1941. Intelligence on the headquarters of the German armies and tank groups

The following abbreviations are used in the article: А - field army AK - army corps, IN - military district, GraA - Army Group, Spacecraft - Red Army, u (md) - motorized corps (division), Goals Difference - intelligence materials, Ro - intelligence department of the headquarters RU - Reconnaissance of the General Staff of the spacecraft, TGr — tank Group, td (mn, tb) - tank division (regiment, battalion).

In the previous part RM were considered about large German headquarters, which came to the leadership of the USSR and spacecraft in 1940. The reliability of these RMs was low. The RM was examined about the presence of GRA commands at the Soviet-German border, which, in fact, were the headquarters of the fronts for commanding troops in strategic directions. Our intelligence services were not able to obtain information about the presence of such commands at the border before the outbreak of war. It was shown that of the large headquarters concentrated near our border, only the 4th TGr that was forming (the Germans tried to create such an impression) and the 4th A. did not have encrypted signs. often used its true name.

Let us consider the Republic of Moldova on the deployment of army and TGr headquarters near our border, which arrived in spring and June 1941 to the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union. Information on the presence of such headquarters could help the command of the spacecraft to determine the main directions of tactical attacks by the enemy armies and with especially dangerous directions in which large mobile groups should be introduced into the breakthrough.

Intelligence on the presence of large headquarters of the allies of Germany

The inability to explain the lack of reliable data on the presence of GrA headquarters, field armies, TGr and MK at the border led individual writers to come up with a new version. According to this version, the command of the spacecraft and the leadership of the USSR were not interested in the RM about the presence of large headquarters. For these leaders it was only necessary to determine the number of divisions and the number of enemy tanks. The author claims the opposite: there was little information about the presence of large headquarters in the Republic of Moldova due to the fact that the German command did not seek to disclose their presence to our intelligence, in contrast to the infantry divisions. Consider a few RM about the troops of the allies of Germany.

Admission No. 4 RU (April 1941):

The existing operational units in Hungary (three armies, nine AKs and one mobile corps) were actually mobilized and brought to wartime states on April 20 ... In the Carpathian Ukraine, in addition to reinforced border units, three AKs are concentrated on the Hungarian-Soviet border (6, 7, 8) ... It can be assumed that the Hungarian command began the transfer to the Carpathian Ukraine of two more AKs (2 and 5 AKs) ...

Admission RO Headquarters KOVO (May 1941):

The deployment of the Romanian army. According to reliable data from radio reconnaissance and the OdVO, the deployment of the following units and formations is confirmed: Bacau - headquarters of the 4th army ... Brasov - headquarters of 6th AK, Buzau - headquarters of 5th AK, Tekuch - headquarters of 3th AK, Pyatra Neamt - headquarters of the mountain rifle corps ...

Special message ("Mars" 15.6.41):

On the Bulgarian-Turkish border are concentrated 3 and 4 Bulgarian armies (five infantry and one cavalry division). Headquarters 3 armies - Mikhailova ... 4 armies - Simeonovgrad ...

It can be seen that information about the presence and locations of the headquarters of the armies and AK of the allies of Germany was in demand by intelligence and leaders of various ranks.

Several intelligence reports before the war

Special message (Costa, 19.5.41):

From the collected information it can be established that at present Germany has concentrated 120 divisions in Poland, and by the end of June there will be 200 divisions on the Soviet border. Early July serious military actions are planned against Ukraine. In this case, proceed from the considerations that it’s impossible to win a war without the resources of Ukraine, because, conclude German competent persons, Europe is not able to provide food to the peoples of devastated countries and regions ...

Special message (Ramsay, 21.5.41):

The war between Germany and the USSR may begin at the end of May ... [Diplomatic couriers - approx. Aut.] Also stated that this year the danger could pass. They said that Germany has nine AKs consisting of 150 divisions against the USSR. One AK is under the command of the famous Reichenau. The strategic scheme of the attack on the Soviet Union will be taken from the experience of the war against Poland ...

There is a note: “... Request Ramsay: specify corps or armies. If the case, then it does not fit with the concept of the case. Golikov. " It is somewhat strange that the head of RU did not write: “What kind of stupidity? There can be no more than 15 divisions in German corps. ”. But this resolution is not strange, if we understand that there is no information in the Republic of Uzbekistan on the redeployment of three headquarters of the fronts to the East and the data on the presence of army headquarters are incomplete and not accurate ... Clarification comes shortly before the outbreak of war.

Special message (17.6.41):

Memo ... reports that in his report on 9 armies on the Soviet-German border, it is said clearly about armies, not about AK ...

In June, the leadership of the Republic of Uzbekistan covers concerns related to the suspicion of unreliability of incoming RM. During this period, there is also a suspicion of the inaccuracy of information obtained by visual observation of epaulettes of German soldiers and rumored to be: “[16.6.41] Dislocation of parts [in Warsaw]"marked on shoulder straps and conversations of local residents, is doubtful and requires careful verification".

The leadership of the intelligence, spacecraft and the Soviet Union are interested in the locations of the German large headquarters, and RU has no certainty with their presence and location. This can be seen from the letter of RU to the NKGB of the USSR (3.6.41):

We ask that the means at your disposal help the RU in checking, identifying and clarifying the following issues: ... 6. The deployment of the headquarters of the German armies and the headquarters of army groups in all theaters of military operations of Germany against the USSR, in particular, to check the presence of the headquarters of the armies and their numbering in Koenigsberg, Allenstein, Warsaw, Lublin, in the area Zamost - Krasnystav - Yankov, in the area of ​​Tarnow - Debica - Bochnia , in the Zakopane region - 75 km south of Krakow. The German army headquarters in Romania, the headquarters of army groups (fronts) in the areas of Lodz - Spala ... and Krakow ... "

Referring to a torn quote from the memoirs of General Golikov, some writers confidently state that our intelligence provided the leadership with all the necessary RMs about the presence and deployment of German troops at our border. About the troops that were stationed in East Germany, our intelligence allegedly had more complete information, because had a more extensive intelligence network there.

Continuation of the letter from 3.6.41:

7. Recheck the number of German divisions and corps east of the Oder River, i.e. from the line Moravsk-Ostrava-Breslau-Stettin ... It is especially important to identify the composition of the troops in the most poorly lit areas: Czestochowa, Katowice, Krakow; Lodz, Poznan, Breslau; Frankfurt an der Oder, Breslau and Danzig, Stettin, Bromberg (Bydgoszcz).
9. What is known about the plans for military operations against the USSR (in any form - documentary, in statements, etc.). Head of RU GSh KA Golikov.

At the beginning of June 1941, the Republic of Uzbekistan should help recheck the number of German troops from East Germany to the Soviet-German border. Intelligence is interested in information about the presence of GRA headquarters, armies and corps. It is a question of rather vast areas about which there is extremely little information ... In RU there is no complete certainty about the plans of the German command in case of war with the USSR. This is referred to in listing nine. Referring to a torn quote from the memoirs of the former head of the Republic of Uzbekistan, writers do not even bother to read the entire text of the memoirs. General F.I. Golikov, even after the war, was convinced that intelligence provided reliable information ...

As of 1.6.41, there were no 286-296 divisions, 40-47 TD and MD, 8-10 paratrooper and airborne divisions in Germany ... Unreliable RMs on the absence of German mk and TGr at the border did not allow the leadership of the spacecraft and air forces to advance our troops to protect especially dangerous areas. Lack of knowledge about the concentration centers of large enemy mobile groups led to errors in orders to move our mechanized corps from the very beginning of the war. Failure to know the locations of the existing enemy parachute units led to the mass involvement of troops in the fight against non-existent large landing parties.

The fact that there are no other RMs that would warn the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union about the outbreak of war on June 22 is also confirmed by the first military report of the Republic of Uzbekistan. It was examined in detail in the intelligence cycle. The vast majority of this summary confirms the RM that our intelligence had by 1.6.41. However, these data turned out to be unreliable, which, in turn, led to errors in the leadership of the spacecraft immediately before the war and on June 22.

The presence of large German headquarters on our border

Consider the actual location of the headquarters of the field armies and TGr in the territory of East Prussia and the Governor General.

Headquarters 4th A in September 1940 it moves to the East. From the beginning of October 1940 to 19.6.41, he was deployed in Warsaw on Hitler Square (former Pilsudski Square), and on June 21 he was in Miedzyrzec.

Headquarters 6th A from 10.4 to 19.6.41 it is deployed in Tarnobrzeg, and on 21.6.41 it moved to Sulov.

Headquarters 9th A from 23.4 to 27.5.41 it is deployed in Vidminnen (20 km north-east of the city of Aris). On June 16 and 19, it is located in Shlagakrug (10 km south of Aris), and on June 21 in the city of Ghiba on the Suvalka ledge. The report for 12.6.41 says that in the evening the army headquarters (A.O.K. 9) proceeded through Aris.

Headquarters 11th A until May 1941 it is deployed in Germany, and on 27.5.41 it is located in Romania.

Headquarters 12th A at the end of 1940 it is deployed in Zakopane. In January 1941, the headquarters of the 17th A was formed on its basis. In March, the headquarters of the 12th A moved to Bulgaria and would not return to our border.

Headquarters 17th A until 12.4.41 it is deployed in Zakopane, and from 23.4 to 19.6 it is located in Rzeszow. By June 21, the headquarters is moving to Rudnik, and its place in Rzeszow is occupied by the command of the GR “South”.

Headquarters 16th A from 23.4 to 19.6.41 it is deployed in Bartenstein, and on June 21 it is celebrated in Gumbinen.

Headquarters 18th A until 19.6.41 it is deployed in Koenigsberg, and on June 21 it is located in the city of Heudekrug.

It can be seen that the headquarters of the 4th, 6th, 9th, 16th, 17th and 18th armies from April to June 1941 were deployed in the same settlements.

Headquarters 1st TGr. On 23.4.41 the headquarters advance group is located north of Rzeszow, and on May 27 it is also celebrated in Sandomierz. In the same period, the main part of the headquarters is in Breslau. On June 16 and 19, the TGr headquarters (in full) was celebrated in Rudka (73 km west of Zamosc), and on June 21 - in Wolka Labunsk (9 km south of Zamosc).

Headquarters 2st TGr 27.5.41 is stationed in Berlin, and its advance group is located on the outskirts of Warsaw. Until June 16, the headquarters of the group will be near Warsaw, and from June 19 to 21 - it is celebrated in Biala Podlaska.

Headquarters 3st TGr It will be deployed in the city of Jena (Germany) until at least 27.5.41, and its advance group will be located in Vidminnen from April 23. On June 16, the TGr headquarters is fully marked in the indicated city. June 19, the headquarters is located in Treiburg.

Headquarters 4st TGr from 17.2 to 16.6.41 it is located at the beginning of formation - in the city of Allenstein. On June 19, it is celebrated 17 km northwest of the city of Tilsit, and on June 21, in the suburbs of Tilsit.

RM on the presence of large headquarters

On 31.5.41, the last prewar summary of the RU, which is currently published, was printed and sent to the addressees. Further, before the outbreak of war, there is no published information of the General Staff of the Space Administration. Why is there no such information in the public domain?

According to the author, the only reason is the lack of changes in the RM, which were available on May 31. In the latest known information, the number of enemy divisions randomly coincided with their actual number. Moreover, the distribution itself along the border of the enemy troops does not correspond to the information from the reports.

The last known RU document published is Bulletin No. 5 (west) of 15.6.41, which repeats the information of the RU bulletin dated 31.5.41. The bulletin additionally includes “The deployment of German units and formations by groups in the USSR border zone by 1.6.41. 15.5.41 g. ”There is a clarification that the information is given according to the intelligence data of the RO VO. But if this information is given in the RU summary, then this information does not contradict the RM available to RU. Consider in detail the information from the report dated XNUMX, which relates to the headquarters of the armies and TGr.

The abbreviations below will be used: PI - verified information, Accident - data requires verification.

In the Republic of Moldova, the presence of the 9th A headquarters in Allenstein, which is a PI, is noted. Headquarters 18th A is located in Koenigsberg (PI). There is a note that in Koenigsberg the headquarters of the army group is marked - in the terminology of RU - the headquarters of the front. It is indicated that an accident.

In Warsaw, there is the headquarters of the 8th A (PI). There is a large headquarters near Warsaw in Otwock. There is a note: "according to, requiring scrutiny, 4th A headquarters and army group headquarters are celebrated in Warsaw ”.

In Spala is the headquarters of the Eastern Group (PI). In Lublin - the headquarters of the 3rd A (PI). In Ropshitsa - headquarters of the 6th A (accident). In Bochnia - the headquarters of the army with an unknown number (accident).

It is noted that according to the testimony of the defector in Ulyanov there is a headquarters of the 16th A (accident). According to unverified data, the headquarters of the 14th A is allegedly deployed in Krakow, the headquarters of the 17th A in Zakopane, and the headquarters of the 11th A in Romania.

In total, it is reliably known that there is one front headquarters (headquarters of the eastern group) and four field armies (3rd, 8th, 9th and 18th). It is required to check the data on the presence of two GRAs (in Koenigsberg and Warsaw) and seven armies: the 4th in Warsaw, the 6th in Ropshitsa, unknown in Bochnia, the 16th in Ulyanov, the 14th in Krakow, the 17th in Zakopane and 11th in Romania. Verify the accuracy of the PM Summary.

According to unverified data, the headquarters of the 14th A is allegedly deployed in Krakow, the headquarters of the 17th A in Zakopane, and the 11th A. headquarters in Romania.

There is no army headquarters in Krakow. Headquarters of the 14th A In the autumn of 1939, it was reorganized into the headquarters of the 12th A. There is no headquarters of the 17th A in Zakopane, which has been located in Rzeszow since April 1941. Headquarters 11th A is indeed located in Romania, but this information (according to intelligence) is not verified ...

You can "catch your ears" RM and say that intelligence has provided reliable information. But the author believes that intelligence information is false. Why?

The headquarters of mobile groups were not found. The reconnaissance of headquarters closer to the border on the eve of the war was not detected by intelligence. According to intelligence, many of the enemy’s formations on the eve of the war were located far enough from the border. And much more…

After the outbreak of the war, maps were prepared at the headquarters of the border military organizations to explain their actions on the eve of the war. Probably, in order to convey the truth hidden from us that the presence of mobile strike groups and the exit of enemy units to the border were not discovered by intelligence. It should be noted that these cards were discussed in detail in the first four parts of the article on intelligence.

On the map of the KOVO headquarters, the presence of the non-existent headquarters of 3rd A and the headquarters of an unknown army in Bochnia is again noted. There are signs of unknown army headquarters near Sandomierz and Zamosc. The headquarters of the eastern army group in Spal, mistakenly mistaken for intelligence by the headquarters of the GraA. On the map of PribOVO in East Prussia, the only major headquarters is marked - the headquarters of the 18th A.

The ZAPOVO headquarters is also inflicted with the situation that they knew about on June 21: the headquarters of the 18th A in Königsberg, the headquarters of the 9th A in Allenstein, the headquarters of the 8th A in Warsaw, the headquarters of the 3rd A in Lublin. All of them, as well as a significant mass of enemy troops, are located in places of deployment quite far from the border ... The information repeats the unreliable RMs that were considered above.

The deployment of large enemy headquarters from the point of view of the command of PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO does not differ much from the information presented in the Summary of 15.6.41. Three field armies against PribOVO and ZAPOVO. Up to four armies against KOVO. The only front headquarters in the East ...

Consider the number of tank and motorized troops, which were given in the intelligence reports of the Republic of Uzbekistan on May 31 and June 15, 1941. Intelligence discovered:

- against PribOVO - 5 TP, which are combined in 2 td. The presence of 3 ppm was noted;

- against ZAPOVO - td and 6 tp, which are combined in total in 4 td. There is one MD;

- against KOVO concentrated up to 6 TD and 5 MD;

- in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja, i.e. against the troops of KOVO and OdVO - 2 TD and 4 MD.

Total, excluding German troops in Romania, twelve TDs and nine MDs were concentrated at the border.

According to the intelligence of the districts, the tank units are concentrated:

- against PribOVO - 6 tb and 5 tp;

- against ZAPOVO - 3 tb and 6 tp;

- against KOVO - up to 4 TD, 6 TP and 3 TB.

It can be seen that the data of the districts are somewhat overestimated relative to the information of the RU.

Based on intelligence, the enemy should deliver the main attacks where there are more tank and motorized troops. And most of them are concentrated against KOVO and OdVO.

Consider the RU report on May 5, 1941 regarding the presence of tank and motorized troops:

In the very composition of forces concentrated against the USSR, attention is drawn to the strengthening of tank forces from 9 divisions on 25.4.41 to 12 divisions at 5.5.41; motorized, including motor divisions, from 7 divisions on 25.4.41 to 8 divisions on 5.5.41 ...

According to the Republic of Uzbekistan, from May 5 to May 31, at the border (excluding the territory of Romania), there are twelve etc. and 8 ... 9 md. In Romania, there are 2 more td and 4 md. Let's check this information.

In Romania, instead of 6 tank and motorized divisions, in fact, there are none. The figure shows information on the deployment of tank and motorized divisions as of 27.5.41. The German map itself is not given, because in the future, an article will be prepared on the data of our intelligence on the German mobile forces, which will contain links to the documents used.

Parts of only two tank divisions (the 1st and 6th in East Prussia) are deployed in the areas of responsibility of the VO and there are no motorized divisions. Even before the Stettin-Breslau-Moravsk-Ostrava line, two TDs and one MD are concentrated, but this territory is already outside the lines of responsibility of PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO. The assumption that intelligence could accept members of the armed forces of divisional subordination is not true. On the maps that will be presented in the future, the designated areas of concentration of these divisions are indicated. There are no tank and motorized units at the border from the word “completely” ... As an example, I will give information (as of 27.5.41) about the deployment of three military units that, according to intelligence, were against the KOVO.

It causes complete bewilderment: what kind of tank and motorized divisions, regiments and battalions are confidently “seeing”, “tracking” and “confirming” by our intelligence ?? Indeed, in places designated as verified information (!) With the deployment of tank battalions, tank regiments, tank and motorized divisions, by the time the reports were compiled, they did not exist and did not exist ...

The German command deliberately "illuminated" a number of field army headquarters before our reconnaissance, hiding the presence of TGr and mk headquarters at the border. Perhaps it wanted to show that there was nothing else near the border except for infantry armies with reinforcements. Taming our intelligence to the fact that digging carefully does not make sense: after all, all information is easily accessible. This information is confirmed by visual and repeatedly verified observation ... And then all of a sudden, Soviet intelligence will start digging and discover what it was not supposed to know ...

The figure shows the locations of large German headquarters according to intelligence. How should the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union be represented by the Republic of Moldova?

From the experience of the campaign in Poland and France, our command knew that the enemy armies consist of AKs and are, in fact, infantry armies. Armies that cannot carry out deep and lightning-fast breakthroughs, maneuvers by numerous mobile troops. Consequently, their presence at the border is not strategically dangerous.

The presence of these armies is even less dangerous due to the concentration of their troops far enough from the border. Indeed, the infantry will need 1 ... 2 ... 4 days to approach the starting positions for an attack at the border.

The presence of these armies is even less dangerous due to the presence of only one headquarters of the front, which should lead all armies from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Our command understands this well, because in the event of war, it itself unfolds 3 ... 4 fronts in the same lane to lead the armies. But to defend the Germans, one headquarters of the front is not so much a hindrance ...

The disinformation was well confirmed by the reinforced construction of fortifications by German units, the preparation of firing positions for artillery, and the installation of many anti-tank guns. In June, the following questions followed the intelligence line: "How many anti-tank guns were installed by the Germans?" The supply of troops and equipment without increasing the number of divisions (in the Republic of Moldova) in June 1941 in the districts could be taken for the accumulation of reserves of infantry armies and supplies.

What does the leadership of the spacecraft and the country know as of June 21, 1941 according to intelligence? At the western border there is only one headquarters of the GRA, which commands 4 ... 9 armies on the territory of East Prussia and the Governor General. All armies are infantry armies supported by 45 ... 54 artillery regiments, with a small number of mobile troops located far from the border.

Up to three armies are concentrated against the forces of PribOVO and ZAPOVO. Up to 6 armies are concentrated against the KOVO in Poland. Tank armies (groups) and motorized corps at a considerable distance from the border are absent. Consequently, deep and lightning strikes should not be expected in the near future. Significant forces aviation there is no enemy at border airfields. Reconnaissance very carefully and in detail tracks all movements of German troops: right down to infantry battalions, artillery batteries and tank companies ... There is no reason not to trust the data provided by intelligence ...

According to the RM, which is confirmed by the situation on 21.6.41 on the maps of the headquarters of PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO, a significant part of the German troops is not located near the border. The only conclusion suggests itself: nothing dangerous is expected in the near future and the situation is under control. There is no reason to withdraw the 1st tier divisions to positions, because The main forces of the German border divisions are also located at a distance from the border. There is no need to disperse the aircraft, as as of the morning of June 21, there were no large forces of German aviation at the border. The main thing was probably not to give the German generals a reason for provocation.

To be continued ...

Comments

[cavl]

Thanks to the author for interesting material!

[antivirus]

what's interestnig?
on 19.6.41 he is deployed in Warsaw on Hitler Square (former Pilsudski Square),
the norm was to drag kings and generals into history. What is worse Kaganovich and IVS?

under the article, it’s possible to put it, nonsense. not everyone knew in July-August (Smolensk-Kiev).
Could not because of the "level of development produces forces and production relations" = LEVEL OF TRAINING OF THE WHOLE ARMY AND NAVY. For about 1 year (until the summer of 42), preparation was underway with losses.
It is better for the modern military to know how many training hours from a new recruit it is now possible to prepare reconnaissance and mechanic guides, and aircraft technicians, and a battalion commander.
A semi-literate country could not single out from its small number of academician-engineer-teachers (how many were from higher education and how many from "teacher's courses?) - tractor drivers, assemblers, assemblers +" I can dig, but I can not dig "WITHOUT DAMAGE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEFUL INDUSTRIES ...
only total mobilization with the rejection of the development of the whole country.
EVERYTHING FOR THE FRONT, EVERYTHING FOR THE VICTORY - AND NOTHING FOR THE COLLECTIVE CLUB, even button accordions, probably EVERYTHING WENT TO THE ARMY

[cavl]

It was interesting to read to me, but not to you.
The color and taste are different lovers.
There are a lot of facts that cannot be refuted, unlike the delirium of the traitor Rezun.
Much becomes clear to me about decision-making before the war.
Stalin for me is no longer the culprit of an unexpected attack.
Purges, destruction of army and intelligence personnel - yes. But the culprit of the unexpected events of June 22, whom Zhukov called, is not.
That they did not know much in June-August 1941

[antivirus]

Stalin for me is no longer the culprit of an unexpected attack.
EXACTLY ABOUT THIS AND I WRITTEN I - many different "initiators" and without IVS worked in the USSR and around him. How not to recall them to Moscow, and there the norms of "hostel" from the 19th century.
I recently read about intelligence officers (?) in Denmark - they were clearly ordered "not to involve the communists in the work of agents," and they took it and fell under the hood. + Our intelligence officers left Germany (to transmit intelligence information) and how Pleishner was stupid from freedom without the Gestapo and also under the hood.
And my minuses just show the psychology of "run from now and still", without thinking about the world around us, and even more so about the other worldview of people from the late 19th century.
everyone in a different light understood the IVS and other Soviet leaders, and not only them.
the big secret is not mentioned - MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY OF THE USA - FOR WHOM THEY ARE WRITING. WWI experience showed that money will not fly past them, everyone will catch - whoever gives the most and will support

[e-sam]

Quote: antivirus

Stalin for me is no longer the culprit of an unexpected attack.

And what, was there an unexpected attack?
No.
Since the spring of 1941, the Red Army carried out covert deployment. And 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX was fully deployed for successful military operations.
They would have happened.
If not the Red Army, but anyone would have fought against the Germans. Even if the Poles, the strength of the Red Army. And even with Deshman weapons of the Red Army.
But the Red Army partially could not fight (could not), and partially did not want to. The armament, again, was deshmans. Later, the Bolsheviks, as they could, taught. And reluctant, forced. But nothing really could be done with weapons.
As a result, having laid 19 million lives of military personnel (against a little more than 3,5 million Germans who died on the Eastern Front), the Red Army in May 1945 finished 2 MBs in Europe in Berlin. And the USSR became one of the four countries, the main winners of the Axis countries in Europe. Although there were enough countries in the Anti-Hitler coalition (it won in WW2).

[AsmyppoL]

Cavl and Seagl, thanks for the kind words!

[seagl]

Very interesting. Thank. We look forward to continuing.

[Olgovich]

Unreliable PM about the absence of borders German mk and TGr did not allow the leadership of the spacecraft and military forces to put forward our troops to protect Hazardous directions. Lack of knowledge about the concentration centers of large enemy mobile groups led to errors in orders to move our mechanized corps from the very beginning of the war.

1. Especially dangerous areas were well known, defeated at the headquarters games in the General Staff of the Red Army on the eve of the war and were confirmed in reality in the process of a real war

2. What does "at the border" mean? The author is not aware that even in war conditions, with battles, the Germans marched at a speed of 70 km / day to Minsk? Therefore, "at the border" is ALL the troops in Poland and in the east of Germany, because they need a couple of days to redeploy. Which is exactly what happened. in the reality. And our ... "suddenly"found themselves in front of a concentrated army.
To avoid "surprise", it was simply necessary to study the attack on Poland and France, and there would be no such "surprise".

3. Ours, in general, ALL knew:

recent the transfer of German troops freed from operations in the Balkans, in the eastern and northeastern regions of Germany related, presumably, to other motives, the TASS statement on June 14, 41:

KNEW, but ... did nothing, the main thing is ... not to "provoke"

As if world wars were beginning .... because of provocations, and not for world reasons ...

Terrible myopia, naivety and inability to really assess the situation by the country's leadership

On the border, a mobilized enemy, fighting for 2 years, and in response, neither mobilization, nor combat readiness ....: "in the opinion of Soviet circles, rumors about Germany's intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are devoid of any ground," ...
Nightmare...

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: Olgovich

KNEW, but ... did nothing, the main thing ... not to "provoke" As if world wars were beginning ... because of provocations, and not for world reasons ... Terrible myopia, naivety and inability to really assess the situation by the leadership country

On the contrary - wisdom. Because otherwise the USSR would have been declared an aggressor, and then it would not have been possible to put together an anti-Hitler coalition and Germany would have acted on the side of Germany. France, and England, and the United States.

And yet, the USSR government took all necessary actions to repulse the attack, but why Pavlov did not comply with the Directive of June 18, 1941 and did not bring his troops on alert, this is another matter.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexander Green

On the contrary - wisdom. Because otherwise the USSR would be declared an aggressor,

1. Learn what "aggression" is. How, in, aggression on .... its territory ?!

Quote: Alexander Green

on the side of Germany would have come forward and. France, and England, and the United States.

Anoglia fought with Germany, France is already defeated, ignorant. These are FACTS. And "if" you can, aha, there.

Quote: Alexander Green

And the government of the USSR took all necessary actions

It is visible and UNEXPECTED in the history of the world military catastrophe

Quote: Alexander Green

Pavlov did not comply with the Directive of June 18, 1941 and did not bring his troops on alert, this is another matter.

1. There is no "directive" of June 18 in nature. On her table, liar!

2. BEFORE it was necessary to act, to carry out mobilization, etc., so do all normal countries.

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: Olgovich

1. There is no "directive" of June 18 in nature. On her table, liar!

2. BEFORE it was necessary to act, to carry out mobilization, etc., so do all normal countries.

There is such a directive. Not all Khrushchevites were able to destroy. Other districts and fleets completed it.

Quote: Olgovich

Anoglia was at war with Germany, France is already defeated, ignorant. These are FACTS. And "if" you can, aha, there.

Hess flew to England with all these years of plans of aggression against the USSR with proposals ... Do you know which ones?

At the expense of "what is aggression." I explain for those who "do not plow deeply"
The USSR was not going to attack, but they could have made it aggressors artificially. On the eve of the war with Poland, the Germans defeated their own radio station, planting corpses in Polish military uniforms, and let correspondents capture it all. Who wanted to believe in the aggression of Poland, he believed.

The British would be very profitable to believe in our aggression against Germany. Therefore, Stalin did everything possible so as not to fall for such a provocation. Compared to what is at stake, no anti-provocative measures are expensive compared to a defeat in a war. And the USSR in this case was threatened by a war on three fronts.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexander Green

There is such a directive.

On her table, liar! Her number, outgoing / incoming and text.

Quote: Alexander Green

Hess flew to England with all these years of plans for aggression against the USSR, with proposals ...

The USSR generally had a friendship treaty with Germany. AND?

Quote: Alexander Green

At the expense of "what is aggression." I explain for those who "do not plow deeply"
The USSR was not going to attack, but it could be done by aggressorsand artificially.

Do not carry nonsense, huh? Even on June 22, no one began to bother with this, but what hindered? Nothing!

Quote: Alexander Green

The British would be very profitable to believe in our aggression against Germany.

Confirmations on the table, liar

Quote: Alexander Green

Therefore, Stalin did everything possible so as not to fall for such a .

Which one? Which ... wasn’t?

Quote: Alexander Green

Compared to what is at stake, no anti-provocative measures are expensive compared to a defeat in a war.

Shaw for bullshit ...

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: Olgovich

On her table, liar! Her number, outgoing / incoming and text.

Do not be so lazy, look on the Internet. Even the forum participants have repeatedly cited it in their comments.
Well, the rest. schizoid reaction of a sick person. there is no point in answering. She does not carry any information. Bored with you, nothing new.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexander Green

Do not be so lazy, look on the Internet. Even the forum participants have repeatedly cited it in their comments.

NOBODY could bring her, not a number, NOTHING. Chatter is yours alone.

Quote: Alexander Green

Well, the rest. schizoid reaction of a sick person. there is no point in answering.

So don’t bother, dear man: I DO NOT touch you NEVER, you all climb, climb .....

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: Olgovich

So don’t bother, my dear man: I DO NOT touch you NEVER, you all climb, climb ....

I do not climb to you, I expose your slander to the History of the USSR. Stop distorting it, and I stop responding to your comments.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexander Green

I do not climb to you, I expose your slander to the History of the USSR.

with your empty chatter you will not "expose" anything.

And you have zero documents.

don't bother people chatter

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: Olgovich

with your empty chatter you will not "expose" anything.

As it does not expose, look at how many minuses you have drawn for past comments, but I have pluses.
By the way, I, unlike you, have not yet set a single minus for our dialogue.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexander Green

As it does not expose, look at how many minuses you have drawn for past comments, but I have pluses.

I don't care about the cons.
I already told you: I have real officer stars

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: Olgovich

I don't care about the cons.
I already told you: I have real officer stars

But the point is not that you are indifferent to the cons or not. Whether you want it or not, but they reflect the audience’s perception, and this cannot be denied, because this is reality.
I also have stars, and besides, I am also a participant in the hostilities.

PS I close the connection, the pipe is calling. Write, I will answer later.

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

On her table, liar! Her number, outgoing / incoming and text.

I don’t know where you served, but if you had a relationship with the troops, you know that not a single unit’s transfer in peacetime, except for PLANNED exercises, takes place without a directive or order from a higher headquarters. Even the commander of the border region does not have the right to personally give instructions on the redeployment of formations unless he receives a directive from the General Staff, because this must necessarily be consistent with the approved cover plan.
Now tell us how it turned out that in the memoirs of a large number of Red Army commanders they found a reflection of the events after June 14-15, 1945, when they "suddenly" accidentally found themselves on the move towards training grounds, camps and to the state border. it was ordered to do it secretly.
Who dared to show such initiative - tell me, I’ll listen with interest to you ...

[Doctor]

Now tell us how it turned out that in the memoirs of a large number of Red Army commanders they found a reflection of the events after June 14-15, 1945, when they "suddenly" accidentally found themselves on the move towards training grounds, camps and to the state border. it was ordered to do it secretly.

Mostly only reconnaissance. There would be no need to go to landfills.

The commander of the 8 mechanized corps Ryabyshev:

... On June 20, 1941, I received from the commander of the Kiev Special Military District, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos, a completely secret package: I was personally ordered to immediately go to the border and reconnoiter the area of ​​the alleged actions of the 8th Mechanized Corps.
... The chief of staff of the army, Colonel I. S. Varennikov, took me. My report on the alarming situation on the border did not make a noticeable impression on him. He rejected the arguments about the impending military threat, I do not know sincerely or not.
“Your fears are more than untenable,” said Varennikov. - If the matter went to war, then we would be officially informed of this. Would be prohibited leave to commanders and withdrawal of artillery pieces to landfills. The troops would be on high alert. But there are no orders about it. As for the fascist aircraft, they flew before. Perhaps this is done by irresponsible pilots. So, shoot at them? Let diplomats regulate such matters.

[ccsr]

Quote: Arzt

Mostly only reconnaissance. There would be no need to go to landfills.

You also seem to be a specialist in troops, since you don’t know that in all border districts they are trying to place the ranges so that they are as close to the border as possible, so that under the guise of firing, they can transfer troops to the border without attracting much attention. That is why polygons and camps are placed so that they are between points of permanent deployment and the border, if possible due to local conditions.

Quote: Arzt

The commander of the 8 mechanized corps Ryabyshev:

That's why they say that some of our district commanders, with their inaction, led to the disaster of 1941, and then they tried to get out of history, blaming everyone for their sins, but not themselves. And Pavlov, in particular, received a fair punishment - I am sure of it, because I know well that in such a situation everything depends on the bosses, their will and courage.

[Olgovich]

Quote: ccsr

Now tell us how it turned out that in the memoirs of a large number of Red Army commanders, the events after 14-15 June 1945, when they "suddenly" accidentally found themselves on the move in the direction of landfills, camps and to the state border

1.Now bring the DIRECTIVE of the General Staff on June 18.

2. Halder:

The complete surprise of our attack for the enemy is evidenced by the fact that units were taken by surprise in a barracks arrangement, planes stood at airfields, covered with tarpaulin, and the advanced units, suddenly attacked by our troops, requested command about what they should do. One can expect an even greater influence of the element of surprise on the further course of events as a result of the rapid advancement of our moving parts, for which there is now a complete opportunity everywhere. the enemy apparently taken by surprise. For the last few days he completely passively watched all the events that we held

It is immediately evident - "were on the alert", "ready" for delight

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

1.Now bring the DIRECTIVE of the General Staff on June 18.

I told you that the movement of troops in the border districts began after June 12-13, judging by the memoirs of many participants in those events. What directive of June 18 do you dream to see?

Quote: Olgovich

Halder:

Firstly, Halder couldn’t know everything, and secondly, the order to act covertly meant to take measures to prevent the enemy from noticing our movements. What is so surprising about this?

Quote: Olgovich

It is immediately evident - "were on the alert", "ready" for delight

At least Zakharov and the fleet commanders proved by example that our armed forces did not all sleep in the barracks when the Germans attacked the USSR.

[Olgovich]

Quote: ccsr

I told you that the movement of troops in the border districts began after June 12-13, judging by the memoirs of many participants in those events. What directive of June 18 do you dream to see?

1. I.e. such -NO. Already good.
2. Give the General Staff Directive, on the basis of which "moved on June 12-13

Quote: ccsr

First Halder not everyone could know, and secondly, the order to act secretly just meant to take measures so that the enemy did not notice our movements. What is so surprising about this?

In general, he is right.

Quote: ccsr

At least Zakharov and the fleet commanders have shown by example that our armed forces not all slept in the barracks when the Germans attacked the USSR.

1. In practice, EVERYTHING.
2. Zakharov is a pilot-commander of HELL?

[VS]

Quote: Olgovich

What directive of June 18 do you dream to see?

1. I.e. such -NO. Already good.

You were asked - WHAT do you need a deer. from June 18 and you immediately suffered nonsense ((

Quote: Olgovich

Give the Directive of the General Staff, on the basis of which "moved on June 12-13

these were directives from June 11-12)) in different districts their directives GS))

[Olgovich]

Quote: V.S.

You were asked - WHAT do you need a deer. from June 18 and you immediately suffered nonsense ((

Above, see what. Do not carry nonsense (((

Quote: V.S.

these were directives from June 11-12)) in different districts their directives GS))

To their table: numbers and texts, liar!

[VS]

Quote: Olgovich

As asked - WHAT do you need deer. from June 18 and you immediately suffered nonsense ((

Above, see what. Do not carry nonsense (((
Quote: V.S.

you just rave here))) Ischo of time - WHAT do you need a directive from June 18?))

Quote: Olgovich

these were directives from June 11-12)) in different districts their directives GS))

To their table: numbers and texts, liar!

do not throw a hysteria here in vain - the directives for the WITHDRAWAL of the troops of the western districts HAVE long been known - they were from June 11-12))) Each district had its own))) They appeared after the meeting with Stalin on June 9 - at which the question of the beginning of the deployment of troops was considered western districts))
You do not know these facts - your problems are ignorant with a woman's "patronymic")))
they were published in a robin back in 1998)))
for KOVO - No. 549)) for ZAPOV - No. 603 - study)))

[Olgovich]

Quote: V.S.

you just rave here))) Ischo of time - WHAT do you need a directive from June 18?))

TU, which was discussed ABOVE. Watch and do not ask more Turkish questions. ((((

Quote: V.S.

do not throw a hysteria here in vain - the directives for the WITHDRAWAL of the troops of the western districts HAVE long been known - they were from June 11-12))) Each district had its own))) They appeared after the meeting with Stalin on June 9 - at which the question of the beginning of the deployment of troops was considered western districts))

Stop wagging your head and directly submit the Directives on the COMMISSION of troops into combat readiness of June 11-12.

Quote: V.S.

You do not know these facts - your problems are ignorant with a woman's "patronymic")))

The fact is known: a military catastrophe, unprecedented in history, caused by FULL sky-ready troops. Halder:

The complete surprise of our attack for the enemy is evidenced by the fact that the units were taken aback in a barracks arrangement, planes stood at airfields covered with a tarp... the adversary is taken by surprise. In recent days, he has been completely passively observing all the activities that we held.

Quote: V.S.

- ignoramus with a woman's "patronymic")))

ignoramus-uch with her the wisest leaderstell more about them the wisest predictions, directives that triumphantly led to the defeat of the Nazis in 41

[VS]

Quote: Olgovich

Directly present the Directives on Bringing troops into combat readiness of June 11-12.

I showed them to you completely - open your eyes)) in their robin and read)))

Quote: Olgovich

tell me more about their wisest foresight, directives that triumphantly led to the defeat of the Nazis in 41

why am I going to tell this stupidity if this was not so?)) As it was - WHAT WAS THE MAJOR REASONS I showed completely - pre-war plans of the General Staff)) some nerds anonymous intelligence break through their stupidity is their problem))

[Olgovich]

Quote: V.S.

I showed them to you completely - open your eyes)) in their robin and read)))

NO "embattled" directives, liar

Quote: V.S.

why am I going to tell this stupidity if this was not so?)) As it was - WHAT WAS THE MAJOR REASONS I showed completely - pre-war plans of the General Staff)) some nerds anonymous intelligence break through their stupidity is their problem))

You were talking nonsense about the Indian Fatherland, 7

[VS]

Quote: Olgovich

I showed them to you completely - open your eyes)) in their robin and read)))

NO "embattled" directives, liar

for batans and rams - no)))

And for the military, the same Zhukov is))

""The commanders of the border military districts were ordered (ORDERED !!!) to withdraw the troops of the districts - designated as part of the covering forces, closer to the state border and the lines that they had to occupy in an emergency, by special order. At the same time, advanced units were ordered to be advanced to the border units. Other equally important events were held. All this obliged the commanders of the districts and armies to increase their combat readiness. "")))

Quote: Olgovich

As it was - WHAT WAS THE MAJOR reasons, I showed completely - the pre-war plans of the General Staff)) some nerds anonymous intelligence break through their stupidity is their problem))

You were talking nonsense about the Indian Fatherland, 7

not about the Fatherland but about the Indian patronymic)))

And the reasons for our defeats are not in reconnaissance, but - in the plans of the General Staff themselves, which is shown by the "lessons and conclusions")))

[Olgovich]

Quote: V.S.

for batans and rams - no)))

)

You were mistaken: Batans and bvrvny are those who see that. which is NOT and was not. ))))

all of those DUNNY wobbles about increased preparedness = alerting — for dumb sheep.

The readiness order was issued when it was too late6 in Directive 1 of June 21.

What was the "readiness" - seen from the June 22 CATASTROPHE

Quote: V.S.

not about the Fatherland but about the Indian patronymic)))

If you don’t know how to speak Russian, maybe it’s not worth it?

Quote: V.S.

And the reasons for our defeats not in intelligence must be looked for, but in the PLANS of the General Staff, which is shown by "lessons and conclusions"))

The stupid policies of the country's leadership are the main causes of the disaster.
Everything Else - Details

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

Stop wagging your head and directly submit the Directives on the COMMISSION of troops into combat readiness of June 11-12.

Since you do not know well how troops are controlled, I am giving you a text from the "robin", where the KOVO military council REQUESTS permission from the NCO on June 11 to move parts of the district to increase the combat readiness of the troops. If you know how to understand military documents, then below you will read the notes that permission was given according to clauses 1-2, according to clause 5 - the deadline was given to June 25, according to clauses 3-4 no permits are given.
Since you never seem to have come across permissions for such activities, because of your ignorance, you demand a mythical Directive from O. Kozinkin, although for permission it is enough to send an encrypted message signed by an NGO or NGSH with a short text like "To your out. "01/00210 of 11.06.1941/1/2 I authorize to execute clauses 12.06.1941-5 from 25/1941/11. According to clause 12, be ready by June XNUMX, XNUMX. "Next, the signature of the NPO or NGSh is put, it is sent in encryption and this is EVERYTHING that is done in such cases. But those illiterate in military affairs do not know this, which is why they require something that can be done in nature So you can take offense as much as you like, but I immediately realized that you were too far from the work of the headquarters and in terms of their operational and intelligence activities. Study the original, you may understand why after June XNUMX-XNUMX, some troops began to move to camps to get as close to the border as possible.

Document No. 538
Note by the Military Council of KOVO to the People's Commissar for Defense of the USSR Marshal Tymoshenko
11.06.1941
№ 01 / 00210
Top secret
Of particular importance
Ex. No. 1
In order to enhance the combat readiness of the KOVO troops, I ask you to allow to carry out this July from 1. following activities:

1. The 62 st division [fir-tree] division should be transferred from Lutsk to a camp site in the Radzihuv area (40 km s [th] -z [western] Kovel), Oletsk, Dolsk, Tuzhisk.
2. The 135 st division [fir-tree] division shall be transferred to the camp site from the region of Ostrug to the camp of the 62 st division [fir-tree] division - Lutsk.
3. The 193rd Infantry Division should be transferred by rail or by campaign from Korosten to the Povursky camp.
4. Relocate the control of the 13th page of the [fir-tree] corps, the 283rd to the [orpus] a [rtillery] p [olk] and the 38th separate battalion of communications of the same corps from Sambir to the city of Stryi, and from the last 12 Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 12th Panzer Division in Sambir.
5. As soon as new airfields are ready, take to the camps for new airfields:
a) Vankovtsy (near Sambir), Miginov (near Stryi) and Lenka (20 km sowing [ernee] Drogobych) - the 20th and [grader] n [olk] from Krasilov and the 91st and [grader] n [olk] from Tiranovka;
b) Popovtsy (25 km south [th] -s [west] Chortkov) - 226th b [low] -b [outing] p [olk] from Kiev;
b) Zapytov (20 km from [Evero] -to [more steadily] Lviv) - 227th b [low] -b [bomber] p [olk] from Kiev;
d) Lisyatichi - 165th fighter regiment from Khristinovka.
For the same purposes, I ask you to relocate in October-November of this year:
a) the 3rd Caval [Aleri] division from the Zhulkev region to Izyaslavl to the barracks fund of the 32nd Caval [Alerii] division, and in its place in the Zhulkev area relocate the 190th page [Christmas tree] division from Cherkasy, transferring it to the states 12 thousandth rifle division.
b) leave the 104th page [Christmas tree] regiment of the 62nd page [Christmas tree] division (stationed in Olyka) for permanent housing in Radzihuv and Oletsk, where there are two barracks-type barracks with a capacity of each on the page [Christmas tree] battalion.

To ensure events scheduled for July 1 this year (arrangement of foci, bunks, wells in the camps) I ask permission to spend 500 rubles from the amount of non-defense construction.
Commander of the KOVO troops
Colonel General Kirponos
Member of the KOVO Military Council
case commissioner Vashugin
Chief of Staff KOVO
Lieutenant General Purkayev
TSA MO RF. F. 16. Op. 2951. D. 261. Ll. 22-23. Typewriting on typographic form: “NPO of the USSR. Commander of the Kiev Special Military District. ” Script. Autograph.

There are litters: against p.p. 1 and 2 litters - “Allowed”, against clause 5 - “An instruction has been given to be ready by June 25, 1941 N. Vatutin.”

[Olgovich]

Quote: ccsr

So you can take offense as you like but я I immediately realized

it’s impossible to be offended, as is customary in Russia

You still stubbornly refuse to submit "directives" about bringing all district troops on alert June 11-12 ..

You can not? Then please do not bother me anymore.

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

You still stubbornly refuse to submit "directives" to bring all the troops of the districts on alert on June 11-12 ..

There was no such directive for ALL districts, if only because the real danger for each district was different, and therefore INDIVIDUALLY considered the activities of each district to increase combat readiness. If they even understood this, then they would not have rushed around the forums with a demand to present you with a single directive for ALL districts, similar to the one that was sent to the troops without a number on June 22.

Quote: Olgovich

You can not? Then please do not bother me anymore.

Why bother you if you demand "I don't know where to go", hoping that it will work - you are our storyteller on military topics.

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

1. I.e. such -NO. Already good.

See the materials of the Grigoriev case, where he confirmed during interrogation that there was a directive.

Quote: Olgovich

Give the Directive of the General Staff, on the basis of which "moved on June 12-13

The troops moved after June 13, and the reason could be a personal order of an NGO or NHS, which was given in Moscow to some military leaders who arrived at the General Staff to coordinate and approve cover plans. This is a common practice, when the administrative order is first enforced, and then follows the directive, which just might have arrived on June 18 and which Grigoryev referred to. What surprises you in this? It seems that you yourself did not even serve in the army headquarters, which is why you have no idea how all this is done, but I have come across this many times and for me there is nothing surprising in this.

Quote: Olgovich

In general, he is right.

Broken bosses are always "right" when they justify their defeat - this is what we went through ...

Quote: Olgovich

Zakharov is a pilot-commander of HELL?

It is strange that you do not know that Zakharov was a NSh OdVO.

He made an outstanding and at that time extremely risky act: drawing a conclusion from the available data on the danger of an enemy attack on the USSR, late in the evening of June 21, 1941, he ordered the district troops to be put on alert, to take up border fortifications and to withdraw troops from their places of permanent deployment, to immediately move aircraft to field airfields (a number of publications indicate that Zakharov persuaded him to give such an order to the district commander I T. Cherevichenko, however Cherevichenko in his memoirs points precisely to Zakharov’s initiative). The outbreak of war confirmed the correctness of this order, and the troops of the district avoided defeat and organizedly entered the battle.

Zakharov’s actions to assess the German attack are completely refuted by the lie of the author of this article that supposedly intelligence did not give data - he understood everything correctly, unlike Pavlov himself.

[Olgovich]

Quote: ccsr

See the materials of the Grigoriev case, where he confirmed during interrogation that there was a directive.

Imagine it, ONCE AGAIN I ask: No., out, in, text

Quote: ccsr

The troops moved after June 13, and the reason could be a personal order of an NGO or NHS, which was given in Moscow to some military leaders who arrived at the General Staff to coordinate and approve cover plans. This is a common practice, when the administrative order is first enforced, and then follows the directive, which just might have arrived on June 18 and which Grigoryev referred to. What surprises you in this? It looks like you yourself didn’t even serve in the army headquarters, that's why you can’t imagine how all this is done, but I have come across this many times and for me there is nothing surprising in this.

Again, empty chatter ...

Quote: ccsr

Broken bosses are always "right" when they justify their defeat - this is what we went through ...

In those days, when he wrote it was beaten was completely different. it is a DIARY, not a memoir.

Quote: ccsr

Zakharov was NSh OdVO.

weird. that you don’t know much more famous Zakharov:

by a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of June 4, 1940, G. N. Zakharov was awarded the title "Major General of Aviation". He was one of the youngest generals in the USSR (at that time he was 32 years old), in November 1940 he was appointed Commander of the 43rd Fighter Aviation Division (from August 1941 - the 43rd mixed aviation division) Air Force of the Western Special Military District.

The one who allegedly made the famous flight along the border and gave packages

Quote: ccsr

The outbreak of war confirmed the correctness of this order, and the troops of the district avoided defeat and in an organized manner joined the battle.

There was no organization, just lucky that the Romanians were advancing. And there were much fewer aircraft than in the West (Pokryshkina cm). Even across the Danube we crossed ...

But the main thing was here: Halder:

Army Command "South" reported that our patrols, ne meeting resistance crossed the Prut between Galati and Husi and between Husi and Iasi. Bridges in our hands.

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

Imagine it, ONCE AGAIN I ask: No., out, in, text

And you yourself try to get into the archives, and look for it there, maybe then you will not demand from me No., vkh, text. The author of this article, Eugene, said that he had rummaged through the German archives - why didn’t you require No., w, w, w, text from him?

Quote: Olgovich

Again, empty chatter ...

You simply showed your unsuitability in matters of the work of the headquarters and the actions of the troops, which is why you modestly lowered from my question what relation you had during your service to the troops. Though they served where, don’t be afraid to say so that it was immediately clear what kind of bird you are?

Quote: Olgovich

it is a DIARY, not a memoir.

And what, do you think he wanted to capture himself not believing in the success of the war? So he wrote so that everyone believed that Barbarossa was a brilliant plan, although any military professional understands that even at the planning stage, the German generals made a fatal mistake, incorrectly assessing the military and economic potential of the USSR.

Quote: Olgovich

weird. that you don’t know much more famous Zakharov:

It is strange that you are equal to a general, albeit a well-deserved one, with the future marshal, chief of the General Staff of the Moscow Region. And at that time, the rank of Zakharov, as the NSh of the okrug, was two steps higher than that of the commander of an aviation division. Do you have any idea about the army hierarchy?

Quote: Olgovich

There was no organization, just lucky that the Romanians were advancing.

Do not lie so it went - the fact of Zakharov’s pre-war actions was fixed by a multitude of documents, so you don’t have to fantasize that he was only lucky, because he did everything to avoid the defeat of the troops, and, moreover, send troops to foreign territory:

The landing forces of the Red Army on the Danube in the first month of the war in Soviet times were not covered, for the first time the actions of the 51st division to land on Romanian territory were described in the 9th issue of the Military History Journal for 1970.

https://russian7.ru/post/pravda-li-chto-22-iyunya-1941-goda-nekotorye-div/

Quote: Olgovich

But the main thing was here: Halder:

And what is so "main" here?

[AsmyppoL]

Milchakov, as always, cannot imagine facts. Something is missing him badly ...

[AsmyppoL]

Milchakov, the facts will be or you as a woman-switchman do not answer for your words)))
Where are the facts about the presence of 16 German divisions on the territory of Moldova and North Dobruge ??
And again, Milchakov is lying ... I never wrote that I rummaged through all the German archives. Do not lie. I reviewed tens of thousands of pages of German documents. There is not a word about the German archives

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Where are the facts about the presence of 16 German divisions on the territory of Moldova and North Dobruge ??

Where are the facts, swindler, that there weren’t any of them or their parts - will you show the documents, or again blah blah blah?

Quote: AsmyppoL

I never wrote that I rummaged through all the German archives.

I went back a step as soon as you were liar convicted that you were not in any German archives.

Quote: AsmyppoL

I reviewed tens of thousands of pages of German documents.

When did you manage to translate them, even with the help of military translators, so as not to carry the gag? Come on, lie something believable ....

[Olgovich]

Quote: ccsr

And you yourself try to get into the archives, and look for it there, maybe then you will not demand from me No., vkh, text. The author of this article, Eugene, said that he had rummaged through the German archives - why didn’t you require No., w, w, w, text from him?

The author-ALL IS SPECIFIED. You have an empty gag and speculation.

Quote: ccsr

You simply showed your unsuitability in matters of the work of the headquarters and the actions of the troops, which is why you modestly lowered from my question what relation you had during your service to the troops. Although they served where, don’t be afraid to say so that it was immediately clear what kind of person you are bird?

WHAT to be afraid of? : UNRM, UNR, UIR - the most honorable troops: colonels of all sorts ran in front of us, as scalded

Quote: ccsr

And what, do you think he wanted to capture himself not believing in the success of the war? So he wrote so that everyone believed that Barbarossa was a brilliant plan, although any military professional understands that even at the planning stage, the German generals made a fatal mistake, incorrectly assessing the military and economic potential of the USSR.

find out how personal daily DIARY differs from MEMOIRS

Quote: ccsr

It is strange that you are equal to a general, albeit a well-deserved one, with the future marshal, chief of the General Staff of the Moscow Region.

This is much MORE well-known General Zakharov: it was he, on the instructions of the"flew over the border on the eve of the war, hundreds of kilometers-and gave packages on purpose - for the General Staff. and "revealed" all the secrets of the impending attack.

Quote: ccsr

Do not lie so it went - the fact of Zakharov’s pre-war actions was fixed by a multitude of documents, so you don’t have to fantasize that he was only lucky, because he did everything to avoid the defeat of the troops, and, moreover, send troops to foreign territory:

the fact is that he was opposed, mainly by ROMANIANS: that’s the whole secret that the front did not immediately go east. But rolled, very soon and catastrophically-with a blockade of Odessa, etc. And this is from some ..... Romanians

Quote: ccsr

The landing forces of the Red Army on the Danube in the first month of the war in Soviet times were not covered, for the first time the actions of the 51st division to land on Romanian territory were described in the 9th issue of the Military History Journal for 1970.

I wrote to you above

Quote: ccsr

And what is so "main" here?

Crossings through a strategic obstacle are captured by TGLY and WITHOUT resistance.
It is immediately evident that the troops were "ready", "waited" and were "on the alert"

[AsmyppoL]

Thank you for your kind words, Andrey

ccsrIf you are too lazy to search on the Internet, then for the sake of the holiday I will conduct a justification instead of you.
German Map Link
http://www.etomesto.ru/map-atlas_plan-barbarossa
The picture is a copy

On the map you can see the locations of German troops: the headquarters of the 11th field army, the headquarters of the 11th and 30th army corps and seven infantry divisions. The Eighth Division (46th Infantry) is on its way to the border. Total 8 German infantry divisions (including not yet arrived).

You can count another 11 Romanian divisions and 10 brigades (taking into account the Marine Corps). Total to 16 Romanian divisions. Scrolling through the map, you can find 4 Hungarian brigades, which will total up to two divisions.
Total German-Romanian and Hungarian troops in this region will amount to 26 divisions.

Why am I counting all the troops? When writing the book "1941. Lessons and Conclusions," the authors "modestly" omitted the data of our intelligence about the troops concentrated against KOVO and ODVO. It follows from this book that the total number of German-Romanian-Hungarian troops there were 63,5 divisions.

When counting, 63 divisions came out on the map against 63,5 divisions according to "1941. Lessons and Conclusions".
Near the brigade of troops was somewhere on the way.

Consequently, our intelligence overestimated the German troops in Romania (in Moldova and North Dobrudzh), if according to the Summary, then by 9 divisions (including two tank four motorized ones). If according to the post-war words of General Golikov (8 divisions, including 2 TD and 4 MD). Moreover, from the map and from the data of the book "1941. Lessons and Conclusions" it is clear that there are no German troops in the Carpathian Ukraine and Slovakia.

[AsmyppoL]

Before the war, our intelligence believed that 5 and 4 German divisions were located at the border of Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine. A total of nine)))
In the first military report of the General Staff of the General Aviation Administration on 22 June 1941, an increase of this grouping by 4-6 divisions was noted. Total non-existent grouping of German troops was 13-15 divisions. Given the nonexistent nine divisions on the Soviet-Romanian border, the mythical grouping is 22-24 German divisions.
The first military report noted that the transfer of German divisions from Bulgaria to Romania had begun. In Romania, on June 22, 33-35 German divisions became.
The reconnaissance error in the region under consideration was about 80% in the calculation of troops and 15 times in the calculation of enemy tanks ...

Total in Romania, Carpathian Ukraine and Slovakia Intelligence Directorate on June 22, 1941 counted as many as 46-50 German divisions. Almost a quarter (!) Of all available troops in the armed forces of Germany. What reliability of intelligence data in 98%, which were confirmed in your head, can we talk about ?? !!

At the same time, intelligence counted 24 divisions before the war against the PribOVO troops, and on June 22 saw as many as 29! Even so, she was fundamentally mistaken. I counted forty-one divisions against the troops of the PribOVO, and in the book "1941. Lessons and Conclusions" there are 40,5 of them! Again, intelligence was more than 25% wrong!

Before the war, reconnaissance troops counted 30 divisions against ZapOVO troops, increasing this group to 31 in a June 22 report. In fact, there were 39,5 enemy divisions. And again, our intelligence error is 22-24%.

This I considered only the number of troops. If we consider the lack of places of concentration of the shock groups of mobile troops and the location of German troops as of June 21, then the intelligence data is absolutely false ....

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Before the war, our intelligence believed that 5 and 4 German divisions were located at the border of Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine. A total of nine)))

This is data as of June 1941, 22. Until June XNUMX, this group could change, which happened repeatedly with units of the Wehrmacht in the last weeks before the war.

Quote: AsmyppoL

In the first military report of the General Staff of the General Aviation Administration on 22 June 1941, an increase of this grouping by 4-6 divisions was noted. Total non-existent grouping of German troops was 13-15 divisions.

Only uneducated can believe in this amateurish nonsense, because a lying author stupidly snatches a figure out of the June 1 report and adds to it what was opened on June 22. But what happened to the German group in three weeks, and how he had moved German troops, he had no idea, like this, once again he got into a puddle, not realizing that the Germans did not change epaulets on the eve of the war, but maneuvered troops along the future front line.

Quote: AsmyppoL

The reconnaissance error in the region under consideration was about 80% in the calculation of troops and 15 times in the calculation of enemy tanks ...

This is not a mistake of intelligence, but the fantastic ignorance of the author of the statues, who still did not understand what happened to the German group on the eve of the war, how the troops moved and where they came from to strengthen until June 21. Especially taking into account the fact that Hitler made the final decision on the date of the attack, according to various sources, only on June 10, 1941.

Quote: AsmyppoL

This I considered only the number of troops.

Once again, you simply demonstrated that you don’t understand anything at all in military affairs, and don’t know what happened in the Wehrmacht on the eve of the war, and how this was reflected in the materials of operational and strategic intelligence until June 21.

Total in Romania, Carpathian Ukraine and Slovakia Intelligence Directorate on June 22, 1941 counted as many as 46-50 German divisions.

What source is this figure taken from if you prove to everyone that there was no other material besides intelligence number 5 on June 1?

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

German Map Link
http://www.etomesto.ru/map-atlas_plan-barbarossa
The picture is a copy

Well, finally, the fraudster cited a site that is not official at all, in order to recognize the documents posted on it as genuine, if only because with the current photoshop you can cook up any card. Moreover, for a genuine document it offers to recognize only a piece of the map with Stockholm - this generally does not go into any gates. A twenty-second clip does not bear any evidence base - this is clear to anyone. As for the second map, there is no link to it, it’s immediately clear that this is Photoshop, of unknown origin, because there can be no texts with names on the original scan. As I suspected, the author of all the statues was just a swindler, slipping materials from dubious sites from somewhere unknown and giving them away for what he allegedly found in the archives.

Quote: AsmyppoL

On the map you can see

This "map" does not indicate who and when it was drawn up, to whom it belonged and who signed it, and therefore all your "conclusions" are a continuous interpretation of an ordinary amateur who has never worked with real documents and maps.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Why am I counting all the troops? When writing the book "1941. Lessons and Conclusions," the authors "modestly" omitted the data of our intelligence about the troops concentrated against KOVO and ODVO.

You personally can count anything you like, but I can unequivocally say that at the time of writing the book "1941 ..." all the materials of military intelligence were not yet open even to them, and which appeared twenty years later on the Internet. That is why the discrepancy between the authors of the book and the AUTHENTIC text of the intelligence report is quite understandable - they were not admitted to all the documents from which the stamp was not removed. At least for a start, you should take into account the level of the head of the team of authors in the military hierarchy, and only then would you compare it with those who opened access to intelligence materials:

The work was prepared by a team of authors: the head of the team of authors, Doctor of Military Sciences, Senior Researcher Major General V.P. Nelasov

Quote: AsmyppoL

Consequently, our intelligence overestimated the German troops in Romania (in Moldova and Northern Dobruge), if according to the Summary, then into 9 divisions (including two tank four motorized).

Therefore, you are an ordinary balabol who failed to present a single DOCUMENT, and built the entire evidence base on one intelligence report on June 1, 1941 and some calculations that were made twenty years before the GENUINE intelligence documents began to open, scans of which appeared in print media and media.
In general, as I expected, "the king is naked" - he did not see ANY DOCUMENT, and all his conclusions were drawn only from the texts of two sources.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Moreover, from the map and from the data of the book "1941. Lessons and Conclusions" it is clear that there are no German troops in the Carpathian Ukraine and Slovakia.

The simple thought that the authors of the book did not see the GENUINE report No. 5 did not occur to the author, and this is the whole wretchedness of his thinking. By the way, the authors of the book did not post it in their application and do not refer to it, which already says a lot.

[icant007]

The Eighth Division (46th Infantry) is on its way to the border. A total of 8 German infantry divisions (including not yet arrived).

If you indicate the 46th division, then you must specify the 73rd, which since June 9 has been in the Yass area.
Only on the map I don’t see something.
What number is this card on?

[AsmyppoL]

There are errors in the information of the site known to us ... I warned that it is impossible to trust only the data in the Tables with the dates and locations.
Wikipedia says: "The division fought on the Eastern Front, in the southern regions from July 1941 to May 1944."

I think that the 73rd Front has not yet arrived at the border by 22.6.41. I would have trusted the map presented more ...

I found the following text in a text related to 73rd front page (I’m having difficulty translating. When working with German documents, I got a hand on typical phrases. Here the text is not typical for me): "[She was marching] west, past Strumitsa, to Lake Dorian. Here she remained until the start of the campaign to Russia as an occupation force and on July 21, 1941 she was subordinated to the 11th Army."
I would guess she hasn't been on her way to Romania yet. Perhaps there is a typo in the table: not "June 9", but July 9. Sorry I was able to quickly find it - this is not the main topic for me ...
Good luck!

[AsmyppoL]

Yes, there are no timestamps on the map. We can only say that the situation was applied to it no earlier than the evening of June 22.
The 900th motorized brigade has a mark "11-00 22.6.41" and its place of movement "22.6.41 evening" is indicated. The dotted border of the deployment zone had previously met me on the maps for connections on vacation or when moving along the railway (only then was a small train also drawn). Here the brigade moved under its own power and there is no locomotive.
I would suggest (but definitely not sure) that the lack of arrival time may indicate that the map was prepared before the arrival of the 900th brigade to a new location.

[AsmyppoL]

I accidentally noticed that a sheet with the timing of the movement of compounds was strengthened on the map.

Regarding the timing of the redeployment of the 73rd front, July is visible.
I discovered that the 46th road front could also be removed from the existing eight road front in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja. It is possible that the text that I previously translated and used relative to the 46th front page was also not reliable.
Thank you for drawing my attention to the fact of the 73rd fr. If necessary, I’ll clarify my information about the 46th division)))

[icant007]

And in the light of what we are looking at, in general, the May intelligence, I would not have crossed out 46 pd. She was in the area at the junction of Hungary, Serbia and Romania. This, of course, is not Dobrudja or Moldova, but still Romania, albeit southwestern.

Again, one must not forget that on the eve of the operation in Yugoslavia, and the formations withdrawn from the Balkans could also end up in Romania.

Last one is mine assumption, it needs to be checked.

[AsmyppoL]

You can consider how you decide for yourself ... This is your business ...

I repeatedly try to emphasize in the article on Intelligence and in the article on headquarters that I am considering the troops on the territory of Romania: in Moldova and in Northern Dobrudja, as the General Intelligence Directorate intelligence considers it. It examines the territories on which troops are located concentrated on the Soviet-German border. Units deployed in these territories are counted by the existing grouping in case of war with the USSR. Until this group has reached a critical value, this may not be dangerous. The rest of the territory of Romania is not considered as the territory on which troops are deployed to attack the USSR. And it’s right, because it takes time to redeploy these troops to our border. In Summary, the rest of Romania belongs to the Balkans ...

Whether these parts you are talking about elsewhere were not important to me. Since the summary was read by the Command of the Spacecraft and the Leadership of the Soviet Union, they should have been guided by the number of enemy troops indicated in the Republic of Moldova, and not have to think over incomprehensible and ambiguous points.

If RU writes about the presence of enemy troops without mentioning the terms "it is required to clarify" or "to check for availability", then this is verified and rechecked information and the intelligence officers are responsible for its reliability. Even if they found a company of infantry soldiers with signs of a division that was not at the border and considered this to be verified information, then this is a mistake of the scouts. This is my opinion, which I express in the articles.

The connections withdrawn from the Balkans could or could not be located: it is not so important for me ... For me, the important thing is that for decision-making in the last peace week the leadership of the country and the spacecraft was guided by unreliable RM! This is important to me! Incorrect decisions related to incorrect knowledge about the situation on the border and in the area of ​​responsibility of the border districts caused the death of gigantic human and material resources during the first two days of the war. I am sorry for the useless death of people, equipment, supplies and for the wrong decisions made on the first day of the war! I am offended by the labels stuck on the military and Stalin for what they are not to blame. There is blame on them, but not the tragedy of June 22 ...

You wrote below about the 13th TD, which was located in Romania. I found the place you are talking about. Again you grab a phrase from the text, unfortunately ...
Here is the text from the article: "Let's consider the number of tank and motorized troops, which were given in the intelligence reports of the Republic of Uzbekistan on May 31 and June 15, 1941. The reconnaissance revealed:
- against PribOVO - 5 TP, which are combined in 2 td. The presence of 3 ppm was noted;
- against ZAPOVO - td and 6 tp, which are combined in total in 4 td. There is one MD;
- against KOVO concentrated up to 6 TD and 5 MD;
— in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja, i.e. against the troops of KOVO and OdVO - 2 TD and 4 MD ...

... Consider the RU report on May 5, 1941 regarding the presence of tank and motorized troops:
In the very composition of forces concentrated against the USSR, attention is drawn to the strengthening of tank forces from 9 divisions on 25.4.41 to 12 divisions on 5.5.41; motorized, including motor division, from 7 divisions on 25.4.41 to 8 divisions on 5.5.41 ...

According to the Republic of Uzbekistan, from May 5 to May 31, at the border (excluding the territory of Romania), there are twelve etc. and 8 ... 9 md. In Romania, there are 2 more td and 4 md. Let's check this information.
In Romania, instead of 6 tank and motorized divisions, in fact, there is not one."

The summary of RU again covers the territory of Moldova and North Dobruge. I am talking specifically about this territory, if there is a comparison with the previous summary. If you think this is my mistake, this is your business. I think this is nit-picking, which is already becoming a regular practice and I don't like it. And who will like petty nitpicking that does not affect basic facts?

In the memoirs of Golikov, you can consider everything that you want. Since he confirms in the article inaccurate information on the number of divisions and says that intelligence provided the leadership with everything that is needed. I am only considering the period of June 1941. The period during which the RU did not record an increase in troops against the districts, confirmed the presence of a mythical group in the south and could not determine the location of the concentration of mobile groups and, as a result, the location of the armored attacks! in my opinion, these errors led to an unexpected blow to our country on June 22, although someday they expected a war ...

Since I began to dislike your petty nitpicking, I will not react to your words in the future. I'm sorry and goodbye
good luck

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Since I began to dislike your petty nitpicking, I will not react to your words in the future. I'm sorry and goodbye
good luck

.....

It is possible that the text that I previously translated and used relative to the 46th front page was also not reliable.

When the rogue was caught by the fraud, he immediately changed his attitude towards the opposition, who repeatedly convicted him of deceiving readers. A natural ending, and now the author of the statues admits that he lied, passing off his fantasies as reliable facts:

There are errors in the information of the site known to us ... I warned that it is impossible to trust only the data in the Tables with the dates and locations.

...

I would guess she hasn't been on her way to Romania yet. Perhaps there is a typo in the table: not "June 9", but July 9. Sorry,

.....

Yes, there are no timestamps on the map. We can only say that the situation was applied to it no earlier than the evening of June 22.

So when the map is drawn up, a swindler, if you speculate on it refuting the data of our intelligence on June 1, 1941? If they were created no earlier than June 22, then at least the data diverge for THREE weeks, and precisely those in which the intensive transfer of German troops to our border took place.

I would suggest (but definitely not sure) that the lack of arrival time may indicate that the map was prepared before the arrival of the 900th brigade to a new location.

And this impudent reproaches Golikov for something, not even understanding the time of drawing up the map. But this is not the main thing, because he still hides who it belonged to, who developed and signed it, which means that only naive people can believe in his "assumptions".

For me it is important that for decision-making in the last peace week, the leadership of the country and the spacecraft was guided by unreliable RM! This is important to me!

This infamous lie can easily be refuted by a simple fact - Golikov was not only not punished, but he was transferred to a more important and responsible position after the outbreak of the war, having been instructed to supply arms from the allies, i.e. represent our state. Moreover, none of the intelligence leadership was punished for false information about our enemy, and in the spring of 1942 a group of GRU officers were awarded government awards based on the results of 1941. So the lie that the vile scribbler spreads is not confirmed by anything, except by his personal imagination about conducting reconnaissance in the pre-war period.

Quote: AsmyppoL

I am only considering the period of June 1941. The period during which the RU did not record an increase in troops against the districts, confirmed the presence of a mythical group in the south and could not determine the location of the concentration of mobile groups and, as a result, the location of the armored attacks!

You’re lying to a swindler - you haven’t seen ANY report for JUNE, and all your speculations are based only on the enemy’s May assessment, published in report No. 5. How can you review reports before June 22 if you haven’t seen a daily in your eyes? Lie something more convincing, maybe someone will believe ....

[icant007]

Honestly, I am also tired of arguing with you, because the argument is pointless.

In addition, you sometimes write and do not understand what to write.
For example, you did not understand my emphasis on Golikov’s words when I indicated that the total number of divisions is 286-296 and then of them ....
You don’t even understand what I told you about.
And they recalled Golikov several times, although I pointed to your essentially typo, which readers might misinterpret.

In order to evaluate the reliability of our intelligence data, we need a clear methodology. And then, on the meager information that we possess, we could draw conclusions.
Neither you nor I have it.
And all your conclusions on the work of intelligence, to put it mildly, are extremely subjective.

If you were a conscientious author, and you would be worried about the truth, then at the beginning of the series of articles you had to raise this question.
Instead, you bite with everyone, take offense and pout your lips.

I also can’t leave this question, and I will continue to do research.

In my comments you can not mark, not a big loss)

[icant007]

Well, if we are discussing the reliability of the information that Golikov cites, then we should look not at the prospect until 22.06.41, but at about mid-May. Is not it?

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

The author-ALL IS SPECIFIED.

This is a lie - the author does not give links from where he got the material and what kind of source.

Quote: Olgovich

You have an empty gag and speculation.

You're lying, as always - I give scans of books that were published on the anniversary of the 200th anniversary of military intelligence and which were published under the editorship of the deputy. Chief of the GRU of the General Staff V.V. Kondrashov, i.e. everything that is written in them is confirmed DOCUMENTALLY.

Moreover, I always try to give links to the text that I use, or I post scans of printed materials published in small print runs. Regarding the well-known facts, I do not consider it necessary to provide links, and if the author of the articles does not know how the intelligence of the General Staff of the General Staff differs and carries nonsense in their content, then this is his and your problems, since you believe him.

Quote: Olgovich

UNRM, UNR, UIR - the most honorable troops: colonels of all sorts ran in front of us like scalded

With you, everything is clear - but I wonder where this nonsense comes from, which sometimes you carry about the actions of the troops. So that you don't turn up your nose too much, I will tell you two of my classmates became the heads of the UNR, in Moscow and Khabarovsk, and I know this structure too well, because I served for many years at a unique facility under construction. And no one ran in front of the UNER people - we didn't give a damn about you, because the cost of your work was a kopeck piece compared to the cost of the unique equipment installed by the "Cascade" and other structures.

Quote: Olgovich

This is much MORE well-known General Zakharov:

Only in your imagination ....

Quote: Olgovich

the fact is that he was opposed, mainly by Romanians:

The fact is that he HAS DECIDED, and here, as always, you confuse cause and effect, which once again confirms that all your military knowledge is beyond the structure of the deputy. MO on the construction and quartering of troops did not rise. And this is noticeable to those who saw you more in the army ....

[Olgovich]

Quote: ccsr

This is a lie - the author does not give links

gives-see higher

Quote: ccsr

You're lying, as always - I give scans of books,

In confirmation of your gibberish to THIS article, you have not given ANYTHING, liar

Quote: ccsr

With you, everything is clear - but I wonder where this nonsense comes from, which sometimes you carry about the actions of the troops. So that you don't turn up your nose too much, I will tell you two of my classmates became the heads of the UNR, in Moscow and Khabarovsk, and I know this structure too well, because I served for many years at a unique facility under construction. And no one ran in front of the UNER people - we didn't give a damn about you, because the cost of your work was a kopeck piece compared to the cost of the unique equipment installed by the "Cascade" and other structures.

Funny You: WHERE did you mount - in the pines?

Quote: ccsr

And no one ran before the Unerovites -

They ran and how they ran, at the High Command especially: "What to do? Where to run ?! How much to send ?!"

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Olgovich
This is much MORE well-known General Zakharov:

Only in your imagination ....

In history.

Quote: ccsr

The fact is that he HAS DECIDED, and here, as always, you confuse cause and effect, which once again confirms that all your military knowledge is beyond the structure of the deputy. MO on the construction and quartering of troops did not rise. And this is noticeable to those who saw you more in the army ....

The fact is that with THIS weak the enemy took place so scary disaster

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

Funny You: WHERE did you mount - in the pines?

You look like a funny amateur - we had a capital construction of 2 million rubles (SOVIET) a year, and the cost of only one radio-transparent dome was for this amount.

Quote: Olgovich

They ran and how they ran, at the High Command especially: "What to do? Where to run ?! How much to send ?!"

Actually, we didn’t see the builders at point blank range, although the construction battalion was always building something and had our own ACS, which was subsequently abolished. They may have run somewhere, but among the other departments they are clearly not quoted.

Quote: Olgovich

The fact is that with such a weak enemy such a terrible catastrophe took place

This is nonsense - the German army in 1941 was the best in the world in terms of combat training and weapons, and this is a fact that you, as a person wearing shoulder straps, should have understood. In this case, your conclusions about the "weak enemy" look strange.

Quote: Olgovich

In confirmation of your gibberish to THIS article, you have not given ANYTHING, liar

I now realized that all your commander’s training did not go beyond concrete and bricks, that’s why the professional analysis of the actions of intelligence in 1941 is for you a Chinese letter, and you believe in any billiards that the inconsiderate author of statues carries.

[Olgovich]

Quote: ccsr

You look like a funny amateur - we had a capital construction of 2 million rubles (SOVIET) per year, but the cost of only one radiotransparent dome bWas under this amount.

They hung it on the pines, I ask again?

Quote: ccsr

Actually, we didn’t see the builders at point blank range, although the construction battalion was always building something and had our own ACS, which was subsequently abolished. They may have run somewhere, but among the other departments they are clearly not quoted.

Motorized riflemen, artillerymen, and rocket launchers worked for me. signalers. they were commanded by majors and partisans, who were given the task for the day.

Quote: ccsr

This is nonsense - the German army in 1941 was the best in the world in terms of combat training and weapons, and this is a fact that you, as a person wearing shoulder straps, should have understood. In this case, your conclusions about the "weak enemy" look strange.

1. This army is 6 (SIX!) Years old.
2. we talked about the ODVO, it was mainly opposed by the Romanians. "Scary" warriors, yes

Quote: ccsr

I now realized that all your commander’s training did not go beyond concrete and bricks, that’s why the professional analysis of the actions of intelligence in 1941 is for you a Chinese letter, and you believe in any billiards that the inconsiderate author of statues carries.

you have "weighty" arguments
Funny you ...

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

They hung it on the pines, I ask again?

It looks like you are the builder if you don’t know that they are usually put on the roof of technical buildings with certain dimensions of parabolic antennas.

Quote: Olgovich

Motorized riflemen, artillerymen, and rocket launchers worked for me. signalers. they were commanded by majors and partisans, who were given the task for the day.

They may have worked for you, but for us the construction battalion itself built everything - both the residential and the technical zones. And we didn’t allocate anyone to them - while they were building we were already on combat duty, so we had no time for it.

Quote: Olgovich

This army is 6 (SIX!) Years old.

Have you heard anything about the Reichswehr? About the training in it and why the sergeant major in the Reichswehr could surpass the graduates of our military schools in terms of training - read Bruno Wienzer to begin with to understand why the German army was stronger than ours.

Quote: Olgovich

we talked about the ODVO, it was mainly opposed by the Romanians. "Scary" warriors, yes

What the hell is the difference, who opposed the OdVO, when it comes to ESTIMATING the actions of the district command on the night of June 22.

Quote: Olgovich

Funny you ...

For you - perhaps for those who are in the subject, you look even funnier.

[antivirus]

don't touch the saint. only Nikolai 2 did it right in 1914. "
the cyclists are to blame ... "

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

The author claims the opposite: there was little information about the presence of large headquarters in the Republic of Moldova due to the fact that the German command did not seek to disclose their presence to our intelligence, in contrast to the infantry divisions.

Because the author is a complete layman in military affairs, then he still believes that the outcome of an army or front-line operation depends only on determining the exact location of the headquarters of the corps, army, army group, and therefore, if this is not indicated, then intelligence worked poorly. Let me remind the amateur that, firstly, even the division headquarters, according to wartime standards, can move up to 2-3 times a day, higher-level headquarters (corps, army) usually move once every 2-3 days, and sometimes more often. Secondly, the movement of the front headquarters, or the German army group, can also occur once every 2-3 days with an active offensive, and with a long defense, these standards increase. So at the beginning of the war, all headquarters practically simultaneously begin to move out of their permanent deployment points in order to take the position provided for by the operational formation of the front units. And what a "tragedy" because the intelligence did not establish the location of some headquarters in the pre-war period, if with the outbreak of the war it is much more important for us to know which forces can attack us than the places of command of these forces. And even after the start of the war, restrictions on the use of radio equipment are lifted, which means that our radio intelligence will quickly determine by radio exchange which formations and associations are involved and at the same time the bearing position of the radio center, determine where this or that headquarters is located.
In a word, this dilettante once again decided to show his unsuitability, and despite the fact that he palms some cards, you can’t trust him in anything, because a person who believes in his lies will find himself in the position of dilettante in a serious discussion of the issue.

[AsmyppoL]

Tra la la la. Again chatter about anything ... As usual ....

There is not a single word explaining: why in the Republic of Moldova there is little information on the headquarters of tank groups and motorized corps. And why, in Baghramyan’s memoirs, two motorized corps of the enemy suddenly broke into our territory.

There is not a single word that not a single headquarters of the enemy’s front has been discovered.

There is not a single word how the headquarters of the fronts, armies, tank groups and corps were on June 21 at the border (many directly at it), and intelligence did not bring this information to the command ...

There is not a single word about the tank units, of which, as of June 1, 1941, not one was in the places indicated in the Republic of Moldova.

You are right, as OBS, who are not responsible for your words .... Yes, and what to expect after all in your friend Olechka ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

There is not a single word explaining: why in the Republic of Moldova there is little information on the headquarters of tank groups and motorized corps.

Because the main intelligence efforts were aimed at opening the Wehrmacht combat units, because only by them it is possible to determine how seriously the enemy is preparing for war.

Quote: AsmyppoL

And why, in Baghramyan’s memoirs, two motorized corps of the enemy suddenly broke into our territory.

For Baghramyan, it may be unexpected, but for the chief of intelligence and command of the district is quite predictable. Maybe Baghramyan just didn’t really want to remember all the nuances of those hours, so he wrote in such a way as to remain unspoken.

Quote: AsmyppoL

There is not a single word that not a single headquarters of the enemy’s front has been discovered.

The Germans had one front against the USSR - the Eastern, and everything else was called "army group", teach materiel, you are our indefatigable dilettante. That is why their use of the word "front" does not at all correspond to our military term "front" and I have already informed you about this more than once, but not in the horse feed. In our country, the concept of "army group" was historically defined as "front" - learn the materiel of the scribbler.

Quote: AsmyppoL

There is not a single word about the tank units, of which, as of June 1, 1941, not one was in the places indicated in the Republic of Moldova.

You may not have this, but you have not seen any genuine materials, and still use the scan of books that I posted on the network. And in three weeks, any tank division in peacetime in general can change its deployment two or three times, but you don’t know this, and that’s nonsense for any reason.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Yes, and what to expect

Has verbal diarrhea started again? Maybe in fact something to argue?

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

There is a note: “... Request Ramsay: specify corps or armies. If the case, then it does not fit with the concept of the case. Golikov. " It is somewhat strange that the head of RU did not write: “What kind of stupidity? There can be no more than 15 divisions in German corps. ”

This is strange only for our amateur Eugene, but Golikov absolutely correctly requested it because he, as a professional, understood that the error could have occurred both with manual encryption and decryption of the text, and with a technical failure of the accepted groups, because the reception of radiograms from Ramsay in Moscow was impossible directly. So Golikov quite adequately signed the encryption to the resident, but our dreamer Eugene, well, doesn’t understand the ear and snout.

[AsmyppoL]

If General Golikov considered it a failure, he wrote a resolution like: "Check the corps or armies."

General Golikov did not consider the professional to indicate the specified text as a technical malfunction, because seriously thought: can this be? He provided his resolution with clarification of this issue: "If the cases, then it does not fit with the concept of the case".

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

If General Golikov considered it a failure, he wrote a resolution like: "Check the corps or armies."

And so he wrote, if you did not misinterpret his words:

There is a note: "... Request Ramsay: specify corps or armies.

Quote: AsmyppoL

General Golikov did not consider the specified text to be a technical malfunction,

Did you find it in his memoirs, or did you come up with it yourself? How do you know this?

Quote: AsmyppoL

He provided his resolution with clarification of this issue:

A chief of this level can write in resolutions whatever he considers necessary, because Ramzai's encryption is an INTERNAL document of the RU GSh. So do not fool people with your amateurish "reflections" in the hope that the military professionals will believe you, especially since you are zero in understanding the activities of intelligence agencies.

[Doctor]

If General Golikov considered it a failure, he wrote a resolution like: "Check the corps or armies."

Sorge reported on 9 corps, consisting of 150 divisions, that is, 16 divisions in the corps. This, of course, seemed a bit much to Golikov, so he specified corps or armies? It is not clear what the argument is about.

Document No. 488
Undercover Ramsay from Tokyo on May 21, 1941
Head of Intelligence
The General Staff of the Red Army

The new German representatives who arrived here from Berlin say that the war between Germany and the USSR could begin in late May, as they received orders to return to Berlin by this time.
But they also said that danger could pass this year. They stated that Germany has against the USSR 9 army corps consisting of 150 divisions. One army corps is under the command of the famous Reichenau. The strategic scheme of the attack on the Soviet Union will be taken from the experience of the war against Poland.

TSA MO RF. Op. 24127. D. 2. L. 381. Certified copy.
Litters: "9. Request “Ramsay”: At number 125: specify - corps or armies. If the case, then it does not fit with the concept of the case. D. " Golikov. The answer is given in accordance with the resolution. 23.05.41/XNUMX/XNUMX g.

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

The last known RU document published is Bulletin No. 5 (west) of 15.6.41, which repeats the information of the RU bulletin dated 31.5.41. The bulletin additionally includes “The deployment of German units and formations by groups in the USSR border zone by 1.6.41. XNUMX g. "

Because Since the author is illiterate in military history, and in particular in the history of intelligence, he is still convinced that this was the last document of the General Staff of the General Staff before the war. In fact, RU, up to the evening of June 22, CONSTANTLY reported to the country's leadership on signs that the war would begin in the coming hours. The author of the books, O. Kozinkin, described the situation in his work:

And here is what the historian O.V. Karimov in the “introduction” to the memoirs of Marshal F.I. Golikova "Philip Golikov. Notes of the head of the Intelligence. " (M. 2018, p. 58), about how the General Staff of the General Staff is real, and about which it provided data to Stalin and Molotov, and Tymoshenko and Zhukov on the last day before June 22:
In June 1941 alone, nine meetings were held with G. Kegel. Based on the information transmitted to them On June 19, 1941, a special report was prepared at the Center “On Signs of a Probable German Attack on the USSR in the near future”146. (146 The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: In 12 t. M., 2013. T. 6. S. 108.)
On June 20, 1941, the General Staff of the General Aviation Administration sent a report to the USSR leadership “On the Signs of the Inevitability of a German Attack on the USSR in the Coming Days” (147 Ibid., P. 147.)
On the morning of June 21, 1941, G. Kegel called the Soviet intelligence officer to a meeting and said that the German ambassador "received a telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin [that the] German war against the USSR would begin in the next 48 hours." The second meeting took place on the same day at 19:00. The source said that in the morning the German ambassador F.V. von der Schulenburg was instructed to “destroy all secret documents” and ordered “all embassy staff to pack all their belongings and hand them over to the embassy, ​​who live outside the embassy, ​​should move to the mission territory” until the morning of June 22. At the end of the conversation, the German anti-fascist said: “Everyone believes that war will begin on the coming night” 148 (148Id. P. 108).
After this meeting, an urgent report was prepared “On the Signs of a German Attack on the USSR on the Night of June 21.06 to June 22.06”. At the direction of Lieutenant General F.I. Golikova, special communications officer at 20:00 on June 21, 1941 urgently delivered an envelope with the inscription "Only to the addressee. Do not open the staff of the apparatus ”I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and S.K. Tymoshenko 149. (149Id., P. 108) ... "

Source: https://liewar.ru/tragedy-22-iyunya/338-iyun-1941-go-vzglyad-skvoz-gody.html

[icant007]

As of 1.6.41, there were no 286-296 divisions, 40-47 td and md, 8-10 paratrooper and airborne divisions in Germany ...

A very categorical statement by the author.

Moreover, Golikov’s quote is misinterpreted, in which 286-296 is the total number of divisions, of which 20-22 are armored, 20-25 are motorized, etc.

Interestingly, the author will withdraw his statement immediately, or should I recount?

20 tank divisions for the fall of 1940, I have already counted.

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: ccsr

Because Since the author is illiterate in military history, and in particular in the history of intelligence, he is still convinced that this was the last document of the General Staff of the General Staff before the war. In fact, RU, up to the evening of June 22, CONSTANTLY reported to the country's leadership

When an unscrupulous user cannot refute anything, he begins to engage in fraud.

The text in the article does not allow a double interpretation: "The last famous published the RU document is Bulletin No. 5 (westward) of 15.6.41, which repeats the information of the RC bulletin dated 31.5.41. "

And the user replacing the text takes criticism of the substituted words. Typical tactics of two fraudsters Milchakov and Kozinkin: to pass off their thoughts as the words of another person and actively challenge them ...

No words, prove that the author is lying. To do this, provide the TEXT (and not the link) of any published Reconnaissance Directorate of the General Staff of the SC in the period after 15.6.41 to 22.6.41

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

No words, prove that the author is lying. To do this, provide the TEXT (and not the link) of any published Reconnaissance Directorate of the General Staff of the SC in the period after 15.6.41 to 22.6.41

Because Since the author is a complete amateur in matters of military intelligence, all his speculation is based on the June report No. 5, which was opened to a wide range of readers in recent years, and he decided on it that this is the criterion for assessing all pre-war intelligence. Although any military professional knows that intelligence reports are daily, ten-day, monthly, and non-periodic, the author is focused on the report No. 5, which our illiterate Eugene speculates in the text. And this is not counting specialized intelligence reports or those that are prepared at the personal direction of the country's leadership or NGOs, about which there is information in Golikov’s memoirs. Therefore, only illiterate readers are capable of believing in his conclusions, and among military professionals, all of his writing is perceived as nonsense by an amateur.
Moreover, our illiterate does not understand that the monthly report for JUNE 1941 can only be created in JULY 1941, which is why this amateur will not understand why such a report was not published until June 22, because daily reports were dispensed with during this period. However, I understand that he even has a stake on his head, but he still looks at any military intelligence document like a ram at a new gate and cannot understand that they have a different level and are intended for different categories of military leaders.

[AsmyppoL]

Where are the facts about the presence of 16 German divisions on the territory of Moldova and North Dobruge ??

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: icant007

As of 1.6.41, there were no 286-296 divisions, 40-47 td and md, 8-10 paratrooper and airborne divisions in Germany ...

A very categorical statement by the author.

Moreover, Golikov’s quote is misinterpreted, in which 286-296 is the total number of divisions, of which 20-22 are armored, 20-25 are motorized, etc.

Interestingly, the author will withdraw his statement immediately, or should I recount?

20 tank divisions for the fall of 1940, I have already counted.

And why should the author withdraw his statement ??
You just try to confirm the words of General Golikov by listing the numbers of the tank and motorized German divisions existing by June 1, 1941, numbering 40 ... 47.
I am also waiting for the numbers 8 ... 10 of the airborne and airborne divisions.
Do not forget to provide a link to documents that will list the total number of German divisions 286 ... 296.

[icant007]

And now I'm counting. I manually check each division. I will need a few days for this.

The link is the same as in your previous article.

But where is your source?

And by the way, do you admit that you distorted Golikov’s quote?

[icant007]

And I must ask all the minus players: "Have you checked the words of the author at least once? No? Then, sit and be silent!"

However, if you like to humiliate yourself, intelligence and your country, then you can continue ...

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

And I must ask all the minus players: "Have you checked the words of the author at least once? No? Then, sit and be silent!"

You correctly noticed this detail, because on the eve of the 75th anniversary of the Victory, a handful of scammers from history were formed, and they specifically conduct propaganda to discredit our country and our army, to show what unlucky and ignoramuses our people were and how Germans easily deceived them with the help of buttonhole changes. Since this company is targeted specifically to a certain category of people who do not have special military and historical knowledge, it includes a team of hackers who specifically minus those who expose such crooks as Eugene and Victoria, who write on this forum.
Therefore, do not be surprised that these vile little people who are not self-describing themselves will minus you, and conclude that you are on the right path, since they are so coordinated minus you. I’ll notice that you just notice all the nonsense and frank lies that the author pushes here, and therefore completely agree with your conclusions that the author is engaged in fraud. Keep in mind that this crook never admits that he lied when you catch him on a lie, and he never gives a link to his sources of information, and this already says a lot.

[AsmyppoL]

Milchakov, do not evade. Where are the facts about the presence of 16 German divisions on the territory of Moldova and North Dobruge ??

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Where are the facts about the presence of 16 German divisions on the territory of Moldova and North Dobruge ??

Do not evade, swindler, where are the documents proving that there were no divisions or their parts at that time? You didn’t submit a single document, and you just lied that you got acquainted with thousands of German documents, though you didn’t say who translated them for you.

[icant007]

For example, 13 tank was in Romania until mid-May 1941.
You said that the tank units were not there at all.

[icant007]

You just try to confirm the words of General Golikov by listing the numbers of the tank and motorized German divisions existing by June 1, 1941, numbering 40 ... 47.

Well, for starters, divide 40-47 into 20-22 tank, and 20-25 motorized.
For a dispute, we need a single base for comparison, right?
Do you like math? )

And about the tank - this is the simplest)))

Division numbers - from 1 to 20)))

[AsmyppoL]

To begin with, you just need to carefully read the text so as not to answer the questions that you ask yourself, not me!
We carefully read the text again: "You just try to confirm the words of General Golikov by giving the numbers of 1 ... 1941 tank and motorized German divisions existing by June 40, 47.
I am also waiting for the numbers 8 ... 10 of the airborne and airborne divisions.
Do not forget to provide a link to the documents, which will give the total number of German divisions 286 ... 296. "

I did not ask to give the numbers of twenty etc - this is a well-known fact. Why say basic things?
It is a question of about 40-47 ppm and so on in total! I’m waiting for at least forty numbers of tank and motorized divisions - this is the lower limit of the indicated range in General Golikov’s notes. And they will not be ... Well, maybe you will find ...

The second number is eight - ten airborne and airborne divisions. At least again on the lower border - name eight numbers. Despite the fact that the 22nd division ceased to be airborne at this time ...

Then I asked to justify with the help of documents that in the German armed forces there really were 286-296 divisions on June 1, 1941. It seemed to me that everything was written clearly ....

[AsmyppoL]

Я for the fourth time I emphasize to youthat you look at documents superficially and try to prove something inarticulate. Therefore, I put three minuses on all three messages.

I'm not going to clarify the words of Golikov, because they are taken from materials. Completely a fragment of materials sounds like this: "...In report No. 5, as of June 1, the GRU noted with certainty that the German ground forces already have 286-296 divisions. Among them, we counted 20-22 tank, 20-25 motorized, 4-5 parachute, 4-5 airborne, 15 mountain and 16 SS divisions.

Soviet military intelligence knew and continuously monitored the massive transfer of troops to our border from the depths of Germany and from occupied Europe. We controlled the process of increasing the composition of German troops at our borders and the adjacent operational zone.

In five intelligence reports, in the first five months of 1941, the GRU repeatedly provided detailed data on the general grouping and specific deployment of the German army in all theaters of operations and operational and strategic directions.

About it speaks with all convictionFor example, the last before the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, a summary of our GRUalready mentioned by me. This is Bulletin No. 5 of June 15, 1941, with a diagram attached to it.

I foresee that historians will refer to this summary and scheme more than once, and it is possible that it will be published sometime. So, in this intelligence report the total number of German troops on our border with Germany and Romania was indicated by June 1, 1941. It was calculated in 120-122 divisions with the inclusion of 14 tank and 13 motorized divisions. The detailed scheme attached to it clearly reveals the grouping of German troops in East Prussia, Poland, Slovakia, and Transcarpathian Ukraine from our border right up to the Danzig, Poznan, Thorn, Elbing regions, i.e., to a strategic depth of 400 km.

In total, 105-107 divisions were identified here, including 11 tank and 10 motorized divisions. The diagram shows that, as part of this mass of troops, the locations of the headquarters of seven armies, twenty-two corps, and seventy-five divisions were found and recorded. In the vast majority, the numbers of these divisions and armies were established, as well as the numbers of half of the corps departments.

The diagram indicates the following focus of this entire enemy group:

23-24 divisions in East Prussia, including three motorized and two tank;

30 divisions against our Western Special Military District with four tank and one motorized divisions included in their number;

35-36 divisions against our Kiev Special Military District, including up to six tank and five motorized;

6 infantry divisions and one cavalry regiment in the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn, Elbing.

These 105-107 divisions must be added 16 German divisions based in Romaniaone German army in 6-8 divisions concentrating against our border with Finland..."

[AsmyppoL]

At the same time, General Golikov "modestly kept silent" that among the 16 divisions concentrated in Romania, the RC General Staff KA counted five motorized and up to two tank divisions, which actually did not exist. This mobile grouping will be confirmed by the first wartime reports of the RU ... Also, he did not indicate the presence of a non-existent grouping, the number of 9 ... 12 ... 15 divisions in Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine, which went into counting the total number of divisions put forward by Germany against Soviet Union. I'm not talking about the underestimated German grouping against the troops of the PribOVO and ZAPOVO ... About the overestimated grouping in Finland, on the southern flank of the KOVO, about the absence of divisions in the Poznan-Thorn area, etc., about the underestimated number of corps near the border, about not opened headquarters of tank groups and army groups ...

I do not blame him. He simply set out his vision of events on the eve of the war before June 22, 1941. What he knew then, he took after the war from the reports of the General Staff of the General Staff. He did not know anything else, even after the war!

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I do not blame him. He simply set out his vision of events on the eve of the war before June 22, 1941. What he knew then, he took after the war from the reports of the General Staff of the General Staff. He did not know anything else, even after the war!

The amateur, who is Eugene, does not have the moral right to blame Golikov, if only because he has proved the utmost professional inappropriateness in understanding the actions of military intelligence on the eve of the war. What Golikov stated in his evaluation materials on the eve of the war was 98-99% later confirmed when German troops were finally deployed and attacked the USSR on June 22, and this was confirmed in various documents and memoirs.

Quote: AsmyppoL

At the same time, General Golikov "modestly kept silent" that among the 16 divisions concentrated in Romania, the RC General Staff KA counted five motorized and up to two tank divisions, which actually did not exist. This mobile group will be confirmed by the first wartime reports of RU ...

At the same time, the liar Yevgeny "forgets" that he is speculating on the state of the German group on June 1, and that the swindler does not mention the fact that it has grown significantly over the three weeks of June.

Quote: AsmyppoL

I'm not talking about the understated German group against the forces of PribOVO and ZAPOVO ...

All the lies of this false researcher are based on the fact that the gullible public will not pay attention to the fact that there is constant speculation on the basis of a single report on June 1, 1941, which does not take into account three weeks of June up to 22, when the group of German troops was constantly growing. And not five intelligence reports were prepared by the General Staff for the senior leadership of the country and the army in the West, but fourteen, but our verbiage does not know about it:

[AsmyppoL]

Let the facts, Mr. Milchakov on the availability of June 1, 1941:
1) in the territory of Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine nine German divisions;
2) the presence in the territory of Moldova and Northern Dobrudja 16 German divisions, including four motorized and two tank divisions; [post-war data of our researchers refute the indicated RM].
3) prove that in the area of ​​responsibility of PribOVO and ZAPOVO there were 24 ... 29 and 30 ... 31 divisions, instead of the 41 and 40 divisions indicated on the maps, respectively.
No need to lie, but present facts with division numbers

[AsmyppoL]

Try to refute the recollections of Generals Baghramyan and Vladimirsky from the operational units of the KOVO and the 5th Army that they knew about the concentration of German motorized corps near our border. According to them, this was a surprise to them ...

[AsmyppoL]

It is easy to operate with 98% without trying to justify it. So always come sofa experts, among whom you have long been assigned to many sites. Your surname there is an analog of the indicated persons

[AsmyppoL]

I understand that in military affairs you are a complete amateur .... In other words, an expert from the couch.
What our government took seriously those events, the scan of which you brought, it should have been obliged to see German troops and mobile groups at the border !!!!
Bring me the documents that such groups were discovered. Do not drool from your mouth, let's get the facts! Clever military people understood that without large shock groups it is impossible to start a war! To start a war, even infantry formations should be brought directly to the border. Where in intelligence or on maps is it indicated that intelligence discovered German units at the border ??? !!!! Have you ever taken anything to increase your mental capacity? Or are your relatives tormented too much with you?

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Let the facts, Mr. Milchakov on the availability of June 1, 1941:
1) in the territory of Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine, nine German divisions;

First, DOCUMENTALLY disprove that there were no headquarters or units of these divisions, and then he will speculate on their absence. So far you have not presented ANY dokumnet, miserable liar.

Quote: AsmyppoL

No need to lie, but present facts with division numbers

First you submit at least one document refuting the intelligence report, so that you are not considered a miserable racket - DOCUMENTS present, swindler.

[icant007]

From your interpretation of Golikov’s words in the article, it turned out that 290 tank divisions, 20 md, etc. should be added to 20 divisions.

I just do not look superficially, but very carefully. I check specific information.

And specifically, I am currently working on Golikov’s information.
When there will be a result, I will inform.

Well, as for the lower border, I will be guided by it.
For 20 tank divisions, you agree, right?

But the article was written as if they were not there.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

This is convincingly evidenced, for example, by the last summary of our GRU before Hitler Germany’s attack on the USSR, which I have already mentioned. This is Bulletin No. 5 of June 15, 1941, with a diagram attached to it.

Only a complete ignoramus does not understand that this summary describes what was known on June 1, 1941, and the data that the intelligence received during the period from June 1 to June 22, 1941, Could not get into it, although it was published on June 15, because the MONTHLY SCOPE is created next month and everything that the intelligence has learned over this period falls into it. Well, are you really so stupid that you couldn’t even understand the first sheet of the bulletin correctly, where the first line indicates that it was based on materials known on June 1, 1941? Read carefully, amateur:

[AsmyppoL]

Where are the facts about the presence of 16 German divisions on the territory of Moldova and North Dobruge ??

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: icant007

But the article was written as if they were not there.

The article shows a drawing with text from an article by General Golikov, which clearly speaks of the number of divisions 286-296. It directly follows from the same text that the remaining divisions are included in the above number of formations.

Including to this text there is a comment of the author that there were no 286-296 divisions, 40-47 md, etc., 8-10 ...

Why do you write that in the article MD, etc. and parachute divisions, the author considers in addition to 286-296 divisions?

I wrote to you many times that I welcome when people try to figure it out, clarify information, just learn something new about events on the eve of the war. They also told me the same thing. For a year and a half, I learned everything that Victoria knew. For another six months, I flipped through all the German documents from their archive.

Having found some discrepancy in your opinion, you immediately begin to laugh hysterically (these are your words) and accuse me of forgery. Although you can’t show anything. In the fall, he promises to find materials and refute our intelligence.
In three months I’ve found everything you need on a site you’ve known, double-checked on two other Russian-language sites and one German ... Although I also work and can be overtime ...

So before accusing me of something, double-check the documents ...
Of course, I will not give you a link to the newly discovered new documents. This is a bonanza. Nobody here gives materials that are a bomb ...
After an article on the deployment of German mobile forces, I will provide links on how to view these documents ... This is my right. If not a single historian or military commander has done this for 70 years, then I don’t want to merge this material to people whom I don’t know and who I don’t like because of hastily three ...

The given examples of the absence of three tank divisions in the places in which our intelligence saw them require analysis. I plan to analyze all the locations of the divisions related to mobile troops in fact, and according to intelligence, and find a pattern in intelligence errors or deliberate misinformation by the German command. This is a big job due to the lack of many settlements on modern maps and on the Internet.

[icant007]

Why do you write that in the article MD, etc. and parachute divisions, the author considers in addition to 286-296 divisions?

Hello) So this is not me writing, but you. You have not written, including, like Golikov’s.

I mean, the total number is -296.
And you write as if to this amount you add another 40-47 td, md, etc ...
Here's a pun!)

[icant007]

Having found some discrepancy in your opinion, you immediately begin to laugh hysterically (these are your words) and accuse me of forgery.

I begin to laugh hysterically when you start your favorite song about the shoulder straps of the German army. Someone here answered you that shoulder straps are about 5% of intelligence.

And I do not blame you for fraud. And in bias, in the fact that you misinterpret the facts and do not always make the right conclusions.

[Doctor]

The article shows a drawing with text from an article by General Golikov, which clearly speaks of the number of divisions 286-296.

This is as of what number?

As of June 1, 1941 - 120-122 divisions.

Special communication of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army on the grouping of German troops on June 1, 1941
31.05.1941
№ 660569
Group of German troops on June 1, 1941
During the second half of May, the main German command, due to forces liberated in the Balkans, produced:
1. The restoration of the Western group to fight England;
2. An increase in forces against the USSR;
3. The concentration of reserves of the high command.
The general distribution of the armed forces of Germany is as follows:
- against England (on all fronts) 122–126 divisions;
— against the USSR - 120–122 divisions;
- reserves - 44–48 divisions.
The specific distribution of German forces against England:
- in the West - 76–80 divisions;
- in Norway - 17 divisions, of which 6 are located in the northern part of Norway and can be used against the USSR.
- in Africa and Italy - 17 divisions;
- in Greece with the island of Crete - 12 divisions.
The distribution of the directions of German forces against the USSR is as follows:
a) in East Prussia - 23–24 divisions, including 18–19 infantry, 3 motorized, 2 tank and 7 cavalry. regiments;
b) in the Warsaw direction against ZAPOVO - 30 divisions, including 24 infantry, 4 tank, one motorized, one cavalry and 8 cavalry. regiments;
c) in the Lublin-Krakow region, against KOVO - 35–36 divisions, including 24–25 infantry, 6 tank, 5 motorized and 5 cavalry. regiments;
d) in Slovakia (the region of Zborov, Prenov, Vranov) - 5 mountain divisions;
e) in Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions;
f) in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja - 17 divisions, including 10 infantry, 4 motorized, one mountain and two tank divisions;
g) in the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - 6 infantry divisions and one cavalry. regiment.
.......
Head of Intelligence
The General Staff of the Red Army
Lieutenant General Golikov

TSA MO RF. Op. 7237. D. 2. Ll. 117–119. Typewriting on a special form. Certified copy.
The newsletter is indicated: to Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Tymoshenko, Beria, Kuznetsov, Zhdanov, Zhukov, Meretskov.

[icant007]

This is as of what number?

As of June 1, 1941 - 120-122 divisions.

This is also on the first of June.

296 is the total. You sum up your data, the same number and get.

However, the author rejects her as well.

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: Arzt

The article shows a drawing with text from an article by General Golikov, which clearly speaks of the number of divisions 286-296.

This is as of what number?

As of June 1, 1941 - 120-122 divisions.

Special communication of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army on the grouping of German troops on June 1, 1941
31.05.1941
№ 660569
Group of German troops on June 1, 1941
During the second half of May, the main German command, due to forces liberated in the Balkans, produced:
1. The restoration of the Western group to fight England;
2. An increase in forces against the USSR;
3. The concentration of reserves of the high command.
The general distribution of the armed forces of Germany is as follows:
- against England (on all fronts) 122–126 divisions;
— against the USSR - 120–122 divisions;
- reserves - 44–48 divisions.
The specific distribution of German forces against England:
- in the West - 76–80 divisions;
- in Norway - 17 divisions, of which 6 are located in the northern part of Norway and can be used against the USSR.
- in Africa and Italy - 17 divisions;
- in Greece with the island of Crete - 12 divisions.
The distribution of the directions of German forces against the USSR is as follows:
a) in East Prussia - 23–24 divisions, including 18–19 infantry, 3 motorized, 2 tank and 7 cavalry. regiments;
b) in the Warsaw direction against ZAPOVO - 30 divisions, including 24 infantry, 4 tank, one motorized, one cavalry and 8 cavalry. regiments;
c) in the Lublin-Krakow region, against KOVO - 35–36 divisions, including 24–25 infantry, 6 tank, 5 motorized and 5 cavalry. regiments;
d) in Slovakia (the region of Zborov, Prenov, Vranov) - 5 mountain divisions;
e) in Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions;
f) in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja - 17 divisions, including 10 infantry, 4 motorized, one mountain and two tank divisions;
g) in the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - 6 infantry divisions and one cavalry. regiment.
.

This is the number of divisions in the German armed forces. The same number is mentioned in his article by General Golikov, which is false information.

"Reconnaissance report No. 5 (in the West) of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army 15.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX Germany
The distribution of the armed forces of Germany in theaters and fronts of military operations as of June 1, 1941

The total strength of the German army as of June 1, 1941 is determined in 286-296 divisions, including: motorized - 20-25, tank - 22, mountain infantry - 15, parachute - 4-5, airborne - 4-5, divisions “SS” - 18.

The German command continues to concentrate troops in the border zone with the USSR, making massive troop transfers from the depths of Germany, the occupied countries of Western Europe and the Balkans1.

The total number of German troops on our western border with Germany and Romania (including Moldova and Dobrudja) as of June 1 reaches one hundred twenty to one hundred twenty-two divisions, including: fourteen tank and thirteen motorized. The directions of the German troops are distributed:

a) in East Prussia twenty-three to twenty-four divisions, including: eighteen to nineteen infantry and three motorized divisions, five tank regiments (two tank divisions) and seven cavalry regiments;

b) in the Warsaw direction (against ZAPOVO) thirty divisions, including: twenty-four infantry, one motorized, one panzer and six tank regiments (four panzer divisions in total), one cavalry division and eight cavalry regiments;

c) in the Lublin-Krakow region (against the KOVO) thirty-five to thirty-six divisions, including: twenty-four to twenty-five infantry, five motorized, up to six tank divisions and five cavalry regiments;

d) in the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - six infantry divisions, one cavalry regiment;

e) in Slovakia (in the area of ​​Duplin, Presov, Michalovce) - five divisions (according to the latest data, some of them supposedly left for former Poland);

f) in Carpathian Ukraine - four divisions;

g) in Moldova and Northern Dobrogea - seventeen divisions, including: four motorized, one mountain and two tank.

One hundred twenty two-one hundred twenty-six divisions are concentrated against England (on all fronts), of which: in Norway - 17 (of which six are located in the northern part of Norway), in Africa - 8, in Italy - 9, in Greece (with the island Crete) - 10, in Yugoslavia (Belgrade, Sarajevo, Nis) - 2, on the north-west coast of France, Belgium, Holland and Denmark - 57-60, inside the occupied part of France - 9-10, on the border with Spain - 10.

The reserve of the main command is forty-four to forty-eight divisions, of which: in the center of Germany - 16-17, in the region of Breslau, Moravska-Ostrava, Katowice - 6-9, in the center of Romania - 11, in Bulgaria - 11. "


In fact, on June 1, 1941, there were only 85 German divisions in East Prussia, former Poland, Moldova, and Northern Dobrudge. There were no German divisions in the Carpathian Ukraine and Slovakia.

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: icant007

From your interpretation of Golikov’s words in the article, it turned out that 290 tank divisions, 20 md, etc. should be added to 20 divisions.

I just do not look superficially, but very carefully. I check specific information.

And specifically, I am currently working on Golikov’s information.
When there will be a result, I will inform.

Well, as for the lower border, I will be guided by it.
For 20 tank divisions, you agree, right?

But the article was written as if they were not there.

I was distracted and will also need to leave.
I do NOT agree with the number 20 td. The German command believed that there were 21. You did not take into account the light division in the African corps. In the table above, it was counted as a tank.

General Golikov incorrectly wrote the number td in the intelligence report. The summary indicates that there were 22. Without any 20-22.
I think this is also a coincidence.
Why?
The Summary indicates the presence at our border of 14 TD by 31.5.41 (including two in Romania). Consequently, the remaining 8 where far from the border.
But if instead of 14 TD, there is only five at our border with a stretch, what kind of reliability of the number of TD according to RU can be discussed?

[VS]

Quote: ccsr

the author is illiterate in military history, and in particular in the history of intelligence,

IT chudo grabbed the elephant by the tail and on this builds theories about WHAT elephant!)))

After all, the ignoramus himself admitted that he could only "analyze" a SOME percent of the possible intelligence reports of those days, but the ignorant draws huge conclusions - the intelligence is his fault that he almost missed the start of the war ..

He was already told to an anonymous clown - GERMAN INTELLIGENCE did not know anything about the composition of the Red Army on our side in the districts at all !! THEY AT ALL "saw" only SEVERAL tank divisions with us !!! But this COMPLETE LACK OF KNOWLEDGE about the Red Army did not prevent them from successfully advancing ((

It’s possible for idiots to say for a long time that the reason for our defeats was not that intelligence didn’t see anything there — it was not about the Germans' riders — but about the pre-war plans of our General Staff that such SUCH plans had led to the pogrom of the Red Army in the very first days of the war!
You say to idiots - read the cretins work of the VNU GSh "1941 - lessons and conclusions" !! THERE IS EVERYTHING long ago shown - what was the cause of our defeats and intelligence IN PRINCIPLE is not the reason for these defeats, because the main reason was the pre-war plans of our General Staff !!! In the plans of the General Staff for the summer of 41, the reasons for our defeat were laid!
but - these idiots say it without a hitch (((the donkeys will check in 5% of intelligence reports and on THIS compose their nonsense - about the fault of intelligence))

[VS]

Quote: Olgovich

Tell us how it turned out that the memoirs of a large number of Red Army commanders reflected the events after June 14-15, 1945, when they "suddenly" accidentally found themselves on the move towards training grounds, camps and towards the state border

1.Now bring the DIRECTIVE of the General Staff on June 18.

the General Staff archive will be declassified - you will see)) in the meantime, study what HAS BEEN DONE on the pre-war days in the districts - when from June 11, troops already began to withdraw, including to the border, directly at the border))))

[ccsr]

Quote: V.S.

General Staff archive will be declassified - you will see))

There is indirect evidence in the materials of the Pavlov case that there was a GS telegram dated June 18:

Data on this telegram are not available in the archives of the Russian Federation. At least this is the situation today. It is not in the General Staff archive either. Either it was destroyed during the Khrushchev "thaw", or it was hidden in such a way that now no one knows where it is. The only clear mention of her is on the 70th sheet of the 4th volume of the investigation on charges of the ZAPOVO command, where the testimony of ZAPOVO’s communications chief, General A. T. Grigoriev, was recorded: “And after the telegram of the chief of the General Staff on June 18, the district troops were not given on alert ... ”

https://nik191-1.ucoz.ru/publ/istorija_sobytija_i_ljudi/istorija_sobytija_i_ljudi/tragedija_22_ijunja_oshibka_ili_predatelstvo_chto_znala_razvedka_o_22_ijunja/7-1-0-2406

[AsmyppoL]

If Milchakov would have been subordinated in those days, then he would have admitted in an extremely short time that he was Orc - if only they hadn’t beat him ... Is there anything more reliable?

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Is there anything more reliable?

Better tell a liar how are you

"For another six months, I flipped through all the German documents from their archive"

, and you don’t indicate how you got into their archives, especially since a huge number of German military documents are missing from them at all.
We'll have to make out some of the fakes that are found in this scribble. No matter how the author tried to cheat on the actions of our military intelligence, but nonetheless gritting his teeth, he admits:

In the latest known information the number of enemy divisions randomly coincided with their actual number.

The fact that it is an accident for the layman, for professionals is only a logical result of the careful work of military intelligence.
The author further states that

It should be noted that these cards were discussed in detail in the first four parts of the article on intelligence.

However, he does not even indicate to whom these cards belonged, who signed them, and at what time and date the situation is applied to them, i.e. there is a forgery that an ignorant person simply will not notice. I tried to clarify with this liar on the basis of what he concludes:

According to the RM, which is confirmed by the situation on 21.6.41 on the maps of the headquarters of PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO, a significant part of the German troops is not located near the border.

. But this swindler, recognizing that he saw only intelligence report No. 5 on June 1, suddenly decided that he knew everything about all the intelligence materials available in the districts on June 22. We ask this liar a question, how does he know about this?
What follows is another thoughtful delirium

Failure to know the locations of the existing enemy parachute units led to the mass involvement of troops in the fight against non-existent large landing parties.

What is the use, even if you know that the airborne unit is 200 or 250 km from the border, if they can be thrown into three different districts with the outbreak of war? Yes, and at that time they fought with DIVERSANTS and SPIES, and not with units that had the operational task of landing to capture important objects, as was the case in May in Crete. So there is nothing strange in this, that they fought with paratroopers, attracting military units, because the training of paratroopers is higher than in conventional troops.

The fact that there are no other RMs that would warn the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union about the outbreak of war on June 22 is also confirmed by the first military report of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

This vile lie will be exposed by any reader who becomes familiar with the Directive b / n, signed on June 21, 1941 and sent to the troops a few hours before the attack. It is she who proves that on the basis of intelligence materials the date and time of the attack was precisely determined.

On 31.5.41, the last prewar summary of the RU, which is currently published, was printed and sent to the addressees.

Eugene himself refutes this lie by the following statement:

The last known published RU document is Summary No. 5 (west) of 15.6.41,

those. the document could not have been sent anywhere before June 15th.
The author of the article is constantly lying that he carefully studied something in the German archives, palm off some unknown cards, and at the same time he admits that they were drawn up almost a month before the start of the war:

As an example, I will give information (as of 27.5.41) about the deployment of three TDs, which, according to intelligence, were against the KOVO.

Any literate person immediately understands that the operational situation has changed a lot in four weeks, which is why, speculating on this map, he avoids what was known to us on June 22, and what the Germans really had at the time of the attack, because he never saw these documents with an eye, and all his "conclusions" are based on the data available as of June 1, 1941 in report No. 5. This is how various crooks falsify our military history

[AsmyppoL]

If you are smart and know how to do it, then getting into electronic archives is extremely easy ...
and if to be milchakov, then apart from the opinion from the couch and insults you can’t find out anything)))

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

If you are smart and know how to do it, then getting into electronic archives is extremely easy ...

And what prevents the swindler from bringing at least a FULL scan of the document, and a link to it in the archive, if any reader has access to it?

Quote: AsmyppoL

and if to be milchakov, then apart from the opinion from the couch and insults you can’t find out anything)))

By the way, verbiage, which of the military translators worked for you, since the question is about thousands of German documents?
By the way, you learned from me that there were not five intelligence reports on the situation in the West, but almost three times as many - fourteen. Teach materiel, amateur ....

[AsmyppoL]

Where are the facts about the presence of 16 German divisions on the territory of Moldova and North Dobruge ??

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Where are the facts about the presence of 16 German divisions on the territory of Moldova and North Dobruge ??

Where are the DOCUMENTS proving that they or their parts were not there?

[AsmyppoL]

Milchakov: "But this swindler, admitting that he had only seen intelligence report No. 5 for June 1, suddenly decided that he knew everything about all the intelligence materials available in the districts for June 22. Let's ask this liar a question, how does he know about this?"

I explain to readers (it’s useless to explain to Milchakova ....).
If the data of the Bulletin of the RS GSh SC for May 31, 1941, reprinted again and released by the same on June 15, and Bulletin No. 1 for June 22, are very close, then other "secret" and "more complete" RMs simply were not brought to the attention of the SC and Soviet Union !!! And the data are very close: for this you just need to familiarize yourself with the materials. And all the nonsense about the data that is in the archive and can turn something there in the vision is the fantasies of the falsifiers of our history!

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

If the data of the Bulletin of the General Staff of the General Aviation Administration for May 31, 1941, reprinted again and released on June 15

You're lying to a swindler - the June 1 report was released on June 15 only because it takes time to summarize and verify the incoming information from all the districts and other intelligence agencies in order to avoid mistakes. That is why the intelligence report for the month of May can never be sent to the addressees on June 1 - what a layman you are in all this, and still have the audacity to say something about Golikov.

Quote: AsmyppoL

and Summary No. 1 for June 22 is very close,

This once again proves the high quality of intelligence materials, which the layman does not even suspect.

Quote: AsmyppoL

it was simply not brought to the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union !!!

Again, you're lying, a swindler, because intelligence reports for the government of the country are not even brought to all the highest military - study carefully to whom the reports are addressed on June 19, 20 and 21, they are available on the network. Only a real fool can believe that documents of this level can be sent to the okrugs - you again sat in a puddle, scribbler.

[AsmyppoL]

As usual, Kozinkin is cheating. He has such a hobby and has no inclination for analysis. From the word "absolutely".
He cannot even understand with his convolutions what is written in those documents to which he cites.
How did he understand that? He did not study military affairs, but sat in the warehouse. Therefore, he writes any nonsense ...

Since June 11, 1941, they could not carry out the Covering Plans, since they had not yet been approved. From the word "absolutely"! He just wants it to be so, because in his writings, he staked out this mythical version ... Now it is impossible to retreat.

The indicated documents for ZAPOVO and KOVO only speak of the transfer of the reserves of the districts closer to the border, since armies of the second strategic echelon arrive at their places of deployment. More is not indicated there.
Because of this, cover plans indicate new locations when moving front reserves. The fulfillment of the Cover Plans is the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to the troops by these Plans!
Kozinkin, in addition to his fantasies, cannot show that units of the 1st or 2nd echelons of cover armies went to positions. He cannot produce orders according to which, for example, the 31st, 36th, 37th, 55th rifle corps must prepare defensive lines (PTR) in accordance with the Cover Plans. Without fulfilling the tasks under the Plans, we only see a change in the deployment of the corps of front reserves. Everything else is the bard ideas of the specified writer and nothing more! as they say, lies and does not blush

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Since June 11, 1941 they could not fulfill the Cover Plans, since they have not yet been approved.

Once again he sat down in a puddle, balabol - until the new cover plans are approved, the old cover plans are fully in force. And you, swindler, still have the audacity to indicate something to Kozinkin? Nalets and the prokhendey - this is briefly your description, with which military professionals will agree.

Quote: AsmyppoL

He just wants it to be so, because in his works, he staked out this mythical version ... Now you can’t retreat.

Change the record, balabol - until the new document is approved, the old one is valid until the last minute, which, in the case of cover plans, cannot radically change, if only because its implementation takes time and costs.

Quote: AsmyppoL

The indicated documents for ZAPOVO and KOVO only speak of the transfer of the reserves of the districts closer to the border, since armies of the second strategic echelon arrive at their places of deployment. More is not indicated there.

It is enough for any professional to find out about this in order to understand how the strengthening of the cover units will be carried out at the expense of the arrivals - this is not clear to the illiterate Eugene.

Quote: AsmyppoL

He cannot produce orders according to which, for example, the 31st, 36th, 37th, 55th rifle corps must prepare defensive lines (PTR) in accordance with the Cover Plans.

You are definitely a layman - you cannot distinguish the concept of "plan" from the concept of "order", so you are talking nonsense that Kozinkin must present you with some order. In fact, the corps commander or his chief of staff personally come to the army commander and make extracts from the army cover plan, and on the basis of the assigned task, they develop their own plan, which is introduced not by order, but by a conditional command from the army - teach materiel, amateur, this is how cover plans for a surprise attack.

Quote: AsmyppoL

as they say, lies and does not blush

This is your exact description, Eugene - you probably looked in the mirror when you typed the text.

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Since June 11, 1941, they could not carry out the Covering Plans, since they had not yet been approved. From the word "absolutely"! He just wants it to be so, because in his writings, he staked out this mythical version ... Now it is impossible to retreat.

SO YOU UNPRECAUTED ANONYM SERIOUSLY THINK THAT THE PP WASN'T HAVE BEEN IN THE DISTRICT BY JUNE 21?)))))) GYGYGY)))) But how did the Kirpanos give orders in the morning - Proceed with the PP if they were not approved?)))

"BATTLE ORDER OF THE STAFF OF THE KIEV SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT TO THE COMMANDERS OF THE 24TH FUR [ANIZED] CORPS AND THE 45TH TANK DIVISION
22th of June 1941

From dawn on June 22, the Germans launched an offensive. The battle is on the border.
Proceed with the 1941 cover plan.


Commander of the Military Council Member
Kiev Special Military District Kiev Special Military District
Colonel General KIRPONOS Corps Commissar VASHUGIN
Chief of Staff of the Kiev Special Military District
Lieutenant General PURKAEV "" (TsAMO, f. 229, op. 164, d. 50, sheet 3. Original.)
Source: https://liewar.ru/tragedy-22-iyunya/200-dokumenty-pervykh-dnej-vojny.html

And Maladin, after conducting a survey among the Sandalovs and Lyapins — HOW they received orders for the red packet — in AUGUST 41, he reported to the General Staff:

"" FROM THE WEST FRONT TROOPS COMBAT ACTION LOG
22th of June 1941
... At about one in the morning, an encryption was received from Moscow with an order to immediately put the troops on alert in case of a German attack expected in the morning.

Around 2–2.30 a similar order was made in cipher: the armies, parts of the SD, were ordered to immediately take the SD.
At the signal of “Thunderstorm”, the “Red Packet” was launched, which contained a plan for covering the state border. ... ")))
Source: https://liewar.ru/tragediya-22-iyunya/200-dokumenty-pervykh-dnej-vojny.html "

Darago anonymous - well, do not go to where you are in ZERO FULL))) Enough for us anonymous women))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The indicated documents for ZAPOVO and KOVO only speak of the transfer of the reserves of the districts closer to the border, since armies of the second strategic echelon arrive at their places of deployment. More is not indicated there.

WHERE ARE YOU FINDING - in THESE directives for the withdrawal of troops along the BCP - that in the REGIONS where the troops of the SECOND echelon of the districts and reserves with the MK were stationed, the armies of the RGC from the internal districts should have arrived?))) Do you carry daraguš? (((

At the same time, Pavlov was DIRECTLY pointed out - according to WHAT plan - according to which PP he needs to withdraw those troops)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

In the cover plans, because of this, new locations are indicated when moving front reserves

cho for nonsense? (((WHERE ARE YOU in the PP seen that due to the arrival in the provincial army armies of the RGC or the movement of some front reserves before the war - new locations are indicated ??)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

The fulfillment of the Cover Plans is the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to the troops by these Plans!

and HOW, deriving PP Pavlov, indicated PP not yet approved in Moscow?)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

Kozinkin, in addition to his fantasies, cannot show that units of the 1st or 2nd echelons of cover armies went to positions.

The DZB of divisions that were deduced by software in those days study)))

WHAT other positions have you dragged in here ??))) were taken to the districts along the PP - WITHOUT taking the "positions" themselves, because this was FORBIDDEN by orders specially)))

"" to take up the pre-faction position only if the enemy violates the state border.
Source: https://liewar.ru/tragediya-22-iyunya/200-dokumenty-pervykh-dnej-vojny.html ""))))

you stop YOUR dreams of HOW YOU would like it to be - ONCE AS YOU WANT, Batan did not do the anonymous, that means they did not wait for the attack - project on REALITY))

Quote: AsmyppoL

He cannot produce orders according to which, for example, the 31st, 36th, 37th, 55th rifle corps must prepare defensive lines (PTR) in accordance with the Cover Plans. Without fulfilling the tasks under the Plans, we see only a change in the deployment of front reserve corps

and WHO told you that THESE troops HAD to prepare some sort of defensive lines?))) Did you see this in the KOVO PP or something ?? You will be pleased with the quote - that when they were transferred to the areas prescribed by him for PP, they SHOULD prepare some sort of defensive lines there - can you show that in their RED packets on the seitz account was written down - - when digging out to those areas, dig trenches urgently ?? ((
And - you actually know that they are packages since June 11 - STARTING THE CONCLUSION IN THESE REGIONS DID NOT OPEN ???))

[AsmyppoL]

So where in the documents that you call the directives for the withdrawal of troops in ZapOVO and KOVO it says about the withdrawal according to Cover Plans ??? Let's take a closer look: documents, memoirs. Any document other than its conclusions of the zavsklad.

The documents refer to redeployment, for example, in the KOVO, 5 rifle corps and one division. There is nothing more about cover plans there. As these associations were front-line reserves, they remained! Only in their places of lodging and in camps did troops of the 2nd echelon of cover armies begin to arrive. There is not a word more in these documents. And Stalin did not discuss anything on PP. This is your fiction again! Let's get the facts if I'm wrong !!!
But where does the scammer come from ?! He would get a new bookstore with foul !!

So where are the facts of Zhukov’s call from the Kremlin? Will the answer be or will you run away again?

Where are the facts that Zhukov came to Stalin in the evening of June 21 with a draft directive? Are there facts, or again, except rudeness, and I won’t hear a bunch of la-la-la?

Where are the facts, what follows about the time of the call to Zakharov "22-00" should he believe and not believe his commander about the time of the call of the People's Commissar "23-00". The words of the commander coincide with the memories of three more people .... So why in your books do you base the mythical version on Zhukov's call from the Kremlin, about the time of the call to Zakharov at "22-00", about opening red packets only in the Western Military District, as an order from Moscow?
Let's show us the facts !! Just do not need general phrases, as you wrote earlier: "in the answers of the division commander everything is there!" Victoria cited all the answers of the division commander and there is not what you refer to.
Let the facts liar, Kozinkin!

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

So where in the documents that you call the directives for the withdrawal of troops in ZapOVO and KOVO it says about the withdrawal according to Cover Plans ???

read the directive to Pavlov dated June 11)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

. There is nothing more about cover plans there. As these associations were front-line reserves, they remained!

and in your opinion they should have become some kind of other parts - at the opening of the red packet and the start of the PP execution officially?))
KOVO was displayed on the MAP and this card from the KOVO PP does not differ much)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

troops of the 2nd echelon of cover armies began to arrive in their places of lodging and in camps. No more words in the indicated documents

well, stop lying yap))) In principle, do you even understand what this means - troops of the 2nd echelon of the ARMY cover?))))

Directives of June 11-12 are directives for the withdrawal of exactly 2 ECHELONES of cover armies! Covering armies this is the military forces of the western border districts themselves)) Damn ... with whom you have to communicate (((
Remember the ignoramus - the corps being withdrawn according to those directives is the withdrawal of the troops of the 2nd ESHELON OF THE COVERAGE ARMIES - to THEIR areas provided for by the constituencies! And these were their areas for PP)))
Can you REMEMBER - anonymous anonymous?))

AND IN THEIR PLACES OF DISLOCATION ANY other troops were not withdrawn)))
It seems like an anonymous dude You don’t understand the principle in terms of what kind of troops to which "echelons" should be attributed - what is the FIRST (!!) ECHELON OF THE COVERING ARMY and what is the SECOND (!!) ECHELON OF THE COVERING ARMY koi were the WEST TROOPS.

What was the FIRST strategic echelon and what was the SECOND STRATEGIC LEVEL the more you do not seem to know)))

and YOU are an anonymous ignoramus, so obviously you don't know - that in NOT YEAR there was no division into "strategic echelons" in the operational plans of the General Staff))

Quote: AsmyppoL

Stalin did not discuss anything on PP. This is your fiction again! Let's get the facts if I'm wrong !!!

On June 9, the deployment of troops was decided. After that, the directives of NCOs and the General Staff from the withdrawal of troops by software were sent to the okrugs)))
June 11 ZhUKOV brought Stalin a directive on the introduction of PP)) Stalin did not allow such a directive to be sent to the okrugs)))

And if you don’t know this, this is not my problem))

Quote: AsmyppoL

Where are the facts of Zhukov’s call from the Kremlin?

but according to your AS operational dezh. Could the General Staff at 22 o'clock give a command to the districts that they would be waiting for "important encryption"?))

Quote: AsmyppoL

Where are the facts that Zhukov came to Stalin in the evening of June 21 with a draft directive? Are there facts, or again, except rudeness, and I won’t hear a bunch of la-la-la?

SO HE HIMSELF - HIMSELF told these things)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

Where are the facts, what follows about the time of the call to Zakharov "22-00" should he believe and not believe his commander about the time of the call of the People's Commissar "23-00". The commander's words coincide with the memories of three more people ...

And WHAT hr..na YOU contrast their words?))

you never know what the memoirists missed in the memoirs))) compare the anonymous fool that Zhukov wrote in the DRAFT and what got into his VIR official = e)) Tell you that the MEMOIRS LIKE the Cherevichenka Zhukovs were LOOKED in the CPSU Central Committee in MANDATORY order - for censorship - You go, you won't understand)) For the sake of laughter, look HOW I.Stadnyuk gave his book "War" to censorship and HOW WHOLE PIECES were crossed out that expose Stalin at least a little positively))))

Zakharov wrote his book and it was CLASSIFIED for 20 years !! )) And Cherevichenko’s memoirs came out with CENSOR))

IT HAS REACHED - Anonymous - WHY do their words differ?))

Quote: AsmyppoL

why in your books do you base the mythical version on Zhukov's call from the Kremlin, about the time of the call to Zakharov at "22-00", about opening red packets only in the Western Military District, as an order from Moscow?

And you prove that Pavlov gave the order for packages UNDERSTANDING!)) AND WHY IN GENERAL, IN THIS case, should Malandin interrogate about these packages if there WAS NO Moscow order))
And the fact that the order was also written - ABOUT 4 hours and this is SEPARATE was the order - read the memoirs of DEPUTY Pavlov ignoramus)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

Victoria cited all the answers of the divisional commanders and there isn’t what you refer to.

1st - who told you that her name is this anonymous and lying woman Victoria?))
2 nd - WHY DID YOU take the ignoramus that IT ALL RESPONSES resulted?))

Quote: AsmyppoL

Let the facts liar, Kozinkin!

1st - WHERE ARE YOU MUCH ANONYMOUS, you dare to contact me by SURNAME DO NOT write to call YOURSELF))
2nd - the fact that you DON'T KNOW THE FUCKING SUBJECT - about the same "echelons" and PP "- then I showed them - THIS is a FACT)) - YOU DO NOT LEARN complete)))

[AsmyppoL]

But how lies, how lies ... Documents or memories will be? Or do you learn about documents from archives by a crystal ball?
Do not communicate with the dead case ??

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

If General Golikov

you saw his memoirs - that you were forbidden to publish during his life?

[AsmyppoL]

I am smart enough to see and prove that the pre-war intelligence reports signed by General Golikov, the chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Aviation Administration, and the first intelligence report of the same department that the data in them are very close. It follows that there are no other intelligence materials.
In addition, the figures from an unpublished article of the same general completely coincide with the pre-war data of the General Staff of the General Aviation Administration, which also indicates that there is simply no other information. And the prewar intelligence data are completely unreliable, as shown by a detailed analysis of these data and maps with the situation for all four districts before the war. The fact that you have completely no data for analysis is your problem)))) But you can juggle quotes well in your little books ... Money doesn’t smell, yes, Kozinkin?

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

And the prewar intelligence data are completely unreliable, as shown by a detailed analysis of these data and maps with the situation for all four districts before the war.

You're lying, you yourself admitted through grit

In the latest known information, the number of enemy divisions randomly coincided with their actual number.

Quote: AsmyppoL

The fact that you have completely no data for analysis is your problem

You didn’t produce a single document at all, and some scraps of cards, unknown by someone drawn in Photoshop (maybe you cooked them yourself judging by the fact that there are administrative cards, and not the General Staff cards), you pass off as genuine documents. We already went through this with Zakoretsky — he also painted such pictures, demanding that they be considered genuine documents, since he concocted them.

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I am smart enough to see and prove that the pre-war intelligence reports signed by General Golikov, Chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the KA,

SO MUCH in% you saw - those reports then?))))

Quote: AsmyppoL

prewar intelligence data are completely unreliable, as shown by a detailed analysis of these data and maps with the situation for all four districts before the war.

lying anonymous - Golikov shows - DATA RU GSH and reality coincided to pieces of German divisions)))

And for the anonymous rattlers, I repeat - THE REASONS FOR DAMAGES at the beginning of the Second World War are not that reconnaissance was up to the drover, but the Germans didn’t see it in those plans of the General Staff in case of war that were written in the General Staff by the summer of the 41st)))
This was shown by both MARSHALS Zakharov-Zhukov and Gareev to the heap and also officers of the VNU General Staff in "1941 - lessons and conclusions"))

Quote: AsmyppoL

you can juggle quotes well in your little books ... Money doesn’t smell, yes, Kozinkin?

so who is YOU anonymous you are our illiterate prevents to publish with a woman that couple of your nonsense anonymous for a couple - analysis of a couple of% RM - about carters - that intelligence is to blame for the tragedy of the beginning of the Second World War)))
Cho are you so afraid YOUR NAME to name in this case ??))

[AsmyppoL]

falsifier of our story Kozinkin: "You are lying anonymous - Golikov shows - DATA of the General Staff of the General Staff and reality coincided up to pieces of divisions of the Germans."

So prove on the figures from the Bulletins that General Golikov read and claimed that the distribution of German troops to the division coincided with the data of the Intelligence Agency.
The reports are known: the famous in the West No. 5 dated 15.6.41 and No. 1 dated June 22, 1941.
Come on, boy, show that you deserve to speak the same professional language with your husbands, and not pull out quotes from individual memoirs

[AsmyppoL]

Well, here I put a minus sign, but there are no facts! Well, I say, he's lying in his books all the time. Come on show me Kozinkinthat I'm wrong!

And what nonsense he writes ... Hitler shuffled the commanders of army groups on the eve of the war, and they didn’t leave their associations from the war in Poland! Here, a liar

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

So prove on the figures from the Bulletins that General Golikov read and claimed that the distribution of German troops to the division coincided with the data of the Intelligence Agency.

So it was proved by the Hitler Wehrmacht general Kurt Tippelskirch in his book “History of the Second World War”:

“By June 22, the day the offensive began, the strategic deployment areas were concentrated: 81 infantry division, 1 cavalry division, 17 tank, 15 motorized, 9 police and security divisions. As reserves of the high command, 22 more infantry, 2 tank, 2 motorized divisions and 1 police division were on their way ”(174). Total: 150 divisions. On the same issue, I will quote from the book of the collective of military historians, “World War II 1939–1945.”: “The Nazi troops (taking into account the reserve of the main command, not counting the five German divisions in Finland, as well as the Allied forces) were located in the directions whose boundaries are indicated above (175). In the main direction, in the center of the front, there were 62 divisions and two brigades, or about 43%, in the southern sector of the front - 54 divisions, or up to 36%, and in the northern sector of the front - 31 divisions, or 21% ”(176). Total: 152 German divisions (with five located in Finland).
Finally, the official evidence on this issue is what was said in the book “50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR”: “153 divisions were allocated to attack the Soviet Union, including 33 tank and motorized ones ... ”(177).

And where is the mistake of Soviet military intelligence in determining the Wehrmacht forces on the eve of June 22? Tell everyone that the German general knew worse than you the group of German troops, which differed from our data by 2 or 3 divisions depending on the authors of the study.

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Olgovich

1. I.e. such -NO. Already good.

See the materials of the Grigoriev case, where he confirmed during interrogation that there was a directive.

Quote: Olgovich

Give the Directive of the General Staff, on the basis of which "moved on June 12-13

The troops moved after June 13, and the reason could be a personal order of an NGO or NHS, which was given in Moscow to some military leaders who arrived at the General Staff to coordinate and approve cover plans. This is a common practice, when the administrative order is first enforced, and then follows the directive, which just might have arrived on June 18 and which Grigoryev referred to. What surprises you in this? It seems that you yourself did not even serve in the army headquarters, which is why you have no idea how all this is done, but I have come across this many times and for me there is nothing surprising in this.

Quote: Olgovich

In general, he is right.

Broken bosses are always "right" when they justify their defeat - this is what we went through ...

Quote: Olgovich

Zakharov is a pilot-commander of HELL?

It is strange that you do not know that Zakharov was a NSh OdVO.

He made an outstanding and at that time extremely risky act: drawing a conclusion from the available data on the danger of an enemy attack on the USSR, late in the evening of June 21, 1941, he ordered the district troops to be put on alert, to take up border fortifications and to withdraw troops from their places of permanent deployment, to immediately move aircraft to field airfields (a number of publications indicate that Zakharov persuaded him to give such an order to the district commander I T. Cherevichenko, however Cherevichenko in his memoirs points precisely to Zakharov’s initiative). The outbreak of war confirmed the correctness of this order, and the troops of the district avoided defeat and organizedly entered the battle.

Zakharov’s actions to assess the German attack are completely refuted by the lie of the author of this article that supposedly intelligence did not give data - he understood everything correctly, unlike Pavlov himself.

The actions of the General Staff of General Zakharov confirm the materials of the article, since according to intelligence information against the OdVO and KOVO troops in Romania, in addition to the Romanian forces, there were up to 16-17 German divisions, including 4 motorized and two tank divisions. In the first military reports, intelligence called the number of enemy tanks to 960 in this group, although there were only about sixty of them! How do you like to misinterpret the words of people. Rogue you just

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

In the first military reports, intelligence called the number of enemy tanks to 960 in this group, although there were only about sixty of them!

Teach materiel, layman - the figure 600 just falls under the definition of "up to 960", and even then it is not known how the tanks were counted - with or without ACS, and whether the captured tanks in the German army were taken into account.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Rogue you just

In this case, you are a swindler, Eugene - you are lying and do not blush, although it is so clear that in military affairs you are a complete ignoramus along with your Victoria.

[AsmyppoL]

Like a tree, you will be born a baobab and you will be a baobab for thousands of years ....
The summary clearly states from 900 to 960 tanks ....
Lord, what does 600 have to do with it ??? Well, the expert from the couch ....

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The summary clearly states from 900 to 960 tanks ....

Where is the documentary refutation of the fact that this figure was erroneous at least twice - by 2 or 3 times? Or do you think that if you cut some scraps of cards, you immediately became an expert in exploration? Run the document, verbiage, and not as usual try to evade, posing as a "honest expert".

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: AsmyppoL

I do not blame him. He simply set out his vision of events on the eve of the war before June 22, 1941. What he knew then, he took after the war from the reports of the General Staff of the General Staff. He did not know anything else, even after the war!

The amateur, who is Eugene, does not have the moral right to blame Golikov, if only because he has proved the utmost professional inappropriateness in understanding the actions of military intelligence on the eve of the war. What Golikov stated in his evaluation materials on the eve of the war was 98-99% later confirmed when German troops were finally deployed and attacked the USSR on June 22, and this was confirmed in various documents and memoirs.

Quote: AsmyppoL

At the same time, General Golikov "modestly kept silent" that among the 16 divisions concentrated in Romania, the RC General Staff KA counted five motorized and up to two tank divisions, which actually did not exist. This mobile group will be confirmed by the first wartime reports of RU ...

At the same time, the liar Yevgeny "forgets" that he is speculating on the state of the German group on June 1, and that the swindler does not mention the fact that it has grown significantly over the three weeks of June.

Quote: AsmyppoL

I'm not talking about the understated German group against the forces of PribOVO and ZAPOVO ...

All the lies of this false researcher are based on the fact that the gullible public will not pay attention to the fact that there is constant speculation on the basis of a single report on June 1, 1941, which does not take into account three weeks of June up to 22, when the group of German troops was constantly growing. And not five intelligence reports were prepared by the General Staff for the senior leadership of the country and the army in the West, but fourteen, but our verbiage does not know about it:

I do not understand ... If you get involved in the discussion of adults and men, moreover, you should somehow back up your facts. We are not here gathering women. If you have not mixed up your place ...
You said that pre-war intelligence data confirmed 98%.
We begin the discussion on the points.
Point 1. If the pre-war data is correct, then show the facts that in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja there really was sixteen German divisions, including two tank and four motorized!
A man can answer for his words, but a woman is not! Just as an expert from the couch will be naughty and pile up a bunch of phrases without facts.
I am waiting for facts from you in Romania, if you are, of course, a man

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Point 1. If the pre-war data is correct, then show the facts that in Moldova and Northern Dobroge there were really sixteen German divisions, including two tank and four motorized!

You even managed to lie here, because intelligence report No. 5 indicates SEVEN divisions. But this is not the point, but the fact that you have not submitted a single DOCUMENT refuting these data from the intelligence report. Where are the documents, the racket - when you present them to the deceived readers?

Quote: AsmyppoL

I am waiting for facts from you in Romania, if you are, of course, a man

I, too, am waiting for documents refuting the intelligence report from you - where are they, trepak? Tales that you delved into the German archives I have already heard - come up with something more believable.

[icant007]

And how many German troops were there in Romania?

[AsmyppoL]

It amazes me how the writer Kozinkin and his "military adviser" Milchakov fool their readers.

At forums, Kozinkin regularly advises everyone to read the book of Marshal Zakharov, the former chief of staff of the OdVO. But he cannot answer my questions, since much in his books is a clear linden. If one should believe the book of Marshal Zakharov, then one should also believe in his phrase: "Having received the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense, I was very excited, because the order I gave to withdraw the troops of the district to the cover areas on the state border was in conflict with the instructions received from Moscow ..."

It turns out that Directive No. 1 did not require the withdrawal of troops according to Cover Plans. However, Kozinkin’s books somehow say that Zhukov was in a hurry to withdraw troops according to the Cover Plans and open the red packets. When asked where he came up with this? The answer follows that in books I showed everything like.
So should Zakharov’s memories be believed or not? Or should one believe only when it falls into Kozinkin’s fabrications?

To the question: where does it follow that Zhukov called in the districts with the requirement to open the packages and leave according to the Cover Plans, a reference should be made to the memoirs of Tyulenev (commander of the Moskovsky Military District). To the question, how can one be trusted if he in the same chapter lied about raising 75% of the air defense missile defense units ?! No answer.
Although the commander of the 1st Air Defense Corps, combat magazines of air defense units and units of the Air Defense Forces also refute the words of Tyulenev.

To the question: why does Kozinkin trust the time of the call to Zakharov at 22-00 and does not believe the named time by the commander of the ODVO troops "23-00", which are confirmed by three more memories, Kozinkin avoids answering the question ....

I am ready to discuss many documents with Kozinkin on the facts on the site, and why he escapes from slippery issues. A writer, not a historian, one word ... A mystifier-falsifier of history, however

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

It amazes me how the writer Kozinkin and his "military adviser" Milchakov fool their readers.

Since you're lying with Victoria on this forum about intelligence actions, no one has ever lied like that, not even Rezun.

Quote: AsmyppoL

At forums, Kozinkin regularly advises everyone to read the book of Marshal Zakharov, the former chief of staff of the OdVO.

And at least read Golikov’s memoirs for a start, since they started writing about intelligence. Zakharov’s book must be read so that amateurs like you understand how to act in a critical situation. Well, take into account that Zakharov later, while in the post of the NSS, was subordinate to the GRU of the General Staff, and received a daily report on the entire operational situation in the world, so he understood more about the intelligence than the authors of worthless statues.

Quote: AsmyppoL

It turns out that Directive No. 1 did not require the withdrawal of troops according to Cover Plans.

This is natural - a BATTLE control signal in the form of a short phrase is provided for entering the district PP.

Quote: AsmyppoL

However, Kozinkin’s books somehow say that Zhukov was in a hurry to withdraw troops according to cover plans

This does not mean that the FULL cover plan was introduced in the districts - when building up the operational group by the administrative order, SEPARATE points of the cover plan can be executed. What is incomprehensible to you here, miserable amateur?

Quote: AsmyppoL

So should Zakharov’s memories be believed or not?

First you need to read them and correctly understand, but this is not given to you - you feel a lack of basic knowledge, so hold on tightly to the elephant by the tail, blind man ....

Quote: AsmyppoL

To the question: where does it follow that Zhukov called in the districts with the requirement to open the packages and go out according to cover plans, a link to Tyulenev’s memoirs

Why don't you like Tyulenev’s memories, scribbler?

Quote: AsmyppoL

why does Kozinkin believe the time of the call to Zakharov at 22-00 and does not believe the named time by the commander of the ODVO troops "23-00", which are confirmed by three more memories Kozinkin avoids answering the question ....

And these could be different calls, because at the time, as follows from the memoirs of Zakharov, they were not together. What is incomprehensible here - two calls at different times?

Quote: AsmyppoL

I am ready to discuss many documents with Kozinkin on the facts on the site, and why he escapes from slippery issues.

Let's discuss verbiage, where DOCUMENTS proving that the data for 9 and 17 divisions as of June 1, 1941 were incorrect. Do not run away from a direct answer, and do not make a reference to YOUR miserable calculations, facts to the studio.

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

It turns out that Directive No. 1 did not require the withdrawal of troops according to Cover Plans. However, Kozinkin’s books somehow say that Zhukov was in a hurry to withdraw troops according to the Cover Plans and open the red packets. When asked where he came up with this?

LITTLE a bastard - NOT THIS in MY books)))

THIS and show - the so-called deer 1 DOES NOT REQUIRE to open the packages, which means - to put the PP into operation)) SHE - ONLY TRANSFERRED ALL the troops, the Air Defense Forces and the Navy to FULL bg. y - SO UNDERSTAND IT THOSE WHO TAKE IT)))

The order for PACKAGES came - first verbally at about 2.30 in the district and written - about 4 hours))

ANONYM - you cho a thread about "Malandin's questions" - from August 41st - heard?)) They were just about - HOW AND AT WHAT TIME were the packages opened?)))
“GENERAL MAYOR LYAPIN
COLONEL SANDALOV
GENERAL TO LIEUTENANT KUZNETSOV

In view of the need, I ask you to briefly answer the following questions:
1.when a warning was received from MINSK about an impending attack and the introduction of a “RED PACKAGE”;
2. What orders were made by the headquarters of the army?
3. What units managed to occupy the defense in accordance with the “RED PACKAGE”?
... "")))))

For nerds, I will tell you - in the packages just "" PP "" and lie down))) "Not approved" in the General Staff))) gygygs ..

Quote: AsmyppoL

Should I Believe Zakharov's Memories or Not?

OF COURSE ms)) IT'S THAT I write - MARSHAL Zakharov and others - they wrote the truth)) Unless of course their words are disproved by the docks))) I also fully specify Zakharov's words - I show in my books HOW it really was in HIS district that night)) )) In general, he showed everything for sure))

Quote: AsmyppoL

whence it follows that Zhukov called in the districts with a demand to open the packages and go out according to the Cover Plans; a reference should be made to the memoirs of Tyulenev (commander of the Moskovsky Military District). To the question, how can one be trusted if he in the same chapter lied about raising 75% of the air defense missile defense units ?! No answer.

How can I give an answer? ((BECAUSE YOU STUPIDY HAVE FOUNDED HERE - I DO NOT SHOW SOME OF THESE STEPS in MY books)) from the word sapsem ((

Quote: AsmyppoL

I am ready to discuss many documents with Kozinkin on the facts on the site, and why he escapes from slippery issues. A writer, not a historian, one word ... A mystifier-falsifier of history, however

for starters, stop attributing to me what I am not saying))) yap anonymously)))

[VS]

Quote: e-sam

putting 19 million lives of military personnel (

interesting - stupid people breed budding or pollination? (((

[VS]

Quote: Olgovich

who allegedly made the famous flight along the border and gave packages

what are you raving about - what packages ?? ((

[VS]

Quote: Olgovich

fortunate that the Romanians were advancing. And there were much fewer aircraft than in the West (Pokryshkina cm). Even across the Danube, we crossed ...

intelligence to blame? (((

[VS]

Quote: Olgovich

Crossings through a strategic obstacle are captured by TGLY and WITHOUT resistance.
It is immediately evident that the troops were "ready", "waited" and were "on the alert"

intelligence to blame?)))

and it didn’t come to Bosko that these bridges SPECIALLY DID NOT MINE - because PLANS were on these bridges in the General Staff ((

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: V.S.

lying anonymous - Golikov shows - DATA RU GSH and reality coincided to pieces of German divisions)))

Again, as always deceive users. Tighten your head and show it with facts, based on the report No. 5 in the West and on the Summary of RU GSh KA No. 1 of June 22?

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

We are not here gathering women. E

yes you never know WHICH BABA is hiding behind the clique of an anonymous dog ((((

Here WE are, for example, WE DO NOT conceal YOUR names and if we are mistaken, it’s difficult to know everything)) - then our names are known to everyone, but you, hiding behind the clique, are cowardly and confirm that you are NOT the MAN, but the woman most likely is like that that the gullible people were eating delirium for a year)))

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: V.S.

Quote: AsmyppoL

The indicated documents for ZAPOVO and KOVO only speak of the transfer of the reserves of the districts closer to the border, since armies of the second strategic echelon arrive at their places of deployment. More is not indicated there.

WHERE ARE YOU FINDING - in THESE directives for the withdrawal of troops along the BCP - that in the REGIONS where the troops of the SECOND echelon of the districts and reserves with the MK were stationed, the armies of the RGC from the internal districts should have arrived?))) Do you carry daraguš? (((

At the same time, Pavlov was DIRECTLY pointed out - according to WHAT plan - according to which PP he needs to withdraw those troops)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

In the cover plans, because of this, new locations are indicated when moving front reserves

cho for nonsense? (((WHERE ARE YOU in the PP seen that due to the arrival in the provincial army armies of the RGC or the movement of some front reserves before the war - new locations are indicated ??)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

The fulfillment of the Cover Plans is the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to the troops by these Plans!

and HOW, deriving PP Pavlov, indicated PP not yet approved in Moscow?)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

Kozinkin, in addition to his fantasies, cannot show that units of the 1st or 2nd echelons of cover armies went to positions.

The DZB of divisions that were deduced by software in those days study)))

WHAT other positions have you dragged in here ??))) were taken to the districts along the PP - WITHOUT taking the "positions" themselves, because this was FORBIDDEN by orders specially)))

"" to take up the pre-faction position only if the enemy violates the state border.
Source: https://liewar.ru/tragediya-22-iyunya/200-dokumenty-pervykh-dnej-vojny.html ""))))

you stop YOUR dreams of HOW YOU would like it to be - ONCE AS YOU WANT, Batan did not do the anonymous, that means they did not wait for the attack - project on REALITY))

Quote: AsmyppoL

He cannot produce orders according to which, for example, the 31st, 36th, 37th, 55th rifle corps must prepare defensive lines (PTR) in accordance with the Cover Plans. Without fulfilling the tasks under the Plans, we see only a change in the deployment of front reserve corps

and WHO told you that THESE troops HAD to prepare some sort of defensive lines?))) Did you see this in the KOVO PP or something ?? You will be pleased with the quote - that when they were transferred to the areas prescribed by him for PP, they SHOULD prepare some sort of defensive lines there - can you show that in their RED packets on the seitz account was written down - - when digging out to those areas, dig trenches urgently ?? ((
And - you actually know that they are packages since June 11 - STARTING THE CONCLUSION IN THESE REGIONS DID NOT OPEN ???))

Well, why lie all the time, Kozinkin. For this stupidity you have already been transported by the muzzle on the table))) Ah, a scammer ...
They did not give commands from Moscow to open the red packets. Do not lie! The package opening team was a personal initiative of Army General Pavlov! Chekunov wrote about this on the website of Military Literature.
Come on, show on the facts that the packages were opened on orders from Moscow and in PribOVO, and in KOVO and OdVO))))
Do not give out your version as historical reality. Cutter you are shtatovsky
Come on facts, prove that I'm wrong.
Therefore, smart people did not give in Moscow about the opening of red packets on unapproved plans to cover the people's commissar of defense. Come on the facts, liar)))

[AsmyppoL]

Maybe you will confirm your other lie? On the decision to withdraw divisions under cover plans at a meeting with Stalin on June 9? Let's show your lying face, Olenka.
Only without drooling, but with facts or memories of veterans ....

[VS]

Quote: ccsr

whence it follows that Zhukov called in the districts with a demand to open the packages and go out according to the Cover Plans; a link to Tyulenev’s memoirs follows

Why don't you like Tyulenev’s memories, scribbler?

This ignoramus anonymous came up with some kind of foolishness - in MY books there is nothing about the fact that "" Zhukov called the districts with the demand to open the packages and go out according to the Covering Plans "" and that this "should be a reference to Tyulenev's memories")))))

[AsmyppoL]

So we got to Tyulenev's memoirs, to which you referred in disputes on the Military Literature website. The fact that Zhukov called the districts all night ...

Show that Tyulenev’s memoirs can be trusted! And then Victoria showed on the memoirs and documents of the 1st Air Defense Corps that the MBO commander lied about an order from Stalin personally to withdraw 75% of the air defense assets to positions .... But how can he be believed if he is lying so big? !! And you writer, ten years writing about the pre-war events proved that he should be trusted? So show on the facts that you can ?? !!
Or run away again?

[AsmyppoL]

Forum site "Military literature". How are Kozinkin's versions born?
Sent: 06.04.18/08/20 XNUMX:XNUMX. V.S. (which is Kozinkin): “The operative duty department of the General Staff who was subordinate only to the beginning of the General Staff - Zhukov - called Zakharov at 22 p.m. again - and it was a call clearly ALL - Wait for an important encryption, and Zhukov in THIS time was still in Stalin’s office.
Then he - the operational duty officer - was unlikely to participate in the process with the deer. bn ... "

And you don’t need any facts, just suck a finger ...

V.S. (which is Kozinkin): "15.04.18/09/42 22:XNUMX At XNUMX o'clock the text was already written and agreed with Stalin, and at this time and the easiest way for the tyrant was to give the command = the head of the General Staff -" Give the command to notify the districts - Wait for an important encryption "... Zhukov primitively calls the operative at the General Staff who is only subordinate to him - and he calls the districts - warns that everyone is waiting there ...

Yes, and Stalin could definitely give a command to Zhukov right in his office - CALL unter - warn the district ... Yes, and Zhukov himself already called in the evening - warned of a possible attack - BEFORE I went to the Kremlin ... "

As usual, a version without any facts. Once the version for the next little book is ready .... Money doesn’t smell, the truth, Mr. Kozinkin?

V.S. (which is Kozinkin): “Do not forget - Zhukov was already on his own nerves - he also brought with him a directive to introduce PP at 20.50 ... which he wore on June 12 and tyrant AGAIN braked - "Again you brought it to me" .. damn

15.04.18/19/23 XNUMX:XNUMX Slan writes:"The memoirs can be trusted only in one case: if several of them confirm the information. General Tyulenev ... How can you believe him if one of the key episodes of his memoirs - Stalin's call at noon on June 21 - is fiction?"

V.S. (which is Kozinkin): “WHAT was Tyulenev's call at noon ?? About the fact that Stalin at "noon" on June 21 gave instructions to bring the air defense to an increased bg, informed the party bosses of Moscow about a possible attack, for example, NG Kuznetsov was also confirmed. the same Chadayev "

Slan writes:"In the memoirs of Tyuleny and Chadayev, you can see the lie if you compare their text with actual events and events. He who lied in small matters does not inspire confidence ... Their words against 10 journals of military operations of the formations and units of the Moscow air defense zone do not pull."

And then went fantasy, how to refute 10 magazines and some memories. And again not a single fact ...

V.S. (which is Kozinkin): [i] “So, according to THREE people - Stalin was not in readiness # 2 or in an increased air defense of the Moscow Military District in the afternoon of June 21 and -“ by 75% ”
As for magazines - Stalin MTF to give instructions on increasing b .. g. And then the air defense was limited to only certain measures in view of the fact that the Germans really could not fly to Moscow in those days, and perhaps decided not to pull the air defense so that the Germans did not make noise in the embassy.
T..e - that THREE people wrote about the air defense - that Stalin gave some instructions on them and at the same time formally didn’t bring the air defense No. 2 to air defense on the afternoon of June 21 — it doesn’t contradict each other)))
Those. there is no particular reason to accuse eyewitnesses of some indications of air defense in lies. We don’t know HOW these instructions were implemented? Maybe Stalin after some time gave instructions - do not twitch - do not introduce b.g. formally".

Three eyewitnesses are Tyulenev, who did not follow Stalin’s order and after 21-00 went home to rest. Admiral Kuznetsov, who heard the version of Stalin’s call from Tyulenev. He already forgot about the time and called the time 14-00. The third Chadayev, who calls the close time around 19-00. The truthfulness of Tyulenev’s memoirs is necessary for Kozinkin to add information about Zhukov’s calls to the okrugs, the mention of which is in Tyulenev’s memoirs.
And the question is, how to believe these words, if Tyulenev wrote a lie about Stalin’s call ??

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

“The operative officer of the General Staff who was subordinate only to the beginning of the General Staff — Zhukov — called Zakharov at 22 p.m. yet — and this was clearly a call to EVERYTHING — wait for an important encryption, and Zhukov was still in Stalin’s office at this time.
Then he - the operational duty officer - was unlikely to participate in the process with the deer. bn ... "

And you don’t need any facts, just suck a finger ...

you suck your own one) THE FACT is simple - OPERATING for GSH submits ONLY to the STS General Manager and executes ONLY his PERSONAL orders))) YOU anonymously just can’t tell the operative for GSh to order it to execute)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

At 22 o'clock the text was already written and agreed with Stalin, and at this time and the easiest way for the tyrant was to give the command = to the head of the General Staff - "Give the command to notify the districts - Wait for an important encryption" ... Zhukov primitively calls the operative to the General Staff, which is only subordinate to him - and he calls the districts - warns everyone to wait there ...

Yes, and Stalin could definitely give a command to Zhukov right in his office - CALL a sergeant - warn the district ... And Zhukov himself called in the evening - warned of a possible attack - BEFORE he went to the Kremlin ... "

As usual, a version without any facts. Once the version for the next little book is ready .... Money doesn’t smell, the truth, Mr. Kozinkin?

and you refute my words booby))

But if you envy my fees - take a risk - publish with an anonymous babot for a couple - - YOUR crap about intelligence that it’s to blame for the type of tragedy of the beginning of the Second World War)) HEARED ,,,))) And we will know YOUR ignoramus of the anti-adviser)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

“Do not forget - Zhukov himself was already on the nerve - he brought with him the directive to enter the PP at 20.50 ... which he wore on June 12 and the tyrant stopped again -“ Again you brought it to me ”.. damn

15.04.18/19/23 XNUMX:XNUMX Slan writes

yes to me in FIG cho this anonymous d .. writes))) IT BEEN SHOWED BY Zhukov)) and IMHO d .. anonymous are not interesting to anyone in principle))

Quote: AsmyppoL

how to believe these words, if Tyulenev wrote a lie about Stalin’s call ??

LIES just you in with this anonymous woman spreading - are nonsense that the attack did not expect even in the evening of June 21))) deb .. b ... b)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

reached the memoirs of Tyulenev, to which you referred in the disputes on the site "Military Literature". The fact that Zhukov called the districts all night ...

WHERE I TALKED THAT Zhukov called all night somewhere?)) Well, what do you LIE yap anonymous ((

Quote: AsmyppoL

Show that Tyulenev’s memoirs can be trusted!

Prove that he is lying - that he was EVENING, BEFORE Zhukov went to Stalin, he said Tyulenev called Zhukov in the okrug and notified everyone about the attack?))

Quote: AsmyppoL

Victoria showed on the memoirs and documents of the 1st Air Defense Corps that the MBO commander lied about an order personally from Stalin to withdraw 75% of the air defense assets to positions ....

NOT FOLLOWING THE ORDER IMMEDIATELY DOES NOT CONFIRM AND DO NOT REFUTE that the order was given by Stalin)) All the more, if then Stalin could allow Tyulenev not to drive the horses)) so that YOUR anonymous lady did not refute ANYTHING)) from the word sapsem ((We will assume that she EXPRESSED the facts ))) but you continue to write further on intelligence)))

just remember the ignoramus - NOT EXPLORATION is guilty of the tragedy of the outbreak of war and the General Plans ..
so all your chatter with these anonymous libels is about how the Germans changed the donuts and our intelligence "outplayed" ANYONE and will not need FUCK in the end))) put it somewhere far away and forget - you DIDN'T OPEN America from the word support) )

The fact that intelligence IS NOT AT ALL HUNDREDS was able to get the Germans so this NOBODY AND NEVER hid))

REMEMBER - THE GERMANS generally set up with our troops to the fullest - THEY had no idea either in terms of number or composition of the Red Army in the western districts - what they were waiting for THEY JUST UNKNOWN - they worked much worse than ours)))

Remember the ignoramus - the reason for the defeats in the GS plans was originally laid down))

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: V.S.

The order for PACKAGES came - first orally at about 2.30 in the district and a written one - about 4 hours

Facts, let’s say that it was in other districts. Without facts and memories, it's just your attempt to fake our story!

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

show that you deserve to speak the same professional language with your husbands

1st - you are definitely not a man but a woman - if you hide behind a clique))
2nd - what kind of professional you are, you showed quite -z on echelons and PP bubbles let loose and not drool)) so go where you go with the second "analysis" about intelligence)) GOLIKOV'S MEMOIRS read))) analyzer)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The order for PACKAGES came - first orally at about 2.30 in the district and a written one - about 4 hours


Facts, let’s say that it was in other districts. Without facts and memories, it's just your attempt to fake our story!

and I’m showing an ignoramus - in Pribovo THIS DID NOT DO THAT that night - KLENOV was Shot IN total was)))

HOW it was in KOVO - showed Purkaev - Kirpanos received orders from the General Staff did NOT DO ANYTHING but stupid not for a decent cattle)))
Well, HOW it was in OdVO - showed Zakharov and his divisional officers))) READ BOB anonymous answers and the book of the Marshal - CLASSIFIED at one time - HOW IT happened to them that night))))))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Without facts and memories, it's just your attempt to fake our story!

here and STUDY THE FACTS and memories of the OCEANID - you are our cowardly and anonymous history of WWII)))

I’m just about FACTS OF DOCKS AND MEMORIES, and I refer in MY books that I SIGN BY MY Surname not hiding like YOU or this d ... anonymous - for a dog click.))

Well, you still have to come up with such a crap for yourself with a nickname - Asmippol !!!))) subscribe better like this - "d..lb ... t)) this is more suitable for falsifiers like you))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Lying? On the decision to withdraw divisions under cover plans at a meeting with Stalin on June 9?

Do you want to say that TENS sd, MK and other troops began to be withdrawn from the AFTER June 9, contrary to Stalin ??)))

but don’t worry - you’re not alone in a search for intelligence - making her guilty of the tragedy of the outbreak of war))
There is one like A. Isaev)) He also ravings that the “Main reason” for our defeats at the beginning of the war “was that intelligence did not reveal the enemy’s plans and missed the pace of his concentration”!

Read the anonymous work “1941 - Lessons and Conclusions”, where these reasons are discussed in detail for IDIOTS and EXPLORATION there is basically not indicated AS THE REASON for our defeats! And even more so, as the main one! Indeed, the main reason for our defeats was the fact that our military, with whom Stalin really created all the possible conditions for meeting the enemy and the war, were still able to manage - with their pre-war plans! And the real MILITARY historians in the same IVI, and even more so the officers of the VNU General Staff, those who wrote the work “1941 - Lessons and Conclusions”, call the bad work of intelligence the main reason for our defeats, namely, the PRELIMINARY plans of our NGOs and the General Staff .. .
Our intelligence, in principle, gave the military everything that was needed - the total number of German divisions, the composition of the Wehrmacht, and WHERE would be the main blow of the Germans. And also gave WHEN there will be an attack by Germany)))
Compared to German, which, in principle, did not really know anything about what forces of the Red Army are waiting for the Wehrmacht on our side, ours worked for 4 with a plus, or even five with a minus!
But, alas, the main reason for our defeats was not in intelligence - as if Isaev and his fans, and similar anonymous supporters, did not zealously affirm this! The main reason for the tragedy of June 22 was precisely the pre-war plans of our General Staff ...

[VS]

Quote: Olgovich

You still stubbornly refuse to submit "directives" to bring all the troops of the districts on alert on June 11-12 ..

but how to imagine them if they are not declassified yet)))

[VS]

Quote: Olgovich

The stupid policies of the country's leadership are the main causes of the disaster.
Everything Else - Details

do not be that guide you wouldn’t fart right now)))

Anti-Stalinist is either ilyot or ram))

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

According to the RM, which is confirmed by the situation on 21.6.41 on the maps of the headquarters of PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO, a significant part of the German troops is not located near the border.

I checked all the cards of this false researcher and it turned out that he himself had cooked them from administrative cards and maps from the atlas for schoolchildren, pasted on them the data taken from nowhere, and required them to be considered genuine documents. I bring their originals, which he took not in the archives, but from the network:
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/C_Zr5ngXoAEDLup.jpg:large
https://cs4.pikabu.ru/post_img/big/2014/04/10/8/1397127853_1828907392.jpg

Regarding the only link to the site

https://mil.ru/files/files/camo/gallery_2.html

where did the card crop come from, then the entrance to it is blocked:

Unable to establish a secure connection
Attackers may try to steal your data from mil.ru (for example, passwords, messages or bank card numbers). More details
net :: ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID

As for the German military maps, there are no links to them at all, and the fact that the date is dated 27.5.1941 on one map trimming only indicates that it is impossible to evaluate the German group on June 22, because after that the Wehrmacht troops were building up .
To show what the real General Staff maps look like, the easiest way is to turn to a recent study on the construction of the third line of SDs, where everything is detailed, there are dates and signatures of the maps. You can immediately understand from it that Rezun is lying, because only a sick person can develop the third line of SD and at the same time plan an attack on Germany.

The author of the study writes:

on the map itself, the date of its compilation was found - May 17, 1941, and at the top, where Tymoshenko's signature should have been, it was "" May 1941. At the bottom there is a place for Zhukov's signature, but it is also not there, but the signature of the head of the department of fortified areas of the spacecraft, General Major Shiryaev is available.
A chain of 4 URs stretched exactly along the line of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky defensive line. The fact is that until now it was believed that this line began to be built (and designed) only after the start of the Great Patriotic War, and here is a ready-made map with the location of the SDs, their defense nodes and strong points. In the lower right corner is a plate with a layout according to how many and what structures should be built and how much it will cost. Judging by the table, the first phase of construction was to be completed by June 1, 1942, an intermediate stage by January 1, 1942.

http://www.great-country.ru/rubrika_myths/vov/00025.html
Compared with genuine scholars who work with historical documents, the false researcher Eugene palms readers only cheap fakes of documents, and even interprets them in a distorted way so that any competent person understands his heinous goals of discrediting military intelligence, and on the eve of 75 Victory Day it looks like a big nasty thing.

[cavl]

Insanity grew stronger and shiz mowed down the ranks of the enemy ...

Steamer "Ivan Kruglov", did you mean the maps with the designations of the headquarters of the armies and tank groups?

Or maps from the site "Memory of the People", to which links were given long ago at my request ?? Something I do not believe that the ship reached them

Or have you already found the ZAPOVO card, which is officially posted on the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation?

Or did you get to the Wehrmacht maps?

I will explain for a first grader. Eugene proved that the data for the division, regiments, corps, armies and front, which is reflected in the tables for Summary N5, practically coincided with the available data as of June 21. These data are reflected on maps of three districts and in the Summary No. 1 of June 22. To understand this, you should carefully read the text of the previous cycle ...

You were not taught at the school and in the service to briefly, clearly convey your thoughts ?!

Schoolboy, damn it, go to school, do not go into the conversation of elders if there is nothing in your head !!

[cavl]

And the links are all singed. That’s because a first-grader boy .... He can’t do anything

Here are the maps to which Eugene gave me the link even under Tsar Gorokh.

They are described in detail by the Author in parts on the intelligence of Pribovo and KOVO.
Below is a map from the site of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. HER The author cited in part on intelligence ZAPOVO

I also found a set of Wehrmacht maps. The link was also given by the Author.
One of the cards

Schoolboy, go to school !!!

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

I will explain for a first grader. Eugene proved that the data for the division, regiments, corps, armies and front, which is reflected in the tables for Summary N5, practically coincided with the available data as of June 21.

It’s a lie, because he didn’t see the report on June 21 of the General Staff and all previous ones, and besides, he didn’t present a map of the intelligence chief of ZapOVO, KOVO where it would be possible to clearly determine what the intelligence had revealed on June 21. I’m not even talking about the map of the head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff - nobody saw it at all, although it is in the archives. So you both could see verbiage?

Quote: cavl

These data are reflected on maps of three districts.

In the district, the situation is marked on the cards for all the heads of departments and services, and almost all officers have the same cards. Only not everything can be reflected on them, because only the intelligence chief has full intelligence data, which he passes to the chief of the operational department after presenting them to the chief of staff, and that’s all. All other cards that are maintained in the district may not have a detailed situation, because it is strictly forbidden for anyone to familiarize themselves with all the information available in the district intelligence department. Teach materiel, balabol.
So you can whistle as much as you like with Eugene, but until he presents whose card he shows and who signed it, it is useless to talk to both of you - you are just wobbly, who have no basic ideas about intelligence.

Quote: cavl

Or maps from the site "Memory of the People", to which links were given long ago at my request?

And why are you afraid of presenting them here, or placing at least a link? I asked repeatedly - give a link, but none of you gives them.

Here are the maps to which Eugene gave me the link even under Tsar Gorokh.

Whose nerd can they have painted after the war, or before the war for training? Can you answer who worked with them, and why there is not a single signature?

They were described in detail by the Author in parts on intelligence of Pribovo and KOVO ..... ITS The author cited in parts on intelligence of ZAPOVO

Once again I ask you amateur - whose are they and when are they composed? By the way, according to ZAPOVO, in general, some kind of muddy picture with text is unclear to anyone - and should I believe in this nonsense?

I also found a set of Wehrmacht maps. The link was also given by the Author.
One of the cards

This is an April card, an amateur - can it be enough for readers to powder their brains when it comes to June 22?

[cavl]

As usual, Mr. Milchakov is cheating. This is a man by nature. For example, when he found the blanks on which Evgeny put for clarity the locations of the movement of the headquarters of field armies and tank groups, he "made a discovery" for himself that the blanks were not taken from the archives ... Although it was clear to any smart reader from the computer font from the first look. It was a discovery for him. At the same time, he managed to get out and to some fired site ... Below are his verbal outpourings.

[quote = ccsr]
I checked all the cards of this false researcher and it turned out that he himself had cooked them from administrative cards and maps from the atlas for schoolchildren, pasted on them the data taken from nowhere, and required them to be considered genuine documents. I bring their originals, which he took not in the archives, but from the network:
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/C_Zr5ngXoAEDLup.jpg:large
https://cs4.pikabu.ru/post_img/big/2014/04/10/8/1397127853_1828907392.jpg
Regarding the only link to the site
https://mil.ru/files/files/camo/gallery_2.html[/quote]
where did the card crop come from, then the entrance to it is blocked:
Unable to establish a secure connection
Attackers may try to steal your data from mil.ru (for example, passwords, messages or bank card numbers). More details
net :: ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID[/ Quote]

At the same time, the article used the map of the headquarters of the North-Western Front with the situation on June 21, 1941, the KOVO map with the situation on June 19-23, 1941. Both maps are listed on the Memory of the People website.
Fragments of the map of the Western Special Military District with the plotted situation for June 21, 1941, which are officially presented on the website "Electronic Exhibitions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation", were used. Fragments of the Wehrmacht map were used. I have cited them as the falsity of Milchakov's statement.
Only instead of the German map with the decor used in the article on 27.5.41, did I bring the April map.

And below Milchakoy raised a howl that I must provide him with all the links .. I owe nothing to the liar provocateur Milchakov and the support group for him and Kozinkin, which consists of three or four people. At the same time, two of them have second or third accounts on our website. They famously move from one account to another, and then back after 1-3 minutes. JULIET ONE WORD ...
Links to county maps were given in the comments of one of the intelligence units. You have to search, there is no desire or mind - do not search. I am completely not interested in your provocative actions .......

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

he "made a discovery" for himself that the blanks were not taken from the archives ... Although it was clear to any smart reader from a computer font at first glance.

Those. You acknowledge that the author did not see any historical documents, did not make any scans, but took and drew maps, which everyone should consider "intelligence data for June 22". Since everything is clear to you at first glance, why do you believe the author's lies that he worked with archives?

Quote: cavl

At the same time, the article used the map of the headquarters of the North-Western Front with the situation on June 21, 1941, the KOVO map with the situation on June 19-23, 1941. Both maps are listed on the Memory of the People website.

As you expected, you yourself have not even seen them in your eyes, but you are ready to believe in any nonsense that this false researcher writes here. The site "Memory of the People" contains ONE map of KOVO:

The working map of the operations department of the KOVO headquarters from June 20 to 22, 1941 (Working map of Major Lyamin)
Describes the period from 20.06.1941/22.06.1941/XNUMX to XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX
Cards. Document No .: 56, Date of creation of the document: 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX
Archive: TsAMO, Fund: 229, Listing: 161, Case: 186
Authors of the document: SWF (I)

Firstly, Major Lyamin is not the chief of the operational department at all, secondly, this is not the chief of the intelligence department, thirdly the map is not signed and approved, and fourthly this is not a document of the level of the chief of staff of the district to conclude from it what intelligence had known the day before war.
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=100926403&backurl=q%5C%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%82%D0%B0%20%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%2022%20%D0%B8%D1%8E%D0%BD%D1%8F::use_main_string%5Ctrue::group%5Call::types%5Copersvodki:rasporyajeniya:otcheti:peregovori:jbd:direktivi:prikazi:posnatovleniya:dokladi:raporti:doneseniya:svedeniya:plani:plani_operaciy:karti:shemi:spravki:drugie
So let’s do something more serious from the documents, verbiage, because I understand what fraudulent methods you use so that readers believe in the nonsense that Evgeny is here about intelligence.

Quote: cavl

. Used fragments of the Wehrmacht map. I cited them as a falsity of Milchakov's statement.

Stop dodging - give a link to the Wehrmacht map, otherwise it may turn out to be the same document as the working map of Major Lyamin, from some rear structure, and not from the operational one.

Quote: cavl

And below Milchakoy raised a howl that I must provide him with all the links ..

I gave you, verbiage, a link to a map that turned out to be not the same intelligence document that the author lied about and you along with him.

Quote: cavl

At the same time, two of them have second or third accounts on our website.

You're lying, scoundrel - I do not have any second account, so do not confuse me with your hackers.

Quote: cavl

Links to county maps were given in the comments of one of the intelligence units.

Everything turned out to be a vile provocation - no intelligence cards were presented, and those that were presented did not even belong to the chiefs of intelligence divisions of the district headquarters.

[cavl]

Schoolboy, would go to school ...
What to talk about, even if you UNDERSTAND WHAT IS WRITTEN, the mind of a first grader is not able to ... And even with a boorish attitude towards elders!

Read, in syllables, the first-grader the text that you cite: "Links to district maps were given in the comments of one of the parts on intelligence."

Where is it written that the cards presented belonged to the chiefs of intelligence departments of the district’s headquarters ???


WHERE, LIQUE OF MILCHAKOV, THIS TEXT IN THE ARTICLE ??? Give me a quote. Here, the crook, blatantly lying in the eye. Just a couple of lies in the books that Kozinkin writes under the delirium of his military adviser

Even the mind map is not enough to find, if in the corresponding parts the details of the cards are given .....

Go to school student !!

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

"Links to the maps of the districts were given in the comments of one of the parts on exploration."
Where is it written that the cards presented belonged to the chiefs of intelligence departments of the district’s headquarters ???

Since our pitiful liar began to dodge, he will have to explain that, first of all, the concept of "links are given" does not indicate where and what they are given, so one should not consider everyone here naive. Secondly, since you are so famously referring to them, what prevents you from repeating them again for your argumentation?
And thirdly, if the cards do not belong to the head of the intelligence department, then what right do you have to scream here with Eugene, what do you know about the exact deployment of the enemy troops if you have not yet submitted the MAIN DOCUMENT of the district level?

Quote: cavl

Even the mind map is not enough to find, if in the corresponding parts the details of the cards are given .....

Well, if you’ve got a mind in your ward, then why are you wagging the loin, and still haven’t posted a single link to intelligence materials at least at the district level, and whistle that

"Links to the maps of the districts were given in the comments of one of the parts on exploration."

After that, listening to your lamentations becomes funny:

Quote: cavl

And that even with a boorish attitude towards the elders!

Firstly, you are not the eldest, and secondly, you are just a fraudster on trust, like the local author of articles about what he has wild ideas about.

[icant007]

The author claims the opposite: there was little information about the presence of large headquarters in the Republic of Moldova due to the fact that the German command did not seek to disclose their presence to our intelligence, in contrast to the infantry divisions. Consider a few RM about the troops of the allies of Germany.

The author claims, and at the same time gives three summaries, which state the opposite.


1. Summary No. 4 RU. As far as I understand, it is not fully published. And in the form as it is on the Internet, does not contain a mention of the headquarters. Which is quite obvious, since it is a generalizing document, and is submitted to the top leadership and sent to the troops.

Unlike the fourth, in summary No. 5 dated 01.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX there is a mention of the headquarters, but only of the Bulgarian army. I dare to suggest that this is done to show that the general structure of the Bulgarian ground forces has not changed. The increase was only due to the deployment of wartime states by mobilization. As confirmation of this thesis, headquarters information is also provided.

Well, again, summary No. 5 is also not fully published.

Here is a summary of June 22, according to the Ministry of Defense, given in its entirety, but there is no mention of headquarters in it either.

2. A summary of the intelligence department of the KOVO headquarters already has a different level of detail, it is more detailed at the district level. Therefore, headquarters data is provided.


3. Well, the message of the agent of Mars dated 15.06.41 is not at all that.

Here is what the author

Special message ("Mars" 15.6.41):

On the Bulgarian-Turkish border are concentrated 3 and 4 Bulgarian armies (five infantry and one cavalry division). Headquarters 3 armies - Mikhailova ... 4 armies - Simeonovgrad ...

Here is the real
https://alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1002148

Document No. 7.105
Message "Mars" from Budapest on the completion of the strategic deployment of German troops against the USSR and others.
15.06.1941

Head of Intelligence
The General Staff of the Red Army
Slovak said:
1. In addition to the five German divisions that were transferred 3 weeks ago from the Presov region to Poland, since June 9, 4 new divisions appeared in the Presov-Vranov region, 2 of them are motorized divisions.
2. By June 15, the Germans will finish the strategic deployment against the USSR. It is possible that they will not oppose the USSR now, but they are preparing for it, and the officers openly speak.
3. From June 15, up to 36 years in air defense are called up in Slovakia for the protection of state and military installations1.
Mobilization in Romania continues. The population has been warned that it should be ready for lengthy bombing.
There are notes: “Inf. / HO-2. To talk. Golikov. " “N-2 and 4. Report on the map. Kuznetsov. June 16.06.41, XNUMX. "
TSA MO RF. F. 23. Op. 24119. D. 4. L. 7497. Copy.

As you can see about Bulgaria, nothing here.

According to the third paragraph, either FORGERY, or you want to believe that the author’s mistake.

[cavl]

Quote: icant007

Here is a summary of June 22, according to the Ministry of Defense, given in its entirety, but there is no mention of headquarters in it either.

And you FALSE not doing ??
But what about sheet 9A attached to the intelligence report on the website of the RF Ministry of Defense ??
Again accidentally did not notice? And by chance it is on this sheet that it refers to numbered armies, which also coincidentally coincide with the army numbers from the appendix to the report dated 15. Armies without numbers in the intelligence department decided not to bring in order not to fall under the hot hand .......
This sheet shows that they would bring everything that was available, but the data were too unreliable .....
As Eugene correctly noted, they even included misinformation about the presence of two selected armored divisions of the SS, which the intelligence department considered unverified information

[icant007]

Quote: cavl

Armies without numbers in the intelligence department decided not to bring, so as not to fall under the hot hand .......

This is your assumption, built apparently on its own dishonesty. Apparently you are so used to working)

About the headquarters of the army, I mean about their deployment. This information is not available in the bulletins.

As for the report dated June 01.06, it is dated June 15.06, the report is available to me only from the Yakovlev Fund, which is cut down.

If you have another source, you can poke my nose. I’ll look with pleasure. I am not proud.

I always admit my mistakes, and I don’t intentionally make them.

Well, according to the summary of comrade "Mars" you have nothing to say?

[cavl]

About the headquarters of the army, I mean about their deployment. This information is not available in the bulletins.

Those. You were poked with your nose into your incorrect wording and you came up with the answer: why are you not to blame

Do you also find fault with the words of Eugene? What about the 11th Panzer Division in Romania? He at least explained why it was written, but you hid behind the phrase I meant.

But you declare with aplomb: "I always admit my mistakes, and deliberately don't make them."
Eugene answered two of your questions, which I think are right. But your mistake is similar to intentional ..............

By the way, on the 46th frig, Eugene gave an exhaustive answer. He even indicated the place of its deployment according to a German source. But then there was a thoughtful discussion about the location on the border ... By the way, did you find a lake? It is not near the border. And of course, our inspector did not say a word about the correctness of Evgeny's answer.

As for Mars, the question is not for me.

Regarding the link - you are not proud, but also inattentive ... Or specially inattentive?
In discussions, Eugene put links to tables from the Intelligence Agency Summary dated 15.6.41. You watched them.
Well, I’ll put it specially for an inattentive user. There are six scans in the comments.
https://topwar.ru/163924-razvedka-o-nemeckih-divizijah-v-aprele-ijune-1941-goda.html#comment-id-9792516

So why is the June 28 Intelligence Agency report describing the German armies and corps?

[icant007]

In addition, the number of headquarters in the application alone does not mean anything.

Using the principle of the triad, we can assume that every three divisions is a corps, 2-3 corps is an army, 2-3 armies are a group, according to our front.

[cavl]

Those. Are you making up how Kozinkin is? Can you bring something from memoirs or a document of the General Staff?

[icant007]

Making up what?

About the principle of the triad? or about the fact that the mere presence of headquarters does not mean anything?

The headquarters of an army, corps, or army group is of course important to know.


But the staff do not go on the attack, their task is to control the troops.

Violation of the headquarters will allow for some time to disorganize the control of enemy troops. This is especially important when we advance.

Revealing the location of the headquarters is always more difficult than the station of the infantry division. And this is understandable, I think no need to explain.

Ideally, it would be nice to know about enemy headquarters. But excessively chasing this information makes no sense. Headquarters is a very mobile group, especially among Germans with their level of radio communications.

[cavl]

or about the fact that the mere presence of headquarters does not mean anything?

You tell this to Golikov, who on 3.06.41 requested the NKGB to assist in clarifying the locations of the Army Groups, Armies and Corps

[cavl]

So any regards from the classics that they were not interested in the presence of army headquarters and corps? I would not want to believe a person who is ready to go not a provocation .....

[icant007]

He requested, and did the right thing. Normal working procedure.

And I do not dispute the importance of headquarters information. I’m talking about why they are not in the final reports of RU.

Golikov himself admitted that they were able to determine the location of the headquarters of 7 armies, 22 corps and 75 divisions.

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

The headquarters of an army, corps, or army group is of course important to know.
But the staff do not go on the attack, their task is to control the troops.

Quite right, from the point of view of combat power, the headquarters is only a burden, because it is necessary to allocate company battalions and even regiments for their protection (depending on the level), not counting the air defense and aviation forces covering the deployment area, and all this is not used in battles on front lines.

Quote: icant007

Violation of the headquarters will allow for some time to disorganize the control of enemy troops. This is especially important when we advance.

This is not entirely true, because at least two positions of the command post of any headquarters of the compound and above are always provided for - the main command post, the spare command post, and usually the rear command post, and often also an advanced command post for the commander. Forces between the main gearbox and the spare gearbox are distributed so that the deputy gearbox is usually located on the spare gearbox. the commander and deputies of the heads of departments and services, so that in the event of the destruction of the main CP or during its movement, to take over all command and control of the troops. So by and large, with the proper organization of the work of any headquarters of a unit or association, there will be no loss of command and control. This is in theory, but in practice, of course, control losses occur and often due to planning errors in communication systems or other organizational errors.

Quote: icant007

Revealing the location of the headquarters is always more difficult than the station of the infantry division. And this is understandable, I think no need to explain.

This is so, given that it cannot be visually determined by typical engineering structures, or by gunshots. But on the other hand, the work of the radio station of a large headquarters on load, especially at the time of the offensive, is always a unmasking sign. So any commander faces a sometimes difficult task - to call the aircraft to destroy the enemy who has broken through or to demand the search and destruction of the headquarters that manages the broken through. I think in 90% of cases, any commander will demand the destruction of enemy combat units.

Quote: icant007

Ideally, it would be nice to know about enemy headquarters. But excessively chasing this information makes no sense.

It is absolutely true, especially taking into account the fact that the combat power of any army is determined by the number of divisions and their staffing. And how many control links there will be for one or another division does not play any role - for example, in the district some divisions were subordinate to the command of the corps, which accordingly was part of the army, and the army was controlled by the district commander. And at the same time there were divisions that were in the reserve headquarters of the district and were directly subordinate only to the command of the district, and for them had their own tasks in terms of cover.

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

But what about sheet 9A attached to the intelligence report on the website of the RF Ministry of Defense ??

You're lying, miserable verbiage:
-list 9 does not apply to intelligence, because firstly it is not indicated that this appendix to the summary;
- secondly, the map is always attached to the report when reporting, and not the military personnel;
- thirdly, the data of the summary itself does not coincide with the data of the table, and this already speaks about everything.
-fourth, the table is not signed by anyone, because it is an internal document that is maintained in the information department, and is not an appendix to the generalized summary of RU, which is prepared under the leadership of the operational duty intelligence department.
fifthly, the document does not have details that would be mandatory if it were attached to the intelligence report;
sixth, the field "for filing" and form No. 10 on the title page indicates that this document is drawn up on the basis of documents from the timetable of urgent reports, and not on the basis of the daily report of the General Staff of the General Staff.
Well and most importantly, in the document itself on the first page there is a link to the intelligence report of June 20, which completely refutes the lies of the author of the articles that the last document of the General Staff was intelligence No. 5 of June 15, 1941.

Quote: cavl

Again, accidentally did not notice?

You would have learned to understand the pitiful verbiage in documents before blaming others for allegedly not having noticed something - sheet 9 is not an appendix to the intelligence report, layman.

Quote: cavl

This sheet shows that they would bring everything that was available, but the data were too unreliable .....

This sheet has nothing to do with intelligence reports at all - learn the materiel, the kettle and learn to understand military documents before you say anything.

[icant007]

Bravo! Keep it up!

Not one step back!

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

Bravo! Keep it up!

Not one step back!

These crooks have already got them with their lies, and this "strategist" of the eights is apparently still that special, even if he does not even know the elementary issues of drawing up staff documents - he apparently never developed operational documents, so who and how in the district and the General Staff draws up documents intelligence.

[icant007]

Quote: cavl

As Eugene correctly noted, they even included misinformation about the presence of two selected armored divisions of the SS, which the intelligence department considered unverified information

Who counted and where is it written?

[cavl]

You didn’t even read the intelligence of the intelligence department for June 22? How did that happen?

[icant007]

I’ll reformulate it especially for you) If you like verbiage to do it.

It looks like you served as a political worker in the encryption service)

Who considered desa information about 2 SS divisions in East Prussia?

[cavl]

It looks like you have trouble with your head? Yes? It’s not hard for me to answer. But how do you check the data, Mr. Checker, if you have not read about this in the article ?? If you didn’t look at the district’s intelligence data and two intelligence reports?
Reconnaissance of the General Staff of the Red Army and the Reconnaissance Headquarters of the headquarters of the Western Military District.
If you are trying to speak on an equal footing, you should first familiarize yourself with the materials, and then write and criticize about something ....

[cavl]

or after rechecking, can you bring two numbers of SS tank divisions?

[cavl]

I will not write myself, but will propose to get acquainted with the materials of the article:

"consider the RM on the appearance of two armored divisions in more detail. The first mention of these divisions appears in the intelligence report of Arnold on 30.5.41.
Special communication in the intelligence department of the headquarters of ZAPOVO:
On the basis of information obtained from two sources: 1) an employee of the county government (landrat) in Mlawa, who is constantly in the midst of the German military; 2) former officer The Polish army, having relations with the Germans, the Germans concentrated in the vicinity of Suwalki 2 selected armored divisions of SS units, which should strike at Kovno, Vilnius and Grodno, as well as 2 armored divisions of the same units in the vicinity of Przemysl, and their direction to Lviv, Kiev ...

None of the reconnaissance personnel and equipment of these divisions saw and no other sources confirmed the presence of SS divisions in the specified area before the outbreak of war. In fact, the report only speaks of rumors. At present, we know that there were no SS tank divisions in Germany before the war, much less “selective armored divisions from SS units”.

In the area of ​​Przemysl also there were neither SS divisions nor tank divisions. The information in the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft could only say: “This is misinformation!” The information from the above special message was included in the Summary of the intelligence department of the ZapOVO headquarters from 4.6.41 (registered and sent out on June 6):
... Based on a number of verified intelligence data, the military training of Germany against the USSR in recent years, especially since May 25, has been carried out more intensively and is characterized by the following data: During the second half of May, the Germans increased their group of forces by 2-3 infantry, two armored divisions " SS ”, mainly in the area of ​​Ostroleka, Prasnysh, Mlava, Tsekhanov. SS divisions - in Suwalki (data require verification) ...

The report was also sent to the General Staff Intelligence Directorate and information on SS armored divisions ended up in Intelligence No. 5 (released June 15): “In the Suwalki area allegedly two SS armored divisions (data require verification) ... ”However, in the summary the indicated divisions were not included in the total number of enemy units concentrated against the ZAPOV. The information was not verified and could be misinformation ...

A report from ZAPOVO dated June 4 and a report from Intelligence Directorate dated June 15 were also received at the headquarters of PribOVO. However, in the intelligence report of the headquarters of PribOVO dated June 18, there is no mention of these SS armored divisions. The summary refers only to the only tank division that has long been featured against the district troops - the 20th Armored Division: On 17.6.41 against PribOVO in the strip: on the left - Suwalki, Likk, Allenstein and in depth - Koenigsberg, Allenstein established: headquarters armies - 2, headquarters of army corps - 6, infantry divisions - 12, motorized divisions - 5, armored divisions - 1, tank regiments - 5 and up to nine separate tank battalions - no less than a tank division ...

They did not find in the intelligence department of the headquarters of PribOVO and in the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff information about the arrival of two SS tank divisions plausible. No new information was received about the arrival of these divisions until the outbreak of war. On June 21, information on armored divisions is no longer included in the prepared summary of the reconnaissance department of the ZapOVO headquarters “On the Grouping of German Forces in 20.6.41,” since this information could not be confirmed or disproved.

In the evening of June 21, a new report on the grouping of German troops is being prepared at the ZapOVO headquarters headquarters on 21.6.41. Since ZAPOVO intelligence detected a massive movement of German troops to the border on June 21, and in the evening found them returning to their original positions at the border, then the reconnaissance report for reinsurance noted the presence of SS divisions: ... presumably two SS divisions ...

In Moscow, this information, which did not state anything new, became a lifesaver. In June 22 Intelligence, they tried to somehow explain the unexpected appearance of armored divisions on all fronts. Therefore, the phrase appeared in Intelligence No. 1:
The general increase in the density of direct concentration of German troops in front of the front is emphasized. Specifically, additional data for June 20 and 21 established: a) the strengthening of the Suvalka group into two SS tank divisions ...
As shown above, these divisions did not exist on the Suwalki ledge ... "

[icant007]

If you like about the SS, then there were no SS tank divisions.

But there were two SS divisions. And if you don’t know, they don’t have numbers.

[icant007]

And by the way, is this something new? From the unpublished? )

Maybe it was somewhere in the early articles. I won’t mention everything.

Eugene is a good writer, he produces a lot of waste paper)

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

The general increase in the density of direct concentration of German troops in front of the front is emphasized. Specifically, additional data for June 20 and 21 established: a) the strengthening of the Suvalka group into two SS tank divisions ...

You are lying a miserable verbiage, if only because on June 22 the war was already on, and in the RU report it is literally written that

" New to the troops in this direction is the approach to the Suwalki area during 21.6 ONE-TWO tank divisions "SS" with a total strength of up to 500 tanks "

Moreover, the word "CC" is underlined in red pencil, which means doubt about this information. So there could be no "additional given on the 20th, and the fact that the appearance of these tank divisions was noted only on June 21 indicates that, even at the beginning of the war, they were not noted at all in this area, but on the contrary doubted their existence and demanded additional reconnaissance. Therefore, speculating on this the way different amateurs do it is simply ridiculous - on June 22 the war began and there was simply no time to double-check the information about these tank divisions and their SS affiliation.

[icant007]

My dear, you are trying to take me away with your SS divisions.
I started the conversation with a discussion about the headquarters.

You did not find what to answer, switched me to the SS division.

[icant007]

Quote: cavl

By the way, on the 46th frig, Eugene gave an exhaustive answer. He even indicated the place of its deployment according to a German source. But then there was a thoughtful discussion about the location on the border ... By the way, did you find a lake? It is not near the border. And of course, our inspector did not say a word about the correctness of Evgeny's answer.

I found a lake) And it was about 73 divisions.

I expressed assumption, which Eugene responded very rudely. I decided not to slide down to his level and did not answer.

I note that the whole series of articles by Eugene is built on assumptions and reasoning.

[cavl]

I note that the whole series of articles by Eugene is based on assumptions and reasoning.

It is you who are deliberately deceiving. Consciously. Eugene’s article examined about one and a half hundred divisions, dozens of corps. Armies and army groups, tank groups. All according to the documents. In the first parts there were no links to the German site, but now anyone can check the presence of German divisions on the border. But you have only one reasoning and assumptions: who and where could be seen if there were no divisions on the border. and where the divisions could be located if Eugene is not right. So where are the facts?

As for the 73rd front, I was wrong.

So, let's get back to the armies. We settled on sheet 9A.
And no matter how much Milchakov yelled, this sheet is officially attached to the report of the RF Ministry of Defense. To refute that he does not belong to her can only be another document or memories. Otherwise, these are just words of people far from military affairs.
On sheet 9a are six numbers of enemy armies. So army numbers are still needed at headquarters ...

Did I understand your position correctly that the General Staff and the headquarters of the border districts did not need to know about the presence, numbers of armies and corps, the locations of these headquarters and headquarters of the districts (fronts)? If confirmation of your point of view?

[icant007]

Quote: cavl

Did I understand your position correctly that the General Staff and the headquarters of the border districts did not need to know about the presence, numbers of armies and corps, the locations of these headquarters and headquarters of the districts (fronts)?

Wrong. Again, my words are misinterpreted.

The headquarters of the districts (fronts), armies by affiliation need to know about the locations of the enemy headquarters in their lane.

The General Staff, specifically Operational Management, needs a maximum of information in all directions, but naturally with its degree of detail.

For senior management, this information is redundant. It is important for them to know the general composition, the composition of groupings in directions, the directions of the main strikes.

What good is it for them to know where the headquarters of the 2nd Panzer Group or for example 18A is located, in Tilsit, Insterburg, or in some village?


These monthly bulletins are the essence of newsletters that are distributed in counties.
If the KOVO intelligence department, for example, receives this report, it will not recognize anything new in its direction.
He will receive all operational materials in his district from above in the working order as new data is revealed.

Well, the report of June 22 was executed in 16 copies.

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

And no matter how much Milchakov yelled, this sheet is officially attached to the report of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

You are lying, verbiage - it just was ADDED to the open documents available in the GRU archive on June 22, and is not an appendix to the summary. Teach the materiel, amateur, you don’t even know how to properly execute service documents.

Quote: cavl

In the first parts there were no links to the German site, but now anyone can check the presence of German divisions on the border.

Where are these links? You still haven't introduced them, and you’re yelling about their presence.

Quote: cavl

As for the 73rd front, I was wrong.

You are wrong in everything, because you initially showed how amateur you are even in matters of paperwork.

Quote: cavl

To refute that he does not belong to her can only be another document or memories.

You're definitely illiterate - if this is an application, then at the end of the text you would have to indicate its name, signature stamp and on how many sheets. Go to your sandbox, clown.

Quote: cavl

On sheet 9a are six numbers of enemy armies. So army numbers are still needed at headquarters ...

Sheet 9a is kept in the information department, because it is needed to simplify the work of officers when the issue relates to admission to past materials. A reconnaissance report is usually executed in one copy and stored in a completely different place. And you still climb to refute something here, a miserable ignoramus.

[icant007]

Quote: cavl

In discussions, Eugene put links to tables from the Intelligence Agency Summary dated 15.6.41. You watched them.
Well, I’ll put it specially for an inattentive user.

These are scans from some book not known to me.

There may be reliable information, but it is not clear from which report. The scan is not specified.

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

These are scans from some book not known to me.

The author of the article began to use these scans after I posted them on this forum from the well-known in certain circles book "History of the Patriotic Military Intelligence" by VV Kondrashov, which was published under the editorship of the Council of Veterans of the GRU on the eve of the 200th anniversary of Russian military intelligence. The book was not published in a very large circulation, but the most valuable thing is that it contains materials that are absolutely reliable, and many of them were not previously known. By the way, it contains DRAWING the German group on June 1, 1941, and understanding people will immediately determine that it was made from a card that was an annex to this intelligence report.

[icant007]

Quote: ccsr

By the way, it contains a FIGURE of a German group on June 1, 1941, and understanding people will immediately determine that it was made from a card that was an appendix to this intelligence report.

Thank. I'll keep it on mind.

[icant007]

[/ quote] [quote = ccsr] This is not entirely true, because there are always at least two positions for the command post of any headquarters of the compound and higher - the main command post, the spare command post, and usually the rear command post, and often also an advanced command post for the commander .

I understand all this.

I mean, information about enemy headquarters becomes more important when we plan an offensive operation. In this case, a blow to the identified control points can help disorganize the enemy’s defense.
The seeming "inattention" of our military intelligence to information about headquarters once again underlines the exclusively defensive nature of our preparations for war.