The following abbreviations are used in the article: А - field army AK - army corps, IN - military district, GraA - Army Group, Spacecraft - Red Army, u (md) - motorized corps (division), Goals Difference - intelligence materials, Ro - intelligence department of the headquarters RU - Reconnaissance of the General Staff of the spacecraft, TGr — tank Group, td (mn, tb) - tank division (regiment, battalion).
In the previous part RM were considered about large German headquarters, which came to the leadership of the USSR and spacecraft in 1940. The reliability of these RMs was low. The RM was examined about the presence of GRA commands at the Soviet-German border, which, in fact, were the headquarters of the fronts for commanding troops in strategic directions. Our intelligence services were not able to obtain information about the presence of such commands at the border before the outbreak of war. It was shown that of the large headquarters concentrated near our border, only the 4th TGr that was forming (the Germans tried to create such an impression) and the 4th A. did not have encrypted signs. often used its true name.
Let us consider the Republic of Moldova on the deployment of army and TGr headquarters near our border, which arrived in spring and June 1941 to the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union. Information on the presence of such headquarters could help the command of the spacecraft to determine the main directions of tactical attacks by the enemy armies and with especially dangerous directions in which large mobile groups should be introduced into the breakthrough.
Intelligence on the presence of large headquarters of the allies of Germany
The inability to explain the lack of reliable data on the presence of GrA headquarters, field armies, TGr and MK at the border led individual writers to come up with a new version. According to this version, the command of the spacecraft and the leadership of the USSR were not interested in the RM about the presence of large headquarters. For these leaders it was only necessary to determine the number of divisions and the number of enemy tanks. The author claims the opposite: there was little information about the presence of large headquarters in the Republic of Moldova due to the fact that the German command did not seek to disclose their presence to our intelligence, in contrast to the infantry divisions. Consider a few RM about the troops of the allies of Germany.
Admission No. 4 RU (April 1941):
The existing operational units in Hungary (three armies, nine AKs and one mobile corps) were actually mobilized and brought to wartime states on April 20 ... In the Carpathian Ukraine, in addition to reinforced border units, three AKs are concentrated on the Hungarian-Soviet border (6, 7, 8) ... It can be assumed that the Hungarian command began the transfer to the Carpathian Ukraine of two more AKs (2 and 5 AKs) ...
Admission RO Headquarters KOVO (May 1941):
The deployment of the Romanian army. According to reliable data from radio reconnaissance and the OdVO, the deployment of the following units and formations is confirmed: Bacau - headquarters of the 4th army ... Brasov - headquarters of 6th AK, Buzau - headquarters of 5th AK, Tekuch - headquarters of 3th AK, Pyatra Neamt - headquarters of the mountain rifle corps ...
Special message ("Mars" 15.6.41):
On the Bulgarian-Turkish border are concentrated 3 and 4 Bulgarian armies (five infantry and one cavalry division). Headquarters 3 armies - Mikhailova ... 4 armies - Simeonovgrad ...
It can be seen that information about the presence and locations of the headquarters of the armies and AK of the allies of Germany was in demand by intelligence and leaders of various ranks.
Several intelligence reports before the war
Special message (Costa, 19.5.41):
From the collected information it can be established that at present Germany has concentrated 120 divisions in Poland, and by the end of June there will be 200 divisions on the Soviet border. Early July serious military actions are planned against Ukraine. In this case, proceed from the considerations that it’s impossible to win a war without the resources of Ukraine, because, conclude German competent persons, Europe is not able to provide food to the peoples of devastated countries and regions ...
Special message (Ramsay, 21.5.41):
The war between Germany and the USSR may begin at the end of May ... [Diplomatic couriers - approx. Aut.] Also stated that this year the danger could pass. They said that Germany has nine AKs consisting of 150 divisions against the USSR. One AK is under the command of the famous Reichenau. The strategic scheme of the attack on the Soviet Union will be taken from the experience of the war against Poland ...
There is a note: “... Request Ramsay: specify corps or armies. If the case, then it does not fit with the concept of the case. Golikov. " It is somewhat strange that the head of RU did not write: “What kind of stupidity? There can be no more than 15 divisions in German corps. ”. But this resolution is not strange, if we understand that there is no information in the Republic of Uzbekistan on the redeployment of three headquarters of the fronts to the East and the data on the presence of army headquarters are incomplete and not accurate ... Clarification comes shortly before the outbreak of war.
Special message (17.6.41):
Memo ... reports that in his report on 9 armies on the Soviet-German border, it is said clearly about armies, not about AK ...
In June, the leadership of the Republic of Uzbekistan covers concerns related to the suspicion of unreliability of incoming RM. During this period, there is also a suspicion of the inaccuracy of information obtained by visual observation of epaulettes of German soldiers and rumored to be: “[16.6.41] Dislocation of parts [in Warsaw]"marked on shoulder straps and conversations of local residents, is doubtful and requires careful verification".
The leadership of the intelligence, spacecraft and the Soviet Union are interested in the locations of the German large headquarters, and RU has no certainty with their presence and location. This can be seen from the letter of RU to the NKGB of the USSR (3.6.41):
We ask that the means at your disposal help the RU in checking, identifying and clarifying the following issues: ... 6. The deployment of the headquarters of the German armies and the headquarters of army groups in all theaters of military operations of Germany against the USSR, in particular, to check the presence of the headquarters of the armies and their numbering in Koenigsberg, Allenstein, Warsaw, Lublin, in the area Zamost - Krasnystav - Yankov, in the area of Tarnow - Debica - Bochnia , in the Zakopane region - 75 km south of Krakow. The German army headquarters in Romania, the headquarters of army groups (fronts) in the areas of Lodz - Spala ... and Krakow ... "
Referring to a torn quote from the memoirs of General Golikov, some writers confidently state that our intelligence provided the leadership with all the necessary RMs about the presence and deployment of German troops at our border. About the troops that were stationed in East Germany, our intelligence allegedly had more complete information, because had a more extensive intelligence network there.
Continuation of the letter from 3.6.41:
7. Recheck the number of German divisions and corps east of the Oder River, i.e. from the line Moravsk-Ostrava-Breslau-Stettin ... It is especially important to identify the composition of the troops in the most poorly lit areas: Czestochowa, Katowice, Krakow; Lodz, Poznan, Breslau; Frankfurt an der Oder, Breslau and Danzig, Stettin, Bromberg (Bydgoszcz).
9. What is known about the plans for military operations against the USSR (in any form - documentary, in statements, etc.). Head of RU GSh KA Golikov.
9. What is known about the plans for military operations against the USSR (in any form - documentary, in statements, etc.). Head of RU GSh KA Golikov.
At the beginning of June 1941, the Republic of Uzbekistan should help recheck the number of German troops from East Germany to the Soviet-German border. Intelligence is interested in information about the presence of GRA headquarters, armies and corps. It is a question of rather vast areas about which there is extremely little information ... In RU there is no complete certainty about the plans of the German command in case of war with the USSR. This is referred to in listing nine. Referring to a torn quote from the memoirs of the former head of the Republic of Uzbekistan, writers do not even bother to read the entire text of the memoirs. General F.I. Golikov, even after the war, was convinced that intelligence provided reliable information ...
As of 1.6.41, there were no 286-296 divisions, 40-47 TD and MD, 8-10 paratrooper and airborne divisions in Germany ... Unreliable RMs on the absence of German mk and TGr at the border did not allow the leadership of the spacecraft and air forces to advance our troops to protect especially dangerous areas. Lack of knowledge about the concentration centers of large enemy mobile groups led to errors in orders to move our mechanized corps from the very beginning of the war. Failure to know the locations of the existing enemy parachute units led to the mass involvement of troops in the fight against non-existent large landing parties.
The fact that there are no other RMs that would warn the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union about the outbreak of war on June 22 is also confirmed by the first military report of the Republic of Uzbekistan. It was examined in detail in the intelligence cycle. The vast majority of this summary confirms the RM that our intelligence had by 1.6.41. However, these data turned out to be unreliable, which, in turn, led to errors in the leadership of the spacecraft immediately before the war and on June 22.
The presence of large German headquarters on our border
Consider the actual location of the headquarters of the field armies and TGr in the territory of East Prussia and the Governor General.
Headquarters 4th A in September 1940 it moves to the East. From the beginning of October 1940 to 19.6.41, he was deployed in Warsaw on Hitler Square (former Pilsudski Square), and on June 21 he was in Miedzyrzec.
Headquarters 6th A from 10.4 to 19.6.41 it is deployed in Tarnobrzeg, and on 21.6.41 it moved to Sulov.
Headquarters 9th A from 23.4 to 27.5.41 it is deployed in Vidminnen (20 km north-east of the city of Aris). On June 16 and 19, it is located in Shlagakrug (10 km south of Aris), and on June 21 in the city of Ghiba on the Suvalka ledge. The report for 12.6.41 says that in the evening the army headquarters (A.O.K. 9) proceeded through Aris.
Headquarters 11th A until May 1941 it is deployed in Germany, and on 27.5.41 it is located in Romania.
Headquarters 12th A at the end of 1940 it is deployed in Zakopane. In January 1941, the headquarters of the 17th A was formed on its basis. In March, the headquarters of the 12th A moved to Bulgaria and would not return to our border.
Headquarters 17th A until 12.4.41 it is deployed in Zakopane, and from 23.4 to 19.6 it is located in Rzeszow. By June 21, the headquarters is moving to Rudnik, and its place in Rzeszow is occupied by the command of the GR “South”.
Headquarters 16th A from 23.4 to 19.6.41 it is deployed in Bartenstein, and on June 21 it is celebrated in Gumbinen.
Headquarters 18th A until 19.6.41 it is deployed in Koenigsberg, and on June 21 it is located in the city of Heudekrug.
It can be seen that the headquarters of the 4th, 6th, 9th, 16th, 17th and 18th armies from April to June 1941 were deployed in the same settlements.
Headquarters 1st TGr. On 23.4.41 the headquarters advance group is located north of Rzeszow, and on May 27 it is also celebrated in Sandomierz. In the same period, the main part of the headquarters is in Breslau. On June 16 and 19, the TGr headquarters (in full) was celebrated in Rudka (73 km west of Zamosc), and on June 21 - in Wolka Labunsk (9 km south of Zamosc).
Headquarters 2st TGr 27.5.41 is stationed in Berlin, and its advance group is located on the outskirts of Warsaw. Until June 16, the headquarters of the group will be near Warsaw, and from June 19 to 21 - it is celebrated in Biala Podlaska.
Headquarters 3st TGr It will be deployed in the city of Jena (Germany) until at least 27.5.41, and its advance group will be located in Vidminnen from April 23. On June 16, the TGr headquarters is fully marked in the indicated city. June 19, the headquarters is located in Treiburg.
Headquarters 4st TGr from 17.2 to 16.6.41 it is located at the beginning of formation - in the city of Allenstein. On June 19, it is celebrated 17 km northwest of the city of Tilsit, and on June 21, in the suburbs of Tilsit.
RM on the presence of large headquarters
On 31.5.41, the last prewar summary of the RU, which is currently published, was printed and sent to the addressees. Further, before the outbreak of war, there is no published information of the General Staff of the Space Administration. Why is there no such information in the public domain?
According to the author, the only reason is the lack of changes in the RM, which were available on May 31. In the latest known information, the number of enemy divisions randomly coincided with their actual number. Moreover, the distribution itself along the border of the enemy troops does not correspond to the information from the reports.
The last known RU document published is Bulletin No. 5 (west) of 15.6.41, which repeats the information of the RU bulletin dated 31.5.41. The bulletin additionally includes “The deployment of German units and formations by groups in the USSR border zone by 1.6.41. 15.5.41 g. ”There is a clarification that the information is given according to the intelligence data of the RO VO. But if this information is given in the RU summary, then this information does not contradict the RM available to RU. Consider in detail the information from the report dated XNUMX, which relates to the headquarters of the armies and TGr.
The abbreviations below will be used: PI - verified information, Accident - data requires verification.
In the Republic of Moldova, the presence of the 9th A headquarters in Allenstein, which is a PI, is noted. Headquarters 18th A is located in Koenigsberg (PI). There is a note that in Koenigsberg the headquarters of the army group is marked - in the terminology of RU - the headquarters of the front. It is indicated that an accident.
In Warsaw, there is the headquarters of the 8th A (PI). There is a large headquarters near Warsaw in Otwock. There is a note: "according to, requiring scrutiny, 4th A headquarters and army group headquarters are celebrated in Warsaw ”.
In Spala is the headquarters of the Eastern Group (PI). In Lublin - the headquarters of the 3rd A (PI). In Ropshitsa - headquarters of the 6th A (accident). In Bochnia - the headquarters of the army with an unknown number (accident).
It is noted that according to the testimony of the defector in Ulyanov there is a headquarters of the 16th A (accident). According to unverified data, the headquarters of the 14th A is allegedly deployed in Krakow, the headquarters of the 17th A in Zakopane, and the headquarters of the 11th A in Romania.
In total, it is reliably known that there is one front headquarters (headquarters of the eastern group) and four field armies (3rd, 8th, 9th and 18th). It is required to check the data on the presence of two GRAs (in Koenigsberg and Warsaw) and seven armies: the 4th in Warsaw, the 6th in Ropshitsa, unknown in Bochnia, the 16th in Ulyanov, the 14th in Krakow, the 17th in Zakopane and 11th in Romania. Verify the accuracy of the PM Summary.
According to unverified data, the headquarters of the 14th A is allegedly deployed in Krakow, the headquarters of the 17th A in Zakopane, and the 11th A. headquarters in Romania.
There is no army headquarters in Krakow. Headquarters of the 14th A In the autumn of 1939, it was reorganized into the headquarters of the 12th A. There is no headquarters of the 17th A in Zakopane, which has been located in Rzeszow since April 1941. Headquarters 11th A is indeed located in Romania, but this information (according to intelligence) is not verified ...
You can "catch your ears" RM and say that intelligence has provided reliable information. But the author believes that intelligence information is false. Why?
The headquarters of mobile groups were not found. The reconnaissance of headquarters closer to the border on the eve of the war was not detected by intelligence. According to intelligence, many of the enemy’s formations on the eve of the war were located far enough from the border. And much more…
After the outbreak of the war, maps were prepared at the headquarters of the border military organizations to explain their actions on the eve of the war. Probably, in order to convey the truth hidden from us that the presence of mobile strike groups and the exit of enemy units to the border were not discovered by intelligence. It should be noted that these cards were discussed in detail in the first four parts of the article on intelligence.
On the map of the KOVO headquarters, the presence of the non-existent headquarters of 3rd A and the headquarters of an unknown army in Bochnia is again noted. There are signs of unknown army headquarters near Sandomierz and Zamosc. The headquarters of the eastern army group in Spal, mistakenly mistaken for intelligence by the headquarters of the GraA. On the map of PribOVO in East Prussia, the only major headquarters is marked - the headquarters of the 18th A.
The ZAPOVO headquarters is also inflicted with the situation that they knew about on June 21: the headquarters of the 18th A in Königsberg, the headquarters of the 9th A in Allenstein, the headquarters of the 8th A in Warsaw, the headquarters of the 3rd A in Lublin. All of them, as well as a significant mass of enemy troops, are located in places of deployment quite far from the border ... The information repeats the unreliable RMs that were considered above.
The deployment of large enemy headquarters from the point of view of the command of PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO does not differ much from the information presented in the Summary of 15.6.41. Three field armies against PribOVO and ZAPOVO. Up to four armies against KOVO. The only front headquarters in the East ...
Consider the number of tank and motorized troops, which were given in the intelligence reports of the Republic of Uzbekistan on May 31 and June 15, 1941. Intelligence discovered:
- against PribOVO - 5 TP, which are combined in 2 td. The presence of 3 ppm was noted;
- against ZAPOVO - td and 6 tp, which are combined in total in 4 td. There is one MD;
- against KOVO concentrated up to 6 TD and 5 MD;
- in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja, i.e. against the troops of KOVO and OdVO - 2 TD and 4 MD.
Total, excluding German troops in Romania, twelve TDs and nine MDs were concentrated at the border.
According to the intelligence of the districts, the tank units are concentrated:
- against PribOVO - 6 tb and 5 tp;
- against ZAPOVO - 3 tb and 6 tp;
- against KOVO - up to 4 TD, 6 TP and 3 TB.
It can be seen that the data of the districts are somewhat overestimated relative to the information of the RU.
Based on intelligence, the enemy should deliver the main attacks where there are more tank and motorized troops. And most of them are concentrated against KOVO and OdVO.
Consider the RU report on May 5, 1941 regarding the presence of tank and motorized troops:
In the very composition of forces concentrated against the USSR, attention is drawn to the strengthening of tank forces from 9 divisions on 25.4.41 to 12 divisions at 5.5.41; motorized, including motor divisions, from 7 divisions on 25.4.41 to 8 divisions on 5.5.41 ...
According to the Republic of Uzbekistan, from May 5 to May 31, at the border (excluding the territory of Romania), there are twelve etc. and 8 ... 9 md. In Romania, there are 2 more td and 4 md. Let's check this information.
In Romania, instead of 6 tank and motorized divisions, in fact, there are none. The figure shows information on the deployment of tank and motorized divisions as of 27.5.41. The German map itself is not given, because in the future, an article will be prepared on the data of our intelligence on the German mobile forces, which will contain links to the documents used.
Parts of only two tank divisions (the 1st and 6th in East Prussia) are deployed in the areas of responsibility of the VO and there are no motorized divisions. Even before the Stettin-Breslau-Moravsk-Ostrava line, two TDs and one MD are concentrated, but this territory is already outside the lines of responsibility of PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO. The assumption that intelligence could accept members of the armed forces of divisional subordination is not true. On the maps that will be presented in the future, the designated areas of concentration of these divisions are indicated. There are no tank and motorized units at the border from the word “completely” ... As an example, I will give information (as of 27.5.41) about the deployment of three military units that, according to intelligence, were against the KOVO.
It causes complete bewilderment: what kind of tank and motorized divisions, regiments and battalions are confidently “seeing”, “tracking” and “confirming” by our intelligence ?? Indeed, in places designated as verified information (!) With the deployment of tank battalions, tank regiments, tank and motorized divisions, by the time the reports were compiled, they did not exist and did not exist ...
The German command deliberately "illuminated" a number of field army headquarters before our reconnaissance, hiding the presence of TGr and mk headquarters at the border. Perhaps it wanted to show that there was nothing else near the border except for infantry armies with reinforcements. Taming our intelligence to the fact that digging carefully does not make sense: after all, all information is easily accessible. This information is confirmed by visual and repeatedly verified observation ... And then all of a sudden, Soviet intelligence will start digging and discover what it was not supposed to know ...
The figure shows the locations of large German headquarters according to intelligence. How should the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union be represented by the Republic of Moldova?
From the experience of the campaign in Poland and France, our command knew that the enemy armies consist of AKs and are, in fact, infantry armies. Armies that cannot carry out deep and lightning-fast breakthroughs, maneuvers by numerous mobile troops. Consequently, their presence at the border is not strategically dangerous.
The presence of these armies is even less dangerous due to the concentration of their troops far enough from the border. Indeed, the infantry will need 1 ... 2 ... 4 days to approach the starting positions for an attack at the border.
The presence of these armies is even less dangerous due to the presence of only one headquarters of the front, which should lead all armies from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Our command understands this well, because in the event of war, it itself unfolds 3 ... 4 fronts in the same lane to lead the armies. But to defend the Germans, one headquarters of the front is not so much a hindrance ...
The disinformation was well confirmed by the reinforced construction of fortifications by German units, the preparation of firing positions for artillery, and the installation of many anti-tank guns. In June, the following questions followed the intelligence line: "How many anti-tank guns were installed by the Germans?" The supply of troops and equipment without increasing the number of divisions (in the Republic of Moldova) in June 1941 in the districts could be taken for the accumulation of reserves of infantry armies and supplies.
What does the leadership of the spacecraft and the country know as of June 21, 1941 according to intelligence? At the western border there is only one headquarters of the GRA, which commands 4 ... 9 armies on the territory of East Prussia and the Governor General. All armies are infantry armies supported by 45 ... 54 artillery regiments, with a small number of mobile troops located far from the border.
Up to three armies are concentrated against the forces of PribOVO and ZAPOVO. Up to 6 armies are concentrated against the KOVO in Poland. Tank armies (groups) and motorized corps at a considerable distance from the border are absent. Consequently, deep and lightning strikes should not be expected in the near future. Significant forces aviation there is no enemy at border airfields. Reconnaissance very carefully and in detail tracks all movements of German troops: right down to infantry battalions, artillery batteries and tank companies ... There is no reason not to trust the data provided by intelligence ...
According to the RM, which is confirmed by the situation on 21.6.41 on the maps of the headquarters of PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO, a significant part of the German troops is not located near the border. The only conclusion suggests itself: nothing dangerous is expected in the near future and the situation is under control. There is no reason to withdraw the 1st tier divisions to positions, because The main forces of the German border divisions are also located at a distance from the border. There is no need to disperse the aircraft, as as of the morning of June 21, there were no large forces of German aviation at the border. The main thing was probably not to give the German generals a reason for provocation.
To be continued ...