Intelligence about German troops at the end of the 1940 year
In the previous part we examined intelligence materials (Goals Difference) about the German troops in 1938 and at the beginning of 1940. PM at the indicated time was significantly different from the real data. With such a significant difference in the data, the presence in the RM of the exact names of infantry units and formations can only be due to the fact that the German command used fictitious formations of military personnel with false signs on uniform. After 3-4 parts, you will be shown that the exact data for tank and the German motorized forces were completely absent in the Republic of Moldova. The German command hid the name and presence of these troops on the border, allowing you to know more about the infantry units.
Having no sources of information in the higher spheres of Germany, our intelligence officers did not know before the war that in the middle of the summer of the 1940 year a final decision was made to start a war with the Soviet Union in the 1941 year. The leadership of the USSR and the spacecraft did not know about this decision and hoped to avoid a war by any means. Since the summer of 1940, in the West, grandiose activities have been launched to prepare for a landing on the territory of England. However, this was only a grandiose hoax ... Understanding the scope and elaboration of measures to prepare for Operation Sea Lion can be obtained by reading the chapters Halder's diary July to August 1940 years.
In this part, materials will be used from the books of B. Müller-Hillebrand, "German Army in 1933-1945." And O.P. Kuryleva “Army of the Third Reich 1933-1945. Illustrated Atlas. " The following abbreviations are used in the article: А - army AK - army corps, IN - military district, Spacecraft - Red Army, cd (kn) - cavalry division (regiment), md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), pd (pp) - infantry division (regiment), Ro - intelligence department, RU - Reconnaissance of the General Staff of the spacecraft, td (mn) - tank division (regiment).
In the comments to the articles of the series “Unexpected war ...” by Vick and to two parts of the intelligence article, writer O. Yu. Kozinkin wrote that the RM RO ZAPOVO had more accurate information than the RM RU. As the only argument, he quotes from the memoirs of the chief of staff of 4-th A General L.M. Sandalova:
General L.M. Sandalov writes about a summary of the RO of the ZAPOVO headquarters from 4.6.41. According to the same data, against the troops of the Military District, an unchanged number of divisions is listed from May 1941 until the start of the war - 30. Oleg Yurievich builds his version on this difference in the number of divisions and even intended to write a book about betrayal in the Republic of Uzbekistan. It is strange that a writer for more than 10 years dealing with events on the eve of the war and writing 10 books does not know about crossing the borders of the areas of responsibility of the intelligence of PribOVO and ZAPOVO. That is why the RM ROs of the ZapOVO headquarters included in their report part of the compounds that RU and the General Staff considered concentrated in front of PribOVO. The issue of the boundaries of the zones of responsibility is registered in the Republic of Moldova and therefore is a fact. More is reviewed earlier. Why did the RU not replace the RO and the VO command? Probably there were circumstances. The author will devote more time in the article to RM RO ZAPOVO to understand the amount of misinformation in these materials. We will start our consideration with a summary from 19.9.40. Later we will analyze other RM ZAPOVO as well.
Special message Chief of RO Zapovo, Chief of RU of the General Staff of the Spacecraft 19.9.40:
There is a lot of incomprehensible information. If you saw the number "27”, Then they saw the division’s headquarters officer close enough. The question arises: "In what form did the scout see the officer or officers of the 27th Armored Division?"
As working clothes, the tankers were given a uniform of black or gray color, which in the future began to be used for all occasions. The figure on the left shows the tanker’s jackets in black and gray, and for comparison, on the right is the casual tunic of the infantry lieutenant.
Knowing what the tank uniform looks like, it is almost impossible to confuse it with the uniform of the officers of the front headquarters. The atlas also has another form of clothing for tankers.
In the German army, belonging to a certain type of army or service was designated as the military color - Waffenfarbe. In color, he made a shoulder strap, gaps on the buttonholes, piping of caps and some types of uniforms, as well as other colored details of the uniform. White color belongs to the infantry, and pink - to the tank troops. If the division headquarters officer was in one of the forms shown in the last figure, then the Waffenfarbe could be confused.
The affiliation to the headquarters of the division and its number was simple enough to determine: there was a letter on the shoulder straps D and below the Arabic numbers the division number (in our case, 27). But this is simply not possible! The formation of the 27th etc. will only begin on 1.10.42, and an officer with such insignia simply could not exist ... If he or they were not dressed up by order from above ...
27 I was in France until September, and in September arrived in Germany (in the city of Grafenver). 1.11.40 began its reorganization in the 17, etc., which will be completed only in March 1941 year. It turns out that the headquarters officers could not be in Rembertov either on the 27th or the 27th. There could only be mummers with signs of the 27 division ... There will be even more oddities in the summary further.
Extension Special messages:
The RMs are confirmed, since both sub-stations were part of the 75-th front, which was located in Poland from July 1940 until 22.6.41.
At the indicated time, there was no 71 th paragraph. There was the 71 md from the 29 md. Unless of course our scout saw servicemen from this regiment, and not mummers. The strangeness is that 29-md was until the 1941 year in the south of France. In the RM, it is indicated that "reliable data", But in fact they are misinformation, tossed by the German command.
100-th PP in the Wehrmacht did not exist.
The 104-th PP was part of the 33-th PD, which from September 1939 to October 1940 was in Germany and France, and in October 1940 again returned to Germany. Since 11.11.40, it has been transformed into the 15 th.
661-th PP was part of the 393-th PD, which began its formation in March 1940 in Warsaw. In July of the 1940 year, the division was celebrated in Germany (6-th VO) where it was disbanded (661-th pp including). In Poland, there remained one battalion of the pp, which became known as the 974 m rifle battalion. In September, no one could walk with the insignia of the 661 th paragraph.
To begin with, the 431-th front never existed. Could it be a typo: 431-th pp? It could have been, but the formation of the 431 th point will begin only on 15.10.40.
The 212-th PP was part of the 79-th PD, which was in Germany from the autumn of 1939 to May 1940 of the year. Then she moves to the city of Langre (France) and will be there until January 1941. Consequently, 212-th paragraph could not be at the border.
The formation of the 182-th front will be launched in the West of 27.8.42. It turns out that only a group of mummers could walk in the East.
511-th PP was part of the 293-th PD, formed 8.2.40 in Germany in the city of Brandenburg. After formation, the division will leave for the West. Its parts will begin to arrive in Poland only 25.2.41
All data that according to intelligence "confirmed"Turned out to be misinformation!
17-I Front takes part in the war in Poland in September, and moves to Germany in October. Since January 1940, she has been in Germany, Luxembourg and France. Only 1.6.41 will arrive in Poland.
The 17th paragraph never included the 28th paragraph. 28-th PP was part of the 8-th PD, which in this period is located in the city of Rouen (France). Again, disa ...
Headquarters 8-th And in the fall of 1939 year did not exist. General Blaskowitz is in this period in the reserve of the High Command. Only in October will he be appointed commander of 1-th A, which is deployed in France. It is again said that the data are reliable, but in fact they are misinformation ...
The 206 1st Division has not been a landver for more than a year. It included the 301, 312 and 413 points. The 312-th sub-unit from RM coincided with the actual number of the regiment from the division. Disbandment information is not correct. The personnel of the division was disbanded on vacation back in July 1940.
What did our intelligence discover? Or mummers with insignia of the 206 th, 13 th, 212 th or 312 th pp, which is a reconnaissance error! Or I saw groups of vacationers whose presence is not a fact of presence full-fledged pp or whole pd! And in this case, this is a gross mistake of our intelligence ...
The city of Insterburg in the period under review was located on the territory of East Prussia. The 3th AK and its headquarters were stationed only in Poland and were never observed in East Prussia. The 12th AK in September of the 1940 of the year was just starting to arrive from France to Poland and was also not located on the territory of East Prussia.
It is interesting that the intelligence and radio intelligence of the OSNAZ recorded the presence of the headquarters of the 12 AK in the city of Insterburg (hundreds of kilometers from its actual location) through June 1941, inclusive. It turns out that the German command not only played the game "in insignia and rumors"But also had fun"radio games"Confusing radio intelligence. Therefore, the radio networks of army groups, tank groups, and motorized corps were not detected by radio intelligence. There will be separate material on this topic through 2-3 parts.
The 1-th paragraph is part of the 1-th front, and the 24-th paragraph is in the 21-th front. Divisions arrive in East Prussia from 13.9.40 and from 12.9.40, respectively. PM confirmed.
224-th pp in the Wehrmacht never existed. Could it be that the military groups from the 24-th village walked around with the added number “2” on uniform?
The 361-th pp will be formed only 1.4.42 g. And will be part of the 90-th light African division. Therefore, he also could not be in Koenigsberg.
The 368-th settlement from the 207-th front, which will be redeployed to Germany in the autumn of the 1939, will participate in the war in the West. 10.7.40 g. Will return to Germany and in March 1941 of the year there will be reorganized into three security divisions.
RMs that are again confirmed are true only for two regiments (1 and 24), and for the other three are misinformation.
The 20th AK will begin its formation in November 1940 of the year in Germany. In Danzig, he can only get after January 1941 year. Pay attention to the scale of misinformation by the German command of our intelligence!
The 23-th subdivision is part of the 11-th pd, which is deployed in the West and only 10.3.41 will arrive in East Prussia. No way this regiment could not be located 25.8.40 in the city of Lykk.
The 45th settlement (21th settlement) and the 413th settlement could be located on the territory of East Prussia.
212-th mp did not exist. It can’t be the 212-th pp from the 79-th bp, since it is already indicated above in the special message.
Information about the aircraft carrier is erroneous.
The data in RM about license plates, divisions and regiments were confirmed at 20%, and at 80% they are misinformation. Such “accurate” and detailed information on the numbers of regiments, divisions, corps and 8-th A could be supplied to our intelligence only by the German command using militia groups. You have been shown that the RM RO ZAPOVO also includes a huge amount of disinformation.
A similar situation is with the formations with known numbers that are not confirmed are constantly found in the Republic of Moldova. For example, the intelligence you already know:
The error in determining the numbers of army headquarters is 100%, and the headquarters of the corps is 71 ... 86%. By the number of PDs, the error is 56 ... 59%. The number of divisions with known numbers even exceeds their actual number.
According to the infantry regiments, the numbers for 88% regiments are known. Amazing accuracy! All the more clearly visible intelligence errors in determining the number of tank troops: there are no matches! Once again, you can make sure that the intelligence knows only what the German command shows it ... Almost the same in the following intelligence summary:
Again, a huge number of infantry regiments with famous numbers. There are 58 divisions, of which 28 numbers are known! Only there was only 16... Mountain Rifle Regiments, Tank and Motorized Divisions was not at all... Intelligence counted 12 AK headquarters, of which 9 with established numbers! Only everything was five AK headquarters and two reduced headquarters corps ... Intelligence counted 3-4 army headquarters, and there was only one - 18-th ... In intelligence, no one even doubted the information provided for analysis to the General Staff, but it turned out to be largely misinformation ...
RU and the General Staff work in a single bundle: intelligence receives information and double-checks it. The General Staff analyzes the Republic of Moldova and determines the number of German troops at the border, with which Germany can start a war with the USSR. The General Staff is also obliged to determine the directions of the main attacks of the enemy.
We have seen major intelligence errors in overstating the number of German formations at the border since the spring of 1940. The situation will not change until the outbreak of war. A sufficiently detailed disinformation about the deployment of German troops was to create the illusion of omniscience at the command of the spacecraft and the leadership of the USSR. The intelligence failed to find out about the presence and deployment of large headquarters of the enemy’s mobile troops at the border. All these major blunders of intelligence led to the sad events at the beginning of the war.
Admission 11.9.40 RU:
Therefore, information about208-228 front"Is a mistake in the work of intelligence, which overestimated the number of divisions by 33 ... 46%. The figure below shows the actual number of ground forces divisions in Germany and information on the number of divisions coming from intelligence. It can be seen that the information in the RM is significantly overstated.
And what mistakes were made by the General Staff of the spacecraft? We come to consider one of the major errors of the General Staff (according to the author), which led to the same consequences as errors in the work of intelligence.
Note by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and Chief of the General Staff of the KA in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) - I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov on the basics of the deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East in the 1940 and 1941 years of 18.9.40:
In the presented document, the specialists of the General Staff made a mistake on the basis of an erroneous estimation of the total number of divisions in Germany by the RU. General Staff experts called excessively high number of divisions to be allocated for war with the USSR. This number will be adjusted upwards in new documents, but will never be reached before the outbreak of war, as the German command decided to conduct military operations fewer troops! This number appears more than once in the Note:
After the arrival of the headquarters of 18-A to the East at the end of July 1940, he began to carry out the functions of command of all troops in the East. During this period, the headquarters of 18-th A is subordinate to OKH. From that moment on, the headquarters of the Eastern Group began to play a supporting role. It is possible that later he began to play the role of a screen, which covered the command of Army Group B. 20.9.40 d. The command of Army Group B arrived in East Prussia and took over the command of all the troops in the East.
According to the Muller-Hillebrand data in the East, as of 7.10.40 there were three armies, ten AKs, two reduced corps and 30 divisions. Two more divisions were in Vienna. The headquarters of the armies are located in the following settlements: 18 — in Bydgoszcz, 12 — in Krakow and 4 — in Warsaw.
The 18th A included the 1th, 16th and 26th AK, and the 4th A included the 12th, 30th, 44th AK and the staff of the reduced corps zbVXXXV. 12-I was represented by 3, 9, 14, 17 AK and the headquarters of the reduced corps zbVXXXIV.
In addition to the listed headquarters, Army Group B was subordinate to the 40 Motorized Corps, which 15.9.40 began to reorganize from the 40 AK. At the source, the location of the headquarters of the 40 th MK marks the territory of Poland. There is another inconsistency with the Muller-Hillebrand data: the location of the 2th building block (from 9.40 to 2.41 years) and the 9 building block (from 9.40 to 11.40 years), included in the 40 storage unit, is also indicated on the territory of Poland .
According to the author, there were 30 ... 31 divisions in East Prussia and Poland. Subsequently, until 21.12.40, an increase in the grouping of German troops in the East did not occur. However, intelligence over the next three months could not understand that the number of "troops" it had discovered at the border was greatly exaggerated ...
According to Müller-Hillebrand, by 7.10.40, there was the next increase in the German group in the East.
The materials of the article considered and will consider the number of German troops at the Soviet-German border in accordance with the data from the Republic of Moldova and their actual number. Visual material allows you to better understand the problem with the number of troops in the Republic of Moldova.
Long work was carried out to verify the location of enemy divisions and identified errors in calculating the number of divisions by the author. The picture presented at the end of the message is an illustration of the errors in the work of our intelligence on estimating the number of German divisions with enough "exact»Knowledge of the names of PP and PD. I would like to note that the schedule is more of an illustrated material, rather than a reference guide ...
When plotting the graphs, the following inaccuracies were identified in the previously submitted article:
- 251 I arrived at the eastern border not in July 1940, but in May 1941;
- 62 I arrived in Poland 20.6.40 g;
- 292 I arrived in Poland in July 1940;
- 13-I fled to Poland not in September 1940 of the year, but 30 of August;
- 1-I cd was lost from the consideration of troops that were relocated to the East in September 1940 year.
When plotting, the author encountered the following problem: for a significant part of the divisions, not a specific date of redeployment is indicated, but only a month. Groups of divisions that do not have specific arrival dates in the East were arranged according to the months in which they are marked at the eastern border.
For some of them it was possible to establish that they arrived at the beginning or at the end of the month. For these compounds, the author accepted that the beginning of the month is the third day, and the end of the month is the 27 day.
For the remaining divisions, which did not have a date of arrival in the East, it was accepted that they arrived in the middle of the month - the 15 day. There are such divisions: among the arrivals in September 1940 of the year - 9, in December - 2, in January 1941 of the year - 1, in April - 8, in May - 16 and in June - 24.
This approach somewhat distorts the real data, but as an illustrative material it clearly shows errors in the work of intelligence.
For divisions without a date of arrival to the East in July, 1940 assumed that they arrived at the border of 20 in July. Halder’s memoirs say that these divisions completed their redeployment by July 20.
The above information related to the actual location of German divisions in Poland and East Prussia.
Let's talk about information from the RM. In 1941 Intelligence Directorates, divisions in the following territories were considered as troops concentrated on our border: in East Prussia, in the Warsaw direction (Polish territory against ZAPOVO), in the Lublin-Krakow region (Polish territory against KOVO), on the border of Slovakia (against KOVO), in the Uzhgorod direction (Carpathian Ukraine, against KOVO), the Danzig - Poznan - Thorn region, in Romania (Moldova and Northern Dobrudzhia). The indicated territories were also considered when the author calculated the number of German troops in the 1940 year.
The difficulty was that since October 1940, German troops were discovered by intelligence in Romania, but their number in Moldova and Northern Dobrudzhia is not indicated in the Republic of Moldova. In October of 1940, the Republic of Moldova says that there is a group of German troops on the eastern border of Romania, but a map with the location of the troops is not provided. Therefore, these divisions when scheduling not taken into account, i.e. the number of German troops near our border in the Republic of Moldova is somewhat underestimated. A similar situation exists with German troops in Slovakia and in the Carpathian Ukraine. In the Republic of Moldova, information about them until the spring of 1941 almost did not occur.
Such a detailed analysis of the data on the movement of German troops from 1940 to 22.6.41 was encountered by the author only in the series “Unexpected war ...”. It is not known what sources of information the author used. failed to install with her. The data on the graphs do not contradict the data cited by the author Vick. Differences exist only in the approach to information for the period from 20 to 22 on June 1941.
The author, as the basis for calculating the number of divisions in the indicated period, used the X-NUMX RU report. Using this document, one can estimate the size of the German group in the same territories that were previously considered by our intelligence. The document indicates that the number of troops in the directions increased due to the approach of the new divisions 22.6.41 and 20 in June. When constructing the schedule, the author accepted that there was no change in the number of troops from 21 to 1.6.41. The summary outlines a similar approach.
It should be noted that 22 June reconnaissance should urgently explain the unexpected appearance of German troops directly at the border. Most likely, the RU tried to overestimate the number of German troops at the border in the first military intelligence report. An example of this is the increase in the number of APs on the Suvalkinsky ledge due to two SS divisions, information about which appeared in May 1941 and has not been confirmed. TD selective SS units in that period did not exist. No one saw the military personnel and equipment from these divisions. It was also recorded an increase in the non-existent group of German troops on the border of Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine by 4-6 divisions, which allegedly came up for 20-21 on June 1941.
A graph with the change in the number of German troops at the border will be given in parts of the materials for the period under review. it should be noted that according to the time stamps on 7.10.40 and 21.12.40, it does not contradict the Muller-Hillebrand data.
The next two parts will be devoted to the RM of the beginning of the 1941 year. It is planned that the third part will be assigned to the headquarters of army groups, field armies and AK. Next will be presented material on radio intelligence. In the fifth part, consider mobile troops. Further, in two parts, the author will present his version of events about the unexpectedness of the outbreak of war for the leadership of the country and the spacecraft.
I would like to say thanks to the administration of the site "Military Review" for the help and support of the author. There would not be this, and there would be no such material. Having started work on the material of the article, the author discovered a lot of new things and looked at the indicated problem from the other side. Without publishing material on the site, the author would have long abandoned this topic.
To be continued ...
Having no sources of information in the higher spheres of Germany, our intelligence officers did not know before the war that in the middle of the summer of the 1940 year a final decision was made to start a war with the Soviet Union in the 1941 year. The leadership of the USSR and the spacecraft did not know about this decision and hoped to avoid a war by any means. Since the summer of 1940, in the West, grandiose activities have been launched to prepare for a landing on the territory of England. However, this was only a grandiose hoax ... Understanding the scope and elaboration of measures to prepare for Operation Sea Lion can be obtained by reading the chapters Halder's diary July to August 1940 years.
In this part, materials will be used from the books of B. Müller-Hillebrand, "German Army in 1933-1945." And O.P. Kuryleva “Army of the Third Reich 1933-1945. Illustrated Atlas. " The following abbreviations are used in the article: А - army AK - army corps, IN - military district, Spacecraft - Red Army, cd (kn) - cavalry division (regiment), md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), pd (pp) - infantry division (regiment), Ro - intelligence department, RU - Reconnaissance of the General Staff of the spacecraft, td (mn) - tank division (regiment).
Intelligence ZAPOVO worked without errors?
In the comments to the articles of the series “Unexpected war ...” by Vick and to two parts of the intelligence article, writer O. Yu. Kozinkin wrote that the RM RO ZAPOVO had more accurate information than the RM RU. As the only argument, he quotes from the memoirs of the chief of staff of 4-th A General L.M. Sandalova:
At the end of the first week of June, the headquarters of our 4-th A, located in Kobrin, received information from the headquarters of the Military District that by June 5 on the border of Belarus more than 40 German divisions and that 15 PD, 5 TD, 2 MD and 2 CD are focused on the Brest direction ...
General L.M. Sandalov writes about a summary of the RO of the ZAPOVO headquarters from 4.6.41. According to the same data, against the troops of the Military District, an unchanged number of divisions is listed from May 1941 until the start of the war - 30. Oleg Yurievich builds his version on this difference in the number of divisions and even intended to write a book about betrayal in the Republic of Uzbekistan. It is strange that a writer for more than 10 years dealing with events on the eve of the war and writing 10 books does not know about crossing the borders of the areas of responsibility of the intelligence of PribOVO and ZAPOVO. That is why the RM ROs of the ZapOVO headquarters included in their report part of the compounds that RU and the General Staff considered concentrated in front of PribOVO. The issue of the boundaries of the zones of responsibility is registered in the Republic of Moldova and therefore is a fact. More is reviewed earlier. Why did the RU not replace the RO and the VO command? Probably there were circumstances. The author will devote more time in the article to RM RO ZAPOVO to understand the amount of misinformation in these materials. We will start our consideration with a summary from 19.9.40. Later we will analyze other RM ZAPOVO as well.
Special message Chief of RO Zapovo, Chief of RU of the General Staff of the Spacecraft 19.9.40:
According to the intelligence data for 15.9.40, it is noted: In Rembertov headquarters 27 armored division, according to other sources, this is the headquarters of the front. Data is being verified ...
There is a lot of incomprehensible information. If you saw the number "27”, Then they saw the division’s headquarters officer close enough. The question arises: "In what form did the scout see the officer or officers of the 27th Armored Division?"
As working clothes, the tankers were given a uniform of black or gray color, which in the future began to be used for all occasions. The figure on the left shows the tanker’s jackets in black and gray, and for comparison, on the right is the casual tunic of the infantry lieutenant.
Knowing what the tank uniform looks like, it is almost impossible to confuse it with the uniform of the officers of the front headquarters. The atlas also has another form of clothing for tankers.
In the German army, belonging to a certain type of army or service was designated as the military color - Waffenfarbe. In color, he made a shoulder strap, gaps on the buttonholes, piping of caps and some types of uniforms, as well as other colored details of the uniform. White color belongs to the infantry, and pink - to the tank troops. If the division headquarters officer was in one of the forms shown in the last figure, then the Waffenfarbe could be confused.
The affiliation to the headquarters of the division and its number was simple enough to determine: there was a letter on the shoulder straps D and below the Arabic numbers the division number (in our case, 27). But this is simply not possible! The formation of the 27th etc. will only begin on 1.10.42, and an officer with such insignia simply could not exist ... If he or they were not dressed up by order from above ...
27 I was in France until September, and in September arrived in Germany (in the city of Grafenver). 1.11.40 began its reorganization in the 17, etc., which will be completed only in March 1941 year. It turns out that the headquarters officers could not be in Rembertov either on the 27th or the 27th. There could only be mummers with signs of the 27 division ... There will be even more oddities in the summary further.
Extension Special messages:
4.9.40 arrived in Warsaw: 222 pp (at 25.8 was in Gumbinen) and 202 pp (at 25.8 was in Hrubieszow). Data is verified.
The RMs are confirmed, since both sub-stations were part of the 75-th front, which was located in Poland from July 1940 until 22.6.41.
Confirmed data on the deployment in Sokolov of 71 and two paragraphs of unidentified numbering (apparently, these are the stations deployed on 25.8. in Sokolov under No. 100, 104, 661. The data is reliable).
At the indicated time, there was no 71 th paragraph. There was the 71 md from the 29 md. Unless of course our scout saw servicemen from this regiment, and not mummers. The strangeness is that 29-md was until the 1941 year in the south of France. In the RM, it is indicated that "reliable data", But in fact they are misinformation, tossed by the German command.
100-th PP in the Wehrmacht did not exist.
The 104-th PP was part of the 33-th PD, which from September 1939 to October 1940 was in Germany and France, and in October 1940 again returned to Germany. Since 11.11.40, it has been transformed into the 15 th.
661-th PP was part of the 393-th PD, which began its formation in March 1940 in Warsaw. In July of the 1940 year, the division was celebrated in Germany (6-th VO) where it was disbanded (661-th pp including). In Poland, there remained one battalion of the pp, which became known as the 974 m rifle battalion. In September, no one could walk with the insignia of the 661 th paragraph.
Confirmed data on the deployment in Lodz: 431 PD and 212 PP, as well as on the departure of 182 PD East. In addition, the presence of 511 and 513 pp is noted ...
To begin with, the 431-th front never existed. Could it be a typo: 431-th pp? It could have been, but the formation of the 431 th point will begin only on 15.10.40.
The 212-th PP was part of the 79-th PD, which was in Germany from the autumn of 1939 to May 1940 of the year. Then she moves to the city of Langre (France) and will be there until January 1941. Consequently, 212-th paragraph could not be at the border.
The formation of the 182-th front will be launched in the West of 27.8.42. It turns out that only a group of mummers could walk in the East.
511-th PP was part of the 293-th PD, formed 8.2.40 in Germany in the city of Brandenburg. After formation, the division will leave for the West. Its parts will begin to arrive in Poland only 25.2.41
All data that according to intelligence "confirmed"Turned out to be misinformation!
Installedthat the headquarters of 17 front is stationed in the Hungarians, it includes the 28 frontier, the headquarters of which is based in Miedzna ... The artillery regiment 17 front is stationed in Lokhov. The shelf number is not installed. Data is being verified ...
17-I Front takes part in the war in Poland in September, and moves to Germany in October. Since January 1940, she has been in Germany, Luxembourg and France. Only 1.6.41 will arrive in Poland.
The 17th paragraph never included the 28th paragraph. 28-th PP was part of the 8-th PD, which in this period is located in the city of Rouen (France). Again, disa ...
According to the 1 branch, it was established that in Warsaw on Hitler's Square ... the headquarters of 8 A, the army commander, General Blaskowitz, is deployed. (Reliable information).
Headquarters 8-th And in the fall of 1939 year did not exist. General Blaskowitz is in this period in the reserve of the High Command. Only in October will he be appointed commander of 1-th A, which is deployed in France. It is again said that the data are reliable, but in fact they are misinformation ...
According to the 1 branch, the headquarters of 3 AK are marked in Insterburg (according to previously available data, the headquarters of 12 AK is deployed there). Information about the 3 AK is coming in for the first time and needs to be verified. In Tilsit, the 206 land-based frontier was deployed, which included 13, 212 and 312 subparagraphs. This division is currently being disbanded. 206 LPD data is being received for the first time, it needs to be verified.
The 206 1st Division has not been a landver for more than a year. It included the 301, 312 and 413 points. The 312-th sub-unit from RM coincided with the actual number of the regiment from the division. Disbandment information is not correct. The personnel of the division was disbanded on vacation back in July 1940.
What did our intelligence discover? Or mummers with insignia of the 206 th, 13 th, 212 th or 312 th pp, which is a reconnaissance error! Or I saw groups of vacationers whose presence is not a fact of presence full-fledged pp or whole pd! And in this case, this is a gross mistake of our intelligence ...
The city of Insterburg in the period under review was located on the territory of East Prussia. The 3th AK and its headquarters were stationed only in Poland and were never observed in East Prussia. The 12th AK in September of the 1940 of the year was just starting to arrive from France to Poland and was also not located on the territory of East Prussia.
It is interesting that the intelligence and radio intelligence of the OSNAZ recorded the presence of the headquarters of the 12 AK in the city of Insterburg (hundreds of kilometers from its actual location) through June 1941, inclusive. It turns out that the German command not only played the game "in insignia and rumors"But also had fun"radio games"Confusing radio intelligence. Therefore, the radio networks of army groups, tank groups, and motorized corps were not detected by radio intelligence. There will be separate material on this topic through 2-3 parts.
Confirmed Dislocation data in Koenigsberg 1, 24, 224, 361 and 368
The 1-th paragraph is part of the 1-th front, and the 24-th paragraph is in the 21-th front. Divisions arrive in East Prussia from 13.9.40 and from 12.9.40, respectively. PM confirmed.
224-th pp in the Wehrmacht never existed. Could it be that the military groups from the 24-th village walked around with the added number “2” on uniform?
The 361-th pp will be formed only 1.4.42 g. And will be part of the 90-th light African division. Therefore, he also could not be in Koenigsberg.
The 368-th settlement from the 207-th front, which will be redeployed to Germany in the autumn of the 1939, will participate in the war in the West. 10.7.40 g. Will return to Germany and in March 1941 of the year there will be reorganized into three security divisions.
RMs that are again confirmed are true only for two regiments (1 and 24), and for the other three are misinformation.
Confirmed 20 AK headquarters in Danzig ...
The 20th AK will begin its formation in November 1940 of the year in Germany. In Danzig, he can only get after January 1941 year. Pay attention to the scale of misinformation by the German command of our intelligence!
In Rastenburg, in the barracks on Hindenburg-Strasse Street, there are 23 and 45 points (23 points at 25.8 were noted in Lykk, and 45 points - at 1.1.40 in Zboino). 413 items are deployed in Seyny (located on Myshynets on 26.6), 212 items are also marked there. The data comes in for the first time, requires verification ...
The 23-th subdivision is part of the 11-th pd, which is deployed in the West and only 10.3.41 will arrive in East Prussia. No way this regiment could not be located 25.8.40 in the city of Lykk.
The 45th settlement (21th settlement) and the 413th settlement could be located on the territory of East Prussia.
212-th mp did not exist. It can’t be the 212-th pp from the 79-th bp, since it is already indicated above in the special message.
There are four warships in the port of Gdynia, including one aircraft carrier, two ships are named: “Shleisen” and “Shleysvik-Malshtein ...”
Information about the aircraft carrier is erroneous.
The data in RM about license plates, divisions and regiments were confirmed at 20%, and at 80% they are misinformation. Such “accurate” and detailed information on the numbers of regiments, divisions, corps and 8-th A could be supplied to our intelligence only by the German command using militia groups. You have been shown that the RM RO ZAPOVO also includes a huge amount of disinformation.
Number of troops with known numbers
A similar situation is with the formations with known numbers that are not confirmed are constantly found in the Republic of Moldova. For example, the intelligence you already know:
The error in determining the numbers of army headquarters is 100%, and the headquarters of the corps is 71 ... 86%. By the number of PDs, the error is 56 ... 59%. The number of divisions with known numbers even exceeds their actual number.
According to the infantry regiments, the numbers for 88% regiments are known. Amazing accuracy! All the more clearly visible intelligence errors in determining the number of tank troops: there are no matches! Once again, you can make sure that the intelligence knows only what the German command shows it ... Almost the same in the following intelligence summary:
In East Prussia and former Poland ... on 25.8.40 it was established: 174 pp (of which 154 with set numbering), which is 58 pd. On 45 divisions (from 58) established locations for their headquarters, on 28 divisions - numbering.
11 Mountain Rifle Regiments with established numbering, which amounts to 4 mountain rifle divisions .6-7 tank divisions. 2-3 motorized divisions ...
12 AK headquarters, of which nine - with established numbering. The identified forces are combined into four armies, of which established the location of the three army headquarters - Warsaw, Radom and Krakow, the fourth army headquarters is supposed to be in Koenigsberg ...
11 Mountain Rifle Regiments with established numbering, which amounts to 4 mountain rifle divisions .6-7 tank divisions. 2-3 motorized divisions ...
12 AK headquarters, of which nine - with established numbering. The identified forces are combined into four armies, of which established the location of the three army headquarters - Warsaw, Radom and Krakow, the fourth army headquarters is supposed to be in Koenigsberg ...
Again, a huge number of infantry regiments with famous numbers. There are 58 divisions, of which 28 numbers are known! Only there was only 16... Mountain Rifle Regiments, Tank and Motorized Divisions was not at all... Intelligence counted 12 AK headquarters, of which 9 with established numbers! Only everything was five AK headquarters and two reduced headquarters corps ... Intelligence counted 3-4 army headquarters, and there was only one - 18-th ... In intelligence, no one even doubted the information provided for analysis to the General Staff, but it turned out to be largely misinformation ...
SC Intelligence and General Staff
RU and the General Staff work in a single bundle: intelligence receives information and double-checks it. The General Staff analyzes the Republic of Moldova and determines the number of German troops at the border, with which Germany can start a war with the USSR. The General Staff is also obliged to determine the directions of the main attacks of the enemy.
We have seen major intelligence errors in overstating the number of German formations at the border since the spring of 1940. The situation will not change until the outbreak of war. A sufficiently detailed disinformation about the deployment of German troops was to create the illusion of omniscience at the command of the spacecraft and the leadership of the USSR. The intelligence failed to find out about the presence and deployment of large headquarters of the enemy’s mobile troops at the border. All these major blunders of intelligence led to the sad events at the beginning of the war.
Admission 11.9.40 RU:
... The total number of divisions in the German army on 10.9.1940 until 208-228 pd (including up to 8 motorized) and 15-17 td. Of this number of divisions, more than one third (up to 85) of the front and more than half (up to 9) are concentrated in the East and Southeast ...
According to Muller-Hillebrand, the total number of ground troops divisions was:Therefore, information about208-228 front"Is a mistake in the work of intelligence, which overestimated the number of divisions by 33 ... 46%. The figure below shows the actual number of ground forces divisions in Germany and information on the number of divisions coming from intelligence. It can be seen that the information in the RM is significantly overstated.
And what mistakes were made by the General Staff of the spacecraft? We come to consider one of the major errors of the General Staff (according to the author), which led to the same consequences as errors in the work of intelligence.
Note by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and Chief of the General Staff of the KA in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) - I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov on the basics of the deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East in the 1940 and 1941 years of 18.9.40:
... At present, Germany has deployed 205 – 226 PD (including up to 8 MD) and 15-17 TD, and in total - before 243 divisions, 20000 fields. guns of all calibres, 10000 tanks and from 14200 to 15000 aircraft ...
Of the indicated number of divisions, up to 85 infantry and up to 9 tank divisions are concentrated in the East and Southeast. The prevailing military situation in Western Europe allows the Germans to transfer most of their forces against our app. borders. With the war still unfinished with England, it can be presumed that in occupied countries and regions Germany would leave up to 50 divisions and inland up to 20 divisions.
Thus, from the above 243 divisions before 173 divisions, - of which up to 140 infantry, 15 – 17 tank, 8 motorized, 5 light and 3 airborne ... will be directed against our borders...
Of the indicated number of divisions, up to 85 infantry and up to 9 tank divisions are concentrated in the East and Southeast. The prevailing military situation in Western Europe allows the Germans to transfer most of their forces against our app. borders. With the war still unfinished with England, it can be presumed that in occupied countries and regions Germany would leave up to 50 divisions and inland up to 20 divisions.
Thus, from the above 243 divisions before 173 divisions, - of which up to 140 infantry, 15 – 17 tank, 8 motorized, 5 light and 3 airborne ... will be directed against our borders...
In the presented document, the specialists of the General Staff made a mistake on the basis of an erroneous estimation of the total number of divisions in Germany by the RU. General Staff experts called excessively high number of divisions to be allocated for war with the USSR. This number will be adjusted upwards in new documents, but will never be reached before the outbreak of war, as the German command decided to conduct military operations fewer troops! This number appears more than once in the Note:
... You can expect the following deployment and grouping of its forces:
- to the north of the mouth of the San River, the Germans can have up to 123 infantry and up to 10 tank divisions and most of their aviation;
- south of the mouth of the river. San to 50 infantry and 5 tank divisions, with their main grouping in the area of Holm, Tomashev, Lublin ... (in total up to 188 divisions. - Auth.) [With a different] version of Germany’s actions, it should be expected that the Germans will allocate 110 for operations in the south –120 PD, the bulk of its tanks and aircraft, leaving for operations in the north 50 – 60 PD, part of the tanks and aircraft [total to 160-180 divisions. - Auth.]. The main, most politically beneficial for Germany, and, therefore, the most likely is the 1-th version of its actions, i.e. with the deployment of the main forces of the German army north of the mouth of the river. San ...
- to the north of the mouth of the San River, the Germans can have up to 123 infantry and up to 10 tank divisions and most of their aviation;
- south of the mouth of the river. San to 50 infantry and 5 tank divisions, with their main grouping in the area of Holm, Tomashev, Lublin ... (in total up to 188 divisions. - Auth.) [With a different] version of Germany’s actions, it should be expected that the Germans will allocate 110 for operations in the south –120 PD, the bulk of its tanks and aircraft, leaving for operations in the north 50 – 60 PD, part of the tanks and aircraft [total to 160-180 divisions. - Auth.]. The main, most politically beneficial for Germany, and, therefore, the most likely is the 1-th version of its actions, i.e. with the deployment of the main forces of the German army north of the mouth of the river. San ...
Continued concentration of German troops in the East
After the arrival of the headquarters of 18-A to the East at the end of July 1940, he began to carry out the functions of command of all troops in the East. During this period, the headquarters of 18-th A is subordinate to OKH. From that moment on, the headquarters of the Eastern Group began to play a supporting role. It is possible that later he began to play the role of a screen, which covered the command of Army Group B. 20.9.40 d. The command of Army Group B arrived in East Prussia and took over the command of all the troops in the East.
According to the Muller-Hillebrand data in the East, as of 7.10.40 there were three armies, ten AKs, two reduced corps and 30 divisions. Two more divisions were in Vienna. The headquarters of the armies are located in the following settlements: 18 — in Bydgoszcz, 12 — in Krakow and 4 — in Warsaw.
The 18th A included the 1th, 16th and 26th AK, and the 4th A included the 12th, 30th, 44th AK and the staff of the reduced corps zbVXXXV. 12-I was represented by 3, 9, 14, 17 AK and the headquarters of the reduced corps zbVXXXIV.
In addition to the listed headquarters, Army Group B was subordinate to the 40 Motorized Corps, which 15.9.40 began to reorganize from the 40 AK. At the source, the location of the headquarters of the 40 th MK marks the territory of Poland. There is another inconsistency with the Muller-Hillebrand data: the location of the 2th building block (from 9.40 to 2.41 years) and the 9 building block (from 9.40 to 11.40 years), included in the 40 storage unit, is also indicated on the territory of Poland .
According to the author, there were 30 ... 31 divisions in East Prussia and Poland. Subsequently, until 21.12.40, an increase in the grouping of German troops in the East did not occur. However, intelligence over the next three months could not understand that the number of "troops" it had discovered at the border was greatly exaggerated ...
According to Müller-Hillebrand, by 7.10.40, there was the next increase in the German group in the East.
Schedule of changes in the number of German troops at the border
The materials of the article considered and will consider the number of German troops at the Soviet-German border in accordance with the data from the Republic of Moldova and their actual number. Visual material allows you to better understand the problem with the number of troops in the Republic of Moldova.
Long work was carried out to verify the location of enemy divisions and identified errors in calculating the number of divisions by the author. The picture presented at the end of the message is an illustration of the errors in the work of our intelligence on estimating the number of German divisions with enough "exact»Knowledge of the names of PP and PD. I would like to note that the schedule is more of an illustrated material, rather than a reference guide ...
When plotting the graphs, the following inaccuracies were identified in the previously submitted article:
- 251 I arrived at the eastern border not in July 1940, but in May 1941;
- 62 I arrived in Poland 20.6.40 g;
- 292 I arrived in Poland in July 1940;
- 13-I fled to Poland not in September 1940 of the year, but 30 of August;
- 1-I cd was lost from the consideration of troops that were relocated to the East in September 1940 year.
When plotting, the author encountered the following problem: for a significant part of the divisions, not a specific date of redeployment is indicated, but only a month. Groups of divisions that do not have specific arrival dates in the East were arranged according to the months in which they are marked at the eastern border.
For some of them it was possible to establish that they arrived at the beginning or at the end of the month. For these compounds, the author accepted that the beginning of the month is the third day, and the end of the month is the 27 day.
For the remaining divisions, which did not have a date of arrival in the East, it was accepted that they arrived in the middle of the month - the 15 day. There are such divisions: among the arrivals in September 1940 of the year - 9, in December - 2, in January 1941 of the year - 1, in April - 8, in May - 16 and in June - 24.
This approach somewhat distorts the real data, but as an illustrative material it clearly shows errors in the work of intelligence.
For divisions without a date of arrival to the East in July, 1940 assumed that they arrived at the border of 20 in July. Halder’s memoirs say that these divisions completed their redeployment by July 20.
The above information related to the actual location of German divisions in Poland and East Prussia.
Let's talk about information from the RM. In 1941 Intelligence Directorates, divisions in the following territories were considered as troops concentrated on our border: in East Prussia, in the Warsaw direction (Polish territory against ZAPOVO), in the Lublin-Krakow region (Polish territory against KOVO), on the border of Slovakia (against KOVO), in the Uzhgorod direction (Carpathian Ukraine, against KOVO), the Danzig - Poznan - Thorn region, in Romania (Moldova and Northern Dobrudzhia). The indicated territories were also considered when the author calculated the number of German troops in the 1940 year.
The difficulty was that since October 1940, German troops were discovered by intelligence in Romania, but their number in Moldova and Northern Dobrudzhia is not indicated in the Republic of Moldova. In October of 1940, the Republic of Moldova says that there is a group of German troops on the eastern border of Romania, but a map with the location of the troops is not provided. Therefore, these divisions when scheduling not taken into account, i.e. the number of German troops near our border in the Republic of Moldova is somewhat underestimated. A similar situation exists with German troops in Slovakia and in the Carpathian Ukraine. In the Republic of Moldova, information about them until the spring of 1941 almost did not occur.
Such a detailed analysis of the data on the movement of German troops from 1940 to 22.6.41 was encountered by the author only in the series “Unexpected war ...”. It is not known what sources of information the author used. failed to install with her. The data on the graphs do not contradict the data cited by the author Vick. Differences exist only in the approach to information for the period from 20 to 22 on June 1941.
The author, as the basis for calculating the number of divisions in the indicated period, used the X-NUMX RU report. Using this document, one can estimate the size of the German group in the same territories that were previously considered by our intelligence. The document indicates that the number of troops in the directions increased due to the approach of the new divisions 22.6.41 and 20 in June. When constructing the schedule, the author accepted that there was no change in the number of troops from 21 to 1.6.41. The summary outlines a similar approach.
It should be noted that 22 June reconnaissance should urgently explain the unexpected appearance of German troops directly at the border. Most likely, the RU tried to overestimate the number of German troops at the border in the first military intelligence report. An example of this is the increase in the number of APs on the Suvalkinsky ledge due to two SS divisions, information about which appeared in May 1941 and has not been confirmed. TD selective SS units in that period did not exist. No one saw the military personnel and equipment from these divisions. It was also recorded an increase in the non-existent group of German troops on the border of Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine by 4-6 divisions, which allegedly came up for 20-21 on June 1941.
A graph with the change in the number of German troops at the border will be given in parts of the materials for the period under review. it should be noted that according to the time stamps on 7.10.40 and 21.12.40, it does not contradict the Muller-Hillebrand data.
Annotation of subsequent articles
The next two parts will be devoted to the RM of the beginning of the 1941 year. It is planned that the third part will be assigned to the headquarters of army groups, field armies and AK. Next will be presented material on radio intelligence. In the fifth part, consider mobile troops. Further, in two parts, the author will present his version of events about the unexpectedness of the outbreak of war for the leadership of the country and the spacecraft.
I would like to say thanks to the administration of the site "Military Review" for the help and support of the author. There would not be this, and there would be no such material. Having started work on the material of the article, the author discovered a lot of new things and looked at the indicated problem from the other side. Without publishing material on the site, the author would have long abandoned this topic.
To be continued ...
Information