2-I brigade of the Serbian army Krajina: organization and combat path
The 2-th Infantry Brigade of the Serbian Army of Krajina (SVK) is largely deprived of the attention of researchers. She did not happen to take large-scale participation in major military operations. She was not armed with any special models of military equipment, and her organizational and staff structure did not stand out among other infantry brigades of the Krai army. But the brigade’s combat path serves as a good illustration of how the Serbian units were formed in Krajina, how they developed and what challenges they faced during the hostilities.
Throughout the war 1991 — 1995. The 2 Brigade held its positions southwest of Knin, the capital of the Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK). Accordingly, it was part of the 7-th North Dalmatian corps and operated in the North Dalmatia region. In her area of responsibility were such settlements as Kistane, Dzhevrske, Bratishkovtsi, Bribir, Varivode and others. Almost all of them before the war, the Serbs made up the vast majority of the population. Accordingly, the brigade was also equipped with them. In addition to local residents, it was replenished by Serbs expelled from Croatian cities on the Adriatic coast.
The direct predecessor of the 2th Infantry Brigade of the ICS was the 2th Territorial Defense Brigade. The territorial defense in Yugoslavia was, in fact, a mass militia whose task was to support the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) in case of war. Each of the six Yugoslav republics had its own territorial defense. With the expansion of the Yugoslav crisis and the beginning of the separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia, the Croatian TO divided into two parts - the one that remained under the control of the government in Zagreb and the one that was under the control of the emerging authorities of the Serbian Krajina.
The Serbian militia in Kistania was subordinate to the TO headquarters in Knin. During the summer of 1991, he was involved in organizing and distributing personnel among the emerging units. As in other settlements of Srpska Krajina, residents of Kistania, Bribir and other cities and villages, which, after the formation of the ICS, will be in the area of responsibility of the 2 infantry brigade, replenished the two components of the TO - maneuverable and local. The first consisted of brigades and detachments and its task was to fight with Croatian forces. The second was organized from companies, platoons and squads, which were to carry out guard duty in the rear. That is, to protect settlements, important objects, patrol roads, etc. The formation of MOT units in the summer of 1991 was complicated by the fact that many of the soldiers who joined its ranks were simultaneously UNA reservists. And the army, increasingly becoming the target of the Croatian attacks, began to mobilize the local Serbs in their units. In North Dalmatia, the 9th Kninsky Corps was located, in whose brigades and regiments they called on the Serbs, already distributed among the TO units.
Krainsky TO is often underestimated and pushed into the background in the description of that war. On the one hand, it really was worse organized and armed than parts of the Federal Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). Her personnel was inherent in a much weaker discipline. But it was the TO formations that were the first to take part in battles with Croatian special forces and guards in the spring and summer of 1991, when the UNA forces still maintained a policy of neutrality and sought to prevent battles between the warring parties. Until the army took part in large-scale battles against the Croatian forces, which began at the end of the summer of that year, the fighters held the emerging front line and repelled Croatian attacks.
In September 1991, realizing that the Croatian side had openly launched military operations against the JNA and the Krajina Serbs, the military leadership in Belgrade undertook the reorganization of the Serbian Krajina TO. During these transformations, the Serbian forces in Kistanye, Dzhevrsk and the surrounding settlements were transformed into the 2th brigade of the Bukovitsa TO. It consisted of three infantry battalions and a headquarters and, according to the state, consisted of 1428 soldiers and officers.
However, the brigade was not able to achieve full numbers “on the list” then. This was due to the fact that local military Serbs in their units mobilized and brigades of the JNA. In North Dalmatia, all Krai formations were subordinate to the 9th Kninsky Corps of the Yugoslav Army, whose striking force was the 180 and 221 motorized brigades. It was in their units that some of the fighters who had previously joined the ranks of units of the Krainsky TO left, The formation and mobilization of the 2th brigade were launched on October 24 and 1991. By the end of that month there were already about 800 people in it. The creation of the new compound was seriously complicated by the fact that the platoons and companies included in its composition had various strengths and weapons, and, moreover, actively participated in the hostilities. After the formation, the brigade was subordinated to the headquarters of the 221-th motorized brigade of the UNA. Then, the artillery division from the 9 mixed artillery regiment and armored vehicles from the 180 motorized brigade were transferred to its zone of responsibility.
By the end of 1991, the front line in Dalmatia had stabilized. The JNA and the Krainsky militia partially completed the tasks of the deblockade of the army facilities besieged by the Croats and protected the areas inhabited by the Serbs from attacks by Croatian guards and police. The fighting reduced to a positional war — artillery shelling, skirmishes, raids by sabotage groups behind enemy lines. The line of defense of the 2 Brigade in December 1991 of the year was as follows. It started south of the village of Chista-Velika, skirted Chista-Malu, then went southeast to Proklyanskoye Lake, then along its northern shore and from there east to the shore of Krka. Here, the Croats controlled Skradin and this particular locality was further regularly mentioned in the brigade’s combat plans - according to the plans of the Serbs, in the event of a large-scale attack on Croatian positions, one of the main tasks of the 2 brigade was the elimination of this “bridgehead” of the enemy on the right bank of Krka. The left neighbor was the 1th TO Brigade and units of the 221th Motorized Brigade of the JNA. To the right of the 2th brigade, positions were held by the 3th TO brigade and the 180th motorized brigade of the UNA.
From October 1991 until June 1992, the brigade was led by Lt. Col. Jovan Grubich.
By the beginning of 1992, the number of brigades had grown to 1114 people. But they were still armed and equipped in different ways. The soldiers of the krainsky TO, and the 2th brigade in particular, lacked camouflage, steel helmets, military-style boots, raincoats, tents, binoculars, etc.
2 January 1992 Croatia and the Yugoslav People's Army signed the Sarajevo Armistice. The basis for a peaceful settlement was the plan of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Cyrus Vance, which implied the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Krajina and Croatia, the introduction of UN peacekeepers deployed between Serb and Croat forces, the disarmament and demobilization of the Krajín units and negotiations for peace. In preparing to leave Krajina, the Yugoslav General Staff undertook two more reorganizations of the Krajina TO - at the end of February and the end of April 1992, the First changed the structure of the TO. The second prescribed the creation of several more units and brigades of Separate Police Units (PKO). The peacekeeping brigades were supposed to take control of the demarcation line after the demobilization of TO and protect the RSK in the event that Croatia breaks the ceasefire (which subsequently happened).
According to Vance’s plan, all of Serbian Krajina’s maintenance was demobilized by the summer of 1992. The personnel were dismissed from their homes or transferred to the formed brigades of the peacekeeping detachment, and heavy weapons were stockpiled under the supervision of UN peacekeepers. As in other brigades and detachments, in the 2-th brigade there were only the headquarters and a few soldiers watching the stored equipment. Another part of the fighters was called up to serve in the 75 th brigade of the OPM, commanded by Milorad Radic, who had previously commanded the military police battalion of the 9 th Knin corps of the UNA. The last Yugoslav units left Krajina at the beginning of June 1992, and from that moment the Krajin Serbs were left alone with the enemy.
What is curious, the TO structure approved in February 1992 by the Yugoslav General Staff did not provide for the existence of the 2th brigade. But its headquarters continued to function. In June-July, the acting brigade was Lieutenant Colonel Zhivko Rodich, then Major Radoslav Zubac and Captain Raiko Bielanovich held this position.
In the spring and autumn of 1992, there were no major military operations in Dalmatia, with the exception of the Croatian attack on the Milyevach plateau of 21 — 22 on June (in the area of responsibility of the 1 MOT brigade). Taking advantage of the demobilization of the Krajina units and the incomplete formation of brigades of the peacekeeping forces, two Croatian brigades attacked the area between the Krka and Chikola rivers and captured a number of settlements. The area of responsibility of the 2 brigade was not affected by the Croatian offensive, but Kistane and a number of other villages were subjected to powerful artillery shelling by enemy artillery. In June – July of 1992, a small number of fighters from the 2th brigade of the TO and 75th brigade of the OPM took part in battles in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina, supporting the forces of the Bosnian Serbs in Operation 92 Corridor, during which ground communications were restored between Krajina and Western Bosnia on the one hand, and Eastern Bosnia and Yugoslavia on the other, previously interrupted by Croatian forces operating in Bosnia.
In October – November 1992, a large-scale military reform was carried out in Krajina. Its final project was approved on November 27 1992. Three months were allotted for the implementation of the transformations conceived by the RSK management. According to the plan, the brigades of the peacekeeping operations were disbanded, and the maintenance brigades became the basis for new formations. On the basis of the 2th TO Brigade, the 2th Infantry Brigade of the 7 Corps was created. Milorad Radic, a native of the village of Raducic in the Knin community, was appointed its commander. He was characterized as a talented and proactive officer, and was respected among the soldiers. The 2 infantry was replenished by fighters from the following brigades: the 1 and 2 mines, the 75 and 92 militias. While the brigade was being formed, manning and the distribution of weapons, the contact line continued to be guarded by fighters from the disbanded 75 OPM brigade. Formally, they already served as part of the new formations, but at the front the old states of border and guard companies were still valid. Heavy weapons were still in stocks under the control of UN peacekeepers.
The composition of the brigade was as follows: headquarters, three infantry battalions, mixed artillery battalion, mixed artillery anti-tank battalion, artillery-missile air defense battery, tank company, communications company, logistics support company, military police platoon, reconnaissance platoon, engineering platoon. At various times, the brigade was armed with 15 T-34-85 tanks, 18 M-38 howitzers, three ZIS-3 guns, three M-48B1 mountain guns, anti-aircraft guns, mortars of 60-mm, 82-mm, 120- caliber mm, etc. Part of the equipment in the winter of 1994 was transferred to the 3rd Infantry Brigade.
The corps headquarters began to set the first tasks for the brigade command immediately after the start of its formation. For example, on 4 on December 1992, corps commander Colonel Milan Djilas ordered subordinate brigades and regiments to increase their combat readiness, prepare for mobilization of personnel and repel a possible Croatian attack. The 2-I brigade, according to the order, was to prepare to repel the enemy’s attack, relying on the support of one of the divisions of the 7 mixed artillery regiment and the help of neighboring units from the 75 motorized (left neighbor) and 92 motorized (right neighbor) brigades . In the event of a breakthrough of positions by the Croatian forces, the Lepuri-Ostritsa-Bribir line became the last line of defense. Then the 2-I brigade was to carry out a counterattack, return the lost territories and remain ready to conduct active offensive actions. Since the brigade, like other formations of the corps, was just beginning to form, the order emphasized that the deployment of units should take place under the guise of duty platoons and companies located on the contact line.
The formation of the 2 infantry brigade was interrupted by a large-scale Croatian offensive, which began on 22 on January 1993. The goals of the Croatian army were Maslenitsa, where the Maslenitsa bridge, which had been destroyed earlier, and the position of the ICS near Zadar, were located. Maslenitsa was defended by the 4 IK light infantry brigade, and battalions of the 92 IK motorized brigade were stationed near Zadar. The main headquarters of the Krajin army knew about the strengthening of the Croatian units along the line of contact, but for unknown reasons did not attach any importance to this and did not take appropriate measures in advance. As a result, the attack that began in the early morning of 22 on January was a complete surprise for the Serbs.
Despite the fact that the area of responsibility of the 2th brigade was relatively quiet, the corps headquarters ordered its mobilization to begin. A day later, “under arms” managed to put 1600 people. First of all, the personnel of the mixed artillery battalion, tank company and battery of mortars of 120-mm caliber were mobilized. Then the brigade headquarters began the deployment of infantry battalions. Arms depots were opened in the villages of Kistanie, Dzhevrske and Pajan, from where all the working equipment, despite protests by UN peacekeepers, was immediately sent to units. On January 23, brigade commander Radic reported to the headquarters of the corps that the 1th battalion was staffed by 80%, the 2th by 100%, and the 3th by 95%. At the same time, a significant shortage of communication facilities was revealed, as well as small arms weapons - Immediately after the mobilization of the brigade, 150 assault rifles were required.
On January 28, the brigade went over to active operations and began to conduct reconnaissance in battle. All three infantry battalions received their area of responsibility and prepared several reconnaissance and sabotage groups, which then made several attempts to penetrate the enemy rear and reconnoitered the front line of their defense. In a number of cases, their actions relied on fire support of the mixed artillery division. It should be noted that in the conditions of significant numerical superiority of the Croatian army, the offensive of the 2 Infantry Brigade could hardly end successfully. But the increased activity of the Serbs in this sector of the front forced the Croatian command to send reinforcements there, which somewhat eased the pressure on the Serbian defense in the Maslenitsa area. In early February, the brigade allocated one infantry company and four T-34-85 tanks to the 3 Battle Group, which was sent to Benkovac, where there were fierce battles. In parallel with this, mobilization continued. In addition to local residents, the brigade was replenished with volunteers from the Republic of Srpska and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 9 February 1993 g. Its number reached 2572 soldiers and officers. On February 12, another infantry company was assigned from the brigade, assigned to the strike battalion, created as a reserve corps.
On February 24, units of the 2 Brigade launched a successful attack on the village of Dragisic. The Croatian units defending it lost several people dead and wounded, 11 fighters were captured by the Serbs. “On the shoulders” of the retreating enemy, Serbs also occupied Gradin Hill. In this battle, the 2 Brigade lost two soldiers killed and five wounded. One T-34-85 was hit, soon repaired and returned to service. But in the evening at about 21: 00, the soldiers who remained in the village at the initiative of one of the officers left him and retreated to their previous positions. As a result, the Croats again occupied Gradina and Dragisic, but without a fight.
At the end of February 1993, the intensity of battles in North Dalmatia significantly decreased, and in March both sides no longer attempted large-scale offensives. For a long time, the 2 Infantry Brigade began a positional war. A huge problem for the connection during this period was the fact that his commander, Milora Radic, was the only personnel officer in the entire brigade. Other officer posts in the headquarters and units either were empty or were occupied by reserve officers and subofficers. Many of them did not have the appropriate experience, and this seriously affected the combat capabilities of the brigade. In particular, on 14 on April 1993, the artillery of the division was not able to act adequately, because, as indicated in the report, “the brigade commander was busy with a different task” ... In fact, Radich alone had to carry on all the staff work and, according to the assessment the headquarters of the corps, was at the limit of its own forces.
From the spring of 1993 until the summer of 1995, there were no major battles in the area of responsibility of the brigade. Relative calm was interrupted by periodic skirmishes with the use of small arms, heavy machine guns, and mortars. Reconnaissance and sabotage groups were active on both sides. They not only engaged in reconnaissance of enemy positions, but also often placed mines on patrol routes and roads in the rear. In the spring of 1994, another armistice was signed, and the artillery and armored vehicles of the Serb brigade were taken from the front line to the rear, in the villages of Dobrievichi, Knezhevichi and Pajan. The combat situation was affected by the general situation both in the 7 corps and in Serbian Krajina as a whole. Payments to officers and soldiers were low and irregular. Therefore, in their free time, the soldiers were forced to look for part-time jobs or combine combat duty in positions with some kind of permanent job. Under the conditions of a formal ceasefire, the brigade, like the entire corps, switched to the principle of shift shifts, when each soldier was in position for three days and six days at home. The entire Krai army was extremely short of fuel for vehicles and armored vehicles, and the 2 infantry brigade was no exception. Its headquarters managed to maintain a minimum fuel supply for armored vehicles, but exercises with its use were infrequent. In the spring and summer of 1994, in the 2th brigade, as well as in the entire 7th corps, a number of changes in the organizational and staff structure took place, related to an attempt to reduce battalions to border companies and to transfer part of the personnel to a contract basis. Soon the brigade returned to its former structure, the principle of border units during the demobilization of the main part of the compound was rejected.
In early May 1994, the brigade formed a combat group of an infantry company, a mortar battery, an air defense platoon, an anti-tank platoon and a rear support platoon, which, together with similar combined detachments from other brigades of the 7 corps, participated in the hostilities of the Bosnian Serb army near the city of Brcko. This practice was continued later, when from the brigade the combined groups went to strengthen their positions on Mount Dinara.
The beginning of 1995 was met by the brigade in a dual situation. On the one hand, during 1994, serious work was done to equip the positions, establish minefields, etc. In February 1995, the positions of the brigade by the commission from the headquarters of the corps were evaluated as the most prepared in the corps. A number of officers and subofficers underwent retraining or advanced training. But on the other, the number of personnel has seriously decreased. If in February 1993, including volunteers, there were 2726 people in the brigade, then in January 1995, there were 1961 people. Of these, 90 officers, 135 podofitserov, 1746 soldiers. There were also problems with discipline and the execution of orders of the command.
At the beginning of May 1995, Mr. Milorad Radic left for promotion and headed the headquarters of the 7 corps. Major Rade Drezgich was appointed commander of the 2 brigade.
The Croatian leadership decided to return Krajina to its control by force and on October 4 of 1995, Operation Storm began. Split corps of the Croatian army, special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and part of the formations of the Gospichsky corps acted against the 7 Corps of the ICS. The 2th Infantry Brigade of Serbs was directly opposed by the 113th Brigade (3500 fighters) and the 15th Domestic Regiment (2500 fighters). Thus, the balance of power was 3: 1 in favor of the Croats.
In 05: 00 On 4 on August, the brigade’s defense line and settlements in its rear were subjected to massive shelling. Both the artillery of the opposing units and the artillery groups of the Split Corps acted on the positions of the 2 Brigade and its area of responsibility. After the artillery preparation, the Croats launched a cautious offensive with the support of armored vehicles. The fighting subsided only in the evening. They managed to retain most of the positions, but on the right flank of the defense the brigade surrendered to the Croats well-fortified positions near the villages of Chista-Mala, Chista-Velika and Lajevtsi. This jeopardized the left flank of the 3 Infantry Brigade.
However, the outcome of the battles for North Dalmatia and Operation Storm was generally decided not on the positions of individual brigades, but on Mount Dinara. Events for them occurred on Dinar. By the middle of the day of August 4, two Croatian guard brigades broke through the defenses of the combined group of militia fighters and soldiers of the 7 corps and rushed to Knin. In this situation, Serbian President Milan Martic decided to start the evacuation of civilians from the communities of North Dalmatia. As a result, many fighters began to disperse from their homes to save their families. This phenomenon did not bypass the 2 brigade, where by the morning of 5 on August a significant part of the soldiers had already left the front. By the middle of the day, the brigade left its positions and, together with refugee columns, began to withdraw to the territory of Republika Srpska.
In fact, the 2 team lost part of their positions in the battle with those who, although they outnumbered it, did not have an advantage in the quality of training or organization. This is especially true for the soldiers of the 15 go-home regiment. 2-I brigade had a prepared line of defense, had armored vehicles and artillery, its battalions were for the most part manned. But on 4 of August she could not stop the enemy. In our opinion, the reason for this was the following reasons.
Firstly, the brigade was affected by the general condition of the corps. The long battles at Dinar, which ended in defeat in July 1995, seriously depleted the reserves of the corps, including fuel and ammunition. Command of the corps was violated - the new commander, General Kovachevich, took up his duties just a few days before the Storm, and the chief of staff Milorad Radic was in Dinar, where he personally led the defense. Secondly, after the defeats in Western Slavonia and Dinar, morale in many Krajina units was low. In a number of parts, the command staff was able to slightly improve the situation and maintain a certain level of discipline (as, for example, in the 4th brigade), and in some brigades the situation remained the same. Apparently, the 2th Infantry Brigade was among those where the mood of the personnel was not up to par. Thirdly, the Croatian forces managed to break the communication not only between the headquarters of the 2 brigade and the 7 corps, but also between the headquarters of the brigade and the headquarters of its infantry battalions by artillery attacks on communication centers and using electronic warfare. The lack of orders and any information about what was happening with the neighbors led to a number of junior commanders panicking and taking their units to reserve positions, completely giving way to the enemy’s initiative. Another important reason was that the brigade’s armored vehicles were used as a reserve on its flanks. Apparently, the commander of the brigade Dresgich did not consider the possibility of using tanks in a counterattack, but preferred to leave them in places of contact with neighboring parts of the ICS.
Having transferred weapons to parts of the Bosnian Serb army, the 2 Brigade ceased to exist. The headquarters of the brigade functioned as the organized unit for the longest time on the territory of Republika Srpska, but soon it broke up, and its officers joined the columns of refugees heading for Yugoslavia.
The area of North Dalmatia, which housed the 2-I brigade. Source: krajinaforce.com
Positions held by the team
Throughout the war 1991 — 1995. The 2 Brigade held its positions southwest of Knin, the capital of the Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK). Accordingly, it was part of the 7-th North Dalmatian corps and operated in the North Dalmatia region. In her area of responsibility were such settlements as Kistane, Dzhevrske, Bratishkovtsi, Bribir, Varivode and others. Almost all of them before the war, the Serbs made up the vast majority of the population. Accordingly, the brigade was also equipped with them. In addition to local residents, it was replenished by Serbs expelled from Croatian cities on the Adriatic coast.
The direct predecessor of the 2th Infantry Brigade of the ICS was the 2th Territorial Defense Brigade. The territorial defense in Yugoslavia was, in fact, a mass militia whose task was to support the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) in case of war. Each of the six Yugoslav republics had its own territorial defense. With the expansion of the Yugoslav crisis and the beginning of the separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia, the Croatian TO divided into two parts - the one that remained under the control of the government in Zagreb and the one that was under the control of the emerging authorities of the Serbian Krajina.
The Serbian militia in Kistania was subordinate to the TO headquarters in Knin. During the summer of 1991, he was involved in organizing and distributing personnel among the emerging units. As in other settlements of Srpska Krajina, residents of Kistania, Bribir and other cities and villages, which, after the formation of the ICS, will be in the area of responsibility of the 2 infantry brigade, replenished the two components of the TO - maneuverable and local. The first consisted of brigades and detachments and its task was to fight with Croatian forces. The second was organized from companies, platoons and squads, which were to carry out guard duty in the rear. That is, to protect settlements, important objects, patrol roads, etc. The formation of MOT units in the summer of 1991 was complicated by the fact that many of the soldiers who joined its ranks were simultaneously UNA reservists. And the army, increasingly becoming the target of the Croatian attacks, began to mobilize the local Serbs in their units. In North Dalmatia, the 9th Kninsky Corps was located, in whose brigades and regiments they called on the Serbs, already distributed among the TO units.
Krainsky TO is often underestimated and pushed into the background in the description of that war. On the one hand, it really was worse organized and armed than parts of the Federal Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). Her personnel was inherent in a much weaker discipline. But it was the TO formations that were the first to take part in battles with Croatian special forces and guards in the spring and summer of 1991, when the UNA forces still maintained a policy of neutrality and sought to prevent battles between the warring parties. Until the army took part in large-scale battles against the Croatian forces, which began at the end of the summer of that year, the fighters held the emerging front line and repelled Croatian attacks.
In September 1991, realizing that the Croatian side had openly launched military operations against the JNA and the Krajina Serbs, the military leadership in Belgrade undertook the reorganization of the Serbian Krajina TO. During these transformations, the Serbian forces in Kistanye, Dzhevrsk and the surrounding settlements were transformed into the 2th brigade of the Bukovitsa TO. It consisted of three infantry battalions and a headquarters and, according to the state, consisted of 1428 soldiers and officers.
However, the brigade was not able to achieve full numbers “on the list” then. This was due to the fact that local military Serbs in their units mobilized and brigades of the JNA. In North Dalmatia, all Krai formations were subordinate to the 9th Kninsky Corps of the Yugoslav Army, whose striking force was the 180 and 221 motorized brigades. It was in their units that some of the fighters who had previously joined the ranks of units of the Krainsky TO left, The formation and mobilization of the 2th brigade were launched on October 24 and 1991. By the end of that month there were already about 800 people in it. The creation of the new compound was seriously complicated by the fact that the platoons and companies included in its composition had various strengths and weapons, and, moreover, actively participated in the hostilities. After the formation, the brigade was subordinated to the headquarters of the 221-th motorized brigade of the UNA. Then, the artillery division from the 9 mixed artillery regiment and armored vehicles from the 180 motorized brigade were transferred to its zone of responsibility.
By the end of 1991, the front line in Dalmatia had stabilized. The JNA and the Krainsky militia partially completed the tasks of the deblockade of the army facilities besieged by the Croats and protected the areas inhabited by the Serbs from attacks by Croatian guards and police. The fighting reduced to a positional war — artillery shelling, skirmishes, raids by sabotage groups behind enemy lines. The line of defense of the 2 Brigade in December 1991 of the year was as follows. It started south of the village of Chista-Velika, skirted Chista-Malu, then went southeast to Proklyanskoye Lake, then along its northern shore and from there east to the shore of Krka. Here, the Croats controlled Skradin and this particular locality was further regularly mentioned in the brigade’s combat plans - according to the plans of the Serbs, in the event of a large-scale attack on Croatian positions, one of the main tasks of the 2 brigade was the elimination of this “bridgehead” of the enemy on the right bank of Krka. The left neighbor was the 1th TO Brigade and units of the 221th Motorized Brigade of the JNA. To the right of the 2th brigade, positions were held by the 3th TO brigade and the 180th motorized brigade of the UNA.
From October 1991 until June 1992, the brigade was led by Lt. Col. Jovan Grubich.
By the beginning of 1992, the number of brigades had grown to 1114 people. But they were still armed and equipped in different ways. The soldiers of the krainsky TO, and the 2th brigade in particular, lacked camouflage, steel helmets, military-style boots, raincoats, tents, binoculars, etc.
2 January 1992 Croatia and the Yugoslav People's Army signed the Sarajevo Armistice. The basis for a peaceful settlement was the plan of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Cyrus Vance, which implied the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Krajina and Croatia, the introduction of UN peacekeepers deployed between Serb and Croat forces, the disarmament and demobilization of the Krajín units and negotiations for peace. In preparing to leave Krajina, the Yugoslav General Staff undertook two more reorganizations of the Krajina TO - at the end of February and the end of April 1992, the First changed the structure of the TO. The second prescribed the creation of several more units and brigades of Separate Police Units (PKO). The peacekeeping brigades were supposed to take control of the demarcation line after the demobilization of TO and protect the RSK in the event that Croatia breaks the ceasefire (which subsequently happened).
According to Vance’s plan, all of Serbian Krajina’s maintenance was demobilized by the summer of 1992. The personnel were dismissed from their homes or transferred to the formed brigades of the peacekeeping detachment, and heavy weapons were stockpiled under the supervision of UN peacekeepers. As in other brigades and detachments, in the 2-th brigade there were only the headquarters and a few soldiers watching the stored equipment. Another part of the fighters was called up to serve in the 75 th brigade of the OPM, commanded by Milorad Radic, who had previously commanded the military police battalion of the 9 th Knin corps of the UNA. The last Yugoslav units left Krajina at the beginning of June 1992, and from that moment the Krajin Serbs were left alone with the enemy.
What is curious, the TO structure approved in February 1992 by the Yugoslav General Staff did not provide for the existence of the 2th brigade. But its headquarters continued to function. In June-July, the acting brigade was Lieutenant Colonel Zhivko Rodich, then Major Radoslav Zubac and Captain Raiko Bielanovich held this position.
In the spring and autumn of 1992, there were no major military operations in Dalmatia, with the exception of the Croatian attack on the Milyevach plateau of 21 — 22 on June (in the area of responsibility of the 1 MOT brigade). Taking advantage of the demobilization of the Krajina units and the incomplete formation of brigades of the peacekeeping forces, two Croatian brigades attacked the area between the Krka and Chikola rivers and captured a number of settlements. The area of responsibility of the 2 brigade was not affected by the Croatian offensive, but Kistane and a number of other villages were subjected to powerful artillery shelling by enemy artillery. In June – July of 1992, a small number of fighters from the 2th brigade of the TO and 75th brigade of the OPM took part in battles in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina, supporting the forces of the Bosnian Serbs in Operation 92 Corridor, during which ground communications were restored between Krajina and Western Bosnia on the one hand, and Eastern Bosnia and Yugoslavia on the other, previously interrupted by Croatian forces operating in Bosnia.
In October – November 1992, a large-scale military reform was carried out in Krajina. Its final project was approved on November 27 1992. Three months were allotted for the implementation of the transformations conceived by the RSK management. According to the plan, the brigades of the peacekeeping operations were disbanded, and the maintenance brigades became the basis for new formations. On the basis of the 2th TO Brigade, the 2th Infantry Brigade of the 7 Corps was created. Milorad Radic, a native of the village of Raducic in the Knin community, was appointed its commander. He was characterized as a talented and proactive officer, and was respected among the soldiers. The 2 infantry was replenished by fighters from the following brigades: the 1 and 2 mines, the 75 and 92 militias. While the brigade was being formed, manning and the distribution of weapons, the contact line continued to be guarded by fighters from the disbanded 75 OPM brigade. Formally, they already served as part of the new formations, but at the front the old states of border and guard companies were still valid. Heavy weapons were still in stocks under the control of UN peacekeepers.
Milorad Radic. Photo from the archive of Kosta Novakovich
The composition of the brigade was as follows: headquarters, three infantry battalions, mixed artillery battalion, mixed artillery anti-tank battalion, artillery-missile air defense battery, tank company, communications company, logistics support company, military police platoon, reconnaissance platoon, engineering platoon. At various times, the brigade was armed with 15 T-34-85 tanks, 18 M-38 howitzers, three ZIS-3 guns, three M-48B1 mountain guns, anti-aircraft guns, mortars of 60-mm, 82-mm, 120- caliber mm, etc. Part of the equipment in the winter of 1994 was transferred to the 3rd Infantry Brigade.
The corps headquarters began to set the first tasks for the brigade command immediately after the start of its formation. For example, on 4 on December 1992, corps commander Colonel Milan Djilas ordered subordinate brigades and regiments to increase their combat readiness, prepare for mobilization of personnel and repel a possible Croatian attack. The 2-I brigade, according to the order, was to prepare to repel the enemy’s attack, relying on the support of one of the divisions of the 7 mixed artillery regiment and the help of neighboring units from the 75 motorized (left neighbor) and 92 motorized (right neighbor) brigades . In the event of a breakthrough of positions by the Croatian forces, the Lepuri-Ostritsa-Bribir line became the last line of defense. Then the 2-I brigade was to carry out a counterattack, return the lost territories and remain ready to conduct active offensive actions. Since the brigade, like other formations of the corps, was just beginning to form, the order emphasized that the deployment of units should take place under the guise of duty platoons and companies located on the contact line.
The formation of the 2 infantry brigade was interrupted by a large-scale Croatian offensive, which began on 22 on January 1993. The goals of the Croatian army were Maslenitsa, where the Maslenitsa bridge, which had been destroyed earlier, and the position of the ICS near Zadar, were located. Maslenitsa was defended by the 4 IK light infantry brigade, and battalions of the 92 IK motorized brigade were stationed near Zadar. The main headquarters of the Krajin army knew about the strengthening of the Croatian units along the line of contact, but for unknown reasons did not attach any importance to this and did not take appropriate measures in advance. As a result, the attack that began in the early morning of 22 on January was a complete surprise for the Serbs.
Despite the fact that the area of responsibility of the 2th brigade was relatively quiet, the corps headquarters ordered its mobilization to begin. A day later, “under arms” managed to put 1600 people. First of all, the personnel of the mixed artillery battalion, tank company and battery of mortars of 120-mm caliber were mobilized. Then the brigade headquarters began the deployment of infantry battalions. Arms depots were opened in the villages of Kistanie, Dzhevrske and Pajan, from where all the working equipment, despite protests by UN peacekeepers, was immediately sent to units. On January 23, brigade commander Radic reported to the headquarters of the corps that the 1th battalion was staffed by 80%, the 2th by 100%, and the 3th by 95%. At the same time, a significant shortage of communication facilities was revealed, as well as small arms weapons - Immediately after the mobilization of the brigade, 150 assault rifles were required.
On January 28, the brigade went over to active operations and began to conduct reconnaissance in battle. All three infantry battalions received their area of responsibility and prepared several reconnaissance and sabotage groups, which then made several attempts to penetrate the enemy rear and reconnoitered the front line of their defense. In a number of cases, their actions relied on fire support of the mixed artillery division. It should be noted that in the conditions of significant numerical superiority of the Croatian army, the offensive of the 2 Infantry Brigade could hardly end successfully. But the increased activity of the Serbs in this sector of the front forced the Croatian command to send reinforcements there, which somewhat eased the pressure on the Serbian defense in the Maslenitsa area. In early February, the brigade allocated one infantry company and four T-34-85 tanks to the 3 Battle Group, which was sent to Benkovac, where there were fierce battles. In parallel with this, mobilization continued. In addition to local residents, the brigade was replenished with volunteers from the Republic of Srpska and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 9 February 1993 g. Its number reached 2572 soldiers and officers. On February 12, another infantry company was assigned from the brigade, assigned to the strike battalion, created as a reserve corps.
On February 24, units of the 2 Brigade launched a successful attack on the village of Dragisic. The Croatian units defending it lost several people dead and wounded, 11 fighters were captured by the Serbs. “On the shoulders” of the retreating enemy, Serbs also occupied Gradin Hill. In this battle, the 2 Brigade lost two soldiers killed and five wounded. One T-34-85 was hit, soon repaired and returned to service. But in the evening at about 21: 00, the soldiers who remained in the village at the initiative of one of the officers left him and retreated to their previous positions. As a result, the Croats again occupied Gradina and Dragisic, but without a fight.
At the end of February 1993, the intensity of battles in North Dalmatia significantly decreased, and in March both sides no longer attempted large-scale offensives. For a long time, the 2 Infantry Brigade began a positional war. A huge problem for the connection during this period was the fact that his commander, Milora Radic, was the only personnel officer in the entire brigade. Other officer posts in the headquarters and units either were empty or were occupied by reserve officers and subofficers. Many of them did not have the appropriate experience, and this seriously affected the combat capabilities of the brigade. In particular, on 14 on April 1993, the artillery of the division was not able to act adequately, because, as indicated in the report, “the brigade commander was busy with a different task” ... In fact, Radich alone had to carry on all the staff work and, according to the assessment the headquarters of the corps, was at the limit of its own forces.
The standard set of equipment fighter SVK. Source: wikimedia.org
Combat Efficiency and General Environment
From the spring of 1993 until the summer of 1995, there were no major battles in the area of responsibility of the brigade. Relative calm was interrupted by periodic skirmishes with the use of small arms, heavy machine guns, and mortars. Reconnaissance and sabotage groups were active on both sides. They not only engaged in reconnaissance of enemy positions, but also often placed mines on patrol routes and roads in the rear. In the spring of 1994, another armistice was signed, and the artillery and armored vehicles of the Serb brigade were taken from the front line to the rear, in the villages of Dobrievichi, Knezhevichi and Pajan. The combat situation was affected by the general situation both in the 7 corps and in Serbian Krajina as a whole. Payments to officers and soldiers were low and irregular. Therefore, in their free time, the soldiers were forced to look for part-time jobs or combine combat duty in positions with some kind of permanent job. Under the conditions of a formal ceasefire, the brigade, like the entire corps, switched to the principle of shift shifts, when each soldier was in position for three days and six days at home. The entire Krai army was extremely short of fuel for vehicles and armored vehicles, and the 2 infantry brigade was no exception. Its headquarters managed to maintain a minimum fuel supply for armored vehicles, but exercises with its use were infrequent. In the spring and summer of 1994, in the 2th brigade, as well as in the entire 7th corps, a number of changes in the organizational and staff structure took place, related to an attempt to reduce battalions to border companies and to transfer part of the personnel to a contract basis. Soon the brigade returned to its former structure, the principle of border units during the demobilization of the main part of the compound was rejected.
In early May 1994, the brigade formed a combat group of an infantry company, a mortar battery, an air defense platoon, an anti-tank platoon and a rear support platoon, which, together with similar combined detachments from other brigades of the 7 corps, participated in the hostilities of the Bosnian Serb army near the city of Brcko. This practice was continued later, when from the brigade the combined groups went to strengthen their positions on Mount Dinara.
The beginning of 1995 was met by the brigade in a dual situation. On the one hand, during 1994, serious work was done to equip the positions, establish minefields, etc. In February 1995, the positions of the brigade by the commission from the headquarters of the corps were evaluated as the most prepared in the corps. A number of officers and subofficers underwent retraining or advanced training. But on the other, the number of personnel has seriously decreased. If in February 1993, including volunteers, there were 2726 people in the brigade, then in January 1995, there were 1961 people. Of these, 90 officers, 135 podofitserov, 1746 soldiers. There were also problems with discipline and the execution of orders of the command.
At the beginning of May 1995, Mr. Milorad Radic left for promotion and headed the headquarters of the 7 corps. Major Rade Drezgich was appointed commander of the 2 brigade.
The Croatian leadership decided to return Krajina to its control by force and on October 4 of 1995, Operation Storm began. Split corps of the Croatian army, special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and part of the formations of the Gospichsky corps acted against the 7 Corps of the ICS. The 2th Infantry Brigade of Serbs was directly opposed by the 113th Brigade (3500 fighters) and the 15th Domestic Regiment (2500 fighters). Thus, the balance of power was 3: 1 in favor of the Croats.
In 05: 00 On 4 on August, the brigade’s defense line and settlements in its rear were subjected to massive shelling. Both the artillery of the opposing units and the artillery groups of the Split Corps acted on the positions of the 2 Brigade and its area of responsibility. After the artillery preparation, the Croats launched a cautious offensive with the support of armored vehicles. The fighting subsided only in the evening. They managed to retain most of the positions, but on the right flank of the defense the brigade surrendered to the Croats well-fortified positions near the villages of Chista-Mala, Chista-Velika and Lajevtsi. This jeopardized the left flank of the 3 Infantry Brigade.
However, the outcome of the battles for North Dalmatia and Operation Storm was generally decided not on the positions of individual brigades, but on Mount Dinara. Events for them occurred on Dinar. By the middle of the day of August 4, two Croatian guard brigades broke through the defenses of the combined group of militia fighters and soldiers of the 7 corps and rushed to Knin. In this situation, Serbian President Milan Martic decided to start the evacuation of civilians from the communities of North Dalmatia. As a result, many fighters began to disperse from their homes to save their families. This phenomenon did not bypass the 2 brigade, where by the morning of 5 on August a significant part of the soldiers had already left the front. By the middle of the day, the brigade left its positions and, together with refugee columns, began to withdraw to the territory of Republika Srpska.
The outcome of the battles for North Dalmatia and Operation Storm
In fact, the 2 team lost part of their positions in the battle with those who, although they outnumbered it, did not have an advantage in the quality of training or organization. This is especially true for the soldiers of the 15 go-home regiment. 2-I brigade had a prepared line of defense, had armored vehicles and artillery, its battalions were for the most part manned. But on 4 of August she could not stop the enemy. In our opinion, the reason for this was the following reasons.
Firstly, the brigade was affected by the general condition of the corps. The long battles at Dinar, which ended in defeat in July 1995, seriously depleted the reserves of the corps, including fuel and ammunition. Command of the corps was violated - the new commander, General Kovachevich, took up his duties just a few days before the Storm, and the chief of staff Milorad Radic was in Dinar, where he personally led the defense. Secondly, after the defeats in Western Slavonia and Dinar, morale in many Krajina units was low. In a number of parts, the command staff was able to slightly improve the situation and maintain a certain level of discipline (as, for example, in the 4th brigade), and in some brigades the situation remained the same. Apparently, the 2th Infantry Brigade was among those where the mood of the personnel was not up to par. Thirdly, the Croatian forces managed to break the communication not only between the headquarters of the 2 brigade and the 7 corps, but also between the headquarters of the brigade and the headquarters of its infantry battalions by artillery attacks on communication centers and using electronic warfare. The lack of orders and any information about what was happening with the neighbors led to a number of junior commanders panicking and taking their units to reserve positions, completely giving way to the enemy’s initiative. Another important reason was that the brigade’s armored vehicles were used as a reserve on its flanks. Apparently, the commander of the brigade Dresgich did not consider the possibility of using tanks in a counterattack, but preferred to leave them in places of contact with neighboring parts of the ICS.
Having transferred weapons to parts of the Bosnian Serb army, the 2 Brigade ceased to exist. The headquarters of the brigade functioned as the organized unit for the longest time on the territory of Republika Srpska, but soon it broke up, and its officers joined the columns of refugees heading for Yugoslavia.
Information