1941. Radio intelligence about enemy headquarters

The following abbreviations are used in the article: А - field army AK - army corps, IN - military district, GraA - Army Group, Spacecraft - Red Army, u (md) - motorized corps (division), pd - infantry division Goals Difference - intelligence materials, Ro - intelligence department of the headquarters RU - Reconnaissance of the General Staff of the spacecraft, TGr - tank Group, mk (td) - tank corps (division).

In the previous part RM were examined about the headquarters of the corps, which came to the leadership of the Soviet Union and the spacecraft in 1941. The reliability of these RMs again proved unsatisfactory. At the end of May, seven mk were located in East Prussia and former Poland. None of them were discovered by intelligence. Before the start of the war, there were ten of these corps, and again not one of them was discovered by intelligence ...

Intelligence only regularly reported the presence of AK, but this information was largely unreliable. Intelligence also did not reveal the fact of the redeployment of the headquarters of the corps, TGr, armies and GRA (fronts) closer to the border. In the final part, we will consider the RMs that arrived in the RO of the border districts from radio intelligence.

Radio intelligence knew everything

There was a version that radio intelligence supplied only reliable information before the war. Radio intelligence allegedly knew the handwriting of all German radio operators and could determine whether radio stations belong to specific formations or associations.

It should be noted that the OSNAZ radio divisions located near the border were subordinate to the RO of the HE headquarters and therefore their information was included in the RO reports. Consequently, some important materials could not exist that passed by the RO and supposedly got into the secret archives of the RU.

The analysis of the information provided in the summary No. 1 of RU dated 22.6.41 and in the memoirs of the former head of the RU coincide with the Republic of Moldova (RU reports dated 31.5.41 and 15.6.41), which were received three weeks before the start of the war and were published. This can only indicate that no other ("sensational") materials in the archives do not exist.

According to the author, the absence of other published RM RMs for June 1941 (until June 22) is due to the fact that our intelligence was not able to adequately detect the movement of headquarters and troops of the invasion group directly to the border. This made it possible to blame the executed generals for the tragic events of June 22, 1941, and after the death of I.V. Stalin - and himself.

Radio intelligence about the completeness of intelligence

Lieutenant General P.S. Shmyrev served in radio reconnaissance for 50 years, and 15 of them led this service. Peter Spiridonovich supplied the author of the book “The Golden Ear of Military Intelligence” with documents, materials and presented them to his colleagues.

The book notes that June 22 attack was tactically sudden for the spacecraft and this is from the words of radio scouts, who, according to a made-up version, were obliged to know about the German troops coming to their original positions. Before the war, radio scouts could only record: on what wavelength, approximately from which settlement did German radio stations get in touch. By the signal strength, they judged how large radio stations were used. Subscribers in other settlements were also registered. They tried to identify the main and subordinate radio stations by radio broadcasts. According to intelligence intelligence about the locations of the headquarters, they also tried to determine the subordination of the headquarters radio networks among themselves. If the RM of undercover intelligence was incorrect, then the conclusions about the belonging of the radio networks to the specific headquarters of the German troops also turned out to be unreliable.

There is not a word in the book that Stalin and the “traitors-generals” did not heed the reliable information received from radio intelligence. Therefore, there was no such information. Also in the book there is no mention of the detection by the radio reconnaissance of the headquarters of German GrA, TGr and MK, and even more so about the intercepted Dortmund signal. Only the captured German documents in the initial period of the war allowed us to move from the technical characteristics of the enemy radio stations to the understanding of operational information.

Most of our military were aware of the inevitability of a war with Nazi Germany, but tactically the June 22 attack was unexpected. A.K. Bushuev:

In September 1940, I was assigned to 394 hordes [separate KOVO radio division. - Note auth.] OCHNAZ by the chief of a peripheral direction finding station ... He intercepted and direction-finding the working radio stations of the German army in a given sector ... Materials of radio interception and direction-finding were delivered to the headquarters [order. - Note auth.] courier by rail ... Apparently, we [command. - Note auth.] they knew about the danger from the Germans in general, so to speak, in the strategic plan, and in the tactical - that the war was over the threshold - they did not know...

On 21.6.41, the direction-finding station was deployed to the border exercises in the Lyubich Ruda area. According to the site’s information on radio intelligence, the site was deployed two kilometers from the border. The arriving division commander expressed dissatisfaction with the chosen position, located too close to the border. At dawn on June 22, Lieutenant Bushuyev arrived at the post office in Lubocha Ruda to report to the horde commander on the chosen new position. Here he was at the start of the war. The point at this time is still near the border. The personnel of the station, with the exception of Lieutenant Bushuyev with a driver and five killed servicemen, was captured along with all his equipment. The commander of the 394th horde is in the apartment on the morning of June 22 and unexpectedly wakes up to the sound of torn bombs. Is it possible to state on the basis of this fact that radio intelligence knew about the beginning of the war at dawn on June 22?

There are similar recollections of the head of the radio direction finding point of the 474th horde of ZAPOVO:

The evening of June 21 was as usual. The personnel, in addition to the shift on duty, went to rest, and I went to an apartment in the village of Rymachi, 1,5 km from the radio station. I woke up on June 22 suddenly, sat on my bed and see earth and glass on a blanket ...

A radio intelligence site says:

In the period from June 23 to 26 according to open radio interception scouts of the 394th horde the presence of the 1st TGr at the border was established Kleist in the 16th TD, 63rd and 79th MD, which were moving in the direction of Sokal and Krystynopl ...

Probably they could not find out about the remaining TGr troops from open negotiations. It should be noted that the 63rd and 79th MDs were not in the Wehrmacht. Consider the summary of RU from 28.6.41:

Documents captured in battle during the defeat of the headquarters of 39 mk reveal the enemy’s operational intentions regarding actions on our Western Front. Installedthat on the Vilnius direction acts 3 Army the enemy, on the Brest direction - 2 Army. The strike group of the 3 Army consisting of 39 mk, 5 AK launched an offensive at the junction of the north-western and western fronts, and in the morning of 25.6 part 3 of the Army from the Vilna region turned to Minsk to act on the rear of the Western Front ...

Only a week after the outbreak of war, our intelligence managed to get the first information about the 2nd and 3rd TGr, which in the summary are called armies. According to the 3rd TGr, even on June 28, reconnaissance is not aware of the presence of the 57th military unit (12 and 19 TD, 18 MD) and its subordinate 6th AK. It turns out that the writers “know” more than the radio intelligence officers ... Nothing is said about the complete command of the situation in the book on the radio intelligence of the Navy.

Radio intelligence

In the published materials there is little information about the information received from radio intelligence before the outbreak of war. Therefore, it is difficult to verify the reliability of these RMs, but we will try. The first mention of radio intelligence data dates back to 2.10.40. Probably, this information was obtained from open negotiations.

RU Summary: “According to radio intelligence, in the Konskie-Jedbouzh region [122 km southwest of Warsaw - author's note] expected arrival of the 1st and 178th fronts, in connection with which the premises are being prepared ... "

Again we are faced with two exact designations of the front and the area where they are expected to be. And again, 100% misinformation. 1st Fri 13.9.40 went to East Prussia and is already located in Koenigsberg. The 178th frd never existed. There can be no talk of the 78th Front, which is located in the West. The radio intelligence provided by the Republic of Moldova resembles the situation with false signs on the shoulder straps of the German military. Only now the German command uses radio and air ...

The following mention of intelligence is available in RO KOVO (20.5.41):

According to reliable data reconnaissance and regional missile defense, the deployment of the following units and formations is confirmed: Bacau - headquarters of the 4th Army, Craiova - headquarters of 1 AK, Brasov - headquarters of 6th AK, Buzau - headquarters of 5th AK, Tekuch - headquarters of 3th AK, Pyatra Neamt - headquarters of the mountain infantry corps, Slatina - headquarters 11 pd ...

Information about the deployment of the headquarters of the Romanian army was obtained from the intelligence sources of the RO, and the radio communications intercepted by radio intelligence were tied to the locations of the headquarters.

Continued Summary:

Radio intelligence data confirm the supply of building material to the border with the USSR. For the period from 30.4. before 2.5, 10 wagons of cement arrived in Tirgu Frumos. From 21.3 to 17.4 at the station 3 km south. Iasi imported 46 kg of round and square iron. 890 thousand beech and oak sleepers were sent to Pyatra-Neamt station ...
At the end of April, the same data established the increased movement of military echelons in the area of ​​Braila, Bacau, Roman, Pashkani, Iasi ... According to radio intelligence, aircraft masters and wireless telegraphists aviation enlisted in the Air Force ... According to radio intelligence, 27.4 at Braila station [30 km from the Soviet-Romanian border. - Note Aut.] unloaded German motorized part ...

It is very likely that these RMs are obtained from open negotiations. The place of unloading of the German motorized unit is doubtful, since there were no German motorized or tank units on the territory of Northern Dobrudja and Moldova before the war. However, the intelligence intelligence of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the NKVD border troops repeatedly confirmed their presence in a significant amount ...

Since the beginning of April, undercover intelligence has provided overestimated information about the presence of German troops in the Romanian border areas (RU summary from 4.4.41): "German troops in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja in total about 9 infantry and one motorized division ..." By 22.6.41, it was already said that there were up to 16 divisions (including up to 2 TD and 6 MD), but these RMs were not disproved by radio intelligence either. Let us analyze the only published report that contains detailed information that came from radio intelligence.

Special communication of the headquarters of Pribovo (5.6.41):

Radio intelligence data: German military radio stations on the territory of East Prussia continued to work on the following radio networks: a) The radio network of the High Command - Berlin; subordinates: Koenigsberg, Danzig, Stettin, Poznan, Breslau.

Radio scouts could only identify the main radio station in Berlin and the subordinate radio stations without indicating the headquarters designation. During this period, the headquarters of the 18th A, 8th AK and 1st VO are stationed in Koenigsberg. Which of these subscribers was supported by radio communication with? Radio intelligence officers do not know this and therefore do not indicate it. We can assume that we are talking about the headquarters of the 18th A.

In Danzig there is the headquarters of the 20th Military District, and to the east, in the town of Elbeng, there is the command of the GR “Sever”, which neither radio intelligence nor undercover intelligence could detect before the outbreak of war. This is probably why, when Danzig is mentioned, then we should talk about radio communications with the North.

There are no major headquarters in Stettin except for the headquarters of the 2nd VO. What should the radio talks from Berlin with this headquarters be about? It is impossible to find out. The only thing that comes to mind is sea airfields and air observation posts located on the coast.

The radio connection with Poznan and Breslau is a connection with the command of the State Center and the South, which are also not detected by our intelligence.

Continuation of special messages:

The radio network of the army group of East Prussia. Home Koenigsberg; subordinates: Insterburg, Ortelsburg. Radio stations in Letzen and Stallupenen are not marked in the work ...

The report talks about the army radio network. Our intelligence knows that the headquarters of the 18th A is located in Koenigsberg. Consequently, this should be the negotiations of the headquarters of the 18th A with subordinate headquarters. Radio intelligence does not answer the question: what radio networks are we talking about? Either the 18th A with subordinate corps, or the 8th AK with subordinate divisions, or the 1st VO with subordinate commandant's offices?

Intelligence is confident that the headquarters of the 12th AK is located in Insterburg. From 14.4.41, the headquarters of the 5th AK relocated from Belgium appears in Ortelsburg. The headquarters of this corps was never subordinated to the 18th A. What could be talked about between the headquarters of a foreign army and the headquarters of the AK, subordinated to 9th A? The author would suggest that negotiations were recorded with the headquarters of the 4th TGr, which was stationed near Allenstein. Other units or associations subordinate to 18th A were absent in the area.

In the town of Letzen, according to RM intelligence, there is an AK headquarters, and in Stallupenen - the 214th Infantry Regiment. In fact, from April 1941, the headquarters of the 26th Front was stationed in Letzen, which in May 1941 was subordinate to the 38th AK. The corps headquarters is located southwest of Koenigsberg. It is possible that these networks were discovered by radio intelligence.

Since May 1941, the headquarters of the 121st infantry division, subordinated to the 2nd AK (headquarters - Gumbinen), has been deployed not far from the city of Stallupenen. The 2nd AK until the middle of April 1941 was subordinated to the 18th A, and from April 22nd to the headquarters of the 9th A.

Continuation of special messages: “The radio network of 12 AK with the main walkie-talkie in Insterburg was not marked in the reporting period”.

Since March 1941 (possibly earlier), the 12th and 7th AKs (mention of it will be slightly lower) are subordinate to 4th A and maintained contact with its headquarters. Therefore, they did not need to negotiate with the headquarters of the 12th and 7th AK with the headquarters of a foreign army.

The problem was also that the radio network of the 12th AK could not be present in Insterburg, because the headquarters of this corps from December 1940 to the end of April 1941 was in Gnesen. In May 1941, he was relocated to Radom, and in early June he received an order to go to the border in the town of Biala Podlaska. It is not known who exactly the undercover and radio intelligence mistook for the headquarters of the 12th AK in Insterburg ... One can only say that the accurate and double-checked RM turned out to be misinformation. One of two conclusions suggests itself: either the German command conducted a radio game on the air, or the radio reconnaissance could not provide anything other than data on radio networks ...

Continuation of special messages: “The radio network of 20 AK on the previous wave of 970 mt [mt - meter - author's note] did not work. The main work was carried out - Danzig with subordinates in Chojnice and Koscezhina on a wave of 133 mt and with a radio station in Elbing on a wave of 64 mt ".

According to intelligence, the headquarters of the 20th AK is stationed in Danzig, which is confused with the headquarters of the 20th VO. 285th is stationed near Khoitice, and 207th security divisions are stationed at Kosyozhin. In Elbing, the management of the GRA Sever is deployed. Presumably, we are talking about the connection of a certain headquarters subordinate to the rear protection service of the GRA "North" with subordinate divisions.

Continuation of special messages: “The radio network of the corps Stettin worked as part of: the main - Stettin; subordinates: Neustattin (on a wave of 258 mt.), Stralsund, Shpyulp (on a wave of 133 mt) ".

The radio network that was mistaken for the corps group network is actually the headquarters of the 2nd Military District. Subordinate radio stations: Neustattin, Stralsund and Schlup are commandant's offices (from a large number) that are subordinate to the 2nd Military District. The headquarters of the security forces and the commander of the rear area of ​​the GR Sever (RHG101) are also located in Neustattin. Once again, the intelligence data does not say anything about the true designations of the subscribers.

Continuation of special messages: “The radio network of 7 buildings. The main radio station is Tilsit; subordinate Shilute ".

According to intelligence, in Tilsit is the headquarters of the 7th AK. The headquarters of the 7th AK from the end of April until 16.6.41 is deployed near Warsaw in the city of Zegrze. The indication of him in the RM as of 1.6.41, as well as the alleged presence of the communications battalion of the 7th AK, can only testify to the misinformation slipped by the German command.

Who is so confidently monitored in Tilsit by our intelligence and radio intelligence? In fact, the headquarters of the 26th AK, which is subordinate to the 18th A., has been located in Tilsit since the end of April. The headquarters of the 61st infantry division from the 26th AK is located in Shilute. Again, we came across a pattern: as soon as accurate and cross-checked data appearing in the Republic of Moldova indicating the number of the unit or headquarters, in the vast majority of cases, this turns out to be misinformation ...

Continuation of special messages: “A radio network in the district of Letzen. Home - Letzen; subordinates: Allenstein, Angerburg, Suwalki ".

As mentioned above, the headquarters of the 26th front is located in Letzen. The 9th A headquarters and the advanced group of the 3rd TGr headquarters are stationed not far from it. It is possible that one of the two indicated subscribers was mistaken for a radio station in Letzen.

Slave radio station in Allenstein. Near Allenstein there is a headquarters of the 39th mk (from the 3rd TGr), headquarters of the 41st mk (from the 4th TGr) and the 403rd security division, subordinate to the 9th A. Who spoke to whom and who the radio stations had in mind the scouts are not clear ...

The city of Angerburg belongs to the zone of responsibility of the 16th A, and it was not possible to attach the headquarters or units (from the division and above) to this city - they are not there.

In Suwalki the headquarters of the 6th front from the 6th AK, subordinate to the 9th A.

It can be seen that radio stations are fixed by radio intelligence, which are tied to settlements, in which there are no headquarters ...

Continuation of special messages: “The radio network of Warsaw. Home - Warsaw; subordinates: Prasnysh, Radom, Dzialdovo ".

Headquarters of 4th A is located in Warsaw. In Prasnysh, the presence of military units or headquarters was not found. Nearby is the training camp "Mlawa" (not to be confused with the city of Mlawa). Perhaps a connection was established with him.

In the city of Radom there is the headquarters of the 12th AK, subordinate to the 4th A. North of Dzialdovo is the 5th front and 57th microns from the 3rd TGr. It is difficult to say again with whom exactly could conduct radio talks from Warsaw ...

Consider one of the last pre-war reports that talk about radio intelligence.

Special communication of the headquarters of ZAPOVO (according to data on 20.6.41):

According to intelligence and radio data, the headquarters of the corps are installed in the following points: Radin, Lukov, Mezhirechye. According to radio intelligence, in Warsaw, two large radio stations have been established that independently communicate with the headquarters of the main command - Berlin. Perhaps one of the radio stations belongs to the headquarters of the Eastern Group, relocated to Otwock, the second to the headquarters of the 8th army ...

According to intelligence and radio intelligence in the city of Radin (Radzun) is the headquarters of the corps. From the evening of June 16, 1941 until the evening of June 19, there were no corps headquarters in this city.

In the city of Lukov in the evening of 16.6.41 there was not just the headquarters of the corps, but the headquarters of the 24th uJune 19, which is already at the border. In the evening of June 19, the headquarters of the 53rd AK is deployed in Lukov. There were corps headquarters in the indicated city, but neither intelligence intelligence nor radio intelligence could detect their replacement and relocation closer to the border.

In the city of Mezhirechye (Miedzyrzeche) from June 16 to 20 there were no constantly corps headquarters, except for those moving to the border. Somewhere from June 18-19, the headquarters of the 2nd TGr proceeded through the city. From June 20, the headquarters of 4th A. began to be located in the city. No reconnaissance was detected on the movements of the 2nd TGr and 4th A headquarters to the border.

According to radio intelligence, in the Warsaw area there are two radio stations that communicate with Berlin. Of the major radio stations in this area, we can only talk about stations at the headquarters of 4th A and 2nd TGr. The headquarters of the 2nd TGr was not discovered by the intelligence services before the war, as a large headquarters of a mobile group. The headquarters number of 4th A is confused with the headquarters of 8th A. Headquarters of 8th A has long been featured in the Republic of Moldova, which has been repeatedly checked, although it has not existed since the autumn of 1939. But someone constantly lights it up. Otherwise, the information about the exact number of the army cannot be explained ... Intelligence is also mistakenly tracking the mythical and only headquarters of the front in the East - the headquarters of the Eastern group. However, this headquarters has not commanded troops in the East since September 1940. It was also misinformation ...

Conclusions

The following conclusions can be made.

1. The management of the spacecraft and airplanes needed information on the presence and location of large headquarters.

This is evidenced by the special message of RU shortly before the war: “We ask that the means at your disposal help the RU verify, identify and clarify the following issues: The deployment of the headquarters of the German armies and the headquarters of army groups in all theaters of military operations of Germany against the USSR”.

General Vladimirov directly reproaches intelligence that the 1st TGr was not discovered: "The concentration of the 1st TGr before the 5th Army ... was not noted at all ...".

Similar words are also reflected in the memoirs of the head of the KOVO operational department, Marshal Baghramyan: “After all, neither the drug dealer, nor the chief of the General Staff knew that the German motorized corps had rushed from Sokal to Radzehuv in a region free of our troops and that the same corps was trying to break through from Ustilug to Lutsk ...”

The former head of the Republic of Uzbekistan after the war cites as a merit of intelligence: “Soviet military intelligence knew and continuously monitored the massive transfer of troops to our border ... This is most convincingly evidenced, for example, by the last report of our GRU before Hitler Germany’s attack on the USSR ... This is report No. 5 of June 15, 1941 ...

As part of this mass of troops, the locations of the headquarters of seven armies, twenty-two corps were found and recorded ... The vast majority of them had numbers for these divisions and armies, as well as numbers for half of the corps departments ... ".

We analyzed in detail the indicated summary and some other RM. This information was largely unreliable ...

2. Scouts tried to get RM at any cost, but massive German misinformation at all levels and through many countries did not allow us to reliably determine the concentration of German troops and large headquarters, as well as their exit from the depths directly to the border.

The headquarters of PribOVO, KOVO and ZAPOVO until June 21 were convinced that most German troops were located quite far from the border. This is evidenced by the maps of the headquarters of all three districts and intelligence reports of RO Pribovo dated June 17 and 21, 1941. In KOVO, the movement of German troops was associated with the expected exercises. In ZapOVO they managed to reveal the approach of the German troops, but the district commander disciplinedly followed instructions from Moscow. Misinformation about the pending exercises of the German troops came from other intelligence.

Special message of the NKGB (20.6.41): “... It has been officially announced that the other day large maneuvers of the German army will be carried out, in connection with which the population is called upon to maintain calm ...”

3. One of the most unpleasant intelligence mistakes was not detecting enemy mobile groups: TGr and mk. Without the presence of such groups, the German command could not start a war. Otherwise, you could put an end to the blitzkrieg ...

In the 2nd part of the article it was shown that intelligence data on the presence of tank divisions were unreliable. For example, in three places where, according to reliable data, there were three etc., they simply did not exist until the end of May 1941. In the spring, an article will be presented on intelligence data regarding the German mobile forces: cavalry, motorized and tank troops.

Comments

[cavl]

Thanks to the author for the interesting materials presented!
I read it with great interest.

[aKtoR]

Thank you for the detailed and multifaceted analysis of the information received from our valiant intelligence!
Enjoyed: fellow
I express my deep greetings to the readers with whom I had to kindly communicate and whose support I felt

[ivamoss]

Baa, familiar faces on my favorite subject .. Hello Victoria
Good luck in all your endeavors and personal life !!

[ivamoss]

Colleagues, we’ll hit our enemies with minuses and support our forces at the tip of the strike with pluses

[ccsr]

Quote: ivamoss

Colleagues, we’ll hit our enemies with minuses and support our forces at the tip of the strike with pluses

If your knowledge is not enough to argue objectively, then it remains like you are only minus one. Moreover, as I have already noted, none of you have yet seriously been able to refute something from the fact that critics of articles by the illiterate author Eugene write. Pour out the soul and the facts proving that he is right - we will listen with interest ...

[antivirus]

interesting
1. how Franzia "knew everything" at 40 (a clever move to save the nation) and became a member of the UN Security Council in 45
2. as the Britons decrypted everything in 39-41 until the moment the Red Army washed its blood and broke off the teeth of the Wehrmacht - the strength of the forces of SukhPut troops leveled - they did not want to land in 42 g in Normandy
3.Compare the above mentioned failure in the article and how much time and effort was spent to determine the Wall of Normandy by 06.44. For the "successful" landing of the allies

cyclists are to blame for everything ..

[svp67]

Before the war, radio scouts could only record: on what wavelength, approximately from which settlement did German radio stations get in touch.

It is only on condition that the enemy violated radio silence, and the Germans were docks in terms of radio masking and radio games ...

[polpot]

Great article, we look forward to continuing.

[Operator]

"The leadership of the spacecraft and military organization needed information about the presence and location of large headquarters:" We ask the means at your disposal to help the Republic of Uzbekistan in checking, identifying and clarifying the following issues: Dislocation of German army headquarters and headquarters of army groups in all theaters of military operations in Germany against the USSR.
Similar words are reflected in the memoirs of Marshal Baghramyan, Chief of the Operations Department of KOVO: “After all, neither the People's Commissar nor the Chief of the General Staff knew that a German motorized corps had rushed from Sokal to Radzekhuv across the area free of our troops and that a similar corps was trying to break through Lutsk ... ""

Kindergarten - it turns out that intelligence should not only track the number of Wehrmacht divisions on the Soviet border, but also provide their exact link to the location, the location of higher headquarters, a radio communication system, etc. etc. (as well as wiping asses for Red Army staff, running for beer and cigarettes, scrubbing boots and much, much more)

And stirring their brains (in terms of ascertaining the dynamics of the increase in the number of these divisions at the border up to exceeding the control level set by the beetles and Baghramians themselves) was too lazy for the staff of the Red Army.

What, in FIG., Does the exact numbering of divisions, corps and army groups of the Wehrmacht matter - if, for example, in mid-June 1941, the deployment of the 13th Army Corps was indicated in the Red Army reconnaissance report in the Belorussian Military District, but in fact it turned out to be the 5th or 22nd, then something would have changed for the Red Army after June 22? Or knowledge of the location of the headquarters of this corps: like there is no data - then they will not attack?

Head of the Operations Department of the Southwestern Front Headquarters Baghramyan, in the memoirs cited above, directly writes about the real (and not contrived by the author of the article) reason for the defeat of the Red Army Covering Army - its undevelopment at the time of the Wehrmacht's attack ("from Sokal rushed to Radzekhuv across the area free of our troops") ... Well, what does the numbering of enemy military units and formations, as well as the deployment of their headquarters, have to do with the deployment of the Covering Army?

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

Kindergarten - it turns out that intelligence should not only track the number of Wehrmacht divisions on the Soviet border, but also provide their exact link to the location, the location of higher headquarters, a radio communication system, etc. etc. (as well as wiping asses for Red Army staff, running for beer and cigarettes, scrubbing boots and much, much more)

According to the author of the statues, this was exactly what the Red Army intelligence should have been doing, only this amateur still does not know what means she possessed, and they would be enough to satisfy all the Wishlist of this verbiage.
.

Quote: Operator

What, in FIG., Does the exact numbering of divisions, corps and army groups of the Wehrmacht matter - if, for example, in mid-June 1941, the deployment of the 13th Army Corps was indicated in the Red Army reconnaissance report in the Belorussian Military District, but in fact it turned out to be the 5th or 22nd, then something would have changed for the Red Army after June 22? Or knowledge of the location of the headquarters of this corps: like there is no data - then they will not attack?

Absolutely correct remark, especially since during the war there were constant reorganizations of many formations and associations of the warring parties, the numbers and composition of which changed. And therefore, it is much more important to know not the numbers of divisions, but their combat readiness, staffing with weapons, equipment and personnel and its purpose. And all the tales of the author of the statues are designed for amateurs in military affairs - he is simply a fan of dusting various clippings of cards, but the most interesting thing is that he never leads them completely with links to the source.

Quote: Operator

The head of the operations department of the headquarters of the South-Western Front Baghramyan directly writes in the memoirs quoted above about the real (and not contrived by the author of the article) reason for the defeat

Naturally, he could not indicate that he did not have intelligence information, not to mention that the intelligence chief was not subordinate to him at all, but directly reported to the chief of staff, so that he could not judge the quality of intelligence materials.
By the way, the author is constantly lying in his conclusions, as for example in this text:

It should be noted that the OSNAZ radio divisions located near the border were subordinate to the RO of the HE headquarters and therefore their information was included in the RO reports. Consequently, some important materials could not exist that passed by the RO and supposedly got into the secret archives of the RU.

Only an amateur can write such nonsense, because in addition to radio divisions (they have several radio stations, and not all at the border), there were also separate radio stations in the districts to intercept encrypted messages, and if it was not possible to decrypt such information on the spot, then it sent to the Intelligence Agency, and there it could be decrypted by specialists, i.e. in the district they could not know that they intercepted the encryption content. And there are many such mistakes in his text - I will dwell on them in detail later.

[VS]

Quote: Operator

Or knowledge of the location of the headquarters of this corps: like there is no data - then they will not attack?

that’s why the author is hiding behind the network clique - so as not to ridicule this falsifier in the PERSON))

[VS]

Quote: Operator

In the memoirs cited above, Baghramyan directly writes about the real (and not contrived by the author of the article) reason for the defeat of the Red Army cover army - its non-deployment at the time of the Wehrmacht attack

ALL normal military and military historians show - the REASON was not in intelligence, but in the PLANS of our General Staff themselves, which managed to spoil everything with their idiotic idea of ​​a counter-blitzkrieg - which led to the tragedy of the outbreak of war, but anonymous clowns are not appeased in any way - they are smarter than Bagramyanov, Zakharovs and officers of VNU GSh and IVI)))

[aKtoR]

Hello Operator!
Good to see you again!
When a long time ago you had an idea about an interesting article for me ... Was it possible to implement it or not?
Unless, of course, remember what we were talking about ...

[Operator]

To my shame I forgot.

[aKtoR]

So she didn’t appear ...
It was about a possible conflict between the United States and China, which could turn into a more global event ...
Then we, together with the respected Stary26, corresponded together ...
That was a long time ago...
Good luck !!
Sincerely, Victoria

[Operator]

Over the past time, I posted to the VO the nth amount of my comments on the well-known scenarios of a possible nuclear conflict between the USA and the Russian Federation - as part of the concept of escalation for de-escalation (when considering the relevant articles).

The scenario of a possible nuclear conflict between the United States and China (published somewhere) is still unknown to me, and I am afraid to invent my own (God forbid, I’ll smooth it out).

[Seal]

Similar words are reflected in the memoirs of Marshal Baghramyan, Chief of the Operations Department of KOVO: “After all, neither the People's Commissar nor the Chief of the General Staff knew that a German motorized corps had rushed from Sokal to Radzekhuv across the area free of our troops and that a similar corps was trying to break through Lutsk ... ""

In fact, the task of informing Moscow about all this was precisely on the Baghramyan himself. Well, through his superiors, of course. Moreover, the head of the operations department, Colonel Bondarev, daily informed the operations department.
From the memoirs of Baghramyan

“The intelligence department of the district began to receive information one more alarming than the other. Our intelligence officer, Colonel G.I. Bondarev, became almost the most frequent visitor to the commander. We noticed that after each conversation with him M.P. Kirponos became increasingly gloomy. There was enough reason for alarm. Bondarev daily informed the operations department about information from various sources.

[AsmyppoL]

He informed when intelligence provided the materials.
From April to noon on June 22, intelligence did not provide such information.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

He informed when intelligence provided the materials.
From April to noon on June 22, intelligence did not provide such information.

This infamous lie of the author of the statues is easily refuted by those military leaders who himself participated in the Great Patriotic War:

In his memoirs, the work of intelligence under the leadership of F.I. Golikova was evaluated by Marshal G.K. Zhukov: “What did we know then about the German armed forces concentrated against the Soviet Union? According to the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, headed by General F.I. Golikov, additional transfers of German troops to East Prussia, Poland and Romania began at the end of January 1941. Intelligence believed that in February and March the grouping of enemy troops increased by nine divisions: against the Baltic region - into three infantry divisions; against the Western District - into two infantry divisions and one tank; against the Kiev district - on one infantry division and three tank regiments. Information that came from General F.I. Golikova, immediately reported by us I.V. To Stalin.

Marshal A.A. Grechko:

“It is also appropriate to raise the question of surprise at the beginning of the war. There is an opinion that the invasion of the German fascist invaders on June 22, 1941 was completely sudden. It seems to us that such an assessment is somewhat simplistic, one-sided in nature. As we have already noted, Soviet intelligence managed to timely reveal the intentions of the enemy, the concentration and deployment of its armed forces at our borders, the timing of the attack. Another thing is that from the available information the correct conclusions were not drawn in time and all measures were taken that were in line with the situation and the data received. But here, apparently, it should be not so much about surprise as about miscalculation.
The attack of the Nazi armed forces on June 22, 1941 was sudden for the troops of the western border districts and, of course, for the Soviet people, although the leadership of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the command of the districts long before this had information about the preparation of this attack. Speaking of "surprise for the troops," we emphasize the enormous responsibility that lies with the leadership for taking all measures to prevent this surprise or to weaken its effect in every possible way.

[Seal]

Just then he could not inform. Since Baghramyan, with his operations department and the encryption department seized, left Kiev for Tarnopol (Ternopol) with a car convoy in the evening of June 21.06.1941, XNUMX, they realized that the war was passing by the city of Brody, seeing Brody being bombed by German aircraft.
And although Baghramyan claims that he reached Tarnopol by seven in the morning, but all calculations show that before 10-00 he could not get to Tarnopol. Although there is no one to confirm or deny this for a long time.

“It was still light when our convoy crossed the crowded city blocks and got out onto the Zhytomyr highway.
Before we reached Zhitomir, we heard intermittent signals from the car that was following me. I ordered the driver to curb and stop. It turned out: several cars got up due to various malfunctions. Several times during the night, it was necessary to stop the convoy. Unexpected delays disrupted the march schedule. Dawn found us not far from Brody, a small Ukrainian village buried in verdure. Here we made another ten-minute stop.
I was about to give the signal "Forward", when suddenly a rumble was heard in the air over Brody. Everyone raised their heads, peering into the sky. We knew that here we had an airfield where fighters and attack aircraft were based. Something early, our pilots began their working day ...
But booming explosions were heard. The ground flinched underfoot. Someone shouted:
- Look! Watch it! Fire!..
Puffs of smoke rose behind Brody. The trained eye of motorists determined: a fuel warehouse caught fire. Everyone froze in anxious silence. The thought burned through: "Is it really a war ?!"
The last doubts left us when we saw planes with a black swastika on planes. Freed from bombs, they were deployed above us. Three enemy bombers broke off and rushed at us. We hastened to Tarnopol already not paying attention to individual cars lagging behind the convoy.
While we were crossing the 60 kilometers remaining to Tarnopol, small groups of fascist aircraft bombed our convoy twice more. Fortunately, no serious harm was done.
We arrived ahead of schedule - at seven in the morning. They were waiting for us. Before the head vehicle reached the military camp, the gates swung open and the officer on duty silently showed me where to go.

They left Kiev "it was still light". But so they say, when the sun has already set, but darkness has not yet come. So it was somewhere around 21:00. The distance to Tarnopol (Ternopil) via Brody along those still not straightened roads - well, somewhere around 540-550 kilometers. The average speed of the convoy on those highways and those vehicles in the dark - God forbid, 40 kilometers per hour. Plus, on the way, the convoy had to be stopped several times due to vehicle breakdowns, plus three bombings. They lost at least two hours. Total travel time is at least 15 hours. Which brings us to noon on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.
So, I believe that saying that they arrived even earlier than the appointed time, Baghramyan is lying. No wonder Kirponos shouted at them. But there is no one to refute it. Few survived. And Purkayev - he can even say thanks to Bagramyan. After all, by his statement that they arrived in Tarnopol on time, Bagramyan eliminates the mistake of Purkayev himself, who had organized the relocation of the Headquarters in this way.

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

The average speed of the column on those highways and those vehicles in the dark - God forbid, 40 kilometers per hour.

The headquarters column always moves faster than warheads, so that they could drive more than 40 km in an hour along the highway with the headlights on (the war has not yet begun) and with the traffic controllers set up.

Plus, on the road, the convoy had to be stopped several times due to vehicle breakdowns,

The headquarters column never stops due to breakdowns of cars, but simply transplant everyone into other cars from headquarters buses.

Quote: Seal

plus three bombings. This is at least two hours they lost.

On the contrary, after the bombing only increase the distance and speed.

Total travel time is at least 15 hours. Which brings us at noon on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.

It could be the last cars, and the first could well be in time by 7 o’clock, especially if they started moving not at 21 o’clock, but earlier.

[Seal]

The headquarters column always moves faster than warheads, so that they could drive more than 40 km in an hour along the highway with the headlights on (the war has not yet begun) and with the traffic controllers set up.

What traffic controllers? Where? On the highway from Kiev to Tarponol? Whose traffic controllers? Orudovskie? Or the military? Well, why fantasize from scratch about some traffic controllers. Moreover, given that such movements are carried out in confidence. And here is for you, you wanted to set up traffic controllers on the entire highway from Kiev to Tarnopol. Aren't you funny?

The headquarters column never stops due to breakdowns of cars, but simply transplant everyone into other cars from headquarters buses.

Are you trying to argue with now? With Baghramyan? Here are his words.

Before we reached Zhitomir, we heard intermittent signals from the car that was following me. I ordered the driver to curb and stop. It turned out: several cars got up due to various malfunctions. Several times during the night, it was necessary to stop the convoy. Unexpected delays disrupted the march schedule.

That is, to your opinion Baghramyan is lying and there were no unforeseen delays? And in my opinion, in this moment, he is just writing the truth. In case someone with a curvimeter in their hands would begin to check his information on movement along the route. Here, technical malfunctions and bombing would be useful. As an excuse for the late arrival of the column.

On the contrary, after the bombing only increase the distance and speed

Well, here you offend German pilots. If the convoy was moving along the highway without paying attention to the bombing, the Germans would certainly have disabled half the convoy. Another thing is if the column was dispersed and waited for raids in roadside copses.

[icant007]

Quote: Seal

Are you trying to argue with now? With Baghramyan? Here are his words.

And here are his words:

After the first bombing near Brody, "we hastened there (to Tarnopol - my note), no longer paying attention to individual vehicles lagging behind the convoy."

I.Kh Baghramyan "This is how the war began", p. 84

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

What traffic controllers? Where? On the highway from Kiev to Tarponol? Whose traffic controllers? Orudovskie? Or the military?

Naturally, the military - even before the main convoy’s exit, the commandant’s service sends them on the route of movement.

Quote: Seal

Well, why fantasize from scratch about some traffic controllers.

Have you heard anything about the district military service, or so, purely theoretical ideas?

Quote: Seal

And here is for you, you wanted to set up traffic controllers on the entire highway from Kiev to Tarnopol.

Do not make the audience laugh, because they are displayed at a certain stage, and taken away after passing the headquarters column, overtake the column and are again exposed in a new section. By the way, for this there were motorcycle companies or platoons.

Quote: Seal

Aren't you funny?

It’s funny to me from your ideas about the organization of the movement of columns in the army — you obviously didn’t serve unless you can imagine how all this is organized.

Quote: Seal

That is, to your opinion Baghramyan is lying and there were no unforeseen delays?

It’s not Baghramyan who is lying, but you’re fantasizing too much about his memoirs. Well, they stopped for a minute or two, a command followed to leave the broken cars and transfer to another, and after 5 minutes the convoy would continue moving, leaving faulty equipment for the technical services of the autobaht serving the district headquarters, which follow the main convoy. After the restoration of the breakdown, these vehicles can catch up with the main convoy before the end of the march - all military drivers are specially taught this during the training 500 km of marches.

Quote: Seal

Well, here you offend German pilots. If the convoy was moving along the highway without paying attention to the bombing, the Germans would certainly have disabled half the convoy.

So their task could be different - to destroy convoys with tanks and artillery, and after that they could simply have no bombs or fuel left to pursue an unknown convoy far from the border.

Quote: Seal

Another thing is if the column was dispersed and waited for raids in roadside copses.

They wait a few minutes from the force, and begin to move further so that the enemy does not have time to return - this is the law of war. So there couldn’t be very large delays, but the average speed after the first raid immediately increases, because I start to drive at maximum speed.

[Seal]

Woooo again spawned that entities. And only with the help of three "P" (finger, floor, ceiling).
Moreover, your column itself is flying faster than the wind, or it turns out that there were supposedly even more airborne motorcyclists who allegedly overtook the column, got off the motorcycles, stood on the sidelines, and upon arrival the columns again got on the motorcycle and again overtook it.

for technical services of the autobaht serving the district headquarters, which follow the main convoy.

Which car? Who told you that an autobaht was moving behind the headquarters column?

They wait a few minutes from the force, and begin to move further so that the enemy does not have time to return - this is the law of war. So there couldn’t be very large delays,

This is in the front-line zone. What enemy could "quickly return" from airfields in Poland back to Zhitomir?

but the average speed after the first raid immediately increases, because I start to drive at maximum speed.

And what prevented you from starting to drive at maximum speed right away? Afraid of catching up?
At maximum speed, only those who want to catch the nearest crater from a bomb burst are driving along the highway that was recently bombed.

chase an unknown column far from the border.

That is, the Germans will find themselves in a convoy of cars, several buses and several trucks of the "kung" type, from which the antennas stick out, which moves to the West at maximum speed - is not interesting in FIG?
I wonder why it is the non-servicemen who so much like to build servicemen from themselves, and even really serve to get all sorts of questions?

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

Moreover, your column itself is flying faster than the wind, or it turns out that there were supposedly even more airborne motorcyclists who allegedly overtook the column, got off the motorcycles, stood on the sidelines, and upon arrival the columns again got on the motorcycle and again overtook it.

You are clearly not a military specialist, which is why your wild assumptions cause laughter in any soldier who served in the army. I explain on the fingers - at first a platoon or a couple of platoons of traffic controllers begins to move on board vehicles, and in certain places they begin to land one person at a time. The main column of the headquarters is followed by curfew cars, which collect traffic controllers after passing headquarters vehicles. When the headquarters column stops at a certain distance, they are overtaken by curfew cars and again expose the previously shot traffic controllers. Motorcycles with a sidecar are used by the commandant if they need to urgently decide on the spot or give an order before the main convoy passes - this is approximately the algorithm used when moving the columns on the march.

Quote: Seal

Which car? Who told you that an autobaht was moving behind the headquarters column?

You have no idea that the "technical services of the autobath" is not the autobath itself, but the repair platoon of the autobath

[icant007]

Quote: Seal

They left Kiev "it was still light". But so they say, when the sun has already set, but darkness has not yet come. So it was somewhere around 21:00.

It is in Siberia (somewhere in Novosibirsk) light at this time. And in / in Ukraine is dark)

[Seal]

At that time, both Moscow and Kiev were in the same time zone. And if in Moscow on June 21, 1941 at 21:00 it could already be getting dark, but in Kiev it was still definitely light. So that everything is correct. Now the time difference between Moscow and Kiev is 1 hour.

[icant007]

And the latitude is different, 5 degrees take-off run, this is more than 500 km.
Moscow and Novosib are approximately at the same degree. I won’t say anything for Moscow, but in Novosibirsk at 10 pm it could still be light.
And in the south it’s getting dark earlier. Living in the Donbass in the same latitudinal zone with Ternopol, I do not remember that it was light at 9 pm.

I can of course be mistaken)

[Seal]

We speak for Kiev. Baghramyan left Kiev when "It was still light when our column crossed the crowded city blocks and got out onto the Zhitomir highway." The calendar for 2020 gives a sunset in Kiev at 20:13. Now the time in Kiev differs from the time of June 21.06.1941, 1 by 21.06.1941 hour. Accordingly, the sunset in Kiev 21/13/XNUMX was supposed to be at XNUMX:XNUMX.

[icant007]

Moreover, the difference in time zones does not matter at all.
Only latitudinal degree matters.

And indeed, all of our complex fabrications are irrelevant), given that they left at 6 pm.

[VS]

Quote: icant007

They left Kiev "it was still light". But so they say, when the sun has already set, but darkness has not yet come. So it was somewhere around 21:00.

It is in Siberia (somewhere in Novosibirsk) light at this time. And in / in Ukraine is dark)

in those days there was Moscow time)))

[genisis]

And although Baghramyan claims that he reached Tarnopol by seven in the morning, but all calculations show that before 10-00 he could not get to Tarnopol. Although there is no one to confirm or deny this for a long time.

So, I believe that saying that they arrived even earlier than the appointed time, Baghramyan is lying.

There is no one to refute, but the Seal still believes that Baghramyan is lying. Just because he counted something there by the speed of the cars. I don’t suppose, but I know that you are lying, Seal. However, this is not the first time. And on this subject I myself have repeatedly brought to you personally documentary materials about how much, when, and where the operational department, headed by Baghramyan, arrived.
Once again, you should be ashamed of your lies in relation to those people who really took part in the Great Patriotic War. In an effort to slander Baghramyan because of his nationality, you lie against all those officers who were part of the operations department. But one of them must have been injured, maybe even killed, so you can sit and type your lies on the keyboard.

[Seal]

Again you with your fantasies. They beat you with materials, beat you, beat you again and beat you again. But again you pretend that you have always proved it. Good goalkeeper of the Caucasus national football team.

[icant007]

Quote: Seal

“It was still light when our convoy crossed the crowded city blocks and got out onto the Zhytomyr highway.

In general, Baghramyan before these words has another sentence:

No one even thought that some ten hours would be separated from the fateful moment when the peaceful course of life would suddenly be interrupted and the terrible word "war" would sound

.

We pass from 4 o'clock in the morning to 10 o'clock on the return line and we get just simply "children's" 6 ​​o'clock in the evening.

It seems to be correctly calculated? )

Therefore, gentlemen, I propose to close the topic of late Baghramyan.

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

Therefore, gentlemen, I propose to close the topic of late Baghramyan.

This topic is not worth a damn, and it’s not clear why they found fault with Baghramyan’s words in his memoirs, especially since maybe he said this in a completely different way. The course of events themselves does not refute his words.

[icant007]

Quote: ccsr

This topic is not worth a damn, and it’s not clear why they found fault with Baghramyan’s words in his memoirs.

Here I am about the same, but the question had to be honestly worked out, that is, to repulse the attack)

[genisis]

Seal always finds fault with all Armenian military leaders: Baghramyan, Khanferyants, Isakov, Madoyan, Safaryan. Any veteran of the Great Patriotic War who wore an Armenian surname is the subject of false attacks by the Seal.
And I still can’t understand why he is trying to come up with Baghramyan’s guilt in relocating to Ternopol? It was an order that the operations department carried out. So what's the problem?

[Seal]

Do you consider Madoyan a hero? What exactly was his feat found out in the Rostov search engines?
And I wonder why all three staff comrades: Bagramyan, Isakov and Khudyakov were late for the war. All three.
Baghramyan met the war on the road where Isakov was not known at all, he appeared in his people's commissar’s office only in the afternoon of 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, and Khudyakov was on sick leave (therefore, he survived and subsequently rose).

[genisis]

Do you consider Madoyan a hero?

Yes. I believe that Ghukas Madoyan completed a work worthy of a real man. But the fact is that I am nobody to assess whether heroism was what the people led by Madoyan did. But those who were a direct participant in the events, those who went through it, those people really had the right to consider their comrade a hero. It was they, as well as hundreds of ordinary Rostovites who passed on their word of mouth admiration for the courage of a Soviet soldier, who gathered every year in Rostov-on-Don and honored Madoyan.

If conscience allows, you can contact Pavel Kravchenko and ask him your questions.

where Isakov was generally unknown

Oh oh Who doesn’t know this? You?
And here is what Isakov's immediate superior, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, writes in his book "On the Course to Victory":
"In June, a training was planned on the Black Sea. But the international situation was so heated that I had a doubt: is it not better to abandon the teaching? Since it was supposed to be held together with the troops of the Odessa Military District, we requested the opinion of the General Staff. They didn’t say anything from there that would give us grounds to change our plan. As a precaution, we instructed the fleet to keep the weapons fully prepared. Admiral I. S. Isakov, chief of the Main Naval Staff, left to lead the exercise. Before we left, we agreed with him that I would immediately notify him if the situation became emergency. On the spot, he had to instruct the commander to use weapons, if necessary. "
And further there:
"...June, 22...
My deputy admiral I. S. Isakov, who arrived from Sevastopol, entered the office with a quick, energetic step. Instead of the usual report on his trip and the Black Sea Fleet’s teachings conducted under his leadership, he asked for time to understand the situation and only then report on his thoughts.
“Welcome,” I agreed.
In the evening report, already reported personally by Admiral Isakov, a significant advance of the enemy towards Libava was noted ... "
As you can see, everyone who should have known knew perfectly well where Isakov was.
Now to you, thank God)
Well, and about Khudyakov, I perfectly remember your comment one and a half year, maybe a little more than a year ago, where you wrote that Khudyakov is the only one of the military of Armenian origin who deserves respect. So you can discuss it yourself)

[Seal]

But those who were a direct participant in the events, those who went through it, those people really had the right to consider their comrade a hero. It was they, as well as hundreds of ordinary Rostovites who passed on their word of mouth admiration for the courage of a Soviet soldier, who gathered every year in Rostov-on-Don and honored Madoyan.

Yeah. Those same 800 people who went out together in Madoyan, abandoning their seriously wounded comrades and commanders.
The fact that Madoyan left both the station and the station square is a historical fact.
Nevertheless, this is exactly what is found everywhere

Member of the Great Patriotic War since June 1941. The battalion of the 159th Infantry Brigade (28th Army, Southern Front), under the command of Senior Lieutenant Ghukas Madoyan, occupied the railway junction on the night of February 8, 1943 - part of the Rostov-on-Don station, and in the morning led the combined detachment of the brigade, with which from February 8 to February 14, 1943 he defended the Rostov station. For six days of heroic defense, the detachment of G.K. Madoyan repelled forty-three attacks of the enemy, but kept the station until reinforcements arrived.

I have already shown you where the station is, and where the bakery is, where Madoyan and his "exhausted detachment" were found by the scouts of the 28th brigade. ? I can show you again.

About Isakov.
At the same N.G. Kuznetsov we read.

On June 18, the Black Sea Fleet returned from the training area to Sevastopol and received an order to remain in readiness No. 2. Most of the sailors and ship commanders did not land. Many of them then did not see their loved ones for months.

I give a scan.
And here is a scan from Shirokorad’s book. Here he writes that

Admiral Isakov was supposed to conduct a review of the exercises and stay for three to four days in Sevastopol. But for unknown reasons, he refused to participate in the analysis and went to the station. The admiral found out about the war on the train.

But Shirokorad comes from the fact that the fleet in Sevastopol allegedly returned on June 20. Although he immediately proves that on June 19 the fleet was in Sevastopol.
So, even if the Black Sea Fleet returned from the exercises on the night of June 18-19, Admiral Isakov, who was in a hurry to Moscow so much that he did not even give an analysis of the exercises, could rush to the airfield, not the train. Moreover, the Black Sea Fleet had significant own aviation. Well, okay, for example, Isakov did not like planes. But even if the train left Sevastopol on the night of June 18-19, then ... how long did the train Sevastopol - Moscow go?
I found how much the train went to St. Petersburg
http://federalcity.ru/index.php?newsid=7258

By the way, it was courier train number 1.
After the steam locomotives became more powerful, the travel time from the city on the Neva to the Black Sea was reduced to 39 hours. Approximately so many trains went during the Soviet era - the branded fast train "Neva" (No. 7-8) completely reduced the time up to 31 and a half hours.

31 hours the train went from Sevastopol to Leningrad. Subtract the time for which the train covered the distance between Moscow and Leningrad

Passenger trains covered the distance between Leningrad and Moscow in 12 hours, and the Red Arrow Express in 10 hours.

Take the time of the Red Arrow - 10 hours.
Total train from Sevastopol to Moscow reached in 21 hours.
This means that on the night of June 18-19, Isakov should have left Sevastopol the next evening, that is, in the evening of June 19-20 in Moscow.
But even if Isakov didn’t immediately go to the train station upon arrival of the fleet, and went to the hotel to rush and shave (although he had all these amenities in his cabin) and checked out only on the afternoon of June 19, then on June 20 he should have been in Moscow.
Even if he left on the morning of June 20, then on the morning of June 21, he was reported to be in Moscow.
But Isakov entered the office of his Commissar only:

В 12 hours, the party and the Soviet government appealed to the people with a statement about the attack of Nazi Germany. The party called on Soviet people to defend their homeland. The words of the appeal sounded harshly and at the same time optimistically. Our cause is right and we will win!
I order the deputy chief of the Main Naval Staff, V. A. Alafuzov, to inform the General Staff more often about what is happening in the fleets. Himself, in turn, tried to get the latest data on the situation on land fronts.
My deputy admiral I. S. Isakov, who arrived from Sevastopol, entered the office with a quick, energetic step.

That is, Kuznetsov and Molotov listened (the beginning of the speech was at 12:15, and he gave orders in due time and received the latest data, and Isakov appeared in the war.

[genisis]

Well, fullness, Seal. Again you want to seem dumber than you are.
What are the 800 people in the detachment of Madoyan? By 15/02/1943, there were 159 active fighters in the entire 500 OSBRs, according to the operative report of the headquarters of 159 OSBRs. Before drawing arrows and squares on Yandex maps and “showing” something to someone, it would not hurt to show documents of 248 cd and 159 osbr for myself during this period in order to imagine who I found and where.
Do it yourself?
Further, "about Isakov."
Shirokorad refers to an “official, but top secret” work that you have not seen in your eyes. But they are sure that it is written there. In my world, people confirm their words by presenting evidence, rather than saying that the dumb told how the deaf heard the story that the blind saw the legless man running.
Our worlds differ in this.

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

And here is a scan from Shirokorad’s book. Here he writes that
Admiral Isakov was supposed to conduct a review of the exercises and stay for three to four days in Sevastopol. But for unknown reasons, he refused to participate in the analysis and went to the station. The admiral found out about the war on the train.

If you knew what kind of nonsense you are talking about, because of the lack of understanding of military service. Isakov is not at all obliged to conduct a debriefing of the exercises - often the chiefs of this level generally decrease after the start of the exercises, and leave the dispatchers to lead the exercises, and then receive a report from them and draw a conclusion about the quality of the training of the fleet, based on the results of the exercises - this, by the way, was not even the final check. And his departure could have occurred on the personal instructions of the same Kuznetsov, who could simply say in a telephone conversation - "Drop everything and come back" and without any comments. That's why Isakov did just that. And this does not cause any surprise to a military man - any chief of staff who should be on the spot in a difficult situation would do this. And if we consider that Kuznetsov heard Vorontsov on June 22 upon his arrival in Moscow from Germany, I am not surprised that he himself or through someone else gave the order for Isakov to return to Moscow.

[Seal]

And if you knew what nonsense you carry because

lack of understanding of military service

.
And now you are rushing well, just into the open gate. In general, I never dispute the right of departure of the Chief of Staff of the Navy Isakov to Moscow indiscriminately. I draw attention to the fact that he departed from another June 19, or even June 18, 1941. The train to Moscow from Sevastopol lasted a maximum of 21 hours. But in fact, maybe even less. And the question that naturally arises from me is why Admiral Isakov deigned to come to the war after lunch on June 22.06.1941, XNUMX.

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

. I pay attention to the fact that I left from another June 19,

Why, then, did the fact, referring to Shirokorad, be said that Isakov supposedly had to conduct exercises and stay for another 3-4 days in Sevastopol?

Quote: Seal

The train to Moscow from Sevastopol lasted a maximum of 21 hours. But in fact, maybe even less.

He could not walk less, because if we assume that the fastest was 31 hours, which I doubt very much, then anyway taking 7-8 hours to go to Moscow, it turns out 23-24 hours at least.

Quote: Seal

And the question that naturally arises from me is why Admiral Isakov deigned to come to the war after lunch on June 22.06.1941, XNUMX.

But you never know what orders he learned from Kuznetsov during June 20-21 to make an elephant out of a fly? What criminal did you see in this if the People's Commissar Kuznetsov knew where Isakov was and who was performing his duties at that time in the General Staff of the NKVMF? In general, you are not digging there, an "expert" in military service and your personal dislike does not mean that it has a real basis.

[Vladimir_2U]

It should be noted that the OSNAZ radio divisions located near the border were subordinate to the RO of the HE headquarters and therefore their information was included in the RO reports. Consequently, some important materials could not exist that passed by the RO and supposedly got into the secret archives of the RU.

And yet, comrade Stalin could not think for all and for army intelligence as well. Very serious article, ATP.

[VS]

Yes, this stupid article - like ALL the previous ones)))

[icant007]

There are similar recollections of the head of the radio direction finding point of the 474th horde of ZAPOVO:



The evening of June 21 was as usual. The personnel, in addition to the shift on duty, went to rest, and I went to an apartment in the village of Rymachi, 1,5 km from the radio station. I woke up on June 22 suddenly, sat on my bed and see earth and glass on a blanket ...

Strange, Rymachi is in the band of the 5th army of KOVO. About 50 km to the junction with the neighboring ZapOVO.
What to do the direction finding point 474 of the ZAPOV ORD in the territory of neighbors? Given that the main part of the division is located in the area of ​​Semyatichi, which in a straight line is 150 km northwest. And then if you lead the line through the then Governor General.

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

What to do the direction finding point 474 of the ZAPOV ORD in the territory of neighbors?

There is nothing strange in this, such a practice existed much later. This is due to the fact that the farther apart the radio points are from the division, the more accurate direction finding can be carried out in the course of work - this is pure physics related to the propagation of radio waves and the bearing error.
By the way, the author of the articles uses the text from the book of Kiknadze, and concludes:

Nothing is said about the complete control of the situation in the book on radio intelligence of the Navy.

This lie is easily refuted by one of the competent historians of our fleet, K. Strelbitsky, in his work, which he created on the basis of notes made in the KBF Reconnaissance Journal for June 22-29, 1941:

The history of the appearance of Baltic sailors in the Bialystok region begins on March 12, 1941, when the Navy Commissar Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov made changes to the staff number 7/1-A - in peacetime staff of the 1st coastal radio detachment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (1 BRO KBF). From this day on, it included the 5th coastal radio station, or in abbreviated form - BRP-5. In the nearby large city, it was also called conditionally “BRP-Bialystok”. In 1941, it was planned to rename this PDU into a RPP - direction finding station, and transfer it to a new state with a different reporting system, but the war started earlier than these organizational events were held.
As of March 12, 1941, the base of the material part of the BRP-5 was 2 transmitting and receiving radios, 3 direction finders and 4 radios. The short-wave radio station "11-AK" of the combined arms (army) model of 1933 was located in a special "radio machine" body on the chassis of the GAZ-AA truck, where the equipment of "kit No. 34" (including the transmitter "1000-KV-1" and the receiver " 5-RKU ") under the number" 177 "of 1939 manufactured by the Gorky Plant No. 197." 11-AK "was supplemented by another car radio - the naval type" Bay ", which" in terms of power range and range was a perfectly suitable mobile radio station satisfying the requirements ”. Radio direction finders were represented by 2 sets of medium-wave offshore installations “Gradus-B” (onshore) and 1 short-wave “55-PK-3” of 1937 “with a receiver in 1938” (already at that time this equipment was critically characterized by specialists as "low sensitivity, a small range of waves and the relative usefulness of the action"). Also, all 4 radios of the station were intended for operation on short waves: the marine “KUB-4M” (“outdated, has low selectivity and sensitivity”) and the civilian model “EKL-5” (both from the production of Leningrad plant No. 210 named after Kozitsky), as well as two “special purpose radios” (or, as they were called then, “slush”) - the search “Dozor” and the overview “45-PK-1”. The combination of one of the “Degrees-Bs” together with the available “Bay” and “55-PK-3” made it possible to create a mobile direction-finding station on their basis, but this could not be done due to the lack of available vehicles. The fact is that, according to the state of BRP-5, it was supposed to have, in addition to the “1,5-ton all-terrain vehicle” (also known as the “authorization 11-AK”), one more pickup truck intended for installation “ Bays. " The rest of the regular BRP-5 vehicles — a “motorcycle with a sidecar,” 2 “scooters” (bicycles), and a “horse-drawn horse with a double wagon and sleigh” —was naturally unsuitable for the implementation of the “mobile direction finding station” project.

Based on the list of equipment, it is easy to conclude that everything was not so bad at this point, as well as at the same points of the Baltic Fleet, which were part of the radio detachment of the BF intelligence department. Here is what the paragraph reported:

Since Tykotin was about a hundred kilometers from the then “border of friendship” with Germany, the BRP-5 continued to function even after the actual start of hostilities of the Great Patriotic War. This is evidenced immediately by 18 relevant entries made in the "Journal of the intelligence branch of the KBF" on June 22-29, 1941. Getting in touch with the Squad about once every two hours, in just the first 35 hours of the Great Patriotic War, BRP-5 sailors navigated at sea about two dozen ships in Germany, Finland and Sweden (including 9 submarines, the flagship of the Finnish fleet - the Ilmarinen coastal defense battleship and at least 8 surface military ships of various classes), as well as 12 aircraft in the air and a number of aviation radio stations working from the ground. The most valuable one should be recognized as a radio interception at 11.02 on the first day of the war, when the German radio station on the island of Rügen reported in detail about two minefields exhibited by the Kriegsmarine ships in the Baltic Sea and about clear navigable fairways along the German coast.
At 14.40 on June 23 the last message was sent from Tykotin to the Detachment, stating that “from 15.30 to 19.34 Finnish planes will fly in the Abo-Aland archipelago and at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland,” and BRP-5 became silent forever ... “BRP No. 5 ( Bialystok) lost contact with the detachment at 15 pm on June 23, we read in the official report on the combat activity of the Detachment. - The personnel of the station withdrew with the units of the Red Army.

By the way, the same radio squad was available at the Black Sea Fleet, i.e. In total, naval intelligence could organize around-the-clock duty of ten radio stations before the war. Based on the availability of equipment and personnel, it can be argued that the point could simultaneously organize seven posts, i.e. only naval forces allowed expanding the work of 70 posts to open the enemy’s networks, and the work of only one was shown by K. Strelbitsky. The radio intelligence of the districts had approximately the same structure in radio divisions, but in total four border districts could put out more than twice as many posts on the eve of the war. And this completely refutes the author’s lie that our radio intelligence did not work well in the pre-war period.

[icant007]

Quote: ccsr

This is due to the fact that the farther apart the radio points are from the division, the more accurate direction finding can be carried out in the course of work - this is pure physics related to the propagation of radio waves and the bearing error.

I understand. what physics)
It just means overlapping areas of responsibility. In theory, radio direction-finding points from the right flank of KOVO should also have been on the ZAPOVO site?

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

It just means overlapping areas of responsibility. In theory, radio direction-finding points from the right flank of KOVO should also have been on the ZAPOVO site?

It is not necessary at all - the length of the KOVO border was much larger than the ZAPOVO, which is why they had enough of their territory. By the way, in the GSVG there were 82 OSN brigades, so one of its points was in Czechoslovakia, i.e. in the Central Headquarters, and it didn’t bother anyone - that’s how it was necessary for work.

[VS]

Calm down an anonymous author - not in the intelligence are the reasons for the tragedy of the outbreak of war but in the PLANES of our GS itself)))

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

According to the author, the absence of other published RM RMs for June 1941 (until June 22) is due to the fact that our intelligence was not able to adequately detect the movement of headquarters and troops of the invasion group directly to the border. This made it possible to blame the executed generals for the tragic events of June 22, 1941, and after the death of I.V. Stalin - and himself.

So, finally, the author "opened his face" and now the purpose of all his false publications becomes clear.
The author, unlike all the commanders of the Great Patriotic War, decided for them and for Stalin that there was not enough military intelligence, and precisely because of the lack of data on the movement of the Wehrmacht headquarters, our troops were defeated in the first months of the war. This is the first time I hear such a rare nonsense, and which can easily be refuted even by the fact that neither Golikov, nor a single intelligence chief of the district was shot or punished at all, which best proves that they coped with their task. To push through his false version, he uses the execution of some military leaders, although not one of them was shot for improper organization of reconnaissance, but they were punished for losing control of the troops of the district, inability to lead them in the first days of the war and for miscalculations in the combat training of troops - that at least sounded in the indictment. So the shameful attempt to whitewash the executed generals for war crimes and negligence by removing guilt from them and shifting it to military intelligence failed miserably - only a complete ignoramus can believe in this version, to which the author of the articles refers. Well, while dragging Stalin here, the author showed that he was also a vile forger - the leader had no time for this on the eve of the war, which is why he didn’t particularly go into professional intelligence affairs, including radio intelligence.
To show how false is fabricated, it is enough just to carefully study what he writes about:

Radio intelligence about the completeness of intelligence
Lieutenant General P.S. Shmyrev served in radio reconnaissance for 50 years, and 15 of them led this service. Peter Spiridonovich supplied the author of the book “The Golden Ear of Military Intelligence” with documents, materials and presented them to his colleagues.

The following is the conclusion, not of Shmyrev, but of the author of the book, the military journalist M. Boltunov, who released it five years after the death of this famous GRU man, and who has nothing to do with this conclusion:

Yes, intelligence information about the preparation of fascist Germany for the war on the Soviet Union was, but the attack itself on the night of June 22, 1941 was tactically unexpected for us. Radio reconnaissance divisions and their units were too close advanced to the state border.

Based on the text, firstly, it is clear that intelligence on the preparation of Germany for the war was, secondly, the mention of Shmyrev is generally unacceptable here, because he graduated from the academy in the summer of 1941, then studied at the courses and only in September 1941 got into the radio division Leningrad front, so that he could not give an assessment of what he did not participate in, because on June 22 he was not at the front. But the most important thing that the author of false statues does not know about is that PS Shmyrev published his memoirs twenty years before the publication of the book, and in which there are no radio intelligence estimates that Evgeny tries to attribute to him on the basis of homegrown interpretations of the book of a military journalist.

[Doctor Evil]

The author would give the structure of a separate radio division of the Red Army or something. Once upon a time, I came across information about the powerful airborne reconnaissance center deployed in the Moonsun Islands. But information from him came only to his command, there was no interaction with the army and navy.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doctor Evil

The author would give the structure of a separate radio division of the Red Army or something.

Yes, he will not give you anything, because he does not even imagine what it is and what equipment was at that time in service with this structure. Above, I gave an example of the BF BF, which details the equipment that was in service. I bring to you pages from the memoirs of a well-known reconnaissance reconnaissance detachment in the GRU, so you can compare the composition of the spacecraft of the spacecraft and the Navy:

If you carefully compare, you will see that both structures are approximately similar - three direction finders, four receivers and a radio transceiver for communication with the division.

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

Before the war, radio scouts could only record: on what wavelength, approximately from which settlement did German radio stations get in touch. They judged by the signal strength: how large the radio stations were used. Subscribers in other settlements were also registered. They tried to identify the main and subordinate radio stations by radio broadcasts. According to intelligence intelligence about the locations of the headquarters, they also tried to determine the subordination between the headquarters radio networks. If the RM of undercover intelligence was incorrect, then the conclusions about the ownership of the radio networks to specific headquarters of the German troops also turned out to be unreliable.

This nonsense, which the author of the statues spreads, is disproved by Colonel I.Z. Zakharov, doctor of sciences, in his memoirs, where he tells in detail how the educational process of radio reconnaissance was organized in 1939, and what data from Bushuev’s radio station arrived on the eve of the war in the operational division of the division:

Colonel I.Z. Zakharov emphasizes that they clearly DIRECTED the focusing German divisions at our borders, for which he was encouraged by a cash prize, which is in itself an extraordinary fact. So the author’s lies that if the agents gave the data incorrectly, then the radio intelligence data were incorrect once again proved to everyone that this layman does not understand how the entire array of intelligence information is formed even at the level of the district intelligence department.

The point at this time is still near the border. The personnel of the station, with the exception of Lieutenant Bushuyev with a driver and five killed servicemen, was captured along with all his equipment. The commander of the 394th horde is in the apartment on the morning of June 22 and unexpectedly wakes up to the sound of torn bombs. Is it possible to state on the basis of this fact that radio intelligence knew about the beginning of the war at dawn on June 22?

This is a heinous lie, because the commander of 394 hordes, Major Kotov G.I. arrived in the division to conduct exercises, which began specially early in the morning of June 21, i.e. he could not sleep at home, because Lieutenant Bushuyev was obliged to owe him at 5 am on the movement of the radio station. So this episode just shows that the division commander conducted unscheduled exercises, handing an extract from the order on the spot, because he knew that the war would begin in the near future. That is why he ordered him to leave the point of permanent deployment under the guise of exercises, and which German intelligence had uncovered even before the war during reconnaissance flights.

[Navigator_50]

In general, this is a direct hit of a "bomb" in a dugout, where 3-4 storytellers talked about how good everything was ...
After graduating from a military school, I served with one of the lieutenants in one of the intelligence departments (RU) for a long time ..
And he crawled on his belly and wound kilometers, and carried portable stations RR and RTR .. I know not from memoirs .. and how in our times RR and RTR together with OSNAZ "screwed up".
As in intelligence reports in the "Center" they composed intelligence signs and intelligence exploits.
In short, the puzzle took shape in 1941 as well - it was a word of 4 letters .. ОА and ПЖ.
41 and 43 naval rifle brigades from sailors and cadets of the naval school, which became the guard of them, I don’t remember .. and also the divisions from Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk (General Beloborodov) were sent to Moscow from the Pacific Fleet. An airborne corps was deployed from Grodekovo - my mother’s brother served in it. The whole corps disappeared - MO answers - part of the loss to the combat mission - no information .. The trains went like clockwork - 15 minutes later - the schoolchildren came to the railway because the fighters threw letters to them - triangles and they carried them to the post office .. The Ministry of Railways was a paramilitary structure ..
Yes, the Japanese did not attack the Far East simply because they didn’t need it. OIL was in the south. And in Siberia - permafrost .. they sniffed the winter in the 20s ..
The final part is killer ... Thanks to the author ..
"Zhukov - he arranged everything ..."

[ccsr]

Quote: Shturman_50

After graduating from a military school, I served with one of the lieutenants in one of the intelligence departments (RU) for a long time ..
And on the belly crawled and wrapped kilometers, and portable stations PP and RTR dragged ..

You could not serve as a lieutenant in the intelligence department, but you most likely served in the RTR company of the Special Forces brigade, and the fact that you were crawling on your belly was no different from commanders of reconnaissance groups who were also graduates of other military schools and crawled with you.

Quote: Shturman_50

I do not know from memoirs .. and how in our times the RR and RTR, together with OSNAZ, "screwed up".

But you don't even need to talk about OSNAZ - you didn't even carry on alert duty in your RTR company, so you can't judge how you could have "screwed up" in the "black" brigade - so, you heard enough gossip, and no more. Or maybe you served in the OSH brigade - educate.

Quote: Shturman_50

As in intelligence reports in the "Center" they composed intelligence signs and intelligence exploits.

Have you risen to the headquarters brigade or to the commander? I wonder where and how you could evaluate who composed and who did not?

Quote: Shturman_50

Thanks to the author ..
"Zhukov - he arranged everything ..."

In fact, Zhukov was not even a people's commissar, but only a deputy, and his term in office was less than six months before the war. You personally, in the RTR company, what did you imagine after six months of service, so that all mistakes in combat training should be blamed on you, and not on the company commander, who, for example, has commanded the company for more than a year. Have not you thought?

[icant007]

Quote: Shturman_50

And on the belly crawled and wrapped kilometers, and portable stations PP and RTR dragged ..

Strange, you wrote so famously on the marine theme. And then it turns out and crawled on his belly. What kind of troops are these? )

[Navigator_50]

Good afternoon, dear colleague! Happy Holiday - February 23 - Day of the SA and Navy!
Do you like stories about the sea? (Consequently, conduct site reconnaissance monitoring?!?!) We have them ..
In the 1970s, when the Lermontovskaya metro station was still the Krasnye Vorota station, there, across the road, there were some departments of our RU.
In the capital, then there was a fashion for various overseas souvenirs: - corals, shells, dried shark fins, shark jaws, ostrich eggs ... (much more) ..
Suddenly the Paper flies from the very top from MinInDel (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) through the Moscow Region ... The authorities, having familiarized themselves, became covered with different spots (pink-brown-raspberry). The paper was kept in strict secrecy .. they collected a commission and flew (no, not from the floundering bay, but by planning according to dates and dates). The bottom line is:
One of the BKO (Br.Kor.OSNAZ) sent ships under different flags of the auxiliary vessels to the “adversary” bases. After loosening the due time (for the RR and RTR), passing the object to the changer, the boat started the return route with the established route, regularly reporting to the Center ( RC) place, course, speed .. etc. And so until the solemn meeting in the database ..
In fact, the route was changing. The ship deviated to uninhabited coral islands and spent several days in the extraction of souvenirs, crabs, shells, etc., etc.
On the map, the movement continued to the native shores according to the transition plan. Fuel was usually saved when they were drifting at the base of the adversary .. Then they were given full speed and went on a given route, processing the souvenirs they got ..
Suddenly, during one such “special operation”, an abandoned foreign cargo ship is found that jumped out to the sandbank. The crew left, (maybe someone picked it up), the ship remained. Well, examined, took some souvenirs, some of the tools .. Arrived at the base - shared information with the next changer .. and off we go. In subsequent visits, everything was taken away - refrigerators from the cabins .. dishes, practical things (the boatswain knew) .. English cards, manuals and ship papers from the captain’s safe were thrown into the sea, and the safe was taken away, scouts were on the alert .. Well, there was a radio room, radio sets and TVs ..
Well, the “fourth” walker is already returning to the base, loaded under “I can’t”, and here our commission meets him - well, the whole command of the BKO, since it was not aware of such an increased Moscow interest .. That was 1941 .. (when the commission aboard, well, or mini Tsushima).
By the way, the initial reason for the epilogue was that the insurance company decided to check the condition and take it aground and tow the ship .. But the ship turned out to be looted, and all the premises were thrown up with cigarette butts of the Belomorkanal cigarette .. well, there were four raids. This was stated in the Paper from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - with a request to take measures (and with a cherry - radio call ships). The measures were taken for a whole week, until everything was taken to the warehouse .. some lost their posts, but by secret order. Reconnaissance, zhezh .. A certain amount of compensation paid by the USSR .. Here's a maritime reconnaissance. History.

[ccsr]

Quote: Shturman_50

But the ship turned out to be looted, and all the premises were thrown up with cigarette butts from the Belomorkanal cigarette .. well, there were four raids. This was stated in the Paper from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - with a request to take measures (and with a cherry - radio call ships).

We know the sea proverb - "The hare is not a sailor, he will not flap."
Firstly, they could receive paper from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only if they violated territorial waters or the rules of navigation.
Secondly, it was still necessary to prove that it was robbed by our sailors, and not a dozen Papuans on their junks long before they appeared.
Thirdly, there couldn’t be any cherries - the callsigns of warships are taken by radio intelligence once or twice, but this is not proof that they violated something there, i.e. need other evidence.
Well, and in the fourth - Lloyd (or other insurers) didn’t care about the ship, if there was no malicious intention to get insurance, they would still sell it after intermediaries in such a state of emergency at best.
So "sailor", prepare the stories more carefully so that they somehow look like real stories.

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

Conclusions
The following conclusions can be made.
.... Similar words are also reflected in the memoirs of the head of the KOVO operations department, Marshal Baghramyan: “After all, neither the narcotics nor the chief of the General Staff knew that the German motorized corps had rushed from Sokal to Radzehuv in the area free from our troops and that the same corps was striving break through from Ustilug to Lutsk ... "

Let’s figure out what Bagramyan knew on the eve of the war, based on the decade-long reports of the KOVO, which were published at least 22 from the beginning of 17 until June 1941. By the way, on the second page it is indicated that two maps were attached to the summary - detailed and overview.

So there was plenty of information in the district even from its own intelligence department, but not everyone understands this, and the author of the article is in the first place. Please note that the scan was made from 80 copies, i.e. all the district leadership and chiefs of the corresponding level received it in their hands. What kind of "tactical" surprise can then be discussed if the most powerful enemy grouping is deployed on the border?

[cavl]

As always, Mr. Milchakov appears and leads a bunch of scans meaningless.
Where in the summary is it written about two motorized corps about which Marshal Baghramyan wrote?
Do not be shy, Milchakov, underline the text about these buildings, something I don’t see this ....
or you again cast a shadow on the wattle fence ....

Second question. Summary states availability five motorized divisions and 4-5 five panzer divisions as of May 10, 1941 (three of them panzer divisions require verification).
Give us the names of the tank and motorized divisions, which were exactly at our border until May 10. With places of deployment!
The problem is that there was not a single such division against the KOVO troops until the end of May 1941, according to the German General Staff of the ground forces (they nevertheless revealed to Milchakova where the maps came from))) Not a single one, but you urge you to believe without checking intelligence information! Why? On what grounds?

You do not just place senseless scans, but do ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION VALIDITY. Or problems with this (with analysis).

You talk a lot about the numerous reports for June 1941. Have you seen them and why can’t you imagine ?? The head of the Intelligence Agency after the war unequivocally wrote that the June 15 report was the last. Try to refute this information not with your throat and your fictional knowledge of military science, but with specific intelligence reports issued between June 16 and 21 (inclusively at both borders). Then you can still listen to your words, supported by facts. And so the meaningless and unproven babskiy demand.

The Intelligence Directorate's report of June 15, 1941 was examined in great detail by Eugene: both for infantry divisions and infantry regiments, and for headquarters of all ranks that were reliably in the places indicated by the summary. So which of the data in the summary is correct? Carry out an analysis and imagine 3-4 dozen German compounds that were reliably located at the border. Let's get facts and analysis.

No womanish words: but everything is not right ....
Why is it wrong?
And couch expert Milchakov thinks so ...

Why so? If he constantly writes all kinds of nonsense ... A concrete example. The reader asked about the structure of the radio division ... Why write something from a book about the radio station? These are military units of different content!

Or drawn words about direction finding and cash bonus payments ?! If the direction finding was correct and all German divisions were spotted, then why is the May 15 reconnaissance report showing the wrong locations for German divisions and headquarters. why the wrong designation of these formations ?? Why are the maps of all the districts showing the incorrect locations of German troops as of June 21 ??
Give specific facts so that someone else (other than the sweet trinity) takes you into account !!!

[icant007]

Quote: cavl

The Intelligence Directorate's report of June 15, 1941 was examined in great detail by Eugene: both for infantry divisions and infantry regiments, and for headquarters of all ranks that were reliably in the places indicated by the summary. So which of the data in the summary is correct? Carry out an analysis and imagine 3-4 dozen German compounds that were reliably located at the border. Let's get facts and analysis.

But this author’s analysis - in your analysis?

Analysis of the information given in the summary No. 1 of RU dated 22.6.41 and in the memoirs of the former head of the RU, match with the Republic of Moldova (RU reports dated 31.5.41 and 15.6.41), which arrived three weeks before the start of the war and were published. This can only indicate that no other (“sensational”) materials exist in the archives.

Where do they coincide if on June 15.06, according to a summary of 120-122 divisions, and on June 23.06, about 140?
Maybe I don’t understand something.

Further, the author cites:

In the city of Lukov on the evening of 16.6.41 there was not just the headquarters of the corps, but the headquarters of the 24th military unit, which is already near the border on June 19. In the evening of June 19, the headquarters of the 53rd AK is deployed in Lukov. There were corps headquarters in the indicated city, but neither intelligence intelligence nor radio intelligence could find their replacement and moving closer to the border.

In the city of Mezhirechye (Miedzyrzeche) from June 16 to 20 there were no constantly corps headquarters, except for those moving to the border. Somewhere from June 18-19, the headquarters of the 2nd TGr proceeded through the city. From June 20, the headquarters of 4th A. began to be located in the city. No reconnaissance was detected on the movements of the 2nd TGr and 4th A headquarters to the border.

The transfer takes place a few days before 22.06/5, while the author himself admits that the permissible delay in the transfer of intelligence from agents is up to XNUMX days. And at the same time he immediately accuses that intelligence has not found.

He probably thinks that the scout stands with an iPhone and immediately posts everything in nete? Or does he not remember what he wrote?

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

Where in the summary is it written about two motorized corps about which Marshal Baghramyan wrote?

Perhaps you have problems with military knowledge, but already in April Baghramyan knew that he was in the KOVO zone "5 motorized divisions, 4-5 tank divisions (three of them require verification)", then knowing the structure of German corps and adding up the known strength, we get 9-10 divisions from the composition of motorized corps. Subtracting three requiring verification, and in the end we get a total of 6-7 German divisions in April, which in the end will just give two motorized corps in any configuration. Do you have math problems, or do you have no idea how the operators work?

Quote: cavl

Give us the names of the tank and motorized divisions, which were exactly at our border until May 10. With places of deployment!

Why on earth will I present this to you if it is possible that intelligence reports with these data have not yet been published?

Quote: cavl

You talk a lot about the numerous reports for June 1941. Have you seen them and why can’t you imagine ??

I don’t have them at home - they are in the archives of the GRU. Here, for example, these are already on the network - SCOPE No. 02 20-00 21.6.41 HQ Pribovo
Similar reports for the entire reconnaissance of the General Staff every day Golikov appeared to Zhukov, who reported to Tymoshenko accordingly. What is incomprehensible to you grief-military?

Quote: cavl

The Intelligence Directorate dated June 15, 1941 was examined in great detail by Eugene:

He did not see it in his eyes, but studied the book version, which I posted on VO - here, too, you manage to demonstrate your ignorance. And he drew ridiculous conclusions, because he did not present a single German document, but only some clippings and his own home-grown conclusions, which have not been confirmed by anything at all, especially since he already writes "probably" in his texts. Ask him what percentage of probability, for a laugh - let him tell you a fairy tale.

Quote: cavl

The reader asked about the structure of the radio division ... Why write something from a book about the radio station? These are military units of different content!

Because there are four direction finding stations in the radio division, and all the basic work lies on them. Summing up the technique of these items, you can calculate how many posts around the clock could be on duty without taking into account the receiving radio center. If you were interested in this, then you yourself could find that the order consisted of a radio interception center (reception center), a local and three peripheral radar stations, a communications center, operations department, and plus auxiliary structures. Well, if both of you are such amateurs that you don’t even know the structure of the hordes, why do you undertake to discuss the possibilities of radio intelligence in your miserable articles and comments on them?

Quote: cavl

Why are the maps of all the districts showing the incorrect locations of German troops as of June 21 ??

Firstly, I didn’t see a single real map of the district’s intelligence chief on June 21 from you both, and from Madame either. Secondly, I do not consider cheap speculation about the data as of June 1, because for three weeks the situation has changed due to the maneuvering of German troops. That’s why I have repeatedly argued that the true picture can be found out from daily intelligence reports of the head of the Republic of Uzbekistan or district intelligence chiefs, but you haven’t even heard of them, which’s why you rush about with a monthly intelligence report, as if it were the only document on the eve of the war.

Quote: cavl

Give specific facts so that someone else (other than the sweet trinity) takes you into account !!!

I know who these people are, but you, as a miserable coward, are still encrypted. Yes, and I do not believe that you introduce yourself to those who actually were in the army - you have too primitive ideas about military affairs.

[antivirus]

strange to read spitting dr in a friend.
glasses against glasses.
until the Minister sends some to Magadan and others up the ladder and nothing will work out right now.

[cavl]

[quote = ccsr] Quote: cavl
Where in the summary is it written about two motorized corps about which Marshal Baghramyan wrote?

ccsr: Perhaps you have problems with military knowledge, but already in April Bagramyan knew that in the KOVO zone there were "5 motorized divisions, 4-5 tank divisions (three of them require verification)", so knowing the structure of the German corps and adding the known number, we get 9 -10 divisions from the motorized corps. Subtract the three requiring verification, and as a result, we will get a total of 6-7 German divisions in April, which in the end will give two motorized corps in any configuration. Do you have problems with math, or do you have no idea how operators work?

Quote: cavl
Give us the names of the tank and motorized divisions, which were exactly at our border until May 10. With places of deployment!

ccsr: Why on earth will I present this to you if it is possible that intelligence reports with these data have not yet been published?

So I am for all readers and show that you are not able to conduct analysis. Indeed, according to intelligence on May 31, 1941, there are 13 motorized and 14 tank divisions from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Only 27 divisions. In fact, 1 and 6 tank divisions are in East Prussia, and 4 tank divisions are in Poznan. There are no motorized divisions in East Prussia and former Poland at all. Total, our intelligence was mistaken nine times in divisions. Almost an order of magnitude difference in data. This cannot be a mistake ...
I asked you to indicate the locations of twenty-four non-existent divisions near our border. And you were immediately blown away ...

In fact, our intelligence has been deceived even more. There are no motorized regiments and divisions where the intelligence saw them. I did not consider them. Intelligence saw 13 motor divisions - so be it. Eugene probably will consider this in more detail.
Let's look at the summary by June 1, 1941 in terms of tank units and divisions. After all, Mr. Milchakov believes her!
If you count all the tank units (I did not count the headquarters of the tank divisions and tank brigade), it turns out that in East Prussia there are 6 tank battalions and 5 tank regiments. In the Warsaw direction - 4 battalions and 6 regiments. Against KOVO - four tank divisions, two battalions and 5 regiments.

A total of 4 divisions, 16 regiments and 12 battalions. And how many actual tank divisions ??
In the spring of 1941, the Wehrmacht’s tank division had one tank regiment of two- or three-battalion composition. And how many tank divisions did the Germans have at the border, if we consider the data of our intelligence exclusively reliable? Do not forget about the two tank divisions at our border in Romania. That the error was less to consider the tank regiments of the three-battalion composition.

So it turns out a crazy number of twenty-six tank divisions! and to them 13 more motorized. 39 tank and motorized divisions ...
Not funny? Is fraud a fit of false intelligence under the actual number of divisions ???

Now about the main thing - about motorcases. If intelligence found something incomprehensible that she mistook for tank units, then she tracked them until June 21. This can be seen on the maps of four districts where tank divisions are located where they have never been - far from the border. And near the border there are small tank units. That is why Marshal Baghramyan writes about unexpected breakthroughs of two motorized corps. Well, you don’t understand this, Mr. Milchakov .......

[icant007]

Quote: cavl

There are no motorized divisions in East Prussia and former Poland at all.

I mean who doesn’t? In our report or in fact?

[cavl]

In fact, somewhere around the beginning of 1941, there were no German motorized divisions in East Prussia and former Poland. The only 60 motorized division was stationed near Danzig until mid-December 1940. Then she left from there.
More MD until the end of May 1941 in the territories indicated above in fact no. There are errors on the site that you found yourself. I already checked it myself. If I am not mistaken, there was another tank division, but it left East Prussia in early 1941.
But from the first days of June 1941, the German units trampled the shaft through the railway stations. It seems that in the documents I still met the numbers May 30 and 31.

[icant007]

Quote: cavl

There are errors on the site that you found yourself. I already checked it myself.

http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/ - короче этот сайт можно отправить в урну.

Hooray! Comrades, we have won.

The author, who built his articles, including on this source, admits that he drove empty)

With the day of victory over German agents, ideological sabotage failed!

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/ - короче этот сайт можно отправить в урну.

I directly burst into tears when I read on this site:

Support the Wehrmacht's vocabulary with a small donation our association. With your donation, you help cover the costs of this site and expand it. Many thanks!
Webmaster: Andreas Altenburger

And our mitrofanushki vparivali us that they almost took their cards in the archives of Germany, in general, the business of Ostap Bender lives and thrives.

Quote: icant007

With the day of victory over German agents, ideological sabotage failed!

From the first publications of a certain madam, the thought crept into me that this was a commission, or an absolutely illiterate person who does not know how to systematize military documents writes, and dumping everything in a heap and making a name for himself on this. Now a certain Eugene has been added to these pseudo-researcher - apparently Rezun's "laurels" do not allow them to sleep well. And how a certain cavl posed as an "expert" from himself, trying to lecture us, and how pitiful he is now making excuses, even funny:

Quote: cavl
On the site that you found yourself there are errors. I already checked it myself.

[icant007]

Quote: cavl

The only 60 motorized division was stationed near Danzig until mid-December 1940. Then left from there.

The strange word "left". I can understand when Isaev says "the division has arrived, left", or in general "is sitting") He is forgiven, he is a civilian.

But you are something like a military man, ay-yay.

[cavl]

I was waiting for something like this
Everything is very simple. On the map, German officers often drew an arrow from the location of the serving division. And above her a train. Even a spiral-shaped smoke was drawn from a train pipe. And at the place of her arrival, the arriving engine was painted again. And these arrows supplied dates of departure and arrival.
So it turns out that the divisions left and arrived

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

Let's look at the summary by June 1, 1941 in terms of tank units and divisions. After all, Mr. Milchakov believes her!

If you have documents refuting it, then submit them here, and not the arguments of a certain Eugene, who speculates on unknown data taken from, and the period from March-May 1941.

Quote: cavl

Total, our intelligence was mistaken nine times in divisions. Almost an order of magnitude difference in data.

Yes, our intelligence was not mistaken - it showed captured documents. A mistake is in your head because you still have not learned that the plan for moving the connection can be completed within a few months. Knowing the displacement plan itself, which could have been obtained by agents, and comparing it with the arriving units at the time indicated in it, we can draw the correct conclusion about where the entire unit will be on the eve of the war.

Quote: cavl

So it turns out a crazy number of twenty-six tank divisions! and to them 13 more motorized. 39 tank and motorized divisions ...
Not funny? Is fraud a fit of false intelligence under the actual number of divisions ???

Fraudsters, like Eugene, having no reliable information about all June intelligence materials, decided to make a name for themselves on the basis of a May intelligence report, proving to everyone that this is the only material and if something is indicated there is not accurate, it means that the Main Intelligence Directorate made an incorrect conclusion about impending German attack. And you want you and Eugene not to be perceived as amateurs?
Do you even have an idea about all the reconnaissance materials of that time in order to draw a similar conclusion? You don’t have it, because you first saw the KOVO decade-long intelligence report here, and did not know about its existence.

Quote: cavl

This can be seen on the maps of four districts where tank divisions are located where they have never been - far from the border.

As an experienced thimbler, you use the word "far from the border", having absolutely no idea what a daily march is for motorized units, and how long it will take for them to reach our border by 4.00 on June 22. Where are your calculations, would-be researcher, so that everyone understands that the Panzer divisions of the Wehrmacht could not advance on June 22 in the first echelon when attacking the USSR, so that intelligence would not take them into account?

Quote: cavl

That is why Marshal Baghramyan writes about unexpected breakthroughs of two motorized corps.

He dodges before history for his mistakes, because already in April the KOVO reconnaissance noted tank and motorized divisions in the district strip, and the number just corresponded to two corps. Only a complete layman will believe that for the head of the operations department this was a surprise on June 22 - tell tales in your sandbox, a dreamer.

[cavl]

Quote: icant007

But this author’s analysis - in your analysis?

Eugene: The analysis of the information given in RU report No. 1 dated 22.6.41 and in the memoirs of the former RU chief coincides with the Republic of Moldova (RU reports dated 31.5.41 and 15.6.41), which were received three weeks before the start of the war and were published. This can only indicate that no other (“sensational”) materials exist in the archives.

icant007 (Andrey): Where do they coincide if, on June 15.06, according to the report of the 120-122 division, and on June 23.06, about 140?
Maybe I don’t understand something.

I am not the author of the material and I can only answer your question, as I understand the text presented by the author Eugene.
And how would you give a milder answer ... The material in the article, I think, found its reader. The reader, who for the most part reads and does not express his opinion. Who does not like the material - he has not read it for a long time. The vast majority of readers are waiting to form their opinions. Of the thousands of figures on German troops from two articles on intelligence, several dozen may be controversial (I think even less). And this should be thoughtful.
So, the stated parts are a single material. It is so huge in volume that it is impossible to repeat it in every part. The first sections on intelligence examined in detail all the districts and most published intelligence reports and reports. The reconnaissance directorate's report of May 31, 1941 was also examined in detail as it relates to infantry and artillery units. I suspect that you have not watched this material again ...

What kind of analysis can we talk about? First of all, after the war, the head of the Intelligence Directorate has been quoting intelligence reports from the beginning of 1941 and considers them absolutely reliable. Therefore, we can conclude that he does not know about other intelligence information (more accurate).

Both reports of the Intelligence Directorate (dated May 31 and June 15, 1941) refer to 120-122 German divisions. On May 31, 1941, there were 120-122 Germans divisions.

The report on June 20-00 really says somewhere about 22-138 German divisions. But the information in the bulletin is compared with a certain bulletin of June 140. Regarding these data, on June 20-20, from 21 to 17 certain new divisions approached the territories considered by intelligence as territories near the border.
Then, by June 20, 121-123 German divisions were in East Prussia and former Poland. In other words, in nineteen days no more than one division arrived from Germany, and this is very strange ... That was not really so.
And the former chief of the General Staff Intelligence Directorate, who wrote an article in the journal and saw all the reports, practically repeats the version presented. Therefore, there is nothing sensational ... This is the analysis.
I would only mention one point. German divisions should be slightly smaller, since the June 22 report additionally considers the area of ​​the city of Katowice, which had not previously been considered by intelligence, since it was located in Germany at that time

[icant007]

Quote: cavl

Regarding these data, on June 20-21, from 17 to 19 certain new divisions approached the territories considered by intelligence as territories near the border.
Then, by June 20, 121-123 German divisions were in East Prussia and former Poland. In other words, in nineteen days no more than one division arrived from Germany, and this is very strange ...

I did not understand the meaning of these mysterious words.

On May 31 it was 120-122, and on June 20 it became 138-140.
Where is one division?

[icant007]

Quote: cavl

German divisions should be slightly smaller, since the June 22 report additionally considers the area of ​​the city of Katowice, which had not previously been considered by intelligence, since it was located in Germany at that time

Golikov writes that reconnaissance was carried out to a depth of 400 km, that is, actually to the territory of Germany.

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

Golikov writes that reconnaissance was carried out to a depth of 400 km, that is, actually to the territory of Germany.

This is the operational intelligence of the districts, and the range of radio intelligence could be even further, and to a greater depth. A strategic intelligence, which was mainly engaged in Golikov, generally covered all countries, even exotic ones.

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

I am not the author of the material and I can only answer your question, as I understand the text presented by the author Eugene.

Everything is clear - they decided to otmazatsya from him, after they realized what sources he used.

Quote: cavl

Of the thousands of figures on German troops from two articles on intelligence, several dozen may be controversial (I think even less).

They are generally not systematized at all, and their origin is questionable by the author of the article, judging by the German site.

Quote: cavl

What kind of analysis can we talk about? First of all, after the war, the head of the Intelligence Directorate has been quoting intelligence reports from the beginning of 1941 and considers them absolutely reliable. Therefore, we can conclude that he does not know about other intelligence information (more accurate).

It’s a lie, because according to the then existing practice, all materials concerning the military potential of foreign countries falling into the NKID, NKVD, NKVMF, NKGB (since February 1941) were sent to the Republic of Uzbekistan in accordance with the list of issues of interest to military intelligence. And after the war, not only captured materials were included in the GRU archives, but also a huge amount of information from our residencies working abroad with our allies.

Quote: cavl

Both reports of the Intelligence Directorate (dated May 31 and June 15, 1941) refer to 120-122 German divisions. On May 31, 1941, there were 120-122 Germans divisions.

Yes, this is one and the same report - what are you fantasizing about here?

Quote: cavl

Then, by June 20, 121-123 German divisions were in East Prussia and former Poland. In other words, in nineteen days no more than one division arrived from Germany, and this is very strange ...

It’s strange for you, because you believed the illiterate Evgeny, and you don’t understand at all that these divisions arrived within three weeks, and traces of their arrival can be found both in the daily reconnaissance reports of the districts and in the RU reconnaissance reports - teach materiel, "researcher" of the incomprehensible ...

[cavl]

Quote: icant007

The transfer takes place a few days before 22.06/5, while the author himself admits that the permissible delay in the transfer of intelligence from agents is up to XNUMX days. And at the same time he immediately accuses that intelligence has not found.

He probably thinks that the scout stands with an iPhone and immediately posts everything in nete? Or does he not remember what he wrote?

First of all, Eugene does not blame intelligence. You are distorting here. He checks the accuracy of the information. According to the principle, at the time the intelligence was prepared by the source, this information was reliable or not. This is what investigators do, discarding false versions. This is what researchers do in research centers. It `s naturally. It’s wild for you. Do you want to believe that intelligence reported exactly? Yes, for God's sake, believe. But thousands of others who read and are silent probably think differently, since they are not bombarded with thousands of abusive comments ... Why should Eugene satisfy only you alone?
And for those who are minusting you, it’s interesting to understand for yourself, and not to read your cheers-patriotic uneducated cries (excuse me). I’m wondering, and therefore I’m trying to protect Eugene from very arrogant arrivals. But this run over from Kozinkin with Milchakov has already been paid, because the books of Mr. Kozinkin (who had a military consultant Milchakov) have a completely different version. Version about nomination for Cover Plans. Absolutely not thought out, for silly readers. That is the difference. Eugene anonymous and does not get a penny, although thousands of people view articles. And Kozinkin receives money for his fantasies.

[icant007]

Quote: cavl

First of all, Eugene does not blame intelligence. You are distorting here. He checks the accuracy of the information. According to the principle, at the time the intelligence was prepared by the source, this information was reliable or not. This is what investigators do, discarding false versions. This is what researchers do in research centers. It `s naturally. It’s wild for you. Do you want to believe that intelligence reported exactly? Yes, for God's sake, believe.

The question is not faith, but the illogical nature of the author. Here, the scientific approach does not smell at all, and there is no need to brush the toilet brush here)

The author gives 5 days for intelligence to transmit information, and it is this last 5-day period before June 22 that reproaches intelligence.

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

The author gives 5 days for intelligence to transmit information, and it is this last 5-day period before June 22 that reproaches intelligence.

Yes, there was no particular gap in intelligence, especially in the strategic link and in radio intelligence. For example, the fact is known that the Germans began to rush into the room of cryptographers in the embassy on June 22, when another denunciation was being processed there, and it was necessary to destroy it along with the ciphers. And radiofacial agents worked in the prewar time with increased load, judging by the number of radiograms received in 1941.

[icant007]

Well, I think there were delays in the border strip on the German side. If our agent, some local resident, has discovered something, he will not be able to transmit this information immediately. Need time.

And on strategic and radio I agree.

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

The question is not faith, but the illogical nature of the author. Here, the scientific approach does not smell at all, and there is no need to brush the toilet brush here)

I’ll add only one important addition to your fair assessment - these dreamers Eugenia, Victoria and some cavl have just wild ideas about military science of that time, and don’t understand how to reconcile it with intelligence materials to get a logical picture. Not only that, they do not own a common array of all the intelligence information of the pre-war period, and they do not imagine what the theory of motorized war is, which was the basis for understanding the future war and our armament programs and operational planning were formed under it. Regarding the basics According to the "IIM theory", according to its logic, it is impossible to determine in advance the locations of strikes by mobile connections. Because within a day or two, these same compounds can be moved 150-200 km from the area of ​​the original location.
And these illiterate, not bothering to study the theory, began to demand from intelligence that by and large did not affect the determination of the true intentions of the German command until June 18, 1941, because this date was a check at the disposal of Halder on June 10:

1. It is proposed to consider June 22 as Day D of Operation Barbarossa.
2. In the case of the postponement of this period, an appropriate decision will be made no later than June 18. The data on the direction of the main attack will remain secret in this case.

In the theory of motor-war conduits, the pace of advancement of troops is directly indicated:

1. Both operations and battles are conducted at a more rapid pace in conditions of greater maneuverability. In an offensive operation, motorized mechanized units will make an average of 16 km / h and up to 160 - 200 km per day; with fights, this mobility, depending on the situation, will fall from 8 - 10 km / h and 80 - 100 km per day to the normal infantry speed. fighter - 2 - 3 km / h. and 10 - 15 km per day.

It is not difficult to calculate that four days before the start of the war, the Germans were able to transfer not only headquarters, but also tank and motorized divisions in any quantity to any point on our border from different regions of Germany and Poland. That is why all the speculation of these "experts" is the usual fantasies of amateurs, because they do not understand why it was important to know the potential of the enemy, and not what headquarters is where in peacetime. O. Kozinkin correctly noted that their description is akin to how three blind men described an elephant by trunk, leg and tail, and their conclusions are as far from scientific as an article in a newspaper about the description of folk remedies from a doctoral dissertation on heart surgery by an honored doctor.

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

First of all, Eugene does not blame intelligence. You are distorting here.

No, it’s you who are blatantly lying - it is Eugene who accuses the intelligence of the unsuccessful beginning of the Great Patriotic War and is trying to whitewash the scribes quite deservedly by the generals.

Quote: cavl

And for those who are minusting you, it’s interesting to understand for yourself, and not to read your cheers-patriotic uneducated cries (excuse me).

Lies - icant007 is one of the few who has a military education, and understands what is at stake, and unlike you, he carefully selects the material so as not to apologize later on how you do it.

Quote: cavl

Eugene anonymous and does not get a penny, although thousands of people view articles.

It is strange that he then hides his name, since you consider that he is writing the truth. By the way, why are you bashfully hiding, because you don’t write articles like?

Quote: cavl

And Kozinkin receives money for his fantasies.

Who is stopping you from publishing books like Chekunov, Isaev, Zakoretsky or Rezun?
By the way, read what Pavlov did on June 21 in the memoirs of General P.A. Teremov, who served in the ZapOVO intelligence department, when he received the report from the intelligence director in the theater along with Boldin - one must think of this a few hours before the start of the war.

[cavl]

Quote: ccsr

Because there are four direction finding stations in the radio division, and all the basic work lies on them. Summing up the technique of these items, you can calculate how many posts around the clock could be on duty without taking into account the receiving radio center. If you were interested in this, you yourself could have found that the order consisted of a radio interception center (reception center), a local and three peripheral radar stations, a communications center, operations department, and plus auxiliary structures.

That is, you do not know the structure of hordes ... You give out, as usual with insults, your thoughts for facts ...
how everything is primitive with you and predictable ... I just today found more than you - up to the number of rifles, pistols and vehicles

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

That is, you do not know the structure of the hordes ...

Why do not I know if I informed you the composition of the order?

Quote: cavl

I just found more than you today - up to the number of rifles, pistols and vehicles

Open the staff of the order - there it is all spelled out, but for you this is news, that's all.

Quote: cavl

I just found more than you today

Do not puff your cheeks - I met with Bushuev more than once, and even visited him at home a couple of times while he was alive, so you found only what is available on the Internet, and no more. What "discoveries" will you indulge in before you start teaching me military science?

[ivamoss]

So just bring the full staff of the division: how many people, how many and which cars, how many direction finders, how many and what radio stations, what weapons, how many commanders, how many junior commanders.
What the word state means. What the reader asked

[ccsr]

Quote: ivamoss

So just bring the full staff of the division:

And why don't you find the state 14/45 or 14/46 on the network yourself to make sure yourself how many commanders and personnel were in the order? Moreover, an interested person himself found everything and even boasted about it:

I just found more than you today - up to the number of rifles, pistols and vehicles

[VS]

Quote: cavl

Eugene does not blame intelligence. You are distorting here. He checks the accuracy of the information. According to the principle, at the time the intelligence was prepared by the source, this information was reliable or not. This is what investigators do, discarding false versions. This is what researchers do in research centers. It `s naturally. It’s wild for you.

Yes, he does not check, but CONCLUSIONS gives - that the intelligence is to blame for him - of which there she did not know for sure))) and MEANS THE ATTACK No one expected)))

[cavl]

Again time. Normally...
A comparison of the numbers provided by the intelligence and the actual number of troops is a check of the reliability of intelligence information.
Based on the results of comparison and analysis, a conclusion is drawn about the unreliability of this information.
And you write about the guilt of intelligence. Eugene does not make such a conclusion. What sources of information were, such were ...
The highest command was obliged to provide for the inaccuracy of intelligence information ...
And you write about the guilt of intelligence with the aim of provocation. Arouse righteous anger and drag a portion of readers. Well, just like a child

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

And you write about the guilt of intelligence. Eugene does not make such a conclusion. What sources of information were, such were ...
The highest command was obliged to provide for the inaccuracy of intelligence information ...
And you write about the guilt of intelligence with the aim of provocation. Arouse righteous anger and drag a portion of readers. Well, just like a child

You are an unscrupulous liar, because in the previous article Eugene directly accuses intelligence of not providing intelligence materials to the country's military leadership:

The absence of large headquarters at the border was likely to indicate that war was not expected in the near future. So they had to think in the higher echelons of spacecraft control. This point of view was reinforced by the absence of a significant number of troops at the border (according to intelligence), concentrated in East Prussia and former Poland. A detailed discussion of the Republic of Moldova on enemy troops concentrated against PribOVO, KOVO, and ZAPOVO was presented in the first 4 parts of an intelligence article.

Moreover, he is lying godlessly in this article:

According to the author, the absence of other published RM RMs for June 1941 (until June 22) is due to the fact that our intelligence was not able to adequately detect the movement of headquarters and troops of the invasion group directly to the border. This made it possible to blame the executed generals for the tragic events of June 22, 1941, and after the death of I.V. Stalin - and himself.

Can you, verbiage, explain on what basis Eugene is lying that there were no other RU intelligence materials in June, if he had no idea even about ten-day district intelligence reports?
Here is what V.V. wrote Slavin, reserve colonel from GOU on the pages of NVO, when the polemic about the preventive strike arose:

Meanwhile, as it is now reliably known, information, quite detailed and accurate, about the planning and timing of the Nazi Germany attack on the USSR, began to arrive in Moscow in December 1940. Gradually, the information was refined and acquired a completely finished form. As Hitler changed the timing of the coming offensive of the Wehrmacht, they became known to the Soviet intelligence with amazing speed.
The reaction from the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, the General Staff of the Red Army, of course, was to follow. Would Moscow want to forestall the impending invasion of the Nazi troops? But who does not understand the benefits of such a blow? Of course they did!
Then why is Army General Mahmut Gareev, despite the fact that he first published information that back in March 1941, the Soviet military-political leadership received intelligence information about the estimated timing of the outbreak of war (June 12), suddenly asserts that in 1941 the Soviet Union did not think of any preventive war against Germany and could not think?

And after that, you suggest that I believe in the lies of this dilettante Eugene, who got under way on the crazy idea that by changing the buttonholes then it was possible to mislead intelligence? Do you yourself believe in this stupidity, or is it just pretending to be a "specialist" in intelligence?

[cavl]

Quote: icant007

Quote: cavl

Regarding these data, on June 20-21, from 17 to 19 certain new divisions approached the territories considered by intelligence as territories near the border.
Then, by June 20, 121-123 German divisions were in East Prussia and former Poland. In other words, in nineteen days no more than one division arrived from Germany, and this is very strange ...

I did not understand the meaning of these mysterious words.

On May 31 it was 120-122, and on June 20 it became 138-140.
Where is one division?

Not this way. On May 31, there were 120-122, by June 20, 121-123. By June 22, according to intelligence, it was up to 138-140

[icant007]

Quote: cavl

June 20, 121-123.

So where is this report of June 20.

You yourself said that the June 22 report refers to the 20th.

Here it is literally:

"1. As a result of the hostilities for the day 22.6, the data available on 20.6 on the following enemy grouping, located directly on the border with the USSR, received factual confirmation: ......."

Or am I looking in the wrong place again?

The appendix to the report contains 140 divisions.

[VS]

Quote: cavl

this run over from Kozinkin and Milchakov has already been paid, because the books of Mr. Kozinkin (who had a military consultant Milchakov) have a completely different version. Version about nomination for Cover Plans. Absolutely not thought out, for silly readers. That is the difference. Eugene anonymous and does not get a penny, although thousands of people view articles. And Kozinkin receives money for his fantasies.

do not envy - write YOUR nonsense that the attack did not wait)))

what was deduced by software is my FACT my dear))) Because I WITHDRAWED from June 8-11, the troops of 2 echelons of reserves and border divisions, including those that I CAN WITHDRAW, were stupid by software ONLY and not otherwise)))
Would you like to challenge the words MARSHALOV) forward miraculous indefatigable))

Beetle: "" The commanders of the border military districts were ordered to withdraw the troops of the districts - designated as part of the covering forces, closer to the state border and the lines that they had to occupy in an emergency, by special order.
At the same time, advanced units were ordered to be advanced to the border units.
Other equally important events were held.
All this obliged the commanders of the districts and armies to increase their combat readiness. and general combat vigilance. ""

But the commander from KOVO shows HOW this conclusion came))

"" "12" December 1949
№ 02879
SECRET
Ex. No. 1
TO THE ASSISTANT TO THE HEAD OF THE GENERAL HQ
USSR ARMED FORCES
Colonel General Comrade Pokrovsky

Fulfilling your number 194519, I report that I did not have any documents on the initial period of the war, so I was able to write memories of the course of hostilities very briefly only of a general nature.

APPENDICES: Memories on 4 sheets,
n / in. No.
Ex. No. 1

GENERAL MAJOR. - autograph (SYMBOLOKOV)

SECRET
Ex. No. 1

MEMORIES

Before the war and in the initial period of the war, I had to be in the position of chief of staff of the 49th Rifle Corps of the Kiev Military District.
According to the deployment of peacetime, 49 sk was in the area of ​​the White Church.
In early May 2 bAn encryption was received in which it was said to be sent to the district headquarters after receiving the order of the chief of staff of the corps. I read the order at the district headquarters, the order said that the corps should go to the camp in the Chertkov region, Gusyatin3. I turned to the head of the district headquarters, General Comrade Purkayev, with a question of explaining the meaning of the order, he answered me that he couldn’t tell me anything else, I asked for permission to contact
=====
1 There are stamps on the sheet: 1 / Entry No. 02668 “13” 9 1950. The Main Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces; 2 / in. No. 01076 "5" 5 1952. Military-historical Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.
2 So in the document. That's right, June.
3 We are talking about the order of KOVO No. A1 / 00231 dated 15.06.1941/131/12507 (TsAMO. F. 9. Op. 10. D. 11. L. XNUMX-XNUMX).
/ 74 /

Colonel General Comrade Kirpanos, who commanded the district, he allowed me. The district commander told me that each echelon should be ready to join the battle, after which I could clearly report to the corps commander General Karpilov4 that the corps does not go to the campsite, but must be ready for hostilities, and the corps took all the assets of the NZ, ammunition, shells that were distributed to units and subunits, but were not issued to their hands.
In the second half of June 1941, divisions of 49 infantry corps concentrated in the Chertkov and Gusyatin regions. With the outbreak of hostilities, the corps became part of the 6th Army, entered the battle in the Tarnopol area, then moved to the line of the old fortified areas in the Podvolochisk area, then the Khmelniki area. Where I was appointed commander of 22 mech. corps, which operated in the area of ​​Korosten, Malin, was then appointed chief of staff of the 38th army, which defended the Dnieper in the section of Cherkasy, Kremenchug.
""
I will tell you for the ignoramus - KOVO was deduced by deer. GSh from June 12 - on a certain card)))
June 9 was a double meeting on the topic - is it time for us to go?))
On June 11, Zh. Once again turned to the tyrant u. Isn’t it time to introduce the PP - officially)))
The tyrant did not allow it, but the troops were withdrawn at the same time - namely, according to the PP - ZAPOVO,
KOVO and Pribovo - KOVO on a certain card))
And all this - in accordance with the General Staff Deployment Plan, about which Vatutin will make TWO inquiries by June 13)))
in general - kill yourself against a wall of ignoramuses and falsifiers)))

[AsmyppoL]

Kozinkin can, as a magician, manipulate quotes, building on his basis his own fantastic theories. But as soon as it comes to numerical information, then a lie in his words is already creeping out.
It remains only to sympathize with the readers who master his work ...

Why are there many lies in Kozinkin's writings? Probably from the fact that he served in the warehouse and military knowledge of an operational nature he could not acquire, and after the service he did not want to.

Why am I writing about the writer Kozinkin? According to him, he has been engaged in history for more than 11 years, or rather collects quotes. Now he is citing a document on the 49th Rifle Corps, allegedly confirming his theory about the withdrawal of troops according to Cover Plans.

The falsehood of this statement follows from the fact that The 49th sk was not planned to be used at all under the Cove Cover Plans... From the word at all. It is easy to see this if you type in the search engine "Coverage Plan KOVO" and carefully look at the military units.

Knowing this, one cannot say that the Directive of the NPO of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the KA to the Military Council of KOVO
dated 13.06.1941/1/1941: "To increase the combat readiness of the district troops by July XNUMX, XNUMX, all deep divisions and corps management with corps units should be transferred closer to the state border to new camps, according to the attached map.
1) 31 sk - campaign; 2) 36 sk - campaign; 3) 55 sk - trip; 4) 49 sk - by rail and hike;
5) 37 sk - on a march ... The execution should be delivered by courier by July 1, 1941 ... "

Among the troops that are available at the points of the Cover Plans there is a corps that is not used on them ... Therefore, the map, which Kozinkin writes with aspiration, is not a fulfillment of the Cover Plans. We can only talk about the deployment of troops in the border areas. And nothing more.

Why the Directive presented above cannot yet be an indication of the implementation of Cover Plans?
1) The fact is that, in pursuance of Cover Plans, these buildings must accept a mob! This takes several days.
2) in wartime, no one will drive these corps at night on foot. Consequently, transport must be mobilized: automobile (for staffing the building) and railway (for transportation).
3) according to the Cover Plans, part of the buildings should not arrive at the camp sites, but at the frontiers of the organization of anti-tank defense, and for this it is necessary to provide them with engineer or engineer units and property.
This is not taught at the warehouse and therefore fantastic theories from this writer appear ...

And then the remaining arguments are blown away: on June 12, Zhukov brought a directive on the implementation of the Cover Plans to Stalin. Did Zhukov write untruths in his books? A lot, and especially about the period on the eve of the war. Why should you believe this quote? After all, not a single document or memory of this exists ... Kozinkina
caught a lot of lies and the episode from the 49th sk one of these.

[AsmyppoL]

And now the question arises: were there any prerequisites on June 12-13 for the introduction of Cover Plans?
Of course it wasn’t. If you carefully look at reconnaissance materials from at least January 1941, you can see that reconnaissance constantly overestimated the number of German divisions and their maximum concentration occurred in April-May 1941: from 83 ... 84 (5.4.41) to 120-122 to 31.5.41 .20. Later, until June 1, intelligence discovered the arrival of another 2-XNUMX divisions.

Since Moscow considers the balance between war and a peaceful solution to be rather fragile, it would not have occurred to anyone on June 12-13 to talk about the introduction of cover plans, because this is not only a withdrawal of troops to the border, but also mobilization! A sharp decrease in the number of redeployed German divisions and mass misinformation about the ultimatum from Germany was obliged to give a reason for the leadership of the spacecraft and the USSR to carefully conceal preparations for a possible war. That is why the corps went mainly at night under the legend of "camps" cover.

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

But were there any prerequisites on June 12-13 for the introduction of cover plans?
Of course it wasn’t. If you carefully review the intelligence materials

learn the anonymous ignoramus - EVENTS of the pre-war days)))

Do not invent cho there who thought - look ignoramus who did what in those days)))

Well, it doesn’t work out for you.

READ Zhukov - from his DRAFT that you didn’t get into the memoirs))) and PROVE that he lied about the withdrawal of troops))) Do not forget to give your false name))) and I'll see how brave you are)))

[icant007]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Among the troops that are in the points of the Cover Plans there is a corps that is not used for them ..

Here is the phrase "pearl barley". I just can't understand what it means in Russian.

You do not know how to formulate thoughts normally, which you yourself admitted to me, and you are still trying to convey your idea to the general reader.

[VS]

So this is the next rezun rubbing our crap here)) One rezuny - ALWAYS anonymous)) this is their first sign))) they write their names ALWAYS call)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Now he is citing a document on the 49th Rifle Corps, allegedly confirming his theory about the withdrawal of troops according to Cover Plans.

The falsity of this statement follows from the fact that the 49th SC was not planned at all to be used according to the KOVO Covering Plans. From the word at all. It is easy to see this if you type in the search engine "Coverage Plan KOVO" and carefully look at the military units.

You distort that - I told you - KOVO was not displayed on PP but on a MAP)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

We can only talk about the deployment of troops in the border areas. And nothing more.

and for what they deduced dear ignoramus? probably mushrooms ?? Do you know what the indication means - with a fully transportable stock of b / p and fuels and lubricants?)))
SO FOR WHAT does it bring them to KOVO - like so that it can attack first? And Pavlov, according to what plan, was ordered to withdraw his troops in these same days?)))

And why in THESE dir. pointed out - do not touch the border ones until a special order of NGOs if since June 11 and the border ones in KOVO were withdrawn to their main lanes?))

Quote: AsmyppoL

Why the Directive presented above cannot yet be an indication of the implementation of Cover Plans?

ignoramus - I DIDN'T SAID - and NEVER SPEAKED, and even more so in my books - that it was fulfillment - EXECUTION OF THE UNLESS - PP)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

On June 2, Zhukov brought a directive for the implementation of Cover Plans to Stalin. Did Zhukov write untruths in his books?

and THIS fact is NOT in HIS books))) you will find - show)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

Why should you believe this quote? After all, not a single document or memory of this exists ... Kozinkina
caught a lot of lies and the episode from the 49th sk one of these.

the trap has not yet grown - at the ANONYMO unfinished)))

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Why am I writing about the writer Kozinkin?

Because you envy his books, because they themselves are only able to fantasize, and to spread various nonsense on VO.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Now he is citing a document on the 49th Rifle Corps, allegedly confirming his theory about the withdrawal of troops according to Cover Plans.

Can you refute the fact of the withdrawal of parts of the case or not?

Quote: AsmyppoL

The falsity of this statement follows from the fact that the 49th SC was not planned at all to be used according to the KOVO Covering Plans. From the word at all. It is easy to see this if you type in the search engine "Coverage Plan KOVO" and carefully look at the military units.

If you had even a little bit of military knowledge, then you would have learned that 49 sk was disbanded along with 5 A in 1940 in Lviv, and a new formation of 49 sk took place in March 1941.

In July 1940, the management of the 5th Army was disbanded. The corps administration transferred its divisions and departed to Lviv. The control of the body and body parts went to the formation of the control of the body and body parts of the 4th mechanized body. The formation of the 4th micron was carried out in Lviv.

And therefore, he could not get into the district’s cover plan, if only because by the time the cover plan was developed in May 1941, he was simply not ready to be assigned a specific task in the cover section of the state border. But this does not mean that the rifle corps before the start of the war was generally freed from all the events held in the okrug, which is why he received commands for certain actions. So the question is not in terms of cover, but in the movement of parts of the corps, which was reflected by Kozinkin as indirect evidence of bringing the parts of the district into combat readiness on the eve of the war. Learn the materiel, the dreamer ...

Quote: AsmyppoL

Among the troops that are available at points of the Cover Plans there is a corps that is not used by them.

There are many units, institutions and educational institutions in the district that are not used according to the cover plan, but they are obliged to comply with all the instructions of the district headquarters when the cover plan is introduced. What is incomprehensible here?

Quote: AsmyppoL

1) The fact is that, in pursuance of Cover Plans, these buildings must accept a mob! This takes several days.

Absolute nonsense - reception of enlistees from the local reserve in cover compounds is made immediately after receiving a signal, and they are put under arms for several hours. Moreover, this is done even before the announcement of the general mobilization. But those servicemen who are called up in the military registration and enlistment offices arrive at cover units during the first days after the start of mobilization, or they can be called up under the guise of fees, and then, after receiving the signal, leave in the units, which was the case with some of the participants 1941 year.
So the directive could be given to implement part of the activities provided for by the cover plan.

Quote: AsmyppoL

2) in wartime, no one will drive these corps at night on foot.

Our dreamer was completely stunned - it was at night that many units in June 1941 moved around, as there were a number of instructions on the covert movement of troops and camouflage. And even in wartime, night marches are constantly performed - I say that you have zero knowledge in military affairs.

Quote: AsmyppoL

3) according to the Cover Plans, part of the buildings should not arrive at the camp sites, but at the frontiers of the organization of anti-tank defense, and for this it is necessary to provide them with engineer or engineer units and property.

The staff of any individual part has engineering property, so they use it when equipping positions, such as

In accordance with the standards of the Red Army of the USSR Armed Forces, a soldier of combined arms formations must be opened with a small infantry shovel in an hour:
3/4 m3 in sandy soil;
1/2 m3 in medium plant soil;
about 1/3 m3 in clay soil.
Both lower sides of the MPL steel tray are sharpened.

. If serious work is ahead, then for this they use engineer or engineer units of division or corps subordination. Go and study the staffs of formations and associations - everything there is indicated about equipping with engineering property.

Quote: AsmyppoL

This is not taught at the warehouse and therefore fantastic theories from this writer appear ...

You were not taught anything at all in the army, due to the fact that you turned away from it, but how dashingly you solve strategic tasks instead of marshals of those years, you are simply amazed. Where did such a nugget come from, "I'm interested in Sonechka," that at least you have behind you.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Kozinkina
caught a lot of lies and the episode from the 49th sk one of these.

In the episode with 49 sk, you did not catch Kozinkin in a lie, but showed complete illiteracy in this matter, which is not surprising for me for a long time.

it can be seen that intelligence constantly overestimated the number of German divisions and their maximum concentration occurred in April-May 1941: from 83 ... 84 (5.4.41) to 120-122 on 31.5.41. Later, until June 20, intelligence discovered the arrival of another 1-2 divisions.

This is a heinous lie, because by June 22, 140 divisions had already been recorded, i.e. in three weeks at least 18-20 divisions arrived, and their appearance was tracked by our intelligence. For example, in a special communication from Berlin dated 15.6 it is indicated that ALL heavy artillery from Krakow by 19.6 should be relocated to the Soviet border. It is easy to understand that many commanders of units and formations received similar instructions during June.

it couldn’t come to anyone’s mind on June 12-13 to talk about introducing cover plans,

It’s complete nonsense, because the question of the deployment of our troops has been discussed several times since the spring of 1941 with Stalin, so the question of introducing cover plans was considered in any case. As far as it is known from the memoirs of various officials, the plan was not introduced in full because of the fear of provoking Hitler, but partially the activities from this plan were carried out on the eve of the war.

[VS]

Quote: Seal

although Baghramyan claims that he reached Tarnopol by seven in the morning, but all calculations show that before 10-00 he could not get to Tarnopol. Although there is no one to confirm or deny this for a long time.

easy))) Arriving in Ternopil Baghramyan received decryption test 1 for decryption - he received it for decryption at 7.45 - he decrypted it at - 12.35 days)))
"" Archive of the USSR Ministry of Defense, file op. dep. SWF, op. 9776ss, d 83. This telegram has the following marks: received at the communication center at 24 pm 30; entered the cipher department. at 22.6 hours 7 minutes 45; transcribed at 22.6:12 pm 35, "")))

[VS]

Quote: Seal

by the statement that they arrived in Tarnopol on time, Bagramyan eliminates the mistake of Purkayev himself, who had organized the relocation of the Staff

Purkayev’s answer to Pokrovsky read - who created and organized there)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Since Moscow considers the balance between war and a peaceful solution to be rather fragile, it couldn’t have crossed anyone’s headlines on June 12-13 to introduce cover plans, because this is not only a withdrawal of troops to the border, but also mobilization!

so THEREFORE, Stalin did not let the military FORMALLY enter the PP))) And - stop fantasizing already, the ignoramus whoever thought and believed in the Kremlin)) You're a snotty kid compared to THEM)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

A sharp decrease in the number of redeployed German divisions and massive misinformation about the ultimatum from Germany was obliged to give a reason for the leadership of the spacecraft and the USSR to carefully conceal preparations for a possible war. That is why the corps went mainly at night under the legend of "camps" cover.

so for WHAT the conclusion was made - go and to attack July 6 yourself?))

So you cut through - the rezun is another unfinished one)))

[Seal]

Quote: ccsr

The headquarters column always moves faster than warheads, so on a highway with headlights on

Speaking of the highway. Baghramyan writes that they left Kiev along the Zhitomir highway. And how far do you think for Zhitomir this highway went further? Well, the same thing where, in your opinion, traffic controllers stood on the sidelines and cars rushed at great speed
Here is a map of the Ukrainian USSR of 1940. Find on it the highway from Zhytomyr to Tarnopol.

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

Speaking of the highway. Baghramyan writes that they left Kiev along the Zhitomir highway.

Do not fool me, because the movement of the headquarters columns is constantly being worked out, and the drivers by the end of the service, almost with their eyes closed, can drive the car along the main route alone even at night. You just don’t know well the real life in the army, that’s where your ridiculous conclusions about some memoirs come from.

[Seal]

Quote: V.S.

Arriving in Ternopil Baghramyan received decryption test 1 for decryption - he received it for decryption at 7.45 - he decrypted it at - 12.35 days)))
"" Archive of the USSR Ministry of Defense, file op. dep. SWF, op. 9776ss, d 83. This telegram has the following marks: received at the communication center at 24 pm 30; entered the cipher department. at 22.6 hours 7 minutes 45; transcribed at 22.6:12 pm 35, ""

So I'm talking about the same thing. Radio operators who could receive and send radiograms were at the headquarters of the SWF in Tarnapol. And they accepted the encryption. But then a problem arose - there was no one to decipher. And the encryption that lay there, waiting for the arrival of the encryption department. Now about it:
1) entered the code at 7 h. 45 m. 22.6;
2) decrypted in 12 h. 35 m... 22.6.,
Maybe someone would like to agree that the encryptors of the Encryption Department of the front spent 5 (FIVE) hours decrypting this encryption ??? I personally want to remember Stanislavsky with his famous "I do not believe". Let me remind you that decryption of encryption codes even at the level of the armies at that time was already carried out in a semi-automatic (mechanical) mode. Since back in 1939 in the USSR a new encryption machine with a rotary encoder K-37" Crystal "was developed. 19 kilograms, it worked on a multi-alphabetic replacement cipher. The K-37 cipher machine was used in the army communication networks, to classify telegraph messages. And I think there should have even been several of these cipher machines in the headquarters of the main South-Western Front.
Most likely, there was some kind of K-37 apparatus at the Front Headquarters in Tarnopol. But there were no cryptographers who could work on it. They rode as part of Baghramyan’s convoy.
I suppose that the whitened Kirponos and Purkaev forced some poor sergeant-major who belonged to the encryption department, but left in advance in order to equip rooms for encryptors, well, arrange tables there, connect the equipment to electricity, hang up signs on the door, take this encryption code and proceed to decryption. Well, as we still have: "Yes, at least decipher with your fifth point, but so that the decrypted radiogram lay on the table for an hour. Otherwise, you will go to the tribunal !!!"
It goes without saying that no one decrypted anything before the encryption department specialists arrived.
If the encryption program was decrypted at 12:35 p.m., then the encryptors with their equipment arrived no earlier than 11:00 p.m.

By the way, the strange designation is not 00:30 22.6., But 24:30. 22.6., Because the 24th hour is the last hour of the previous day, that is, the hour related to 21.6. Well, maybe the signalmen at that time had some kind of their own conventions.

[Seal]

I suggest looking at the decryption speed of the same cryptogram from Moscow in the neighboring Pavlov district.

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

I suggest looking at the decryption speed of the same cryptogram from Moscow in the neighboring Pavlov district.

They accepted it at the district stationary node, their cryptographers were sitting at the district headquarters, which is why everyone quickly decrypted it. Do you have any idea how wired communication channels differ from radio channels, at least in terms of noise immunity?

[Seal]

Why are you so worried? I know very well that Moscow has duplicated its instructions on the HF. And Purkaev personally called the army commanders on the basis of this call on the HF.
So what ? In your opinion, this eliminates the need to decrypt in the prescribed manner radiograms from Moscow and transfer them to the troops in the same established manner? Eh, the tribunal would cry for you with your approach.
By the way, now, excuse me, I don’t remember which of the commanders or commanders, but there were those who, after listening to Purkaev, asked for confirmation of everything that he said, cipher in the prescribed manner.

[icant007]

Quote: Seal

By the way, now, excuse me, I don’t remember exactly which of the commanders or commanders, but there were those who, after listening to Purkaev, asked for confirmation of all that he said with a cipher program in the prescribed manner

It was a camcor camcor.

"General KAMKOV answered me that before receiving the required telegram from the Military
He will not do anything to the county council. Cipher telegram comrade Kamkov was sent about
6 am 22.6 (after the cipher department arrived with the documents). "
General Purkayev.

I write exclusively from memory. Red Army commanders about
disaster of the first days of the Great
World War II.
Chekunov S. Vol. 2, p. 11.

And by the way, from this quote it is clear that at 6 in the morning the encryption department was already in place.

[icant007]

Quote: Seal

Maybe someone wants to agree that the cryptographers of the Encryption Department of the front have been decrypting this encryption program for as many as 5 (FIVE) hours ???

But could it be this, here I’m not arguing, but reasoning that the decoding of this directive was postponed, since its text could be communicated verbally by phone?
Moreover, by noon this directive was no longer of particular relevance, but it was deciphered purely for the sake of order.
Is it possible that cryptographers were engaged in more priority tasks, for example, already by Directive No. 2?

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

Maybe someone wants to agree that the cryptographers of the Encryption Department of the front have been decrypting this encryption program for as many as 5 (FIVE) hours ???

This could be due to the breakdown of cryptographic equipment after such a march, and no more.

Quote: Seal

Let me remind you that decryption of cryptograms even at the army level at that time was already carried out in semi-automatic (mechanical) mode.

And if the radio operators accepted with distortions, and this is not excluded in those conditions, and the machine processing could not carry out reliable decryption? Therefore, I would have to give a second request for the transfer of the cipher program, which naturally led to a delay in machine processing.

Quote: Seal

The K-37 cryptographic machine was used in army communication networks to classify telegraph messages.

In fact, K-37 in total was produced by 150 units by the beginning of the war, and it was not used in the strategic link for encryption - they worked there on the M-100 at that time for encryption in the general staff-district link, and there were much fewer of them. And this kit weighed 140 kg and was transported in a special machine, which could just get stuck on the road after a breakdown or bombing. So there is no need to cheat the situation, everything could be much simpler than you might think.

Quote: Seal

If the encryption program was decrypted at 12:35 p.m., then the encryptors with their equipment arrived no earlier than 11:00 p.m.

It is absolutely not connected, because the cipher telegram itself from Moscow was most likely received at a stationary node in Kiev, and then sent to a field node in Tarnopol, which is why there could be problems with the exact decryption of the cipher telegram - at least this is a more logical version, why there was a delay.

[Seal]

It could; and if; probably; what if ..... Why produce entities without what is needed? You have procreated so much - Mama Do not Cry.
This was especially amusing:

It’s absolutely not connected, because the cipher telegram itself from Moscow was most likely received at a stationary node in Kiev, and then it was forwarded to a field node in Tarnopol,

That is, the NGO and the General Staff, in your opinion, are so round that they decided not to send the encryption to the Headquarters of the already created South-Western Front, where the front commander and the Head of the Front Staff were located, but to the old empty apartment in Kiev, where the KOVO Headquarters was previously located ?

[icant007]

Quote: Seal

It could; and if; probably; what if ..... Why produce entities without what is needed?

Look who's Talking. You yourself started pouring Baghramyan from empty to empty with an invented "delay".

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

It could; and if; probably; what if ..... Why produce entities without what is needed?

It tempts me to ask, have you ever traveled at least three hundred kilometers on military equipment to tell me how it could be? Have you ever seen a soldier standing in front of a raised hood with cancer to think about it?

Quote: Seal

That is, the NGO and the General Staff, in your opinion, are so round that they decided not to send the encryption to the Headquarters of the already created South-Western Front, where the front commander and the Head of the Front Staff were located, but to the old empty apartment in Kiev, where the KOVO Headquarters was previously located ?

In fact, at the time of movement, all orders for technical communications are taken to the second position of the communications center, which is located at the district headquarters until the end of the movement. You are not here in the subject. I don’t have accurate data on how the encryption was received from Moscow precisely when the Directive was transmitted, but based on experience and knowledge that it went along the lines of the People’s Commissariat of Communications, I can conclude that the delay was connected with the fact that it was first accepted in Kiev through wired channels, and then already transported to the field communication center.

[VS]

Quote: ccsr

he couldn’t get into the district’s cover plan, if only because by the time the cover plan was developed in May 1941, he was simply not ready to be assigned a specific task in the cover section of the state border.

therefore, he was the second echelon of KOVO - which is not deduced from the word SAPSEM to the BORDER)))

[Seal]

Quote: ccsr

Firstly, they could receive paper from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only if they violated territorial waters or the rules of navigation.

An uninhabited island is still legally someone’s sovereign territory. And around the island - someone's territorial waters.
And what are "or shipping rules"? Where? In the World Ocean in neutral waters? Well, what kind of Ministry of Foreign Affairs will monitor our ships in neutral waters so that they do not violate the "Rules of Shipping" there and, if any, would send verbal NOTES to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs? By the way, what kind of shipping rules do you mean? The Convention on the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea (COLREGs 72)?

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

An uninhabited island is still legally someone’s sovereign territory. And around the island - someone's territorial waters.

That's why we still need to prove that ours were there, and not by cigarette butts, but by means of objective control - for example, radio stations will be recorded, or circled by patrol planes (ships) with precise fixation of coordinates and output at special frequencies for communication with the intruder.

Quote: Seal

And what are "or shipping rules"? Where? In the World Ocean in neutral waters?

Necessarily - this is what all future captains are taught in sailors.

Quote: Seal

Well, what kind of Foreign Ministry will follow on our ships in neutral waters,

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not monitor - it is simply the order that all complaints are submitted through these structures in order to add weight to the incident.

Quote: Seal

By the way, what kind of shipping rules do you mean? Convention on the International Rules for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea (MPPSS-72)?

And her including. But there are a number of other international agreements where the USSR, and now Russia, is participating - for example, the use of the coastal waters of Spitsbergen, which is why a scandal has arisen now.

[Seal]

Well, you change your shoes on the fly.
I make you a comment on one of your misconceptions:

Firstly, they could receive paper from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only if they violated territorial waters or the rules of navigation.

and explain that

An uninhabited island is still legally someone’s sovereign territory. And around the island - someone's territorial waters.

- you have further reasoning

That's why you need more ...

Quickly changed shoes.

But there are a number of other international agreements where the USSR, and now Russia, is participating - for example, the use of the coastal waters of Spitsbergen, which is why a scandal has arisen now.

Further. I asked you:

By the way, what kind of shipping rules do you mean? Convention on the International Rules for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea (MPPSS-72)?

Your Answer:

And her including. But there are a number of other international agreements where the USSR, and now Russia, is participating - for example, the use of the coastal waters of Spitsbergen, which is why a scandal has arisen now.

Well what can I say? I'm just sobbing.
In fact, the Agreement on the Delimitation of Maritime Spaces and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean (hereinafter - the Delimitation Agreement) signed between Norway and the Russian Federation on September 15, 2010 in Murmansk has absolutely nothing to do with the rules of navigation (shipping).
This Treaty of Delineation delimits the maritime space and the bottom between our countries.
The parties to the Delineation Agreement refused to use the methods of delimiting the sea spaces previously defended by them and chose a political solution to this issue, dividing the disputed zone into two approximately equal parts. Moreover, Art. 2 of the Agreement obliges the parties to comply with the established line of delineation of sea spaces and not to claim sea spaces outside this line.
The special legal regime of the Special Region is a kind of compromise: on the one hand, Norway refuses to exercise its sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the specified region in favor of Russia, and on the other hand, Russia does not expand its exclusive economic zone at the expense of this region.
Well, they would say that the rules of shipping include, for example, the Radio Regulations in the Gulf of Finland, for violation of which at one time the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland sent us verbal notes in packs (accumulate 2 or 3 cases in 10-XNUMX years, and then for each case, it draws up a separate NOTU and sends them all to our Foreign Ministry).

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

and explain that

You do not know the sea realities - this island, even if it belongs to someone, can be very rarely controlled by the authorities, especially when there are thousands of such islands.

Quote: Seal

In fact, the Agreement on the Delimitation of Maritime Spaces and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean (hereinafter - the Delimitation Agreement) signed between Norway and the Russian Federation on September 15, 2010 in Murmansk has absolutely nothing to do with the rules of navigation (shipping).

Erase tears - I just gave an example when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be included in the work on contracts, it does not matter whether it is shipping or the separation of fishing zones.
So do not push - you still did not understand what is the essence of the fairy tale that the "sailor" told about, but it is much more prosaic, because I am sure that they were laid by their own, so they made a hunt on the ship upon their arrival.

[Seal]

They react to them like this.

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

They react to them like this.

You famously attributed the Tulkin fleet to a warship, which, for example, can carry nuclear weapons, and destroy half of the coastal country. Apparently you do not understand the reaction of any country when a warship enters its waters, and even with incomprehensible goals.

[Seal]

It’s strange. The fact that you switched to the rules of shipping, which relate to the commercial fleet, did not bother you. And the fact that I continued the discussion in your given direction is a guard !!!!
You are simply the world champion in shoe changing on the fly.

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

The fact that you switched to the rules of shipping, which relate to the commercial fleet, did not bother you.

Navigation rules and naval sailors observe in peacetime.

Quote: Seal

You are simply the world champion in shoe changing on the fly.

You are just verbiage, and no more, and this opinion is not only I hold, as you should have noticed.

[Seal]

Quote: icant007

After the first bombing near Brody, "we hastened there (to Tarnopol - my note), no longer paying attention to individual vehicles lagging behind the convoy."

Well yes. Here he says only that they did not pay attention to the lagging cars. But he did not write that he was in a hurry, not paying attention to the German planes that bombed us.
And besides, please pay attention again. The highway ended in Zhytomyr. Next came the primer. Unknown strength. Plus, it should be borne in mind that the Tarnopol region became part of the USSR only in the autumn of 1939. Poland did not care much for roads in the eastern regions.

[icant007]

Well, you know, on a packaged primer, you can sometimes drive faster than on poor asphalt.

Well, I’m leading to the fact that the stragglers pulled themselves up later, maybe there were cryptographers, maybe everything, or maybe part.
As far as I remember, about 20 people were in the cryptographic service.

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

Poland did not care much for roads in the eastern regions.

Here you are mistaken - I was in the Grodno region in the eighties, and it was in those areas that belonged to Poland. So I went nuts from some of their old roads laid with paving stones, i.e. such as I saw in Germany. In our rest of the country, these are rarely seen.

[Seal]

The roads are really old. Even ours, built in Tsarist times. We must not forget that in the Grodno and Grodno provinces (where Peter Arkadyevich Stolypin was the governor from 1902 to 1903), road and bridge construction was underway. In 1862, the St. Petersburg-Warsaw Railway passed through the city, and in 1861 it was under construction The railway built a single-track railway bridge across the Neman. In 1912, Emperor Nicholas II signed a decree on the construction of a fortress in Grodno. Construction work continued until August 1915.
So, you don’t need to attribute to the Poles what they did RUSSIAN.

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

So that it is not necessary to attribute to the Poles what the RUSSIANS did.

It was you who wrote that Poland did not worry about the roads, but in fact they were maintained in good condition, even if they were made in the Russian Empire. By the way, where then are such roads in other regions of Russia?

[Seal]

Quote: icant007

code the peaceful course of life will suddenly be interrupted and the terrible word "war" will sound

The word "war" will sound in the message of VM Molotov at 12:15 Moscow time.
We minus 10 hours and get WHAT? We get 02:00 Moscow time.
Maybe we will not lower to such primitive calculations?

[icant007]

Well, you're already picking on that.
In Soviet times, everyone knew the sacramental song "On June 22, exactly at 4 in the morning, Kiev was bombed, they announced to us that the war had begun."

Getting attached to Molotov’s 12-hour message about the start of the war was somehow not entirely scientific.
Even if we assume that the first bombing of Kiev took place at 5-6 in the morning, it still turns out no later than 8 in the evening.

[VS]

Quote: Seal

I suggest looking at the decryption speed of the same cryptogram from Moscow in the neighboring Pavlov district.

everything here is also simple - the text itself was accepted in Minsk at 1.15 approximately))) At 1.30 Pavlov already read it and began to notify the army headquarters - so that everyone would get together and wait for further instructions))) He did not raise the personnel so far on alarm ..
At 1.45, the text from Pavlov got into the SHO of the O.Zapovo headquarters headquarters .. for half an hour for encryption and at 2.25 this text was from Pavlov that you brought and sent to the army))) and at 2.30 Pavlov began to give a command to open the red packets)) If cho - in this directive it is forbidden to do so far))

[VS]

Quote: Seal

Why are you so worried? I know very well that Moscow has duplicated its instructions on the HF. And Purkaev personally called the army commanders on the basis of this call on the HF.
So what ? In your opinion, this eliminates the need to decrypt in the prescribed manner radiograms from Moscow and transfer them to the troops in the same established manner? Eh, the tribunal would cry for you with your approach.
By the way, now, excuse me, I don’t remember exactly which of the commanders or commanders, but there were those who, after listening to Purkaev, asked for confirmation of all that he said with a cryptogram in the prescribed manner.

so if you know then in vain do you shake the air? At 7.45, the cryptographers had other concerns - more important than deciphering the outdated GSh directive about the meaning of which the bricklayers knew and it was more important for the cryptographers to take more important new directives)))
Or do you think that at 7.45, having received an order from Kirpanos to send which thread of the Kirpanos directive in the KOVO army, the encryptors would answer him - would you go to pipis = we need to first deer. b.n. decrypt?)))

In OdVO, too, not everyone complied with Zakharov’s oral orders, since writing or using obscenities did not confirm his orders)))

[VS]

Quote: icant007

But could it be this, here I’m not arguing, but reasoning that the decoding of this directive was postponed, since its text could be communicated verbally by phone?
Moreover, by noon this directive was no longer of particular relevance, but it was deciphered purely for the sake of order.
Is it possible that cryptographers were engaged in more priority tasks, for example, already by Directive No. 2?

naturally)))

[Seal]

Unnatural. Ciphers are decrypted in the order they are received. War is war, and order is order.

[icant007]

Quote: Seal

Unnatural. Ciphers are decrypted in the order they are received. War is war, and order is order.

And if the cipher program is an increased category of urgency?

And if there are 10 of them, two of them are urgent, and there are 4 encryptors, for example?

Is it possible to change the established procedure for processing cryptograms by special instructions of the management?

[Seal]

Both the first and second ciphergrams were signed by the people's commissar and the chief of the general staff. That is, they had the highest priority and were equivalent to each other. All that mattered was the order of receipt.

And if there are 10 of them, two of them are urgent, and there are 4 encryptors, for example?

Two sit down to decipher urgent, the other two work with ordinary ones.

[icant007]

And how many encryption programs were there at the SWF headquarters, both incoming and outgoing, before noon on June 22?

[VS]

Quote: ccsr

If the encryption program was decrypted at 12:35 p.m., then the encryptors with their equipment arrived no earlier than 11:00 p.m.

It is absolutely not connected, because the cipher telegram itself from Moscow was most likely received at a stationary node in Kiev, and then sent to a field node in Tarnopol, which is why there could be problems with the exact decryption of the cipher telegram - at least this is a more logical version, why there was a delay.

Yes, everything is simpler))) They arrived in Ternopol by 7.30. and they needed to send fresh and important orders of Kirpanos to the KOVO army rather than messing with the decoding of the directive, the essence of which everyone already knew in Ternopol and carried out already))) Naturally, this was done at the direction of Kirponos or Purkayev - to hell with her with a deer. 1 - send new orders to the army))) Well, the hands of the encryptors reached the deer. 1 - well, it was also decrypted .. at 12.45 ... for filing in Cases)))

[VS]

Quote: ccsr

she walked along the lines of the People’s Commissariat of Communications, I can conclude that the delay was due precisely to the fact that she was first received in Kiev via wired channels, and then sent to the field communications center.

she came to Ternopil as elsewhere - at 1 o'clock with minutes)) Could NOT decrypt it and therefore it was not decrypted before Baghramyan’s arrival with encryptors))) everything is simple)))

There are notes - what Gretsov brought up — on the encryption form itself — was received at 24.30 in Ternopol at the communications center and was given to SHO at 7.45)))

[ccsr]

Quote: V.S.

she came to Ternopil as elsewhere - at 1 o'clock with minutes)) Could NOT decrypt it and therefore it was not decrypted before Baghramyan’s arrival with encryptors))) everything is simple)))

It is quite possible if only on the headquarters node received information to send all cipher telegrams that relate to the KOVO to the communication center in Ternopol. But there is a small nuance that Chekunov drew attention to - in order to reduce funds for paying for the services of the People’s Commissariat of Communications, in 1941 it was customary to divide the work time into communication centers of the OdVO and KOVO, which is why in Kiev they could take the encryption, and only then send it to Ternopol. The communication line to Odessa passed through Kiev, so it’s hard to say how it really was, because evidence of that time has not been preserved.

Quote: V.S.

There are notes - what Gretsov brought up — on the encryption form itself — was received at 24.30 in Ternopol at the communications center and was given to SHO at 7.45)))

Do not get excited - you have already been told once that it was not received at 24.30, but at 2 in the morning, which is why you need to be more careful about the very fact that the encryption was sent to Ternopol. If it was transmitted from Kiev by radio, then just 30h.2 min. quite normal time to receive it.

[VS]

Quote: Seal

Ciphers are decrypted in the order they are received. War is war, and order is order.

that is, the cryptographers from Kirpanos received his order to enter the software, for example - and they answered him - you went to .. - we should spend half an hour at first on the directive that you have already implemented)) Can you imagine this yourself?))) I understand that you are in the SHO and served?))))
But it’s easier for me - it’s not difficult for me to ask different specialists about such matters - my neighbor on the site in special communications served just))) - alas, the commander will do everything in a particular situation)))

Look at the markings on the form of the incoming directive 1 in the KOVO - I brought them to you: they took the text at 24.30 - 00.30 naturally, they gave it to the SHO at 7.35))) decrypted at 12.45. )) Thus, you couldn’t call Baghramyan a liar))) and prove that he arrived at LUNCH in Ternopol))

[ccsr]

Quote: V.S.

I understand that you are in the SHO and served?

It was not he who served, but another "expert" in staff work and a "specialist" in strategic planning.

Quote: V.S.

alas, the commander’s will will be in a specific situation

Yes, the commander decides everything, but this will have to be reflected in the documentation, otherwise the encryptors themselves will be pulled out by the higher authority for disrupting the timing of decryption of the cipher telegram during verification.

Quote: V.S.

Thus, you couldn’t call Baghramyan a liar))) and prove that he arrived at LUNCH in Ternopol))

This is generally a delusional version, if only because Baghramyan’s memoirs could have been refuted by other participants in those events.

[VS]

Quote: icant007

Quote: Seal
Unnatural. Ciphers are decrypted in the order they are received. War is war, and order is order.


And if the cipher program is an increased category of urgency?

And if there are 10 of them, two of them are urgent, and there are 4 encryptors, for example?

Is it possible to change the established procedure for processing cryptograms by special instructions of the management?

Well, you are a comrade, but the specialist in such matters is unambiguous))) True, the mark on the incoming cipher program refutes his words, but that doesn’t matter)))

[icant007]

Quote: V.S.

Well, you are a comrade, but the specialist in such matters is unambiguous))) True, the mark on the incoming cipher program refutes his words, but that doesn’t matter)))

Well, you don’t let me make fun of this "specialist")

[VS]

Quote: Seal

Both the first and second ciphergrams were signed by the people's commissar and the chief of the general staff. That is, they had the highest priority and were equivalent to each other. All that mattered was the order of receipt.
And if there are 10 of them, two of them are urgent, and there are 4 encryptors, for example?

Two sit down to decipher urgent, the other two work with ordinary ones.

look at the marks - on the incoming cipher program dir 1 - and stop talking nonsense)))

You will be in the SHO of the district in such a situation and you will tell the Kirpanos that he can go further and you urgently need to decrypt the already executed directive)))

[VS]

Quote: ccsr

There are notes - what Gretsov brought up — on the encryption form itself — was received at 24.30 in Ternopol at the communications center and was given to SHO at 7.45)))

Do not get excited - you have already been told once that it was not received at 24.30, but at 2

nnea .. this is what I thought at first - that it costs 2 hours 30 minutes)) because SO is indicated in the book of Gretzov)) but judging by the fact that there is an obvious typo in the same place - deer. No. not 3 but 8 is shown, I think it’s just a typo and it was there - in Ternopol they accepted at 24.30. That is - at 00.30 the reception began))) And then -....

[ccsr]

Quote: V.S.

I think it’s just a typo and it was there - in Ternopol they accepted at 24.30. That is - at 00.30 the reception began

If they had accepted at 00.30, they would have written like that - 24.00 is the last minute of the outgoing day, and then the countdown starts from 00 hours 00 minutes of the new day.

[VS]

Quote: icant007

Quote: V.S.
Well, you are a comrade, but the specialist in such matters is unambiguous))) True, the mark on the incoming cipher program refutes his words, but that doesn’t matter)))


Well, you don’t let me make fun of this "specialist")

yes you are evil however (((mmmm .... (((

[icant007]

Quote: V.S.

yes you are evil however (((mmmm .... (((

I am angry only to visionaries and enemies of the fatherland)

[VS]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: V.S.

I think it’s just a typo and it was there - in Ternopol they accepted at 24.30. That is - at 00.30 the reception began

If they had accepted at 00.30, they would have written like that - 24.00 is the last minute of the outgoing day, and then the countdown starts from 00 hours 00 minutes of the new day.

otherwise they could not allow a slip of the tongue in those hours (((And, in principle, this does not matter - in any case, the dispatch went to .0.30 from the General Staff, and if there was a failure, then they could finish the reception in Ternopil at 2.30))) and at all the same, until the ciphermen arrived, they could not decipher it .. But Purkaev shows - "" Between 1 and 2 o'clock on June 22, the commander of the military district received an order from the General Staff, which required to bring the troops to full combat readiness, " "...

[itarnmag]

I won’t say anything about radio intelligence. But in 2010 he was in the hospital, and a roommate gave me a documentary book to read by a German general (I don’t remember my last name). It was written there that just a day before the start of the Second World War, the Germans sent diversion groups to our territory for the sole purpose of cutting telephone lines, and our troops were left without telephone communications, and they had no radio communications

[Seal]

Quote: ccsr

but based on the experience and knowledge that she was following the lines of the People’s Commissariat of Communications, I can conclude that the delay was due to the fact that she was first received in Kiev via wired channels, and then transferred to a field communications center.

Oh, as I have repeatedly noted, it is with this that you have problems. And with experience. And with knowledge.
Here is one of Baghramyan’s memoirs

At 0 hours 25 minutes on June 22, the district communications center in Tarnopol began receiving telegrams from Moscow. It was addressed to the commanders of all the western districts. The People's Commissar and the Chief of the General Staff warned that "during 22-23.6.41 a sudden attack by the Germans is possible," and demanded, without succumbing to any provocative actions, to bring the troops "into full combat readiness to meet the sudden attack of the Germans and their allies." ...
Only at half past three in the night did the reception of this very important, but, unfortunately, rather lengthy directive, end. Before the start of the fascist attack, less than an hour and a half remained.
The reader may ask, but it would not be easier, in order to save time, to send a short conditioned signal from the General Staff, upon which the district command could order the troops just as briefly: to put into operation "KOVO-41" (this is what we called the plan to cover the state border ). All this would take no more than 15-20 minutes.
Apparently, Moscow did not dare to do this. After all, a signal of the introduction of a cover plan would mean not only the rise of all troops on combat alert and their withdrawal to the intended lines, but also the mobilization of the entire territory of the district.
While the telegram was being studied and instructions were being prepared for the armies, the Nazis launched powerful air and artillery attacks on our troops.

So what ? Baghramyan admits that the reception of the telegram began at 0 hours 25 minutes on June 22, the district communications center in Tarnopol. And then what I was talking about. They accepted it, but there is no one to decrypt it.
And Baghramyan begins to spread thought on the tree, saying that it would be better to send a conditional signal. In what, by the way, he is generally right. But in this particular case, he seeks excuses for himself.

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

And then what I was talking about. They accepted it, but there is no one to decrypt it.

You are lying because the cryptographer remained at least one at the headquarters of KOVO, but he most likely did not have key documentation, as it was with the departed in Tarnopol.

Quote: Seal

And Baghramyan begins to spread thought on the tree, saying that it would be better to send a conditional signal.

He speaks correctly, because he knows that such a signal always unambiguously means how to act, and not to read the directive in order to figure out what is possible and what cannot be executed.

Quote: Seal

In what, by the way, he is generally right. But in this particular case, he seeks excuses for himself.

He is completely right, because he understood what this directive led to when they began to transmit and execute it in the army. And he does not need to make excuses - this is a blunder of Tymoshenko and Zhukov, who on June 21 could not convince Stalin to give a short order.

Not transmitted. From Kiev. On the radio channel.

Baghramyan was not the chief of staff, and does not know how the signalmen handed her over, so I’m not going to prove anything to you, although the question of why it was decrypted so late is surprising.

Quote: Seal

And then about the text in general, but not verbatim, only Kirponos and Purkaev were informed on the RF Zhukov, who phoned the district. If both do not lie of course.

Why should they lie if other participants in those events confirm the calling of the districts?

[Seal]

Quote: ccsr

If it was transmitted from Kiev by radio, then just 2h.30 min. quite normal time to receive it.

Not transmitted. From Kiev. On the radio channel.

At 0 hours 25 minutes on June 22, the district communications center in Tarnopol began receiving a telegram from Moscow. It was addressed to the commanders of all the western districts. The People's Commissar and the Chief of the General Staff warned that "during 22-23.6.41 a sudden attack by the Germans is possible," and demanded, without succumbing to any provocative actions, to bring the troops "into full combat readiness to meet the sudden attack of the Germans and their allies." ... Further, the telegram indicated specific measures that should have been taken ...

Well, this Baghramyan already retroactively speaks of what was stated in the telegram. And then about the text in general, but not verbatim, only Kirponos and Purkaev were informed on the RF Zhukov, who phoned the district. If both do not lie of course.

[Seal]

Quote: genisis

By 15/02/1943 in all 159 OSSB there remained active fighters of 500 people, according to the opersvodka headquarters 159 OSBR.

Where do you see the problem? In my opinion, it is clearly stated "in the ranks of up to 500 active force fighters." Not only 500 fighters remained in the brigade, but 500 fighters of those who can fight in the trenches. Since 800 Madoyan fighters are apparently still resting or are giving testimony to special officers. All the same, they were surrounded. Or maybe both taken together. And it goes without saying that the brigade also had rear units that were not counted as an active force. Here in the database from 18.02. it is indicated that 350 people are service units: sappers, reconnaissance company, autorot. Moreover, 20% - service of carts. (I did not include the reconnaissance service in the service units, this is what it says in the Combat Report. I attached it).
Now we look at the DB from 18.02/43. 1860 It indicates the total number of teams up to XNUMX people. Well, this is understandable, the Madoyanovites were returned to duty. And they counted not only the active bayonets, but also the rear.
Of course, as a true one, I will not say who the genesis can say that this pier has arrived replenishment.
Yes, the recharge has arrived. As noted in the OS from the same 18.02.43/02/00, but from 17.02.43:90. Moreover, it is indicated that the replenishment arrived on XNUMX. In the amount of XNUMX (ninety) people.
So what we think.
500 active bayonets
90 - replenishment
800 - Madoyanovtsy
Those who stayed in Rostov came up.
Well, 350 people, as indicated in the database, are among the service divisions.
All converges.
What, again, you were in a puddle again?
Which is already time.

[Seal]

Quote: ccsr

You are just verbiage, and no more, and this opinion is not only I hold, as you should have noticed.

It is very noticeable who verbiage
And I still didn’t evaluate you.

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

And I still didn’t evaluate you.

It wouldn't change anything. You would simply join a team of claqueurs who support the author of articles on intelligence, but they themselves cannot report anything intelligible to somehow refute my words. Judging by the fact that you began to use the calculations of my minus users as arguments, you have essentially nothing to say yourself. Keep burning, especially in "exposing" some historical events, based only on their nationality - the flag is in your hands.

[Seal]

Quote: ccsr

That would not change anything. You would just join a team of hackers who support the author of intelligence articles,

It goes without saying that all who consider you verbiage are those clackers. By the way, those of your minuses that I have cited do not apply to the article itself. They relate specifically to those of my comments that you tried to refute.

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

They relate specifically to those of my comments that you tried to refute.

And it doesn’t matter to the hackers that I answered you - you simply exaggerate the significance of your texts for them.

[Seal]

Quote: ccsr

Why should they lie if other participants in those events confirm the calling of the districts?

Yes, how to say.
Let's see who confirms.
Called Kirponos and (or) Purkayev. Kirponos cannot confirm anything. It remains to believe Purkayev.
Who could he call? Probably the army commander, huh?
The following armies were part of the Kirponos front:
5th (Potapov) - did not answer questions or answers are unknown, did not leave a memoir.
12th (Ponedelin) - was killed on 10.08.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.
26th (Kostenko) died 26.05.1942/XNUMX/XNUMX
You can also consider the 19th army of Konev. But he doesn’t say anything about Purkayev’s calls.
It can be considered as part of the front and the 16th army of Lukin. He also says nothing about Purkayev’s calls.
Perhaps Purkayev called the corps commanders.
22nd Mechanized Corps - Kondrusev S.M. - died June 24.06.1941, XNUMX
16th Mechanized Corps - Sokolov A.D. - died in captivity 17.08.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX
15th Carpezo M.I. I did not answer questions, I did not leave my memoirs.
24th building. Chistyakov V.I. died 18.08.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX
The 8th Rifle Corps of Snegov did not leave memoirs, did not answer questions.
8th Mechanized Corps Ryabyshev.

At exactly four o'clock in the morning, Moscow time, I was awakened by a young Red Army soldier who was out of breath from running.
“Comrade General,” he said hastily, “at the headquarters you are urgently called to the telephone!”
Apartment from headquarters nearby. He gathered quickly and after a few minutes picked up the phone. The head of the operational department of the 26th army, on behalf of the commander, said that Nazi troops in many places violated our state border, are fighting with border guards, bombing our border cities and airfields.
“But I ask without panic,” his excited voice sounded. Then, in a tone of order, he added: “We think these are provocations.” Do not succumb to them! Do not open fire on German planes! Wait for further directions!
I decided to immediately put the formations on alert, withdraw them from the military camps on alert. In this case, even earlier, I agreed with the division commanders to notify them in special words, the meaning of which only we understood.
- On duty, call the division commanders to the apparatus!

Here, too, by.
9th mechanized corps Rokossovsky

About four o'clock in the morning of June 22, the officer on duty brought me a telephone message from the headquarters of the 5th Army: to open a special secret operational package.
We had the right to do this only by order of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR or the People's Commissar of Defense. And in the telephone message there was a signature of the deputy chief of the operations department of the storm. Having ordered the duty officer to clarify the reliability of the dispatches in the district, in the army, in the people's commissariat, I called the chief of staff, my deputy for political affairs and the head of a special department, to advise what to do in this case.
Soon the duty officer reported that the connection was broken. Neither Moscow, nor Kiev, nor Lutsk answer.
I had to take responsibility and open the package.
The directive indicated: immediately put the corps on alert and speak in the direction of Rivne, Lutsk, Kovel. At four o'clock, he ordered the announcement of a combat alert, division commanders N. A. Novikov, N. V. Kalinin and V. M. Chernyaev to arrive at my command post.

Rokossovsky says nothing about the calls of Kirponos or Purkayev.
19th Feklenko mechanized corps. He did not leave his memoirs. But there are memoirs of his deputy for political affairs (commissioner of the corps) Kalyadin I.S.

“Several people have already gathered at the headquarters of the corps, mainly the chiefs of the armed forces who have received similar messages from their line. A comcor arrived immediately.
“Fascist aviation is smashing border cities,” they reported from all divisions. Enemy aircraft have not yet appeared over Berdichev. Summing up the reports from the field, Colonel Devyatov handed the final report to the Commander, and he reported the situation to the Chief of Staff of the District, General M. A. Purkayev.
“In a few minutes you will receive important instructions,” warned Purkayev. - Not to leave the headquarters.
About twenty minutes we sat in silence, waiting for the call. Then General Feklenko could not stand it and ordered Colonel Devyatov:
- Give, Kuzma Demyanovich, the order: to all headquarters immediately rise on alarm - and to the forests, to the troops. The situation shall be reported to the operational duty officer of the corps headquarters every hour.
Another thirty minutes passed. There was no call. They contacted the operational duty officer at the district headquarters. Communication was given instantly, but there was no news, they only found out that the Germans bombed Kiev. ”
After this, Feklenko decided to send the corps headquarters from Berdichev to the field CP, and stay with the commissar and the task force himself and wait for Purkaev’s call with the task for the corps. It was also necessary to notify the local party and city authorities and begin the evacuation of the families of the commanders according to the mobplan. Soon there were calls from the divisional commanders that their headquarters had gone "to the area where the units were located."
“An hour later a report was received that all the headquarters in the field are waiting for further instructions. But we couldn’t give instructions - clear, precise and concrete.
Finally, General Feklenko picked up the phone and ordered him to be connected with General Purkaev.
“The general is with the commander.” As soon as I return, I will report on your call, ”the adjutant answered.

Also past.
So who confirms something?

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

Also past.
So who confirms something?

At each communication node that serves the People's Commissar and the NHS, a journal is kept of ALL telephone conversations held with these subscribers, and the time and duration are indicated. From this magazine it’s easy to check who and when called the districts - you don’t know this either, but you’re still trying to teach me something. In the districts, by the way, the same picture - there it concerns the commander of the district. So look for these magazines in the archives of the commander of the communications troops, and you will be happy - unless of course they were destroyed.

[AsmyppoL]

The only one who confirms is Comrade Feklenko’s answers to Pokrovsky.
In the series Unexpected war in the part about KOVO.
His deputy in the political sector greatly distorted his memoirs

[Seal]

Quote: ccsr

Keep burning, especially in "exposing" some historical events, based only on their nationality - the flag is in your hands.

Shit. And you are in this nationalist swamp. In fact, I am just trying to give some antidote to this huge stream of lies and exaggeration of the merits of this "separate nation". That is, what was good - they are more than successful at telling stories without me.
Well, at least you try to answer what such victorious naval decisions and personal exploits of I.S. Isakov during the war remained unnoticed and were not rewarded by I.V. Stalin, that in order to "restore justice" to the 20th anniversary of I.S. . Isakov needed to give a full Admiral and Hero of the USSR?

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

... In fact, I am just trying to give some antidote to this huge stream of lies and exaggeration of the merits of this "separate nation".

Yes, you yourself create this swamp, your illiterate interpretations of military history, and they come from poor knowledge of military affairs.

Quote: Seal

Well, at least you try to answer,

It doesn’t bother me - I don’t care about the decisions that are made many years later, although as you know, often heroes don’t find awards precisely because of the biased attitude of some military leaders. Is Sorge an example enough for you?

[Seal]

Quote: ccsr

So look for these magazines in the archives of the head of the communications troops, and you will be happy - unless, of course, they were destroyed.

Interesting position. You stated that there is confirmation entirely unfoundedly, but I should look for these confirmations (if I don’t want to trust you on your most honest word), right?
At the same time, I also have to take into account the fact that there may be no confirmation at all, since it was destroyed.
Do you know what this position is called?
I think you know!!!
This is why they give you minuses.
People don't respect verbiage!!!

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

You stated that there is confirmation solely unfoundedly,

You are lying as always - in the memoirs of the commanders it was repeatedly mentioned that the districts received calls from Moscow on the eve of the arrival of the Directive, and if you do not know about this, then this is your problem.

Quote: Seal

and look for these confirmations

But you don’t need them, the main thing for you is to crow, and then at least it won’t dawn.

Quote: Seal

At the same time, I also have to take into account the fact that there may be no confirmation at all, since it was destroyed.

Yes, this question is not interesting to you at all, you just want to express another stupid thing for others to hear. As for destruction, it is strange that you do not know that such a procedure exists in the army in relation to documents whose storage period has expired.

Quote: Seal

Do you know what this position is called?
I think you know!!!
This is why they give you minuses.
People don't respect verbiage!!!

I know why various laymen in military affairs give me minuses - this is the lot of all illiterate people.

[Seal]

Quote: ccsr

Yes, you yourself are creating this swamp with your illiterate interpretations of military history, and they come from poor knowledge of military affairs

Really. And can you give at least one example where I allegedly misinterpreted something specific?

[Seal]

Quote: ccsr

He could not walk less, because if we assume that the fastest was 31 hours, which I doubt very much, then anyway taking 7-8 hours to go to Moscow, it turns out 23-24 hours at least.

Passenger trains covered the distance between Leningrad and Moscow in 12 hours, and the Red Arrow Express in 10 hours.
Nobody traveled faster than the Red Arrow between Leningrad and Moscow. So, your 7-8 hours are absolutely groundless. Like the vast majority of your absolutely illiterate statements.

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

.So your 7-8 hours are absolutely groundless.

Now fast train No. 082B from Moscow to St. Petersburg covers the distance in 7 hours and 25 minutes. So even then, if we made fewer stops, this distance could be covered in 8 hours. But that’s not the point, it’s how you cleverly evaded the answer - what is Isakov’s fault before you, that you are throwing shit at him here because of personal hostility.

[Seal]

You are clearly not in the subject here, but you are trying to pass yourself off as an expert. You do not take into account that in addition to the passenger Red Arrow, on the Moscow-Leningrad section, other passenger trains, as well as freight trains, also moved on the same rails.
To increase the speed of a passenger train, it was necessary to at least automate the signaling system. It was also necessary to introduce electrical centralization of switches and signals....
Who am I explaining all this to???
And most importantly - why???
After all, you don’t perceive anything!!!!
You consider only yourself, your loved one, to be infallible and the wisest. Which everyone envies and downvotes out of envy.
What does Isakov have to do with this?
I just want to figure out where he was at the start of the war and on the last peaceful day before the war.
And also to figure out which of his great exploits and wise victorious naval leadership decisions were not adequately appreciated by Comrade in a timely manner. Stalin that on the 20th anniversary of the Victory it was necessary to “eliminate injustice” and award Isakov with the rank of full admiral and the title of Hero of the USSR.

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

I just want to figure out where he was at the start of the war and on the last peaceful day before the war.

Figure it out to your heart's content, but don't drag Isakov into this by blaming him for your lack of knowledge of where he was at that time.

[Seal]

Quote: ccsr

just don’t drag Isakov into this

Strange. How do you propose to understand without the main participant in the analysis?

Memoirs of Nikolai Mikhailovich Kulakov.
Publisher's abstract: The author was a member of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet during the Great Patriotic War. Shortly before his death, he handed over his memories to the Military Publishing House. At the center of the story is the heroic defense of Odessa and Sevastopol, the fleet’s support of the coastal flank of the Ground Forces. The book summarizes the experience of party political work. Warm stories are told about people - sailors, infantrymen, aviators, and about meetings with prominent military leaders.
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/kulakov_nm/01.html

The exercise management headquarters was located on the Elbrus floating base. When we arrived on the Elbrus in Odessa, the commander of the naval base, Rear Admiral G.V. Zhukov, came on board and reported that the commander of the troops of the Odessa Military District, Colonel General Ya. T. Cherevichenko, could not meet the head of the Main Naval headquarters due to the alarming situation on the border, which does not allow him to move away from communications.
“If the mountain does not come to Mohammed, then Mohammed goes to the mountain,” joked Ivan Stepanovich Isakov and invited F. S. Oktyabrsky and me to go with him to the district headquarters.
The commander of the district troops introduced us to the latest facts of the invasion of foreign aircraft into Soviet airspace, with reports of the observed movement of troops beyond the Danube and Prut. Referring to the turbulent situation near the border, Cherevichenko asked the head of the Main Marine Headquarters to exempt him from personal participation in the exercise.
The teaching continued as planned. Troops were landed on the western coast of the Crimean peninsula. Admiral Isakov praised the actions of the ships and the landing division. Naval pilots and submariners performed well.
On June 18, the exercise ended, and the ships began to return to Sevastopol. However, the fleet maintained operational readiness number two. Analysis of the maneuvers was planned for June 23. Admiral Isakov announced that he could not linger, and, having entrusted the analysis to the Military Council of the Fleet, he left for Moscow.

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

Referring to the turbulent situation near the border, Cherevichenko asked the head of the Main Marine Headquarters to exempt him from personal participation in the exercise.

If you understood the military hierarchy even a little, then you would know that the commander of the OdVO did not have the right to ask Isakov for anything, if only because these were different people’s commissariats at that time, and Cherevichenko was not subordinate to the naval one. If he was personally required to participate in these exercises, then either Timoshenko or Zhukov could give him permission not to participate in them.
But the point is not even that, but the fact that Isakov acted absolutely correctly, without waiting for the analysis of the teachings - he himself saw everything with his own eyes, so he could report to Kuznetsov without materials from the teachings.

[Seal]

Quote: ccsr

If you understood even a little about the military hierarchy, then you would know

If you knew how to read a little, you would understand that with this claim of yours you need to address not me, but Nikolai Mikhailovich Kulakov, who during the Great Patriotic War was a member of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet, a quote from whose memoirs I quoted in full and without distortions.

But the point is not even that, but the fact that Isakov acted absolutely correctly, without waiting for the analysis of the teachings - he himself saw everything with his own eyes, so he could report to Kuznetsov without materials from the teachings.

Why are you banging on an open door? Does anyone argue with this? The point is why, immediately after the fleet returned to Sevastopol (June 18), Isakov urgently left for Moscow, but only showed up at Kuznetsov’s in the afternoon of June 22.06.1941, XNUMX.
The following is a quote from the memoirs of N.G. Kuznetsov "On the Eve".
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/kuznetsov-1/37.html

On June 18, the Black Sea Fleet returned from the exercise area to Sevastopol and received orders to remain in readiness No. 2. Most of the sailors and ship commanders never went ashore. Many of them then did not see their loved ones for many months.

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

The point is why, immediately after the fleet returned to Sevastopol (June 18), Isakov urgently left for Moscow, but only showed up at Kuznetsov’s in the afternoon of June 22.06.1941, XNUMX.

I think that you will not be able to pin on Isakov the case of unauthorized leaving of service, no matter how you try to lead inexperienced readers to this.

[Seal]

Quote: ccsr

I think that you will not be able to pin on Isakov the case of unauthorized leaving of service, no matter how you try to lead inexperienced readers to this.

These are your fantasies. I just want to figure out where he disappeared for approximately 48 hours before the war itself and where he was in the first 10 hours of the war. I do not rule out that the same thing could have happened to him as happened to Meretskov on June 23. Only Isakov was much luckier.
Or (unlikely, but nothing can be ruled out) Isakov gave some evidence against Meretskov. After all, they both held equivalent positions for some time. Only Meretskov is in the Red Army, and Isakov is in the Red Army.

[ccsr]

Quote: Seal

Or (unlikely, but nothing can be ruled out) Isakov gave some evidence against Meretskov. After all, they both held equivalent positions for some time. Only Meretskov is in the Red Army, and Isakov is in the Red Army.

“There is an elderberry in the garden, and a man in Kyiv” - this is from the same series.