according to the order for 600 days) and then brought out more than 60 people (there were strangers there) with the wounded. having lost up to 70-XNUMX fighters. He and the regiment commander were appointed (senior lieutenant, just like that).

And the division itself, after 3 months after the formation, held the front for 42 km and retreated only 15 km. And already behind Volokolamsk (after replenishment), it held a front of 16 km, and then retreated to 50 km (of course, this is not only the fault of the division, but anyway the combat efficiency dropped sharply ..

[Magog]

The combat training of the troops was manifested in Khalkin-Gol, in the Polish campaign of 39, in the "winter" war with Finland, in the lightning-fast Bessarabian operation. Yes, and the first days of the Second World War showed the ability of the forward echelon to capture and hold bridgeheads on the border. Blind counterstrikes by a spacecraft in the face of a truly unexpected enemy attack are the subject of the proceedings. Such a small nuance as the complete absence of topographic maps of one's own territory does not in any way contribute to the successful actions of troops in defense, including. "Siberian divisions", you say? Where were they located in Siberia? 40 divisions is a noticeable force ... The divisions were removed from the Far Eastern Front, conducting a whole operation to misinform the Japanese. These were the same troops of the personnel spacecraft. Poorly trained personnel for defensive actions - I agree, the rest is very controversial. The enemy acted very ingeniously and rationally - the amount of forces at his disposal obliged him to do this. This was not particularly observed in our actions in the conditions of vast territories and resources.

[chenia]

Quote: Magog

"Siberian divisions", you say?

Well, how can you skip the meaning (I myself am skeptical about the word "Siberian")?
The main thing there is with FOUR MONTHLY training in wartime conditions.

Quote: Magog

Combat training of troops

She had not been a strength of the Red Army before. Now imagine the scale of the reorganization of the Red Army.
In my time serving in CA, the biggest organizational experiment was creating
DShBr, so for a decade and a half poor people did not know where to stick, until finally they stuck it in the airborne forces.
Well, the creation of ADN in TP. So armed with ADN during the first year was ---- (fanfare) -ZIS-3. And now stormy applause (not self-propelled guns went in groups of troops).
With frames it’s naturally easier. KD-after the academy, com.batteries immediately found. So this is in MSD where there are more than thirty art. react. , and min. batteries.
And if the proportion is vice versa ?.
And in the new place (and in the old one when the division was to be created from the brigade), new parks (from water-oil heating, capra-water, to battery.) And training fields, classes, and tank tracks. shooting ranges, training fields, etc. And the barracks fund.A ....
The question is what did the Red Army do?
We cried at one time that BP occupied and disrupted a lot of time - the so-called perfection of the material and technical base of this very preparation (there is no end to perfection, but it was exhausted to the limit) ..
And this is in the towns and garrisons of 30. and even 50-year history. (In the parks, all the equipment in the boxes, about the rest is understandable and the developed system of field training).

[Magog]

"General Apanasenko played an extremely important role in strengthening the defense capability of the Far East in the critical months of the war. In the famous Soviet song about the war, there are the words" Siberians saved Moscow. "At critical moments of the battle for Moscow, divisions with combat experience of battles were transferred on Khasan and Khalkhin-Gol.From June 1941 to July 1942 he sent 22 divisions to the active army from the Far East.Apanasenko manned the naked front with prisoners from the GULAG, including from the Kolyma camps.
Berlin, demanding that Tokyo begin hostilities in Manchuria, informed Japan about the transferred divisions. But Japanese intelligence did not detect the redeployment of troops. General Pyotr Grigorenko wrote: “... during the first year of the war, there was a serious skirmish between the Japanese and the Germans. German intelligence claimed that the Soviets were withdrawing their divisions from under the noses of the Japanese and transferring them to the West. The Japanese intelligence insisted that not a single Soviet division left their places of deployment. It is even difficult to imagine how the events in the Far East would have developed if a man-executor was in command there. He would have sent all the troops, as Moscow demanded, and would not have formed anything, since unauthorized formations are strictly prohibited. With one remaining division, three army headquarters and one front headquarters, even together with the border guards, it is impossible not only to defend, but also to observe the vast border of the Far East. Apanasenko showed statesmanship and great courage in this matter. "
At the end of autumn 1941, the first ten Far Eastern divisions, along with a thousand tanks and aircraft, were deployed along the Trans-Siberian Railway near Moscow. Many Siberians in the late autumn of 2 witnessed a fantastic spectacle [94665]. Along the Trans-Siberian Railway, raising whirlwinds of snow and locomotive dust, military echelons rushed to the West from the Far East with double thrust and courier speed. On separate tracks, the oncoming traffic was blocked and the hurricane of echelons, accompanied by an incessant roar, increased the unreality of what was happening. One after another, within sight of the Far Eastern military units, staffed by regular military personnel, rushed to help Moscow. "(See: https://dergachev-va.livejournal.com/XNUMX.html)

[chenia]

Quote: Magog

"General Apanasenko played an extremely important role

I agree completely. Apanasenko is one of those who ensured victory near Moscow.
There would be a corresponding B.P. before the war, the Germans would begin to fight with the Red Army level of 42 with combat platoons, companies and battalions. although with shitty (yet) commanders of regiments, divisions, and to commanding fronts. And most importantly, without losses in 1941.

[Magog]

That "it would be" stupid to assert, but the spacecraft was "sharpened" on actions outside its territory, and the enemy imposed a completely different story with his attack ... My father never tired of repeating during his lifetime: "Do not believe anyone who says that we are not ready war. We were ready! " Participant of the Second World War "from call to call". "Not long before the war, regular trips to the very border (with Romania) for the purpose of reconnaissance on the ground: where it is better to organize firing positions for artillery on the other side." "In the very first days, with battle, they seized a bridgehead on the other side of the border and held it until the order to withdraw was received." Here are just a couple of theses from the stories of my front-line soldier.

[chenia]

Quote: Magog

then "it would" be foolish to say

Any analysis, any research (and what are we doing? Well, at least, so as not to repeat mistakes) is an enumeration of options. Well, you need to understand the reason? And what I said "if only" is to take it as an argument in support of your point of view.

Quote: Magog

but the spacecraft was "sharpened" on actions outside its territory,

You won’t believe it, but the SA of my time was sharpened in the same way (the solution of the defense problem is a decisive attack, until the enemy is completely defeated.) And only this way (the attack is the main type of database. Moreover, in the 70s and until the 90s we had tremendous superiority. but the war did not start.

But talking about the lack of training in defensive combat in the Red Army causes a smirk to any professional.
This statement was born when some historians decided. that they can become strategists.
What is the point? When the tank brigades and military personnel in the MK were taken from SK and SD. Rifle corps are already extremely weakened for defensive operations (there is no strike nucleus for counterattacks, and cover for retreat - all this is according to the Combat Charter of 1939 ..). AND
here is the MK-machine for the offensive unambiguously. And immediately the conclusion with a clever look - "we did not prepare the troops to conduct defensive actions." And we really had problems in defense during the war because of this. MK was disbanded. But already for conducting offensive operations near Moscow, the need for these formations naturally arose. and at the beginning of 1942 they began to form again (although these were already somewhat different TCs.)

And so, after filling MK equipment (although 30 MK is higher than my understanding and understanding0, both SK and divisions should have tanks (no one canceled the charter at that time. Because any attack always involves a transition to defense by all the rules.

[Magog]

Therefore, the MK was disbanded, because even in the counterattacks of the first days of the war, all this super armored fist of different sizes was practically uncontrollable. And who proposed the formation of such corps to the detriment of diabetes?

[chenia]

Quote: Magog

Therefore, they disbanded MK

And in 1942 they recreated Well already as a TC (it is clear. That with a different OSH.
And who interfered. one year before the war, to drive the MK to the full, it will be determined with the OSh. And this is with the parallel construction of 9 MK (to hell with it). But by spring, they would have a new OSH, most likely the one that they later created with blood in the war ..

[Magog]

He interfered with who proposed this miracle to the organization ...

[chenia]

Quote: Magog

He also interfered with who proposed this miracle to the organization.

Well, also wrong. Understand. as soon as the Germans fucked the French with the British, quite rightly we understood how it was done. And they torn off the OShs at them (but inattentively). Generally wise. (And MK we already had. Early 30s). But they created a hard-to-control monster for a thousand tanks.

[Magog]

and MK we already had. early 30s This is not what I meant, but a reproach from your bell tower that they took the tank reinforcement from the SD. The "hard-to-control" MK became clear back in 39 during the Polish campaign, when no one had thought of, in addition, to strengthen this miracle of war at the expense of rifle divisions. By the way, then they were abolished for the first time. Many now think that this was a major mistake. So what ? Before the Nazi attack, they restored it again - the war showed "the same rake"! In any case, considering all these organizational bloopers as an inability to fight is a far-fetched reason. Not brilliant, but they could fight. Who else in the world had so many armadas of armored vehicles? And here we, as I understand it, are discussing the INTENTIONS and PLANS of the military-political leadership of the USSR, and not the real possibilities. And it proves, first of all, the ABSENCE (from the word AT ALL!) Of plans to repel aggression ...

[chenia]

Quote: Magog

Now many believe that this was a major mistake.

Doctors say there is no poison or medicine, there are quantities.
So it is here. Yes. knowing how the events of 1941 unfolded, it was better not to create MK. Then the durability of our SC would significantly increase. We had TD for tank counterattacks. Naturally for the offensive, and MK is designed to enter the breakthrough after the defeat of the corps reserves, TD will not be enough. But by any measure, the organizational itch of our generals would lead to the creation of mechanized
divisions (2 joint ventures + 1 TP). The structure is excellent, but at least 100 such divisions would be created immediately (corps TBRs were disbanded into battalions that needed to turn into regiments). And these are the same Faberge. as MK. The same BP failure. One advantage. they would not have perished so quickly (and stupidly) as MK.

I know how to do it, but it's not fair. This is afterglow, with appropriate education.

I rely on what, if you created a structure, check how it works. A year has been for it. If (after all they could) having driven MK, he would immediately notice that TP is not capable of performing raid tasks. It came to war, it would have reached landfills. And then the structure known to us would appear (it appeared in real life as well). TP-3 battalion, with 3 tank platoons. All. TP - 94-96 tanks. (like now). MK has 5 TP - about 475 main tanks + 120 combat support tanks. Total 600 tanks, and not more than a thousand. And instead of 20 TB, only 15. And not even 30 MK (by the way, Meretskov at the meeting in March, although he objected weakly).
But unfortunately the increase in the number of formations (and swift), was the mania of our generals. Hence, there is no quality of troops.

[ccsr]

Quote: Magog

Therefore, the MK was disbanded, because even in the counterattacks of the first days of the war, all this super armored fist of different sizes was practically uncontrollable.

This question is controversial, because the main reason was the huge losses of armored vehicles and the lack of the required amount of fuel and tankers so that rational use of mechanized corps could be organized. It was because of the losses that they switched to tank brigades in the first months of the war - there were no other reasons then.

Quote: Magog

And who proposed the formation of such corps to the detriment of diabetes?

Our military theorists, including such as Tukhachevsky, who dreamed of 50-100 thousand tanks for the Red Army.

[ccsr]

Quote: Magog

but the spacecraft was "sharpened" on actions outside its territory, and the enemy imposed a completely different story with his attack ...

I don’t know your level of military education, but I’ll ask you a question about your thesis - how did you plan to launch an offensive outside our territory if all of our long-distance wired communications were provided by the People’s Commissariat of Communications (civil organization) without its own nodes abroad, and when radio communications organizations have dead zones after 50 km and up to 90. How are you going to manage a huge mass of troops, if we didn’t have field long-distance communications equipment at all, but there was a radio phobia even at the level of command of formations?
So what about our general readiness for war cannot be judged by the recruits of the front-line soldier - one must at least understand at what level all our armed forces were in order to conclude whether we could fight in foreign territories or not.

[Magog]

This question should have been asked to the "Marshal of Victory". He was the Chief of the General Staff, he had to take care of communications and brilliantly foresee the problems of a future war, seek the introduction of advanced communications, convince the country's leadership and subordinates of this, right? And so, as always with Zhukov, someone is to blame for something, but not he. Here is a typical explanation: "At the beginning of the war, some of the combined-arms commanders overestimated wire communications too much and did not always believe in radio equipment. This attitude towards radio communications at the beginning of the war received a very apt definition -" radio fear. "Unfortunately, this" disease "in 1941-1942 For years, many commanders and officers of the headquarters of rifle units and formations suffered.Even front headquarters officers, for a long time after the start of the war, continued to consider the telephone as the main means of communication. Breaking the line for them was often tantamount to losing communication with subordinate troops. For organizational and technical reasons, potential Radio communications in the Red Army were far from being used to the full.However, radio fear was not observed in aviation, in armored and mechanized troops, as well as in the Navy. commanders and commanders. no matter the front commander or the army commander, a personal radio station should always be with him. Together with the radio operators, an officer of the operations department and a cipher officer must have been at the radio station. This decision was very important and played a big role in improving command and control. And already in the second half of the war, cases of underestimation of radio communications or misuse of various means of communication were rare. "But there were still radio stations in the troops, as they say here. Whether it is enough or not, the question is all the same for the Chief ... The Germans did not have winter lubricant. , warm uniforms for the campaign against the USSR, the banal motor resource of armored vehicles for such distances, and much more, but they fought and very successfully ... Nobody wants to talk about the readiness / unavailability of the Wehrmacht, but the spacecraft was no good!

[ccsr]

Quote: Magog

This question should have been asked to the "Marshal of Victory". He was the Chief of the General Staff, he had to take care of communications and brilliantly foresee the problems of a future war, achieve the introduction of advanced communications, convince the country's leadership and subordinates of this, right?

I don’t know what the roots of your claims to Marshal Zhukov are, but in this case you simply don’t know that until March 1941 the communications department was not subordinate to the NSS, but was an independent structure of the people's commissariat of defense on the basis of control, i.e. Zhukov was simply unable to fix anything. Especially when you consider that the People’s Commissariat of Defense didn’t have its own landline or field wired communication system. And what could Zhukov have foreseen if he took the first significant post in the armed forces in the summer of 1940, becoming the commander of the district. I think that your claims to him are not entirely justified, at least from the understanding that upstarts do not have authority in the military environment until they prove their superiority over the others. When, in your opinion, could Zhukov do this if he was only a half-year non-vocational school before the start of the war?

Quote: Magog

And so, as always with Zhukov, someone is to blame for something, but not him.

All memoirists suffer from this - so do not believe everything that is written in memoirs, and Zhukov is no exception.

Quote: Magog

True, radio-fear was not observed in aviation, in armored and mechanized troops, and also in the Navy.

Of all the above, only the fleet had the most trained radio communications specialists, but this is due to the fact that there is no other connection with the ships. As for airplanes and armored vehicles, it is better for you not to remember this - everything was sadder there than you might think. It may be a great discovery for you that in cavalry divisions radio stations were transported on carts at the beginning of the war, and this says a lot to experts.

Quote: Magog

And already in the second half of the war, cases of underestimation of radio communications or the misuse of various means of communication were rare.

This is natural - we paid a lot of blood for the fact that we lost control of the troops at the beginning of the war, and precisely because the radio communications did not pay the required attention in peacetime.

Quote: Magog

No one wants to talk about the readiness / unpreparedness of the Wehrmacht, but the KA was no good!

The fact that we were weaker than the Wehrmacht, no one denies. But if we could make the army better, the question is very complicated, given the fact that industrialization was taking place in the country, and we were saving on the army, which is why we were not ready for the war in 1941.

[Magog]

The fact that we were weaker than the Wehrmacht, no one denies. There is nothing more to talk about! Time to waste on you "oh fitzer" is not worth it ...

[ccsr]

Quote: Magog

Time to waste on you "oh fitzer" is not worth it ...

This is exactly what everyone who tries to hide their incompetence in military affairs declares - you are not the first here ....

[icant007]

Quote: Magog

The fact that we were weaker than the Wehrmacht, no one denies. There is nothing more to talk about! Time to waste on you "oh fitzer" is not worth it ...

We were weaker in combat training and organizational level.

We’re at least officers, but you’re incomprehensible.

Magog or Gog?
Or just a demagogue)

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

We were weaker in combat training and organizational level.

To this can be added the general level of education of the population of the two countries, as well as the technological superiority of Germany, which received not only loans for the development of industry, but also advanced American technologies of those years. Even in communications technology, they were so far ahead of us that already during the war they used radio relay stations (cryptographic equipment, short- and medium-range missiles, jet aircraft, radar stations, submarines, etc.) that we had in 1950 :

Work on the creation of mobile radio-relay lines for military use was launched in Germany in the late 1930s and in the United States just before the outbreak of World War II. Several modifications of American stations were developed, but nothing is known about their use on the fronts.
We had to face the first German military radio relay stations during the Great Patriotic War. Meter stations were called “Michael” (DMG-5A, DMG-7A) and provided single-channel or two-channel communication up to 150 km with a single interval length of up to 40-50 km. At the end of the war, Rudolph and Stuttgart radio relay stations appeared. Our experts carefully studied the captured equipment, conducted a number of studies on the creation of more advanced radio-relay equipment for the Soviet Army, and already in recent war years, a sample of the domestic Comet radio-relay line “Comet” was tested on the Western Front.
The highest army leadership recognized the prospect of using radio-relay communication lines in almost all military command and control links, and immediately after the war, in early 1946, work began on creating radio lines with pulse modulation “Rubin” and “Disk”. Both works were later combined and received the name “Disk Rubin”. The stations were commissioned under the index P-400 in 1950.

https://trcvr.ru/2018/12/21/radiorelejnaja-svjaz-v-vs-sssr/

Quote: icant007

We’re at least officers, but you’re incomprehensible.

I think that these are ordinary verbiage, with a couple of years of military service behind them and no more, because they do not know what it means to train personnel, and after what time a civilian becomes a soldier. They will never understand why in Germany the educational process is much easier to organize and get better results in training military personnel than ours - they simply never bother with this, which is why they carry nonsense about preparing the Wehrmacht and the Red Army on the eve of World War II.

[icant007]

The bike. Especially about the one remaining division in the Far East.

[Magog]

"Bike" in what? That the Far Eastern divisions entered the battle near Moscow? Yes, probably, the unit numbers did not correspond to their Transbaikalian values. But where did the forces for the counteroffensive come from then? All reserves by that time were exhausted. In Siberia, there were no noticeable troops - "Siberian divisions", indeed, a bike of Soviet times.

[icant007]

From June 1941 to July 1942 from the Far East he sent 22 divisions to the army. ....
One remaining division, three army headquarters and one front headquarters, even with border guards, not only defend, but also observe the vast extent of the border of the Far East. Apanasenko showed the state mind and great courage in this matter

This bike is about one division. Yes, and to see about the camps, too.

22 divisions are redeployed in stages throughout the year.
With the composition of the troops of the Far Eastern Front in 23 divisions, one division could not stay there. Considering that about 41 divisions were transferred to the West in the fall of the 7st, at least a dozen should remain in the Far East. In the locations of the departed divisions, a new replenishment was carried out. For several months, new divisions were being prepared, and so on.


And about the rushing trains generally keep quiet.

On separate stages, the oncoming traffic was blocked and the hurricane of echelons, accompanied by an incessant hum, intensified the unreality of what was happening.

Military historical fantasy)

[Magog]

In the first part, contradict yourself a little. Well, the author of the article has some touch of poetry, but has the essence of this somehow changed?

[icant007]

In no way contradict.
I do not deny the fact of the transfer from the Far East to the West and the role of the "Siberians" in the defense of Moscow.
This passage contains a logical problem, which I tried to draw attention to.

Such a touch of poetry is akin to mayonnaise, which they try to season a spoiled dish.
A touch of poetry is good when it magnifies the truth.

[Magog]

I do not deny the fact of the transfer from the Far East to the West and the role of the "Siberians" in the defense of Moscow. [B] - one thing, and then another: [/ bAn air of poetry is good when it exalts the truth.] Or is it only I see a contradiction?

[icant007]

There are authors who write stories, mixing truth and falsehood. And to make such stories attractive, they add all sorts of sauce, spices, etc.
If the whole story were true to the end, then poetry would be appropriate.

Personally, such a poetry of the author immediately suggests that I am dealing with a fake.

[Magog]

Without any "poetry", state your truth-womb! So who literally saved Moscow from destruction?

[icant007]

Russian soldier of all nationalities.

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

And about the rushing trains generally keep quiet.

Some "historians" often use memoirs instead of facts, extolling details and not seeing the big picture. By the way, back in 1939, my father was sent to the Pacific Fleet as a whole graduate from the Perm School, and was there throughout the war, although their naval aviation regiment three times was put completely into echelons with equipment and weapons, and they waited a day or a little more, and then the order came to cancel the shipment - he told me this himself. Moreover, the pilots were worried most of all - they were eager to go to war, but no one let them go, and only in the war against Japan did they participate. Although, of course, this is also just a small stroke for understanding the events of that time, and where the reserves came from.

[Magog]

In how: even 22 divisions! The rest scored on the way ...

[A1Lukno]

I read all the articles. A lot of work has been done. Thanks to the author

[Seal]

Quote: chenia

And then, under Khrushchov, they picked up the thesis about surprise and opposition to the deployment of Stalin

It’s interesting how Khrushchev himself describes the pre-war days.

I saw that I had nothing to do in Moscow, and Stalin would not let me go because he was afraid of loneliness, he wanted as many people as possible around him. Finally, on Friday, June 20, I turned to him: "Comrade Stalin, I have to go. The war is about to start and may find me in Moscow or on the way." I pay attention to "on the way", but to go from Moscow to Kiev one night. He says, "Yes, yes, that's right. Drive." I immediately took advantage of Stalin's consent and left for Kiev. I left on Friday and was already in Kiev on Saturday. This suggests that Stalin understood that the war was about to begin. Therefore, he agreed that I should leave and be there, in Kiev at the time of the outbreak of the war. What reasoning can there be about a surprise attack? For whom and in whose name is this version created and strengthened now? It is only needed to justify oneself. These authors are responsible themselves.

If all the husk is removed, the dry sediment remains that Khrushchov and Stalin knew for sure that the war would begin on June 22, 1941. Not the fact that in the morning of 22.06.1941/22.06.1941/XNUMX, but it was XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX.

[VS]

"" The absence of large headquarters at the border probably should have indicated that war is not expected in the near future. So they were obliged to think in the highest echelons of spacecraft control. ""

Again, the author came up with some kind of stupidity, and on her heaped up his fantasies)))

author - YOU HAVE TAKEN THAT since large headquarters were not found then they don’t expect war ??))
Someone told you this - or did you come up with this very truth?)))

[VS]

Quote: Olgovich

liquid chain of divisions on the border, everything would be "the same"!

do you think, like the same Isaev, that if you started sending troops according to the PP already in March, it would probably be not a liquid chain on the BORDER or what?)))

[VS]

Quote: Olgovich

On June 13, 1941, the command of the Kiev district received an order from the General Staff to advance formations from a depth closer to the border. Their nomination began on June 17-18. But they were supposed to arrive in the designated areas already ... June 27-28.

Therefore, it didn’t help. Nobody had time and didn’t get anywhere.

that is, YOU THINK that according to the PP of the districts - EXCEPT 42 divisions assigned to the border MUST be some other divisions or something - THAT YOU STARTED to withdraw in the districts according to the directives of the General Staff from June 11-12?)))

Do you seriously think so?)))

[VS]

Quote: chenia

Quote: Olgovich

Zhukov also testifies directly opposite to Vasilevsky:

Memoirs. Heh. And not Zhukov. Zhukov is the main culprit (or one of them). catastrophe of 1941
If you think. if we had deployed two weeks earlier, it would have been different. badly mistaken. Everything would be as it was in real life.

Zhukov and Vasilyevsky and a group of responsible comrades from the leadership of the Red Army failed to fill up the BP completely. assuming that the 41st (summer) will slip through (we will carry out organizational measures to create new formations). and in the fall we’ll take a tight BP.
Do not slip. The miscalculation is first of all GSh.
And then under Khrushchov they picked up the thesis about the unexpectedness and opposition to the deployment of Stalin (Kirponos started in two weeks, no one punished, but it didn’t help. Late.)

maladets)))

[VS]

Quote: icant007

Firstly, the author draws conclusions for our command, attributing to our leadership a methodology of thinking invented by himself (the author).
Secondly, the lack of information about the deployment of headquarters is not identical to their absence in principle. The presence of large divisions at the border automatically indicates the presence of higher-level headquarters over them. Such a conclusion will be made by any competent military man, and even more so, a military historian should know this.

maladets))))
scary when the bats climb with their "understanding" how it should be done there in the army - these are the questions)))

[VS]

Quote: chenia

Magog
All our intentions in the upcoming campaign considered only one form of influence on the enemy: SUDDEN ATTACK,


Well yes! It’s straight to do cool, 30 MKs could be ready only by 1944-45. And the whole reform of the army was not earlier (naturally in peacetime, during the war there are other terms). MK race was planned for the fall of 1941, well, and large fees, too.
In the summer of 1941, "thanks to" the organizational itch of the General Staff, the Red Army was absolutely unprepared for hostilities.

so it’s scary - the plans of the General Staff are huge - in case of an attack by the Germans themselves, how much we will hit them hard !!! and the opportunity to realize them is ZERO!
guys do not argue - you're both right)))

[VS]

Quote: Magog

my theses - I recommend reading: https://www.litmir.me/br/?b=82483&p=1

I can’t open, can you give Bole an exact link - I’ll look with pleasure)))

[icant007]

http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/index.html

This is Meltiukhov, Lost chance of Stalin. The Soviet Union and the struggle for Europe: 1939-1941.

I think you are already familiar with this)

[VS]

understandably)))

[VS]

Quote: Magog

That "it would be" stupid to assert, but the spacecraft was "sharpened" on actions outside its territory, and the enemy imposed a completely different story with his attack ... My father never tired of repeating during his lifetime: "Do not believe anyone who says that we are not ready war. We were ready! " Participant of the Second World War "from call to call". "Not long before the war, regular trips to the very border (with Romania) for the purpose of reconnaissance on the ground: where it is better to organize firing positions for artillery on the other side." "In the very first days, with battle, they seized a bridgehead on the other side of the border and held it until the order to withdraw was received." Here are just a couple of theses from the stories of my front-line soldier.

one nuance - we prepared according to the plans of the General Staff to attack in the event of a war, but not the first but in the ANSWER)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Map with intelligence from Army Group Center for the same period

what the Germans knew about tim WHAT forces of the Red Army are waiting for them - - this is generally laughter))
Do not puzzle -
see - http://liewar.ru/knigi-o-vojne/348-1941-god-uroki-i-vyvody.html - Appendix 10)))

We noticed - as soon as a MILITARY man comes to your articles, he laughs at your nonsense?))) Isn’t it time to think ??)))

[A1Lukno]

I noticed that when the kozinkin blizzard carries, then it is silently minus ....
Consequently, he is far from a true military man ...

[icant007]

Cons is not an indicator. Those who put pluses to the author apparently lack critical thinking.

The light of truth always finds its way with difficulty in the darkness of ignorance.

[cavl]

Nicely wrapped up about "critical thinking" and about "the light of truth" ...
Forgot to write more about your hysterical laugh ...

The truth, to some extent, was reflected in the articles of Eugene ...
Among critics, something is not a refutation of the facts in a numerical, so to speak, reflection. For example, since the fall of last year, you threatened to refute something there.
I participated in the discussion then and saw that everything was clarified by Eugene, and you wrote something unreasonable there ... And you won’t refute everything ... Can't you?

Now they ranked themselves, Kozinkin and Milchakov, as a proud constellation of the military, which everyone knows ... So tell me the lieutenant colonel that you discovered Evil. Maybe I also laugh, but not hysterically ...

For now I can only shake my head in bewilderment. Well, what are these three arrogant or stupid.
One of them, the great couch theorist, cannot figure out the cards. Well, he did not work with them in the service, but so verbose something is broadcasting stupid ... He does not need to read the article carefully ...

Another quotes only quotes. A sort of walking quote from Mao ... He constantly says that the location of the headquarters of the corps, armies and army groups is not important. It does not matter the presence of motorized corps of tank groups ...
How did he get such a thought in his head, he himself does not know. He cannot cite a quote from the memoirs of the military that these headquarters did not interest them.
Yes, none of the military commanders will say such stupidity and drunkenly .... And Kozinkin can. He writes not such nonsense in his science fiction ...

The third of the military couch’s couch thoughtfully broadcasts something there, but how does Kozinkin have no facts ... Few know ... Have you even found and read Sergei Chekunov’s two-volume?

The opinion of such a military is of no interest to the site. They should be in the service more interested in military affairs and the classics of military theory. And so they turned from the former military into an ugly trinity of sofa experts ... At which everyone laughs and do not accept their words ...
Former military who became unauthorized ...

[icant007]

Quote: cavl

At which everyone laughs and does not accept their words ...

Do you think that readers generously plus Eugene, very well versed in the topic?
If you didn’t notice from my comments, my claims to Eugene are not so much in the factology on which he relies, but on the conclusions he draws.

Yes, it’s hard for me to object to Golikov’s statement about 288-296 divisions. I honestly counted all the divisions in German sources and reached the same figure as that of Muller-Hillebrand, about 210 divisions. But neither I nor Eugene know which sources Golikov relied on. Perhaps he meant the additional armed forces of Finland and Romania. If you include them in the calculation, you get a similar figure.
And only Evgeny allows himself to draw the "correct" conclusions.

None of us can, neither Eugene, nor you, nor as you put it couch experts, clearly judge where there was a lack of intelligence data, and where there was misinformation.
No one will say that.
And only, you see, Eugene is sure that all the inaccuracy of intelligence is a consequence of German misinformation.

I am silent about the fact that he has data corruption.
For example, Belov's fake memories, to which he could not argue anything, but only sent me to hell.
Or the false message of Mars dated May 15, 1941.

Eugene to a certain extent, the continuer of the author’s case in Victoria about the first days of the war. I don’t know if they work together.
Well, she found a link to the memoirs of the division commander, who disappeared without 23.06.41.

The audience of such authors is a reader who does not understand the topic, and takes everything on faith.

What to say, the darkness of ignorance is thickening

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

Yes, it’s hard for me to object to Golikov’s statement about 288-296 divisions. I honestly counted all the divisions in German sources and reached the same figure as that of Muller-Hillebrand, about 210 divisions. But neither I nor Eugene know which sources Golikov relied on.

In this case, the discrepancy is associated with the methodology for assessing the military potential of Germany on June 22. Müller-Hillebrand calculates the actual number of divisions deployed on the eve of the war for the full state, i.e. what the military people say is "under the gun." Military intelligence materials must include not only those divisions that have already been deployed, but also those that will appear in the coming months, and which will be used to compensate for losses - this is required by the Operations Directorate so that they have the ability to make decisions taking into account the enemy's mobility reserve. Here is another scan of the document on how RU took into account the capabilities of Germany in 1939 (before the start of WWII), and even then the total potential was estimated at 180 divisions:

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

One of them, the great couch theorist, cannot figure out the cards. Well, he did not work with them in the service, but so verbose something is broadcasting stupid ... He does not need to read the article carefully ...

Well, what about the lieutenant colonel, it’s sad, but you have to haul you with a face, since you climbed to teach those who understand you more in military affairs.
So, the author presents a fragment of the map and writes:

As an example, below is a fragment of a German map with intelligence information about our troops.

The map is dated May 20, 1941, and there is not a single Wehrmacht unit on it — how can it be used as evidence that our intelligence has not been taken into account, especially since the map is not clear when it was drawn up and to whom it belongs. No way, but you won’t understand this, because you have not gone far from the author of the article, not to mention that there are no Wehrmacht parts on it, which is already suspicious for those who look at another map where these parts are plotted:

The two fragments of the German map below show that by the start of the war large headquarters of all levels moved closer to the border. The problem was that all our intelligence services did not record the movement of these headquarters.

So can you explain why such a difference in the design of the cards? Not only that, and these fragments do not carry information who made these cards, when and at what time the situation is plotted, and there is no data where they performed, which already says a lot. I do not exclude that it was compiled after the war for some memoirs - these two cards differ too much.
Well and further the author gives the third card with the words:

Later, when intelligence data became more complete, not only German divisions began to appear on the maps of our army headquarters headquarters and fronts of the General Staff, but their affiliation with the corps (armies) was also indicated. Famous locations of large German headquarters began to be applied to maps.

Moreover, this amateur cites the September map of the Reserve Front, and judges from it that before the war we had no cards with the situation. In this lie, you lieutenant colonel, believed that he said once again that your knowledge was not far removed from the knowledge of this dreamer, if only because the intelligence report of the intelligence chief of any level is PRESENTED with the applied situation, and this is a fact that amateurs do not know about. To disprove the lies of both of you, I present a simplified diagram of the deployment of German troops from the famous book, which was compiled on the basis of the map that was attached to Bulletin No. 5:

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

Those who put pluses to the author apparently lack critical thinking.

They have the mindset of housewives - the more colorful vows, the more they like the lie of this amateur.

Quote: icant007

The light of truth always finds its way with difficulty in the darkness of ignorance.

The most important thing is that professionals, reading his opuses, immediately see that the king is naked, and so that he does not drag him here, it is immediately clear that he is not at all in the subject. By the way, I studied a lot of different versions of why we suffered heavy losses in the first weeks of the war, but none of the researchers stated that it happened precisely because of the lack of information about the Wehrmacht in the general staff and in the headquarters of the districts. In general, the new version of the next dilettante in military affairs is so unique that I cannot find at least the predecessors of this nonsense to understand where he ripped it off from. I think you have correctly noted - we will soon come to new "discoveries" of this silk-operator, indicating that the intelligence did not open all the battalions of the Wehrmacht. We are waiting for the performance ...

[Navigator_50]

Wonderful loop ..
He makes you think! It becomes clear the level of military art and military construction of the Red Army and the reasons for the failure in 1941 ..
Intelligence worked the way it could .. And not the way it is written in the memoirs ..
The level of NGS, NPO is understandable. And so everything lay with the blood of the people. Stalin did not allow them to engage in combat training.
Now at work it is impossible to entrust the young specialist with work - he will fill up, and then he will say that he was not given, the initiative was constrained and, in general, he was innocent ..

[AsmyppoL]

Thank navigator 50

[VS]

Quote: Shturman_50

Wonderful loop ..
He makes you think! It becomes clear the level of military art and military construction of the Red Army and the reasons for the failure in 1941 ..
Intelligence worked the way it could .. And not the way it is written in the memoirs ..
The level of NGS, NPO is understandable. And so everything lay with the blood of the people. Stalin did not allow them to engage in combat training.
Now at work it is impossible to entrust the young specialist with work - he will fill up, and then he will say that he was not given, the initiative was constrained and, in general, he was innocent ..

yes rubbish this "cycle"))) a person hiding under an anonymous klikuha or does not understand or deliberately lies - carries nonsense about intelligence)))

[ccsr]

Quote: V.S.

yes rubbish this "cycle"))) a person hiding under an anonymous klikuha or does not understand or deliberately lies - carries nonsense about intelligence)))

Moreover, he lies in the arrogant, and when he is punished with facts, he immediately goes into unconsciousness. At first I used information from someone else's LJ, and when they dug it, it turned out that the author of the LJ texts does not use documents himself, but some dubious Czech source, not archives. So with maps now this is repeated - he takes some clippings, of unknown origin, where it is unknown who writes some text, and when you ask for a link to the source, he comes up with some kind of excuse, they say he will then "declassify", i.e. to. afraid of competitors. Laughter and only ...
But in general, everyone who has a military education has long understood that such a nonsense about intelligence can either be commissioned to write, or simply from illiteracy, which the author confirmed with his enchanting fabrications in the form of several articles.

[A1Lukno]

Yes, you do not have enough intelligence to try Evgeny ....
It was impossible to invent anything stupid to write about the cards of the intelligence chief .... You are not even able to read the materials of the article. These are maps of the General Staff, bast shoes ..... It is also written there .....
Went to school Malyavka

[ccsr]

Quote: A1Lukno

Yes, you do not have enough intelligence to try Evgeny ....

It doesn't take much effort to do this - just ask the source of his "knowledge" and find out where he got it from that Intelligence Report # 5 was the last of all intelligence reports on the eve of June 22nd. By the way, he got acquainted with it after I posted a scan of it from the book.

Quote: A1Lukno

It was impossible to invent anything stupid in order to write about the cards of the intelligence chief.

Have you ever seen one head of intelligence to talk about my stupidity? You are just an ordinary amateur in these matters, that's why you believe in everything. author's bowl of statues.

Quote: A1Lukno

These are the cards of the General Staff, bast shoes .....

Who told you that, wise guy, if there were no links to any maps?

Quote: A1Lukno

Well it's written right there.....

You are lying - on those cards that he cited there is not a single signature, and this already says everything to those who understand this.

Quote: A1Lukno

Went to school Malyavka

Don’t be nervous, clown, it’s better to ask links from this verbiage to the materials posted by him.

[aKtoR]

Of course, Mr. Milchakov is too self-confident, and such people are often stupid. They cannot see what is written under their nose. This is due to a lack of education and experience in handling German maps of the war period.
On the maps in the parts of the cycle, you can clearly see the designation corresponding to the "Operations Department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces"
And knowing this is not difficult to find the cards

[icant007]

Quote: aKtoR

This is due to a lack of education.

And you probably have an excess of education, flowing into swaggering and pride.

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

And you probably have an excess of education, flowing into swaggering and pride.

She is an ordinary liar who decided in such a cheap way to make a name for herself, but ran into the fact that she was repeatedly convicted of lies, and a complete lack of professional knowledge. Judge for yourself her enchanting statements, if she claims that on June 22 in the Moscow district air defense was to be raised before the war, although the Germans had no way to raid the capital at that time. And such pearls in her carriage and a small cart.

[cavl]

She is smart and looked through many documents. Unlike you.
How else can a teacher-level person speak with an elementary school student who is trying to prove something inarticulate!
For example, you have already written more than once about Evgeny’s lies about the words of General Belov.
But Eugene correctly pointed to the low level of your knowledge about the initial period of the war. At the beginning of the article (in the part where he wrote to you) there is a link to parts of the Victoria cycle, which lists all the statements of the divisional commander regarding General Pokrovsky’s questions that were near the border. And you not only did not look at the material from the link - this is not a nobleman’s business. I already know everything ...
But even when I wrote to you about the two-volume S.L. Chekunov You did not understand that you do not know much ...
The same self-confident person as Milchakov. Similar people are attracted to each other.
Well, if you do not want to leaf through hundreds of thousands of documents on the Memory of the People website, then read the series "Unexpected War ...", which contains almost all the information on the eve of the war according to documents and up to 70-80% of the memories of war veterans. You are not going to do this!
Only hysterical laughter ... It's a pity not for my low level of awareness ...

I personally read Victoria's cycle three times and now I am free to navigate in the materials and immediately see the stupidity of Eugene's opponents ... And most importantly, this kind of behavior of a know-it-all hurry is already common. I see that you wrote a question to Yevgeny about the village "Rymachi". You looked for it on the computer - it's easy to do. But to read a fragment in Boltunov's book is already too lazy ... And it says that on the eve of the war the radio post was relocated to the territory of KOVO. He had to return to the territory of the district (which had already become a front) only at the beginning of July 1941. And here it was necessary not to look for the mythical mistakes of Eugene, but simply to raise their awareness and level of information !!!

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

And you not only did not look at the material from the link - this is not a nobleman’s business. I already know everything ...

A few years before the publication of Chekunov’s book, I already studied the scanned answers to Pokrovsky’s questions, and there was nothing there that would fundamentally change my views.
And knowing in what circumstances they answered these questions, it’s clear to me, that’s why some didn’t answer at all, and many referred to forgetfulness. So what did you find there, along with Madame, that should have surprised me?

Quote: cavl

But even when I wrote to you about the two-volume S.L. Chekunov You did not understand that you do not know much ...
The same self-confident person as Milchakov.

We don’t even hide our surnames, but you, like a miserable coward, are afraid that those who served with you will laugh at your jumps, and you’re hiding under a nickname. I would admit honestly that they dodged classes on command training, for such a dense lieutenant colonel was difficult to find in my time.

Quote: cavl

I personally read Victoria’s cycle three times and now I am free to navigate in the materials and immediately see the stupidity of Eugene’s opponents ...

You are stupid in this case because you do not see that their conclusions contradict not only military science, but also common sense. Are you really such an ignoramus that you have never heard of the two positions of any headquarters from the compound and above? Are you really so illiterate that you don’t know that the district headquarters (groups) could disappear from the SDA for 7-10 days during the exercises, while all the services of the district headquarters continued to fulfill their duties? I don’t know where you got this dense, but only I get the impression that you yourself have never left the field.

Quote: cavl

I see that you wrote a question to Yevgeny about the village "Rymachi".

Do not fantasize - I don’t write anything to him at all, because he is a coward and is afraid to answer any question directly.

Quote: cavl

And it says that on the eve of the war, the radio station was relocated to the territory of KOVO. He had to return to the territory of the okrug (which had already become a front) only at the beginning of July 1941.

Do you even have the idea that intelligence units can be located not only in other districts, but even in other countries? Maybe you have enough of your ignorance to make fun of?

[ccsr]

Quote: aKtoR

On the maps in the parts of the cycle, you can clearly see the designation corresponding to the "Operations Department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces"
And knowing this is not difficult to find the cards

You’re lying, as always, because in the first place the maps are not completely presented, without indicating when they were drawn up and to whom they belonged. Secondly, the latest map was made a month before the start of the war, i.e. in May, and to judge her that our intelligence knew about the enemy on the eve of June 22 can only amateurs, like Madame. Moreover, in the operational department, each officer has cards, so it is important to know who the card belongs to - the head of the department or the dispatcher, whether it is working or prepared for the exercises. So learn the materiel, know-it-all - you have not gone far from the liar Eugene.

Quote: aKtoR

And knowing this is not difficult to find the cards

And why then are you and Eugene so cowardly hiding links to them?

[A1Lukno]

Of course rubbish, if he negates the profit of Kozinkin from his literary works ....
Of only a few hundred facts, Mr. Kozinkin cannot challenge a single one ....
Therefore: the dog barks, and the caravan goes ....

[ccsr]

Quote: A1Lukno

Of only a few hundred facts, Mr. Kozinkin cannot challenge a single one ....

This lie is easily refuted if you carefully read what this verbiage writes:

Insufficiently complete and unreliable RMs on the deployment of large German headquarters, probably, They are connected with counteracting the leak of information from the German command and carrying out mass misinformation of all possible sources of our intelligence.

Firstly, earlier it was impudently lying that precisely because of the disinformation of the Germans, our intelligence could not reveal the composition of German troops on the eve of the war. When he was caught in ignorance, he immediately began to use the word "PROBABLY", such as "high-likes" by analogy with the Skripal case, i.e. the author signed in the complete absence of facts that our intelligence believed the disinformation. And this is really so, because the composition of the German group was indicated absolutely accurately, with a discrepancy in the number of 1-2-3 divisions, according to various sources.
Secondly, because Since the author of the articles is an absolute layman in the field of intelligence, he does not understand that on the eve of the war many German headquarters were in permanent deployment centers, and in the places of their deployment before the war only operational groups of several officers could be located - this is a common practice for all armies of the world. And this is primarily due to the fact that before time does not reveal the secret deployment area of ​​the headquarters of the corps, army, army group or front. So to send agents to search for headquarters in peacetime it can only come to the head of an ignoramus, if only because the headquarters columns are too small, and do not have distinctive signs by which to judge their affiliation, and are well guarded.
I'm not even talking about the fact that the headquarters column of a large headquarters itself may consist of several dozen cars, and until a signal is received, Dortmund is generally in the place of permanent deployment, and does not move anywhere. So the author's delusional fabrications that the intelligence "probably" did not reveal something are based on his fantasies, which buy such amateurs as you.
For example, the author stated:

The absence of large headquarters at the border was likely to indicate that war was not expected in the near future. So they had to think in the higher echelons of spacecraft control.

On what basis does he assert this, if Stalin had a meeting on June 21, and as a result of which the Directive was issued? And the words, "they were obliged to think so" once again shows that this layman does not understand at all what the commanders of that time were thinking, if only because Timoshenko and Zhukov asked Stalin's permission long before June 21 to give permission for mobilization and de-deployment. parts of the Red Army. This is how deceitful researchers distort our military history, and many readers have noticed this.

[icant007]

Quote: ccsr

he immediately began to use the word "PROBABLY", like "high-likes" by analogy with the Skripal case, ie the author signed in the complete absence of facts that our intelligence believed the disinformation.

By the way, yes, I also noticed that the author began to treat his conclusions more carefully if you pay attention to his "probably")

What is already pleasing, maybe not all is lost.

Imagine how many articles one could write about all the same thing only with a "plus" sign - here our intelligence did not open it, it's a pity of course, and here I found it, and here, and here too. What is our intelligence fellow! With an accuracy of 1 division, she opened the German grouping. There are really inaccuracies in the structure, in the number of mobile connections - but there is a solid "4"!

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

By the way, yes, I also noticed that the author began to treat his conclusions more carefully if you pay attention to his "probably")

So he was taken so many times by the face for his illiterate lies, and he was afraid that he would be considered just a liar.

Quote: icant007

What is already pleasing, maybe not all is lost.

This is an order, and therefore incurable.

Quote: icant007

Imagine how many articles one could write about the same thing only with a "plus" - here our intelligence did not open it, it's a pity of course, but here it found it, here and here, too. What a fine fellow our intelligence! With an accuracy of 1 division, she opened the German grouping. There are really inaccuracies in the structure, in the number of mobile connections - but there is a solid "4"!

Of course, if you wish and carefully study the newly discovered materials, you can seriously analyze the intelligence of those years and make a competent analysis. But this requires basic knowledge, and the author of the article does not have it from the word "in general". That is why no matter how much he puffed up, nothing serious can come out of his clave except lies and speculation. The poor are those people who believe in his "research" and thus show themselves to be absolutely ignorant of the achievement of military intelligence on the eve of the war. I will only say this - judging by the fact that there are no serious complaints from all the participants in the war against Golikov, he organized the case at the right level, and our leadership had all the necessary materials about the enemy. Even now, studying open documents of those years, one wonders how they could have obtained such, knowing the level of forces and means of intelligence of that time, and this commands respect among professionals. Well, the opinion of various silk-workers hardly needs to be taken into account - in our country there are all the "experts" in football, medical treatment and now military affairs ...

[VS]

Quote: A1Lukno

Of course rubbish, if he negates the profit of Kozinkin from his literary works ....
Of only a few hundred facts, Mr. Kozinkin cannot challenge a single one ....
Therefore: the dog barks, and the caravan goes ....

Yes, go wherever you want))
I DO NOT ridicule this batan and CONCLUSIONS this ignoramus anonymous))) It’s nonsense that the Germans deceived the GS General and other intelligence of the Soviet Socialist Republic - it’s necessary to guess) and that’s rubbish because it’s not in the reports of the General Staff of the General Staff of the TG didn’t wait for the attack - this is generally complete nonsense)))

It happened that WE ridicule the ignoramus who is hiding behind a clique-click network?)) CONCLUSIONS !!)))

[icant007]

Quote: cavl

Well, if you do not want to leaf through hundreds of thousands of documents on the Memory of the People website, then read the series "Unexpected War ...", which contains almost all the information on the eve of the war according to documents and up to 70-80% of the memories of war veterans. You are not going to do this!

And you think I do not read, I read.
But I am not sure that the series "Unexpected War" is based solely on truthful sources.
The author refers, for example, to Colonel Grebnev

A.I. Grebnev (PribOVO, commander 374 joint venture 128 sd): “Nobody even thought about the war with Germany. We were generally very peaceful towards Germany. We considered her a good neighbor, loyally observing the non-aggression pact ... ”This opinion is not the only one ...

When he managed to publish his memoirs, if he went missing on June 23.06.41, XNUMX according to the Memory of the People. Question.

Perhaps of course I didn’t finish something somewhere. And Colonel Grebnev, resurrected, left the encirclement, I admit completely.


I do not see any crime in the issue of Rymachi. I asked, the author did not answer. Ccsr answered, for which many thanks to him! He dispelled my doubts.

And for some reason you have my every action - this is an occasion to gloat.

This clearly indicates the level of your maturity)
And on my "hysterical laughter" they clearly fixed themselves)))

Usually who shouts "stop the thief"?

[cavl]

Grebnev A.I. - commander of the 374th joint venture of the 128th SD. Volume 1, pp. 226-241.
For an attempt to slip away from the source again - minus.

If you think that I am gloating, then do not contact me with questions.
But if I see another blooper I can also express my opinion

[icant007]

Let’s already then link to Belov. Do you have an electronic version of the book, by the way?

I have neither one nor the other.
What is available to me, I study.

And as for the cons, you can at least get out of the cons)

[cavl]

I have a paper version.
This is the first book by the author Chekunov, and I decided to buy a fairly expensive two-volume. Then I saw a pirated electronic version. It has long been. Want to search for yourself.

It should be noted here that O. Yu. Kozinkin repeatedly advertised this book. It is from this advertisement that I know many readers who bought it. Despite his difficult relationship with Chekunov. For this I can say thanks to him.
But I have a negative attitude to Oleg Yuryevich

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

The author refers, for example, to Colonel Grebnev

Of course, such recollections of Colonel Grebnev are surprising if they are written by him, of course, and not literary, but this is what another front-line soldier writes, whose memoirs completely disagree with the opinion of this officer:
P.A. Golitsyn. Notes from the intelligence chief.
http://eugend.livejournal.com/56911.html

The regiment commander, Captain Gromov, periodically arranged general formations that resembled a drill review. Apparently, he wanted to see for himself what he had at a certain moment. The divisions were built on a small parade ground adjacent to the forest. After the command "at attention" Gromov came out of the grove, received the report and walked around the line. Several times in mid-June 1941, the regiment commander personally organized and conducted marches with the withdrawal of military equipment, weapons, and rear supplies. This usually began with an alarm, followed by a regiment exit to the assembly area and a 10-15 kilometer march. Thus, the command of the regiment sought in a short time to carry out combat coordination of the unit. About a week before the war, the units of our unit were given ammunition, some of which were placed in motorcycles, while the rest were loaded onto cars. In the units and in the whole regiment, the internal guard duty was strengthened. Tension was felt in everything. On June 22, 1941, at about 5-6 o’clock in the morning, our regiment was alerted and organized, as it was during training, went into the concentration area in a pine forest, located 7-10 km from a permanent location. Units occupied the areas allotted to them, the commanders organized observation, and rear cars stretched along the road going from the location to the regiment's concentration area. Everyone thought that this was another training session, but even before the official announcement of the start of the war, everyone saw a German plane with black crosses in the air, probably a scout who made circles over the concentration center of our regiment. Heart tremble - war.
About 10 hours on June 22, the company commander Tverdokhlebov announced the beginning of the warriors. There were no constructions. A meeting of platoon commanders took place, at which Tverdokhlebov set tasks for the protection and defense of the occupied area and disguise.

It turns out that just before the service began, tension was felt before June 22, and the colonel did not expect anything - something is hard to believe in this.

[VS]

Quote: cavl

rebnev A.I. - commander of the 374th joint venture of the 128th SD. Volume 1, pp. 226-241.
For an attempt to slip away from the source again - minus.

And other commanders wrote OTHER - as they were informed on June 17 that the attack would be on June 20 and they took measures)))

[icant007]

Well here, yes. We need to look at the total number of respondents and the proportion of those who answered in the spirit of Grebnev. It is no accident that Victoria stuck the memories of him in the initial part of the article so that the reader immediately formed the necessary attitude.
Also later, Evgeny refers to Belov in the introductory part of one of the articles and further develops his "idea" on this.

[VS]

Quote: icant007

Do you have an electronic version of the book, by the way?

I have neither one nor the other.
What is available to me, I study.

And as for the cons, you can at least get out of the cons)

want a Word version of the two-volume book "I am writing solely from memory .."?))

[email protected] ))) strike ...

[icant007]

I would be grateful, I will write now. From [email protected]