What should be the multipurpose submarine of the Russian Navy? Some couch analytics
We have devoted the last article to the appearance of a promising corvette for the Russian Navy, now let's think: what should be our multipurpose submarines?
To begin, let us recall what tasks the ships of this class (both atomic and nonatomic) must solve according to the military doctrine of the USSR:
1. Ensuring the deployment and combat stability of strategic missile submarines. In fact, the task is more important than this for multi-purpose submarines, and there simply cannot be. Providing strategic nuclear forces of the USSR (and now the Russian Federation) is an absolute priority, because the nuclear triad is, in fact, the most important (and today it is the only) guarantee of the existence of our country.
2. Anti-submarine defense of their facilities and forces, search and destruction of enemy submarines. As a matter of fact, the first task (providing the SSBN) is solved by submarines precisely by anti-submarine defense, but the latter, of course, is much broader than the SSBN cover alone. Indeed, anti-submarine defense is also required by the connections of our other warships, and coastal shipping, and the coast and bases fleet etc.
3. Destruction of warships and enemy ships operating as part of formations and groups, as well as singly. Everything is clear here - submarines must be able to fight not only against enemy submarines, but also surface ships, and destroy them, both solitary and as part of the highest operational formations of the fleets of our probable opponents (AUG / AUS).
4. Violation of maritime and oceanic communications of the enemy. Here we are talking about actions against non-military transport ships of our "sworn friends". For the USSR Navy, this task was all the more important because, in the event of the beginning of a large-scale military conflict between the countries of the ATS and NATO, the Atlantic ocean transportations assumed a strategic character for NATO. Only a speedy and massive transfer of US ground forces to Europe gave them at least a shadow of a chance to stop the Soviet "tank skating rink "without large-scale use of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the disruption of such shipments, or even their substantial limitation, was one of the most important tasks of the USSR Navy, but only submarines could implement it in the Atlantic.
5. The destruction of important military targets of the enemy on the coast and in the depths of its territory. Of course, multipurpose submarines cannot solve this problem as dramatically as the SSBNs, but even they, being carriers of nuclear and non-nuclear cruise missiles, can cause significant damage to the enemy infrastructure.
The above objectives were key for multipurpose submarines of the Navy of the USSR, but besides them there were others, such as:
1. Conducting intelligence and providing guidance to the enemy groups. Here, of course, it did not mean that the submarine should rush around the water area in search of enemy ship groups. But, for example, the deployment of a PL subunit on a wide front on possible paths of its movement made it possible to detect and report on the observed forces of the enemy if, for whatever reason, its immediate attack is impossible or irrational;
2. The implementation of mine productions. In essence, it is a form of struggle against enemy ships and ships;
3. The landing of reconnaissance and sabotage groups on the coast of the enemy;
4. Navigation-hydrographic and hydrometeorological support of military operations;
5. Transportation of cargo and personnel to the blocked points of the base;
6. Rescue crews of ships, ships and aircraft in distress;
7. Refueling (supply) of submarines at sea.
The creation of submarines to solve these problems in the USSR was engaged in a kind of "Snake Gorynych" consisting of three design teams:
1. Central Design Bureau "Rubin" - this design team was engaged in nuclear submarines-carriers of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as diesel submarines. By the time of the collapse of the USSR, the products of this design bureau were represented by the Akun 941 project, the 949 project SSGN — the carriers of Granit anti-ship missiles, the Palnus type 877 diesel submarines and its export version, the Varshavyanka 636 project;
2. SPMBM "Malachite", the main profile of which were multi-purpose nuclear submarines, the top of which by the beginning of the 90-ies, no doubt, were the famous boats of the 971 "Pike-B" project;
3. The Lazurit Central Design Bureau is a “master of all hands”, starting with designing diesel submarines, then taking up submarines - carriers of cruise missiles, but giving up the position of Rubin here and finally creating very successful multipurpose boats with a titanium hull. The latter - the submarine of the 945A "Condor" project - became the "calling card" of this design bureau by the end of the 80's.
Thus, in the USSR at some stage they came to the following structure of a multi-purpose submarine fleet:
Submarines - carriers of anti-ship missiles (SSGN)
They were heavy (surface displacement - 14 700 t, which is not too different from the Ohio SSBNs with its 16 746 t), highly specialized submarine rocket carriers to attack the enemy’s fleet with heavy anti-ship missiles, including AUG. In fact, the SSGNs could effectively solve only one (albeit an important) task indicated in our list under No. XXUMX, “Destruction of enemy warships and vessels operating as part of formations and groups, as well as singly.” Of course, it could have been used to solve the remaining tasks of multi-purpose submarines, but due to its large size, relatively high noise level and worse, compared with less heavy boats of maneuverability, such use of the SSGN was not optimal;
Torpedo Nuclear Submarines (PLAT)
They were effective anti-submarine ships, a means of fighting on enemy communications, and, thanks to equipping them with long-range cruise missiles C-10 "Granat", launched from torpedo tubes, could strike land targets. Thus, the PCB effectively solved the other four major tasks of multi-purpose submarines. Of course, they could also take part in the defeat of enemy ship groups, but, not armed with heavy anti-ship missiles, were inferior here in the effectiveness of specialized SSGNs.
Diesel submarines (diesel submarines)
They represent, in essence, a cheap analogue of PLAT systems with reduced capabilities. Of course, in this case “cheap” does not mean “bad”, because while driving on electric motors, the diesel-electric submarines had much less noise than the PCB. And, although their modest size did not allow placing sonar complexes on them, equal in capabilities to those of their “elder atomic brothers”, they still had an advantage zone in which enemy nuclear submarines had not yet heard the diesel-electric submarines, and the diesel-electric submarines detected submarines. What, in fact, was the reason for some to call the very same “Varshavyanka” a “black hole”.
As is known, the Soviet Navy, with all its gigantic size and the well-deserved title of the second fleet of the world, still did not dominate the oceans, and to ensure safety in the “bastions” of the Barents and Okhotsk seas, the diesel-electric submarines were an excellent means: what about the Baltic and Black the seas, the use of nuclear submarines there was generally irrational. Thus, both in the USSR and today, the diesel-electric submarines, or perhaps non-nuclear submarines using air-independent power plants (VNEU), are an important component of submarine forces, both military and economic considerations.
But with nuclear boats everything is not so simple - the very separation of multi-purpose submarines on the SSGN and PLAT generated the heterogeneity of the ship staff, which could not be welcomed, but in addition, in the USSR, they also managed to improve the PLAT in two types - with a conventional hull (671РТМ / RTMK "Pike" and the project 971 "Pike-B"), and with titanium (project 945 / 945А "Condor"). Americans managed the only type of multi-purpose submarine "Los Angeles", while in the USSR at the same time created the boat three types of two different subclasses! And the design bureaus were already working hard on new projects: the Rubin designed the newest SSARC, Lazurit, a specialized boat for the submarine hunter, the Malachite, a multi-purpose submarine ...
All of the above, of course, entailed a desire to somehow unify the domestic multi-purpose submarines. The result of these efforts was the latest boat project 855 "Ash" from the creators of the famous "Pike-B" - SPMBM "Malachite".
In this ship, our designers made a very good attempt to tie together the "horse and quivering doe": in fact, it was about creating a single type of multi-purpose nuclear submarine, suitable for all tasks assigned to ships of this class of the Soviet Navy.
The result, I must say, turned out to be extremely interesting. Let's compare “Ash” and “Pike-B”: there is no doubt that “Ash” and, especially, “Ash-M” (head “Kazan” and the boats following it) have a much lower noise level - the one-and-a-half 885 project design, and improved shock absorbers that reduce vibrations and, therefore, the noise of a number of units, and (at Yasen-M), have a special reactor design that provides natural circulation of the coolant, which makes circulating pumps one of the strongest noise sources on an NPS, and the use of composite mater oyalov, and other innovations unknown to the general public. In general, one can argue about how the noise of "Ash" and "Virginia" correlate, but the fact that the domestic shipbuilding has taken a big step forward in terms of low noise relative to the ships of previous types is undoubtedly.
Hydroacoustic complex. Here "Ash" also significantly tugs forward - it is equipped with the latest and very powerful SJSC Irtysh-Amfora, which, among other things, takes significantly more space on the ship than the IGK-540 Skat-3, which equipped "Pikes -B. Strictly speaking, both of them and other GAK have large side area conformal antennas and towed antenna, and they probably occupy an approximately equal place, but we are talking about the main antenna, the traditional one installed in the bow section of the boat. So, if the "Pike-B" main antenna "Skat-3" is completely combined in the nose compartment with torpedo tubes,
then at “Ash” the nose compartment is fully engaged under the “Irtysh Amphora” antenna, due to which the torpedo tubes had to be shifted to the center of the hull. That is, again, one can argue for a long time about the real effectiveness of SJSC Irtysh Amphora, but the fact is that he was given more volume and weight than Skatu-3 on Pike-B.
By the number of weapons, "Ash" also significantly exceeds the "Pike-B". The latter had 4 * 650 and 4 * 533-mm torpedo tubes, and the ammunition load was 12 * 650-mm and 28 * 533-mm torpedoes, and only 40 units. Ash has a slightly more modest torpedo armament: 10 * 533-mm TA with 30 torpedoes, but also has a launcher on the 32 rocket of the Caliber or Onyx family.
Thus, we see that “Malachite” managed to create a lower noise, more loaded with equipment, more armed, equally deep-water ship (maximum depth of immersion - 600 m for both “Ash” and for “Schuki-B”), at the price of ... total, approximately, 200-500 t of additional weight ("Ash" has a surface displacement of 8 600 t, "Pike-B" - 8 100-8 400 t) and a speed drop on the 2 node (31 nodes. against 33 nodes.). True, the volume of the body of "Ash" by more than 1 000 t more than "Pike-B" - 13 800 t against 12 770 t. How was it done? Apparently, the rejection of the two-body scheme in favor of the one-and-a-half package, which made it possible to greatly facilitate the corresponding structures, played a significant role.
Multipurpose nuclear submarines of the Yasen and Yasen-M type will undoubtedly become the landmark ships of our Navy, they are quite successful, but, alas, they are not suitable for the role of the prospect of a multipurpose nuclear submarine of the Russian Navy. And the reason here is quite simple - this is their price. The contract value of the construction of the head boat of the Yasen-M project was 47 billion rubles, which at that time was about 2011 billion dollars in 1,5 prices. As for serial ones, there is no clarity with them. Most likely the price for them was 41 billion (1,32 billion dollars), but, perhaps, still 32,8 billion rubles. (1,06 billion.) However, in any case, more than a billion in dollar equivalent. Such a price tag turned out to be too cool for our Navy, so ultimately the Yasene-M series was limited to all 6 hulls - along with the “ancestor” of the Yasen series - Severodvinsk, the 7 boats of this project will come into service.
And we need them, according to the most modest estimates, well, that's no less than 30.
Accordingly, we need a modern nuclear submarine of another project that will be able to perform the tasks listed at the beginning of the article in the most difficult conditions of the modern battlefield: the submarine capable of opposing the ships of the first fleets of the world. And, at the same time, the submarine, which at its cost will be significantly lower than the "Ash" and allow us to build it on this mass series (over 20 units). Obviously, without some victims can not do. What could we refuse in the project of a promising multi-purpose submarine? We divide all its qualities into 3 groups. The first is that in no case should we give up, the second is indicators that may allow some reduction with minimal consequences for the ship’s combat capability and, finally, the third group is what promising submarines can do without.
First, we will define what we should not completely abandon. This is low noise and the power of the hydroacoustic complex: our ship, without any doubt, should be as quiet as possible with the best HOOK we can put on it. Detecting the enemy, remaining invisible, or at least not allowing the enemy to do this is the key question of the survival of the submarine and the performance of its combat missions. If we can achieve parity with the Americans here - well, we can beat them - it’s just wonderful, but there can be no savings on these characteristics.
But with the speed of the ship and the depth of immersion, everything is not so clear. Yes, modern submarines are quite capable of developing very high speeds under water: “Pike-B” - up to 33 bonds, “Virginia” - 34 bonds., “Sivulf” - and even to 35 nodes, but how much such speeds are needed in “underwater the world? It is well known that at such speeds even the quietest submarines turn into “roaring cows” whose noise is heard through half of the ocean, and in combat situations the submarines will never walk at such speeds. For a submarine, not the “limiting” speed is much more important, but the maximum speed of the low-noise course, but in modern submarines, it usually does not exceed 20 nodes, and in 3-generation boats it was 6-11 nodes. At the same time, the lower speed of the ship is the lower cost of the power plant, smaller dimensions and cost savings for the ship as a whole.
But ... look at things from the other side. After all, high speed is provided by the increased power of the power plant, and the last is an unconditional benefit for the submarines. Indeed, in combat conditions, when a submarine is discovered and attacked by the enemy, the submarine can undertake an energetic maneuver, or a series of them, in order to evade, say, torpedoes attacking it. And here, the more powerful its power, the more energetic the maneuvering will be, no one has repealed the laws of physics. This, if you will allow, is the same as comparing any family car, which, for cheapness, was “stuck” in a weak motor with a sports car - yes, the first car would still accelerate if necessary to the maximum allowed speeds in the city and on the highway, but sports car speed acceleration, maneuver, leave him far behind.
The maximum speed of the "Ash" is 31 node, and we can say that in this parameter our submarines were in the penultimate place - lower than only in the British "Estyut" (29 knots.), And is it worth further reducing the speed? The answer to this question can only give professionals.
With the depth of immersion, too, everything is ambiguous. On the one hand, the deeper the submarine goes under water, the stronger its body should be, and this, of course, increases the cost of construction as a whole. But on the other hand, this, again, is a matter of the survival rate of a ship. The sea and ocean strata is a real “layer cake” of various currents and temperatures. Using this wisely, the underwater combat ship can get lost, chase the track, and, of course, the easier it is to do, the greater the depth available to the submariner. Today, our newest “Ash” and “Ash-M” have a working depth of 520 m, a maximum depth of 600 m, and this is much higher than the same indicators of the American Virginia (300 and 490 m) and the British “Estyut”, which has a working depth of immersion 300 m with an unknown limit. Does our boats have a tactical advantage? Apparently - yes, because the best American hunter for submarines, "Sivulf", had a working and maximum depth of immersion, similar to the "Ash" - 480 and 600 m.
As you know, the Americans in the Sivulf project came very close to the ideal of an underwater warrior - of course, at the technical level that existed at that time, but the cost of such submarines turned out to be prohibitive even for the United States. As a result, they switched to the construction of much more modest "Virginia", limiting them, including the depth of immersion. How justified was such a saving? Alas, the author of this article can not offer an answer to this question.
What we have left for sequestration? Alas, only weapons, but here you can really give up something: we are talking about launchers for the Caliber, Onyx and, probably, Zircon missiles.
Why is that?
The fact is that out of the five main tasks of multi-purpose submarines, only one (#3, “Destruction of enemy warships and ships operating as part of formations and groups, as well as singly”) requires a launcher for the anti-ship missiles, and even then, in fact, it is really needed only when the submarine acts against a large mix of warships, such as AUG or an amphibious group or of similar dimensions. But for anti-submarine warfare, and therefore, to cover the combat stability areas of the SSBN missiles are not needed - even if we assume that multi-purpose submarines need torpedoes, they can be used from torpedo tubes, a vertical launcher is not necessary. And also it is not necessary for actions against the merchant shipping of the enemy: if there is, say, an urgent need to disable the escort ship covering the transports, then, again, you do not need a volley of 32 missiles, which means, again, you can use as a launcher torpedo tubes. There are still actions "fleet against the coast", which submarines can lead only with the use of cruise missiles, but even here there is a strong feeling that the use of vertical launchers for these purposes is completely unjustified.
The fact is that the launch of rockets greatly unmasks a submarine - regardless of the launch method, we need very powerful engines or boosters in order to "pull out" the rocket from the unnatural sea element, transferring it to the air element. It’s impossible to make them quiet, so launching rockets under water is very distant. But this is not all - the fact is that the launch of the missiles is well monitored by early warning radar: we know well the important role attached to the control of air and surface spaces in the NATO countries. Thus, the launch of missiles in the zones of control of NATO fleets can greatly unmask a submarine, which, in the future, is fully capable of leading it to death.
However, the attack of the enemy coast can be carried out in another way, which, as far as is known to the author, is not used today, but is quite realizable at today's technological level. Its essence is in the use of special containers for missiles equipped with a delayed launch system: that is, if the submarine drops such containers, it will move a considerable distance, and only after that will the missiles launch.
In other words, there seems to be nothing stopping our submarine from dropping containers with cruise missiles from torpedo tubes - this will most likely be much quieter than an underwater missile salvo. The containers themselves can be made extremely inconspicuous - while ensuring zero buoyancy, they will not rise to the surface of the sea, where they could be visually or otherwise detected by the patrol aviation, they do not make noise, that is, they are not controlled by passive sonar, and their small size and the general litter of the seas and oceans will well protect such containers from active sonar equipment. At the same time, missiles can be launched autonomously (that is, without a start signal) simply by using a timer located in the container 2-3 hours after “sowing” or even more - in this case, the submarine will have time to leave the launch area and detecting it will be much more difficult. This method is not suitable, of course, for hitting moving targets (unless pulling wires from dropped containers to a submarine to correct target designation), but it is quite suitable for destroying land-based stationary ones. Even if the currents take the containers to the side, the usual means of orientation (yes, the same “Glonass”) in combination with the fixed coordinates of the target will allow the rocket to correct the route for the resulting error. Which, moreover, can be “chosen” to a large extent at the stage of target designation — the dumping point of the containers is known, the speed and direction of the currents in the dumping area — too, what else do we need?
And so it turns out that from 5 “alpha tasks” of multi-purpose submarines, two are solved completely without the use of cruise missiles, and for the other two there is no need to install a vertical launch: and only one task (defeating AUG and its ilk) requires underwater missile carriers like the "Ash" and "Ash-M".
It should be understood that in the event of a military conflict, multi-purpose nuclear submarines of the Russian Navy will receive a variety of tasks - someone will guard SSBNs and conduct anti-submarine defense of water areas and ship formations, someone will be ordered to go into the ocean, attack enemy communications, someone strike at the enemy’s territory, and only part of the submarines will be deployed to counteract the operational groups of our “sworn friends”. Moreover, the installation of vertical start will be needed only to "anti-aircraft" forces.
But the fact is, we already have them. In vain, perhaps, we commissioned the "Ash" and build 6 ships of the modified project "Ash-M"? From the point of view of the author of this article, it makes sense to order another ship of this type, so that you can form 2 connections on 4 boats: one for the Northern and Pacific fleets, so each of them will receive their "anti-aircraft" connection (for the 4 division ship, of course, do not pull ... team? Division?).
As for the torpedo tubes, here, in the opinion of the author of this article, there is no need to save: yes, the additional apparatus, of course, costs and weighs, but, by and large, the benefits from the possibility of immediate use of weapons are outweighed by others. considerations. Therefore, we probably do not need to go to the level of "Virginia" and "Estuytov" with their 4-6 torpedo tubes, but to keep their number at the level of 10, like the Yasen-M, or 8, like the "Shuki-B "Or" Syvulf.
That, in fact, is exactly the way the outlook of our multi-purpose submarine looms. Minimum noise with the most powerful means of lighting underwater environment that are available to us. To approach the case in an unconventional way, do not limit yourself to pouring money into the design bureaus, but carefully study all that enthusiasts are offering, weed out what turns out to be husk, but “not splash out the baby with water” - it is quite possible that some practices contain a rational grain . In general, it is not necessary to dismiss work with “rationalization proposals” solely on the basis that it is not interesting for someone, or because 95 or even 99% of these rationalization proposals will be ineffective.
The boat, most likely, will have to be made single-hulled, as it involves serious benefits both in terms of the weight of the hull, and in terms of low noise. A water cannon is most likely to be used as a mover, although ... the author of this article does not understand why, in the presence of jet propulsion units installed on the Borey SSBN, the Yasen-M advanced series continues to be built with classic screws. It would be nice if our Kulibins found a way to provide the screw with the same low-noise capabilities as a water cannon - but then why do we build a Borei-A with water cannons? Nevertheless, it is possible to make an assumption (more similar to a conjecture) that the most effective propulsion system for a multi-purpose submarine will be a water cannon. Other characteristics look like this:
Displacement (surface / underwater) - 7 000 / 8 400, if it is less, it is great, but it is not necessary to artificially lower the displacement;
Speed - 29-30 knots .;
Immersion depth (working / maximum) - 450 / 550 m;
Armament: 8 * 533 torpedo tubes, ammunition - 40 torpedoes, mines or rockets;
Crew - 70-80 people. Less is possible, but not necessary - the fact is that today it is really possible to “do-automate” a submarine to a crew of 30-40 people, perhaps less. But after all, the crew, in addition to direct control of the ship and its weapons systems, must be served on it, and, in the case of emergency situations, they must also fight for survivability. In such conditions, human hands are extremely important, which cannot be replaced by any automaton, and therefore excessive reduction in crew size is still undesirable. The situation could be different if the submarine were able to implement ... tank technologies, something like what was implemented in the project of the newest tank "Armata" - a small crew in a special, very well-protected capsule. If something like this could be implemented on a submarine, limiting the crew of 20-30 people, but placing their jobs in a separate capsule, which could leave the submarine that received critical damage and emerge ... but this is clearly not today's technology, and hardly whether even tomorrow.
And further. The most remarkable submarine will not succeed in modern combat unless it is armed with the newest and most effective weapons, as well as the enemy's disinformation means. Fortunately, the completely horrifying situation in the field of torpedo armament seems to be starting to straighten out, with the advent of the newest, and, God forbid, torpedoes “Physicist” and “Case” that are at a good world level - alas, it’s difficult to judge them seriously since most of their TTX secrets. But the questions with traps-simulators, designed to mislead the enemy about the real situation of the submarine, remain open - according to the author (though incomplete and fragmentary) of the author of this article, there are simply no effective simulators in service with the Russian Navy. If this is actually the case, then this situation is completely intolerable and should be corrected as soon as possible. To build nuclear powered submarines with crews for a hundred people, worth a billion dollars or more, but not to provide them with the means of setting up "underwater interference" is not even a mistake, it is a state crime.
To begin, let us recall what tasks the ships of this class (both atomic and nonatomic) must solve according to the military doctrine of the USSR:
1. Ensuring the deployment and combat stability of strategic missile submarines. In fact, the task is more important than this for multi-purpose submarines, and there simply cannot be. Providing strategic nuclear forces of the USSR (and now the Russian Federation) is an absolute priority, because the nuclear triad is, in fact, the most important (and today it is the only) guarantee of the existence of our country.
2. Anti-submarine defense of their facilities and forces, search and destruction of enemy submarines. As a matter of fact, the first task (providing the SSBN) is solved by submarines precisely by anti-submarine defense, but the latter, of course, is much broader than the SSBN cover alone. Indeed, anti-submarine defense is also required by the connections of our other warships, and coastal shipping, and the coast and bases fleet etc.
3. Destruction of warships and enemy ships operating as part of formations and groups, as well as singly. Everything is clear here - submarines must be able to fight not only against enemy submarines, but also surface ships, and destroy them, both solitary and as part of the highest operational formations of the fleets of our probable opponents (AUG / AUS).
4. Violation of maritime and oceanic communications of the enemy. Here we are talking about actions against non-military transport ships of our "sworn friends". For the USSR Navy, this task was all the more important because, in the event of the beginning of a large-scale military conflict between the countries of the ATS and NATO, the Atlantic ocean transportations assumed a strategic character for NATO. Only a speedy and massive transfer of US ground forces to Europe gave them at least a shadow of a chance to stop the Soviet "tank skating rink "without large-scale use of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the disruption of such shipments, or even their substantial limitation, was one of the most important tasks of the USSR Navy, but only submarines could implement it in the Atlantic.
5. The destruction of important military targets of the enemy on the coast and in the depths of its territory. Of course, multipurpose submarines cannot solve this problem as dramatically as the SSBNs, but even they, being carriers of nuclear and non-nuclear cruise missiles, can cause significant damage to the enemy infrastructure.
The above objectives were key for multipurpose submarines of the Navy of the USSR, but besides them there were others, such as:
1. Conducting intelligence and providing guidance to the enemy groups. Here, of course, it did not mean that the submarine should rush around the water area in search of enemy ship groups. But, for example, the deployment of a PL subunit on a wide front on possible paths of its movement made it possible to detect and report on the observed forces of the enemy if, for whatever reason, its immediate attack is impossible or irrational;
2. The implementation of mine productions. In essence, it is a form of struggle against enemy ships and ships;
3. The landing of reconnaissance and sabotage groups on the coast of the enemy;
4. Navigation-hydrographic and hydrometeorological support of military operations;
5. Transportation of cargo and personnel to the blocked points of the base;
6. Rescue crews of ships, ships and aircraft in distress;
7. Refueling (supply) of submarines at sea.
The creation of submarines to solve these problems in the USSR was engaged in a kind of "Snake Gorynych" consisting of three design teams:
1. Central Design Bureau "Rubin" - this design team was engaged in nuclear submarines-carriers of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as diesel submarines. By the time of the collapse of the USSR, the products of this design bureau were represented by the Akun 941 project, the 949 project SSGN — the carriers of Granit anti-ship missiles, the Palnus type 877 diesel submarines and its export version, the Varshavyanka 636 project;
2. SPMBM "Malachite", the main profile of which were multi-purpose nuclear submarines, the top of which by the beginning of the 90-ies, no doubt, were the famous boats of the 971 "Pike-B" project;
3. The Lazurit Central Design Bureau is a “master of all hands”, starting with designing diesel submarines, then taking up submarines - carriers of cruise missiles, but giving up the position of Rubin here and finally creating very successful multipurpose boats with a titanium hull. The latter - the submarine of the 945A "Condor" project - became the "calling card" of this design bureau by the end of the 80's.
Thus, in the USSR at some stage they came to the following structure of a multi-purpose submarine fleet:
Submarines - carriers of anti-ship missiles (SSGN)
They were heavy (surface displacement - 14 700 t, which is not too different from the Ohio SSBNs with its 16 746 t), highly specialized submarine rocket carriers to attack the enemy’s fleet with heavy anti-ship missiles, including AUG. In fact, the SSGNs could effectively solve only one (albeit an important) task indicated in our list under No. XXUMX, “Destruction of enemy warships and vessels operating as part of formations and groups, as well as singly.” Of course, it could have been used to solve the remaining tasks of multi-purpose submarines, but due to its large size, relatively high noise level and worse, compared with less heavy boats of maneuverability, such use of the SSGN was not optimal;
Torpedo Nuclear Submarines (PLAT)
They were effective anti-submarine ships, a means of fighting on enemy communications, and, thanks to equipping them with long-range cruise missiles C-10 "Granat", launched from torpedo tubes, could strike land targets. Thus, the PCB effectively solved the other four major tasks of multi-purpose submarines. Of course, they could also take part in the defeat of enemy ship groups, but, not armed with heavy anti-ship missiles, were inferior here in the effectiveness of specialized SSGNs.
Diesel submarines (diesel submarines)
They represent, in essence, a cheap analogue of PLAT systems with reduced capabilities. Of course, in this case “cheap” does not mean “bad”, because while driving on electric motors, the diesel-electric submarines had much less noise than the PCB. And, although their modest size did not allow placing sonar complexes on them, equal in capabilities to those of their “elder atomic brothers”, they still had an advantage zone in which enemy nuclear submarines had not yet heard the diesel-electric submarines, and the diesel-electric submarines detected submarines. What, in fact, was the reason for some to call the very same “Varshavyanka” a “black hole”.
As is known, the Soviet Navy, with all its gigantic size and the well-deserved title of the second fleet of the world, still did not dominate the oceans, and to ensure safety in the “bastions” of the Barents and Okhotsk seas, the diesel-electric submarines were an excellent means: what about the Baltic and Black the seas, the use of nuclear submarines there was generally irrational. Thus, both in the USSR and today, the diesel-electric submarines, or perhaps non-nuclear submarines using air-independent power plants (VNEU), are an important component of submarine forces, both military and economic considerations.
But with nuclear boats everything is not so simple - the very separation of multi-purpose submarines on the SSGN and PLAT generated the heterogeneity of the ship staff, which could not be welcomed, but in addition, in the USSR, they also managed to improve the PLAT in two types - with a conventional hull (671РТМ / RTMK "Pike" and the project 971 "Pike-B"), and with titanium (project 945 / 945А "Condor"). Americans managed the only type of multi-purpose submarine "Los Angeles", while in the USSR at the same time created the boat three types of two different subclasses! And the design bureaus were already working hard on new projects: the Rubin designed the newest SSARC, Lazurit, a specialized boat for the submarine hunter, the Malachite, a multi-purpose submarine ...
All of the above, of course, entailed a desire to somehow unify the domestic multi-purpose submarines. The result of these efforts was the latest boat project 855 "Ash" from the creators of the famous "Pike-B" - SPMBM "Malachite".
In this ship, our designers made a very good attempt to tie together the "horse and quivering doe": in fact, it was about creating a single type of multi-purpose nuclear submarine, suitable for all tasks assigned to ships of this class of the Soviet Navy.
The result, I must say, turned out to be extremely interesting. Let's compare “Ash” and “Pike-B”: there is no doubt that “Ash” and, especially, “Ash-M” (head “Kazan” and the boats following it) have a much lower noise level - the one-and-a-half 885 project design, and improved shock absorbers that reduce vibrations and, therefore, the noise of a number of units, and (at Yasen-M), have a special reactor design that provides natural circulation of the coolant, which makes circulating pumps one of the strongest noise sources on an NPS, and the use of composite mater oyalov, and other innovations unknown to the general public. In general, one can argue about how the noise of "Ash" and "Virginia" correlate, but the fact that the domestic shipbuilding has taken a big step forward in terms of low noise relative to the ships of previous types is undoubtedly.
Hydroacoustic complex. Here "Ash" also significantly tugs forward - it is equipped with the latest and very powerful SJSC Irtysh-Amfora, which, among other things, takes significantly more space on the ship than the IGK-540 Skat-3, which equipped "Pikes -B. Strictly speaking, both of them and other GAK have large side area conformal antennas and towed antenna, and they probably occupy an approximately equal place, but we are talking about the main antenna, the traditional one installed in the bow section of the boat. So, if the "Pike-B" main antenna "Skat-3" is completely combined in the nose compartment with torpedo tubes,
This photo of the boat project 971 "Cheetah" clearly visible torpedo hatches
then at “Ash” the nose compartment is fully engaged under the “Irtysh Amphora” antenna, due to which the torpedo tubes had to be shifted to the center of the hull. That is, again, one can argue for a long time about the real effectiveness of SJSC Irtysh Amphora, but the fact is that he was given more volume and weight than Skatu-3 on Pike-B.
By the number of weapons, "Ash" also significantly exceeds the "Pike-B". The latter had 4 * 650 and 4 * 533-mm torpedo tubes, and the ammunition load was 12 * 650-mm and 28 * 533-mm torpedoes, and only 40 units. Ash has a slightly more modest torpedo armament: 10 * 533-mm TA with 30 torpedoes, but also has a launcher on the 32 rocket of the Caliber or Onyx family.
Thus, we see that “Malachite” managed to create a lower noise, more loaded with equipment, more armed, equally deep-water ship (maximum depth of immersion - 600 m for both “Ash” and for “Schuki-B”), at the price of ... total, approximately, 200-500 t of additional weight ("Ash" has a surface displacement of 8 600 t, "Pike-B" - 8 100-8 400 t) and a speed drop on the 2 node (31 nodes. against 33 nodes.). True, the volume of the body of "Ash" by more than 1 000 t more than "Pike-B" - 13 800 t against 12 770 t. How was it done? Apparently, the rejection of the two-body scheme in favor of the one-and-a-half package, which made it possible to greatly facilitate the corresponding structures, played a significant role.
Multipurpose nuclear submarines of the Yasen and Yasen-M type will undoubtedly become the landmark ships of our Navy, they are quite successful, but, alas, they are not suitable for the role of the prospect of a multipurpose nuclear submarine of the Russian Navy. And the reason here is quite simple - this is their price. The contract value of the construction of the head boat of the Yasen-M project was 47 billion rubles, which at that time was about 2011 billion dollars in 1,5 prices. As for serial ones, there is no clarity with them. Most likely the price for them was 41 billion (1,32 billion dollars), but, perhaps, still 32,8 billion rubles. (1,06 billion.) However, in any case, more than a billion in dollar equivalent. Such a price tag turned out to be too cool for our Navy, so ultimately the Yasene-M series was limited to all 6 hulls - along with the “ancestor” of the Yasen series - Severodvinsk, the 7 boats of this project will come into service.
And we need them, according to the most modest estimates, well, that's no less than 30.
Accordingly, we need a modern nuclear submarine of another project that will be able to perform the tasks listed at the beginning of the article in the most difficult conditions of the modern battlefield: the submarine capable of opposing the ships of the first fleets of the world. And, at the same time, the submarine, which at its cost will be significantly lower than the "Ash" and allow us to build it on this mass series (over 20 units). Obviously, without some victims can not do. What could we refuse in the project of a promising multi-purpose submarine? We divide all its qualities into 3 groups. The first is that in no case should we give up, the second is indicators that may allow some reduction with minimal consequences for the ship’s combat capability and, finally, the third group is what promising submarines can do without.
First, we will define what we should not completely abandon. This is low noise and the power of the hydroacoustic complex: our ship, without any doubt, should be as quiet as possible with the best HOOK we can put on it. Detecting the enemy, remaining invisible, or at least not allowing the enemy to do this is the key question of the survival of the submarine and the performance of its combat missions. If we can achieve parity with the Americans here - well, we can beat them - it’s just wonderful, but there can be no savings on these characteristics.
But with the speed of the ship and the depth of immersion, everything is not so clear. Yes, modern submarines are quite capable of developing very high speeds under water: “Pike-B” - up to 33 bonds, “Virginia” - 34 bonds., “Sivulf” - and even to 35 nodes, but how much such speeds are needed in “underwater the world? It is well known that at such speeds even the quietest submarines turn into “roaring cows” whose noise is heard through half of the ocean, and in combat situations the submarines will never walk at such speeds. For a submarine, not the “limiting” speed is much more important, but the maximum speed of the low-noise course, but in modern submarines, it usually does not exceed 20 nodes, and in 3-generation boats it was 6-11 nodes. At the same time, the lower speed of the ship is the lower cost of the power plant, smaller dimensions and cost savings for the ship as a whole.
But ... look at things from the other side. After all, high speed is provided by the increased power of the power plant, and the last is an unconditional benefit for the submarines. Indeed, in combat conditions, when a submarine is discovered and attacked by the enemy, the submarine can undertake an energetic maneuver, or a series of them, in order to evade, say, torpedoes attacking it. And here, the more powerful its power, the more energetic the maneuvering will be, no one has repealed the laws of physics. This, if you will allow, is the same as comparing any family car, which, for cheapness, was “stuck” in a weak motor with a sports car - yes, the first car would still accelerate if necessary to the maximum allowed speeds in the city and on the highway, but sports car speed acceleration, maneuver, leave him far behind.
The maximum speed of the "Ash" is 31 node, and we can say that in this parameter our submarines were in the penultimate place - lower than only in the British "Estyut" (29 knots.), And is it worth further reducing the speed? The answer to this question can only give professionals.
With the depth of immersion, too, everything is ambiguous. On the one hand, the deeper the submarine goes under water, the stronger its body should be, and this, of course, increases the cost of construction as a whole. But on the other hand, this, again, is a matter of the survival rate of a ship. The sea and ocean strata is a real “layer cake” of various currents and temperatures. Using this wisely, the underwater combat ship can get lost, chase the track, and, of course, the easier it is to do, the greater the depth available to the submariner. Today, our newest “Ash” and “Ash-M” have a working depth of 520 m, a maximum depth of 600 m, and this is much higher than the same indicators of the American Virginia (300 and 490 m) and the British “Estyut”, which has a working depth of immersion 300 m with an unknown limit. Does our boats have a tactical advantage? Apparently - yes, because the best American hunter for submarines, "Sivulf", had a working and maximum depth of immersion, similar to the "Ash" - 480 and 600 m.
As you know, the Americans in the Sivulf project came very close to the ideal of an underwater warrior - of course, at the technical level that existed at that time, but the cost of such submarines turned out to be prohibitive even for the United States. As a result, they switched to the construction of much more modest "Virginia", limiting them, including the depth of immersion. How justified was such a saving? Alas, the author of this article can not offer an answer to this question.
What we have left for sequestration? Alas, only weapons, but here you can really give up something: we are talking about launchers for the Caliber, Onyx and, probably, Zircon missiles.
Why is that?
The fact is that out of the five main tasks of multi-purpose submarines, only one (#3, “Destruction of enemy warships and ships operating as part of formations and groups, as well as singly”) requires a launcher for the anti-ship missiles, and even then, in fact, it is really needed only when the submarine acts against a large mix of warships, such as AUG or an amphibious group or of similar dimensions. But for anti-submarine warfare, and therefore, to cover the combat stability areas of the SSBN missiles are not needed - even if we assume that multi-purpose submarines need torpedoes, they can be used from torpedo tubes, a vertical launcher is not necessary. And also it is not necessary for actions against the merchant shipping of the enemy: if there is, say, an urgent need to disable the escort ship covering the transports, then, again, you do not need a volley of 32 missiles, which means, again, you can use as a launcher torpedo tubes. There are still actions "fleet against the coast", which submarines can lead only with the use of cruise missiles, but even here there is a strong feeling that the use of vertical launchers for these purposes is completely unjustified.
The fact is that the launch of rockets greatly unmasks a submarine - regardless of the launch method, we need very powerful engines or boosters in order to "pull out" the rocket from the unnatural sea element, transferring it to the air element. It’s impossible to make them quiet, so launching rockets under water is very distant. But this is not all - the fact is that the launch of the missiles is well monitored by early warning radar: we know well the important role attached to the control of air and surface spaces in the NATO countries. Thus, the launch of missiles in the zones of control of NATO fleets can greatly unmask a submarine, which, in the future, is fully capable of leading it to death.
Start of two anti-ship missiles "Onyx" from "Severodvinsk"
However, the attack of the enemy coast can be carried out in another way, which, as far as is known to the author, is not used today, but is quite realizable at today's technological level. Its essence is in the use of special containers for missiles equipped with a delayed launch system: that is, if the submarine drops such containers, it will move a considerable distance, and only after that will the missiles launch.
In other words, there seems to be nothing stopping our submarine from dropping containers with cruise missiles from torpedo tubes - this will most likely be much quieter than an underwater missile salvo. The containers themselves can be made extremely inconspicuous - while ensuring zero buoyancy, they will not rise to the surface of the sea, where they could be visually or otherwise detected by the patrol aviation, they do not make noise, that is, they are not controlled by passive sonar, and their small size and the general litter of the seas and oceans will well protect such containers from active sonar equipment. At the same time, missiles can be launched autonomously (that is, without a start signal) simply by using a timer located in the container 2-3 hours after “sowing” or even more - in this case, the submarine will have time to leave the launch area and detecting it will be much more difficult. This method is not suitable, of course, for hitting moving targets (unless pulling wires from dropped containers to a submarine to correct target designation), but it is quite suitable for destroying land-based stationary ones. Even if the currents take the containers to the side, the usual means of orientation (yes, the same “Glonass”) in combination with the fixed coordinates of the target will allow the rocket to correct the route for the resulting error. Which, moreover, can be “chosen” to a large extent at the stage of target designation — the dumping point of the containers is known, the speed and direction of the currents in the dumping area — too, what else do we need?
And so it turns out that from 5 “alpha tasks” of multi-purpose submarines, two are solved completely without the use of cruise missiles, and for the other two there is no need to install a vertical launch: and only one task (defeating AUG and its ilk) requires underwater missile carriers like the "Ash" and "Ash-M".
It should be understood that in the event of a military conflict, multi-purpose nuclear submarines of the Russian Navy will receive a variety of tasks - someone will guard SSBNs and conduct anti-submarine defense of water areas and ship formations, someone will be ordered to go into the ocean, attack enemy communications, someone strike at the enemy’s territory, and only part of the submarines will be deployed to counteract the operational groups of our “sworn friends”. Moreover, the installation of vertical start will be needed only to "anti-aircraft" forces.
But the fact is, we already have them. In vain, perhaps, we commissioned the "Ash" and build 6 ships of the modified project "Ash-M"? From the point of view of the author of this article, it makes sense to order another ship of this type, so that you can form 2 connections on 4 boats: one for the Northern and Pacific fleets, so each of them will receive their "anti-aircraft" connection (for the 4 division ship, of course, do not pull ... team? Division?).
As for the torpedo tubes, here, in the opinion of the author of this article, there is no need to save: yes, the additional apparatus, of course, costs and weighs, but, by and large, the benefits from the possibility of immediate use of weapons are outweighed by others. considerations. Therefore, we probably do not need to go to the level of "Virginia" and "Estuytov" with their 4-6 torpedo tubes, but to keep their number at the level of 10, like the Yasen-M, or 8, like the "Shuki-B "Or" Syvulf.
That, in fact, is exactly the way the outlook of our multi-purpose submarine looms. Minimum noise with the most powerful means of lighting underwater environment that are available to us. To approach the case in an unconventional way, do not limit yourself to pouring money into the design bureaus, but carefully study all that enthusiasts are offering, weed out what turns out to be husk, but “not splash out the baby with water” - it is quite possible that some practices contain a rational grain . In general, it is not necessary to dismiss work with “rationalization proposals” solely on the basis that it is not interesting for someone, or because 95 or even 99% of these rationalization proposals will be ineffective.
The boat, most likely, will have to be made single-hulled, as it involves serious benefits both in terms of the weight of the hull, and in terms of low noise. A water cannon is most likely to be used as a mover, although ... the author of this article does not understand why, in the presence of jet propulsion units installed on the Borey SSBN, the Yasen-M advanced series continues to be built with classic screws. It would be nice if our Kulibins found a way to provide the screw with the same low-noise capabilities as a water cannon - but then why do we build a Borei-A with water cannons? Nevertheless, it is possible to make an assumption (more similar to a conjecture) that the most effective propulsion system for a multi-purpose submarine will be a water cannon. Other characteristics look like this:
Displacement (surface / underwater) - 7 000 / 8 400, if it is less, it is great, but it is not necessary to artificially lower the displacement;
Speed - 29-30 knots .;
Immersion depth (working / maximum) - 450 / 550 m;
Armament: 8 * 533 torpedo tubes, ammunition - 40 torpedoes, mines or rockets;
Crew - 70-80 people. Less is possible, but not necessary - the fact is that today it is really possible to “do-automate” a submarine to a crew of 30-40 people, perhaps less. But after all, the crew, in addition to direct control of the ship and its weapons systems, must be served on it, and, in the case of emergency situations, they must also fight for survivability. In such conditions, human hands are extremely important, which cannot be replaced by any automaton, and therefore excessive reduction in crew size is still undesirable. The situation could be different if the submarine were able to implement ... tank technologies, something like what was implemented in the project of the newest tank "Armata" - a small crew in a special, very well-protected capsule. If something like this could be implemented on a submarine, limiting the crew of 20-30 people, but placing their jobs in a separate capsule, which could leave the submarine that received critical damage and emerge ... but this is clearly not today's technology, and hardly whether even tomorrow.
And further. The most remarkable submarine will not succeed in modern combat unless it is armed with the newest and most effective weapons, as well as the enemy's disinformation means. Fortunately, the completely horrifying situation in the field of torpedo armament seems to be starting to straighten out, with the advent of the newest, and, God forbid, torpedoes “Physicist” and “Case” that are at a good world level - alas, it’s difficult to judge them seriously since most of their TTX secrets. But the questions with traps-simulators, designed to mislead the enemy about the real situation of the submarine, remain open - according to the author (though incomplete and fragmentary) of the author of this article, there are simply no effective simulators in service with the Russian Navy. If this is actually the case, then this situation is completely intolerable and should be corrected as soon as possible. To build nuclear powered submarines with crews for a hundred people, worth a billion dollars or more, but not to provide them with the means of setting up "underwater interference" is not even a mistake, it is a state crime.
Information