There is no reason for optimism yet
What inheritance went to the new Minister of Defense of Ukraine
At the presentation ceremony of Mikhail Ezhel, the newly appointed Minister of Defense noted that in the next five years overalls will become the main uniform in the army. Thereby it is clear by letting everyone understand that the work on bringing the armed forces to the proper state is no end ...
POLICIES ARE NOT NEEDED
The presidential elections in Ukraine led to changes in the leadership of the country's power structures. But for almost everyone, the decision of President Viktor Yanukovych to appoint Mikhail Yezhel as Minister of Defense was a surprise. On the one hand, it was very likely that Alexander Kuzmuk, people's deputy of the Verkhovna Rada from the Party of Regions and the former head of the military department, was expected to come to this post. On the other hand, as an alternative, it was expected that the position would again be taken by a civilian - a professional politician. But, apparently, the political component in the issue of selection and appointment of the top leaders of the power sector in the country has now begun to go so high that even those prominent representatives of the Ukrainian power elite who have previously selected a team solely on the principle of “national svіdomost” and personal loyalty, are now looking at things more objectively.
For example, the former president Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994) spoke out sharply against the appointment of the defense minister. In an interview with The Day, in particular, he considered it appropriate to state: “My position is as follows. There can and should not be any political figures in military affairs ... I firmly believe that now it is necessary to bring a professional to the Ministry of Defense. A man who spent his whole life in the army and knows all the military laws. ” According to Kravchuk, the soldiers and the rest of the population will accept this minister. He considers sufficient the presence of one political leader of the army. This is the president, he is the supreme commander.
In general, one can agree with the position of Leonid Makarovich and recognize the moral right to give such assessments. Interestingly, Alexander Kuzmuk also opposed the appointment of the representative of another department by the Minister of Defense.
Although to say that previously the Ukrainian Defense Ministry was headed exclusively by civilian politicians, it will be self-deception. Indeed, formally, ex-ministers Yevgeny Marchuk, Alexander Kuzmuk (during his second term in office), Anatoly Gritsenko, Valery Ivashchenko are civilians. But at the same time, all of them are with vast experience of service in power structures. However, the newly appointed Minister of Defense has an undeniable dignity compared to his predecessors: Mikhail Ezhel has a military career that looks more than decent. First of all, this is the experience of leadership for a considerable time by the naval forces, and he did not receive them in finished form, but in fact in the process of creation. For comparison: after the collapse of the Soviet Union, his colleagues in the land and air forces after the collapse of the Soviet Union got a huge "legacy", but it was only reformed, reduced, plundered ...
Being several years at the post of chief inspector of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine also gave Mikhail Yezhel an undeniable "trump card". Called on duty to check and control everything inside the military department, he, like no one else, knows his real condition, problems, etc. A properly defined diagnosis of “disease” is half the success of the future “treatment”.
KILLING INDICATORS
About what "inheritance" went to the reserve admiral this time, figures eloquently say. For example, in 2009 aviation The Armed Forces of Ukraine received only 2,5% of the minimum required amount of funding. With an annual demand of 65-70 thousand tons of fuel, aviation units were provided with them at the level of about four thousand tons. About three dozen Ukrainian fighter jets (more than a hundred of these aircraft available in combat units) are more or less ready to perform tasks. In 2009, the average raid on one crew of aviation forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was 17,5 hours, and on the crew of army aviation of the ground forces - only 10 hours. For comparison: combat pilots fly in Belarus and Russia for 40-60 hours, in Romania - 100, in Poland - 150.
There are also other indicators of the level of training of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: the average tenure of Ukrainian naval ships at sea was about 11 days, and the total figure of parachute jumps among the airborne and airmobile troops is 15 186.
To fulfill all the programs planned in 2009 in the Ukrainian armed forces, their budget should have been 32,4 billion hryvnia. So that the army could “just develop and fulfill its functions” (the words of ex-Minister of Defense Yuriy Yekhanurov), “only” 17,7 billion hryvnia was required. And the government allocated only 8,4 billion, or 0,87% of GDP to the military department for the year.
In reality, the activities of the State Program for the Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006-2009 were financed only from 30 to 50% (2006-50%, 2007-39%, 2008-54%, 2009-th 28%). This already allows us to speak with confidence at the present moment about the impossibility of its implementation within the prescribed period and the need for the new minister to develop a plan of anti-crisis measures to actually save the Ukrainian army.
SUBJECTIVE FACTORS
Initially, Mikhail Yezhel found himself in a very delicate situation of ethical choice. On the one hand, he faces serious challenges, which will require real professionals who are well versed in all areas of the activities of the problem military department. On the other hand, it’s quite a logical desire to bring his like-minded people to the key positions, people whom he trusts, has certain obligations to them. In addition, the "new team", which has taken over the power in the country, will influence the personnel appointments of the minister in their business and political interests.
And with the third - what to do with those officials who remained from the previous leadership? Some of them are in their place and will benefit the state further. But after all, after the victory of the "Orange Revolution", generals were appointed to high posts, who were previously removed from their posts for scandals for certain serious omissions, such as explosions in ammunition depots. It is difficult to understand the logic of the immediate predecessors of Ezhel, but now such “rehabilitated” generals as V. Mozharovsky, R. Nurullin and the like still hold high posts. Only here the efficiency of these military leaders in modern conditions is painfully controversial ...
The selection process for the new minister is also aggravated by ethical issues: being the commander-in-chief of the Navy, the chief inspector of the Ministry of Defense, he was confronted by many of the current leaders of the military department, who became his subordinates overnight. And now “to put some outside the door” in a moral sense is quite problematic.
It would be wrong not to point out another component in the work of the new Minister of Defense: he has to spend much of his time on work and contacts outside the walls of his department - with the presidential administration, the Cabinet, other ministries and government agencies. They are also headed by new people, and each has its own interests. Moreover, in the course of their previous activities, some officials did not demonstrate a particular desire to work in the interests of the country's security forces, beginning with the newly appointed Prime Minister, whom we respect. And Mikhail Ezhel will have to communicate with them without fail: on budget financing and providing the sun with all the necessary things, personnel issues, lawmaking, etc.
Without being previously a politician and a public person, not having a resource of personal influence, the level of, for example, his predecessor and at the same time rival Alexander Kuzmuk, the new minister will have to find a way out and fill these gaps.
FIRST STEPS
Literally a day after his appointment — on Saturday, March 13, Ezhel held a meeting with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff on the future appearance of the military administration system. During the nearly six-hour (!) Meeting, he heard the heads of the main structural units of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. Moreover, some decisions regarding their further fate followed immediately: expand, reorganize, reduce, reassign, etc. For example, it was not long to wait for the liquidation of the department for the sale of surplus property, which the Ministry of Defense earned in the past year in the amount of only about 2009% of its budget.
On Monday, March 15, the work was continued in relation to other military authorities, such as the Joint Operational Command, the Support Command Command and the like. The participants in these meetings drew attention to the style of work of the new minister: he did not listen to the reading of the “slick” reports of the speakers, but translated the meeting to a business discussion “not from the list”. And it was bad for those managers who could not in “live” communication substantiate the achievements and the need for the units they headed.
It should be mentioned that the General of the Army of Ukraine Ivan Svyda, recently appointed the Chief of the General Staff, went in a similar way. Having arrived at his post at the end of last year and familiarized himself with the state of affairs, he commissioned working through the issues of optimizing the organizational structure of the “brain” of the Ukrainian armed forces. And this involved three groups of specialists. Svid was supported by Valery Ivashchenko, the minister at the time, who gave instructions to carry out similar work in departments and offices that are not part of the General Staff, but subordinates to him personally.
This is doubly important, since the insurmountable desire of the business and political elites in power to control the material resources of the military is not a secret. And high-ranking civilian officials appointed to posts related to public procurement, the distribution of money from the military budget, etc., are doing everything possible to preserve the previously existing “relationship” schemes.
For example, after Yuriy Yekhanurov left the military department, an attempt was made to revise the structure of the central office of the Defense Ministry in order to deprive some officials of access to the “control” resources created by them. But the "system" was outraged, and it even came to trial. Thus, the Constitutional Court determined whether the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers obliging the head of the military department to coordinate with the First Deputy Prime Minister the approval of the structure of the central apparatus of the Defense Ministry complies with the basic law of the country.
Not everything causes a clear assessment within the military department. For example, there is the General Directorate of Communications and Information Systems of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. But there is also another structure - the Department of Transformation and Information Technologies of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine with 21 people. Among his tasks are the implementation of the state policy of informatization in the military, the introduction of modern information technologies, and the project to create the Unified Automated Control System of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
There are also other "pairs" that unreasonably duplicate each other:
- The Department of Humanitarian Policy of the Ministry of Defense and the General Directorate of Social-Psychological and Educational Work of the General Staff;
- Department of Personnel Policy of the Ministry of Defense and the General Directorate of the Staff of the General Staff;
- Sports Committee of the Ministry of Defense and the Department of Physical Training of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
And what standards provided for the existence of so-called structures of service of the troops? Note that in the days of the Soviet Union, they were absent as superfluous.
There is generally a unique structure - the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. This special service, being formally just a structural subdivision of the military department, in practice turned into an independent subject on the state and political horizon of the country, endowed with a separate line in the state budget. Which, by the way, is enshrined at the legislative level.
It is not surprising that the leaders of the GUR were carried away with getting “access to the bodies” of Ukrainian politicians and even went into politics, business, etc. But then it is appropriate to raise the issue of the “high quality” of their work, once with authority, independence and other “attributes” they are fine. Do not believe? Then let someone answer: where was this special service when the pirates seized the Ukrainian citizens? What is the situation with the use of space intelligence information (note that the purchase of commercial images due to their delay for several hours does not count)? Why Ukraine systematically "wet" in the information space?
I want to share some more interesting facts. It is about the conditions under which the formation of the Joint Operational Command. This military command body during 2009 of the year was checked by the Commission of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine three times (!). Sorry, but military structures at the stage of their formation according to generally accepted rules should not be subject to inspection measures of this level. And although formally, the KLO already exists not only on paper, but also in real life, it needs time to firmly get back on its feet, and the third stage of its creation is completed only in 2010 year.
Are there really high officials who do not understand these simple things? Apparently, such narrow-minded people are available. After all, those who know the realities of army life will confirm that several weeks before such inspections, the planned daily activities of a military organism can actually be paralyzed and all personnel will rush to meet the inspectors and show the results.
BRIEF FORECASTS
The current year does not give much cause for optimism. It was not by chance that General Ivan Svyda, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said: “As for the strategic directions, we will implement first of all those that do not require significant material costs, but are related to organizational issues and improvement of the management system. The armed forces should function as a mechanism, which means that it is necessary to eliminate duplicate functions so that everyone clearly knows his area of responsibility, is responsible for a specific direction, today this question needs clarification. As for funding, we will ask for as much as we need, not only for the maintenance of the armed forces, but also for elementary development. This amount has already been determined - we need 19,8 billion hryvnia. These funds will be enough to ensure the minimum security of the state. Ideally, in order for us to be provided for everything and at the same time the army developed, you need 30 billion hryvnias. Since we understand that there is a difficult situation in the country, and besides the military, there are still teachers and doctors, we have determined the minimum necessary amount - about 20 billion hryvnias. But not the 13 billions that are included in the draft budget for the next year, of which 4 is a special fund, which means that this money is not and never will be. ”
Undoubtedly, Ivan Svyda assesses the situation in the country objectively and therefore does not dream of getting something completely impossible.
But ... After the presidential election for at least six months, Ukraine will be "passionate" about reformatting the power structures and relations between them. Ukrainian elites are concerned with their well-being in the changed system of business and political coordinates. The Minister of Defense also needs to organize his work in the new post. The leaders of lower rank in the military department themselves are anxiously awaiting the decision of their fate. And when everyone around them feels "temporary", will anyone in such conditions be engaged in creative work for the benefit of the armed forces? The question is rather rhetorical ...
And the money for the military in the draft budget for the 2010 year does not give reasons for particular optimism. However, there is also no reason to say that rhythmic funding will be provided. It is not for nothing that the documents of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine clearly state that the requirement not to carry out costly combat training activities in the first four months of 2010.
Over the 18 years of the existence of the Ukrainian army, attempts have been made to reform its control system more than once. Moreover, this “variety” of reforms became more often repeated. To assert that the leapfrog of these innovations has benefited, we do not dare. Alas, as long as we see a complex, cumbersome, non-system-based “machine” of the Ukrainian military department. And the words from the famous fable come to mind: “And you, friends, no matter how you sit down, all are not fit for musicians.” I would like to wish that finally the new Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff managed to rebuild the system in relation to modern realities and in line with common sense ...
At the presentation ceremony of Mikhail Ezhel, the newly appointed Minister of Defense noted that in the next five years overalls will become the main uniform in the army. Thereby it is clear by letting everyone understand that the work on bringing the armed forces to the proper state is no end ...
POLICIES ARE NOT NEEDED
The presidential elections in Ukraine led to changes in the leadership of the country's power structures. But for almost everyone, the decision of President Viktor Yanukovych to appoint Mikhail Yezhel as Minister of Defense was a surprise. On the one hand, it was very likely that Alexander Kuzmuk, people's deputy of the Verkhovna Rada from the Party of Regions and the former head of the military department, was expected to come to this post. On the other hand, as an alternative, it was expected that the position would again be taken by a civilian - a professional politician. But, apparently, the political component in the issue of selection and appointment of the top leaders of the power sector in the country has now begun to go so high that even those prominent representatives of the Ukrainian power elite who have previously selected a team solely on the principle of “national svіdomost” and personal loyalty, are now looking at things more objectively.
For example, the former president Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994) spoke out sharply against the appointment of the defense minister. In an interview with The Day, in particular, he considered it appropriate to state: “My position is as follows. There can and should not be any political figures in military affairs ... I firmly believe that now it is necessary to bring a professional to the Ministry of Defense. A man who spent his whole life in the army and knows all the military laws. ” According to Kravchuk, the soldiers and the rest of the population will accept this minister. He considers sufficient the presence of one political leader of the army. This is the president, he is the supreme commander.
In general, one can agree with the position of Leonid Makarovich and recognize the moral right to give such assessments. Interestingly, Alexander Kuzmuk also opposed the appointment of the representative of another department by the Minister of Defense.
Although to say that previously the Ukrainian Defense Ministry was headed exclusively by civilian politicians, it will be self-deception. Indeed, formally, ex-ministers Yevgeny Marchuk, Alexander Kuzmuk (during his second term in office), Anatoly Gritsenko, Valery Ivashchenko are civilians. But at the same time, all of them are with vast experience of service in power structures. However, the newly appointed Minister of Defense has an undeniable dignity compared to his predecessors: Mikhail Ezhel has a military career that looks more than decent. First of all, this is the experience of leadership for a considerable time by the naval forces, and he did not receive them in finished form, but in fact in the process of creation. For comparison: after the collapse of the Soviet Union, his colleagues in the land and air forces after the collapse of the Soviet Union got a huge "legacy", but it was only reformed, reduced, plundered ...
Being several years at the post of chief inspector of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine also gave Mikhail Yezhel an undeniable "trump card". Called on duty to check and control everything inside the military department, he, like no one else, knows his real condition, problems, etc. A properly defined diagnosis of “disease” is half the success of the future “treatment”.
KILLING INDICATORS
About what "inheritance" went to the reserve admiral this time, figures eloquently say. For example, in 2009 aviation The Armed Forces of Ukraine received only 2,5% of the minimum required amount of funding. With an annual demand of 65-70 thousand tons of fuel, aviation units were provided with them at the level of about four thousand tons. About three dozen Ukrainian fighter jets (more than a hundred of these aircraft available in combat units) are more or less ready to perform tasks. In 2009, the average raid on one crew of aviation forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was 17,5 hours, and on the crew of army aviation of the ground forces - only 10 hours. For comparison: combat pilots fly in Belarus and Russia for 40-60 hours, in Romania - 100, in Poland - 150.
There are also other indicators of the level of training of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: the average tenure of Ukrainian naval ships at sea was about 11 days, and the total figure of parachute jumps among the airborne and airmobile troops is 15 186.
To fulfill all the programs planned in 2009 in the Ukrainian armed forces, their budget should have been 32,4 billion hryvnia. So that the army could “just develop and fulfill its functions” (the words of ex-Minister of Defense Yuriy Yekhanurov), “only” 17,7 billion hryvnia was required. And the government allocated only 8,4 billion, or 0,87% of GDP to the military department for the year.
In reality, the activities of the State Program for the Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006-2009 were financed only from 30 to 50% (2006-50%, 2007-39%, 2008-54%, 2009-th 28%). This already allows us to speak with confidence at the present moment about the impossibility of its implementation within the prescribed period and the need for the new minister to develop a plan of anti-crisis measures to actually save the Ukrainian army.
SUBJECTIVE FACTORS
Initially, Mikhail Yezhel found himself in a very delicate situation of ethical choice. On the one hand, he faces serious challenges, which will require real professionals who are well versed in all areas of the activities of the problem military department. On the other hand, it’s quite a logical desire to bring his like-minded people to the key positions, people whom he trusts, has certain obligations to them. In addition, the "new team", which has taken over the power in the country, will influence the personnel appointments of the minister in their business and political interests.
And with the third - what to do with those officials who remained from the previous leadership? Some of them are in their place and will benefit the state further. But after all, after the victory of the "Orange Revolution", generals were appointed to high posts, who were previously removed from their posts for scandals for certain serious omissions, such as explosions in ammunition depots. It is difficult to understand the logic of the immediate predecessors of Ezhel, but now such “rehabilitated” generals as V. Mozharovsky, R. Nurullin and the like still hold high posts. Only here the efficiency of these military leaders in modern conditions is painfully controversial ...
The selection process for the new minister is also aggravated by ethical issues: being the commander-in-chief of the Navy, the chief inspector of the Ministry of Defense, he was confronted by many of the current leaders of the military department, who became his subordinates overnight. And now “to put some outside the door” in a moral sense is quite problematic.
It would be wrong not to point out another component in the work of the new Minister of Defense: he has to spend much of his time on work and contacts outside the walls of his department - with the presidential administration, the Cabinet, other ministries and government agencies. They are also headed by new people, and each has its own interests. Moreover, in the course of their previous activities, some officials did not demonstrate a particular desire to work in the interests of the country's security forces, beginning with the newly appointed Prime Minister, whom we respect. And Mikhail Ezhel will have to communicate with them without fail: on budget financing and providing the sun with all the necessary things, personnel issues, lawmaking, etc.
Without being previously a politician and a public person, not having a resource of personal influence, the level of, for example, his predecessor and at the same time rival Alexander Kuzmuk, the new minister will have to find a way out and fill these gaps.
FIRST STEPS
Literally a day after his appointment — on Saturday, March 13, Ezhel held a meeting with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff on the future appearance of the military administration system. During the nearly six-hour (!) Meeting, he heard the heads of the main structural units of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. Moreover, some decisions regarding their further fate followed immediately: expand, reorganize, reduce, reassign, etc. For example, it was not long to wait for the liquidation of the department for the sale of surplus property, which the Ministry of Defense earned in the past year in the amount of only about 2009% of its budget.
On Monday, March 15, the work was continued in relation to other military authorities, such as the Joint Operational Command, the Support Command Command and the like. The participants in these meetings drew attention to the style of work of the new minister: he did not listen to the reading of the “slick” reports of the speakers, but translated the meeting to a business discussion “not from the list”. And it was bad for those managers who could not in “live” communication substantiate the achievements and the need for the units they headed.
It should be mentioned that the General of the Army of Ukraine Ivan Svyda, recently appointed the Chief of the General Staff, went in a similar way. Having arrived at his post at the end of last year and familiarized himself with the state of affairs, he commissioned working through the issues of optimizing the organizational structure of the “brain” of the Ukrainian armed forces. And this involved three groups of specialists. Svid was supported by Valery Ivashchenko, the minister at the time, who gave instructions to carry out similar work in departments and offices that are not part of the General Staff, but subordinates to him personally.
This is doubly important, since the insurmountable desire of the business and political elites in power to control the material resources of the military is not a secret. And high-ranking civilian officials appointed to posts related to public procurement, the distribution of money from the military budget, etc., are doing everything possible to preserve the previously existing “relationship” schemes.
For example, after Yuriy Yekhanurov left the military department, an attempt was made to revise the structure of the central office of the Defense Ministry in order to deprive some officials of access to the “control” resources created by them. But the "system" was outraged, and it even came to trial. Thus, the Constitutional Court determined whether the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers obliging the head of the military department to coordinate with the First Deputy Prime Minister the approval of the structure of the central apparatus of the Defense Ministry complies with the basic law of the country.
Not everything causes a clear assessment within the military department. For example, there is the General Directorate of Communications and Information Systems of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. But there is also another structure - the Department of Transformation and Information Technologies of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine with 21 people. Among his tasks are the implementation of the state policy of informatization in the military, the introduction of modern information technologies, and the project to create the Unified Automated Control System of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
There are also other "pairs" that unreasonably duplicate each other:
- The Department of Humanitarian Policy of the Ministry of Defense and the General Directorate of Social-Psychological and Educational Work of the General Staff;
- Department of Personnel Policy of the Ministry of Defense and the General Directorate of the Staff of the General Staff;
- Sports Committee of the Ministry of Defense and the Department of Physical Training of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
And what standards provided for the existence of so-called structures of service of the troops? Note that in the days of the Soviet Union, they were absent as superfluous.
There is generally a unique structure - the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. This special service, being formally just a structural subdivision of the military department, in practice turned into an independent subject on the state and political horizon of the country, endowed with a separate line in the state budget. Which, by the way, is enshrined at the legislative level.
It is not surprising that the leaders of the GUR were carried away with getting “access to the bodies” of Ukrainian politicians and even went into politics, business, etc. But then it is appropriate to raise the issue of the “high quality” of their work, once with authority, independence and other “attributes” they are fine. Do not believe? Then let someone answer: where was this special service when the pirates seized the Ukrainian citizens? What is the situation with the use of space intelligence information (note that the purchase of commercial images due to their delay for several hours does not count)? Why Ukraine systematically "wet" in the information space?
I want to share some more interesting facts. It is about the conditions under which the formation of the Joint Operational Command. This military command body during 2009 of the year was checked by the Commission of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine three times (!). Sorry, but military structures at the stage of their formation according to generally accepted rules should not be subject to inspection measures of this level. And although formally, the KLO already exists not only on paper, but also in real life, it needs time to firmly get back on its feet, and the third stage of its creation is completed only in 2010 year.
Are there really high officials who do not understand these simple things? Apparently, such narrow-minded people are available. After all, those who know the realities of army life will confirm that several weeks before such inspections, the planned daily activities of a military organism can actually be paralyzed and all personnel will rush to meet the inspectors and show the results.
BRIEF FORECASTS
The current year does not give much cause for optimism. It was not by chance that General Ivan Svyda, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said: “As for the strategic directions, we will implement first of all those that do not require significant material costs, but are related to organizational issues and improvement of the management system. The armed forces should function as a mechanism, which means that it is necessary to eliminate duplicate functions so that everyone clearly knows his area of responsibility, is responsible for a specific direction, today this question needs clarification. As for funding, we will ask for as much as we need, not only for the maintenance of the armed forces, but also for elementary development. This amount has already been determined - we need 19,8 billion hryvnia. These funds will be enough to ensure the minimum security of the state. Ideally, in order for us to be provided for everything and at the same time the army developed, you need 30 billion hryvnias. Since we understand that there is a difficult situation in the country, and besides the military, there are still teachers and doctors, we have determined the minimum necessary amount - about 20 billion hryvnias. But not the 13 billions that are included in the draft budget for the next year, of which 4 is a special fund, which means that this money is not and never will be. ”
Undoubtedly, Ivan Svyda assesses the situation in the country objectively and therefore does not dream of getting something completely impossible.
But ... After the presidential election for at least six months, Ukraine will be "passionate" about reformatting the power structures and relations between them. Ukrainian elites are concerned with their well-being in the changed system of business and political coordinates. The Minister of Defense also needs to organize his work in the new post. The leaders of lower rank in the military department themselves are anxiously awaiting the decision of their fate. And when everyone around them feels "temporary", will anyone in such conditions be engaged in creative work for the benefit of the armed forces? The question is rather rhetorical ...
And the money for the military in the draft budget for the 2010 year does not give reasons for particular optimism. However, there is also no reason to say that rhythmic funding will be provided. It is not for nothing that the documents of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine clearly state that the requirement not to carry out costly combat training activities in the first four months of 2010.
Over the 18 years of the existence of the Ukrainian army, attempts have been made to reform its control system more than once. Moreover, this “variety” of reforms became more often repeated. To assert that the leapfrog of these innovations has benefited, we do not dare. Alas, as long as we see a complex, cumbersome, non-system-based “machine” of the Ukrainian military department. And the words from the famous fable come to mind: “And you, friends, no matter how you sit down, all are not fit for musicians.” I would like to wish that finally the new Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff managed to rebuild the system in relation to modern realities and in line with common sense ...
Information