Where does Admiral Evmenov "run"?
"Prince Vladimir" became the first submarine in the domestic storiesthe crew of which mastered the device of the ship and passed all the necessary tasks even before the boat became part of the Navy. This process went in parallel with factory and state exams. Commander of the North reported on this innovation to the Minister of Defense, Army General Sergei Shoigu fleet Admiral Nikolai Evmenov.
Another success? How to say ... For the theme of reducing the courses and training periods for submarine crews in our Navy is very, very ambiguous.
The precedents for this part, of course, were, for example, the crew of A.N. Lutsky’s SSB K-258:
The first task was prepared and passed without problems. Problems arose with the approval of a plan for the transition to Kamchatka. Some "soldiers" (officers of the fleet combat training management) expressed doubts about the crew’s readiness for independent transition, they began to talk about the need to call the first-line crew from Kamchatka to transfer our "iron" to the permanent base, and to deliver "small" speed "cruise ship. Of course, I couldn’t allow such humiliation ... it was difficult to overcome all instances in the fleet headquarters ... Before entering the missile silos, they loaded rockets in the transport variant, that is, without warheads.
So go. 12 December 1972 of the year SSB K-258 moored at the pier in Krasheninnikov Bay. Until the end of December, they were improving themselves, settling into a new, now permanent base. And from the beginning of the new 1973, intensively engaged in combat training. As a result of the transition to Kamchatka, we closed task No. 2 and part of the elements of task No. 3. The immediate goal is to reach the 1 line on the level of combat training in the shortest possible time and become part of the combat readiness forces. It was expected that the first military campaign, we can plan in May and June.
So go. 12 December 1972 of the year SSB K-258 moored at the pier in Krasheninnikov Bay. Until the end of December, they were improving themselves, settling into a new, now permanent base. And from the beginning of the new 1973, intensively engaged in combat training. As a result of the transition to Kamchatka, we closed task No. 2 and part of the elements of task No. 3. The immediate goal is to reach the 1 line on the level of combat training in the shortest possible time and become part of the combat readiness forces. It was expected that the first military campaign, we can plan in May and June.
Essential here is that at the time of 1972, the 667A project was well mastered by the Navy, and relevant training courses were worked out. At the same time, in spite of the enormous strain of the Cold War and the urgent need to put K-258 SSBNs into constant readiness forces in the shortest possible time, the well-trained crew "closed" the XMNUMX task team already in Kamchatka, as part of a combat unit ships under construction).
RPLSN "Prince Vladimir" is not just a "project 955 with a letter A", it is actually a new project RPLSN Navy, which has very significant differences from the previous "Boreev." Taking into account this factor, the reduction of crew working hours is an obvious bewilderment. Especially given the fact that to start a new project, you need to fully test (about this, with some details, below).
Here it is time to recall the words of Vice-Admiral ED Chernova, who recently departed from us, and his book “Secrets of Underwater Disasters”:
... there is an unreasonable state of affairs in the Navy Submarine Forces tendency to drastically reduce the time devoted to combat training of nonlinear crews when entering them into the first line ... the introduction of "Changes and Additions to the Navy Submarines Combat Training Course" is a serious prerequisite for increasing accidents and injuries and the deaths of the crews of Russian submarines.
Vice-Admiral E.D. Chernov
The book “Secrets of Underwater Disasters” became in the middle of 2000's the cause of a public conflict between Vice Admiral Chernov and Admiral Erofeev. Despite the fact that not everything can be agreed with Vice Admiral Chernov, the book was written by a Professional with a capital letter, and was certainly extremely useful to the fleet. Unfortunately, Admiral Yerofeev went to express his disagreement with her to the court, which, taking into account the location and civil position of Yerofeyev, issued a “relevant decision”. This largely blocked a serious (with the discovery of causal relationships) professional conversation on the problems of the Navy, including accidents.
In fact, the essence of this personal admiral conflict is one of the most acute problems of our Navy, of which only the commander of the multipurpose submarine K-244 cap.1 rank Alikov (the series of publications is posted on http : //k-244.ru] k-244.ru).
What led to the K-429, K-219, K-278 disasters is primarily a consequence of our traditional naval "at any price". Well wrote about this, Rear Admiral Kirillov:
The division commander Yerofeyev often had to see who came from the sea, in white-washed salted from sea water, in wet walking boots, with red eyes inflamed from lack of sleep, with multi-day gray stubble on his cheeks. ... He appeared in the headquarters, as a rule, on 20-30 minutes, in order to take off the situation in the division, to give the most necessary orders, and again at sea now on another submarine, with a different crew. And so for months ...
And here it is appropriate to recall the phrase of American Admiral H. Rickover:
I want my cheerful sailor to meet a weary opponent in the sea.
And now the most important thing: In full volume of all naval guidance documents, all requirements of combat training guidance documents cannot be physically fulfilled. And this “lump” of the fact that the personnel is “obliged”, but physically there is no time (even if “all 24 hours” are engaged in combat training) grows from year to year. At one time, salvation was a system of priorities (“the main thing was to do something that must be done, and not done something that cannot be done categorically (no matter how“ pressed ”)). If this healthy system of priorities is broken (and this is in most cases today it is so!) Then the crews turn the ships into hostages of the situation, managing to work out only the “last introductory” ones.
Actually Today there is a situation when “if something happens,” a criminal case, on “formal grounds,” can be brought against any commander of the Navy ship, there is already a “squadron” for everyone!
This problem is a “time bomb” under the fleet. Instead of working out really important issues for combat and training for the struggle for survivability (BMD), I have to reflexively work out “next introductory” for the most part, eliminate “next remarks” of “next examiners” (a significant part of empty, formal content). It got to the point that, sometimes on ships, several sets of daily plans are being prepared for inspections according to which events were allegedly “worked out” (the most important thing is not to confuse with those who check what daily plans to show).
Lies and falsifications have become an integral part of the life of the fleet.
This problem needs to be solved, it is necessary to revise the governing documents, reduce them to a system, but this is a very complex and painstaking work, which not only does not cancel but also emphasizes the need to develop and implement a "system of priorities", and specifically "battle priorities"! The experience of the older generation of fleet officers is certainly in demand.
Returning to the book of Chernov. The question is that there is little to allocate "regular time" for working off tasks. If the “experienced” foreman of the command of the holds do-it-yourself opens the outboard hole, actually drowns the boat (as was the case at Komsomolets), it speaks not so much about the “lack of training time” as about the systemic problems of the Navy's combat for survivability training .
A separate question that cannot be avoided is the “work” of V. Ryazantsev. "In the wake of the system after death." In fact, this book is a combination of Ryazantsev’s “personal accounts” with the former command of the Northern Fleet (their actual actions and mistakes are the subject of a separate conversation). Simple questions like “his version” correspond to the raised wreckage of a torpedo “event No.1” ?, Ryazantsev is not able to answer, materially, he was not even interested in ... At that time, the 2003 Training Center (Vilyuchinsk) had a split training “fat” torpedo, there were experts who had vast experience in operating these torpedoes, but did not show any interest in the materiel and refined their version of Ryazantsev. But most of all in his book strikes absolutely "wild" level of ignorance weapons and technical means, tactics, adversary, demonstrated by the author. The question arises - how could a person with such a level of "training" occupy high admiral posts?
With all this, we received today the actual destruction of discussions about the fleet. Alas, the critical and good analytical publications of Navy veterans today are almost singular.
Today, there was no one who could competently and firmly speak out of the shortened training period for submarine crews indicated at the beginning of the article (I’d stress, I am sure, if Vice-Admiral Chernov were alive today, he wouldn’t be silent).
Especially when There are obvious serious problems with combat training of the submarine in the Northern Fleet....
1 example. Movie RT 2016. "Baltic Fleet" (submarine "Magnitogorsk" in the film from the Northern Fleet).
“Delivery of offsets” on the simple question of the International Rules for Preventing Collisions of Ships (COLRIS) by the chief mate (!) Of the submarine commander, rating “3-”.
The senior assistant to the commander of the submarine (!!!) keeps the watch with ... a “cheat sheet” in the form of the “Handbook of the watch officer”.
The phrase “first night is coming soon, and the next officer of the watch will stand and read it with a flashlight,” demonstrates not just the “zero” level of training of this crew, but the fact that there was not a single officer in the fleet management bodies who would see it and nipped in!
The same place (in the film RT) shows an attempt to actually blow up the 53-65K combat torpedo during loading.
Gross error - loading a torpedo into the compartment through a torpedo tube was started before the outer yoke was removed. A further unauthorized lifting of the boom of the crane upwards could lead to a torpedo “jam” in the torpedo tube niche, in the area of the oxygen and kerosene tank, with loss of their tightness and explosion (plus more than 300 kg of good explosive in the warhead).
“Everything is fine, beautiful marquise” - on the pier “this” (with screams of the commander of the mine-torpedo warhead in the video) is quietly watched by the submarine commander and the crew of the RT shoots ...
Example 2 (Northern Fleet diesel submarine). In the photo of the Guardian of the Baltic newspaper, “corsairs of the ocean depths,” trying to equip regeneration in dirty and greasy Chinese gloves, are trying to arrange an explosion and a fire in the torpedo room. Deck above - ammunition, incl. oxygen torpedoes 53-65K!
The garbage in the background (boxes and drying socks) is not only an indicator of extremely low "marine culture", but also a direct prerequisite for clogging of the receiving kingston and the impossibility of irrigating the ammunition "around the ring"!
I repeat, the question is not to these sailors (they were simply not taught), but to an extremely low level of officers, and their superiors, who saw this photo and did not notice the roughest prerequisites for the catastrophe.
Note: Oxygen standards in the “Battle Watch” photo are outdated, canceled as one of the “Komsomolets lessons” (apparently forgotten, despite the fact that it was the increased oxygen content in the feed compartments that caused the intense fire at Komsomolets).
Yes, the examples given are rather the exception, and of course there are crews with good professional training in the Navy.
But the very fact of the existence of such examples of “wild” incompetence speaks of the serious problems of the system of combat training of submarine forces of the Navy, of the need to carefully and carefully “look around in the compartments”.
Obviously, under these conditions, the reduction of the time for training the crews of the submarines of the Navy has no basis.
However here there is another problem - the testbecause We are talking about new projects submarines (955A and 855A).
We have assumed that we supposedly have "big problems" in surface shipbuilding, and with "underwater (supposedly) everything is in order." The real situation is the opposite. If the surface “exploded” “to the very top”, a number of necessary “personnel decisions” occurred, many problems were actually revealed and they were actually eliminated (a vivid example of what the frigate “Admiral of the Soviet Navy Gorshkov” frigate) in submarine shipbuilding there was a system of silence and concealment of problems, testing in obviously simplified conditions. The biggest shame of our newest shipbuilding program is the order of 160, - “Severodvinsk” of the 885 project.
The author has already touched on a number of problems with the 885 project (article 2014 in "The pitfalls of Severodvinsk." The story of the disarming of the third-generation submarines should not be repeated ").
Taking into account the fundamentally different torpedo complex and the new torpedo, the following (minimal!) List of only “valid” tests of the “Physicists” from “Ash” was suggested:
- shooting of all torpedo tubes at maximum firing speed without remote control;
- shooting of all torpedo tubes at maximum firing speed with remote control;
- in combination with shooting at various targets, single and salvo (including remote control) under hydroacoustic countermeasures (GPA), recording and measuring the noise of gunfire and torpedoes (including - and this is very important - discrete components).
A separate issue is testing with the use of torpedoes in the Arctic, similar to the regularly conducted US Navy anti-submarine exercises with ICEX torpedo firing (followed by lifting of the shot torpedoes from under the ice).
Taking into account the inevitable overlays of the tests of the new ship, this should have made dozens of shots (and this is only the torpedo "1 Physicist") ...
With regard to the submarine "Severodvinsk" and its torpedo complex, we have a clearly insufficient amount of testing.
- shooting of all torpedo tubes at maximum firing speed without remote control;
- shooting of all torpedo tubes at maximum firing speed with remote control;
- in combination with shooting at various targets, single and salvo (including remote control) under hydroacoustic countermeasures (GPA), recording and measuring the noise of gunfire and torpedoes (including - and this is very important - discrete components).
A separate issue is testing with the use of torpedoes in the Arctic, similar to the regularly conducted US Navy anti-submarine exercises with ICEX torpedo firing (followed by lifting of the shot torpedoes from under the ice).
Taking into account the inevitable overlays of the tests of the new ship, this should have made dozens of shots (and this is only the torpedo "1 Physicist") ...
With regard to the submarine "Severodvinsk" and its torpedo complex, we have a clearly insufficient amount of testing.
As a confirmation of the importance of the issues raised, we can cite a photo of the US Navy with damage to the Mk48 torpedo water cannon, due to its collapse in the torpedo tube.
Airborne torpedo tubes in the US Navy have been brought for a long time, with significant improvements carried out by the US Navy PLA. The similar problems on the 885 project are evidenced by a noticeable change in the hull lines on its modernization - the 885М project in the area of torpedo tubes' breakwater panels.
Obviously, such a change requires not only the entire full range of torpedo tubes to be tested anew, but also what has not been done on Severodvinsk (under various supposedly “plausible bases”).
The next question is anti-torpedoes.
Today, there can be no effective anti-torpedo protection (PTZ) without an anti-torpedo. All Russian submarines are required to have them in ammunition. The task of equipping and mastering them is real and should be solved in the shortest possible time.
In spite of the fact that surface ships have long and successfully fired anti-torpedoes, “for some reason they haven't heard anything like this in our sub-melt.” This is undoubtedly an extremely alarming sign of problems with the real combat capability of the naval submarine forces.
Officially, the Ministry of Defense of the anti-torpedo "Lasta" was declared (on the form "Army-2015") in the RPLNS "Borey-A" ammunition.
Photo: forums.balancer.ru.
The adoption of the Navy's newest RPPLS "Prince Vladimir" without anti-torpedoes is unacceptable (as well as without shooting all the torpedo tubes with various torpedoes under various conditions, including in a volley and with a remote control).
Another extremely sensitive question - hydroacoustic countermeasures. The article by Rear Admiral Lutsky in the Sea Collection No. 7 for 2010 states:
Subscriber projects of Yasen and Borey under construction are proposed to be equipped with PTZ systems, the development specifications of which were compiled even in 80x years of the last generation, the results of studies of the effectiveness of these means against modern torpedoes testify to an exceptionally low probability
All objective experts on the subject agree with the opinion of Lutsky (the reasons for this are clear and understandable). At the same time, the problem with these GPA complexes is not “minor flaws”, but the fundamental mistakes of the head developer (SPBM “Malachite”), about which he knows perfectly well for many years, and hides. This case is when there can be no talk of “therapy”, the critical issue of the anti-torpedo protection of our submarines requires “surgery”!
And especially it is surprising to see the products, about which extremely low efficiency they reasonably wrote in 2010. Lutsky, today in the GOZ (on the site of public procurement).
Obviously, they could be taken by the Navy only with forgery during testing (for example, conducting them only against deliberately outdated torpedoes).
The tests of the complex, which A.Nutsky wrote about, must be repeated (already in an objective form) upon the surrender of “Prince Vladimir” and “Kazan” to reveal the real situation and make the necessary decisions (both technical and personnel).
Tests in ice conditions.
We have never had any torpedo firing in the Arctic, under the ice with homing systems turned on. At the same time, our "partners" conduct annual anti-submarine exercises there with group use of submarines and shooting up to two dozen torpedoes per submarine.
Raising torpedoes Mk48 from under the ice, the teachings of the US Navy ICEX. (photo: defpost.com)
The Navy of the Russian Federation (and the USSR) have never done such a thing.
The Navy of the Russian Federation (and the USSR) have never done such a thing.
While we in the Arctic are engaged in “patrolling with fitness elements,” the enemy is working out tough combat training there, being ready for the immediate destruction of our submarines with the receipt of an order.
In the case of real hostilities, under the ice, our submarines in dueling situations with the submarines of the US Navy expects to be shot.
The above is only a part of the problems on the orders of 885М and 955А projects, and taking into account the entire volume of necessary (objective!) Tests, there can be no question of their completion in 2019г.
The author considers it quite normal for the Navy to accept these orders in 2020, even with a list of shortcomings. But under the condition of a real objective conduct of all the necessary tests, the discovery of problems and shortcomings, and the tough questioning of the industry to eliminate them
It is also obvious that the crew training courses for new submarines can appear in complete form only after the completion of these tests, and there can be no talk about time reductions.
Admiral Yevmenov’s statement about the “surrender of all tasks” by the crew of Prince Vladimir and his “readiness” has no basis, and is apparently caused by the intrigues of industry.
Last thing.
Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy Admiral Fleet V.I. Kuroyedov.
About the feasibility of the establishment in the structure of the Main Command of the Navy. Management of the scuba diving of the Navy ... Submarines, as a branch of the naval forces, have features due to which their operation (combat and daily) and their management is significantly different from the operation and control of surface ships. This circumstance determines the need for special approaches to training and practical training, both for the crews of submarines, and for the bodies of combat and daily control of them.
...
Vice Admiral E. Chernov
20 May 2000 city
About the feasibility of the establishment in the structure of the Main Command of the Navy. Management of the scuba diving of the Navy ... Submarines, as a branch of the naval forces, have features due to which their operation (combat and daily) and their management is significantly different from the operation and control of surface ships. This circumstance determines the need for special approaches to training and practical training, both for the crews of submarines, and for the bodies of combat and daily control of them.
...
Vice Admiral E. Chernov
20 May 2000 city
The presence of acute problems with the construction of submarines, their combat training and application issues for their intended purpose does not simply require recalling and finally implementing the report of Vice-Admiral Chernov, today a much deeper solution is required: the creation in the High Command of the Navy of the Directorate of the submarine warfare with the separation from the special services of the Navy of the corresponding "submarine" units and their subordination to the Directorate of the submarine warfare
Afterword from 04.04.19.
The article contains an error, - according to the thesis with the loading of a torpedo 53-65K (in the article itself saved the source text).
The author served on nuclear submarines, with loading a torpedo into the compartment with a torpedo-loading device (TPU) with a fast-loading device (UBZ). On the diesel-electric submarine of the 877 project, as indicated by the readers, a manual drive of loading the torpedo into the compartment is installed, respectively, the torpedo hall in the niche is impossible.
In this case, all other theses are not only confirmed by the author, but he also considers it necessary to add:
In the next issue of "NVO" (5 of April) the article of the author should be published on the features and methods of the US Navy torpedo firing.
Let me remind you that the question of carrying out such shooting has been raised many times by initiative officers, and the statements of officials of the Ministry of Defense about this (allegedly “conducting”), for example Volosat
Volosatov
Even more surprising is the statement that the Navy does not work out combat training exercises in the Arctic. Probably Maxim Klimov does not bother with conventional monitoring news information on this subject.
not only have no reason, but it seems that these officials are so incompetent that they do not even understand what they are talking about.
Let the deputy Konashenkov Volosatov try to give at least one example of “news information” from the Ministry of Defense on this issue (we are no longer talking about photographic documents similar to ICEX)! There is simply no such “information of the Ministry of Defense”, as well as no facts of such exercises of the Russian Navy!
In the last conversation (a few years ago) of the author, with one of the initiators of conducting such shooting in the Russian Navy, Captain 1 of the rank and honored and respected in the fleet, he was told the phrase:
I broke down ... I no longer believe in anything ... Nothing can be changed ...
the man is just tired of fighting ...
Moreover, as of 2013g. (the departure of Admiral Suchkov, the last high-ranking official who tried to really change the situation on this subject), in the armament complex of the “newest” 885 project, what provided the torpedo weapon’s sublingual use and was technically incorporated ... locked by software.
The author there is reason to believe that the situation is similar today (including for the newest 885M project).
What is it? "Extremely stupid"? Or unprincipled officials? Or conscious sabotage? Let the readers decide it themselves.
This has been repeatedly reported, all responsible officials are aware of this, including, obviously, the Admiral Evmenov, the Commander of the Northern Fleet, must also know.
I note only that some high-ranking leaders of the defense industry, in a “closed format”, raised the question of deliberate sabotage on the subject of our sea underwater weapons and means of underwater warfare.
According to official statements of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense, following the results of combat training for 2018, not a single prize of the Commander-in-Chief by carriers with a torpedo "Physicist-1" (our only torpedo, whose use in ice conditions can be effective) was not received. Considering the fact that the “Physicist” has the highest performance characteristics of all domestic torpedoes, it follows a logical conclusion that there are very serious problems with the development of this torpedo in the fleet.
There is nothing surprising in this, and the reasons for this have long been known: the small, obviously insufficient shooting statistics, the extremely high (overestimated) cost of the shot, the unprincipled stance on the effectiveness of torpedo weapons of the Navy of business leaders: GNPP Region, Morteplotekhni Research Institute and Engine ”(to which one can add, obviously continuing intrigues against this torpedo of“ certain persons ”).
All this has been known for a long time, and continues, apparently still.
2014g. "Pitfalls" of Severodvinsk
The exceptionally high cost of the shot with torpedoes “Physicist-1” draws attention (especially for work in the north of Severodvinsk — more than eight million rubles). Actually such a cost “kills” the torpedo “Physicist-1”, excluding its effective modernization and normal development in the fleet due to the exorbitant cost of testing and combat training.... The prices should be revised, and the re-preparation of torpedoes after the shooting should be carried out in the fleet with the participation of industry representatives, but under the supervision of naval experts ....
... you need to restore the practice of one hundred percent shooting (shooting) of all thermal torpedoes released. This will give statistics and reliability, and confident development of new weapons.
... it is necessary to conduct ice tests similar to the American ICEX with new torpedo firing and countermeasures
... you need to restore the practice of one hundred percent shooting (shooting) of all thermal torpedoes released. This will give statistics and reliability, and confident development of new weapons.
... it is necessary to conduct ice tests similar to the American ICEX with new torpedo firing and countermeasures
For the full development of the "Physicists" and ensuring their high combat effectiveness, massive torpedo firing by the fleet (including from third and second generation carriers) is necessary, including in difficult conditions (the use of countermeasures, subglacial conditions, etc.) and the harsh formulation of a number of problematic issues for industry.
Until this is done, there can be no full-scale mastering by the Physics fleet. You can deceive people, but not "iron" (materiel).
In a detailed and detailed form, these questions were repeatedly raised, both by the author and by a number of specialists, but the position of the Navy on them, to put it mildly, is “strange” - “we’re going to carry it on / through”, - “there will be no war anyway.”
In the autumn of 2015., On the issues and problems of development by the Physicists fleet, the author of this article reported to the Vice-Admiral Fedotenkov A.N., Chief of the Navy Commander of the Navy, after that the report to the Head of the Defense Ministry of the Ministry of Defense Vernigore A.P. everything was done to disrupt it.
Taking into account the official disappointing "results" of the Navy torpedo preparation for the end of 2018, I consider it expedient to publicly announce the "acceptable for the media" part of the "Physics" proposals of 2015.
The introduction is not just 100% zeroing (shooting in the practical version) of all torpedoes fired (the author is not ready to vouch for authenticity, but in American sources, there was information that the Mk48 torpedo gets into the US Navy AMP ammunition after performing 5 practical shots with it (!)) .
Moreover, this should be done not in the “aquarium conditions” of “lakes and other polygons”, but directly in the fleets, according to the scheme: a submarine, before receiving torpedo ammunition, accepts all these torpedoes in a practical form and shoots them all with remote control on their own, torpedoles , ... with various options for their use and the use of countermeasures. After the shooting of all the torpedoes in the practical version and with successful shooting results, they are reprocessed in the combat version and are issued as ammunition. With unsuccessful firing, - their repetition (with the elimination of the revealed defects), up to stable successful results.
Those “who are in the subject” immediately understood what the “intent” of these proposals was, and due to which, if they were implemented, the cost of reprocessing (firing) torpedoes would inevitably decrease sharply. Given the collapse during the "Serdyukovskogo reform" system of the torpedo support of the Navy, the fleet today has very limited ability to independently solve their problems. The only real option is compel do this industry. That is, to make technical problems of the fleet with torpedoes, problems not just industry, but personal problems of the “first persons” of the military-industrial complex (as it happened, for example, with the frigate Admiral of the Soviet Navy Gorshkov).
But for this, organizational solutions are required from the fleet - at least not to hide problems at the level, not to be afraid to report them to the top military-political leadership.
Autumn 2006g. The author of this article had a conversation with the head of the Directorate of anti-submarine weapons of the Navy (UPV Navy), Rear Admiral Melentyev G.V. (a very ambiguous and extremely cautious person).
Literally just before the conversation, Melent'ev was reported on the telegram of the Director General of the Concern "Gidropribor" Osipov V.A. with the “proposals” for the delivery of the head order of the 955 “Yuri Dolgoruky” project. A cautious Melentyev simply “floundered” from the indignation of these “proposals”! And now "a very good question", - with what was Yury Dolgoruky rented out by the industry? And even more "good" - and with what "Yuri Dolgoruky" today?
Well, quite "wonderful question", - What is Admiral Evmenov ready to accept the head RPLNS of the 955A project "Prince Vladimir" this year?
Maybe all the same it's time to start putting tough questions to industry - and in part of our submarine shipbuilding (as it has already happened (alas, only partially) with a surface one)?
The problems are so critical that the question is not even about the combat effectiveness of the submarine forces, but about the possibility of simply walking safely into the sea (especially the boats of the old structure, which did not go through all the necessary repairs).
“A good question,” did the naval commander report to the Supreme Commander that the fleet in the middle of 2000x almost never received his Thresher (US Navy submarine that died on deep-sea diving in 1963), and “Kursk-type”? An instant reaction (the count went on for seconds) from a well-trained crew saved me ... I believe that in the case of an objective report from this to the President, the issue of average repairs and upgrades to the 3 generation would be resolved quickly and in the most decisive way. Today, the modernization of the 3 multi-purpose boats of the generation is in fact disrupted; none of them have yet passed it
Anti-torpedo protection.
For ten years, on March 2009, the author of this article found on the website of public procurement, data on the delivery of new anti-torpedo protection devices "Vist-2" to the Pacific Fleet:
NOTICE No. 253 / 10 / 9 ... for the supply of the product "Vist-2" for the needs of the Ministry of Defense ... in 2008 year. The subject of the state contract Product "Vist-2" TBKE.365.161.009 TU - 20 pcs.
Place of delivery of products:
• 5 pieces. - Primorsky Territory, Partizansk;
• 15 pcs. – Murmansk region, Roslyakovo settlement.
The initial (maximum) contract price (lot price) 15000,0 thousand rubles.
Terms (periods) of delivery: The term of shipment is no later than November 25 2008 of the year
Place of delivery of products:
• 5 pieces. - Primorsky Territory, Partizansk;
• 15 pcs. – Murmansk region, Roslyakovo settlement.
The initial (maximum) contract price (lot price) 15000,0 thousand rubles.
Terms (periods) of delivery: The term of shipment is no later than November 25 2008 of the year
Arrived with a report to the commander of 16 squadron PL Pacific Fleet Rear Admiral Evmenov. Suggestions were:
get 5 already set in Partizansk "Vista", examine, shoot one of them when performing practical torpedo firing, according to the results - take in ammunition (primarily for duty RPLSN and combat forces). Further, to request the delivery of additional "Vista" for all submarines of the squadron.
At the time of 2009. devices (SGPD) "Vist-2" had a certain efficiency, because The mass torpedo of the United States Navy at that time was the Mk48mod.6 (deliveries of the new Mk48mod.7, which practically “nullified” the effectiveness of previous countermeasures, were just beginning).
For RPLSN combat service, the use of "Vista" in the event of a sudden torpedo attack, could give an opportunity, if not survive, then at least have time to report back to the shore (which is already information and a possibility of strategic importance).
Moreover, the practice of US Navy SSNs consists not only in maintaining constant intelligence of the waters adjacent to the Navy bases, and tracking our SPs, but also deliberately “setting it up” for our torpedo shots (to gather intelligence on our torpedo weapons), and even imitating firing torpedoes at our submarines (such cases in the 16 submarine squadron in 2000x were ...)
The literal answer (and the end of the conversation) of Rear Admiral Evmenov was:
- I am not interested ...
Yes, “ten years have passed”, “was-was”, “was not” ...
Only here there is a very simple question - were these “Vista” from Partizansk in 2009? taken to 16 ammunition squadron submarine? Or it all turned out to be “not interesting” ...
After the above-mentioned report, the author remembered the question of an 5-year-old son (after watching a video with military equipment and visiting an armament exhibition):
- Is there any "interference" on the boats ???
- “a wonderful question”, - the 5 year-old child, taking into account the fact that 5 years later, Rear-Admiral Lutsky wrote in the “Sea Collection”:
The current means of anti-torpedo protection of domestic submarines are ineffective against modern foreign torpedoes
The son then had to explain that "torpedoes are induced by ears", and therefore "there are special manufactured noise makers".
After thinking for a while, he, drawing “scribbles” with “trajectories”, thoughtfully “issued”:
- And what will happen if the torpedo aimed at the “noisy” missed and the boat leaves?
- i.e. a child in 5 years intuitively came to understand the concept of “zone of suppression of GPRS”!
In 7 years, on board the “loaf” (project 949А), his first question was:
- Show me where the “noises” are produced ...
In 8 years, on board the 971 project, he had a dialogue with me:
- And what a little "torpedo tubes" in the "nose"?
- For "noisy".
- This is a good "buzz"?
- Yes.
- Why didn't they put them on the “loaf” then?!?!?
- For "noisy".
- This is a good "buzz"?
- Yes.
- Why didn't they put them on the “loaf” then?!?!?
General Designer of the project 949А I. Baranov. commented on this dialogue with the phrase:
- It’s good to shoot from such issues ...
And it was not a “joke” from the “child’s questions”, it was rather a “heart-stone” from really “hard questions” for dear Igor Leonidovich (the fact that the APCR of the 949A project did not receive effective CPAP and launchers for them) ...
And now a very simple, and at the same time, a very difficult question - why did a small child understand the importance and importance of modern anti-torpedo protection means for submarines, and a whole range of our admirals simply ignored and ignored this question (and problems with them)?
Questions of conducting objective tests of our SFDP against new torpedoes were repeatedly raised by the author and a number of other initiative officers, however, they didn’t evoke any “interest” from the naval command (and there was a fierce opposition from the industry). The reasons are known, - The results of such tests (provided they are objectively carried out) will be deliberately "devastating and scandalous."
The author, of course, is not familiar with the State Testing Program of the CPRF “Prince Vladimir”, however, he has good reason to believe that the implementation of “problem” measures was obviously excluded from it.
For example, shooting by a “Physicist” with a telecontrol on “Prince Vladimir” himself, using his own “counteraction” means (about which Rear Admiral Lutsky wrote in 2010). It seems to be something easier? - “everything is ready,” Admiral Evmenov “will unambiguously accept the order in 2019”, ... and the crew is “ready” (to load the battle “Bulava”, and “immediately into the autonomous system”) ...
А such events are not held for a very simple reason - the real picture of complete defenselessness from modern torpedoes of ours, even the newest submarines, and the absolute insecurity of the NSNF combat stability will be immediately revealed ...
The result of all this is - complete non-ability of the Russian Navy to conduct submarine warfare with a modern enemy.
If the “newest” Severodvinsk of Syria’s Su-16 had been shot down by the Turkish F-24 in Syria, the attack of the Turkish submarine on it would most likely be fatal for it (as for any other domestic submarine).
The question arises, - What is the position, and what does the Commander of the Federation Council Admiral Evmenov report to the military-political leadership on this real situation? Including taking into account the fact that his fleet is not ready to accomplish tasks for the intended purpose ...
At the same time, almost all the problems in this area do not represent technical difficulties; they can and should have been solved “just yesterday”. If only they are really solved, and not silenced, “advancing promises” to take “the cat in the bag” in the same year ...
Information