What is wrong with our minesweepers?
The author (and other specialists) repeatedly raised questions of the critical state of the mine action forces of the Navy, not only incapacitated against the modern mine threat, but also having a military-technical backlog from the current level of military affairs, unprecedented in our armed forces (reaching 50-75 years!) . The reasons for this are not technical, but purely organizational, and to a large extent personnel.
Moreover, the problems of mine defense (JI) make it possible to reveal the much deeper problems of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense, which need to be discussed.
It is necessary, while there is still time to have time to eliminate their consequences.
At the end of 2018, the Anonymous hacker group released excerpts from Christopher Donnelly's materialsSuggestions for Crimea"2014 of the year. In the list of measures - the installation of bottom mines in the Sevastopol Bay ...
All this was written not just by a “private person”, but by a person who was in charge of the state and special structures of Great Britain and NATO and carried out the assignments of a “certain character”.
In #1 for 15 January 2019 in “MIC»An article by the author was published with reference to these documents and the likely consequences of their implementation:
Note: earlier, taking into account the likelihood and danger of the use of mines by terrorist groups, the author in open publications avoided this topic (while repeatedly putting it in a “closed format”). However, the complete ignoring of this threat from the Navy forces open alarm bells to sound.
The question is so urgent that it was reflected even in the Navy's printed body - the magazine Morskoi sbornik (No. XXUMX, 10), in the article of the employees of the Central Research Institute of the Investigative Committee VK Bystrov B.V., Pirozhenko V.A., Kuleshov K.V.
The reaction of the Ministry of Defense “followed” in the person of the deputy head of the Information and Mass Communications Department (DIMK) of the Ministry of Defense A. Volosatov, “MIC, 29.01.2019 G.:
The first thing to note about this “answer” is the military rank of the city of Volosatov - the colonel, and the post of “chief expert” of the press service of the Ministry of Defense, previously held by him.
It is logical to see a strong professional in such a position and in such a rank, but there are simply no objections as such in the publication of the “expert” Volosatov, not a single fact I mentioned has been refuted by him. In his letter there are only inaccurate statements and vague references to some anonymous and obviously dubious "foreign analysts" and "bloggers."
All the facts cited in my January 15 article are true and have documentary evidence (including documents of the Ministry of Defense itself posted on the public procurement website):
Conclusions from this:
The only relatively modern anti-mine ship of the Black Sea Fleet was not operational (not in the main complex; list of faults, see procurement documents No. 0173100004515000738) until the end of 2016, and no emergency repair measures taking into account the sharp exacerbation of the military-political situation At the beginning of 2014, the central bodies of the Navy and the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation did not undertake.
At the beginning, the situation is similar (in acoustics), and its solution is only “planned” by the end of 2019.
There is not a single modern anti-mine ship at the beginning of 2019 in the Black Sea Fleet today. Even completely outdated ones that did not undergo any modernization and the 1973 minesweepers built in the city were forced to go to the combat service area (accompanied by a tugboat) to combat services.
Note: at present, MTC “Vice-Admiral Zakharyin” is in military service in the Mediterranean Sea, and, I really want to hope, Livadia GAS urgently put into operation repaired (and not “blind”).
Mr. Volosatov’s statement on the modernization and improvement of anti-mine weapons by combat crews of minesweepers has no basis, the situation is not only getting better - they have even lost what they had (for example, searchers).
The new PMK of the 12700 project has an outdated concept and a number of serious flaws. The main thing is that the ships are actually up to the first mine with a modern fuse (on which either the minesweeper itself or its only and extremely expensive self-propelled underwater vehicle will explode).
Note: 12700 issues are covered in a separate article.
The main type of hydroacoustic stations (GAS) of naval minesweepers is MG-89 "Serna" (developed by 1969, which has not undergone any modernization since then)
Moreover, tenders for the repair of GAS MG-89 (from ship-repair enterprises engaged in repairing the PMK Navy) in recent years have ended with a “typical phrase”: “Not one application has been submitted”. On a significant part of the PMK Navy, GAS MG-89 is simply not in disrepair, and there is no one to repair them.
Those. A significant part of the Navy minesweepers is simply “blind”! This "level" of anti-mine forces corresponds to the first years of the Second World War ...
The Kabarga GAS development of the 10750-s development, which do not have full digital processing, and with the performance characteristics close to the MG-12660 GUS are installed on the 80 off-shore cruise shipyard of the 89 project and two sea-sweepers of the XNUMX project.
In the 2000-ies, an attempt was made to modernize GUS MG-89, with the introduction of full-fledged digital processing, GAS MG-89ME. With the ability to effectively upgrade virtually all naval minesweepers:
However ... “the customer (the Navy) did not show interest,” the modernization work (GAS MG-89ME) was not completed, and today this GUS is excluded from all the “promotional offers” of Okepribor JSC.
For comparison: in the middle of the 2000's, the Polish Navy conducted its own modernization of our MG-89 (installed on Polish minesweepers of the 60-70-s of the last century).
Moreover, Polish specialists have created a modern set of new anti-mine weapons (from underwater vehicles to proximity trawls), and today the combat capabilities of the Polish Naval Forces naval fleet are many times greater than those of the Russian Navy (even taking into account the presence of two newest 12700 PMKs in the Baltic)!
Could we do the same? Of course! According to GAS, it was said above, and underwater vehicles we had a number of companies that successfully worked in this area (SNNP "Region", OKB OT, Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Yuzhmorgeologiya", OKB STS and others).
The “rate” of the Navy on “import” (or rather, the “interest” of a number of high-ranking officials of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense in “import”) played an extremely negative role. A report at the round table on underwater technology of the Army-2018 forum of the general director of Tethis-Pro JSC:
Surprisingly, these figures are proud! Or maybe it was not domestic? But at the same round table a report was made by representatives of the Tomsk University (TUSUR). Among others, the long-term work of domestic submersibles at great depths to search for the Argentinean submarine San Juan (purchased by a “different structure” of the Russian Defense Ministry, not the Navy) was mentioned. Representatives of 40 NII NII also praised the RTM-500 apparatus (developed by 90-s) based on the results of work on the Kursk APCR. However, not a single RTM-500 (or any other domestic underwater vehicle) was purchased by the Navy after that (except for OCR “Mayevka”, “Livadia”) - all the money was spent on imports from Tethys-Pro ...
The task of creating massive underwater vehicles for the domestic industrial software was simply not set (despite the fact that the potential for its solution, of course, was)!
Against the background of all other minesweepers of the Navy, MTSchch “Vice-Admiral Zakharyin” of the 02668 project stands out - the first full-fledged minesweeper-finder of mines (TCHIM) of the RF Navy, equipped not only with GAS, but also with dynamic positioning system, automated mine action system (ACS PMD) and special self-propelled underwater vehicles (SPA) software.
The main “anti-mine tool” MTC “Vice-Admiral Zakharyin”, SPA complex “Mayevka”, successfully passed the state tests in November 2008 (together with the ship). Decision №253 / 8.6309 from 25.11.2008, "recommended for adoption and the organization of mass production."
Moreover, “Mayevka” turned out to be the only our example of a marine underwater weapons and a mine complex developed on time and funding and successfully passed (right away!) government tests.
The complex had two modifications, incl. container, successfully tested at MTSVS “Valentin Pikul” of the Black Sea Fleet in 2007, which was possible to use from all the naval minesweepers and minesweepers (i.e., it opened up the possibility of effective modernization of practically all naval personnel of the naval personnel).
Planned series. The first Maevka should have been received by the minesweepers MT-264 and MT-265 of the Joint Command of Forces and Forces in the North-East of the Russian Federation (for mine support of the Boreev of the Pacific Fleet).
However, the container "Mayevka" was taken out to "storage" in Moscow, and the planned series was excluded during the "proof-reading" of the State Defense Order (without any justification).
I would very much like to ask about the motives of such a “decision” of the then head of the development and orders department for ships, marine equipment and weapons of the Navy in the city of Benzoruk.
Subsequently, the city of Benzoruk turned out to be the deputy general director of the SNNP "Region" for R & D, after which all the latest events on "Mayevka" (including the sad end of its stories) no longer seem amazing.
At the beginning of 2010, finances again went to “import”, “Mayevka” was “ordered to forget”, and, moreover, gossip was launched at a very high level that “Mayevka” allegedly “failed the tests”.
Only one example of this is interview after the Evronaval-2012 salon with the deputy head of the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau A. Zakharov .
I note that mentioned in an interview with V.V. Chirkov personally for 5 months before, when he visited the Region, he observed the actual work of the Mayevka container modification (in the hydroacoustic basin) and had objective information on it.
In order to show an objective picture, below are the documents (from the site of public procurement).
Thus, the facts are documented:
• the presence of the complex of two modifications, incl. container;
• the ability to work on silted mines (while the vast majority of submersibles are unable to do this) - and this was confirmed by tests (!);
• successful completion of state tests by the complex and the availability of its letter O1 (ie, documentary evidence of readiness for the series).
In reality, the tests were failed not by “Mayevka”, but by NPA “Livadia”, which was (until the end of 2009) part of GAS “Livadia”, developed by ZAO Aquamarine (St. Petersburg). Unfortunately, contrary to the advertising statements of JSC Aquamarine, its products do not always confirm in practice the stated characteristics and capabilities.
As a result of all these intrigues of the Navy, “Mayevka” did not start operating; in fact, only the ancient trawls were armed with the MTShch “Vice-Admiral Zakharyin”.
Obviously, such a state of the only relatively modern PMK of the Navy was absolutely abnormal. However, for Benzoruk, Chirkov and the like chiefs "everything was all right" ("there will be no war!").
As a result, in 2013, the tender “Technical and service maintenance and repair of automatic control devices for trawls and searchers, contact, non-contact mines and mine finders ...”, under which it was planned to commission and start operating the Navy Mayevka complex, that "the auction for this lot was declared invalid (no bids were submitted)."
I emphasize: the repair and commissioning of the main complex of the only THIS Navy.
I will say the reason for this myself: the only executor of the work was not informed about it, found out only at the last moment and simply did not have time to prepare the documents.
Those. officials have a “line,” formally, “they have done everything,” but in fact the case failed already at the stage of tender placement. Such obviously impracticable “dummies” for tenders of sea underwater weapons was enough. Of course, no one bore any responsibility for this.
2014 d. From the report to the commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral VV Chirkov, in. 11977:
The essence of the document was the need for an emergency commissioning of not only “Mayevka” on “Zakharyin”, but also a return to “V. Pikul "its container modification.
However, Navy officials and Defense Ministry officials (below their names will be named) “continued to plan”:
Those. there is a war in which the Russian Federation participates, incl. Navy and the Black Sea Fleet. The only relatively modern military-industrial complex of the Navy is out of order, but among the officers of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense "everything is all right", "epaulets are not too tight", "maybe the enemy will not use mines"!
At the same time, the only adequate approach in this situation, with the start of the operation in Syria, was the commissioning of “Mayevok” on Zakharyin and Pikule in the shortest possible time, and the permanent location of one of these PMKs in Tartus!
However, in 2017, after the repair and commissioning of the “Mayevka” at the end of 2016, the MTShch. Vice Admiral Zakharyin left for the combat zone, having his main weapon in the ranks for his first military service. Characteristically, this fact was not noted in any way at DIMK Konashenkova, who continued to publish "popular prints" about "fleet-sweepers in trawling trawls" and advertising films on complexes that were not known to have efficient software (for example, "Galtel").
However, the period of functioning of the MTShch "Vice-Admiral Zakharyin" as LOOKNOW turned out to be short-lived - the substrip GAS "Livadia" failed.
And again, instead of emergency repairs and putting the ship into operation, “next planning”.
Those. there is a war, the Black Sea Fleet is fighting, not having in the composition of a single modern PMK!
With "Maya" even "more fun." Instead of upgrading it (with the elimination of existing shortcomings and increasing the performance characteristics) and mass production, the “question” on it is closed. Finally. The chief designer is fired. In fact, today for the fleet it is already lost, and it is necessary to think about replacing it with Zakharyin.
And here we must separately emphasize that we have lost with this.
The modernization of GAS MG-89 and the Mayevok series ensured at least limited combat capability of the entire group of the PMK Navy (MTShch projects 266M, 12660 (with GAS Kabarga)), BTschch project 1265). This did not require any significant expenses, it was necessary (for the officers of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense) only to properly treat their official duties.
Moreover, "Mayevka" was not allowed not only to the fleet, but also for export.
Despite its presence in the Rosoboronexport catalogs, the design of an advertising passport and export-type passport was blocked. Inzakazchikov requests for it were, but for the above reasons remained unanswered
As a result, the Vietnamese Navy went to the purchase of the Italian PLUTO PLUS TNPA to equip their PMK projects 266E and 1265E (Soviet-built).
The above are convincing evidence of the critical state of the Navy’s anti-mine forces. At the same time, there are no technical problems for the Navy to have effective anti-mine forces, there is no need for large expenditures on this.
And now the names of the officials who are personally responsible for the situation with the MVP Navy and the state of mine defense.
Head of Navy Shipbuilding Tryapichnikov V.A.
Head of the Marine Underwater Weapons Development and Operation Service of the Naval Shipbuilding Directorate I.M. Taran:
Head of the Department of Marine Underwater Weapons of the Department of the Ministry of Defense to ensure the state defense order (DOGOZ) Kaplouhy S.А.
After all these high persons, mentioning the head of the anti-mine department of the Central Research Institute for Military Shipbuilding (also called the Shipbuilding Research Institute) of the city of R-ko is even somehow “fine”, but necessary.
January 2015, after the Supreme Commander received information (in the fall of 2014) about the critical condition of sea underwater weapons, the Navy urgently prepares a document with “proposals for resolving the crisis” (actually writing them off from previously developed documents with which we are underwater pit "and turned out to be). Mr. R-ko writes his “own part,” in its text it reads:
From such “numbers” “speechless” even Taran standing next to him (hereinafter - with “preservation of intonation”):
I emphasize that in this “parallel reality” there is a whole head of the core department of the central research institute of the Ministry of Defense and the Navy on the subject!
But, excuse me, someone appointed him ...
The head of the military representative office of SNNP "Region" in Z., as a representative of the Ministry of Defense at the enterprise, personally responsible for what happened to "Mayevka" and ISPUM problems (as well as a number of other problematic issues of IGOs).
And what about the commander in chief of the Navy Korolev?
And he has known everything for a long time:
Note: Annex No. 1 is the text of a report on the problems of the Navy’s PMO, prepared by the author to the Scientific and Technical Council of the Navy and the Military Industrial Commission under the Government of the Russian Federation in spring 2017.
Yes, strictly speaking, the Queen in the theater of military operations (theater of operations), in the warring (!) Fleet there is not a single modern military-technical complex in the ranks! Or does he “not know” about this?
He is not provided with the combat stability of the NSNF, is it elementary, the withdrawal of forces from the bases in mine action, and he also does not know about this?
In the book “The Main Marine Parade of Russia”, edited by Admiral Korolev, simply amazing historical “information” about both the ships participating and the “history of the Navy” is given. For example, the fact that Vice-Admiral Makarov is a “hero of the Tsushima battle”!
This is alas, not a joke. The commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy does not know that Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov died more than a year before Tsushima, 31 March 1904, and being blown up by a Japanese mine!
I suppose if Admiral Korolev to ask a question about the ship of our fleet that has achieved the greatest combat success in history, he will also “find it very difficult” ...
Well, let's call it: this is the minelayer "Amur", on the battle account of which two battleships (battleships) of the enemy (blown up on Russian mines)! "Good question" - at least one Navy ship today bears this name?
And this is all against the background of the shameful renaming of ships: "Vilyuchinsk" in "Tver" and "Hurricane" in "Mytishchi", and the preservation of such odious names in the names of ships, such as "Fists".
We have no problems with equipment, the problem of the Navy’s software can and should be solved in the shortest possible time.
The main obstacle to this is a number of specific officers of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense, by their actions (inaction), undermining the real combat capability of the Navy and deliberately misleading the command of the RF Armed Forces and society.
The “wildness” of the current situation on the subject of the ITP is that it is clearly visible to everyone, even to outside civilian observers.
However, the “experts” of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense do not want to “see” this ...
The solution here is only one, complex:
1. The real (critical) situation and the necessary measures should be reported to the command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (including the Supreme Commander-in-Chief).
2. The need for appropriate "solutions" for specific "individuals".
3. Society. One should sound the alarm about the current situation on the part of the society (civil society, and not in the “liberal version” of this concept, but patriotic - “citizens responsibly belonging to their country, its future”).
And the last.
Obviously, the problem of an MIP is far from the only one in the Navy and the MoD (although the most "failure" in terms of scale is the lag behind the current level).
And the fact that the current bishops try to cover the problems with pseudo-secrecy requires the society to develop effective independent control mechanisms (for example, the creation of parliamentary commissions and empowering them to conduct inspections in cases of special resonance and significant to the country's security).
(From the directive of the Deputy Commissar of the Navy of the USSR and the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Navy, Army Commissioner 2 of the rank of IV Rogov.)
2007, New Defense Order, V.A. Katenin, A.V. Katenin, (GNINGI MO RF).
2010 g., "MIC", M.A. Klimov:
2014 d. From the report to the commander-in-chief of the Navy Admiral V.V. Chirkov in.11977 :
2014 g. "MIC" "Unarmed minesweepers».
29.02.2016 g., "VPK.name", "We stand on the threshold of the next Tsushima"...
2016, December, “VPK.name”, “The question of the incapacity of the Russian Navy against the modern mine threat must be resolved as soon as possible.».
2018, NVORussian Navy ran into mines and submarines».
Moreover, the problems of mine defense (JI) make it possible to reveal the much deeper problems of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense, which need to be discussed.
It is necessary, while there is still time to have time to eliminate their consequences.
The sea minesweeper "Ivan Golubets" built by 1973 and without any modernization at the end of the second decade of the XXI century goes to military service
Terrorist threat in the fairway
At the end of 2018, the Anonymous hacker group released excerpts from Christopher Donnelly's materialsSuggestions for Crimea"2014 of the year. In the list of measures - the installation of bottom mines in the Sevastopol Bay ...
Military measures CND 01.03.2014 (Military measures, CND, 01.03.2014) ...
2. Bottom mines in the Sevastopol Bay. You can easily deliver from a civilian ferry, if they do not have special minelayers. Many minutes are not required to achieve the required efficiency. They could easily buy them.
2. Bottom mines in the Sevastopol Bay. You can easily deliver from a civilian ferry, if they do not have special minelayers. Many minutes are not required to achieve the required efficiency. They could easily buy them.
All this was written not just by a “private person”, but by a person who was in charge of the state and special structures of Great Britain and NATO and carried out the assignments of a “certain character”.
Christopher Nigel Donnelly (CND), Co-Director of the Institute of Public Administration
In #1 for 15 January 2019 in “MIC»An article by the author was published with reference to these documents and the likely consequences of their implementation:
In view of the complete absence in the Russian Navy of means of combating modern bottom mines ... using Sevastopol as a base fleet could be paralyzed for a long time. On the only minesweeper that was part of the Russian Navy — mine-seeker “Vice Admiral Zakharyin”, the mine complex ... was out of order. ... despite a sharp aggravation of the situation, the Mayevka at the Zakharyin was put into operation only two years later ...
Note: earlier, taking into account the likelihood and danger of the use of mines by terrorist groups, the author in open publications avoided this topic (while repeatedly putting it in a “closed format”). However, the complete ignoring of this threat from the Navy forces open alarm bells to sound.
The question is so urgent that it was reflected even in the Navy's printed body - the magazine Morskoi sbornik (No. XXUMX, 10), in the article of the employees of the Central Research Institute of the Investigative Committee VK Bystrov B.V., Pirozhenko V.A., Kuleshov K.V.
... the threat to the sea remains terrorism, which was formed as an instrument of a new war with all the attributes of asymmetry.
Currently known 3 cases of so-called mine terrorism:
- mining of ports of Nicaragua in 1984;
- setting mines in the Red Sea in 1984;
- staging mines off the coast of Sri Lanka in 2008
Currently known 3 cases of so-called mine terrorism:
- mining of ports of Nicaragua in 1984;
- setting mines in the Red Sea in 1984;
- staging mines off the coast of Sri Lanka in 2008
Ministry of Defense and Navy: "There are no problems, everything is under control"
The reaction of the Ministry of Defense “followed” in the person of the deputy head of the Information and Mass Communications Department (DIMK) of the Ministry of Defense A. Volosatov, “MIC, 29.01.2019 G.:
... trying to analyze the issues of the mine support of the Navy, the development of mine-trawling forces, Klimov, without the slightest constraint, uses outdated data, ... a program of updating new 12700 project ships ... equipped with the most modern anti-mine systems ... weapons of mine-moving ships of existing projects are constantly being improved and updated ... which is characteristic of Klimov, in the same material there is a hodgepodge of completely different themes, made up of rumors and conjectures ... by the author onimaet their incompetence, but strengthens the emotional component of the articles due to the usual "hoax" and manipulation of information.
Real situation
The first thing to note about this “answer” is the military rank of the city of Volosatov - the colonel, and the post of “chief expert” of the press service of the Ministry of Defense, previously held by him.
It is logical to see a strong professional in such a position and in such a rank, but there are simply no objections as such in the publication of the “expert” Volosatov, not a single fact I mentioned has been refuted by him. In his letter there are only inaccurate statements and vague references to some anonymous and obviously dubious "foreign analysts" and "bloggers."
All the facts cited in my January 15 article are true and have documentary evidence (including documents of the Ministry of Defense itself posted on the public procurement website):
Purchase #0173100004515000738.
Date of auction: 25.05.2015. Completion date: until November 25 2016.
Purpose and objectives of the work results: maintenance of the self-propelled remote-controlled mine seeker “Mayevka” in good condition ... training of personnel.
The 4047 SINM.788133.001 and 4047K SINM.788133.001-01 products are intended for the additional search, classification and destruction of anchor, bottom (including silted) and bottom mines, detected by the ship's sonar mine detection station (GASM). The 4047 SINM.788133.001 product is used to equip XSHM Ave 02668. Product 4047K SINM.788133.001-01 is used for autonomous installation on ships or vessels.
Date of auction: 25.05.2015. Completion date: until November 25 2016.
Purpose and objectives of the work results: maintenance of the self-propelled remote-controlled mine seeker “Mayevka” in good condition ... training of personnel.
The 4047 SINM.788133.001 and 4047K SINM.788133.001-01 products are intended for the additional search, classification and destruction of anchor, bottom (including silted) and bottom mines, detected by the ship's sonar mine detection station (GASM). The 4047 SINM.788133.001 product is used to equip XSHM Ave 02668. Product 4047K SINM.788133.001-01 is used for autonomous installation on ships or vessels.
Purchase #0173100004518001288 - the complex of works on the repair of GAS Livadia on the order of the Black Sea Fleet 02668 Ave. Deadline for completion: September 30 2019.
Conclusions from this:
The only relatively modern anti-mine ship of the Black Sea Fleet was not operational (not in the main complex; list of faults, see procurement documents No. 0173100004515000738) until the end of 2016, and no emergency repair measures taking into account the sharp exacerbation of the military-political situation At the beginning of 2014, the central bodies of the Navy and the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation did not undertake.
At the beginning, the situation is similar (in acoustics), and its solution is only “planned” by the end of 2019.
There is not a single modern anti-mine ship at the beginning of 2019 in the Black Sea Fleet today. Even completely outdated ones that did not undergo any modernization and the 1973 minesweepers built in the city were forced to go to the combat service area (accompanied by a tugboat) to combat services.
Note: at present, MTC “Vice-Admiral Zakharyin” is in military service in the Mediterranean Sea, and, I really want to hope, Livadia GAS urgently put into operation repaired (and not “blind”).
Mr. Volosatov’s statement on the modernization and improvement of anti-mine weapons by combat crews of minesweepers has no basis, the situation is not only getting better - they have even lost what they had (for example, searchers).
The new PMK of the 12700 project has an outdated concept and a number of serious flaws. The main thing is that the ships are actually up to the first mine with a modern fuse (on which either the minesweeper itself or its only and extremely expensive self-propelled underwater vehicle will explode).
Note: 12700 issues are covered in a separate article.
Remote-controlled underwater vehicle “Luch-1” (left photo, under the cover) and towed finder “Needle-1” of the KIU-1 complex of the 1265 project TSH (photo: forums.balancer.ru)
The main type of hydroacoustic stations (GAS) of naval minesweepers is MG-89 "Serna" (developed by 1969, which has not undergone any modernization since then)
GUS MG-89
Moreover, tenders for the repair of GAS MG-89 (from ship-repair enterprises engaged in repairing the PMK Navy) in recent years have ended with a “typical phrase”: “Not one application has been submitted”. On a significant part of the PMK Navy, GAS MG-89 is simply not in disrepair, and there is no one to repair them.
Those. A significant part of the Navy minesweepers is simply “blind”! This "level" of anti-mine forces corresponds to the first years of the Second World War ...
The Kabarga GAS development of the 10750-s development, which do not have full digital processing, and with the performance characteristics close to the MG-12660 GUS are installed on the 80 off-shore cruise shipyard of the 89 project and two sea-sweepers of the XNUMX project.
In the 2000-ies, an attempt was made to modernize GUS MG-89, with the introduction of full-fledged digital processing, GAS MG-89ME. With the ability to effectively upgrade virtually all naval minesweepers:
The installation of MG-89МЭ instead of the previous GUS can be made without docking the ship, without a significant change in the hull structures of the ship and with the preservation of most cable routes.
However ... “the customer (the Navy) did not show interest,” the modernization work (GAS MG-89ME) was not completed, and today this GUS is excluded from all the “promotional offers” of Okepribor JSC.
For comparison: in the middle of the 2000's, the Polish Navy conducted its own modernization of our MG-89 (installed on Polish minesweepers of the 60-70-s of the last century).
Polish modernization GAS MG-89
Moreover, Polish specialists have created a modern set of new anti-mine weapons (from underwater vehicles to proximity trawls), and today the combat capabilities of the Polish Naval Forces naval fleet are many times greater than those of the Russian Navy (even taking into account the presence of two newest 12700 PMKs in the Baltic)!
The descent of the PMO from the Polish modernized minesweeper (built at the end of the 60-s)
Missed opportunities of our underwater robots
Could we do the same? Of course! According to GAS, it was said above, and underwater vehicles we had a number of companies that successfully worked in this area (SNNP "Region", OKB OT, Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Yuzhmorgeologiya", OKB STS and others).
The “rate” of the Navy on “import” (or rather, the “interest” of a number of high-ranking officials of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense in “import”) played an extremely negative role. A report at the round table on underwater technology of the Army-2018 forum of the general director of Tethis-Pro JSC:
... from the 155 supplied by the Tetis-Pro Group of Navy submersibles 27 domestic.
Surprisingly, these figures are proud! Or maybe it was not domestic? But at the same round table a report was made by representatives of the Tomsk University (TUSUR). Among others, the long-term work of domestic submersibles at great depths to search for the Argentinean submarine San Juan (purchased by a “different structure” of the Russian Defense Ministry, not the Navy) was mentioned. Representatives of 40 NII NII also praised the RTM-500 apparatus (developed by 90-s) based on the results of work on the Kursk APCR. However, not a single RTM-500 (or any other domestic underwater vehicle) was purchased by the Navy after that (except for OCR “Mayevka”, “Livadia”) - all the money was spent on imports from Tethys-Pro ...
The task of creating massive underwater vehicles for the domestic industrial software was simply not set (despite the fact that the potential for its solution, of course, was)!
Against the background of all other minesweepers of the Navy, MTSchch “Vice-Admiral Zakharyin” of the 02668 project stands out - the first full-fledged minesweeper-finder of mines (TCHIM) of the RF Navy, equipped not only with GAS, but also with dynamic positioning system, automated mine action system (ACS PMD) and special self-propelled underwater vehicles (SPA) software.
The main “anti-mine tool” MTC “Vice-Admiral Zakharyin”, SPA complex “Mayevka”, successfully passed the state tests in November 2008 (together with the ship). Decision №253 / 8.6309 from 25.11.2008, "recommended for adoption and the organization of mass production."
Moreover, “Mayevka” turned out to be the only our example of a marine underwater weapons and a mine complex developed on time and funding and successfully passed (right away!) government tests.
The complex had two modifications, incl. container, successfully tested at MTSVS “Valentin Pikul” of the Black Sea Fleet in 2007, which was possible to use from all the naval minesweepers and minesweepers (i.e., it opened up the possibility of effective modernization of practically all naval personnel of the naval personnel).
PMO “Mayevka” container complex, tests at MTSch Valentin Pikul, 2007,
Planned series. The first Maevka should have been received by the minesweepers MT-264 and MT-265 of the Joint Command of Forces and Forces in the North-East of the Russian Federation (for mine support of the Boreev of the Pacific Fleet).
However, the container "Mayevka" was taken out to "storage" in Moscow, and the planned series was excluded during the "proof-reading" of the State Defense Order (without any justification).
I would very much like to ask about the motives of such a “decision” of the then head of the development and orders department for ships, marine equipment and weapons of the Navy in the city of Benzoruk.
Subsequently, the city of Benzoruk turned out to be the deputy general director of the SNNP "Region" for R & D, after which all the latest events on "Mayevka" (including the sad end of its stories) no longer seem amazing.
At the beginning of 2010, finances again went to “import”, “Mayevka” was “ordered to forget”, and, moreover, gossip was launched at a very high level that “Mayevka” allegedly “failed the tests”.
Only one example of this is interview after the Evronaval-2012 salon with the deputy head of the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau A. Zakharov .
For us, it was very important to get off the ground in the creation of mine defense ships. And we here have found certain elements that are ready to use on our ships. We held very effective negotiations, including with French companies. ... what is useful for the national fleet is that we can really use, and where we are seriously lagging behind. This applies primarily to uninhabited underwater vehicles, which we will put on our mine-defense ships.
The commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, confirmed the correctness of all our actions.
The commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, confirmed the correctness of all our actions.
I note that mentioned in an interview with V.V. Chirkov personally for 5 months before, when he visited the Region, he observed the actual work of the Mayevka container modification (in the hydroacoustic basin) and had objective information on it.
In order to show an objective picture, below are the documents (from the site of public procurement).
Data on the complex "Mayevka" (purchase number 0173100000813000784 from 20.06.2013)
Thus, the facts are documented:
• the presence of the complex of two modifications, incl. container;
• the ability to work on silted mines (while the vast majority of submersibles are unable to do this) - and this was confirmed by tests (!);
• successful completion of state tests by the complex and the availability of its letter O1 (ie, documentary evidence of readiness for the series).
In reality, the tests were failed not by “Mayevka”, but by NPA “Livadia”, which was (until the end of 2009) part of GAS “Livadia”, developed by ZAO Aquamarine (St. Petersburg). Unfortunately, contrary to the advertising statements of JSC Aquamarine, its products do not always confirm in practice the stated characteristics and capabilities.
GAS “Livadia-ME” equipment as of 2009 (hereinafter STPA in the advertisement of Aquamarine CJSC was replaced with mediocre HBO)
SPA PMO: two "Mayvki" and "Livadia" near
As a result of all these intrigues of the Navy, “Mayevka” did not start operating; in fact, only the ancient trawls were armed with the MTShch “Vice-Admiral Zakharyin”.
Obviously, such a state of the only relatively modern PMK of the Navy was absolutely abnormal. However, for Benzoruk, Chirkov and the like chiefs "everything was all right" ("there will be no war!").
As a result, in 2013, the tender “Technical and service maintenance and repair of automatic control devices for trawls and searchers, contact, non-contact mines and mine finders ...”, under which it was planned to commission and start operating the Navy Mayevka complex, that "the auction for this lot was declared invalid (no bids were submitted)."
I emphasize: the repair and commissioning of the main complex of the only THIS Navy.
I will say the reason for this myself: the only executor of the work was not informed about it, found out only at the last moment and simply did not have time to prepare the documents.
Those. officials have a “line,” formally, “they have done everything,” but in fact the case failed already at the stage of tender placement. Such obviously impracticable “dummies” for tenders of sea underwater weapons was enough. Of course, no one bore any responsibility for this.
When the "struck" 2014 year
2014 d. From the report to the commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral VV Chirkov, in. 11977:
The critical problem of the Navy is mine defense (PMO) ... In March of this year [2014] handed over to the Chief of the Naval Underwater Weapon Service of the Navy ... a document (in annex) on the situation, possible consequences and necessary measures ... taking into account the current military and political situation. Necessary measures are not taken.
The essence of the document was the need for an emergency commissioning of not only “Mayevka” on “Zakharyin”, but also a return to “V. Pikul "its container modification.
However, Navy officials and Defense Ministry officials (below their names will be named) “continued to plan”:
Purchase No.0173100004515000738 Maintenance in good condition of self-propelled remote-controlled mine searcher “Mayevka”…. personnel training.
Date of auction: 25.05.2015. Completion date: until November 25 2016.
Date of auction: 25.05.2015. Completion date: until November 25 2016.
Those. there is a war in which the Russian Federation participates, incl. Navy and the Black Sea Fleet. The only relatively modern military-industrial complex of the Navy is out of order, but among the officers of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense "everything is all right", "epaulets are not too tight", "maybe the enemy will not use mines"!
At the same time, the only adequate approach in this situation, with the start of the operation in Syria, was the commissioning of “Mayevok” on Zakharyin and Pikule in the shortest possible time, and the permanent location of one of these PMKs in Tartus!
However, in 2017, after the repair and commissioning of the “Mayevka” at the end of 2016, the MTShch. Vice Admiral Zakharyin left for the combat zone, having his main weapon in the ranks for his first military service. Characteristically, this fact was not noted in any way at DIMK Konashenkova, who continued to publish "popular prints" about "fleet-sweepers in trawling trawls" and advertising films on complexes that were not known to have efficient software (for example, "Galtel").
However, the period of functioning of the MTShch "Vice-Admiral Zakharyin" as LOOKNOW turned out to be short-lived - the substrip GAS "Livadia" failed.
And again, instead of emergency repairs and putting the ship into operation, “next planning”.
Purchase No. 0173100004518001288 - a set of works on the repair of GAS Livadia on the order of the Black Sea Fleet 02668 Ave. Completion date: until 30 September 2019.
Those. there is a war, the Black Sea Fleet is fighting, not having in the composition of a single modern PMK!
With "Maya" even "more fun." Instead of upgrading it (with the elimination of existing shortcomings and increasing the performance characteristics) and mass production, the “question” on it is closed. Finally. The chief designer is fired. In fact, today for the fleet it is already lost, and it is necessary to think about replacing it with Zakharyin.
And here we must separately emphasize that we have lost with this.
The last two last days of the 1265 project’s BSTPH (readiness - more than 70%), which the Navy refused, lost in Petrozavodsk
The modernization of GAS MG-89 and the Mayevok series ensured at least limited combat capability of the entire group of the PMK Navy (MTShch projects 266M, 12660 (with GAS Kabarga)), BTschch project 1265). This did not require any significant expenses, it was necessary (for the officers of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense) only to properly treat their official duties.
Moreover, "Mayevka" was not allowed not only to the fleet, but also for export.
Despite its presence in the Rosoboronexport catalogs, the design of an advertising passport and export-type passport was blocked. Inzakazchikov requests for it were, but for the above reasons remained unanswered
As a result, the Vietnamese Navy went to the purchase of the Italian PLUTO PLUS TNPA to equip their PMK projects 266E and 1265E (Soviet-built).
Launching of the PLUTO PLUS technical and industrial pumping station of the Vietnam Navy 266 project
So what is wrong with our minesweepers?
The above are convincing evidence of the critical state of the Navy’s anti-mine forces. At the same time, there are no technical problems for the Navy to have effective anti-mine forces, there is no need for large expenditures on this.
And now the names of the officials who are personally responsible for the situation with the MVP Navy and the state of mine defense.
Head of Navy Shipbuilding Tryapichnikov V.A.
Head of the Marine Underwater Weapons Development and Operation Service of the Naval Shipbuilding Directorate I.M. Taran:
Head of the Department of Marine Underwater Weapons of the Department of the Ministry of Defense to ensure the state defense order (DOGOZ) Kaplouhy S.А.
After all these high persons, mentioning the head of the anti-mine department of the Central Research Institute for Military Shipbuilding (also called the Shipbuilding Research Institute) of the city of R-ko is even somehow “fine”, but necessary.
January 2015, after the Supreme Commander received information (in the fall of 2014) about the critical condition of sea underwater weapons, the Navy urgently prepares a document with “proposals for resolving the crisis” (actually writing them off from previously developed documents with which we are underwater pit "and turned out to be). Mr. R-ko writes his “own part,” in its text it reads:
... the lag factor of the Russian Navy from Western countries for underwater vehicles is 0,8, the trawl superiority factor is 1,2.
From such “numbers” “speechless” even Taran standing next to him (hereinafter - with “preservation of intonation”):
- Aaaaaa ... aaa, why 0,8 and 1,2?!?!?!?
- Well, how are these "scientifically based" coefficients!
- Well, how are these "scientifically based" coefficients!
I emphasize that in this “parallel reality” there is a whole head of the core department of the central research institute of the Ministry of Defense and the Navy on the subject!
But, excuse me, someone appointed him ...
The head of the military representative office of SNNP "Region" in Z., as a representative of the Ministry of Defense at the enterprise, personally responsible for what happened to "Mayevka" and ISPUM problems (as well as a number of other problematic issues of IGOs).
And what about the commander in chief of the Navy Korolev?
And he has known everything for a long time:
Note: Annex No. 1 is the text of a report on the problems of the Navy’s PMO, prepared by the author to the Scientific and Technical Council of the Navy and the Military Industrial Commission under the Government of the Russian Federation in spring 2017.
Yes, strictly speaking, the Queen in the theater of military operations (theater of operations), in the warring (!) Fleet there is not a single modern military-technical complex in the ranks! Or does he “not know” about this?
He is not provided with the combat stability of the NSNF, is it elementary, the withdrawal of forces from the bases in mine action, and he also does not know about this?
In the book “The Main Marine Parade of Russia”, edited by Admiral Korolev, simply amazing historical “information” about both the ships participating and the “history of the Navy” is given. For example, the fact that Vice-Admiral Makarov is a “hero of the Tsushima battle”!
This is alas, not a joke. The commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy does not know that Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov died more than a year before Tsushima, 31 March 1904, and being blown up by a Japanese mine!
Mine exploded (with detonation of mine ammunition) of the squadron battleship "Petropavlovsk". Photo from the Golden Mountain (Port Arthur).
I suppose if Admiral Korolev to ask a question about the ship of our fleet that has achieved the greatest combat success in history, he will also “find it very difficult” ...
Well, let's call it: this is the minelayer "Amur", on the battle account of which two battleships (battleships) of the enemy (blown up on Russian mines)! "Good question" - at least one Navy ship today bears this name?
And this is all against the background of the shameful renaming of ships: "Vilyuchinsk" in "Tver" and "Hurricane" in "Mytishchi", and the preservation of such odious names in the names of ships, such as "Fists".
What are the conclusions from all this?
We have no problems with equipment, the problem of the Navy’s software can and should be solved in the shortest possible time.
The main obstacle to this is a number of specific officers of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense, by their actions (inaction), undermining the real combat capability of the Navy and deliberately misleading the command of the RF Armed Forces and society.
The “wildness” of the current situation on the subject of the ITP is that it is clearly visible to everyone, even to outside civilian observers.
However, the “experts” of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense do not want to “see” this ...
The solution here is only one, complex:
1. The real (critical) situation and the necessary measures should be reported to the command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (including the Supreme Commander-in-Chief).
2. The need for appropriate "solutions" for specific "individuals".
3. Society. One should sound the alarm about the current situation on the part of the society (civil society, and not in the “liberal version” of this concept, but patriotic - “citizens responsibly belonging to their country, its future”).
And the last.
Obviously, the problem of an MIP is far from the only one in the Navy and the MoD (although the most "failure" in terms of scale is the lag behind the current level).
And the fact that the current bishops try to cover the problems with pseudo-secrecy requires the society to develop effective independent control mechanisms (for example, the creation of parliamentary commissions and empowering them to conduct inspections in cases of special resonance and significant to the country's security).
Lies and lies in propaganda, agitation and the press discredit the party-political work, the navy press and cause exceptional harm to the cause of the Bolshevik education of the masses.
(From the directive of the Deputy Commissar of the Navy of the USSR and the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Navy, Army Commissioner 2 of the rank of IV Rogov.)
Application. Some (far from complete) chronology of “posing tough questions on MIP”.
2007, New Defense Order, V.A. Katenin, A.V. Katenin, (GNINGI MO RF).
... [enemy mines] is enough to completely block our forces in all fleets ... The lack of serious work over the past twenty years to improve mine and mine weapons in the Navy has led to the fact that trawling forces are not able to effectively deal with the modern mine threat ... Political awareness and the country's military leadership of the mine threat and the degradation of domestic mine-trawling forces should be the first step towards solving this acute problem.
2010 g., "MIC", M.A. Klimov:
... the capabilities of the mine-miner's forces of the Navy are so low that they question the possibility of ensuring the deployment of the forces of the Russian Navy from their bases. in the context of the modern mine threat ... despite the successful passage of the MTShch "Vice-Admiral Zakharyin" state tests, today in the Navy he is alone.
2014 d. From the report to the commander-in-chief of the Navy Admiral V.V. Chirkov in.11977 :
The current level of Navy anti-mine forces corresponds to 50-60. last century. The minesweepers owned by the Navy are actually abandoned - in contrast to the foreign ones, no modernization was carried out with the introduction of new anti-mine systems.
On the only minesweeper-seeker of the Navy "Vice-Admiral Zakharyin" new anti-mine systems or preserved ("Mayevka") or ...
The new container complex “Mayevka”, which was successfully tested in 2007 on the mine sweeper “Valentin Pikul” before the war, 08.08.08 was taken out for safekeeping ... to Moscow.
Prospective minesweepers for the 12700 project. A series of these extremely expensive minesweepers, if there will be, is small, while the Navy doesn’t need “several minesweepers for parades” but ANTIMINAL FORCES - dozens of modern PMKs, and not “in the bright future tomorrow”, but just yesterday!
... the planned mass production of the Mayevka complexes has been thwarted by intrigues ...
On the only minesweeper-seeker of the Navy "Vice-Admiral Zakharyin" new anti-mine systems or preserved ("Mayevka") or ...
The new container complex “Mayevka”, which was successfully tested in 2007 on the mine sweeper “Valentin Pikul” before the war, 08.08.08 was taken out for safekeeping ... to Moscow.
Prospective minesweepers for the 12700 project. A series of these extremely expensive minesweepers, if there will be, is small, while the Navy doesn’t need “several minesweepers for parades” but ANTIMINAL FORCES - dozens of modern PMKs, and not “in the bright future tomorrow”, but just yesterday!
... the planned mass production of the Mayevka complexes has been thwarted by intrigues ...
2014 g. "MIC" "Unarmed minesweepers».
To overcome the half-century backwardness of the MIP from the current level, the following set of measures is needed:
• serial construction of the 12700 project’s BSCT - no alternative;
• proactive delivery of the Navy of modern mine action systems and emergency upgrades of minesweepers in service, ensuring the installation of these systems in the 12700 project corps after the decommissioning of old TSH;
• Immediate launch of the development work on the modernization of the STIUM “Mayevka” (in the container version) in order to increase the performance and preparation of serial production;
• procurement and development of HBO and AUV with the implementation of tasks for mapping min-like objects, primarily in the area of bases;
• development on a competitive basis (with tests on fleets) small-sized disposable anti-mine anti-nuclear weapons;
• development on a competitive basis in the shortest possible time of unmanned mine trips.
• serial construction of the 12700 project’s BSCT - no alternative;
• proactive delivery of the Navy of modern mine action systems and emergency upgrades of minesweepers in service, ensuring the installation of these systems in the 12700 project corps after the decommissioning of old TSH;
• Immediate launch of the development work on the modernization of the STIUM “Mayevka” (in the container version) in order to increase the performance and preparation of serial production;
• procurement and development of HBO and AUV with the implementation of tasks for mapping min-like objects, primarily in the area of bases;
• development on a competitive basis (with tests on fleets) small-sized disposable anti-mine anti-nuclear weapons;
• development on a competitive basis in the shortest possible time of unmanned mine trips.
29.02.2016 g., "VPK.name", "We stand on the threshold of the next Tsushima"...
And here we come to the essence of what was happening.
The obvious negligent and unprincipled attitude of officials to ensure the real combat effectiveness of the Navy. For example, today the 955 “Alexander Nevsky” project for military service RPLNS “provide” at the OKVS (Kamchatka) only two sea-going minesweepers whose anti-mine armament corresponds to the western end of 60x and unable to fight modern ground mines. At the same time, previously, “Mayevka” was planned primarily for Kamchatka, in support of “Boreev” (they were excluded from the state defense order). In fact, today the release to the sea RPLSN Pacific Fleet obviously is not provided. Everybody knows about this (including Chirkova V.V.). No measures.
The obvious negligent and unprincipled attitude of officials to ensure the real combat effectiveness of the Navy. For example, today the 955 “Alexander Nevsky” project for military service RPLNS “provide” at the OKVS (Kamchatka) only two sea-going minesweepers whose anti-mine armament corresponds to the western end of 60x and unable to fight modern ground mines. At the same time, previously, “Mayevka” was planned primarily for Kamchatka, in support of “Boreev” (they were excluded from the state defense order). In fact, today the release to the sea RPLSN Pacific Fleet obviously is not provided. Everybody knows about this (including Chirkova V.V.). No measures.
2016, December, “VPK.name”, “The question of the incapacity of the Russian Navy against the modern mine threat must be resolved as soon as possible.».
2018, NVORussian Navy ran into mines and submarines».
The minesweepers that are presently present in the Navy’s combat composition have long since become outdated and have practically lost their combat significance. Moreover, the new project of the sea minesweeper (MSC) of the 12700 project has a number of key flaws:
- the outdated concept of an MIP is a ship “before the first modern mine”;
- knowingly unsecured actual explosion resistance;
- limited efficiency at shallow depths;
- inability to solve multipurpose tasks (at least at the level of the 266М project);
- the possibilities of serial construction are limited by the capacities of PJSC "Zvezda" (one set of diesel engines per year).
- the outdated concept of an MIP is a ship “before the first modern mine”;
- knowingly unsecured actual explosion resistance;
- limited efficiency at shallow depths;
- inability to solve multipurpose tasks (at least at the level of the 266М project);
- the possibilities of serial construction are limited by the capacities of PJSC "Zvezda" (one set of diesel engines per year).
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