Intelligence gathering on the eve of the war

The following abbreviations are used in the article: GSh - General base, GraA - army group Spacecraft - Red Army, cd (kn) - cavalry division (regiment), md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), pd (pp) - infantry division (regiment), PT - anti-tank Goals Difference - intelligence materials, Ro - intelligence department of the military district, RU - Reconnaissance GSh KA, TGr - tank Group, td (mn) - tank division (regiment).

In the previous part materials on the concentration of German mobile forces near our border in 1940 and in early 1941 were examined. In the Republic of Moldova, which arrived by 26.4.41, it was said that there were 16 motorized and tank divisions at the border. This information was considered verified as has been confirmed by several sources.

In fact, there were only three German TDs near the border, of which only one began to arrive in the area of ​​the city of Poznan. There was not a single md at the border. In terms of the number of motorized and tank divisions, our intelligence was mistaken more than five times ... Why did such a gross mistake appear? Why did the leadership of the Soviet Union and the spacecraft not raise troops until June 22? In the article, the author will present his version, which will answer these and other questions.

Since May 1941, in the Republic of Uzbekistan it was believed that the German grouping concentrated against the USSR was deployed on the territory of East Prussia, former Poland, Romania (in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja), the Carpathian Ukraine (Hungary) and Slovakia.

The mobile forces in the German armed forces included motorized infantry, motorized rifle, tank and cavalry regiments, anti-tank divisions, motorcycle rifle, scooter and reconnaissance battalions. The author will limit himself to considering only materials related to the presence and deployment of infantry regiments, infantry regiments, infantry motorized regiments, infantry motorized regiments (hereinafter - megapixels), cd, army divisions, infantry motorized divisions (hereinafter - md).

The lack of some RM in the public domain

When discussing events that occurred on the eve of the war, the official point of view diligently does not consider some issues. For example, all published RM RUs, which describe in detail the number of divisions and places of their deployment near our border, are limited to the date of 31.5.41. After this date, there is no published RU information on the number and deployment of German troops. The next published RU report refers to the evening of June 22. This suggests that this information is hidden from the public.

The same thing happens with the published RM, received from the reconnaissance of the NKVD border troops. Until the end of May, there are published reports and information on the deployment of enemy troops, and since June 1941, only documents containing the specified information are absent from the published ones.

A similar situation can be observed with maps in the Russian-German project for digitizing captured German documents. At present, there are no maps in the public domain with the situation after May 27 and until 21.6.41. Therefore, there are documents whose contents should not be disclosed, and it was they that should determine the decisions taken by the leadership of the country and the spacecraft on the eve of the war. Let's try to figure out what may be hiding in the Republic of Moldova, which arrived in June 1941.

The absence of this information allows individual writers to falsify our historyusing fictional versions of them. A typical example is the version that the spacecraft’s top command did not specifically comply with Stalin’s instructions on the eve of the war, or they specifically carried out activities that should have led to the defeat of the spacecraft and, consequently, of our country.

The author decided to repeat some material that had previously been published in other articles. This is due to the fact that articles published on the Military Review website began to be posted on numerous other sites. Without repeating this material, it will be difficult for new readers to sort out the individual details. Therefore, readers who expect publication of links to maps of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, will be forced to wait until the fourth part is released.

Intelligence on the organization of German tank and motorized divisions

From 1939 to 1940, the German TD consisted of a tank brigade (two military regiments), an infantry brigade (two megapixels), an artillery regiment (two divisions), a battalion of reconnaissance, reconnaissance, motorcycle and sapper battalions, a communications battalion and other units.

MD consisted of three MPs, an artillery regiment, reconnaissance, motorcycle, combat engineer, anti-tank battalions, communications battalion and other units. Mp (md) SS did not belong to the Wehrmacht mobile forces. The figure shows the change in the number of compounds that could be attributed to the mobile forces. In the assessment, it was assumed that two brigades or three regiments are equal to one settlement division.

In the autumn of 1940, the formation of 10 new TDs for staffing began, with respect to which it was decided to remove one TP from existing compounds. After the reorganization, in all the military units there was one TP of two or three battalion personnel. A similar situation was observed during the formation of new MD. Since the end of 1940, in all md of the Wehrmacht, instead of three mp, two remained.

On 20.5.41, a report was prepared by the head of the Main Armored Directorate, which provides data that does not take into account changes in the structure of German tank and motorized divisions. The report was heard at a meeting of the Main Military Council of the SC on May 21. The co-rapporteurs were the chiefs of the RU and the Main Directorate of the Air Force.

From the presented figures it is seen that the RM did not correspond to reality. The leadership of the spacecraft fully trusted the RM, which came from intelligence. Therefore, one of the proposals of the report read: “... to bring in the future the organization of the TD to 9 tank battalions with a total number of tanks of up to 500 units.” Thus, it was proposed in the future to increase the number of tanks in our TD, so that it was not weaker than the German division.

However, the important advantage of the German TD was not the number of tanks, but the interaction of tanks, motorized infantry, artillery, reconnaissance, sapper units, supply and reinforcement units. The interaction of the division with aviation, but in the composition of the compound, the groups responsible for liaison with the Luftwaffe were not included.

Conducting operations over vast areas of Eastern Europe, taking into account the experience gained by the German command, required the formation of large motorized formations, including motorized corps, reinforcement units, tank repair, sapper and engineering units, communications and supply units. To control them in battle, the headquarters of the TGr were created, which were entrusted with the same tasks for the operational command of the troops, as with the headquarters of the field armies.

In the fall of 1940, our intelligence knew about the presence of up to 10 motorized corps in the Wehrmacht. At a meeting of the highest command personnel in December 1940, it was said about the use by the Wehrmacht in the war with Poland and in France from 3 to 5 mobile groups (TGr), but our reconnaissance could not establish the redeployment of such groups to the border. Also, it was not possible to find a concentration at the border of a single motorized corps. Therefore, on the eve of the war, the SC command had no idea of ​​the places of concentration of the enemy's mobile strike groupings: neither corps nor army.

As an example in article the German group in the area of ​​the city of Brest was considered. According to the RO of the ZAPOVO headquarters, on June 21, the presence of the 2nd TGr was not found near the border. The entire grouping consisted of three infantry divisions, two cavalry brigades, and up to two TP. Therefore, such a grouping did not pose a threat to the southern flank of the Western Military District.

Confirmation that the RU did not have any other information about the enemy troops in this direction is evidenced by the RU report at 20-00 on June 22: "Western Front: The groupings are confirmed: ... b) The grouping of troops in the Brest, Sedlets, Domachev area on the operational direction Brest - Kobrin, consisting of at least three infantry and one tank division ..." Therefore, in the operational reports of the General Staff (in two reports of June 22 and in the morning report of June 23), nothing dangerous was noted in this direction.

In fact, it was not intelligence that was bad, but our intelligence simply did not have sources of information in the German headquarters. We must pay tribute to the Germans: they turned out to be masters at disinformation, at lightning-fast and covert redeployment of their troops to the border. Much later, the right to the same skill passed to our command.

Concentration of German troops at our border

The absence of our sources of information in the German headquarters also confirms the significant discrepancies between the actual data and the RM on the number of German divisions in Germany and on the number of divisions concentrated on our border.

Intelligence also did not have reliable information about the presence of German large offensive groupings and their headquarters near the border (headquarters of the GRA, TGR and armies ), and headquarters of army and motorized corps.

Couldn't fix the situation and radio intelligence, parts of which were subordinate to the RO of military districts. With the use of radio intelligence data, the RM did not become more reliable neither in the RO, nor in the RU.

RM on the presence of the border of infantry units and formations

Previously, the author assessed the reliability of the RM with the actual data in terms of the correspondence of the numbers of pd and pp, which were focused PribOVO and ZAPOVOas well as against Cova.

Of the 51 infantry divisions concentrated against ZAPOVO and PribOVO, our intelligence knew exactly the numbers of the 43rd. At first glance, it seems that RMs are good. However, fourteen PDs with "exact" numbers did not exist by 22.6.41. Eight more divisions, which, according to the RM, were concentrated against the PribOVO and ZAPOVO, were actually located in completely different places: 5 divisions - in France, 2 - in Romania and one - against KOVO. Another division (14th Infantry Division) in the fall of 1940 was reorganized into the 14th MD and was located in Germany. It should be noted that the insignia of infantry and motorized troops are different.

The information on the numbers of the pd, concentrated against PribOVO and ZAPOVO, rechecked with the help of several sources, in more than 50% of cases turned out to be unreliable.

The same happens with the "exact" numbers of the md, which were concentrated against KOVO. Of the 25 divisions with numbers known to our reconnaissance, 22 did not exist as of June 10nd. Three divisions were actually in other places: one in the GRA "Sever" reserve, one in the Balkans and one in France. Another (18th Infantry Division) in the fall of 1940 was reorganized into the 18th Infantry Division and was located in Germany.

Intelligence regularly monitored the presence of divisions with "accurate" numbers at the points of deployment where they were originally discovered, and cross-checked this information. The information was confirmed, but in fact there were no such divisions in the area or they did not even exist ... How could this be? ..

The site "Electronic exhibition of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. The first day of the war" there is a map with the position of the ZAPOVO troops and the enemy as of June 21. This map began to be prepared after the outbreak of the war, probably to justify the surprise of the German attack. On the map, a lot of German divisions and regiments on June 21 are deployed in the same areas in which they were recorded by our intelligence by May 31. Some of the divisions and regiments by June 21 simply disappeared ...

Interestingly, out of the missing nine units, six were never in the areas in which they were discovered and tracked by intelligence. The same thing happened with the PP: out of the missing 52 regiments, 37 were never in the zone of responsibility of the ZAPOVO and PribOVO.

The above regiments and divisions could regularly represent certain groups of military personnel in front of our intelligence. They spread rumors among the local population, they were seen with insignia of fictitious military units, and when the intensive movement of troops to the border began, the need for these blanks disappeared, and they disappeared ...

Methods for obtaining RM by our intelligence

Before the war, our intelligence services collected information at the strategic, operational-tactical and tactical levels. Information was collected on the military-economic potential of Germany and its allies. Any information about Germany's plans was collected in diplomatic circles, in conversations with the military who belonged to the highest echelons of power in different countries.

There were isolated scouts in the German headquarters and in the headquarters of Germany's allies. However, as shown above, these sources could not get reliable information about the structure of German divisions and about their redeployment to the border.

There were numerous sources of information living on the territory of Germany and its allies, on the territory of occupied Poland. Border guards, reconnaissance of artillery units, and reconnaissance aircraft of the spacecraft observed the adjacent territory. Repeated flights of Soviet aircraft over the border territory of Germany were noted. Every day, at least twice a day, aircraft of the border troops flew along the border, whose task was also to monitor the movements of troops in the adjacent territory.

They tried to get information from Soviet employees traveling on the Reich railways, from smugglers and defectors. According to the memoirs of P. A. Sudoplatov, our counterintelligence officers knew that among the deserters there were many Abwehr agents. Therefore, their testimony could not be particularly trusted. However, RM's analysis showed that the testimony of the defectors contained a lot of reliable information.

The fact that war with the USSR is inevitable and will begin in June, not many people knew in Germany itself. For example, in the Ministry of Propaganda, only Goebbels knew about this. Numerous German officials were exposed to misinformation that was supposedly true but contradictory. These officials believed they had learned reliable gossip ...

Information came either about an attack on Ukraine alone, or about setting conditions under which the war with the USSR would not start, or about the fact that Britain would be defeated first, and only then the Soviet Union. All these officials at different levels shared this information, which reached our leadership through intelligence officers located in many countries. The information received did not contain an unambiguous answer about the inevitable start of the war on June 15-22. When reliable information about the beginning of the war began to arrive in 1-3 days, they did not believe her because of the inertia of thinking and the inertia of the receipt of information from border regions. In addition, this information contradicted the vision of the SC leadership on the tactics of warfare by the German command.

Since our scouts were not in the German headquarters, the main methods of obtaining information about the deployment of enemy troops near the border were visual observation (for traffic, the movement of columns, for insignia of German military personnel, etc.) and collecting information from the local population or tracking rumors ... Consider two examples with the mention in the RM of information about the insignia on the shoulder straps of German servicemen. The first is a message from Arnold (30.5.41). The report also talks about ways to obtain RM through visual observation and rumor.

Special message of the NKGB BSSR People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR Merkulov on the military mobilization preparations of the Germans (10.5.41): "On April 25, the deployment of an infantry unit was marked in Terespol, the soldiers of which wear the sign" No. 11 and 14 "on their collar tabs ..."

Terespol is located almost at the border near the city of Brest. On the map of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces from 23.4.41 to 27.5.41, units of the 1st cd are stationed in this area. There are no servicemen in this division who could wear insignia on their shoulder straps. «11» or «14»... Somewhat to the side is the 131st front-line servicemen, who also could not wear the indicated signs.

On April 12, the deployment of units of the 292nd Infantry Division is noted in Sedlec, but the servicemen of this division could only wear the signs "292", "507", "508" and "509". Thus, reconnaissance recorded the presence of an infantry unit, which could not be in the area.

There is a lot of information about signs on shoulder straps in RM. Here are some of them:

"Established: soldiers and officers with numbers 6, 17, 80 ..."
“According to the violator of the state border ... in the second half of April 1941, 48 tonnage units (75-80 tanks) arrived in the city of Johaninsburg, the tanks were armed with 105 mm artillery. Up to two regiments of artillery (60-65 guns) horse-drawn ... Most of the soldiers have numbers 76 on their shoulder straps ... "

“[29.5.41] ... Data on the deployment of 1, 56, 66, 98 and 531 points in Warsaw # 711 received from shoulder straps. There are no numbers on the shoulder straps - they were cut off, but the prints remained on them. He saw such soldiers with numbers in the ranks from the company, passing through the city.

17 pp in Vyshkov was also identified by the disputed numbers, in addition, he specified in conversations with the population ...

50 pp was established in conversations with the population, and No. 711 himself saw soldiers with prints on their shoulder straps before the company: "50" ...

537 pp has not yet cut off the numbers on uniform and continues to wear them, in addition, the whole Island knows about him that he arrived from the Greek front ... ”

It is interesting that the 537th pp will be formed only in 1942 and, of course, he could not participate in the Greek campaign. We came across one example of German misinformation using insignia and rumors spread through the local population. Somewhere around June 8–9, 1941, intelligence agencies began to doubt numerous information based on the open wearing of uniforms on shoulder straps by German military personnel.

“15.6.41 ... Data on the deployment of Warsaw 531 pp, 1 and 14 pp are trustworthy ...
The deployment of the parts of Warsaw marked on shoulder straps and conversations of local residents is doubtful and requires careful verification ... ”

“According to the data on 20.6.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX ... According to the latest verified data, it is known that ordinary, non-commissioned officers and officers of the entire army are strictly forbidden to wear uniforms or divulge the valid numbers of units and formations ..."

It turns out that until the beginning of June in the Republic of Uzbekistan they believed that the German command was so short-sighted that it was not aware of the determination of the deployment of their units and formations by their insignia.

Now we know that after the end of the war in Poland with the aim of masking the names of field armies and GRA, the vast majority of them changed their names. Therefore, it is unbelievable that the German command missed such an obvious intelligence sign as the presence of true signs on uniform. After all, hiding them is quite simple: it is enough to put on cloaks from uniform cloth on shoulder straps, which was acceptable, but for some reason this was not done ...

RM on SS divisions

In pre-war RM there is little information about SS divisions. Of course, exotic information like "68th SS Tank Regiment". A regiment with such a number was not in the SS units, nor in the tank troops of the Wehrmacht.

The RU report dated 26.4.41 refers to the presence in the German armed forces: "... SS divisions - 18 (of which up to 10 motorized) ..." Similar information is available in the RU report dated 15.6.41 (with the situation on 1.6.41): "... SS divisions - 18 ...".

By June 22, the border had up to 4,3 SS divisions, but in the RM there was no information about any of them. Although the SS divisions "Dead Head", "Reich" and the regiment "Great Germany" arrived at the border in early June. Only they were not found ... This is strange, because the shape of the SS in the insignia differs from the shape of the Wehrmacht.

Perhaps this was due to strict observance of the rules and norms of the regime of secrecy by SS troops or the concealment of their insignia. The only mention of SS divisions was in a message from Arnold dated 30.5.41 to the Zapovo RO:

On the basis of information obtained from two sources: 1) an employee of the county government in Mlawa, who is constantly in the midst of the German military; 2) the officers of the former Polish army, having contact with the Germans, the Germans concentrated in the vicinity of Suwalki 2 selective armored divisions of the SS detachments, which should strike at Kovno, Vilno and Grodno, as well as 2 armored divisions of the same detachments in the vicinity of Peremyshl, and their direction to Lviv, Kiev…

Information was based only on rumors. Visually, none of these divisions or military personnel were seen. And of course "Selected armored divisions of SS units" in the armed forces of Germany did not exist. In the area of ​​Peremyshl there were also neither SS divisions nor so on. Therefore, the issue of SS divisions in the Przemysl region was never considered again.

The information from the Arnold message was included in the report of the headquarters of ZapOVO from 4.6.41: “During the second half of May, the Germans increased their group of forces by 2-3 infantry units, two SS armored divisions ... SS divisions - in Suwalki (data require verification) ...” The report was sent on June 6 to subordinate armies, in RU and in Pribovo. The author was unable to find information on whether such reports were sent or not sent from ZAPOVO to KOVO.

15.6.41 RU issues Summary No. 5 (in the West), which also includes the information: “There are allegedly two SS armored divisions in the Suwalki region (data require verification) ...” Regarding this information, it is twice specified that it may be erroneous: "Supposedly" и “Data needs verification”.

Since the data may be false, in the June 15 report the indicated SS armored divisions are not taken into account in the number of troops opposing PribOVO and ZAPOVO. On May 15, according to intelligence, there were 23 ... 24 and 30 divisions, respectively, against the troops of PribOVO and ZAPOVO, respectively. The same number of divisions against these districts remained in the June 15 report.

Reports from ZAPOVO from June 4 and from RU from June 15 arrived at the headquarters of PribOVO. However, in the RO reports of the headquarters of PribOV dated June 18 and 21, there is no mention of these SS armored divisions. Consequently, this information was not trusted at the headquarters of PribOVO.

The summary of RO Pribovo speaks only of the only TD (20th), which has long been listed against the troops of the district:

On 17.6.41 against Pribovo in the band: on the left - Suwalki, Likk, Allenstein and in depth - Koenigsberg, Allenstein it was established: ... armored divisions - 1, tp - 5 and up to nine separate tank battalions - no less than ...

In total, up to 4,5 tank divisions were counted against PribOVO.

They did not find in RO Pribovo and RU information about the arrival of two TD SSs believable. Supporting information on the arrival of these divisions was not received until the outbreak of the war. On June 21, information on the SS armored divisions was no longer included in the prepared RO ZAPOVO report “On the Grouping of German Forces on 20.6.41”, because this information could not be confirmed or disproved.

Our intelligence is not to blame for this, because Germans simply blocked this area and civilians could not get there:

The German authorities closed the markets in Suwalki, i.e. entry into the city, to the bazaar is prohibited. All private shops are closed, restaurants are also closed, except for those serving German military units ...
The German command, together with the city government, issued an order that prohibits entry and entry into the forest to the south and north-east of Suwalki. All persons detained in the forest and not living in the area are to be executed as spies ...

It is possible that similar measures were taken in all places of concentration of mobile groups. This may explain the fact of non-disclosure of these groups.

On the evening of June 21, a new report on the grouping of German troops is being prepared at the ZapOVO headquarters RO. Since ZAPOVO intelligence detected a massive movement of German troops to the border, and in the evening discovered their return to their original positions near the border, the report probably noted the presence of SS divisions for safety reasons: “Presumably two SS divisions”.

There were no tank or motorized divisions on the Suvalkinsky ledge at least until the evening of June 19. This can be seen from fragments of maps of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht. The attacks from the Suvalkinsky ledge should have been unexpected and the German command did not want to alert the command of the spacecraft in advance. Therefore, there were no motorized and tank troops on the ledge until June 20. On June 22, only the only part of the SS (part of the connection) is noted in this area - “SS Verb.”.

On the map with the situation on June 21, which is being prepared at the headquarters of the Western Front after the outbreak of war, the mention of two SS armored divisions has a question mark, and in another inscription the word “presumably ". Even after the outbreak of war, the headquarters of the Western Front did not consider this information reliable.

Below is a fragment of a similar map, which was prepared after the outbreak of war at the headquarters of the North-Western Front. It also shows that on June 21 on the Suvalka ledge, according to intelligence from the mobile forces, there were only two md, two infantry regiments, and a tank battalion.

In accordance with the first operational report of the General Staff from the Suvalkinsky ledge, only one strike is made in the composition of 3-4 front and 500 tanks. In the evening GS report, the number of APs advancing from the Suvalkinsky ledge increases to 3-4.

Since a large strike group unexpectedly appeared on the ledge, it was necessary to somehow explain the appearance of tank divisions there. By evening, a report from ZAPOVO dated June 21 stating the availability of the TD SS was received in RU: “Presumably two SS divisions”. The phrase about the SS tank divisions was inserted into the RU report on 20-00 on June 22. Just decided not to mention the word "Supposedly"... In the report of the RU, another TD appeared in the Letzen-Lyk-Avgustov area, operating from the road in the direction of Grodno.

Interestingly, our intelligence has no information about the presence of tank divisions on the Suvalka salient or in the Letzen-Lyk-Avgustov area on the evening of June 21. The summary of RO ZAPOVO says:

The grouping of the German army on 21.6.41 is determined:
1. East Prussian direction. Within the borders on the right - Suwalki, Heilsberg; left - Shuchin, Naydenburg: the headquarters of the 9th Army Allenstein, four headquarters of the army corps - Elk (Lykk), Letzen, Ortelsburg, Allenstein; nine headquarters of infantry divisions - Seyny, Bryzgel, Suwalki, Oletsko (Troyburg, Margrabovo), Elk (Lykk), Aris and in the depths - Allenstein, Lyubava (Lebau), Lidzbark; up to two infantry divisions, two motorized divisions (PribOVO data), ten artillery regiments (up to two heavy artillery regiments); presumably two SS divisions, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, up to four CP ...

On the fragment of the map with the situation for June 22, the zone indicated in item 1 of the above summary is indicated.

No full-fledged TD was found in the PribOVO area of ​​responsibility: north of the Suwalki - Helsberg line. The 3rd TGr turned out to be undetected by the intelligence services of PribOVO, ZAPOVO and RU. The same as the 2nd TGr ...

The lack of information about the presence of a strike group in the form of the 3rd TGr is confirmed by the recollections of the chief of staff of the 3rd Army of the ZAPOVO General A.K. Kondratyev:

«20.6.41 [According to undercover information. - Approx. ed.] in East Prussia and, in particular, in the Lykk region, the Germans are concentrating large forces.

On the Lykk-Graevo direction, up to 35000-40000 German soldiers are allegedly concentrated. He ordered the immediate transfer of this data to the headquarters of the district, on the establishment of surveillance of the state border.
New divisions are being pulled up from our rear to the state border. The 85th Rifle Division comes to us with Major General Bandovsky. The 17th Rifle Division, which I met on the march on 16.6, was moving, the 37th Rifle Division moved from Vitebsk and Lepel, and the headquarters of the 21st Rifle Division - from Vitebsk.
What does this all mean ???
Yes, apparently, the clouds are gathering, serious days are approaching!
21.6.41 ... Why, however, there are no instructions on the command line? ..
Recently, during my report to Pavlov, I asked him what to do with the families of the command personnel in case of any complications.
Oh, what a question I was! .. “Do you know that I have 6 tank corps at the ready ?! I forbid not only talking, but also thinking about evacuation! "
“I'm listening,” I replied, but the thought remains in my head: are we too arrogant ?!

The 3rd Army is the right-flank army of the ZAPOVO. The command of this army should be greatly concerned about a possible strike by a mechanized group from the side of the Suvalka salient. However, General A.K. Kondratyev writes only about the concentration of 35000-40000 people. Apparently, these are the PDs, which are mentioned in the latest peace report of the RO ZAPOVO, which will be sent to addressees at 15-00 on June 22.

In the zone of the 3rd Army, a possible increase in infantry formations near the border was recorded. But it was not supposed to frighten the commander of the ZAPOVO, because intelligence did not tell him the main thing: about the completion of the concentration of two tank groups on the flanks of his district ...

The situation on the Suvalka ledge did not cause concern among the command of the spacecraft. When the command of the ZAPOVO sent an encrypted message to Moscow about the continuous movement of the columns towards the ledge, probably few people in Moscow believed it ... But they did not believe this information because, according to intelligence, neither the PribOVO nor the ZapOVO had so many tank divisions. And numerous echelons with tanks did not move from Germany to East Prussia and to former Poland ... In addition, each TD had about 2900 vehicles. If the reconnaissance at the very least found something on the TP, but such a huge number of cars on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland did not pass through the Republic of Moldova ... Therefore, the strike from the Suwalki salient turned out to be unexpected for the command of the spacecraft, PribOVO and ZapOVO ...

To be continued ...

Comments

[polpot]

Thanks, very interesting, we look forward to continuing.

[Bar1]

The author continues to insist that the reconnaissance DID NOT detect the accumulation of tanks near our borders on the eve of the war; therefore, there was no need to bring the troops to combat readiness.
For now, let's focus only on this fact. For a start, we can recall thin. film War in the West 90g. The film is rather disgusting, the scenes of repression of the commanders of the Red Army are stuck out in the foreground. Among others there is such a scene - the interrogation of army commander Pavlov. He said that yes, he deliberately distorted intelligence information downward in order to calm the high command, the General Staff and Stalin, who unconditionally believed in a non-aggression pact; if this is true, then it is symbolic.

watch from 3h 30min.

[media = https: //ok.ru/video/1681987473738]

I do not have reports of the RU army and other types of reconnaissance, I proceed only from a general analysis of the situation for that period, and therefore, even having distorted data on the underestimated numbers of troops on the German. the border and even without noticing the accumulations on the border of the masses of tanks, but having only data on the accumulations of infantry armies, it is already POSSIBLE TO DRAW a CONCLUSION that the concentration of troops was assembled specifically for the invasion, and not for playing soldiers, and the lack of reliable information about the tank masses says that these data are not reliable. Therefore, the carelessness of the political leadership of the USSR, which the author hints at, cannot correspond to reality.
Germany CONCENTRATED troops on our borders and the date of the Summer Equinox on June 22 was quite suitable for the invasion - the political leadership of the USSR could not but understand this. And therefore it could not remain idle and not take adequate measures. But measures were not taken, who is to blame for this? I believe, following some researchers, the generals and the general staff.
And therefore there is even no need to bring a heap of documents, where everything is already clear.

[Doctor]

Among others there is such a scene - the interrogation of the commander of the army Pavlov. He said that yes, he deliberately distorted intelligence information downward in order to calm the high command, the General Staff and Stalin, who unconditionally believed in the non-aggression pact. If this is true, then this is symbolic.

There is no such thing in the interrogation records. He recognizes only criminal negligence, and the traitors, in his opinion, sit at the top.

 Show / Hide text

... Thus, I plead guilty:

1. The fact that due to my inaction I committed crimes that led to the defeat of the Western Front and heavy losses in people and equipment, as well as to a breakthrough of the front, which jeopardized the further unfolding of the war.

Question: All of your treasonous actions that you have shown are not the result of complacency, but of deliberate betrayal. As a participant in an anti-Soviet conspiracy, you carried out wrecking work in the district, knowing about its consequences in the upcoming war with Germany. We invite you to tell the truth about your organized betrayal - the system that you created among your subordinates.

Answer: I did not receive a task from anyone to open the Western Front, but my criminal inaction created a certain group of command, political and staff personnel, which worked in unison with me. So, for example, the chief of staff of Klimovskikh did not fulfill his direct duties of checking how my orders were executed. ....

Question: You again talk about the treacherous actions of individuals. You are required to talk about the intent of these actions. You, as a conspirator, deliberately opened the front to the enemy, the enemy knew your entire deployment and plans of action, once again we suggest that you tell the investigators about this now.

Answer: What happened on the Western Front makes me be convinced of a great betrayal in the Brest direction. I do not know this traitor, but the enemy calculated the blow exactly in the place where there were no concrete points and where the Bug River was most weakly covered. I repeat that I deliberately did not open the front to the enemy. The breakthrough of the Germans was due to my inactivity and failure to comply with the instructions of the Central Committee on constant mobilization readiness.

True, the protocol of July 21 is still classified, maybe there.

[AsmyppoL]

It is strange that Benikovich Arsen does not know the most elementary: how the RM was exchanged between different departments ... Victoria wrote about this in the most detailed way in the series "Unexpected War ..." They also considered how information from border guards got into the reports of the General Staff of the General Staff of the KA. You just have to read more to provide an authoritative opinion ...

The first way of receiving information in RU is through the system of intelligence agencies of the military district, including the receipt of data from radio intelligence units.

The second way is the receipt of information from military attaches and agents of the RU.

The third path (from the spring of 1941) is from the territorial bodies of the NKGB to the center and from the intelligence agents of the NKGB. Everything related to troops and their transportation was combined into a single report and sent to RU through the People's Commissar of Defense. At the same time, regularly at least twice a month (there is data, which happened more often), the NKGB fueled the RC General Staff of the KA to assess the reliability of the RM received from the NKGB. At the same time, the NKGB sent a similar document (the author does not know whether it was the same document or different ones) to Stalin, Molotov, Beria ...

The fourth way is from the intelligence of the border troops of the NKVD. Through the headquarters of the border districts, reports came to Maslennikov and further to Beria. Reports from the NKVD were sent to the RC General Staff of the KA and also to Stalin, Molotov. Whether they were on their way to the NKGB is unknown to the author ...

Thus, there was a system of cross-checking of RM between different departments. At the same time, the RU periodically refueled, initially in the NKVD, and later in the NKGB, about rechecking the RM about large headquarters and deployment from divisions and higher with the help of sources of other special services

Therefore, to claim that Pavlov underestimated something there is simply to show that a person does not fully understand the problem ...

We looked at vertical ties between intelligence services with horizontal communications at the very top, cross-controlled by Stalin himself. Let me remind you that Stalin was the only one who received intelligence reports in two copies and I think he carefully calculated everything.

Someone may think that he sent the second copy to Hitler or played tic-tac-toe on the back. This is according to their level of awareness ...

[AsmyppoL]

But besides vertical ties, there were also horizontal ones. Division commanders received information from border guards at their own level. They also received ascending information from the intelligence agencies of the border guards at the headquarters of corps, armies and military districts. Hundreds of memoirs have been written about this, and there are documents confirming this statement of mine.

The headquarters of the military district received information, including overseas sources, a survey of deserters of the German army, smugglers, residents with relatives in the adjacent territory and from border aviation.

Intelligence reports, for example ZAPOVO, were sent to the PribOVO headquarters, possibly to the KOVO headquarters and to the RC General Staff of the KA. Thus, at all levels there was an exchange of intelligence information between different departments. Therefore, even if Pavlov wanted it, he could not hide the concentration of German troops at the border. In addition, the same situation was observed in the PribOVO (where the 3rd and 4th tank groups were not found), in the KOVO (where the 1st tank group was not found) and in the OdVO (where, on the contrary, a large mechanized group was found in Romania, numbering up to 15 motorized and tank divisions - almost two full-fledged tank groups!) This is not counting the mechanized troops of Romania and Hungary (according to intelligence, there were up to two motorized brigades in Romania, and in Hungary - 1-2 tank divisions).

It is often written that the intelligence data of the military and border guards were different. This is how people who do not fully understand the problem can reason. Earlier in my articles, I showed that the intelligence data of the border troops overestimated the number of German troops in comparison with the RU. They overestimated when these troops were not actually there. And when it was closer to the beginning of the war, the data of these two departments turned out to be all close.

[AsmyppoL]

A concrete example can be seen in the RM of the intelligence department of the PribOVO headquarters. In the summary of June 18, with the situation on the 17th, nothing is said about different data from border guards and army intelligence agencies. Since they exchanged information with each other, it can be assumed that there was no difference in information.

On June 21, a document is being prepared "Information on the grouping of forces and means of German troops in East Prussia by 18-00 on 21.6.41." Do you know what is the difference between information from border guards and military intelligence officers?
Here's what: "For the Klaipeda grouping, two regiments established by the Border Troops Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but not confirmed by our data, were not taken into account."
The difference in information from different departments 10 hours before the start of the war was in two regiments, information on which has not yet been confirmed by military intelligence officers ...

In about two hours, a report from the intelligence department is being prepared: "The intelligence report
headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District No. 02 of June 22, 1941 on the grouping of enemy forces by 20 o'clock on June 21, 1941 "

The difference between RM is as follows: "b) according to the 105th border detachment in Klaipeda, the headquarters of the 61st infantry division is noted, in the forest (7220) - up to an infantry battalion and a cavalry squadron, in the forest (7218) - up to a battalion of tanks with artillery, in the forest (7416) - up to two battalions of tanks (data must be verified).
Note. Our intelligence data the headquarters of the 61st Infantry Division in Klaipeda was not marked. "

The Germans are massively withdrawing troops to the border (to their initial positions before the offensive - they will go directly to the border only somewhere around or after midnight). And the difference between these border guards and military intelligence officers is the movement of the headquarters of the 61st Infantry Division, an infantry battalion, a cavalry squadron and three battalions of tanks ...

[Bar1]

The narrow-mindedness of rezunasuvorov, the author of this libel, makes you think of only one thing, about purposeful misinformation on the forum, so you shouldn't attach serious importance to these articles.

[Bar1]

topvo leadership in its repertoire, soak for the glory of ideology, but in this case, the author is against Stalin and his policies. Yes, you can't understand which side of the topvo, however, on the side of entropy.

[icant007]

The author has a prolonged attack of graphomania. He straddled the topic and constantly tries:

Penknife, penknife
Penknife, penknife
Penknife, penknife ...

and so on in a cycle from 1 to infinity ...

[ccsr]

Quote: Bar1

the author continues to insist that the reconnaissance DID NOT detect the accumulation of tanks near our borders on the eve of the war.

The author spreads this lie constantly and at the same time does not shun outright lies, as he did in previous articles:

AsmyppoL (Eugene) As usual, a completely incompetent opinion. According to Mr. Milchakov, the GABTU has its own intelligence, which delivers information about the German tank forces on its own and without involving the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft ... Well, this is the same as according to the intelligence report of the Republic of Uzbekistan on June 22.

Due to his lack of literacy, the author of the article does not know that the head of the GABTU does not have the right to demand anything from intelligence materials from the RU, because F. Golikov is not subordinate to him and he only carried out orders of the People's Commissar and the National General Staff. That is why at the end of the report, the head of the GABTU asks the People's Commissar to instruct Golikov to provide accurate data. And the materials that Fedorenko used have nothing to do with intelligence materials, and are most likely the personal opinion of the author of the report or those who prepared it on the basis of 1940 data. By the way, the author avoided answering why he slipped a copy of the report without a number, while the original copy at number six was returned to the GABTU, and how these two reports coincide. I do not exclude that they are different and all the nonsense that the author is talking about here was not in the report at the military council.

AsmyppoL (Eugene) The Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft was a co-rapporteur of the said Report. It is indicated in the protocol of the GVS of the spacecraft. I can also easily answer the rest of the questions, but after your tearful apology. I do not want to communicate with a person who offends me and does not have the proper knowledge, moreover ...

This is a lie, because F. Golikov was not any co-speaker of Fedorenko, since he prepared a report on his views on new means of struggle, and not an extended report on the views of the GABTU - even here the author managed to lie. If we discard the verbal husk, then the dreamer Evgeny could not intelligibly explain where the copy without the number came from and where the 6th copy of Fedorenko's report got to, because it could be fundamentally different from what is now posted.

AsmyppoL (Eugene) You didn’t know where this army was going from April 26, 1941 to June 9-11. Historians Isaev and Timin told you and Martirosyan about this.

Isaev and Timin can say anything, but the opinion of I.P. Makara - head of the department of history of wars and military art of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, major general, candidate of historical sciences refutes them:
“... A very important decision was made to move the troops of the second strategic echelon - the reserve armies of the High Command. The formation of this echelon in the Western theater of operations began on May 13, 1941, when, with the permission of I.V. Stalin, the General Staff issued orders to move the four armies formed in the internal districts: the 22nd - from the Ural military district to the Velikiye Luki region, the 21st - from the Volga military district to the Gomel region, the 19th - from the North Caucasian military district to the area of ​​Belaya Tserkov and the 16th - from the Trans-Baikal Military District to the Proskurov area. The 25th Rifle Corps from the Kharkov Military District, which was transferred to the subordination of the 19th Army, was also transferred to the west. The transfer of troops was planned with the expectation of the completion of concentration in the areas outlined by operational plans, in the period from June 1 to July 10, 1941. "

AsmyppoL (Eugene) In intelligence reports, it is believed that the German tank division consists of two tank regiments.

The author did not support this lie - there is not a single reference to the intelligence report, and it is also unclear who it is "considered" because the level of knowledge of the intelligence officer and the level of knowledge of the head of the intelligence department are too different.

[icant007]

Quote: AsmyppoL

15 motorized and tank divisions - almost two full-fledged tank groups!) This is not counting the mechanized troops of Romania and Hungary (according to intelligence in Rum

And your Cavl thinks that one and a half)))

Romania is your favorite horse. If it was not there, it would have to be invented.

Yes, no one has been arguing about Romania for a long time, not even me)

Why repeat this in 30 articles?

[AsmyppoL]

In any case, I have something to say. I have something to rely on in my articles with specific data from intelligence materials. I can find materials on the internet and found them. I have learned and now I can double-check the information using different sources. Thousands of views show that the topic is interesting for those who want to understand. There are much fewer pluses ...
Well, specifically, you cannot dispute anything, you only post comments that try to cast a shadow ... So why should I pay attention to you? ... Readers already see who is doing defamation on request ...

[icant007]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Readers can already see who is doing the slandering by order ...

Eh, if I had a customer really)

But you judge by yourself.

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

But you judge by yourself.

You correctly noted this side of the "creativity" of this figure, who has been slandering military intelligence for a long time, and at the same time he has no idea what it is. There is a fundamental work prepared by the GRU General Staff for the 200th anniversary of Russian military intelligence, where this is a detailed analysis of everything. what is happening not only on the eve of the war, but also during the Great Patriotic War. And our "intelligence specialist" is injecting misinformation on a VO forum like this:

AsmyppoL (Eugene) In the same period, the district school of scouts was thrown completely into the territory of Iran.

An enchanting lie, because no "district schools of scouts" existed, and besides, it is generally impossible to completely abandon such a "school", if only because there is a permanent staff in the training units that teaches, but there is a variable one, which only after passing the course, can be directed for further action.
Here is the cover of the book, which describes in detail many reports and intelligence materials of the pre-war period, which refute the amateurish fabrications of the author of these articles.

[media=http://s018.radikal.ru/i503/1702/41/288502f8a871.jpg]

[AsmyppoL]

You're lying again. There were intelligence schools in the districts. And the cadet in Iran met with the Instructor.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

There were intelligence schools in the districts. And the cadet in Iran met with the Instructor.

The author of the article cannot confirm his lies, and he can only dodge, because he was once again caught in a lie.

[Operator]

The author, as always, touches with his "ability" to understand the known information.

One graph about the presence of German divisions directly on the border with the USSR is worth something - like how German divisions in the border strip of 100-200 km with a developed road network should not be counted in the invasion army (the author sees it this way).

Another signature trick of the author - well, the stupid Soviet intelligence did not know about the military alliance of the Third Reich with Finland, Hungary and Romania (having a common border with the USSR), because the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces did not take into account their divisions in the layout for 1941.

Graphomania is a terrible thing.

[AsmyppoL]

The territories in which the troops are concentrated against the Soviet Union are determined not by me, but by the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft. Since this approach suited the General Staff, it was used throughout the first half of 1941: only territories were specified. Therefore, you should submit your claims to the General Staff and the SC Intelligence Directorate ...
I’m ready to sprinkle ashes on my head if you don’t state your point of view disparagingly to the author, but simply quote any pre-war intelligence report from the Intelligence Directorate, which would confirm your point of view: RU ranked the troops located in these territories as a group intended for an attack on the Soviet Union ....
No smart thoughts that do not reflect reality, just give the facts, dear Operator.

I once asked you in an article about the Arctic what the pictures you gave mean. You then answered that the question was not for you, but for the site where you got them from. therefore, I concluded that you are not responsible for your cited material. The word flew out, but whether it’s true or not, or quite the opposite, you don’t know ...
the facts will be or again in the bushes?

[Operator]

I am not a graphomaniac, therefore I will refrain from confirming well-known facts.

[AsmyppoL]

You are not a graphomaniac. You are a person who is not responsible for your words. Common facts for you?
So convey them to Us indicating the facts and not your fabrications ...

[VIP]

Operator, you have figured out the sinister: the author here "makes a fool of our brother"

[Operator]

The author is trying to fool the readers with misinformation - it is exclusively Soviet intelligence that is to blame for the unexpected attack on July 22, 1941.

While it is generally known that according to Soviet intelligence (complete, incomplete, correct, incorrect - it does not matter) the number of enemy divisions as of June 1 in the border zone reached 180 units, which was determined by the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces as a criterion of the enemy's readiness to attack Soviet Union.

Another thing is that J.V. Stalin got a little clever and sent Soviet intelligence to hell - like there are contradictions in some intelligence reports. Stalin really wanted to start the war on schedule in May 1942, so he scored on intelligence reports (and not on separate intelligence reports).

Hitler, for his part, acted extremely rationally - he decided not to get up twice, i.e. to break only the USSR, after which Britain itself will ask for peace without any landing of the Germans on the islands. Stalin simply missed a logic that was as simple as a nail.

PS The author of the article tries to exclude Iosif Vissarionovich from responsibility for the failure of the 1941 military campaign.

[VIP]

Significant Stalin is an "enemy of the people". Perhaps this is so, but it is no longer fashionable to make Stalin an "enemy of the people" - it went off with a bang in 1956-1967 or, in the worst case, in 1994

[Operator]

Why is it immediately an enemy of the people - Stalin is a man who once in his life made a mistake (passed off the wishful thinking). I corrected the error with interest.

[AsmyppoL]

As usual Operator authoritatively, so to speak from the point of view of an expert, he tried to argue his point of view ... But, firstly, the author has already noticed that the Operator is not responsible for his words. The site or someone else should be responsible for his words, but not himself ... O.Yu. Kozinkin, when either Marshal Zhukov, or General Tyulenev, or other military leaders should answer unpleasant questions, but not Oleg Yuryevich himself, who cites this opinion as arguments. This makes the behavior of the Operator and Kozinkin similar.

Operator Wrote: “... The author is trying to fool the readers with misinformation - it was exclusively Soviet intelligence that was to blame for the unexpected attack on July 22, 1941. Whereas well knownthat by Soviet intelligence (complete, incomplete, correct, incorrect - it does not matter) the number of enemy divisions as on June 1 in the border strip reached the number in 180 units that was defined by the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces as a criterion of the enemy's readiness to attack the Soviet Union... »

What pays attention to authoritative opinion The operator?

1) He claims that it is generally known that as of June 1, there were 180 units of enemy divisions in the border zone. But for some reason this information is generally known only to Mr. Operator and can he share it with us? Will give, so to speak, an excerpt from the document where this is said.
It is not accepted as an argument that it was Stalin or someone from the General Staff who told the Operator ...

In fact, according to intelligence, there was no grouping of 180 divisions near our border as of June 1, 1941.

On 31.5.41 there were 120-122 German divisions near the border, up to a maximum of 6,5 Hungarian divisions, if you count the divisions from the brigades.
On 5.6.41 against the USSR there were concentrated Romanians: "11 infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions, a mechanized brigade, two mountain rifle brigades and one separate cavalry brigade".
Total maximum 143,5 enemy divisions. Still, the Operator should at least look for numbers on the Internet ...

[AsmyppoL]

2) The General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces was defined as a criterion for the enemy's readiness to attack the Soviet Union. This statement is generally difficult to comment on. it looks like this is a revelation of the Operator himself ...

I do not know the author of such a document. But the Operator is unlikely to be able to quote an excerpt from such a document. Although we will wait ...

Other documents are well known. For example, a document dated March 11, 1941, in which the enemy grouping only on the western border is assessed in 254 divisions and up to 400 Romanian tanks ...
From the plan of the General Staff of the Spacecraft on the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the west and east 11.03.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX

“... Germany currently has 225 infantry, 20 tank and 15 motorized divisions deployed, and a total of up to 260 divisions, 20 field guns of all calibers, 000 tanks and up to 10 aircraft, of which up to 000-15 are combat.
Of the indicated number of divisions, 76 divisions, of which up to 6 tank and 7 motorized, are currently concentrated on our borders and up to 35 divisions in Romania and Bulgaria.
If the war with England ends, it can be presumed that of the existing 260 divisions, Germany will leave at least 35 divisions in the occupied and bordering countries and up to the 25 divisions in the depths of the country.
Thus, up to 200 divisions, of which up to 165 infantry, 20 armored and 15 motorized, will be directed against our borders.
Finland will be able to put up against the Soviet Union 18 infantry divisions.
Romania currently has up to 45 infantry divisions and 700 combat aircraft, of which it can be expected that no less than 30 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions, up to 2700 guns of all calibers, 400 tanks and 600 aircraft will be used against the Soviet Union.
Hungary will be able to deploy up to 20 infantry divisions, 2 motorized brigades, 850 guns, 350 tanks and 500 combat aircraft against the USSR ... "

In May 1941, the Operational Directorate was developing a draft document.
Note of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin with considerations on a plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies
“... It is assumed that in the current political situation, Germany, in the event of an attack on the USSR, will be able to put up against us - up to 137 infantry, 19 tank, 15 motorized, 4 cavalry and 5 airborne divisions, and up to 180 divisions in total ...
Germany's probable allies can put up against the USSR: Finland - up to 20 infantry divisions, Hungary - 15 infantry divisions, Romania - up to 25 infantry divisions. In total, Germany and its allies can deploy up to 240 divisions against the USSR ... "
And again the number of divisions is up to 240, and not 180, as according to the Operator ...

Between the two above-mentioned documents, a Directive is directed to the ZPOVO, which unambiguously states that in case of war Germany will be able to issue before 200 divisions. And this is one Germany without allies ...

Directive of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft to the Commander of the ZapOVO Troops Colonel-General D.G. Pavlov
"... In the event of a war with us, Germany, out of its 225 infantry, 20 tank and 15 motorized divisions, will be able to send up to 200 divisions against our borders, of which up to 165 infantry, 20 tank and 15 motorized ..."

It seems that either Mr. Operator is not at all aware of the issue, although he is trying to express his expert opinion. In any case, this characterizes him, not as an expert, but as an ordinary lover to say something ... But for this something he is not able to answer ...

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

Graphomania is a terrible thing.

I completely agree with you, because nothing can stop his stream of consciousness. I gave a detailed answer to some of his nonsense in the previous article, so you can read my comments if they were not deleted due to the complaint of the author of the article.
https://topwar.ru/172586-1941-sosredotochenie-otdelnyh-armij-k-juzhnoj-gosgranice.html#comment-id-10593821
For example, he states:

AsmyppoL (Eugene) In intelligence reports, it is believed that the German tank division consists of two tank regiments.

The author did not support this lie - there is not a single reference to the intelligence report, and it is also unclear who it is "considered" because the level of knowledge of the intelligence officer and the level of knowledge of the head of the intelligence department are too different.
The fact that our intelligence knew the structure and number of German divisions on the eve of the war is described in the book by V.V.Kondrashov, although the author writes that the intelligence allegedly did not know the number of vehicles in the Wehrmacht divisions:

[AsmyppoL]

You are lying again, Mr. Milchakov. The author pointed out that the intelligence report of the Intelligence Directorate said: "... The total number of German troops on our western border with Germany and Romania (including Moldova and Dobrudja) on June 1 reaches one hundred twenty to one hundred twenty-two divisions, including: fourteen tank and thirteen motorized. The directions of the German troops are distributed:

a) in East Prussia twenty three to twenty four divisions, including: eighteen to nineteen infantry and three motorized divisions, five tank regiments (two tank divisions) [five tank regiments in the Intelligence Directorate turned into two divisions] and seven cavalry regiments;

b) in the Warsaw direction (against the ZAPOVO) thirty divisions, including: twenty-four infantry, one motorized, one tank and six tank regiments (four tank divisions in total) [one tank division plus 6 regiments, two per division - a total of 4 divisions], one cavalry division and eight cavalry regiments ... "

When will you apologize for your rudeness and your lies?

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

five tank regiments (two tank divisions) [five tank regiments in the Intelligence Directorate turned into two divisions]

The author spreads this lie because of his illiteracy, because he does not understand what is written in the intelligence reports, because in this case, it was about the fact that five tank regiments were recorded in the reconnaissance zone, and the presence of the headquarters of two tank divisions. And he refutes his juggling, in order to lie that this is exactly how we should think, in his own text of p. B:

Quote: AsmyppoL

one tank and six tank regiments

If we count as he thinks, it turns out that there are six tank regiments in one division.
This is how the "expert in military intelligence" once again proved that he does not understand at all how to read intelligence reports.

Quote: AsmyppoL

When will you apologize for your rudeness and your lies?

When people like you will stop lying and make false stuffing for inexperienced people. Where is the evidence of the existence of district intelligence schools and the sending of agents to Iran on the eve of the war?

[RuSFr]

Yes, Milchakov's lies are visible.
Evgeniy did not write that our scouts did not know the number of vehicles in the German tank division. You are lying! He only wrote that up to 2900 vehicles for each tank division were NOT DETECTED BY INTELLIGENCE! PART OF TANK DIVISIONS OBTAINED BY FOLDING FROM TANK SHELVES. CARS ARE NOT DETECTED FOR SUCH DIVISIONS!

By citing a scan of the structure of the German motorized division, you again distort the facts, trying to mislead the members of the forum who do not have the full amount of knowledge.
IN YOUR TABLE GERMAN MOTORIZED DIVISION CONSISTS OF THREE MOTORIZED SHELVES !!!
IN FACT, SINCE THE END OF 1940 THESE DIVISIONS HAVE ONLY TWO MOTORIZED SHELVES!
Eugene wrote about this in this part.
You specifically did not give the table of the structure of the German tank division, because it probably contains two tank regiments. And not alone, as it really was

[ccsr]

Quote: RuSFr

He only wrote that up to 2900 vehicles for each tank division were NOT DETECTED BY INTELLIGENCE!

Why find them, if they are already part of a deployed division and are distributed to all units? They are not concentrated in one place - can you at least understand this, a dreamer on military topics?

Quote: RuSFr

By citing a scan of the structure of the German motorized division, you again distort the facts, trying to mislead the members of the forum who do not have the full amount of knowledge.

You are lying, because you do not know that there is a regular structure, but there is a real staffing of the unit, when not all regular units may be available, because SEPARATE units can be transferred to other units, including newly deployed ones.

Quote: RuSFr

IN FACT, SINCE THE END OF 1940 THESE DIVISIONS HAVE ONLY TWO MOTORIZED SHELVES!

Do not show your illiteracy - since the summer of 1940, the Wehrmacht was reduced, right up to the approval of the Barbarossa directive, which is why the number of regiments in the divisions was changed.

Quote: RuSFr

Eugene wrote about this in this part.

He is just a dreamer who does not know how everything was in reality, and moreover, constantly lying about some mythical district intelligence schools, not to mention the fact that he constantly speculates with troops on the border, but never indicates the distance at which they are located from her actually.

Quote: RuSFr

You specifically did not give the table of the structure of the German tank division, because it probably contains two tank regiments.

And why don't you and the "expert" of intelligence reports Yevgeny give the structure of the TD in order to point out the mistake of RU? So far, apart from unsubstantiated verbiage, I have not heard anything from you, so go ahead for the orders ...

[VIP]

Canaris and Abwehr did not eat their bread for nothing. What kind of misinformation they turned around.
I got used to reading that Richard Sorge laid out everything on a saucer: the beginning of the war and what they dreamed about, and Stalin made an airplane from Ramsay's message.
In fact, the Abwehr fooled our heads perfectly.
The author, how can you explain that there are no messages from May 31 to the start of the war? After all, 20 (I do not take into account 21) days is a solid period. During this time, with the development of technology, a lot can be done

[AsmyppoL]

I would not really like to get ahead of myself, but I will answer briefly ...
We all know how many and what divisions arrived in the last two echelons when moving troops to the border: more than 40 divisions, more than half of which were tank and motorized.
Those. with a lot of technology. Some went along the roads, some were transported by rail ... Intelligence saw this, but could not tie them to divisions. Therefore, in three districts (PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO), they could not tie the detected units to tank groups.

Specific examples (we will look at them in the 4th part). One motorized division was confused with the undetected headquarters of the 6th Army. They tracked the headquarters, considering that it was MD.
The headquarters of one of the light divisions was confused with the headquarters of a tank division. All this was true in 1939, when a tank unit was part of such divisions. In the reality of 1941, our intelligence did not know that the light division had become a cut-down infantry division. We will look later at all the locations of the motorized and tank divisions discovered by intelligence and understand who was mistaken for these formations ... And also where most of these blanks were located on June 21, 1941 ...

And in RM from 1 to 19 June, no more than 7 divisions arrived - most of them infantry ... This is not true. Therefore, when in the summary of May 31, the number of divisions turned out to be close to the actual indicated RM, they stopped publishing ...
Hope I answered your question.

If you are interested, then stay in the future topic. Such a review, as far as I know the material, is nowhere in the public domain. There will be the author's version of why they were not afraid of German reconnaissance aircraft before the war

[VIP]

Eugene, no offense, you are at least a little bouncer, but you really know the material.
Your materials are still closer to the topic of the site than some authors.
PS. I want to know what happened in nature, and therefore, with your permission, I remain in anticipation of the continuation

[AsmyppoL]

Thank! I will be glad that you stay ...
About the bouncer ...
A long time ago, my dad jokingly used to say: "You yourself will not boast, so no one will praise ..."

[ccsr]

Quote: V I P

Eugene, no offense, you are at least a little bouncer, but you really know the material.
Your materials are still closer to the topic of the site than some authors.

He is not only a braggart, but also an ordinary dreamer, who in general, apart from two intelligence reports from June 15 and June 22, did not see, and not even fully, but imagines himself to be an expert in military intelligence, although he cannot distinguish a daily report from a monthly one. Note that he always writes "posted on the border", although if you ask him he doesn't even know the depth of the border zone in the USSR.
To refute it, it is enough to at least carefully read the memoirs of F. I. Golikov, which are published:

It is interesting to compare the information about the number of German divisions concentrated against the USSR by June 1941, according to the then information of our Intelligence Agency and today's data. Here is the book of the Publishing House of Political Literature "Soviet Army", circulation of 100 thousand. On pages 155-156 we read: “By the spring of 1941, the German army had 214 divisions, including 21 tank and 14 motorized ... And of these 214 tested, fired divisions, 153, including 19 tank and 14 motorized, were sent east, to the borders of the Soviet Union. " What did our Intelligence Agency report on this almost 30 years ago? In the same intelligence report No. 5, it claimed that as of June 1, 1941, the Hitlerite command against the Soviet Union already had concentrated along our western borders (including Finland and Romania)

about 130-131 German divisions with a depth of their location of 400 kilometers (that is, up to the Danzig, Poznan, Thorn, Elbing area).

At the same time, in the same document, we indicated that "the German command continues (emphasized by me. - FG) the concentration of troops to the border zone with the USSR, making massive transfers of units from the depths of Germany, the occupied countries of Western Europe and the Balkans." And in the depths of Germany, as we argued in the same document, the main military command of Hitlerite Germany on June 1 had 44–48 divisions in its general strategic reserve. And in any case, at least half of them were intended against the USSR. Thus, the total composition of the forces of Hitlerite Germany, deployed and intended to begin operations against the Red Army, on June 1, 1941 was no less than 150-155 German divisions. Obviously, this count does not include the number of ground divisions and individual brigades of the then Hitler's allies - Romania, Hungary and Finland. We knew their numbers exactly, as it is rightly said in the aforementioned book "Soviet Army" on page 156, "a total of 190 divisions stood in full readiness against the Red Army ..." The accuracy of our data is the result of the exceptional conscientiousness of military intelligence officers on the ground and special checks of information received by employees of the Intelligence Agency.
Naturally, the desire to compare these data of our Intelligence Agency with the fact that written in the book by General of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht Kurt Tippelskirch "History of World War II": "By June 22, the day of the start of the offensive, in the areas of strategic deployment were concentrated: 81 infantry division, 1 cavalry division, 17 tank, 15 motorized, 9 police and security divisions ... 22 more infantry, 2 tank, 2 motorized divisions and 1 police division were on the way as reserves of the main command "(174). Total: 150 divisions. On the same issue, I will quote from the book of a collective of military historians "World War II 1939-1945": "The German fascist troops (taking into account the reserve of the main command, not counting the five German divisions stationed in Finland, as well as the Allied troops) were are located in the directions, the boundaries of which are indicated above (175). On the main axis, in the center of the front, there were 62 divisions and two brigades, or about 43%, in the southern sector of the front - 54 divisions, or up to 36%, and in the northern sector of the front - 31 divisions, or 21% ”(176). Total: 152 German divisions (with five stationed in Finland).
Finally, the official evidence on this issue is what was said in the book "50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR": "For the attack on the Soviet Union, 153 divisions were assigned, including 33 tank and motorized ..." (177).

And now ask the author of the article a question - 400 km is it to be considered on the border with the USSR, or all the same these parts were in the deep rear. At the same time ask him a question - how long will a tank division move to the border, if, for example, it is 200-400 km deep from our border. I think "Eugene" will amuse you with a bunch of useless reasoning, but essentially will not answer anything - this is the style of this pseudo-researcher.

[Operator]

The author is also naive as a schoolboy - he does not understand the content of the apparatus documents. For example, the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Golikov, in intelligence report No. 5 reported to Stalin that as of June 1, 1941, Germany had deployed 131 divisions in the east of its territory and kept 48 more divisions in its strategic reserve, which it could also send to the east. Taking into account individual brigades, the given number of divisions deployed against the USSR amounted to more than 180 units, i.e. exceeded the critical level of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

The use of the phrase "at least half of the strategic reserve" in intelligence bulletin No. 5 (in line with Stalin's political directive about the start of the war no earlier than 1942) only means an apparatus safety net - in the event of the outbreak of war in 1941, Golikov could always documentarily prove that before the war he did not underestimate the maximum threat. Former secretary of the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin, Golikov's apparatus was absolutely clear.

As for the official version of Hitler, communicated to Stalin through diplomatic channels, about the concentration of German troops in the east with the aim of misinforming Britain before the invasion of its territory, Stalin knew in detail about Hitler's refusal to war with Britain through a Soviet agent - John Kernkros, a member of of the Cambridge "five" and part-time employee of the British Center for Decrypting German Correspondence (in Bletchley Park) using Enigma scramblers. From 1939 to 1942, the British used an electromechanical decoder donated to them by Polish intelligence officers, and from 1942, they used their own decryption computing devices.

In the first half of 1941, the British had all the information about Germany's refusal to invade the British Isles; Stalin had a copy of this information on his desk, and almost online.

So Stalin is solely to blame for the "surprise" of the German attack, who believed in his connection with the astral and his own infallibility in predicting the enemy's actions.

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

Former secretary of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin, Golikov's apparatus was absolutely clear.

I think this is not the point, but the fact that F. I. Golikov himself was heard several times personally by Stalin, and without Timoshenko and Zhukov, i.e. he would hardly have fought in front of the leader, realizing that Stalin would certainly double-check his data. In this case, the fact is important that Golikov, based on the results of the pre-war work of the Intelligence Directorate, was not punished at all, but on the contrary he was entrusted to negotiate with our allies in the rank of ambassador on special assignments of the Government of the USSR. Anyone who understands the Soviet system will immediately guess that this was a career take-off for Golikov.

Quote: Operator

So Stalin is solely to blame for the "surprise" of the German attack, who believed in his connection with the astral and his own infallibility in predicting the enemy's actions.

This conclusion is biased, if only because on June 21, Stalin gave the command to send the Directive w / n to the troops, and this suggests that there was no surprise for him. By the way, Admiral Kuznetsov recalled in his memoirs that by about 14.00 pm on June 21, Stalin knew about Hitler's order to start a war on June 22 - at least there is no reason to disbelieve the admiral, given the Dortmund signal. And Vorontsov's call from Berlin says a lot. But how further events took place, and why the cover units did not take up positions according to the cover plan, is of course an interesting question, and painful for our military leadership of that time.

[Operator]

What I (a former apparatchik) are talking about is that Golikov wrote the reports competently: both the boss is pleased and is insured himself.

Through the special departments (NKVD units), Stalin had a reliable picture of the situation with personnel and equipment in the newly formed units and formations of the Red Army in the western military districts and knew that even for a simple deployment of a covering army (taking field positions), as of June 1941, it would be necessary multiples of more than one day, not to mention the dispersal of aviation over the field airfields, the issuance of ammunition from army depots, the deployment of mechanized corps in battle formations, etc. etc.

Therefore, the directive of the Red Army of June 21, 1941 to be ready to repel the German aggression on June 22, from the point of view of the apparatchiks, is just an excuse (a dead poultice).

Taking into account the speed of passage and execution of orders at all levels of command from the General Staff to the division, such a directive should have been given to the troops no later than June 14, and according to the rules of apparatus work - no later than June 2, i.e. on the next day after Stalin's acquaintance with intelligence report No. 5 of the General Staff of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

What I (a former apparatchik) are talking about is that Golikov wrote the reports competently: both the boss is pleased and is insured himself.

Golikov was a fairly competent head of intelligence, although of course he was not a top-class professional in this matter - this is also recognized in the GRU.

Quote: Operator

Through the special departments (NKVD units), Stalin had a reliable picture of the situation with personnel and equipment in the newly formed units and formations of the Red Army in the western military districts

Make no illusions about the officers of the special departments - they were not so literate as to thoroughly know military affairs, because they were trained according to other programs. All their military experience did not go beyond the knowledge gained in the school and in the posts of junior officers, because they were engaged in other matters in the OO.

Quote: Operator

that even for a simple deployment of a covering army (occupying field positions), as of June 1941, it will take multiple times more than one day,

Here it is necessary to consider not the issue of the deployment of the entire army, but only the issue of the temporary arrival of cover regiments at the assigned section of the state border. It was they who had to delay the German offensive for a period sufficient for the deployment of the entire army - this is how the military science of that time taught us.

Quote: Operator

Therefore, the directive of the Red Army of June 21, 1941 to be ready to repel the German aggression on June 22, from the point of view of the apparatchiks, is just an excuse (a dead poultice).

I do not think so, because if all the troops took up positions according to the cover plan at least by 03.00 on June 22, then from the first hours of the war the plans of the Germans would begin to collapse, the accumulation of troops on the adjacent territory would begin, their mixing and this would be convenient target for our artillery and aviation.

Quote: Operator

Taking into account the speed of passage and execution of orders at all levels of command from the General Staff to the division, such a directive should have been given to the troops no later than June 14, and according to the rules of the apparatus work - no later than June 2,

It was impossible to do this for several reasons, and above all because any delay in the German attack was beneficial to us. If we began to introduce cover plans from June 2, the Germans would immediately open it and immediately start a war, because they understood that they would have to face great difficulties if we had time to introduce the full PP.

Quote: Operator

those. on the next day after Stalin got acquainted with intelligence report No. 5 of the General Staff of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

Intelligence report No. 5 is just an ordinary monthly document for a wide level of high military command, and he needed this report like a goat accordion, because he received DAILY intelligence reports through at least four departments, not counting the materials of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, as well as all kinds of analytical materials. which he was obliged to provide at his request.
In general, do not worry about this intelligence report No. 5 - firstly, it was published with a two-week delay, and secondly, it could not include many materials that were not supposed to be known in the districts and in some structures of the People's Commissariat of Defense.

[Operator]

I commented only from the point of view of the hardware rules for taking into account the speed of execution of circular instructions in the field - when you compose your own telegram or a draft of a telegram from the chief, you always lay down a real deadline for its implementation by grassroots performers.

Knowing the real terms is the basis for the survival of apparatchiks in the central office.

Another thing is that the boss can cross out your text of the draft telegram and write, for example, "immediately" - but then the responsibility goes to him.

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

when you compose your own telegram or a draft of a telegram from your boss, you always set a realistic deadline for its implementation by lower-level performers.

Here on this I completely agree, and therefore the biggest fault of Timoshenko and Zhukov I think that they really did not take into account how their Directive would be passed in the troops, what problems would arise in the districts with its implementation, and did not get Stalin's permission to introduce cover plans with a short command at least from 22.30 on June 21. This backfired on us with the German offensive near Moscow, which could have been avoided in 1941 if the covering troops had taken up positions and fought to the end, dying in trenches on the border, and not on the march or in beds.

[Operator]

As for the central apparatus of the NKO of the USSR, the apparatchiks are employees of the operational, intelligence and other departments of the General Staff (such as Vasilevsky and Golikov), and the People's Commissar Timoshenko and the head of the General Staff Zhukov are purely political appointees who were appointed to senior positions for personal loyalty to Stalin.

Any NPO apparatchik at least knew the information that we now have about the real time frame for bringing the covering army to combat readiness (about a month), but the ruling party, represented by Stalin and his appointees, until June 22, commanded "whoa", thereby predetermining the defeat of the army cover in a border battle.

What the party was guided by (astral knowledge or something else that contradicted the intelligence reports of the RU General Staff of the NCO, the NKGB and the Comintern) does not matter.

[VIP]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Thank! I will be glad that you stay ...
About the bouncer ...
A long time ago, my dad jokingly used to say: "You yourself will not boast, so no one will praise ..."

And what did he say correctly.
I think that we get along. Two normal men

[BAI]

According to the memoirs of P. A. Sudoplatov

When I read Sudoplatov's memoirs, I was shocked. Before that, I was sure that the intelligence is full of James Bond and Stirlitz, who once again recruited ministers and officers of the General Staff of an enemy country. And according to Sudaplatov - unimaginable squalor! The country destinations were led by people whose entire experience was political emigration. Residents - some officials, of the collegiate assessor level. Someone's wife from the department is going to establish intelligence work in a neighboring country, etc. Horror! And with such a staff, to get something ?!

[Jurkovs]

I just have one question. Why such an analysis has not been done at the General Staff until now. I understand that in the 50-60s, the Victory Marshals, who then led the country's armed forces, were not interested in this, since their actions in 41-42 were not flawless. But now what to hide and encrypt? The people need the truth, whatever they are.

[AsmyppoL]

I can only express my assumptions.
The General Staff has enough of its problems. V.V. Putin said long ago that there would be no revision of history.
Relatively recently, under the auspices of the RF Ministry of Defense, a multivolume work on the war was published, incl. about the pre-war events. The level of this work in terms of pre-war events, in my opinion, is very low. This can be judged at least by the fact that it included an episode invented by Arsen Martirosyan about the online flight of General Zakharov at the direction of Stalin. It is good that his next sneaky idea of ​​betrayal in the KA did not enter. Now he has voiced a new idea: "Conspiracy of generals. The goal is to falsify the true picture of the disposition of German divisions before the war in the eyes of Stalin."
So, the first problem is the official point of view in the above work, which Shoigu signed to the publishing house. The man trusted not professionals ...

Second problem. Our history is written by illiterate people who are actively published. For example, the opinion of one historian about the work of one writer: "I already told you that all the publishers do not call you in other words, except as a jerk. When asked, [what for] then you publish, the answer follows: there are a lot of psychos in our country, they need "their" psycho-writer ... " Crazy readers are ready to pay money for their idea ...

Third problem. Quite a lot of people know about the problem with RM, incl. historians. Only they evaluated only the number of divisions. Yes, everyone admits that from the fall of 1940 to May 1941 there was a mistake in the number of divisions, but by June it was eliminated.
It took me about a year to understand about the discrepancy between the RM and the actual data. I was also lucky that six months later I managed to stumble upon German maps. How many people want to dig thoroughly where everything is already known? Until now, there was no point in digging in this direction, since according to the last published RM (as of 1.6.41), the coincidence with the actual number is quite close - within several divisions.
If there is no standard with which to compare RM, the work will not be done, because even on German websites there are conflicting or sometimes incorrect data.

The fourth problem. A limited number of people may know about the existence of such a discrepancy, mainly related to archives and issues of declassification of archival data. In addition, these documents are associated with the documents of the Intelligence Directorate (now the legal successor of the GRU) and the FSB (former KGB border troops). Who needs to raise a problem that is currently of little interest to anyone (due to ignorance).

[AsmyppoL]

Interested in a group of fanatics who are trying to understand this issue: why did they do that ???
Will he justify the actions of Stalin, Zhukov, Timoshenko, Pavlov, Klenov and others?
The last two have already been rehabilitated - what do they need more? Of course, nothing else is needed ...
Stalin is already at his best. About Tymoshenko, and so few people remember ...
To acquit Zhukov? ... Why acquit him? The Victory Marshal is already standing at Red Square ...
Nobody is interested in this ....

There is one more problem. No matter how funny it is, but the version of the betrayal of the generals and scouts was adopted by one of the overseas special services. During the threatened period, among other nasty things, there should be network stuffing and information about the betrayal of generals and scouts, as well as the impossibility of revealing the facts of preparation for the outbreak of war by intelligence. The goal is to cause fear of a (supposedly) unexpected nuclear strike on our country, to cause massive cases of disobedience, etc. etc. Sow the illusion in people participating in mass actions of disobedience, the possibility of saving from a nuclear strike ...

In fact, the only way we can avoid a nuclear strike is the excellent reconnaissance that we have (it is actually excellent here!) And combat-ready strategic nuclear forces. Our main enemy should know that even if he is ready to start a war with us, we will find the elite (and their relatives) who will unleash a war even outside the states. Even if they think the world is too big ...

[Jurkovs]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Who needs to raise a problem that currently few people are interested in

1. Each new generation asks: How could this happen? Who is to blame for this?
2. The problem of assessing Stalin's activities hangs over our history like the sword of Damocles. This cannot be done without a thorough knowledge of all the nuances. For example, for quite a long time I blamed him for the crash of 41. After reading many articles, he shook his head and came to the conclusion that this was absolutely not his fault. He was not a military man and was forced to believe the calculations of the General Staff. The fact that the General Staff showed a monstrous non-professionalism, conceptually fell behind by as much as 30 years and could not even correctly assess the results of the Polish and French companies of the Wehrmacht. The fact that the higher command personnel succumbed to panic and, instead of competent counterattacks under the flanks, was in a hurry to withdraw the troops from under the newly emerging encirclement. In 41, none of the military said a word to Tymoshenko when he threw reserves from the march with his spread fingers and as a result, after the Vyazma boiler, they were left without an army at all. And Stalin could not at all assess the correctness of the decisions made. After all, he was never involved with intelligence and simply did not know how to assess conflicting (and there is no other) intelligence.
So this issue needs to be raised. And if such interested people as you do it competently and professionally, then it will be a very big deal.

[AsmyppoL]

Thanks for your words!

[ccsr]

Quote: Jurkovs

I just have one question. Why such an analysis has not been done at the General Staff until now. I understand that in the 50-60s, the Victory Marshals, who then led the country's armed forces, were not interested in this, since their actions in 41-42 were not flawless.

This analysis was made a long time ago, for the anniversary of military intelligence in the book by V.V. Kondrashov, pp. 427-428

[Jurkovs]

Quote: ccsr

This analysis was made a long time ago, to the anniversary of military intelligence in the book by V.V. Kondrashov

It's like sending a complaint to someone they complain about. The military intelligence is screwed up, it is quite clear. But you can't build your entire defensive strategy on reports from military intelligence alone. Where is the analytical work of the General Staff. For example, the so-called oil equation. The British knew him, the Americans knew, the Germans knew. Why didn't we know? You take the presence of strategic reserves, add an income (mainly from Romania), drive it all through an oil refinery, and get gasoline. How much is spent in industry is known, how much is spent on a tank division in war conditions is also known. Other spending is also no secret. And it turns out that in the conditions of the naval blockade declared by Britain, Germany should have attacked the USSR in 41-42, not later. In the conditions of the beginning of the rotation of the senior draft age, the recruitment of youth into the army, and not directly because of this drop in the combat readiness of the troops, only 41 years remain. Otherwise, Germany is over. Such motives are a dime a dozen, and nowhere the General Staff was noted positively. The border cover plan was written off since 1914. But even then it did not work. The distance of the URs from the state border in 1914 was calculated from the ability of the cavalry to break through the front and move along the rear. Tanks are not horses. After the border was pushed back in 39, the distance of the old URs from the state border would have been just that. But no, they convinced the country's leadership of the need to build new ones, and when they failed to meet the deadlines, they convinced Stalin (as they called him) to disarm the URs along the old border and transfer weapons to a new one. As a result, neither one nor the other, but millions of dead and prisoners. This is the kind of analysis the people need. Coupled, of course, with misses of intelligence and bad command and control of troops by Pavlov, Timoshenko, Shaposhnikov and other dead and alive.

[ccsr]

Quote: Jurkovs

It's like sending a complaint to someone they complain about. The military intelligence is screwed up, it is quite clear.

All amateurs think so. Where did the intelligence go, tell me in more detail, and why was Golikov not put up against the wall like Pavlov, but on the contrary entrusted with an even more important matter?

Quote: Jurkovs

But you can't build your entire defensive strategy on reports from military intelligence alone. Where is the analytical work of the General Staff.

In fact, in the General Staff, each structure is engaged in its own business, so there is no need to ride around the General Staff, in which only the Intelligence Directorate was engaged in intelligence issues. Here RU also presented analytical materials of different levels not only for the General Staff, but also for the People's Commissar of Defense.

Quote: Jurkovs

For example, the so-called oil equation. The British knew him, the Americans knew, the Germans knew. Why didn't we know? You take the presence of strategic reserves, add an income (mainly from Romania), drive it all through an oil refinery, and get gasoline.

Your whole equation can be shoved into one place if Hess's mission ended successfully, and the British would refuse to fight Hitler in Africa and other places where there is oil.

Quote: Jurkovs

Otherwise, Germany is over. Such motives are a dime a dozen, and nowhere the General Staff was noted positively.

Have you seen all the materials of the General Staff of that time, or so, just to shake the air?

Quote: Jurkovs

The border cover plan was written off since 1914. But even then it did not work. The distance of the URs from the state border in 1914 was calculated from the ability of the cavalry to break through the front and move along the rear. Tanks are not horses.

You contradict yourself, because since tanks are not horses, it means that in the 1914 PP, the role of tanks was not taken into account at all, as well as aviation.

Quote: Jurkovs

As a result, neither one nor the other, but millions of dead and prisoners. This is the kind of analysis the people need.

Have you ever seen an analysis of a surgical operation published in the mass media for the general public, and not in a specialized medical publication? In our country, many people die from the mistakes of doctors in peacetime, but you do not demand a report in the media about their mistakes - you are simply an unprofessional in this matter and you simply cannot understand why the irreparable happened due to the lack of basic knowledge. So why are the military obliged to report to various amateurs like the author of articles, and those who sing along with him, if they are not aware of what has already been published over the past twenty years? I do not get the point of it.

Quote: Jurkovs

Coupled, of course, with misses of intelligence and bad command and control of troops by Pavlov, Timoshenko, Shaposhnikov and other dead and alive.

And why did you drag Shaposhnikov to this - do you even know his level of knowledge in order to understand his thoughts? I do not think that you are able to understand him, which means that it is not for you to judge him.

[stalkerwalker]

I still don’t understand when the next holivar on the popularized theme of the unsuccessful start of the Great Patriotic War in June 41 begins. The topic is so extensive that it requires a whole monograph of several hundred pages, but not an article with an excessive abundance of graphs and data, documents.
My opinion is simple - one should not keep both the generals of the Red Army and the military-political leadership in general, including I.V. Stalin.
The country knew that the War would take place. Without exception, except for the blind and deaf
The so-called RM flowed to Moscow from all possible directions from all kinds of agents and agents, including the legendary British Ambassador Cripps.
But wasn’t the Abwehr engaged in the delivery of disinformation, including in it grains of truthful information, which was impossible to hide?
In the end, it all came down not so much to the timing of the attack, but to the place of the Main Strike, and the concentration of attacking and defending troops in this place. And here, for comparison, we recall Operation Citadel, and compare the aspect ratio in the places of impact of 4 Wehrmacht tank groups, and draw a parallel to the state of the sides on 04.07.43/XNUMX/XNUMX.
Comments, I think, will be superfluous.
Neither Tymoshenko nor Zhukov were deceived by the state of the troops in all border districts on the eve of the war. This was Punchinel's secret not only for the country's leadership, but also for Germany.
Everything that could be done was done. But a second-rate player cannot resist a champion, no matter how he prepares. Therefore, there is no reason to argue whether intelligence is to blame. What, in the end, is the difference - they hit you with the butt of an ax on the bare head on the left, or on the right.
No wonder all cover plans began with the condition that "... the enemy was stopped at a distance of 100-120 km from the border, ...".
The Red Army fought skillfully, as best it could. It makes no sense to compare the revenue of all branches of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. And so everything is clear. And only a naive and liberal-minded young man can claim that the short-sighted Stalin, stupid Zhukov, and stupid Timoshenko ruined everything ...