Military Review

Intelligence about German troops at the end of the 1940 year

26
In the previous part we examined intelligence materials (Goals Difference) about the German troops in 1938 and at the beginning of 1940. PM at the indicated time was significantly different from the real data. With such a significant difference in the data, the presence in the RM of the exact names of infantry units and formations can only be due to the fact that the German command used fictitious formations of military personnel with false signs on uniform. After 3-4 parts, you will be shown that the exact data for tank and the German motorized forces were completely absent in the Republic of Moldova. The German command hid the name and presence of these troops on the border, allowing you to know more about the infantry units.




Having no sources of information in the higher spheres of Germany, our intelligence officers did not know before the war that in the middle of the summer of the 1940 year a final decision was made to start a war with the Soviet Union in the 1941 year. The leadership of the USSR and the spacecraft did not know about this decision and hoped to avoid a war by any means. Since the summer of 1940, in the West, grandiose activities have been launched to prepare for a landing on the territory of England. However, this was only a grandiose hoax ... Understanding the scope and elaboration of measures to prepare for Operation Sea Lion can be obtained by reading the chapters Halder's diary July to August 1940 years.

In this part, materials will be used from the books of B. Müller-Hillebrand, "German Army in 1933-1945." And O.P. Kuryleva “Army of the Third Reich 1933-1945. Illustrated Atlas. " The following abbreviations are used in the article: А - army AK - army corps, IN - military district, Spacecraft - Red Army, cd (kn) - cavalry division (regiment), md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), pd (pp) - infantry division (regiment), Ro - intelligence department, RU - Reconnaissance of the General Staff of the spacecraft, td (mn) - tank division (regiment).

Intelligence ZAPOVO worked without errors?


In the comments to the articles of the series “Unexpected war ...” by Vick and to two parts of the intelligence article, writer O. Yu. Kozinkin wrote that the RM RO ZAPOVO had more accurate information than the RM RU. As the only argument, he quotes from the memoirs of the chief of staff of 4-th A General L.M. Sandalova:
At the end of the first week of June, the headquarters of our 4-th A, located in Kobrin, received information from the headquarters of the Military District that by June 5 on the border of Belarus more than 40 German divisions and that 15 PD, 5 TD, 2 MD and 2 CD are focused on the Brest direction ...


General L.M. Sandalov writes about a summary of the RO of the ZAPOVO headquarters from 4.6.41. According to the same data, against the troops of the Military District, an unchanged number of divisions is listed from May 1941 until the start of the war - 30. Oleg Yurievich builds his version on this difference in the number of divisions and even intended to write a book about betrayal in the Republic of Uzbekistan. It is strange that a writer for more than 10 years dealing with events on the eve of the war and writing 10 books does not know about crossing the borders of the areas of responsibility of the intelligence of PribOVO and ZAPOVO. That is why the RM ROs of the ZapOVO headquarters included in their report part of the compounds that RU and the General Staff considered concentrated in front of PribOVO. The issue of the boundaries of the zones of responsibility is registered in the Republic of Moldova and therefore is a fact. More is reviewed earlier. Why did the RU not replace the RO and the VO command? Probably there were circumstances. The author will devote more time in the article to RM RO ZAPOVO to understand the amount of misinformation in these materials. We will start our consideration with a summary from 19.9.40. Later we will analyze other RM ZAPOVO as well.

Special message Chief of RO Zapovo, Chief of RU of the General Staff of the Spacecraft 19.9.40:
According to the intelligence data for 15.9.40, it is noted: In Rembertov headquarters 27 armored division, according to other sources, this is the headquarters of the front. Data is being verified ...


There is a lot of incomprehensible information. If you saw the number "27”, Then they saw the division’s headquarters officer close enough. The question arises: "In what form did the scout see the officer or officers of the 27th Armored Division?"

As working clothes, the tankers were given a uniform of black or gray color, which in the future began to be used for all occasions. The figure on the left shows the tanker’s jackets in black and gray, and for comparison, on the right is the casual tunic of the infantry lieutenant.



Knowing what the tank uniform looks like, it is almost impossible to confuse it with the uniform of the officers of the front headquarters. The atlas also has another form of clothing for tankers.

Intelligence about German troops at the end of the 1940 year


In the German army, belonging to a certain type of army or service was designated as the military color - Waffenfarbe. In color, he made a shoulder strap, gaps on the buttonholes, piping of caps and some types of uniforms, as well as other colored details of the uniform. White color belongs to the infantry, and pink - to the tank troops. If the division headquarters officer was in one of the forms shown in the last figure, then the Waffenfarbe could be confused.

The affiliation to the headquarters of the division and its number was simple enough to determine: there was a letter on the shoulder straps D and below the Arabic numbers the division number (in our case, 27). But this is simply not possible! The formation of the 27th etc. will only begin on 1.10.42, and an officer with such insignia simply could not exist ... If he or they were not dressed up by order from above ...

27 I was in France until September, and in September arrived in Germany (in the city of Grafenver). 1.11.40 began its reorganization in the 17, etc., which will be completed only in March 1941 year. It turns out that the headquarters officers could not be in Rembertov either on the 27th or the 27th. There could only be mummers with signs of the 27 division ... There will be even more oddities in the summary further.

Extension Special messages:
4.9.40 arrived in Warsaw: 222 pp (at 25.8 was in Gumbinen) and 202 pp (at 25.8 was in Hrubieszow). Data is verified.


The RMs are confirmed, since both sub-stations were part of the 75-th front, which was located in Poland from July 1940 until 22.6.41.

Confirmed data on the deployment in Sokolov of 71 and two paragraphs of unidentified numbering (apparently, these are the stations deployed on 25.8. in Sokolov under No. 100, 104, 661. The data is reliable).


At the indicated time, there was no 71 th paragraph. There was the 71 md from the 29 md. Unless of course our scout saw servicemen from this regiment, and not mummers. The strangeness is that 29-md was until the 1941 year in the south of France. In the RM, it is indicated that "reliable data", But in fact they are misinformation, tossed by the German command.

100-th PP in the Wehrmacht did not exist.

The 104-th PP was part of the 33-th PD, which from September 1939 to October 1940 was in Germany and France, and in October 1940 again returned to Germany. Since 11.11.40, it has been transformed into the 15 th.

661-th PP was part of the 393-th PD, which began its formation in March 1940 in Warsaw. In July of the 1940 year, the division was celebrated in Germany (6-th VO) where it was disbanded (661-th pp including). In Poland, there remained one battalion of the pp, which became known as the 974 m rifle battalion. In September, no one could walk with the insignia of the 661 th paragraph.

Confirmed data on the deployment in Lodz: 431 PD and 212 PP, as well as on the departure of 182 PD East. In addition, the presence of 511 and 513 pp is noted ...


To begin with, the 431-th front never existed. Could it be a typo: 431-th pp? It could have been, but the formation of the 431 th point will begin only on 15.10.40.

The 212-th PP was part of the 79-th PD, which was in Germany from the autumn of 1939 to May 1940 of the year. Then she moves to the city of Langre (France) and will be there until January 1941. Consequently, 212-th paragraph could not be at the border.

The formation of the 182-th front will be launched in the West of 27.8.42. It turns out that only a group of mummers could walk in the East.

511-th PP was part of the 293-th PD, formed 8.2.40 in Germany in the city of Brandenburg. After formation, the division will leave for the West. Its parts will begin to arrive in Poland only 25.2.41

All data that according to intelligence "confirmed"Turned out to be misinformation!

Installedthat the headquarters of 17 front is stationed in the Hungarians, it includes the 28 frontier, the headquarters of which is based in Miedzna ... The artillery regiment 17 front is stationed in Lokhov. The shelf number is not installed. Data is being verified ...


17-I Front takes part in the war in Poland in September, and moves to Germany in October. Since January 1940, she has been in Germany, Luxembourg and France. Only 1.6.41 will arrive in Poland.

The 17th paragraph never included the 28th paragraph. 28-th PP was part of the 8-th PD, which in this period is located in the city of Rouen (France). Again, disa ...

According to the 1 branch, it was established that in Warsaw on Hitler's Square ... the headquarters of 8 A, the army commander, General Blaskowitz, is deployed. (Reliable information).


Headquarters 8-th And in the fall of 1939 year did not exist. General Blaskowitz is in this period in the reserve of the High Command. Only in October will he be appointed commander of 1-th A, which is deployed in France. It is again said that the data are reliable, but in fact they are misinformation ...

According to the 1 branch, the headquarters of 3 AK are marked in Insterburg (according to previously available data, the headquarters of 12 AK is deployed there). Information about the 3 AK is coming in for the first time and needs to be verified. In Tilsit, the 206 land-based frontier was deployed, which included 13, 212 and 312 subparagraphs. This division is currently being disbanded. 206 LPD data is being received for the first time, it needs to be verified.


The 206 1st Division has not been a landver for more than a year. It included the 301, 312 and 413 points. The 312-th sub-unit from RM coincided with the actual number of the regiment from the division. Disbandment information is not correct. The personnel of the division was disbanded on vacation back in July 1940.

What did our intelligence discover? Or mummers with insignia of the 206 th, 13 th, 212 th or 312 th pp, which is a reconnaissance error! Or I saw groups of vacationers whose presence is not a fact of presence full-fledged pp or whole pd! And in this case, this is a gross mistake of our intelligence ...

The city of Insterburg in the period under review was located on the territory of East Prussia. The 3th AK and its headquarters were stationed only in Poland and were never observed in East Prussia. The 12th AK in September of the 1940 of the year was just starting to arrive from France to Poland and was also not located on the territory of East Prussia.

It is interesting that the intelligence and radio intelligence of the OSNAZ recorded the presence of the headquarters of the 12 AK in the city of Insterburg (hundreds of kilometers from its actual location) through June 1941, inclusive. It turns out that the German command not only played the game "in insignia and rumors"But also had fun"radio games"Confusing radio intelligence. Therefore, the radio networks of army groups, tank groups, and motorized corps were not detected by radio intelligence. There will be separate material on this topic through 2-3 parts.

Confirmed Dislocation data in Koenigsberg 1, 24, 224, 361 and 368


The 1-th paragraph is part of the 1-th front, and the 24-th paragraph is in the 21-th front. Divisions arrive in East Prussia from 13.9.40 and from 12.9.40, respectively. PM confirmed.

224-th pp in the Wehrmacht never existed. Could it be that the military groups from the 24-th village walked around with the added number “2” on uniform?

The 361-th pp will be formed only 1.4.42 g. And will be part of the 90-th light African division. Therefore, he also could not be in Koenigsberg.

The 368-th settlement from the 207-th front, which will be redeployed to Germany in the autumn of the 1939, will participate in the war in the West. 10.7.40 g. Will return to Germany and in March 1941 of the year there will be reorganized into three security divisions.

RMs that are again confirmed are true only for two regiments (1 and 24), and for the other three are misinformation.

Confirmed 20 AK headquarters in Danzig ...


The 20th AK will begin its formation in November 1940 of the year in Germany. In Danzig, he can only get after January 1941 year. Pay attention to the scale of misinformation by the German command of our intelligence!

In Rastenburg, in the barracks on Hindenburg-Strasse Street, there are 23 and 45 points (23 points at 25.8 were noted in Lykk, and 45 points - at 1.1.40 in Zboino). 413 items are deployed in Seyny (located on Myshynets on 26.6), 212 items are also marked there. The data comes in for the first time, requires verification ...


The 23-th subdivision is part of the 11-th pd, which is deployed in the West and only 10.3.41 will arrive in East Prussia. No way this regiment could not be located 25.8.40 in the city of Lykk.

The 45th settlement (21th settlement) and the 413th settlement could be located on the territory of East Prussia.

212-th mp did not exist. It can’t be the 212-th pp from the 79-th bp, since it is already indicated above in the special message.

There are four warships in the port of Gdynia, including one aircraft carrier, two ships are named: “Shleisen” and “Shleysvik-Malshtein ...”


Information about the aircraft carrier is erroneous.

The data in RM about license plates, divisions and regiments were confirmed at 20%, and at 80% they are misinformation. Such “accurate” and detailed information on the numbers of regiments, divisions, corps and 8-th A could be supplied to our intelligence only by the German command using militia groups. You have been shown that the RM RO ZAPOVO also includes a huge amount of disinformation.

Number of troops with known numbers


A similar situation is with the formations with known numbers that are not confirmed are constantly found in the Republic of Moldova. For example, the intelligence you already know:



The error in determining the numbers of army headquarters is 100%, and the headquarters of the corps is 71 ... 86%. By the number of PDs, the error is 56 ... 59%. The number of divisions with known numbers even exceeds their actual number.

According to the infantry regiments, the numbers for 88% regiments are known. Amazing accuracy! All the more clearly visible intelligence errors in determining the number of tank troops: there are no matches! Once again, you can make sure that the intelligence knows only what the German command shows it ... Almost the same in the following intelligence summary:
In East Prussia and former Poland ... on 25.8.40 it was established: 174 pp (of which 154 with set numbering), which is 58 pd. On 45 divisions (from 58) established locations for their headquarters, on 28 divisions - numbering.

11 Mountain Rifle Regiments with established numbering, which amounts to 4 mountain rifle divisions .6-7 tank divisions. 2-3 motorized divisions ...

12 AK headquarters, of which nine - with established numbering. The identified forces are combined into four armies, of which established the location of the three army headquarters - Warsaw, Radom and Krakow, the fourth army headquarters is supposed to be in Koenigsberg ...


Again, a huge number of infantry regiments with famous numbers. There are 58 divisions, of which 28 numbers are known! Only there was only 16... Mountain Rifle Regiments, Tank and Motorized Divisions was not at all... Intelligence counted 12 AK headquarters, of which 9 with established numbers! Only everything was five AK headquarters and two reduced headquarters corps ... Intelligence counted 3-4 army headquarters, and there was only one - 18-th ... In intelligence, no one even doubted the information provided for analysis to the General Staff, but it turned out to be largely misinformation ...

SC Intelligence and General Staff


RU and the General Staff work in a single bundle: intelligence receives information and double-checks it. The General Staff analyzes the Republic of Moldova and determines the number of German troops at the border, with which Germany can start a war with the USSR. The General Staff is also obliged to determine the directions of the main attacks of the enemy.

We have seen major intelligence errors in overstating the number of German formations at the border since the spring of 1940. The situation will not change until the outbreak of war. A sufficiently detailed disinformation about the deployment of German troops was to create the illusion of omniscience at the command of the spacecraft and the leadership of the USSR. The intelligence failed to find out about the presence and deployment of large headquarters of the enemy’s mobile troops at the border. All these major blunders of intelligence led to the sad events at the beginning of the war.

Admission 11.9.40 RU:
... The total number of divisions in the German army on 10.9.1940 until 208-228 pd (including up to 8 motorized) and 15-17 td. Of this number of divisions, more than one third (up to 85) of the front and more than half (up to 9) are concentrated in the East and Southeast ...
According to Muller-Hillebrand, the total number of ground troops divisions was:





Therefore, information about208-228 front"Is a mistake in the work of intelligence, which overestimated the number of divisions by 33 ... 46%. The figure below shows the actual number of ground forces divisions in Germany and information on the number of divisions coming from intelligence. It can be seen that the information in the RM is significantly overstated.



And what mistakes were made by the General Staff of the spacecraft? We come to consider one of the major errors of the General Staff (according to the author), which led to the same consequences as errors in the work of intelligence.

Note by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and Chief of the General Staff of the KA in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) - I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov on the basics of the deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East in the 1940 and 1941 years of 18.9.40:
... At present, Germany has deployed 205 – 226 PD (including up to 8 MD) and 15-17 TD, and in total - before 243 divisions, 20000 fields. guns of all calibres, 10000 tanks and from 14200 to 15000 aircraft ...

Of the indicated number of divisions, up to 85 infantry and up to 9 tank divisions are concentrated in the East and Southeast. The prevailing military situation in Western Europe allows the Germans to transfer most of their forces against our app. borders. With the war still unfinished with England, it can be presumed that in occupied countries and regions Germany would leave up to 50 divisions and inland up to 20 divisions.

Thus, from the above 243 divisions before 173 divisions, - of which up to 140 infantry, 15 – 17 tank, 8 motorized, 5 light and 3 airborne ... will be directed against our borders...


In the presented document, the specialists of the General Staff made a mistake on the basis of an erroneous estimation of the total number of divisions in Germany by the RU. General Staff experts called excessively high number of divisions to be allocated for war with the USSR. This number will be adjusted upwards in new documents, but will never be reached before the outbreak of war, as the German command decided to conduct military operations fewer troops! This number appears more than once in the Note:
... You can expect the following deployment and grouping of its forces:

- to the north of the mouth of the San River, the Germans can have up to 123 infantry and up to 10 tank divisions and most of their aviation;

- south of the mouth of the river. San to 50 infantry and 5 tank divisions, with their main grouping in the area of ​​Holm, Tomashev, Lublin ... (in total up to 188 divisions. - Auth.) [With a different] version of Germany’s actions, it should be expected that the Germans will allocate 110 for operations in the south –120 PD, the bulk of its tanks and aircraft, leaving for operations in the north 50 – 60 PD, part of the tanks and aircraft [total to 160-180 divisions. - Auth.]. The main, most politically beneficial for Germany, and, therefore, the most likely is the 1-th version of its actions, i.e. with the deployment of the main forces of the German army north of the mouth of the river. San ...


Continued concentration of German troops in the East


After the arrival of the headquarters of 18-A to the East at the end of July 1940, he began to carry out the functions of command of all troops in the East. During this period, the headquarters of 18-th A is subordinate to OKH. From that moment on, the headquarters of the Eastern Group began to play a supporting role. It is possible that later he began to play the role of a screen, which covered the command of Army Group B. 20.9.40 d. The command of Army Group B arrived in East Prussia and took over the command of all the troops in the East.



According to the Muller-Hillebrand data in the East, as of 7.10.40 there were three armies, ten AKs, two reduced corps and 30 divisions. Two more divisions were in Vienna. The headquarters of the armies are located in the following settlements: 18 — in Bydgoszcz, 12 — in Krakow and 4 — in Warsaw.

The 18th A included the 1th, 16th and 26th AK, and the 4th A included the 12th, 30th, 44th AK and the staff of the reduced corps zbVXXXV. 12-I was represented by 3, 9, 14, 17 AK and the headquarters of the reduced corps zbVXXXIV.

In addition to the listed headquarters, Army Group B was subordinate to the 40 Motorized Corps, which 15.9.40 began to reorganize from the 40 AK. At the source, the location of the headquarters of the 40 th MK marks the territory of Poland. There is another inconsistency with the Muller-Hillebrand data: the location of the 2th building block (from 9.40 to 2.41 years) and the 9 building block (from 9.40 to 11.40 years), included in the 40 storage unit, is also indicated on the territory of Poland .



According to the author, there were 30 ... 31 divisions in East Prussia and Poland. Subsequently, until 21.12.40, an increase in the grouping of German troops in the East did not occur. However, intelligence over the next three months could not understand that the number of "troops" it had discovered at the border was greatly exaggerated ...

According to Müller-Hillebrand, by 7.10.40, there was the next increase in the German group in the East.



Schedule of changes in the number of German troops at the border


The materials of the article considered and will consider the number of German troops at the Soviet-German border in accordance with the data from the Republic of Moldova and their actual number. Visual material allows you to better understand the problem with the number of troops in the Republic of Moldova.

Long work was carried out to verify the location of enemy divisions and identified errors in calculating the number of divisions by the author. The picture presented at the end of the message is an illustration of the errors in the work of our intelligence on estimating the number of German divisions with enough "exact»Knowledge of the names of PP and PD. I would like to note that the schedule is more of an illustrated material, rather than a reference guide ...

When plotting the graphs, the following inaccuracies were identified in the previously submitted article:

- 251 I arrived at the eastern border not in July 1940, but in May 1941;

- 62 I arrived in Poland 20.6.40 g;

- 292 I arrived in Poland in July 1940;

- 13-I fled to Poland not in September 1940 of the year, but 30 of August;

- 1-I cd was lost from the consideration of troops that were relocated to the East in September 1940 year.

When plotting, the author encountered the following problem: for a significant part of the divisions, not a specific date of redeployment is indicated, but only a month. Groups of divisions that do not have specific arrival dates in the East were arranged according to the months in which they are marked at the eastern border.

For some of them it was possible to establish that they arrived at the beginning or at the end of the month. For these compounds, the author accepted that the beginning of the month is the third day, and the end of the month is the 27 day.

For the remaining divisions, which did not have a date of arrival in the East, it was accepted that they arrived in the middle of the month - the 15 day. There are such divisions: among the arrivals in September 1940 of the year - 9, in December - 2, in January 1941 of the year - 1, in April - 8, in May - 16 and in June - 24.

This approach somewhat distorts the real data, but as an illustrative material it clearly shows errors in the work of intelligence.

For divisions without a date of arrival to the East in July, 1940 assumed that they arrived at the border of 20 in July. Halder’s memoirs say that these divisions completed their redeployment by July 20.

The above information related to the actual location of German divisions in Poland and East Prussia.

Let's talk about information from the RM. In 1941 Intelligence Directorates, divisions in the following territories were considered as troops concentrated on our border: in East Prussia, in the Warsaw direction (Polish territory against ZAPOVO), in the Lublin-Krakow region (Polish territory against KOVO), on the border of Slovakia (against KOVO), in the Uzhgorod direction (Carpathian Ukraine, against KOVO), the Danzig - Poznan - Thorn region, in Romania (Moldova and Northern Dobrudzhia). The indicated territories were also considered when the author calculated the number of German troops in the 1940 year.

The difficulty was that since October 1940, German troops were discovered by intelligence in Romania, but their number in Moldova and Northern Dobrudzhia is not indicated in the Republic of Moldova. In October of 1940, the Republic of Moldova says that there is a group of German troops on the eastern border of Romania, but a map with the location of the troops is not provided. Therefore, these divisions when scheduling not taken into account, i.e. the number of German troops near our border in the Republic of Moldova is somewhat underestimated. A similar situation exists with German troops in Slovakia and in the Carpathian Ukraine. In the Republic of Moldova, information about them until the spring of 1941 almost did not occur.

Such a detailed analysis of the data on the movement of German troops from 1940 to 22.6.41 was encountered by the author only in the series “Unexpected war ...”. It is not known what sources of information the author used. failed to install with her. The data on the graphs do not contradict the data cited by the author Vick. Differences exist only in the approach to information for the period from 20 to 22 on June 1941.

The author, as the basis for calculating the number of divisions in the indicated period, used the X-NUMX RU report. Using this document, one can estimate the size of the German group in the same territories that were previously considered by our intelligence. The document indicates that the number of troops in the directions increased due to the approach of the new divisions 22.6.41 and 20 in June. When constructing the schedule, the author accepted that there was no change in the number of troops from 21 to 1.6.41. The summary outlines a similar approach.

It should be noted that 22 June reconnaissance should urgently explain the unexpected appearance of German troops directly at the border. Most likely, the RU tried to overestimate the number of German troops at the border in the first military intelligence report. An example of this is the increase in the number of APs on the Suvalkinsky ledge due to two SS divisions, information about which appeared in May 1941 and has not been confirmed. TD selective SS units in that period did not exist. No one saw the military personnel and equipment from these divisions. It was also recorded an increase in the non-existent group of German troops on the border of Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine by 4-6 divisions, which allegedly came up for 20-21 on June 1941.

A graph with the change in the number of German troops at the border will be given in parts of the materials for the period under review. it should be noted that according to the time stamps on 7.10.40 and 21.12.40, it does not contradict the Muller-Hillebrand data.



Annotation of subsequent articles


The next two parts will be devoted to the RM of the beginning of the 1941 year. It is planned that the third part will be assigned to the headquarters of army groups, field armies and AK. Next will be presented material on radio intelligence. In the fifth part, consider mobile troops. Further, in two parts, the author will present his version of events about the unexpectedness of the outbreak of war for the leadership of the country and the spacecraft.

I would like to say thanks to the administration of the site "Military Review" for the help and support of the author. There would not be this, and there would be no such material. Having started work on the material of the article, the author discovered a lot of new things and looked at the indicated problem from the other side. Without publishing material on the site, the author would have long abandoned this topic.

To be continued ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
Intelligence service. Information about the German troops in 1938 and in 1940
1939-40 Intelligence about German troops near our border
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  1. polpot
    polpot 1 October 2019 07: 10
    +13
    Thanks for the article, interesting material, I look forward to continuing.
    1. AsmyppoL
      7 October 2019 08: 43
      +2
      Thank you, Polpot!
      Thanks Alex013!
  2. Albatroz
    Albatroz 1 October 2019 07: 39
    +8
    I read that
    Immediately after the defeat of France, on July 4, 1940, Soviet intelligence informed the Kremlin about the transfer of the first German divisions to the Soviet border. In total, on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, foreign intelligence sent to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) More than 120 detailed messages. They not only tracked the military preparations of Germany, but also contained information on military-economic preparations for the operation of the Soviet territories, which would be captured by the Wehrmacht.
    .
    The Red Chapel opened the preparations of Germany just in 1940.
    I think that even without information about the LEGAL decision of the leadership of the 3rd Reich for a war with the USSR, the Soviet foreign policy leadership should properly evaluate the ACTUAL preparations of the Germans and others like them for such a war.
    The article is informative, I read with great interest
  3. Alex013
    Alex013 1 October 2019 08: 24
    +11
    I read the article with interest, each subsequent supplement previously published. thank
  4. ccsr
    ccsr 1 October 2019 13: 40
    -10
    Author:
    Eugene
    RM at the indicated time significantly differed from the real data. With such a significant difference in the data, the presence in the RM of the exact names of infantry units and formations can only be due to the fact that the German command used fictitious formations of military personnel with false signs on uniform.

    The author does not reinforce his fantasies. Not only that, there is a disinformation guideline where this event is not even mentioned:

    GERMAN DISINFORMATION DIRECTIVE
    Supreme High Command
    Operational Headquarters
    Country Defense Department (Operations Division)
    No. 44142 / 41. Sov.secret
    Fuhrer rate
    November 15.02.41, XNUMX
    Base. Order of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces. Headquarters operational management. Department of Defense of the country No. 22048 / 40 from 3.02.41 Propulsion Sov. secretly.
    ADVENTANT DISINFORMATION DIRECTIVE
    The purpose of misinformation is to hide preparations for Operation Barbarossa. This main goal should be the basis of all measures to misinform the enemy.
    In the first period of time, until about April, it is necessary to continue to maintain public uncertainty regarding our intentions. At the next stage of preparation for Operation Barbarossa, which will no longer be possible to hide, false measures should be presented, carried out ostensibly to divert attention from a possible invasion of England.
    The following are guidelines for misinformation.
    At the first stage. Emphasizing the impending invasion of England; extensive information on new means of attack on transports; exaggeration of the significance of the auxiliary operations “Marita”, “Sunflower”, the actions of the 10 Air Corps and the number of forces intended to carry out these operations.
    Motivation for strategic focus and deployment for Operation Barbarossa. The deployment of forces for Operation Barbarossa should be conducted under the guise of an exchange of forces between West, Germany and the East, pulling up of the rear echelons for Operation Marita, or, in the end, under the guise of providing rear cover from Russia in case of transition to defense.
    In the second stage. The strategic deployment of forces for Operation Barbarossa should be presented in the light of the greatest disinformation maneuver in the history of wars in order to divert attention from the last preparations for the invasion of England.
    This event may be successful, since the first strike on England, thanks to the intensive use of new military equipment and the preponderance of British forces only at sea, can be carried out by relatively insignificant forces. In this regard, the bulk of the German troops can be used for demonstrative maneuver. Strategic deployment against England, on the contrary, will begin only at the same time as the first strike.
    The implementation of misinformation. The information service, which is managed by the head of intelligence and counterintelligence of the high command of the armed forces, should be guided by the basic principle: use general information carefully, only strictly through the channels that will be indicated by the head of intelligence and counterintelligence. The latter also directs the transfer of appropriate misinformation to the attaché in neutral countries and the attaché of neutral states in Berlin. In general, disinformation should take the form of a mosaic pattern, which is determined by common goals.
    To ensure the coherence of the practical activities conducted by the branches of the armed forces (mainly the transfer of troops) with the activities of the information service of the high command, the operational leadership headquarters (national defense department), by agreement with the main headquarters of the armed forces and the intelligence and counterintelligence department of the high command, will periodically Depending on the situation, replenish existing general instructions with new instructions ...


    Полный текст
    Source: http://liewar.ru/knigi-o-vojne/348-1941-god-uroki-i-vyvody.html?start=5
    And where is at least one hint of the author’s fantasies here?
    Moreover, I have repeatedly denied this lie by the fact that radio reconnaissance by callsign and the handwriting of radio operators will immediately determine which connection is in the reconnaissance strip, even if they change all the insignia. In a word, the author either does not understand this or suffers from an obsession, but lies at the same time without embarrassment.
    Having no sources of information in the higher spheres of Germany, our intelligence officers did not know before the war that in the middle of the summer of the 1940 year a final decision was made to start a war with the Soviet Union in the 1941 year.

    This is complete nonsense, because as long as there is no formalized documentary solution, all conversations cannot be considered reliable information until directives appear. Hitler canceled preparations for an attack on England, although such a decision was made. With the same success, he could also cancel preparations for the attack if he correctly assessed the military potential of the USSR in the 1941 year.
  5. ccsr
    ccsr 1 October 2019 14: 01
    -12
    Author:
    Eugene
    In this part, materials from the books of B. Müller-Hillebrand "German Army in 1933-1945" will be used.

    The author is too trusted in the book of this author, although many military historians have long been refuted by some materials of this publication, which, as always, are beneficial for the Western version of the outcome of the war. Therefore, everything that Evgeni writes on the forum should be treated with caution - he famously lied about 3 thousand German tanks, which even in B. Müller-Gillebrand's materials is refuted to the greater side.
    That is why the RM ROs of the ZapOVO headquarters included in their report part of the compounds that RU and the General Staff considered concentrated in front of PribOVO.

    This is generally amateurish nonsense, because the RU maintains a record of all formations, and even if the intelligence of another district reports on finding some kind of connection in its band, this does not mean that it will enter the daily intelligence of the RU. The author has just wild ideas about how intelligence works, which is why he has irrepressible fantasies for any reason. As an example, this:
    The author will devote more time in the article to RM RO ZAPOVO to understand the amount of misinformation in these materials. We will start our consideration with a summary of September 19.9.40, XNUMX. Later we will analyze other RM ZAPOVOs.

    How can one seriously assess this material from the point of view of assessing the enemy in May-June 1941, if at that moment even Barbarossa's directive had not been issued? Yes, during this time, the German command could replay the scenario itself more than once, not to mention the fact that external factors, such as the actions of England or the war in Yugoslavia, would have forced to change the very course of preparations for a war with the USSR. In a word, the author again took up his favorite business - sucking "facts" out of his finger, which speaks of his prejudiced attitude towards the materials of military history. As the saying goes, "whatever the child ...", but it's sad that some readers will take his lie for the truth.
  6. ccsr
    ccsr 2 October 2019 19: 47
    -10
    Author:
    Eugene
    There is a lot of incomprehensible information. If you saw the number “27” on the shoulder straps, then you saw the officer of the division headquarters close enough. The question arises: "In what form did the intelligence officer see the officer or officers of the 27th Armored Division?"
    As working clothes, the tankers were given a uniform of black or gray color, which in the future began to be used for all occasions. The figure on the left shows the tanker’s jackets in black and gray, and for comparison, on the right is the casual tunic of the infantry lieutenant.

    Since the author does not know that 27 TDs of the Wehrmacht were formed on the basis of the 1940th military base in November 17, it never occurred to him that the military personnel of these 27th combat units could accompany the armored vehicles for this formation:
    27 Artillery Regiment
    27th Reserve Battalion
    27th Reconnaissance Battalion
    27th Anti-Tank Battalion
    27th Engineer Battalion
    27-th battalion of signalmen
    27th auxiliary infantry battalion.
    Because the formation of the TD takes quite a lot of time, it is not surprising that in the month of September not all military personnel of the 27th regiment received new uniforms and new insignia.
    It is interesting that the intelligence and radio reconnaissance of OSNAZ recorded the presence of the headquarters of the 12th AK in the city of Insterburg (hundreds of kilometers from its actual location) until June 1941 inclusive. It turns out that the German command not only played the game “insignia and rumors” with our intelligence, but also had fun with “radio games”, confusing radio intelligence.

    Another stupid thing, because when moving formations and associations, the commander (commander) and communication center can remain until the last at permanent deployment points and manage subordinate units from this place. It would be a nonsense to explain this to the author, because he would never understand what the two positions of the governing body were, and hence all his lies. So it’s not intelligence that got confused, but the author is illiterate in these matters.
    Information about the aircraft carrier is erroneous.

    The author again shows the denseness, because at that time not only ships with carrier-based aircraft fell under the category of "aircraft carrier", but also those who had one or two aircraft for reconnaissance and who splashed down:
    All cruisers Kriegsmarine, with the exception of Emden, at different times in their careers carried equipment designed for launching and lifting seaplanes, but only on Nuremberg and the heavy cruisers Admiral Hipper, Blucher and Prince Eugene air catapults were installed. Hangars were available only on heavy cruisers.

    This article consists of such fantasies, and this is immediately visible to those who have an idea of ​​military affairs.
  7. VS
    VS 4 October 2019 08: 30
    -9
    the author writes: "" The General Staff is obliged to determine the directions of the enemy's main attacks.

    We saw major intelligence errors in the overestimation of the number of German formations near the border starting in the spring of 1940. The situation will not change until the start of the war. Sufficiently detailed misinformation about the deployment of German troops was supposed to create the illusion of omniscience among the command of the spacecraft and the leadership of the USSR. Intelligence failed to find out about the presence and deployment of large headquarters of the enemy's mobile forces near the border. All these major intelligence blunders led to sad events at the beginning of the war.

    Nonsense)) and Nonsense))

    The tragedy of the beginning of the Second World War was led not by the intelligence cho that there did not see, IMHO, the illiterate aftar and clearly trying to make the guilty intelligence out of intelligence - the pre-war planning of the General Staff. And for this it is enough to read the work of the VNU GSh "1941 - lessons and conclusions". TAMM completely shows the REASONS of the tragedy of the beginning of the war and intelligence there practically does not appear as at least one of the main culprits, all the more so))

    author - THE GERMANS WOULD NOT FIGHT KNOW WHAT parts of the RKKA opposed them! The Abwehr, who was such a skillful type and beat the RC General Staff, saw "on our side, in each district, NOT MORE THAN 2-3 TANK divisions of the Red Army - ON THE DISTRICT, Karlusha!))

    And cho - DOES NOT INFORM THIS UNKNOWLEDGE or the poor intelligence of Abwehr destroy our border armies in dust :?

    so it’s not about intelligence in PRINCIPLE, but what were the plans in the General Staff in case of war. And this is what the officers of the VNU General Staff show in "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions" as well as the Zakharovs Gretsovs, Baghramyans Gareevs Kokoshin and other SMART and NOT ANONYMOUS historians ..

    So - both the aftara and its articles are illiterate watered intelligence by slops - into the furnace))

    the author writes: "" I would like to say the words of gratitude to the administration of the site "Military Review" for the help and support of the author. This would not exist, and there would be no such material. Having started work on the article material, the author discovered a lot of new things and looked at the indicated problem from the other side. Without publishing the material on the site, the author would have abandoned this topic long ago. ""

    touches that adm. The site supports stupid anisovechin of this kind ((and aftaru - it’s better to abandon your writings))
    Your anonymous articles give nothing but stupidity ...
    1. jhltyjyjctw
      jhltyjyjctw 5 October 2019 15: 19
      -2
      I tried to somehow publish an article about the true number of former prisoners and special immigrants in the Red Army and a clearly overestimated assessment of their contribution to the victory over the Wehrmacht, collected the necessary factual material, some of which were naturally quoted (excerpts from the decisions of the GKO, orders of NGOs, correspondence of the Gulag leadership). They refused to publish, citing citations. I spat and do not communicate with VO anymore, sometimes I read something. I believe there are Russophobes alone. Here are articles like this one that suit them. They even provide some kind of support. I wonder what it is expressed in.
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 5 October 2019 18: 00
        -13
        Quote: jhltyjyjctw
        Here are articles like this one that suit them.

        I also noticed that this author shamelessly lies about military intelligence materials over several articles, and his nonsense is readily posted here. So you have to expose this rogue, who does not have the slightest idea of ​​conducting intelligence at that time, makes stunning conclusions that inexperienced people can believe in, and for sane people this causes a rush of such shameless lies. Apparently, the author fulfills the order well, once he reproduces the same lie over several articles.
  8. VS
    VS 4 October 2019 08: 40
    -8
    the author writes: "" On this difference in the number of divisions, Oleg Yuryevich builds his version and was even going to write a book about betrayal in RU. ""

    1st and why is the author lying to me and does not blush?))

    Maybe the poet is hiding behind a network click who is hiding her name in the filthy articles - what fears that he can be found for LIES?))
    2nd calm down daraga an anonymous author with a klikuha instead of a name - I had TWO books on this topic published in early June - "Before June 22" and "Myths on June 22" where the nonsense of him and his anonymous illiterate girlfriend - they understand too)))

    Intelligence of DIFFERENT departments - and this is not only RU General Staff around which the author runs with joyful screams - ahhh, intelligence overslept everything !! - All that was needed by the military and the Kremlin was brought on time. The reason for the tragedy of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War was not in intelligence, which they supposedly did not see there, but in the PLANS of our military ...
    But in order to understand these things, it is necessary to have BRAINS and not to hide behind network clicks ...
    1. AsmyppoL
      6 October 2019 17: 01
      +12
      In the article, the author Eugene wrote about the point of view of the writer O. Yu. Kozinkin: "On this difference in the number of divisions, Oleg Yuryevich builds his version and was even going to write a book about betrayal in RU. "
      We are talking about a different number of divisions in the Republic of Moldova Reconnaissance Directorate of the General Staff of the SC and in the Republic of Moldova reconnaissance department of the headquarters of ZapOVO.

      Writer O.Yu. Kozinkin criticizing the author replies: “1Why is the author Lying on me and does not blush? Maybe the poet is hiding behind a network click who is hiding her name in the nasty articles - what fears that he can be found for LIES? ”

      In both his answers there are a lot of literary errors and rudeness. It turns out that someone else composes material for him in books. It is strange that O.Yu. Kozinkin, for more than 10-year literary activity, did not understand the most elementary things and easily deceives readers of the commentary on the article.

      I found a similar dispute on the Military Literature forum at

      https://militera.borda.ru/?1-3-0-00001624-000-200-0

      It also says that Oleg Yuryevich does not understand the different numbers of German divisions in different RMs. He builds his entire fantastic version on one quote from the memoirs of General Sandalov. He does not need to verify the accuracy of this information and easily trace the fingers of his non-readers ... And this is a fraud ... There is absolutely no truth in his books, but only personal considerations of Mr. Kozinkin ...

      Here are his quotes from the specified forum:
      “RU GSh clearly underestimated the data on the Germans on ZAPOVO ... non-profiters (this is about our military commanders. Whether they were good or bad, let's say later. But they can only call them boor ...) it seemed smarter then to blame on reconnaissance which they didn’t report to them on time ... RU GSh really deliberately distorted information - on the deployment of German troops. Creating the illusion that the main forces of the Germans were against the KOVO. Underestimating intentionally against the ZAPOVO ... ”

      “Analysis of ALL data shows -“ And the General Staff of the General Staff and the intelligence of the NKVD and the NKGB - ALL that is needed - they gave the military ... ”
      We are now studying and analyzing in detail what intelligence provided to the country's leadership and the army. As of 31.12.40, it was clear that intelligence, apart from desa, did not give anything. Then it will be the same ...

      “Sandalov shows that they were given data on 5 of June - against ONLY BREST ie against the 4 army revealed - up to 15 PD, 5 TD, 2 MD and 2 CD Germans! And Sandalov also showed that at 21 in June they knew that against the ZAPOV more than 45 German divisions were expected!
      He refers to the district HQ reports and we know that they DIFFERENT with the data of the General Staff.
      WHAT intelligence did not reveal the headquarters of the tank units of the Germans ??? And where and how did Sandalov 5 (FIFTH !!) still June gave data about - FIVE so on. , TWO MD, 2 cd and 15 pd Gnemtsev - ONLY against only Brest - from 30 identified against the ZAPOVO German divisions ???? “

      This is exactly what I had in mind when I said that Oleg YUrevich for TEN YEARS of his writing did not understand that the lines of demarcation in the preparation of RM PribOVO and ZAPOVO are different. This was described in detail in the materials of the article and in the materials of the series “Unexpected war ...” with quoting fragments of text from intelligence reports ZAPOVO and PribOVO ... Do you think he does not know about this? He knows, but having left his version, he sends his 10 books to mukalatura ... For the sake of preserving his readers, he deliberately deceives Oleg Yuryevich, who lives on our site under the creative name “Vasily”. Therefore, he accuses the treason of employees of the Intelligence Agency.
      And he also wrote about the new book in the same place: “The fact that it was the RU GSh that distorted the information is INTELLIGENT by fitting it to the idea that the main blow will be south of woodland - I have been writing for more than a year already and the new book will also talk about it ...”

      And Oleg Yuryevich writes that this is a lie ... It turns out that the writer himself is deceiving the forum users ... There the same thing is repeated many times on the forum: about the distortion of conscious information in the Intelligence Directorate and about non-commissioners ... An illiterate writer,
      1. AsmyppoL
        6 October 2019 17: 05
        +11
        An illiterate writer who presents his understanding of the situation as true. Moreover, he completely lacks the analysis of RM.

        Kozinkin: “The foreman in general either was a double agent or - it was most likely used by the Germans knowing that he was an agent))) he drove DIESES most of all ... ”

        Not understanding the events, he simply builds his crazy versions without evidence ...

        For example, his next pearl in the same place on the number of German divisions at the border: “All the divisional commanders, including the same LenVO, were given a common figure - about 120 German divisions on the 21 of June ... And now look - TOTAL - 120 divisions are expected and THIS number is brought to the divisors and this figure coincides with reality ... ”

        According to the West Summary as of 1.6.41, the 120-122 of the German divisions are really called, but they are not distributed that way, as Oleg Yuryevich fantasizes.

        Kozinkin O.Yu .: "South Group - 43 Division. Group North - 29 divisions.
        Group Center - 51 Division. AND TOGETHER = 123 of the GERMAN division only ... i.e. by PribOVO - by 30 divisions, by KOVO - by 42’s, and the remaining German divisions by 50, of 120 identified only German, where they should be - not against Belarus?! .. ”


        This is a typical example of fitting their intelligence reports to their fantastic version. After all, not everyone will begin to recheck RM!

        Let's see how the German divisions were distributed according to intelligence reports.
        Let's see the same N5 West summary: “The total number of German troops on our western border with Germany and Romania (including Moldova and Dobrudja) on 1 June reaches 120-122 divisions ... In the directions the German troops are distributed:
        a) in East Prussia 23-24 divisions ...
        b) in the Warsaw direction (against ZAPOVO) 30 divisions ...
        c) in the Lublin-Krakow region (against KOVO) 35-36 divisions ...
        d) in the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - 6 infantry divisions ...
        e) in Slovakia (in the area of ​​Duplin, Presov, Michalovce) - 5 divisions ...
        f) in the Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions;
        g) in Moldova and Northern Dobrogea - 17 divisions, including: four motorized, one mountain and two tank ... ”


        Total 120-122 German divisions. In the first military report, the Intelligence Agency will begin to increase the number of divisions using unverified intelligence. Then 4-5 of new divisions will appear against PriOVO ... 6 of new divisions will also appear in Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine.

        Oleg Yuryevich using the number of the 123 divisions to play their distribution along the front.

        In accordance with the Republic of Moldova, there were up to 62 German divisions against the KOVO and OdVO troops, and a constant number of divisions — 30 — remained for almost a month and a half against the ZapOVO troops! So where should the main blow be expected ??

        In fact, there were up to 78-79 divisions in the zone of responsibility of the intelligence of PribOVO and ZAPOVO (instead of the divisions 25 + 30 = 55 discovered by the reconnaissance). Against KOVO in the Lublin-Krakow region, the data were close. In Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine, there were no German troops at the border. Instead of 17 German divisions, only 7 was deployed on the border in Romania, and the eighth was concentrated ...

        I tried to show those readers who can read Kozinkin’s comments, his full competence, amateurism and fraud ...
      2. VS
        VS 9 October 2019 13: 43
        -7
        Well, WHERE in my books did you even see a word about TRIETNESS in RU GSH - you are a cowardly anonymous ??)) Do you want to contact your opponents by SURNAME - indicate YOUR last name)) Or - you are so afraid of calling yourself because you’re stupidly Lying in your libel for exploration is YOU ??))
  9. AsmyppoL
    6 October 2019 17: 18
    +13
    Quote: jhltyjyjctw
    I tried to somehow publish an article about the true number of former prisoners and special immigrants in the Red Army and a clearly overestimated assessment of their contribution to the victory over the Wehrmacht, collected the necessary factual material, some of which were naturally quoted (excerpts from the decisions of the GKO, orders of NGOs, correspondence of the Gulag leadership). They refused to publish, citing citations. I spat and do not communicate with VO anymore, sometimes I read something. I believe there are Russophobes alone. Here are articles like this one that suit them. They even provide some kind of support. I wonder what it is expressed in.


    When I wrote words of gratitude to the site administration, it was understood that from October 2018 to May 2019, I submitted my first publication six times and they were rejected due to the use of a large number of quotes, errors, etc. Six times! And you broke after the first time. I had to learn how to fulfill the site’s design requirements. For the seventh time, an article was adopted on the Southern Front ... Seven months of continuous alteration of the material was spent on the first article ...
    Thanks to the administration for their patience and for explaining in detail how to correct the material ...
    The second time I am ready to say thank you for the non-format of my posts. There are certain requirements for the volume (format of the article). Sometimes the volume of the material of the parts exceeded the norm, but it was difficult to break it. The administration was moving forward.
    The third thank you would like to say again for the patience of the administration. Even having learned how to design, the human factor came into play: either I forgot to insert the intro to the parts about intelligence, then I forgot about the headlines, then after numerous copyright edits the proposal did not fit ...
    Everyone understands that the material is interesting ...
  10. AsmyppoL
    6 October 2019 17: 45
    +11
    Quote: ccsr
    Author:
    Eugene
    RM at the indicated time significantly differed from the real data. With such a significant difference in the data, the presence in the RM of the exact names of infantry units and formations can only be due to the fact that the German command used fictitious formations of military personnel with false signs on uniform.

    The author does not reinforce his fantasies. Not only that, there is a disinformation guideline where this event is not even mentioned:

    GERMAN DISINFORMATION DIRECTIVE
    Supreme High Command
    Operational Headquarters
    Country Defense Department (Operations Division)
    No. 44142 / 41. Sov.secret
    Fuhrer rate
    November 15.02.41, XNUMX
    Base. Order of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces. Headquarters operational management. Department of Defense of the country No. 22048 / 40 from 3.02.41 Propulsion Sov. secretly.
    ADVENTANT DISINFORMATION DIRECTIVE
    The purpose of misinformation is to hide preparations for Operation Barbarossa. This main goal should be the basis of all measures to misinform the enemy.
    In the first period of time, until about April, it is necessary to continue to maintain public uncertainty regarding our intentions. At the next stage of preparation for Operation Barbarossa, which will no longer be possible to hide, false measures should be presented, carried out ostensibly to divert attention from a possible invasion of England.
    The following are guidelines for misinformation.
    At the first stage. Emphasizing the impending invasion of England; extensive information on new means of attack on transports; exaggeration of the significance of the auxiliary operations “Marita”, “Sunflower”, the actions of the 10 Air Corps and the number of forces intended to carry out these operations.
    Motivation for strategic focus and deployment for Operation Barbarossa. The deployment of forces for Operation Barbarossa should be conducted under the guise of an exchange of forces between West, Germany and the East, pulling up of the rear echelons for Operation Marita, or, in the end, under the guise of providing rear cover from Russia in case of transition to defense.
    In the second stage. The strategic deployment of forces for Operation Barbarossa should be presented in the light of the greatest disinformation maneuver in the history of wars in order to divert attention from the last preparations for the invasion of England.
    This event may be successful, since the first strike on England, thanks to the intensive use of new military equipment and the preponderance of British forces only at sea, can be carried out by relatively insignificant forces. In this regard, the bulk of the German troops can be used for demonstrative maneuver. Strategic deployment against England, on the contrary, will begin only at the same time as the first strike.
    The implementation of misinformation. The information service, which is managed by the head of intelligence and counterintelligence of the high command of the armed forces, should be guided by the basic principle: use general information carefully, only strictly through the channels that will be indicated by the head of intelligence and counterintelligence. The latter also directs the transfer of appropriate misinformation to the attaché in neutral countries and the attaché of neutral states in Berlin. In general, disinformation should take the form of a mosaic pattern, which is determined by common goals.
    To ensure the coherence of the practical activities conducted by the branches of the armed forces (mainly the transfer of troops) with the activities of the information service of the high command, the operational leadership headquarters (national defense department), by agreement with the main headquarters of the armed forces and the intelligence and counterintelligence department of the high command, will periodically Depending on the situation, replenish existing general instructions with new instructions ...


    Полный текст
    Source: http://liewar.ru/knigi-o-vojne/348-1941-god-uroki-i-vyvody.html?start=5
    And where is at least one hint of the author’s fantasies here?
    Moreover, I have repeatedly denied this lie by the fact that radio reconnaissance by callsign and the handwriting of radio operators will immediately determine which connection is in the reconnaissance strip, even if they change all the insignia. In a word, the author either does not understand this or suffers from an obsession, but lies at the same time without embarrassment.
    Having no sources of information in the higher spheres of Germany, our intelligence officers did not know before the war that in the middle of the summer of the 1940 year a final decision was made to start a war with the Soviet Union in the 1941 year.

    This is complete nonsense, because as long as there is no formalized documentary solution, all conversations cannot be considered reliable information until directives appear. Hitler canceled preparations for an attack on England, although such a decision was made. With the same success, he could also cancel preparations for the attack if he correctly assessed the military potential of the USSR in the 1941 year.


    As usual, Mr. Milchakov, if he doesn’t try to deceive his readers, then the day was lost to them in vain ... He lies by hammering huge quotes of text that confirm nothing ...

    What is his lie? The first is dates. The author showed his readers that in May 1940, our border (in Poland and East Prussia had about 7-8 German divisions, and our intelligence counted about 28! Increased the number of troops by more than three times !!! In the Republic of Moldova in July In August, September and September, the number of numbering divisions and regiments contained disinformation in 80% of cases! And how can you have supposedly verified information about regiments and divisions giving names (group numbers) that either did not exist or were located in the West? case of conscious misinformation issued by the German command, that is, disinformation using epaulets has already taken place since May 1940 of the year and continued in the autumn of that year.
    And the given Directive by Mr. Milchakov dates back to the 1941 year! How can I regulate the events of 1940 of the year in the document of the beginning of 1941 of the year? It operates on the principle: write any information that no one will analyze. No one reads the messages of this expert from the couch, they don’t interfere with a dispute with him, but simply minus him. I got it, in a word ...

    The second lie. The documents of this level do not spell out specific measures on how to conduct misinformation. With the help of which particular events this will be carried out by the special service and command. He outlined only a strategic direction. One of them is an overestimation of the number of troops, which is what is happening. But mainly infantry units are shown.

    I would advise you simply not to read the pearls of this expert from the sofa bed ...
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 6 October 2019 18: 45
      -12
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      The documents of this level do not spell out specific measures on how to conduct misinformation. With the help of which particular events this will be carried out by the special service and command.

      Well, let the author cite a document that spells out activities to mislead SC reconnaissance by changing the numbers of formations and units on the buttonholes. And at the same time he will explain how and why the radio scouts, without seeing the insignia, quite accurately determine the presence and belonging of the compounds in the reconnaissance strip.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      I would advise you simply not to read the pearls of this expert from the sofa bed ...

      I also advise you not to believe AsmyppoL, a professional liar, when he tries to cheat on his gullible public. Like this one for example:
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      And the given Directive Mr. Milchakov dates from 1941! How can the events of 1940 be regulated in a document from the beginning of 1941?

      The events of 1940 should not be taken seriously at all, because at that time the Barbarossa directive had not yet been issued, but the February directive was just issued after the plan of attack on the USSR began to be implemented. Once again, the author of the article has demonstrated a blatant illiteracy in military affairs.
  11. AsmyppoL
    6 October 2019 17: 58
    +12
    Quote: ccsr
    The author again shows the denseness, because at that time not only ships with carrier-based aircraft fell under the category of "aircraft carrier", but also those who had one or two aircraft for reconnaissance and who splashed down:
    All cruisers Kriegsmarine, with the exception of Emden, at different times in their careers carried equipment designed for launching and lifting seaplanes, but only on Nuremberg and the heavy cruisers Admiral Hipper, Blucher and Prince Eugene air catapults were installed. Hangars were available only on heavy cruisers.

    This article consists of such fantasies, and this is immediately visible to those who have an idea of ​​military affairs.


    This is generally a pearl of a boy from the 1st grade! Our "dumb" scouts called any ship that had catapults for launching seaplanes aircraft carriers.

    I would like to answer that only a stupid expert from the sofa or a brazen scammer thinks so! Why?

    Because in intelligence materials, our scouts called the heavy cruiser - the heavy cruiser, the light cruiser - the light cruiser, and the aircraft carrier - the aircraft carrier.

    Reconnaissance in the West ..., 1940: "... The state of the German navy
    on 1 of September 1940, by the beginning of the war, Germany had the following numbers in the fleet
    ships ...
    7 battleships ...
    2 HEAVY SHIP ...
    6 Light Cruisers ...
    30 destroyers ...
    Destroyers 22 ...
    Submarines 71 ...
    20 torpedo boats ...
    Patrol ships 22 ...
    80 minesweepers ...
    Aircraft carriers ... under construction - 1 ...

    Cruisers. The heavy cruiser Seidlitz is under construction, and the cruiser
    "Prince Eigen" - in a state of acceptance. According to reports, 9 August
    in Kiel, during a British raid, Prince Eigen was seriously injured
    denia in the stern and got up for repairs. In the stern of the lung
    sulfur "Leipzig" during the Norwegian operation hit the bomb. As a result
    of this, the stern tower was broken, and the ship 31 / 2 of the month was in
    Danzig and Kiel under repair. On 9 of August he re-entered service.
    4 light cruisers planned to be built in 1938, presumably
    They are under construction, but where and what percentage of their readiness is
    managed.
    Thus, on 1 September 1940, the cruisers were in service: “Cologne”,
    <Jlейпциг», «Нюрнберг», «Хиппер», «Эмден»; в ремонте - «Принц Эйген»; в
    construction - Seidlitz "and 4 light cruisers with a displacement of 7000 tons ..." And not a word about the cruisers that are aircraft carriers ... Liar, one word ...

    And after all, this couch expert-liar will not submit a single document in which the scouts would call the cruiser an aircraft carrier !!
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 6 October 2019 18: 53
      -12
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      This is generally a pearl of a boy from the 1st grade! Our "dumb" scouts called any ship that had catapults for launching seaplanes aircraft carriers.

      I would like to answer that only a stupid expert from the sofa or a brazen scammer thinks so! Why?

      Because in intelligence materials, our scouts called the heavy cruiser - the heavy cruiser, the light cruiser - the light cruiser, and the aircraft carrier - the aircraft carrier.

      Our professional liar is back to cheating because he uses the terminology "aircraft carrier" in ground intelligence, where recruited agents cannot know all the subtleties of categorizing naval ships, which is why they allow for simplification in low-level materials. And in contrast, the fraudster allegedly cites intelligence reports on the West, and does not give links, which means he is again lying where the ships are counted, most likely according to the intelligence department of the NK Navy, which corresponds to a more accurate classification of ships.
      Such distortions and outright lies pervade all the work of this pseudo-researcher. However, the money does not smell for him, so he will continue to lie ...
  12. AsmyppoL
    6 October 2019 18: 11
    +12
    As usual mr Milchakov is cheating again, giving his next comment: " Since the author does not know that on the basis of 27 in November, 1940 was formed 17 etc. Wehrmachta, it didn’t occur to him that the armored vehicles for this formation could be accompanied by the military personnel of these units of the 27 front:
    27 Artillery Regiment
    27th Reserve Battalion
    27th Reconnaissance Battalion
    27th Anti-Tank Battalion
    27th Engineer Battalion
    27-th battalion of signalmen
    27th auxiliary infantry battalion.
    Because the formation of the TD takes quite a long time, it is not surprising that in September not all servicemen of the 27th Infantry Division received new uniforms and new insignia ... "


    Why doesn't the author know about that ?! He knows and the article has a whole paragraph about it. But Milchakov needs to lie again!

    The text in the article: "The 27th Infantry Division was in France until September, and in September it arrived in Germany (in the city of Grafenwehr). 1.11.40 began its reorganization in the 17 th, which will be completed only in March 1941... It turns out that the staff officers of neither the 27th TD, nor the 27th Infantry Division could be in Rembertow. There could only be mummers with the insignia of the 27th division ... There will be even more oddities in the summary. "

    And even the deadline for the start of formation and its end is indicated. Reformation took place in Germany. The author even knows the cities where the shelves were located. But the liar-milchakov does not know this. And the formation division arrived from the West to Germany! And no parts of it were in Poland, but there could be groups of mummers ...
    Vrun Milchakov doesn’t come up with epics with his employer Kozinkin ...
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 6 October 2019 19: 07
      -12
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      On 1.11.40, its reformation began in the 17th TD, which will be completed only in March 1941. It turns out that the staff officers of neither the 27th TD nor the 27th PD could not be in Rembertovo. There could only be mummers with the signs of the 27th division ...

      This lie is easily refuted by the fact that Rembertov is a modern district of Warsaw, and in the pre-war time it was a large railway station near the capital of Poland, where wagons with armored vehicles from trains could be unloaded (formed), in which at the same time there were wagons with 27 pd military personnel performing security functions. So, he gave out ordinary organizational measures during the formation of a new tank formation almost as a strategic operation to misinform Soviet military intelligence, thereby proving once again that he was a complete layman in military affairs. Especially for the amateur, I inform you that when troops were withdrawn from the Western Group of Forces, the entire train could consist of 28-30 cars, and consist, for example, of tanks (10 platforms) of one unit, 10 more platforms with engineering equipment of the other part, and 10 cars with different property several parts. And all this could be protected by a guard from a motorized rifle regiment, for example, and not from a tank.
      That is why some wise guy will tell in many years that mixed units existed in the SA, or we specially misinformed the NATO countries.
  13. AsmyppoL
    6 October 2019 18: 20
    +11
    This pearl is generally typical for a sofa expert "... the fact that intelligence and radio intelligence OSNAZ recorded the presence of the headquarters of the 12th AK in the city of Insterburg (hundreds of kilometers from its actual location) through June 1941 inclusive. It turns out that the German command did not only played with our intelligence game "in insignia on shoulder straps and rumors", but also had fun with "radio games" confusing radio intelligence.

    Another stupidity, because during the movement of formations and formations, the commander (commander) and the communications center can remain until the last in the points of permanent deployment, and manage subordinate units from this place. It is useless to explain this to the author, because he will never understand what the two positions of the control body are, and hence all his lies. So it is not intelligence that is confused, but the author is illiterate in these matters. "

    According to an expert from the sofa, the headquarters of the 12 building can be located hundreds of kilometers from its communications center ....
    In general, all ku_kuu can rest ...))) From May 1941 to 17 on June 1941, the headquarters of the corps in one place, and its communications center for hundreds of kilometers ...
    At the same time, he says stupidly that the radio reconnaissance opened everything, even Dormut recorded a signal, but he can’t present a single document. Like a regular expert from the couch. Can't imagine anything ... Why then can I present the facts?
    Why didn’t the radio reconnaissance record a single mk headquarters or tank group? Why did intelligence veterans write that radio intelligence on the eve of the war worked poorly? Why did the intelligence data include data on non-existent headquarters locations? Why did not radio intelligence reveal a single headquarters of army groups?

    After all, he will not say anything worthwhile, Milchakov. It will lead a scan about nothing, a bunch of text about anything ... And it won’t blow a single document, where something is clearly written ...
    Boy go prepare your lessons and don’t write any bullshit !!!
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 6 October 2019 19: 12
      -12
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      According to an expert from the sofa, the headquarters of the 12 building can be located hundreds of kilometers from its communications center ....

      Once again, for the illiterate - all nodes of connections and above without fail have equipment and personnel in two positions. This is the ABC of military science, about which the author has wild ideas.
      By the way, at the time of the withdrawal from the Western Group of Forces headquarters and communications centers could still be in the group, and a huge number of troops subordinate to them were already thousands of kilometers away at new points of permanent deployment.
    2. ccsr
      ccsr 7 October 2019 13: 27
      -9
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      At the same time, he says stupidly that the radio reconnaissance opened everything, even Dormut recorded a signal, but he can’t present a single document. Like a regular expert from the couch. Can't imagine anything ...

      Our illiterate author AsmyppoL does not know that not all documents of the Soviet military intelligence are declassified, which is why he lies about what he does not know.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      Why didn’t the radio reconnaissance record a single mk headquarters or tank group?

      This is a lie, because the author of not a single document that the radio intelligence sent to Moscow did not see, but refers only to what went into declassified intelligence reports of some districts.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      Why did intelligence veterans write that radio intelligence on the eve of the war worked poorly?

      And this is a blatant lie that can easily be refuted by the study of the Navy historian K. Strelbitsky, who in 2011 posted his material on the net:
      ... Since Tykotin was about a hundred kilometers from the then “border of friendship” with Germany, the BRP-5 continued to function even after the actual start of hostilities of the Great Patriotic War. This is evidenced immediately by 18 relevant entries made in the "Journal of the intelligence branch of the KBF" on June 22-29, 1941. Getting in touch with the Detachment about once every two hours, in just 35 first hours of the Great Patriotic War BRP-5 sailors took bearings in the sea about two dozen ships in Germany, Finland and Sweden (including 9 submarines, the flagship of the Finnish Navy - Ilmarinen coastal defense battleship and at least 8 surface warships of various classes), and the same 12 aircraft in the air and a number of aviation radio stations working from the ground. The most valuable thing is to recognize the radio interception at 11.02 on the first day of the war, when the German radio station on the island of Rügen reported in detail about two minefields exhibited by the Kriegsmarine ships in the Baltic Sea and about clear navigable channels along the German coast.
      At 14.40 on June 23 the last message was sent from Tykotin to the Detachment that “from 15.30 to 19.34 Finnish planes will fly in the Abo-Aland archipelago and at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland,” and BRP-5 was silent for good ... “PDU No. 5 ( Bialystok) lost contact with the detachment at 15 pm on June 23, we read in the official report on the combat activity of the Detachment. - The personnel of the station withdrew with the units of the Red Army. In the absence of a sufficient amount of transport, the equipment of the point was destroyed. From the personnel of the point, 14 people arrived in the detachment. The rest, led by the commander of the station, went missing "....

      http://forum.patriotcenter.ru/index.php?topic=14414.0
      Since our liar AsmyppoL does not know about such details, he doesn’t have to lie about the fact that radio reconnaissance did not work well before the war, although after reading Strelbitsky’s text a competent person will immediately understand that if direction finding of moving objects was carried out by sailors, then the radio stations of the OSN divisions were trained, if only because we had one common technical and intelligence level:
      As of March 12, 1941, the base of the material part of the BRP-5 was 2 transmitting and receiving radios, 3 direction finders and 4 radios. The short-wave radio station "11-AK" of the combined-arms (army) model of 1933 was located in a special "radio machine" body on the chassis of a GAZ-AA truck, where the “kit No. 34” equipment was installed (which included the “1000-KV-1 transmitter” and “5-RKU” receiver) under number “177” of 1939 manufactured by Gorky Plant No. 197. “11-AK” was supplemented by another walkie-talkie - marine type “Cove”, which “in terms of power and range was a completely suitable mobile radio station that meets the requirements”

      Moreover, the author Strelbitsky described only the activities of one coastal radio point, and in the four border districts on the eve of the war there were more than 20 such points and separate radio nodes in the intelligence of the Red Army, not counting the divisions equipped with internal districts, which also conducted radio reconnaissance. So the cited text once again proves that on the eve of the war, radio intelligence worked as it should, and not like the author AsmyppoL is lying
  14. VS
    VS 9 October 2019 13: 33
    -7
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    In accordance with the Republic of Moldova, there were up to 62 German divisions against the KOVO and OdVO troops, and a constant number of divisions — 30 — remained for almost a month and a half against the ZapOVO troops! So where should the main blow be expected ??

    read the lessons and conclusions - there are applications 15 and 16 - there you will see WHERE they were waiting for the main blow in our GS))

    If you call me by your SURNAME, so maybe you’d risk showing yourselves at last or so by an anonymous person and you will die in the end?))
  15. VS
    VS 10 October 2019 08: 40
    -7
    Quote: ccsr
    On the eve of the war, radio intelligence worked as it should, and not as the author AsmyppoL is lying


    this anonymous eccentric is trying to blind from the intelligence of our idiots - they say the Germans outplayed our intelligence and we didn’t know that the Germans were driving the desu and carried on it))

    "" Note of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army in the NKGB of the USSR with an assessment of the received intelligence data on the movement of German troops

    21 May 1941 city

    № 660533

    21 May 1941 city

    The German command is strengthening the grouping of troops in the border zone with the USSR, making massive transfers of troops from the deep regions of Germany, the occupied countries of Western Europe and from the Balkans. This increase is beyond doubt. However, along with a real increase in troops in the border zone, the German command is simultaneously engaged in maneuvering, transferring individual units in the border area from one settlement to another, so that in the event of their assessment we get the impression the German command needs. ... ""