The Ministry of Defense will buy more than one and a half thousand Italian armored cars
Part of 1. Buy weapon. Expensive
Most recently, all of us cheered one interesting newsNamely, the fact that the Ministry of Defense of Russia finally decided on the purchase of Italian armored vehicles IVECO LMV M65 for the Russian army, having refused, at the same time, from its domestic counterpart (GAZ-2330 "Tiger"), adopted three years ago. In addition, according to a number of media reports, it is planned to supply the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB with new Italian armored cars in the future, although the representatives of these departments have not commented on such assumptions.
Russian Technologies, where the assembly of machines will be organized, confirmed the information that the company is in talks with IVECO. According to a company representative, a pilot batch will be created this year, and the next mass production will begin. It is assumed that the minimum turnover will be 500 machines per year.
The scope of supply for the Ministry of Defense has already been agreed, the newspaper Kommersant writes. In the next five years, the defense ministry wants to purchase IVECO LMV M1775 65 machines. In the 2011-2012, it is planned to purchase 278 vehicles per year, over the next two years - 458 units per year, in the 2015 year - 228, and in the 2016 year - 75 armored vehicles.
At the same time, it is reported that, in total, the Defense Ministry is allocating billion rubles to 30 for this. In "Russian Technologies" clarified that each unit of equipment will cost no more than 300 thousand euros.
According to estimates of various observers, as well as analysts of near-war analysts, Russia is simply “hooked” on foreign weapons. It is not excluded that in the coming 5-6 years the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation will purchase arms from European countries and Israel for 10 billion euros. One of the most ambitious and negotiable orders will be the purchase of Mistral helicopter carriers from France. The “2 + 2” scheme is now being considered, which implies that Russia will buy the ship's 2 in finished form, and also 2 will assemble it in its shipyards.
In addition, work is underway to conclude a contract with the Israeli company IAI ("Israeli aviation industry ”) on the licensed production of unmanned aerial vehicles in Russia. Along with this, the Russian Federation is negotiating with the French Thales and Safran groups on the supply of additional lots for the assembly in Russia of thermal imaging systems and target designation containers. It was also reported that the Russian Defense Ministry is going to purchase a limited batch of FELIN equipment for the GRU special forces from Safran Corporation.
Part of 2. A little about the army or "Who is with a sword to us ...", so we are with this!
For any of us who are even slightly interested in the Armed Forces (VS) of Russia, it is no secret that their composition and strategy of application is determined by the current military doctrine adopted in the state on the basis of the law. Thus, in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of February 5 2010 146 "On the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" and entered into force since the signing (published in the Russian newspaper 10 February 2010), the main tasks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation during the immediate threat of military aggression is:
a) implementation of a set of additional measures aimed at reducing the level of threat of aggression and increasing the level of combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces and other troops in order to carry out mobilization and strategic deployment;
b) maintaining the potential of nuclear deterrence in the established degree of readiness;
c) participation in ensuring the regime of martial law;
d) implementation of measures for territorial defense, as well as the implementation of civil defense measures in the prescribed manner;
e) fulfillment of the international obligations of the Russian Federation for collective defense, repelling or preventing, in accordance with the norms of international law, an armed attack on another state that appealed to the Russian Federation with a corresponding request.
In addition, in wartime, the main tasks of the Armed Forces are:
- reflection of aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies;
- defeat the troops (forces) of the aggressor;
- forcing him to cease hostilities under conditions that meet the interests of the Russian Federation and its allies.
That is, apart from the tasks of peacetime, the main purpose of the armed forces is to be a "punishing sword" in the hands of the state, which is designed to ensure freedom and independence for all citizens of the Russian Federation from the external aggressor.
True, in the modern doctrine of the Russian Federation, among the tasks of peacetime, there were a number of points that in the old days were not something that the armed forces were “not typical” - no one even thought to load the Army with similar tasks.
So, for example, one of the main tasks of the Armed Forces in peacetime are:
- the fight against terrorism;
- participation in the protection of public order;
- ensuring public safety.
The participation of the regular army in the suppression of unauthorized rallies and demonstrations, riots and even various kinds of armed conflicts on the territory of the state itself contradicts the very nature and purpose of the armed forces, which becomes especially clear when viewed not in isolation, but in combination with other elements of the state’s power mechanism. Such use of troops leads to an aggravation of their relations with the people, undermines the authority of a person in uniform.
I would like to consider the use of army units for unusual purposes as a forced, temporary measure to compensate for the weakness of other instruments to maintain or restore order and stability within the country. Moreover, in our state there are plenty of other law enforcement agencies to whom such functions are close, and most importantly they are designed to solve these problems.
For example, internal troops (VV). The main tasks of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia are:
- participation, together with the internal affairs bodies, in localizing and blocking emergency areas or areas of armed conflict, suppressing armed clashes and separating the opposing parties in the indicated areas, taking weapons away from the population, carrying out measures to disarm illegal armed groups, and providing armed resistance - in their elimination;
- participation, together with the internal affairs agencies, in taking measures to strengthen the protection of public order and public security in areas adjacent to emergency areas or areas of armed conflict;
- participation in the suppression of riots in settlements, and, if necessary, in correctional institutions;
- participation, together with law enforcement bodies, in taking urgent measures to rescue people, protect unattended property, ensure the protection of public order in emergency situations and other extraordinary circumstances, as well as in ensuring the state of emergency;
- participation, together with the internal affairs bodies, in the fight against crime in the manner determined by this Federal Law;
- participation, together with the internal affairs bodies, in the protection of public order through the maintenance of patrol and inspection service in localities, as well as in ensuring public safety during public events;
- allocation of forces and means to border agencies of the FSB to participate in border searches and operations in the manner determined by the joint decisions of the Minister of the Interior and the Director of the FSB.
- formations and military units (divisions) of internal troops, in accordance with the regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation, participate in counter-terrorist operations and ensuring the legal regime of counter-terrorist operations.
A separate question is the role and place of the army in the power mechanism. International experience confirms that states use armed forces to thwart illegal attempts to change the state system, territorial integrity, and in some cases to invade neighboring states to overthrow the state system existing there. It can be assumed that the use of the armed forces not according to their intended purpose carries with it the danger of turning them into an active means of resolving internal political and domestic confrontation, especially in situations that are tense for the country.
In other words, someone very persistently and carefully decided to duplicate the functions of the internal troops in peacetime tasks by the armed forces of the Russian Federation.
Part of 3. "Shield and Sword", or each IVECO in a mine
But I would like to talk not about the cost of IVECO LMV M65, not about the advantages or disadvantages of this technique compared to domestic developments or about the quality of writing laws that regulate the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. I would like to talk about the location and relevance of using IVECO LMV M65 technology in the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces.
It would be unfair not to say anything about the design features of this type of equipment that our Minister of Defense, A.E. Serdyukov, so interested. and his loyal deputy for armament, Popovkin. For example, an LMV armored personnel carrier can withstand an explosive device exploded under a wheel or a bottom that is 6-compliant in kilograms of trinitrotoluene, and is 6-grade protection class. And some time ago, the company Iveco published a list of cases of undermining of the LMV, which are located in Afghanistan: the cars were fired at with machine guns and grenade launchers, undermined by mines and land mines - there were no dead, the fighters were treated only with light wounds.
As Iveco experts say, this is a merit of the design: to ensure maximum protection for the crew, the “habitable” compartment is separated from the engine and cargo compartments, so that when the shock wave is blown up, only the front or rear parts of the vehicle are destroyed. Moreover, the crew seats are fixed elastically in order to absorb the impact, and the U-shaped bottom protects the bottom of the fighters (this form ensures a good reflection of the fragments) made of two types of armor: steel and composite. Complete the picture of the insert in the wheels, which allow you to move on shot through tires.
But since the vendors of IVECO LMV M65 talked about the merits of this type of machine when they exploded mines and land mines, then it is worth remembering a little of the historical experience gained by our armed forces in Afghanistan.
The war in Afghanistan was very cruel for our soldiers, including because of the frequent mine explosions. The mine war in Afghanistan is, above all, a war along the paths of movement. As a rule, the Mujahideen chose road construction sites for setting up mine-blast obstacles: mountain passes, narrow entrances to valleys, sharp turns of roads, ups and downs, pedestrian and pack trails, entrances to caves and abandoned buildings, approaches to water sources, entrances to the kariz, oases and groves, tunnels. The charge explosion was supposed not only to cause damage, but also to delay the advancement of troops for the longest possible time, and when setting up an ambush - to deprive the maneuver. Having good intelligence, the Mujahideen often knew in advance about the upcoming advancement of the columns, which allowed them to conduct appropriate training for their actions. But we should not forget that all the questions of the mine explosive business and the tactics of the mine warfare were taught to the Afghan mojaheds by Western instructors in Pakistani camps.
It would be fair to note that in Afghanistan, Soviet troops got an unprecedented experience in modern fighting mines and land mines, as well as with those who lay them on the roads. Yes, of course, there were losses in personnel and equipment, this is an open secret. But, if you read the memoirs of participants in those events or military-scientific literature of those times, then you can trace a very interesting picture. As a rule, the Mujahideen attacked those columns that were either formed from a small amount of equipment, or those that did not have sufficient forces and means to cover the flanks of the column, vanguard and rearguard. In other words - these were separately moving groups of equipment, and not combat units.
You understand that it is much easier to destroy a column of two KamAZ trucks and one BMP than to do serious damage to a column of a motorized rifle battalion with a sufficient number of heavy weapons, trawling, and radio suppression, having in its composition in accordance with the combat regulations of the ground forces (now this document is called a little differently, but the essence does not change from this). In the conditions of mountainous terrain, it is incredibly difficult to organize and comply with all measures ensuring the maximum level of security for the column, but still it is possible, but in order, stupidly, not to lose equipment and people, it is also necessary. But, according to our popular custom, the exact, “literal” implementation of all the prescribed activities is considered optional, and in Chechnya, especially during the first campaign, such events were often not held at all. That is, despite the fact that “the charter is written in blood,” we still have it. "A mess is not a mess, it is such an order."
If you turn to the original source - the combat regulations, then, with the threat of a collision with the enemy (which was constantly in Afghanistan), the troops should generally move (“make the march”, to be entirely accurate in military terminology) exclusively as part of units.
In order not to be unfounded:
“A march is an organized movement of troops in columns along roads and column tracks in order to exit to a designated area or to a specified line. He is the main way of movement of the battalion (company). The march can be made in anticipation of engaging in battle or outside the threat of a collision with the enemy, and in the direction of travel - to the front, along the front or from the front to the rear. In all cases, the march takes place secretly, as a rule, at night or in other conditions of limited visibility, and in combat situations and in the deep rear of its troops - during the day. In any conditions, units must arrive at the designated area or at a specified line in a timely manner, in full force and in readiness to perform a combat mission.
When a ground enemy threatens to attack, depending on the nature of the terrain, head and closing patrols, or sentinel detachments, are sent for removal, providing observation of them, supporting them with fire and eliminating the surprise attack of the ground enemy on the guarded column.
The question arises: why is everything so cool on paper and so bad in a real combat situation?
And probably because in the same Chechnya, as a rule, not well-coordinated military units, “sharpened” for a war with an external aggressor, acted, but hastily formed consolidated military units, which did not have not only full-armed weapons, but were often too limited in both methods and methods of dealing with the bandits who ambushed on the roads.
We often heard news reports from the media: here and there in Chechnya, an attack on a convoy of riot police took place.
And riot police is still a militia, albeit of a special purpose. Actions in a combat situation, which are governed by the combat regulations, have not been trained.
Specificity is completely different. And those activities that were carried out in Chechnya, clearly demanded from the heads of the consolidated units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the relevant (missing) knowledge, experience and skills. If they had reported, for example, that a strategic nuclear missile launched by the head of the ROVD didn’t hit the target, would anyone be surprised?
As you can see - there is a contradiction. On the one hand, combat (under combat regulations) actions must be conducted by units of the Ministry of Defense, which exist to repel attacks from outside, and cannot act against citizens of their country. On the other hand, the guidance of the public and constitutional order within the country is a function of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but the militia units and its command are not prepared to “act according to the military regulations”, and they don’t know how to hide them. One more negative factor is added. Frequently the Ministry of Internal Affairs sent to Chechnya absolutely “civilian” leaders from all sorts of internal affairs departments and police departments solely for the purpose of obtaining “combat” experience and corresponding to this experience, privileges. So the loss is half on their conscience.
Part of 4. "Organizational Conclusions"
So what am I talking about? Still, need or not need the Russian army IVECO LMV M65? You can answer boldly and without regard to - machines of a similar class in the armed forces would not be superfluous and, perhaps, would occupy their niche.
By the way, the same NATO units deployed in Iraq are forced to use this type of technology, because what they do there, rightly implies the widespread use of this type of machine.
For example: on the next patrol of the streets of Baghdad, the American infantrymen will shoot at the same time moving vehicles of peaceful Iraqis, kill a dozen people who are guilty only of living in Iraq, and by the will of fate there are large oil reserves in their state. Indeed, in this case, it is worth fearing that some offended Iraqi, out of hatred for sowing democracy to American soldiers, will bury the bomb on the road and undermine another jeep-armored car. From this calculation, of course, it is worth buying vehicles with armored capsules and putting them into service to protect your soldiers.
But, as far as I know, unlike the American one, the Russian army seems to be not going to ride, for example, on Iraq and does not amuse itself with “postrelushki” on civilian structures and civilian vehicles, thus causing fair indignation of peaceful citizens of a Middle Eastern state.
In other words: cool - not cool, and with all the existing range of military equipment in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the maximum for which IVECO LMV M65 class cars can come in handy is to transport the brigade commander (battalion) and other army commanders. But for explosives and other units that are called upon, first of all, to take measures to strengthen the protection of public order and public security in areas adjacent to emergency areas and areas of armed conflict and fight terrorism (as well as participating in curbing riots in localities, and, if necessary, in correctional institutions), a technique of this class would be very useful.
Most recently, all of us cheered one interesting newsNamely, the fact that the Ministry of Defense of Russia finally decided on the purchase of Italian armored vehicles IVECO LMV M65 for the Russian army, having refused, at the same time, from its domestic counterpart (GAZ-2330 "Tiger"), adopted three years ago. In addition, according to a number of media reports, it is planned to supply the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB with new Italian armored cars in the future, although the representatives of these departments have not commented on such assumptions.
Russian Technologies, where the assembly of machines will be organized, confirmed the information that the company is in talks with IVECO. According to a company representative, a pilot batch will be created this year, and the next mass production will begin. It is assumed that the minimum turnover will be 500 machines per year.
The scope of supply for the Ministry of Defense has already been agreed, the newspaper Kommersant writes. In the next five years, the defense ministry wants to purchase IVECO LMV M1775 65 machines. In the 2011-2012, it is planned to purchase 278 vehicles per year, over the next two years - 458 units per year, in the 2015 year - 228, and in the 2016 year - 75 armored vehicles.
At the same time, it is reported that, in total, the Defense Ministry is allocating billion rubles to 30 for this. In "Russian Technologies" clarified that each unit of equipment will cost no more than 300 thousand euros.
According to estimates of various observers, as well as analysts of near-war analysts, Russia is simply “hooked” on foreign weapons. It is not excluded that in the coming 5-6 years the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation will purchase arms from European countries and Israel for 10 billion euros. One of the most ambitious and negotiable orders will be the purchase of Mistral helicopter carriers from France. The “2 + 2” scheme is now being considered, which implies that Russia will buy the ship's 2 in finished form, and also 2 will assemble it in its shipyards.
In addition, work is underway to conclude a contract with the Israeli company IAI ("Israeli aviation industry ”) on the licensed production of unmanned aerial vehicles in Russia. Along with this, the Russian Federation is negotiating with the French Thales and Safran groups on the supply of additional lots for the assembly in Russia of thermal imaging systems and target designation containers. It was also reported that the Russian Defense Ministry is going to purchase a limited batch of FELIN equipment for the GRU special forces from Safran Corporation.
Part of 2. A little about the army or "Who is with a sword to us ...", so we are with this!
For any of us who are even slightly interested in the Armed Forces (VS) of Russia, it is no secret that their composition and strategy of application is determined by the current military doctrine adopted in the state on the basis of the law. Thus, in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of February 5 2010 146 "On the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" and entered into force since the signing (published in the Russian newspaper 10 February 2010), the main tasks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation during the immediate threat of military aggression is:
a) implementation of a set of additional measures aimed at reducing the level of threat of aggression and increasing the level of combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces and other troops in order to carry out mobilization and strategic deployment;
b) maintaining the potential of nuclear deterrence in the established degree of readiness;
c) participation in ensuring the regime of martial law;
d) implementation of measures for territorial defense, as well as the implementation of civil defense measures in the prescribed manner;
e) fulfillment of the international obligations of the Russian Federation for collective defense, repelling or preventing, in accordance with the norms of international law, an armed attack on another state that appealed to the Russian Federation with a corresponding request.
In addition, in wartime, the main tasks of the Armed Forces are:
- reflection of aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies;
- defeat the troops (forces) of the aggressor;
- forcing him to cease hostilities under conditions that meet the interests of the Russian Federation and its allies.
That is, apart from the tasks of peacetime, the main purpose of the armed forces is to be a "punishing sword" in the hands of the state, which is designed to ensure freedom and independence for all citizens of the Russian Federation from the external aggressor.
True, in the modern doctrine of the Russian Federation, among the tasks of peacetime, there were a number of points that in the old days were not something that the armed forces were “not typical” - no one even thought to load the Army with similar tasks.
So, for example, one of the main tasks of the Armed Forces in peacetime are:
- the fight against terrorism;
- participation in the protection of public order;
- ensuring public safety.
The participation of the regular army in the suppression of unauthorized rallies and demonstrations, riots and even various kinds of armed conflicts on the territory of the state itself contradicts the very nature and purpose of the armed forces, which becomes especially clear when viewed not in isolation, but in combination with other elements of the state’s power mechanism. Such use of troops leads to an aggravation of their relations with the people, undermines the authority of a person in uniform.
I would like to consider the use of army units for unusual purposes as a forced, temporary measure to compensate for the weakness of other instruments to maintain or restore order and stability within the country. Moreover, in our state there are plenty of other law enforcement agencies to whom such functions are close, and most importantly they are designed to solve these problems.
For example, internal troops (VV). The main tasks of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia are:
- participation, together with the internal affairs bodies, in localizing and blocking emergency areas or areas of armed conflict, suppressing armed clashes and separating the opposing parties in the indicated areas, taking weapons away from the population, carrying out measures to disarm illegal armed groups, and providing armed resistance - in their elimination;
- participation, together with the internal affairs agencies, in taking measures to strengthen the protection of public order and public security in areas adjacent to emergency areas or areas of armed conflict;
- participation in the suppression of riots in settlements, and, if necessary, in correctional institutions;
- participation, together with law enforcement bodies, in taking urgent measures to rescue people, protect unattended property, ensure the protection of public order in emergency situations and other extraordinary circumstances, as well as in ensuring the state of emergency;
- participation, together with the internal affairs bodies, in the fight against crime in the manner determined by this Federal Law;
- participation, together with the internal affairs bodies, in the protection of public order through the maintenance of patrol and inspection service in localities, as well as in ensuring public safety during public events;
- allocation of forces and means to border agencies of the FSB to participate in border searches and operations in the manner determined by the joint decisions of the Minister of the Interior and the Director of the FSB.
- formations and military units (divisions) of internal troops, in accordance with the regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation, participate in counter-terrorist operations and ensuring the legal regime of counter-terrorist operations.
A separate question is the role and place of the army in the power mechanism. International experience confirms that states use armed forces to thwart illegal attempts to change the state system, territorial integrity, and in some cases to invade neighboring states to overthrow the state system existing there. It can be assumed that the use of the armed forces not according to their intended purpose carries with it the danger of turning them into an active means of resolving internal political and domestic confrontation, especially in situations that are tense for the country.
In other words, someone very persistently and carefully decided to duplicate the functions of the internal troops in peacetime tasks by the armed forces of the Russian Federation.
Part of 3. "Shield and Sword", or each IVECO in a mine
But I would like to talk not about the cost of IVECO LMV M65, not about the advantages or disadvantages of this technique compared to domestic developments or about the quality of writing laws that regulate the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. I would like to talk about the location and relevance of using IVECO LMV M65 technology in the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces.
It would be unfair not to say anything about the design features of this type of equipment that our Minister of Defense, A.E. Serdyukov, so interested. and his loyal deputy for armament, Popovkin. For example, an LMV armored personnel carrier can withstand an explosive device exploded under a wheel or a bottom that is 6-compliant in kilograms of trinitrotoluene, and is 6-grade protection class. And some time ago, the company Iveco published a list of cases of undermining of the LMV, which are located in Afghanistan: the cars were fired at with machine guns and grenade launchers, undermined by mines and land mines - there were no dead, the fighters were treated only with light wounds.
As Iveco experts say, this is a merit of the design: to ensure maximum protection for the crew, the “habitable” compartment is separated from the engine and cargo compartments, so that when the shock wave is blown up, only the front or rear parts of the vehicle are destroyed. Moreover, the crew seats are fixed elastically in order to absorb the impact, and the U-shaped bottom protects the bottom of the fighters (this form ensures a good reflection of the fragments) made of two types of armor: steel and composite. Complete the picture of the insert in the wheels, which allow you to move on shot through tires.
But since the vendors of IVECO LMV M65 talked about the merits of this type of machine when they exploded mines and land mines, then it is worth remembering a little of the historical experience gained by our armed forces in Afghanistan.
The war in Afghanistan was very cruel for our soldiers, including because of the frequent mine explosions. The mine war in Afghanistan is, above all, a war along the paths of movement. As a rule, the Mujahideen chose road construction sites for setting up mine-blast obstacles: mountain passes, narrow entrances to valleys, sharp turns of roads, ups and downs, pedestrian and pack trails, entrances to caves and abandoned buildings, approaches to water sources, entrances to the kariz, oases and groves, tunnels. The charge explosion was supposed not only to cause damage, but also to delay the advancement of troops for the longest possible time, and when setting up an ambush - to deprive the maneuver. Having good intelligence, the Mujahideen often knew in advance about the upcoming advancement of the columns, which allowed them to conduct appropriate training for their actions. But we should not forget that all the questions of the mine explosive business and the tactics of the mine warfare were taught to the Afghan mojaheds by Western instructors in Pakistani camps.
It would be fair to note that in Afghanistan, Soviet troops got an unprecedented experience in modern fighting mines and land mines, as well as with those who lay them on the roads. Yes, of course, there were losses in personnel and equipment, this is an open secret. But, if you read the memoirs of participants in those events or military-scientific literature of those times, then you can trace a very interesting picture. As a rule, the Mujahideen attacked those columns that were either formed from a small amount of equipment, or those that did not have sufficient forces and means to cover the flanks of the column, vanguard and rearguard. In other words - these were separately moving groups of equipment, and not combat units.
You understand that it is much easier to destroy a column of two KamAZ trucks and one BMP than to do serious damage to a column of a motorized rifle battalion with a sufficient number of heavy weapons, trawling, and radio suppression, having in its composition in accordance with the combat regulations of the ground forces (now this document is called a little differently, but the essence does not change from this). In the conditions of mountainous terrain, it is incredibly difficult to organize and comply with all measures ensuring the maximum level of security for the column, but still it is possible, but in order, stupidly, not to lose equipment and people, it is also necessary. But, according to our popular custom, the exact, “literal” implementation of all the prescribed activities is considered optional, and in Chechnya, especially during the first campaign, such events were often not held at all. That is, despite the fact that “the charter is written in blood,” we still have it. "A mess is not a mess, it is such an order."
If you turn to the original source - the combat regulations, then, with the threat of a collision with the enemy (which was constantly in Afghanistan), the troops should generally move (“make the march”, to be entirely accurate in military terminology) exclusively as part of units.
In order not to be unfounded:
“A march is an organized movement of troops in columns along roads and column tracks in order to exit to a designated area or to a specified line. He is the main way of movement of the battalion (company). The march can be made in anticipation of engaging in battle or outside the threat of a collision with the enemy, and in the direction of travel - to the front, along the front or from the front to the rear. In all cases, the march takes place secretly, as a rule, at night or in other conditions of limited visibility, and in combat situations and in the deep rear of its troops - during the day. In any conditions, units must arrive at the designated area or at a specified line in a timely manner, in full force and in readiness to perform a combat mission.
When a ground enemy threatens to attack, depending on the nature of the terrain, head and closing patrols, or sentinel detachments, are sent for removal, providing observation of them, supporting them with fire and eliminating the surprise attack of the ground enemy on the guarded column.
The question arises: why is everything so cool on paper and so bad in a real combat situation?
And probably because in the same Chechnya, as a rule, not well-coordinated military units, “sharpened” for a war with an external aggressor, acted, but hastily formed consolidated military units, which did not have not only full-armed weapons, but were often too limited in both methods and methods of dealing with the bandits who ambushed on the roads.
We often heard news reports from the media: here and there in Chechnya, an attack on a convoy of riot police took place.
And riot police is still a militia, albeit of a special purpose. Actions in a combat situation, which are governed by the combat regulations, have not been trained.
Specificity is completely different. And those activities that were carried out in Chechnya, clearly demanded from the heads of the consolidated units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the relevant (missing) knowledge, experience and skills. If they had reported, for example, that a strategic nuclear missile launched by the head of the ROVD didn’t hit the target, would anyone be surprised?
As you can see - there is a contradiction. On the one hand, combat (under combat regulations) actions must be conducted by units of the Ministry of Defense, which exist to repel attacks from outside, and cannot act against citizens of their country. On the other hand, the guidance of the public and constitutional order within the country is a function of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but the militia units and its command are not prepared to “act according to the military regulations”, and they don’t know how to hide them. One more negative factor is added. Frequently the Ministry of Internal Affairs sent to Chechnya absolutely “civilian” leaders from all sorts of internal affairs departments and police departments solely for the purpose of obtaining “combat” experience and corresponding to this experience, privileges. So the loss is half on their conscience.
Part of 4. "Organizational Conclusions"
So what am I talking about? Still, need or not need the Russian army IVECO LMV M65? You can answer boldly and without regard to - machines of a similar class in the armed forces would not be superfluous and, perhaps, would occupy their niche.
By the way, the same NATO units deployed in Iraq are forced to use this type of technology, because what they do there, rightly implies the widespread use of this type of machine.
For example: on the next patrol of the streets of Baghdad, the American infantrymen will shoot at the same time moving vehicles of peaceful Iraqis, kill a dozen people who are guilty only of living in Iraq, and by the will of fate there are large oil reserves in their state. Indeed, in this case, it is worth fearing that some offended Iraqi, out of hatred for sowing democracy to American soldiers, will bury the bomb on the road and undermine another jeep-armored car. From this calculation, of course, it is worth buying vehicles with armored capsules and putting them into service to protect your soldiers.
But, as far as I know, unlike the American one, the Russian army seems to be not going to ride, for example, on Iraq and does not amuse itself with “postrelushki” on civilian structures and civilian vehicles, thus causing fair indignation of peaceful citizens of a Middle Eastern state.
In other words: cool - not cool, and with all the existing range of military equipment in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the maximum for which IVECO LMV M65 class cars can come in handy is to transport the brigade commander (battalion) and other army commanders. But for explosives and other units that are called upon, first of all, to take measures to strengthen the protection of public order and public security in areas adjacent to emergency areas and areas of armed conflict and fight terrorism (as well as participating in curbing riots in localities, and, if necessary, in correctional institutions), a technique of this class would be very useful.
Information