Naval robbers against nuclear deterrence
Very often, when trying to discuss hypothetical military scenarios, one has to face the argument that, say, Russia has a nuclear weapon, and therefore the war with it will be strictly nuclear, therefore no enemy will dare to attack.
The question of the combat use of nuclear weapons, however, is too serious to judge him at that level. Therefore, it is worthwhile to dwell on this topic in somewhat more detail.
The document explaining the circumstances in which the Russian Federation uses nuclear weapons is the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.
In military doctrine, in section "The use of the Armed Forces, other troops and agencies, their main tasks in peacetime, during the immediate threat of aggression and in wartime" It reads as follows:
This phrase should be repeated to the full enlightenment of any citizen who believes that nuclear mushrooms will bloom in response to a sunken ship or a downed plane over the aggressor. No use of nuclear weapons against the Russian Federation? Not questioned the very existence of the state? Hence, there will be no use of nuclear weapons from our side.
The only question that remains is: what is “the very existence of the state” threatened? The answer to this is trivial logic - this is when aggression with conventional weapons is either real or potentially fraught with consequences that will lead to the termination of the existence of the Russian Federation. Either to the loss of statehood, or to the physical destruction of the population.
Of course, such a formulation can be interpreted very broadly. For example, a non-nuclear massive strike against the forces of nuclear deterrence quite falls into the list of factors that threaten the very existence of the Russian Federation. A single misses, but gives grounds for readiness number 1. At first glance, the hypothetical assault force of NATO to the Crimea does not threaten the existence of Russia, but if it is not nipped in the bud, different neighbors will have so many temptations about the vast Russian territory that their totality will be sufficiently dangerous for the use of nuclear weapons . This is exactly what Putin had in mind when he mentioned his readiness to use this very nuclear weapon in the frames of the film about the return of Crimea.
Again, no one will launch an ICBM en masse in response to an anti-ship missile that has flown into a small rocket ship. And if then, on the occurrence of which conditions nuclear weapons will be used, is indicated in the Military Doctrine, then the possible ways of its entry into the game are described in special editions.
In 1999, in the Military Thought magazine, in the 3 issue (5-6), an article was published "On the use of nuclear weapons for the de-escalation of hostilities" For the authorship of Major-General V.I. Levshina, Colonel A.V. Nedelina and Col. ME Sosnowski.
The article, of course, reflected (at that time) the opinion of the authors, and this is how they saw the stages of “putting into the game” of nuclear weapons.
It is proposed to highlight the following steps to increase the scale of OTNA use:
It is easy to see that the automatic “the whole world into dust” is not even close. It is difficult to say how literally the doctrinal documents closed to the public “prescribed” these views, however, according to reports from Western intelligence agencies and the specialized military press, the transition from a non-nuclear to a nuclear war would look like this in the Russian leadership’s view.
Two facts are interesting. The first is that the Russian leadership is hiding the “nuclear threshold” - no one really knows at what stage Russia will still use nuclear weapons. It is assumed that this will be done in response to a serious military defeat.
The second fact is that in official documents issued by Western structures involved in the development of military strategies, The concept of nuclear de-escalation, attributed to Russia as officially accepted, is called erroneous and incapable of stopping the advance of Western countries (and in fact the United States) to Russia, as long as a decision on such will be made. At the same time, the Americans believe that they should not be the first to use nuclear weapons, since with their superiority in conventional weapons, it is more advantageous to achieve the defeat of the enemy without the use of nuclear weapons. However, it should be understood that according to American views, in response to nuclear de-escalation, it is necessary to resort to nuclear escalation, to translate the nuclear conflict, and then to conduct it as nuclear. They will not stop.
Everything according to Herman Kahn and his “Thermonuclear War”: “No one should doubt America’s readiness to wage a nuclear war.” It fits well with the mentality of the Americans, about whom it is known that they just don’t know how to dwell in a good way, in war with them they need to be killed in huge quantities and for a long time, and so that they cannot improve their situation, and only then just start to even think about what is happening.
Thus, the following intermediate conclusions can be drawn:
1. There will be no nuclear strike in the hurray-patriotic frenzy - hurray-patriots should breathe out. The criteria for the use of nuclear weapons will be very far from the “righteous anger”.
2. Nuclear weapons will be used when there is no alternative to this except for the self-dissolution of the Russian Federation and the surrender of the surviving population at the mercy of the winner - whatever it is, or as a response to the actions of the enemy, who has already de facto destroyed Russia along with its population ( reciprocal and retaliatory nuclear strikes by the forces of the SNF).
3. From this it follows that in the course of a local military conflict (see the term in “Military Doctrine”) or a local war, nuclear weapons will NOT be used. And with a probability close to 100%, even a defeat in such a war, it does not entail restricting the sovereignty of Rossim on its own territory, in whole or in part, to the use of nuclear weapons also does not.
We are not alone. At the beginning of the 80 of the last century, when the world was very close to a nuclear apocalypse, the Americans who planned the maritime war with the USSR indicated in their documents that it was undesirable to convert a war into a nuclear one, it was necessary to keep it in a non-nuclear conflict. On land, the use of nuclear weapons was allowed as a response to a large-scale Soviet aggression, and already after the Soviet Army and ATS armies broke through to the West Germany through the Fulda corridor. And even in this case, it would not be guaranteed at all, NATO would at least try to do with conventional weapons. A curious but similar point of view was held by the USSR Minister of Defense D. Ustinov. The truth is that a non-nuclear conflict was considered as a temporary phenomenon, after which nuclear weapons would still be used. In the Soviet textbooks on tactics, fire training in the form of a single shot by a nuclear artillery shell was "common ground". But this, too, was not guaranteed.
Researchers at the Chinese naval doctrine Tosi Yoshihara and James Holmes, relying on Chinese sources indicate that China proceeds from the non-use of nuclear weapons first in any case (T.Yoshihara, JR Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific).
In practice, the United States theoretically discusses a preventive nuclear strike on Russia, but “in the academic sense” (so far), on a theoretical level. Admittedly, they have gone quite far in their theories, but this is still the theory.
In fact, it is already safe to say now that nuclear countries have their own “red lines” before the enemy crosses which nuclear weapons will not be used. These “lines” are secret — we could hardly live in peace, if you knew exactly the Americans, when we would use nuclear weapons, and which ones we wouldn’t. Our patience may well have been tried in this case. For the time being, only the “lower boundaries” are clear - there will be no nuclear war due to a single incident, albeit with heavy losses. The rest is still unknown.
We will put ourselves, however, in the place of a country that considers it necessary to punish Russia for this or that with the help of military force. Or achieve something by force.
So, what should such a country not allow when attacking Russia?
First, Russia inflicted large, single-stage losses, capable of creating a military defeat’s sense of the military defeat that is irreparable by conventional weapons, fraught with adhering to the attacker of other countries who believed in impunity.
Secondly, the territorial escalation of the conflict - the conflict over the river bank is one thing, and over a thousand kilometers of the border is another.
Third, we must avoid a massive attack against the Russian strategic nuclear forces - this can cause the effect that the Americans call "launch or lose" when not launching missiles on the enemy will mean their loss, and, as a result, a temporary loss of the ability to contain the enemy rocket still remain.
Fourthly, it is worth avoiding situations where the enemy will have no other option than to go tanks to the capital of the attacker - and this is not only a matter of appropriateness, there is also a need to take into account psychology - for example, a tank raid on St. Petersburg from the Baltic could well cause a counterattack with the capture of this same Baltic, and the failure of such a counterattack with large losses and without solving the problem of cleaning the territory of the Russian Federation from the attacker will already be fraught with thereby. A massive bombing strike on civilians will cause the same reaction.
And here we come to an interesting point. For a country to which Russian tanks can reach by land, the risks of escalation escalation to the use of nuclear weapons are much higher. You can even reluctantly unleash the conflict "all the way" - contrary to the original plans.
But in the case of a maritime conflict, the situation is exactly the opposite - with the right actions of the attacker, the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons on him is near zero, and for the time being there is an opportunity to get "dry out of the water."
Consider the options.
1. The enemy attacks and drowns the warship of the Russian Federation, stating that his forces were unprovoked attacked and defended. At the current level of Russophobia in the world, most of the planet will believe that Russia attacked first and got what it deserved, and we will not be able to leave such a blow without an answer. Something like this happened with the Georgian attack of South Ossetia. As a result, we are drawn into hostilities under conditions where the attacker will set us up as the aggressor. At the same time, we have no reasons for the use of nuclear weapons - our territory has not been attacked, civilians have not died, there is no threat to the existence of the state, according to our Military Doctrine, the use of nuclear weapons is out of the question, and the whole world believes that we started the war. Thus, the enemy will only be required to conduct combat operations successfully enough to incline Russia to peace on favorable terms for the attacker, and not to do what, as shown above, could lead to a nuclear strike. And no nuclear war.
2. The blockade from the sea - the enemy stops the merchant ships going to the Russian Federation, and those that go under the Russian flag simply searches and releases, which causes serious damage to carriers (the day of the ship’s stay in the port due to the fault of the freighter can cost tens and hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines - in this case, the losses are the same, but no one compensates for them), and vessels under flags of convenience, but belonging to companies affiliated with the Russians, are arrested. This will inevitably cause a catastrophic blow to the economy of the Russian Federation, but we will not have a formal reason to intervene - our courts are not arresting. To solve such a problem is still possible only by force, but again, while there is no room for a nuclear weapon in response. And the opponent can quite reduce it to the item of 1.
3. Raid the territory. The enemy, closely monitoring the actions of the Russian forces, disembarks his military units into the territory of the Russian Federation, at the time of Russia's reaction, they are evacuated. As a result, there is political damage for the Russian Federation — enemy troops are in charge on its territory, but there is no reason to use nuclear weapons. At all. In principle, such things can be easily done in sparsely populated areas of Russia, in the same Chukotka, for example.
4. Suppression of cabotage under the pretext of combating smuggling, drugs and other forms of cross-border crime. For example, the blockade of a port in Chukotka by capturing merchant ships going to it. The goal is to “pull out” Russian forces to the place of conflict, to provoke the use of force, to conduct a series of clashes with an outcome that is favorable to the attacker.
In fact, you can think of hundreds of scenarios of such provocations. Everyone will bring the Russian military losses, economic damage, and politically it will be just a disaster. In this case, no reason to use nuclear weapons will not arise - and it will not apply. At the same time, if on land, you can easily “drag on the tail” Russian tanks directly to your capital, then the sea is not so.
Consider, for example, the 4 script in the Pacific. Suppose the enemy - the United States - hijacks several ships under the pretext of their arrest, they say, the Russians carry drugs to the Arctic (whatever that means, their population will "eat" any, even the most idiotic excuse - as "eaten" by the Skripale poisoning, into reality believes the overwhelming majority of the population of Western countries, these people, in general, are not able to think) Russia sends several DSCNRs and one destroyer to insure (there are almost no ships on the Pacific Fleet that could be sent on such a mission, only four ships of the first rank are on the move) to protect ships from US piracy and not to disrupt the Northern Delivery. The USA, using the extreme small number of Russian forces, find a ship that they will manage to capture faster than help will come to it, do it and leave, taking the ships to their shores, but keeping fighters and DRLO planes in full combat readiness on Alaskan bases the air.
We have no other options left, to wipe ourselves and express indignation in the UN, and in conditions when the world press has beaten "Russian aggression" and "drugs".
And then, at the first opportunity, an airborne raid by a pair of American special forces platoons somewhere in Meynypilgino, with a demonstrative presence of bags of heroin under a bush, with video fixation and quick evacuation back, until the “Dry” from Yelizovo or Anadyr flew to sprinkle snow reds. On the bags of "drugs" do not care, but the fact that on the territory of the Russian troops can be landed, the world will notice, and how.
Such things for us, today's, in wonder. They do not believe in them. Well, how to believe in this? Meanwhile, these operations will ideally fit into the outline of the concept of a “warm war” now invented in the US - not “cold”, as it was with the USSR, when the weapon was mostly silent, and not a full-fledged “hot”, when it’s clear that, wars are not wars. With losses and damage, but on a small, non-hazardous scale.
At the same time, if we restrict ourselves to the actions of the naval forces, then one can always stop the escalation, or at least try. It is easy to stop all the clashes and divert your forces under the “umbrella” of the home air defense, giving the attacked poor Russians the Russians to carry out attacks on the verge of the possible and bear all new and new casualties.
Or consider a more down to earth option - the Japanese seize a pair of Kuril Islands. Will this cause a military response to Russia? Definitely yes. Is this the reason for the nuclear strike on Japan? If you believe the military doctrine, then no.
And in ordinary forces they have an advantage at times.
We, perhaps, in this case will beat them. But without nuclear fantasies.
If someone still sees the fog in front of his eyes, then recall historical facts.
In the 1950 year, nuclear fighter jets, the United States, attacked the Sukhaja Rechka airfield near Vladivostok, while the USSR was also a nuclear power. Not scared.
In the same year, not nuclear China attacked the "UN troops", but actually the troops of the US nuclear power and American allies, and threw them to the south with heavy losses. The Chinese were not afraid, and nuclear war did not happen.
In 1969, nuclear China attacked a nuclear USSR on Damanski Island and at the lake Zhalanoshkol.
During the Cold War, nuclear pilots of the United States and the USSR nuclear fired at each other in Korea, American reconnaissance pilots fired from Soviet interceptors in the Soviet airspace, killing more than a dozen of our pilots, and years later, American pilots were rarely, but lost. forever along with the planes when trying to fly behind the Soviet Tu-16 through the clouds. The survivors talked about bright long flashes somewhere near, in the fog - and after that some people did not return back to the ship.
In 1968, the DPRK seized the American reconnaissance ship, without being ashamed of the fact that the United States has nuclear weapons and the DPRK does not.
In 1970, nuclear Israel shot down Soviet pilots over Egypt.
In 1982, non-nuclear Argentina seized British territory, not being afraid that Britain had nuclear weapons and that she was a member of NATO. This, by the way, is another reason to think about the Kuril Islands. The analogy will be “one to one” if that, minus the Japanese superiority in the theater — overwhelming.
In 1988, Iranian ships were not afraid to attack US Navy destroyers, no American nuclear weapons stopped anyone.
In 2015, a non-nuclear Turkey shot down a combat aircraft of nuclear Russia during a cynically planned provocation and with the hands of its militants made a demonstrative murder of one of the pilots, trying to kill the second one too. Then the marine also died and the helicopter was lost. Nuclear weapons again did not stop anyone.
As they say, clever is enough.
We summarize.
Nuclear weapons work as a deterrent, but in the real world their applicability is significantly limited. Russia has officially designated the situations in which these weapons will be used, from which follow those situations in which they will not be used.
The mere fact of the availability of nuclear weapons in any quantities does not guarantee that the country that has it will not be attacked, and the attacker, as history shows, may not have nuclear weapons at all. Such scenarios of wars and clashes are quite possible and feasible, in which nuclear weapons prove to be inapplicable for political reasons. At the same time, the weakness of general purpose forces quite allows some nuclear and non-nuclear countries to defeat the Russian Federation in such clashes under certain conditions.
The most preferred form of open military confrontation of a non-nuclear country against a nuclear one is a maritime conflict, since this form of conflict allows you to interrupt hostilities at any time and force the enemy to either interrupt them too or act in an extremely unfavorable position. The conflict on land entails much more risks for the attacker, and, as a result, is much less likely.
What methods to deal with this "policy"? Yes, the good old ones: a lot of ships, trained crews, moral readiness to act autonomously before the arrival or arrival of reinforcements, preventing any aggression in the bud, even if it is a toy with hijackings of ships, at least in reality - in the Kuril Islands or anywhere else.
Some things don't even change nuclear weapons.
The question of the combat use of nuclear weapons, however, is too serious to judge him at that level. Therefore, it is worthwhile to dwell on this topic in somewhat more detail.
The document explaining the circumstances in which the Russian Federation uses nuclear weapons is the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.
In military doctrine, in section "The use of the Armed Forces, other troops and agencies, their main tasks in peacetime, during the immediate threat of aggression and in wartime" It reads as follows:
27. The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened.
The decision on the use of nuclear weapons is made by the President of the Russian Federation.
The decision on the use of nuclear weapons is made by the President of the Russian Federation.
This phrase should be repeated to the full enlightenment of any citizen who believes that nuclear mushrooms will bloom in response to a sunken ship or a downed plane over the aggressor. No use of nuclear weapons against the Russian Federation? Not questioned the very existence of the state? Hence, there will be no use of nuclear weapons from our side.
The only question that remains is: what is “the very existence of the state” threatened? The answer to this is trivial logic - this is when aggression with conventional weapons is either real or potentially fraught with consequences that will lead to the termination of the existence of the Russian Federation. Either to the loss of statehood, or to the physical destruction of the population.
Of course, such a formulation can be interpreted very broadly. For example, a non-nuclear massive strike against the forces of nuclear deterrence quite falls into the list of factors that threaten the very existence of the Russian Federation. A single misses, but gives grounds for readiness number 1. At first glance, the hypothetical assault force of NATO to the Crimea does not threaten the existence of Russia, but if it is not nipped in the bud, different neighbors will have so many temptations about the vast Russian territory that their totality will be sufficiently dangerous for the use of nuclear weapons . This is exactly what Putin had in mind when he mentioned his readiness to use this very nuclear weapon in the frames of the film about the return of Crimea.
Again, no one will launch an ICBM en masse in response to an anti-ship missile that has flown into a small rocket ship. And if then, on the occurrence of which conditions nuclear weapons will be used, is indicated in the Military Doctrine, then the possible ways of its entry into the game are described in special editions.
In 1999, in the Military Thought magazine, in the 3 issue (5-6), an article was published "On the use of nuclear weapons for the de-escalation of hostilities" For the authorship of Major-General V.I. Levshina, Colonel A.V. Nedelina and Col. ME Sosnowski.
The article, of course, reflected (at that time) the opinion of the authors, and this is how they saw the stages of “putting into the game” of nuclear weapons.
It is proposed to highlight the following steps to increase the scale of OTNA use:
... "demonstration" - the application of single demonstrative nuclear strikes on deserted territories (water areas), on secondary enemy military installations with limited military personnel or not served at all;
“Intimidation-demonstration” - delivering single nuclear strikes at transport hubs, engineering structures and other facilities for the territorial localization of the area of military operations and (or) on individual elements of the opposing group of troops (forces) of the enemy, resulting in a violation (decrease in efficiency) of the invasion grouping at the operational (operational-tactical) level and not causing relatively high losses of the enemy forces;
“Intimidation” - launching group strikes against the main grouping of enemy troops (forces) in one operational direction to change the balance of forces in a given direction and (or) eliminate the enemy’s breakthrough into the operational depth of defense;
"Intimidation-retribution" - the application of concentrated blows within one or several adjacent operational areas to groups of troops (forces) of the enemy in the theater of operations with the unfavorable development of a defensive operation. In doing so, the following tasks are accomplished: the elimination of the threat of the defeat of the grouping of its troops; decisive change in the balance of forces in the operational direction (s); the elimination of the breakthrough by the enemy of the defensive line of the operational-strategic association, etc .;
“Retaliation-intimidation” - a massive strike on the grouping of the aggressor's armed forces in the theater of operations for its defeat and a radical change in the military situation in its favor;
“Retaliation” - a massive strike (blows) on the enemy within the entire theater of war (if necessary with the defeat of individual military-economic objects of the aggressor) with the maximum use of available forces and means, coordinated with the strikes of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, if they are used.
“Intimidation-demonstration” - delivering single nuclear strikes at transport hubs, engineering structures and other facilities for the territorial localization of the area of military operations and (or) on individual elements of the opposing group of troops (forces) of the enemy, resulting in a violation (decrease in efficiency) of the invasion grouping at the operational (operational-tactical) level and not causing relatively high losses of the enemy forces;
“Intimidation” - launching group strikes against the main grouping of enemy troops (forces) in one operational direction to change the balance of forces in a given direction and (or) eliminate the enemy’s breakthrough into the operational depth of defense;
"Intimidation-retribution" - the application of concentrated blows within one or several adjacent operational areas to groups of troops (forces) of the enemy in the theater of operations with the unfavorable development of a defensive operation. In doing so, the following tasks are accomplished: the elimination of the threat of the defeat of the grouping of its troops; decisive change in the balance of forces in the operational direction (s); the elimination of the breakthrough by the enemy of the defensive line of the operational-strategic association, etc .;
“Retaliation-intimidation” - a massive strike on the grouping of the aggressor's armed forces in the theater of operations for its defeat and a radical change in the military situation in its favor;
“Retaliation” - a massive strike (blows) on the enemy within the entire theater of war (if necessary with the defeat of individual military-economic objects of the aggressor) with the maximum use of available forces and means, coordinated with the strikes of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, if they are used.
It is easy to see that the automatic “the whole world into dust” is not even close. It is difficult to say how literally the doctrinal documents closed to the public “prescribed” these views, however, according to reports from Western intelligence agencies and the specialized military press, the transition from a non-nuclear to a nuclear war would look like this in the Russian leadership’s view.
Two facts are interesting. The first is that the Russian leadership is hiding the “nuclear threshold” - no one really knows at what stage Russia will still use nuclear weapons. It is assumed that this will be done in response to a serious military defeat.
The second fact is that in official documents issued by Western structures involved in the development of military strategies, The concept of nuclear de-escalation, attributed to Russia as officially accepted, is called erroneous and incapable of stopping the advance of Western countries (and in fact the United States) to Russia, as long as a decision on such will be made. At the same time, the Americans believe that they should not be the first to use nuclear weapons, since with their superiority in conventional weapons, it is more advantageous to achieve the defeat of the enemy without the use of nuclear weapons. However, it should be understood that according to American views, in response to nuclear de-escalation, it is necessary to resort to nuclear escalation, to translate the nuclear conflict, and then to conduct it as nuclear. They will not stop.
Everything according to Herman Kahn and his “Thermonuclear War”: “No one should doubt America’s readiness to wage a nuclear war.” It fits well with the mentality of the Americans, about whom it is known that they just don’t know how to dwell in a good way, in war with them they need to be killed in huge quantities and for a long time, and so that they cannot improve their situation, and only then just start to even think about what is happening.
Thus, the following intermediate conclusions can be drawn:
1. There will be no nuclear strike in the hurray-patriotic frenzy - hurray-patriots should breathe out. The criteria for the use of nuclear weapons will be very far from the “righteous anger”.
2. Nuclear weapons will be used when there is no alternative to this except for the self-dissolution of the Russian Federation and the surrender of the surviving population at the mercy of the winner - whatever it is, or as a response to the actions of the enemy, who has already de facto destroyed Russia along with its population ( reciprocal and retaliatory nuclear strikes by the forces of the SNF).
3. From this it follows that in the course of a local military conflict (see the term in “Military Doctrine”) or a local war, nuclear weapons will NOT be used. And with a probability close to 100%, even a defeat in such a war, it does not entail restricting the sovereignty of Rossim on its own territory, in whole or in part, to the use of nuclear weapons also does not.
We are not alone. At the beginning of the 80 of the last century, when the world was very close to a nuclear apocalypse, the Americans who planned the maritime war with the USSR indicated in their documents that it was undesirable to convert a war into a nuclear one, it was necessary to keep it in a non-nuclear conflict. On land, the use of nuclear weapons was allowed as a response to a large-scale Soviet aggression, and already after the Soviet Army and ATS armies broke through to the West Germany through the Fulda corridor. And even in this case, it would not be guaranteed at all, NATO would at least try to do with conventional weapons. A curious but similar point of view was held by the USSR Minister of Defense D. Ustinov. The truth is that a non-nuclear conflict was considered as a temporary phenomenon, after which nuclear weapons would still be used. In the Soviet textbooks on tactics, fire training in the form of a single shot by a nuclear artillery shell was "common ground". But this, too, was not guaranteed.
Researchers at the Chinese naval doctrine Tosi Yoshihara and James Holmes, relying on Chinese sources indicate that China proceeds from the non-use of nuclear weapons first in any case (T.Yoshihara, JR Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific).
In practice, the United States theoretically discusses a preventive nuclear strike on Russia, but “in the academic sense” (so far), on a theoretical level. Admittedly, they have gone quite far in their theories, but this is still the theory.
In fact, it is already safe to say now that nuclear countries have their own “red lines” before the enemy crosses which nuclear weapons will not be used. These “lines” are secret — we could hardly live in peace, if you knew exactly the Americans, when we would use nuclear weapons, and which ones we wouldn’t. Our patience may well have been tried in this case. For the time being, only the “lower boundaries” are clear - there will be no nuclear war due to a single incident, albeit with heavy losses. The rest is still unknown.
We will put ourselves, however, in the place of a country that considers it necessary to punish Russia for this or that with the help of military force. Or achieve something by force.
So, what should such a country not allow when attacking Russia?
First, Russia inflicted large, single-stage losses, capable of creating a military defeat’s sense of the military defeat that is irreparable by conventional weapons, fraught with adhering to the attacker of other countries who believed in impunity.
Secondly, the territorial escalation of the conflict - the conflict over the river bank is one thing, and over a thousand kilometers of the border is another.
Third, we must avoid a massive attack against the Russian strategic nuclear forces - this can cause the effect that the Americans call "launch or lose" when not launching missiles on the enemy will mean their loss, and, as a result, a temporary loss of the ability to contain the enemy rocket still remain.
Fourthly, it is worth avoiding situations where the enemy will have no other option than to go tanks to the capital of the attacker - and this is not only a matter of appropriateness, there is also a need to take into account psychology - for example, a tank raid on St. Petersburg from the Baltic could well cause a counterattack with the capture of this same Baltic, and the failure of such a counterattack with large losses and without solving the problem of cleaning the territory of the Russian Federation from the attacker will already be fraught with thereby. A massive bombing strike on civilians will cause the same reaction.
And here we come to an interesting point. For a country to which Russian tanks can reach by land, the risks of escalation escalation to the use of nuclear weapons are much higher. You can even reluctantly unleash the conflict "all the way" - contrary to the original plans.
But in the case of a maritime conflict, the situation is exactly the opposite - with the right actions of the attacker, the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons on him is near zero, and for the time being there is an opportunity to get "dry out of the water."
Consider the options.
1. The enemy attacks and drowns the warship of the Russian Federation, stating that his forces were unprovoked attacked and defended. At the current level of Russophobia in the world, most of the planet will believe that Russia attacked first and got what it deserved, and we will not be able to leave such a blow without an answer. Something like this happened with the Georgian attack of South Ossetia. As a result, we are drawn into hostilities under conditions where the attacker will set us up as the aggressor. At the same time, we have no reasons for the use of nuclear weapons - our territory has not been attacked, civilians have not died, there is no threat to the existence of the state, according to our Military Doctrine, the use of nuclear weapons is out of the question, and the whole world believes that we started the war. Thus, the enemy will only be required to conduct combat operations successfully enough to incline Russia to peace on favorable terms for the attacker, and not to do what, as shown above, could lead to a nuclear strike. And no nuclear war.
2. The blockade from the sea - the enemy stops the merchant ships going to the Russian Federation, and those that go under the Russian flag simply searches and releases, which causes serious damage to carriers (the day of the ship’s stay in the port due to the fault of the freighter can cost tens and hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines - in this case, the losses are the same, but no one compensates for them), and vessels under flags of convenience, but belonging to companies affiliated with the Russians, are arrested. This will inevitably cause a catastrophic blow to the economy of the Russian Federation, but we will not have a formal reason to intervene - our courts are not arresting. To solve such a problem is still possible only by force, but again, while there is no room for a nuclear weapon in response. And the opponent can quite reduce it to the item of 1.
3. Raid the territory. The enemy, closely monitoring the actions of the Russian forces, disembarks his military units into the territory of the Russian Federation, at the time of Russia's reaction, they are evacuated. As a result, there is political damage for the Russian Federation — enemy troops are in charge on its territory, but there is no reason to use nuclear weapons. At all. In principle, such things can be easily done in sparsely populated areas of Russia, in the same Chukotka, for example.
4. Suppression of cabotage under the pretext of combating smuggling, drugs and other forms of cross-border crime. For example, the blockade of a port in Chukotka by capturing merchant ships going to it. The goal is to “pull out” Russian forces to the place of conflict, to provoke the use of force, to conduct a series of clashes with an outcome that is favorable to the attacker.
In fact, you can think of hundreds of scenarios of such provocations. Everyone will bring the Russian military losses, economic damage, and politically it will be just a disaster. In this case, no reason to use nuclear weapons will not arise - and it will not apply. At the same time, if on land, you can easily “drag on the tail” Russian tanks directly to your capital, then the sea is not so.
Consider, for example, the 4 script in the Pacific. Suppose the enemy - the United States - hijacks several ships under the pretext of their arrest, they say, the Russians carry drugs to the Arctic (whatever that means, their population will "eat" any, even the most idiotic excuse - as "eaten" by the Skripale poisoning, into reality believes the overwhelming majority of the population of Western countries, these people, in general, are not able to think) Russia sends several DSCNRs and one destroyer to insure (there are almost no ships on the Pacific Fleet that could be sent on such a mission, only four ships of the first rank are on the move) to protect ships from US piracy and not to disrupt the Northern Delivery. The USA, using the extreme small number of Russian forces, find a ship that they will manage to capture faster than help will come to it, do it and leave, taking the ships to their shores, but keeping fighters and DRLO planes in full combat readiness on Alaskan bases the air.
We have no other options left, to wipe ourselves and express indignation in the UN, and in conditions when the world press has beaten "Russian aggression" and "drugs".
And then, at the first opportunity, an airborne raid by a pair of American special forces platoons somewhere in Meynypilgino, with a demonstrative presence of bags of heroin under a bush, with video fixation and quick evacuation back, until the “Dry” from Yelizovo or Anadyr flew to sprinkle snow reds. On the bags of "drugs" do not care, but the fact that on the territory of the Russian troops can be landed, the world will notice, and how.
Such things for us, today's, in wonder. They do not believe in them. Well, how to believe in this? Meanwhile, these operations will ideally fit into the outline of the concept of a “warm war” now invented in the US - not “cold”, as it was with the USSR, when the weapon was mostly silent, and not a full-fledged “hot”, when it’s clear that, wars are not wars. With losses and damage, but on a small, non-hazardous scale.
At the same time, if we restrict ourselves to the actions of the naval forces, then one can always stop the escalation, or at least try. It is easy to stop all the clashes and divert your forces under the “umbrella” of the home air defense, giving the attacked poor Russians the Russians to carry out attacks on the verge of the possible and bear all new and new casualties.
Or consider a more down to earth option - the Japanese seize a pair of Kuril Islands. Will this cause a military response to Russia? Definitely yes. Is this the reason for the nuclear strike on Japan? If you believe the military doctrine, then no.
And in ordinary forces they have an advantage at times.
We, perhaps, in this case will beat them. But without nuclear fantasies.
If someone still sees the fog in front of his eyes, then recall historical facts.
In the 1950 year, nuclear fighter jets, the United States, attacked the Sukhaja Rechka airfield near Vladivostok, while the USSR was also a nuclear power. Not scared.
In the same year, not nuclear China attacked the "UN troops", but actually the troops of the US nuclear power and American allies, and threw them to the south with heavy losses. The Chinese were not afraid, and nuclear war did not happen.
In 1969, nuclear China attacked a nuclear USSR on Damanski Island and at the lake Zhalanoshkol.
During the Cold War, nuclear pilots of the United States and the USSR nuclear fired at each other in Korea, American reconnaissance pilots fired from Soviet interceptors in the Soviet airspace, killing more than a dozen of our pilots, and years later, American pilots were rarely, but lost. forever along with the planes when trying to fly behind the Soviet Tu-16 through the clouds. The survivors talked about bright long flashes somewhere near, in the fog - and after that some people did not return back to the ship.
In 1968, the DPRK seized the American reconnaissance ship, without being ashamed of the fact that the United States has nuclear weapons and the DPRK does not.
In 1970, nuclear Israel shot down Soviet pilots over Egypt.
In 1982, non-nuclear Argentina seized British territory, not being afraid that Britain had nuclear weapons and that she was a member of NATO. This, by the way, is another reason to think about the Kuril Islands. The analogy will be “one to one” if that, minus the Japanese superiority in the theater — overwhelming.
In 1988, Iranian ships were not afraid to attack US Navy destroyers, no American nuclear weapons stopped anyone.
In 2015, a non-nuclear Turkey shot down a combat aircraft of nuclear Russia during a cynically planned provocation and with the hands of its militants made a demonstrative murder of one of the pilots, trying to kill the second one too. Then the marine also died and the helicopter was lost. Nuclear weapons again did not stop anyone.
As they say, clever is enough.
We summarize.
Nuclear weapons work as a deterrent, but in the real world their applicability is significantly limited. Russia has officially designated the situations in which these weapons will be used, from which follow those situations in which they will not be used.
The mere fact of the availability of nuclear weapons in any quantities does not guarantee that the country that has it will not be attacked, and the attacker, as history shows, may not have nuclear weapons at all. Such scenarios of wars and clashes are quite possible and feasible, in which nuclear weapons prove to be inapplicable for political reasons. At the same time, the weakness of general purpose forces quite allows some nuclear and non-nuclear countries to defeat the Russian Federation in such clashes under certain conditions.
The most preferred form of open military confrontation of a non-nuclear country against a nuclear one is a maritime conflict, since this form of conflict allows you to interrupt hostilities at any time and force the enemy to either interrupt them too or act in an extremely unfavorable position. The conflict on land entails much more risks for the attacker, and, as a result, is much less likely.
What methods to deal with this "policy"? Yes, the good old ones: a lot of ships, trained crews, moral readiness to act autonomously before the arrival or arrival of reinforcements, preventing any aggression in the bud, even if it is a toy with hijackings of ships, at least in reality - in the Kuril Islands or anywhere else.
Some things don't even change nuclear weapons.
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