Military Review

Intelligence service. Information about the German troops in 1938 and in 1940

20
In a previous article a review of intelligence materials has begun (Goals Difference) on the concentration of German troops near the Soviet-German border in the 1940 year. It was shown that the data on the enemy troops in the Republic of Moldova are very different from the real information. The presence in RM of the exact designations of the German armies, army corps, divisions and regiments could only be due to the fact that the German command used military personnel with false signs on uniform. These soldiers near the Soviet-German border depicted associations, formations and units of the Wehrmacht that did not exist at that time or were in Germany or in the West.


Intelligence service. Information about the German troops in 1938 and in 1940


In this part, let's go back a little. Recently, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation declassified several documents that were developed in the 1938 year. The consideration of the Republic of Moldova for the period from 1938 to 22.6.41 will allow us to get an idea of ​​the reliability of the materials that our intelligence extracted in different periods before the war. Can we find a connection between the information supplied by our intelligence, between the documents developed by the General Staff of the KA, between the actions of the leaders of the Soviet Union and the Red Army?

In several subsequent parts, the author decided to examine in more detail the events of 1940 and the beginning of 1941. Information about these events will be supplemented by material from additional literature. This is due to small inaccuracies that occurred in the two previous parts. The author decided to somewhat expand the scope of the article, considering not only the Republic of Moldova, but also to propose a version of the appearance of some documents at the headquarters of the spacecraft, which allow to explain the actions of the leaders of the USSR and the spacecraft on the eve of the war. The materials prepared by the author will be supplemented by materials from the book of B. Müller-Hillebrand, "German Army 1933-1945." And from the diary of the former Chief of the General Staff of the German Army F. Halder.

The following abbreviations will be used in the article: А - field army AK - army corps, IN - military district, for - Landwehr Division, cd (kn) - cavalry division (regiment), ld - light division, md - motorized division, pd (pp) - infantry division (regiment), td (mn) - tank division (regiment).

The number of German tanks in the documents


Recently, the Russian Ministry of Defense published Note Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army B.M. Shaposhnikova narcotics defense K.E. Voroshilov from 24.3.38, "On the most likely opponents of the USSR." The text of the Note was previously available in the A.N. Yakovleva. The Note provides an estimate of the number of divisions in the German armed forces: "... 96 pd, 5 cd, 5 md, 30 tank.b ...".



The document clearly speaks of the 30 tank battalions, since the next page talks about the direction of Germany’s troops against 2 / 3 against our country. Among the enumerations of these troops, 20 tank battalions are mentioned.



In the Note, the number of German tanks and wedges is estimated by the number 5800. Such a number of tanks and wedges in the German troops was not even in 22.6.41, and this is taking into account the presence of Czechoslovak and French captured tanks in the German tank forces, as well as the work of industry in Germany and the occupied countries of Europe over the next three years. Therefore, the information about the tanks, which is given in the Note, is very high. The overly overestimated idea of ​​intelligence about production and the presence of tanks in the German armed forces continued until the outbreak of war in 1941.

Special message Reconnaissance of the General Staff of the spacecraft 11.3.41:
The average production capacity of the main tank factories in Germany varies between 70-80 tanks per month. The total production capacity of 18 currently known to us factories in Germany ... is determined in 950-1000 tanks per month.

Bearing in mind the possibility of rapidly deploying tank production on the basis of existing automotive tractor factories (up to 15-20 plants), as well as increasing the production of tanks at plants with their established production, we can assume that Germany will be able to produce up to 18-20 thousand tanks a year. With the use of French tank factories located in the occupied zone, Germany will be able to additionally receive up to 10000 tanks per year...


In fact, in Germany before 1937, 1876 tanks and wedges were produced. From 1938 to 1940, another 3006 tanks were produced. Throughout the entire 1941 year, another 3153 tank was produced. Analyzing the Republic of Moldova, the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union also sought to produce as many modern tanks as possible. It is possible that the number of tanks was preferred over their quality ...

Based on the Republic of Moldova, the number of tanks in the German army was also overestimated in the General Staff of the spacecraft. Plan of the General Staff of the Spacecraft on the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East (11.3.41):
Germany currently has deployed 225 infantry, 20 tank and 15 motorized divisions, and all in all 260 divisions, xnumx field guns of all calibres, 10000 tanks and to 15000 aircraft ...


At 22.6.41 the tanks in the German forces were a little more than 3 thousand.



Intelligence report No. 5 (in the West) of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the KA:
The total size of the German army at 1 June 1941 g. Is determined in 286 — 296 Divisionsincluding: motorized - 20-25tank - 22...


RM about the total number of divisions were overstated: 11.3.41 by 26%, 15.5.41 by 36% and 1.6.41 by 37-41%. In total there were 209,5 divisions. At 22.6.41, the total number of motorized divisions and individual regiments was actually 15,2.

At the same time, information about tank divisions turned out to be fairly accurate: on June 22, in fact, there were 21, etc. However, the number of tanks in twenty-one divisions and in a small number of individual tank regiments and battalions three times overpriced! Since intelligence did not find most of the tank divisions, the number of tanks at the border should have corresponded significantly less than 10 thousand ...

Since the data on the German tank forces in Germany are severely distorted, it is proposed that the number of German divisions that existed in the 1938 year of the 30 tank battalions be disregarded. In principle, 30 tank battalions are not so many: only about 7,5 etc. At that time, the German TD consisted of a tank brigade, which included two military units, two battalions each.

Number of German divisions in 1938


Below are data on the increase in the number of divisions of the German army.



In addition to the field troops indicated in the figure, there were 21 dLs that were intended for the defense of cities, border and fortified areas. These divisions had limited mobility and were equipped with military servicemen from 35 to 45 of summer age. Those liable for these divisions underwent military training in the 1918 year and earlier. In dl supplied obsolete weapons, withdrawn from the armament of the army. According to some reports, these divisions (except for the 14-th DL) have never been fully deployed. In the spring of 1940, the formation of several infantry divisions (with three hundred numbers) began on the basis of these divisions.



In case of mobilization, 4 reserve divisions were to be formed. These divisions in their structure corresponded to infantry divisions, but had fewer weapons and vehicles. The bulk of the personnel of the reserve divisions was staffed by the reservists of the 1 and 2 categories, and if there were a shortage of them, they were from the Landver.



According to B. Müller-Hillebrand, in the autumn of the 1938 of the year, the Wehrmacht had up to 69,5 divisions. German troops are described fairly well in the article "The German Army in September 1938 g ..." . The article material is cross-checked and presented in the form of tables below.







Could not find 61, 69, and 70 dL. At the same time, in the 1th Military District (East Prussia) there were 3-I, 22-I and 67-I DL not mentioned in the article. It is possible that there is an inaccuracy in the article.

9-md was absent in the Wehrmacht. It should be about the 9-th front formed in the 1934 year in the city of Hesse.

Failed to find five reserve divisions - perhaps the author of the article looked for them better. According to B. Muller-Gillebrand, we can talk about eight reserve divisions.

The tables do not show: 5 Id formed by 18.10.38 in the city of Oppeln and 46 Id formed by 24.11.38 in the city of Carlsbad. The author of the article also wrote about these divisions.

Thus, by 24.3.38 in the Wehrmacht there were only 66 divisions that could theoretically be deployed at the front. Excluding td - 63 divisions. The Note by the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army says 106 divisions that also do not take into account so on.

What conclusions should be made?

1) Intelligence significantly overestimates the number of divisions - by 68% (according to Mueller-Hillebrand - by 61%).

2) The intelligence information does not say about larger formations of tank troops - about tank divisions.

3) Intelligence counted five MD, although there were four.

4) Intelligence counted five cd. In Germany, there was only one cavalry brigade during this period. At the same time, there are four ld. Three of these divisions have two infantry regiments and one motorized reconnaissance and artillery regiments each. 1-I LD has TP, CP, motorized reconnaissance regiment and artillery regiment.

We can assume that the intelligence correctly estimated the number of MD and CD (inaccuracy of information about 25%).

We can assume that intelligence could not track changes in the structure of German troops. You cannot equate infantry divisions and landver divisions. Failed to track the creation of td and ld.

Army Group Vostok May – June 1940


Back in 1936-37. The Vostok border guard was replaced by a border guard capable of only garrison service and lacking artillery. The regiments of the border guards had three battalions of riflemen and one machine-gun company. The regiment was armed with three field guns and two mortars. Along the Eastern border there were about 25 border guard regiments, which were part of nine Border Guard commands.

6.10.39 g. On the basis of the above commands were created commanders: zbV XXXI (since 3.40 in Denmark), zbV XXXII (before 14.5.40 in Poland), zbV XXXIII (from 12.39 - in the Netherlands), zbV XXXIV (before the war in Poland), zbV XXXV (before the war in Poland), zbV XXXVI (11.5.40 g. In France). On the basis of three commands (8 regiments), three infantry divisions were formed (521-I, 526-I and 537-I). 521-I PD 18.3.40 began the reorganization in the 395 th. 526-I PD 28.5.40 g. Was relocated to the 6-th VO and 15.12.41 g. Disbanded. 537-I PD - 9.12.40 was disbanded

By early June 1940 For two years, in two military commanders, there were about seven former border regiments and two front-line regiments (395 and 537-back), formed on the basis of border regiments.

In addition, by the beginning of June, newly formed infantry divisions were located on the territory of East Prussia and Poland: 311-I, 351-I, 358-I, 365-I, 379-I, 386-I, 393-I and 399-I. It is possible that until June in the indicated territory there were the 206-I and 213-I fronts. 209-I was until July 1940 year. Total total up to 13 divisions excluding parts zbV XXXIV and zbV XXXV. The data presented do not differ much from the Muller-Hillebrand data on ten divisions in the East.





It should be noted that the note 1 applies only to the period May - Summer 1940 of the year. In 22.6.41, part of the security divisions were located near the border and participated in the invasion of our territory in the first echelon.

In June 1940 of the year from East Prussia and Poland five traffic units (206-I (6.40), 213-I (6.40), 311-I (9.6.40), 351-I (1.6.40) and 358 -th (1.6.40 g.)). According to the author, in the East there remain 8 divisions. According to Müller-Hillebrand, there were 9.6.41 SDs at 7 in the East.



In the figure, the only of the divisions of the 3 wave is the 209 I, which declined at the end of June - July of the 1940 year. The difference in the total number of divisions may be due to the disregard for the 311 th front, which began the redeployment of 9 in June. With the redeployment of 311, the East will remain in the East only six divisions!

Halder 28.5.40 Mr. noted in the diary: “... Six divisions will remain in the East ... In addition, two reserve divisions ...” The number of divisions indicated in the diary coincides with the data provided by the author.

In the spring of 1940, two artillery divisions (from the 3's available) were sent to the West from the rear guard divisions. Six rear security divisions had limited mobility due to a lack of road and horse-drawn vehicles.

Two questions for which there are no documented answers. Was the German command so trusting in the government of the USSR and was not afraid of a blow to the back, having begun the rout of the Anglo-French troops? Was the Red Army so weak that the German command was not afraid of it?

According to the author, Hitler was not afraid of a stab in the back from the Soviet Union. At the same time, the German command very successfully carried out work to misinform our intelligence. According to the 5-th Office of the Red Army as of 15.6.40 in East Prussia and Poland was up to 27 Error in RM is 78%!

Memoirs of General G. Blumentrit:
Prior to this, there were only a few divisions along our eastern border ... They were deployed in large cities, as in peacetime, and normal security measures were taken along the border. The Red Army, located on the other side of the demarcation line that divided Poland, behaved as quietly as our army. It was clear that neither side was thinking of war. But barely ceased all operations in France, the German divisions began to gradually, but steadily transfer to the East ...


In the diary of Helder 15.10.40, it is recorded:
Duce at a meeting with the Fuhrer: We have to put up with the onset of a new military winter. Italy is not worried. There is no danger from Russia.


The Soviet Union did not want to start a war with Germany. The war between Germany and the USSR was the result of Germany’s positional impasse in the war with England and Hitler’s confidence in his army. Some German generals wrote in their memoirs that the British should be attacked in the Mediterranean Sea, on the North coast of Africa and to continue the subsequent attack on other colonies of England ...

According to Müller-Hillebrand, as of May 1940 there were 4 Army Group Headquarters (“A”, “B”, “Ts” and the headquarters of the commander of troops in the East), 9 Army Headquarters (1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9 (since 15.5.40), 12, 16 and 18) and 28 Hull Headquarters with headquarters units. Before the relocation of the command of Army Group B to the East, the German command considered the headquarters of the Eastern Group the command of the Army Group. There was not a single army headquarters subordinate to the headquarters of the Eastern Group, which made this command of the army group purely nominal. But intelligence could rightly take him for the headquarters of an army group. The commander of the troops in the East from 15.5.40 was the cavalry general von Ginant.

According to the author, in the West and in Germany there were 32 AKs: from 1 to 19, from 22 to 27, 30, from 38 to 42 and 44. In May, the formation of the 29th AK began. It was not possible to find a single AK headquarters (existing or emerging) in East Prussia and Poland.

Point of non-return


In June 1940, after the defeat of the Anglo-French army, German troops stopped in front of the largest "channel" - the English Channel. Almost the entire German army is concentrated in the West and in Germany. Through its intelligence, the British government was supposed to freeze in horror and begin to probe the situation for peace. But this does not happen.

1.7.40 Mr. Halder will write in his diary:
Leeb reported that he knew landing in England is not supposed. I answered him that, in spite of this, it is necessary to analyze the possibilities of carrying out such an operation, because if the political leadership poses this task, it will require the greatest speed.


It turns out that by 1 July, Hitler did not give instructions on the preparation of the landing operation on the territory of England. Perhaps there was an attempt at peace talks by Germany ... From the 1 of July in the troops and at the headquarters the elaboration of plans and measures for the implementation of the landing operation begins.

On 3.7.40, the following entry appears regarding plans for war with the USSR:
The English problem, which should be worked out separately, is now in the foreground, and eastern problem. The main content of the latter: a method of delivering a decisive blow to Russia in order to force it to recognize the dominant role of Germany in Europe.


The positional impasse and the lack of incitement on the part of the British to conclude peace leads to the fact that at the headquarters of the German ground forces on July 4 the question of the relocation of the 18 army to the East is being considered. On the same day, the head of the Foreign Armies-East department made a report that served as the basis for preparing a plan of war with the Soviet Union. The report made a mistake in underestimating the size of the spacecraft and the rearmament that began.

13.7.40 Mr. Halder writes in his diary:
The Führer is most concerned with the question of why England is still not looking for peace. He, like us, sees the reason for this in the fact that England still hopes for Russia.


16.7.40. Hitler issued Directive No. 16, "On the Preparation of the Landing Operation Against England." In a week, the Führer will be informed about the big problems associated with the landing operation ...

22.7.40 Mr. Halder writes:
Conducting a landing seems to the Führer very risky. An invasion only if no other way is found to end England ...

The reaction to the proposal of peace: the press first took a sharply negative position, then somewhat softened the tone ...

News from England. The situation is assessed as hopeless. The British ambassador in Washington said: England lost the war, She must pay, but do nothing that detracts from her honor and dignity ...

Russian problem will be resolved by offensive. A plan for the upcoming operation should be considered. To defeat the Russian ground army, or at least occupy such territory that it would be possible to secure Berlin and the Silesian industrial region from Russian attacks aviation...

Political goals: Ukrainian State, Federation of the Baltic States, Belarus, Finland ...


On July 22 of 1940, Brauchitsch was instructed to begin preliminary development of a campaign plan against the USSR. The High Command, with his Note signed by Keitel, convinced Hitler that for some reason it was impossible to launch an operation against Russia in the fall of 1940.

31.7.40 Halder:
We will not attack England, but we will break those illusions that give England the will to resist ... England's hope is Russia and America. If hopes for Russia collapse, America will also fall away from England, since the defeat of Russia will result in the incredible strengthening of Japan in East Asia ...

Output. In accordance with this reasoning Russia must be liquidated. Duration - spring 1941 of the year ... The duration of the operation is five months. It would be better to start this year, however, this is not suitable, since it is necessary to carry out the operation with one blow. The goal is the destruction of the life force of Russia...


The leadership of the Third Reich made a fatal decision for themselves and the entire German people. Soviet intelligence did not find out about this decision ...

Preparations for war with the Soviet Union began. An order to strengthen troops in the East was issued to the OKH on September 6. From West to East, the transfer of command of Army Group B, the headquarters of the 4 and 12 armies, the headquarters of the AK and up to 17 divisions began.

To be continued ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
1939-40 Intelligence about German troops near our border
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  1. kloss
    kloss 23 September 2019 05: 24
    +8
    Liked. Thanks for the interesting information. I look forward to continuing.
    The article says that on the territory of Poland there was not a single headquarters of the army corps either existing or forming.
    But weren't Oberkomando zb V. 34 and 35 the headquarters and army reserve corps?
    Thank you
  2. antivirus
    antivirus 23 September 2019 10: 42
    +4
    neither "lady" nor man "undertakes to understand the mentality of the USSR leadership and their experience (from WWI) —MORE FROM THE GUERRILLA AND SEMI-REGULAR RKKA 1918-21GY.
    they judge everything by themselves.
    isolation (now I marvel at the stupid adherence to an "open economy", they welcome "actionists" with an obvious spit on realistic art) changes relations with the world environment.
    EVERYTHING IN DR. COLOR IS VISIBLE.
  3. Amurets
    Amurets 23 September 2019 11: 23
    +9
    Everything is good, interesting, and this is a huge plus for the author. But here is a photo of a border guard guarding a border post that just hurts his eyes. Do not guard so the border. We have many border guards, but I haven’t seen border guards guarding the pillars. Unless they put on the holidays.
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 23 September 2019 13: 41
      +2
      Quote: Amurets
      . But here is a photo of a border guard guarding a border post that just hurts his eyes. Do not guard so the border.

      If I understood correctly, then the border guard in the picture is just before the train leaves our territory, which, by the way, I saw in Brest during the Soviet era. Further the neutral territory began, and then we were met by the same Polish border guard on the other side. And the pillar apparently meant the border of the post, and perhaps it was also used for communications.
      1. bubalik
        bubalik 24 September 2019 09: 22
        +5
        If I understand correctly, the border guard in the picture is just before the train leaves our territory,

        ,,, border guard Zolotukhin stands at the Finnish border post on the right bank of the Sestra River, i.e. in Finnish territory.
        http://waralbum.ru/181237/
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 24 September 2019 11: 21
          0
          Quote: bubalik
          border guard Zolotukhin stands at the Finnish border post on the right bank of the Sestra River, i.e. in Finnish territory.

          Well that explained. Only I didn’t understand why the cars and the track are visible in the middle picture on the right - maybe this misled me.
    2. AsmyppoL
      23 September 2019 18: 29
      +2
      Thank Amurets! Good photo!
      The photos on the screensavers are again a "figurative expression". Tribute to photographs in parts of the article. Once 1938 - so budennovka)))
      1. Amurets
        Amurets 23 September 2019 23: 35
        +6
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        Thank Amurets! Good photo!

        Thanks. Not at all. Photo from the Internet about my city. There is another photo, one photo, from the same place. "Citizens and tourists often rub the nose of a dog. Traditionally, this brings good luck to a person and even to the whole city. Therefore, now a dark coating on bronze is everywhere, except for a dog's nose, which glitters and sparkles in the sun."
        .
        1. bubalik
          bubalik 24 September 2019 09: 26
          +6
          Amur (Nikolai) Yesterday, 00: 35
          ,, we also have a dog with a "shiny" nose. yes
  4. 1970mk
    1970mk 23 September 2019 11: 28
    +2
    So the USSR and Germany were the best friends)))) were not going to fight ....
    Or on June 17, 1940, after the Germans captured Paris and five days before the surrender of France, Molotov himself invited the German ambassador to congratulate him on the "brilliant success of the German armed forces" on behalf of the Soviet Union ??? This is history! Which is hushed up intensely ...
  5. ccsr
    ccsr 23 September 2019 12: 02
    -5
    Author: Eugene writes
    [Quote] It was shown that the data on the enemy troops in the Republic of Moldova are very different from the real information.[/ Quote]
    The author is shamelessly lying, because his conjectures were refuted in detail in previous articles, and precisely because of the lack of evidence, tk. the main source of his "knowledge" is Wikipedia and LJ. Not a single real document confirming his version was ever presented.
    Author: Eugene writes
    [Quote]The presence in RM of the exact designations of the German armies, army corps, divisions and regiments could only be due to the fact that the German command used military personnel with false signs on uniform. These soldiers near the Soviet-German border depicted associations, formations and units of the Wehrmacht that did not exist at that time or were in Germany or in the West. [/ Quote]
    This lie has not yet been supported by anything, because there is no documentary evidence that such a program existed in the Wehrmacht at a strategic level. Certain measures to camouflage troops, including the use of other insignia, may have existed on a limited scale, but only illiterate people can believe that changing insignia can mislead radio intelligence, which, by the callsign and handwriting of radio operators, quickly determined who owns a radio node.
    Further Author: Eugene writes: [quote]In the Note, the number of German tanks and wedges is estimated at 5800. Such a number of tanks and wedges in the German troops was not even by 22.6.41. And this, taking into account the presence of Czechoslovak and French captured tanks in the German armies, as well as the work of German industry and occupied European countries over the next three years.[/ Quote]
    This lie has long been exposed by more competent specialists than the author of the article, who blindly believes in some German sources and deliberately distorts the story.
    I quote the material published at VO in 2011, which describes in more detail the number of armored vehicles in the Wehrmacht on June 22:
    [Quote]Consequently, even without taking into account anti-tank destroyers based on Renault UE infantry tractors, improvised heavy self-propelled guns based on 12 and 15 ton semi-tracked tractors, anti-aircraft installations (no less than 200 copies) etc. we can appreciate the number of Wehrmacht combat vehicles exhibited against the USSR in 4800 units, which exceeds the figures we know from B. Muller-Hillebrandt’s work by about 1000 units, and the data of M.I. Meltiukhov 600 units.
    From the calculations of all sorts of pseudo-historians who sing to us about the complete superiority of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht, one more fact usually falls: not only the Third Reich carried out an invasion of the USSR. According to current data, every third soldier from the regular "great" army, which invaded the "wild" Russia in June 1941, was not German! Accordingly, the armored vehicles of the satellite countries of Germany were also available.
    [/ Quote]

    https://topwar.ru/8452-1941-god-skolko-tankov-bylo-u-gitlera.html

    So, Soviet intelligence was not mistaken at all when it brought the number of 5800 units, taking into account the technology of Germany’s allies and taking into account anti-tank guns, the total number was estimated in the figure given in the summary:
    [Quote]In total, all the allies of Germany fought against the USSR about 500 tanks and over 300 tankettes [5].
    In total, the German troops and the troops of the countries of the allies of Germany had about 5600 tanks, and tankettes, concentrated against the USSR. And, consequently, the repeatedly praised "monstrous superiority of the Red Army" over the Wehrmacht and Germany's allies in armored vehicles, in fact, was twofold. Which, of course, does not negate the very fact of quantitative superiority. [/ Quote]
    https://topwar.ru/8452-1941-god-skolko-tankov-bylo-u-gitlera.html

    The monstrous lie of the author that supposedly intelligence overestimated the amount of German armored vehicles is refuted by various sources:

    Author: Eugene writes [/ quote]
    Based on the Republic of Moldova, the number of tanks in the German army was also overestimated in the General Staff of the spacecraft. Plan of the General Staff of the Spacecraft on the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East (11.3.41):
    Germany currently has 225 deployed infantry, 20 tank and 15 motorized divisions, with a total of up to 260 divisions, 20000 field guns of all calibers, 10000 tanks and up to 15000 aircraft ...
    At 22.6.41 the tanks in the German forces were a little more than 3 thousand.
    [/ Quote]

    But in fact, even the figure of 3000 tanks is refuted by Muller-Gillebrandt and Thomas Jents:
    [Quote]according to B. Muller-Gillebrandt, in total about 3332 tanks (without flamethrower), about 250 assault guns and 350 reserve reserve 2nd and 5th tank divisions were concentrated against the USSR. Consequently, the total number of armored units was 3332 + 250 + 350 = 3932 units. As we see the data of Muller-Gillebrandt and M.I. Meltiukhov are somewhat different. Why? Yes, because M.I. Meltiukhov tried to take into account (however, incorrectly) just the flamethrower tanks and individual tank battalions in the north, in Finland, which Mueller-Gillebrandt generally “forgot” to calculate.[/ Quote]

    We can continue to convict the author of an illiterate article in fraud and outright lies about the information presented by the Soviet military intelligence, but for now I would like to know for what purpose he perverts the military history, deliberately distorting the numbers known to many objective researchers.
    1. vladcub
      vladcub 23 September 2019 15: 39
      0
      And for some reason it is not surprising to me: some of today's historians have long, long ago decided: EVERYTHING that is not written by them is doubtful, which means we are re-opening America?
      1. zenion
        zenion 23 September 2019 18: 34
        0
        Moreover, it is necessary to prove how some copperheads wrote that there were no tanks at all in the troops of the Wehrmacht during the attack on the USSR. Show that in the USSR, at each site of the invasion, there were armored horses against half a million tanks of the Red Army, and about a thousand cooks. These figures are reminiscent of posters written by Yaroslav Hasek in Schweik. As an explorer, under the fire of Russian artillery, he went to remove a harness from a horse, because it is almost new. As Schweik said, there will always be a new harness in our army. That is, these Russian saloids are singing American songs about how, as stated by expatriate Barack, my grandfather freed Auschwitz, he also took Berlin.
    2. AsmyppoL
      23 September 2019 18: 23
      +5
      sssr. "This lie has long been exposed by more competent specialists than the author of the article, who blindly believes in some German sources and deliberately distorts the story. [we are talking about the number of tanks and wedges 5800 in the Note of 24.3.38]
      I quote the material published at VO in 2011, which describes in more detail the number of armored vehicles in the Wehrmacht on 22 on June ...»

      Eugene: Need to read the text carefully! You are quoting my Note text 1938 years, but disprove with numbers on 22.6.41 5800 figure if you carefully read the Note does not apply to allies Germany - this figure is only German tanks in 1938 year according to intelligence.
      By 1.4.38, there were actually about 2077 tanks and wedgesthat gives intelligence data error in 2,8 times. In my opinion, this is a gross mistake ...

      Then you try to refute in numbers my following text: “So many tanks and wedges [5800] the German troops were not even in 22.6.41. And this is taking into account the presence of Czechoslovak and French captured tanks in the German tank forces, as well as the work of industry in Germany and the occupied countries of Europe over the next three years. Therefore, the information about the tanks, which is given in the Note, is very high. The overly overestimated idea of ​​intelligence about production and the presence of tanks in the German armed forces continued until the outbreak of war in 1941.»

      This is a figurative expression. A figurative expression is a unit of speech that is primarily used in a figurative sense.

      I mean intelligence data in March 1938 were excessively high and to the number of tanks indicated in the RM Germany only approached the beginning of the war, using all capacities of Germany and occupied countries. It doesn’t matter which tanks there were more 5800 or less. The main thing is that such an amount was not by the 24 of March of the 1938 of the year! If you understood differently, then this is your problem ... "
      1. AsmyppoL
        23 September 2019 18: 26
        +4
        sssr. "So Soviet intelligence was not mistaken at all when it brought the number of 5800 units, taking into account the technology of Germany’s allies and taking into account anti-tank artillery, the total number was estimated in the figure given in the summary: Total, all German allies fought against the USSR about 500 tanks and over 300 tankettes. In sum, the German troops and the troops of the countries of the allies of Germany had about 5600 tanks, and tankettes, concentrated against the USSR.»

        Eugene: We need to read carefully: I do not have a word about tanks and wedges allies. The article is about the number of German tanks! And if you switched to 22 on June 1941, you should also look at my information on German tanks in 1941. Intelligence called in March 1941 of the year 10 thousands of German tanks. With tanks and wedges allies will be even greater! Again, we see a gross huge error of our intelligence, which overestimated the number of German tanks twice!

        3000 tanks ... Yes there is a mistake. I had at our border - I apologize!

        But the number of 3000 tanks is again figurative expression when compared with the number 10000 of German tanks.

        10000 German tanks indicated by intelligence September 1940 years (will be in the next part). While the Germans didn’t have that many tanks.
        10000 tanks called in early March 1941 year and again such Germans didn’t have their number.

        You can argue that Germany did not have 24.3.38 Mr. 5800 tanks and wedges? And intelligence found out about it ...

        Can you argue that Germany did not have 11.3.41 tanks by the 10000? And intelligence found out about it ...

        Can you argue that the declared tank production capacity in the Third Reich did not amount to 18000-20000-30000 per year? And intelligence reported this ...
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 23 September 2019 20: 59
          -7
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          Eugene: We need to read carefully: I do not have a word about the tanks and wedges of the Allies. The article is about the number of German tanks!

          This technique is used by all crooks when our wedges are credited to light tanks, and German armored personnel carriers with cannon weapons are not taken into account at all, although in terms of armor and weapons they surpass everything that was in the spacecraft at that time from armored vehicles weighing up to 8-9 tons.
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          Intelligence called in March 1941 10 thousand German tanks. With tanks and wedges allies will be even greater! Again, we see a gross huge error of our intelligence, which doubled the number of German tanks!

          Another author’s scam, because in 2013 a detailed analysis of the French captured armored vehicles available in the Wehrmacht in 1941 appeared on the VO:
          By May 1940, the French army had 2637 tanks of a new type. Among them: 314 tanks B1, 210 — D1 and D2, 1070 - R35, AMR, AMC, 308 - H35, 243 - S35, 392 - H38, H39, R40 and 90 FCM tanks. In addition, up to 2000 old FT17 / 18 combat vehicles (of which 800 were combat-ready) during the First World War and six heavy 2C were stored in the parks. 600 armored vehicles and 3500 armored personnel carriers and tracked tractors complemented the armored weapons of the ground forces. Almost all of this equipment, which received damage during the fighting, and was absolutely serviceable, fell into the hands of the Germans.
          We can safely say that never before has any army in the world seized as much military equipment and ammunition as the Wehrmacht during the French campaign. Nor does history know an example for trophy weapons in such large numbers to be adopted by the victorious army. The case is undoubtedly unique! All this applies to French tanks, the exact number of which is not even called by German sources.
          Repaired and repainted in German camouflage, with crosses on the sides, they fought in the ranks of the enemy army right up to 1945 year. Only a small number of them, located in Africa, as well as in France itself, in 1944, were able to rise again under the French banner. The fate of combat vehicles, forced to act "under a foreign flag," was different.
          Some tanks, captured serviceable, used by the Germans during the fighting in France. The bulk of the armored vehicles after the completion of the "French campaign" began to be brought to the specially created parks, where they passed the "inspection" in order to determine the faults. Then the equipment was sent for repair or conversion to French factories, and from there it went to German military units.

          https://topwar.ru/28438-trofeynaya-bronetankovaya-tehnika-vermahta-franciya.html
          Not only that, there was also an English trophy armored vehicle:
          https://topwar.ru/28545-trofeynaya-bronetankovaya-tehnika-vermahta-velikobritaniya.html

          So our intelligence absolutely accurately calculated all the trophies of the Wehrmacht and summed them up with what was produced in Germany, which is why such a figure appeared.
      2. ccsr
        ccsr 23 September 2019 20: 38
        -7
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        Eugene: We need to carefully read the text! You cite my text on the Note of 1938, but disprove the figures on 22.6.41.

        And who wrote this, a swindler?
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        At 22.6.41 the tanks in the German forces were a little more than 3 thousand.

        Or wasn’t you writing? Started dodging again?
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        The note does not apply to the allies of Germany - this figure is only German tanks in 1938 according to intelligence.

        First, bring the text and link to this note so that you can understand whether you are lying or not.
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        I mean,

        You meant that you would lie again, and you would not be seized by the hand. But the trick failed again ...
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        No matter the tanks were more than 5800 or less.

        It’s not important for different swindlers what figures to justify their false version, but for those who study our military history objectively, this approach looks not only amateurish, but also mean.
  6. ccsr
    ccsr 23 September 2019 13: 32
    -7
    Author:
    Eugene
    Two questions for which there are no documented answers. Was the German command so trusting in the government of the USSR and was not afraid of a blow to the back, having begun the rout of the Anglo-French troops? Was the Red Army so weak that the German command was not afraid of it?

    I will throw two more questions to the author, from which he will fall into insomnia: did the Soviet command trust the Japanese government so much and was not afraid of a blow to the back that in difficult times it was necessary to partially withdraw troops from Siberia and the Far East to participate in the defeat of the Germans near Moscow?
    Was the Japanese army so weak that the Soviet command was not afraid of it?
    Well, burn Eugene, give the mountain a new stunning version, so that all readers fall into a stupor ...
  7. bubalik
    bubalik 23 September 2019 15: 46
    +5
    Maybe someone will be interested. hi


  8. ccsr
    ccsr 30 September 2019 12: 18
    -9
    Author:
    Eugene writes
    It was shown that the data on the enemy troops in the Republic of Moldova are very different from the real information. The presence in RM of the exact designations of the German armies, army corps, divisions and regiments could only be due to the fact that the German command used soldiers with fake badges on shoulder straps. These soldiers near the Soviet-German border depicted associations, formations and units of the Wehrmacht that did not exist at that time or were in Germany or in the West.

    I believed and still believe that the author of these articles is simply lying, without even bothering to study German documents about the misinformation of the troops. It is useless to discuss this topic with him, and therefore I quote the text of the directive, which completely breaks the author’s lies:
    GERMAN DISINFORMATION DIRECTIVE
    Supreme High Command
    Operational Headquarters
    Country Defense Department (Operations Division)
    No. 44142 / 41. Sov.secret
    Fuhrer rate
    November 15.02.41, XNUMX
    Base. Order of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces. Headquarters operational management. Department of Defense of the country No. 22048 / 40 from 3.02.41 Propulsion Sov. secretly.
    ADVENTANT DISINFORMATION DIRECTIVE
    The purpose of misinformation is to hide preparations for Operation Barbarossa. This main goal should be the basis of all measures to misinform the enemy.
    In the first period of time, until about April, it is necessary to continue to maintain public uncertainty regarding our intentions. At the next stage of preparation for Operation Barbarossa, which will no longer be possible to hide, false measures should be presented, carried out ostensibly to divert attention from a possible invasion of England.
    The following are guidelines for misinformation.
    At the first stage. Emphasizing the impending invasion of England; extensive information on new means of attack on transports; exaggeration of the significance of the auxiliary operations “Marita”, “Sunflower”, the actions of the 10 Air Corps and the number of forces intended to carry out these operations.
    Motivation for strategic focus and deployment for Operation Barbarossa. The deployment of forces for Operation Barbarossa should be conducted under the guise of an exchange of forces between West, Germany and the East, pulling up of the rear echelons for Operation Marita, or, in the end, under the guise of providing rear cover from Russia in case of transition to defense.
    In the second stage. The strategic deployment of forces for Operation Barbarossa should be presented in the light of the greatest disinformation maneuver in the history of wars in order to divert attention from the last preparations for the invasion of England.
    This event may be successful, since the first strike on England, thanks to the intensive use of new military equipment and the preponderance of British forces only at sea, can be carried out by relatively insignificant forces. In this regard, the bulk of the German troops can be used for demonstrative maneuver. Strategic deployment against England, on the contrary, will begin only at the same time as the first strike.
    The implementation of misinformation. The information service, which is managed by the head of intelligence and counterintelligence of the high command of the armed forces, should be guided by the basic principle: use general information carefully, only strictly through the channels that will be indicated by the head of intelligence and counterintelligence. The latter also directs the transfer of appropriate misinformation to the attaché in neutral countries and the attaché of neutral states in Berlin. In general, disinformation should take the form of a mosaic pattern, which is determined by common goals.
    To ensure the coherence of the practical activities conducted by the branches of the armed forces (mainly the transfer of troops) with the activities of the information service of the high command, the operational leadership headquarters (national defense department), by agreement with the main headquarters of the armed forces and the intelligence and counterintelligence department of the high command, will periodically Depending on the situation, replenish existing general instructions with new instructions ...

    Полный текст
    Source: http://liewar.ru/knigi-o-vojne/348-1941-god-uroki-i-vyvody.html?start=5
    And where is at least one hint of the author’s fantasies here?