Military Review

Land units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Tactics of combat use. Ending

15
Heavy mortars and cannons in caliber above 100 mm, as well as RZSO are unusually massively used in the Donbas. Multiple rocket launchers operate on average two to three times more actively than in all previous local wars. Especially popular are the Grads and Hurricanes, which are relatively easy to use for both the militiamen and the artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In addition, the advantages of MLRS include high power, mobility, as well as a huge field of destruction - up to 6 hectares. Finally, Ukraine has accumulated just huge reserves of military equipment for such artillery systems, even if overdue.


A distinctive feature of the conflict is the fact that both parties use obsolete weaponsamong which the Grads, the D-20, the entire 122-mm artillery and the 100-mm anti-tank guns are considered the most "elderly". Relatively new can be called self-propelled and towed "Msta" with "Hyacinth", "Hurricane" and 120-mm gun "Nona". The most "young", perhaps, is the most powerful "god of war" of the Donbass - RZSO "Smerch".











Artillery is one of the main actors of the war in the Donbas.

According to the former deputy minister of defense of Ukraine, Vladimir Tereshchenko, the trunk resource in the 1,5-2 is thousands of shots becoming the most important problem of artillery. On average, one gun in the Donbass shoots its resource in one, maximum two months, and then it must be sent to the rear to replace the trunk. In Ukraine, its own production of artillery guns there, and the stocks of cannon barrels are not unlimited. Obviously, the former Warsaw Pact countries will provide some kind of help, but the end is inevitable: Ukrainian cannon artillery from Soviet reserves will ultimately order a long life. "Point-U" could be a panacea for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, although the very fact that the use of such weapons during the civil war is shocking. But in the army, it seems, there are no specialists left to work with such equipment: the rocket men cannot correctly enter the flight program. The Americans tried in vain to help in pointing missiles with their own satellite system, but the age of the Tochka-U electronics in this case played into the hands of the militia.

The next "highlight" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was the connection, which is not protected by almost anything. 95% of operational information is transmitted through the mobile phones of generals, officers and soldiers, and the remaining 5% comes from foreign digital stations for special forces. However, even elite units do not always correctly use such equipment, often not observing the radio silence mode. Practice shows that when communicating during a march, the radio signals of units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are easily detected by the militiamen, and artillery strikes are being made at the points of broadcasting. Of course, this experience does not pass without a trace for the Ukrainian military: at present such incidents are becoming isolated. But the APU used cellular communication and, obviously, will continue to use it. Such a telephone connection becomes an invaluable information source, not only for the militia, but, paradoxically, for the command of the ATO.

So, 11 July 2014, the headquarters of the ATO learned about the actual destruction of the 24-th mechanized brigade after the spouse of one of the surviving fighters was able to get through to the general. Similar situations in the Ukrainian army are not rare. Often, the results of the operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine can be learned only from the personal Twitter or Facebook of the unit commander, and sometimes the details of the impending offensive appear on such pages. In addition, the danger of active work of the ATO headquarters on the radio is the possibility that the militia will determine their location using triangulation methods. Given the low mobility of headquarters, the likelihood of an artillery strike on them multiply increases.


The destroyed 24-I separate motorized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine under Zelenodolyem. The neglect of engineering training in the ranks of the Ukrainian army is clearly visible.


Body armor became a cult in the ranks of the APU.

This cult of body armor and personal protective equipment with almost complete disregard for fortification - this also became the hallmark of the tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the southeast. In this sense, the example of the Slavyansk blocking operation is indicative, when equipment, people and tents were placed in an open area of ​​about a hectare. Now it becomes clear why militiamen use RZSO so effectively. During the 2014 offensive operations, the APU equipment on the parking lots almost never dug in, or went deep enough. The fighters slept on beds in tents set right on the open field, even without a roll. The equipment was often crowded “board to board” - naturally, in the event of an artillery attack, it increased the loss of combat vehicles.












A series of destroyed equipment, located actually aboard to board.

In many ways, this slovenliness is a consequence of the undemanding ATO command in the early years of the conflict towards the engineering support of troops. Tanks at checkpoints they do not dig in, and fortifications are built from tires, boards and bricks. Over time, the Ukrainian army understands that even the most advanced NATO body armor is inferior to a conventional trench in defense conditions. This is especially true in the possibilities of massive use by the enemy of all types of artillery. In fact, now military clashes in southeastern Ukraine bypass without direct contact of the parties, and pass around roadblocks and reference points.

The operational-tactical sterility of the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is clearly manifested in the release of encircled groups and attempts to cut off the LDNR from the border with Russia. Surrounded, as a rule, do not receive any help from outside and are forced to surrender en masse, die or, at best, break through on their own. So, near Ilovaysk 12 August 2014, after a series of unsuccessful attempts to take the city "in the forehead," the command sent a battalion tactical group to attack from the north. And it succeeded - a group with a dagger blow broke through between Mospino and Ilovaisk, and then moved in the direction of Zelenoye - Fedorovka. There was no support for further advancement by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the militia launched flank attacks, slamming the BTG in the mousetrap.


Something like this, Ukraine is digging in appliances.

The reason for such failures of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the battlefields was the ignorance of top commanders, as well as the lack of basic combat skills among middle and junior commanders. People are often appointed to positions in command not on professional qualifications, but on ideological grounds. Also played a role whistleblow in the General Staff, when the post of Minister of Defense for a short period was replaced by five people. One of them was Valery Geletei, who spent only two years in the army, the rest of the time he served in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It is also important and the American influence on the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - specialists from West Point are trying to translate the tactics of combat operations of the Ukrainian army in their own way. The trouble is that the army of Ukraine has forgotten how to fight even by the Soviet canons, not to mention the overseas standards. It is extremely difficult for offensive ground forces. This is largely due to the low motivation of the infantry, which refuses to fight without the support of armored vehicles, and this very technique with its breakdowns often disrupts even the usual troop movements along the front. The low level of engineering service does not allow for the effective repair of failed armored vehicles, which often fall into the hands of the militia, and they, in turn, are very attentive to such gifts and successfully restore the vehicles. They are not effectively able to command a tank force in Ukraine, therefore they are limited to point strikes of groups on 6-8 machines. They pinned their hopes on the “Hummers” in the 95-th separate airmobile brigade from Zhytomyr, but they are poorly armored, do not like Ukrainian dirt and are difficult to repair due to lack of spare parts.

Of course, like any other army, the Armed Forces of Ukraine learn from their mistakes and, over time, increase their combat potential. However, the effect of a low starting base, as well as a much more effective growth in the capabilities of the LDNR army in recent times, is still having an effect.

According to the materials of A. D. Gypsy "Donbass: unfinished war. Civil war (2014-2016): Russian view".
Author:
Photos used:
lostarmour.info
Articles from this series:
Land units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Tactics of combat use. Part of 1
15 comments
Ad

Subscribe to our Telegram channel, regularly additional information about the special operation in Ukraine, a large amount of information, videos, something that does not fall on the site: https://t.me/topwar_official

Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. avia12005
    avia12005 2 October 2018 06: 23
    +5
    There is a strong impression that the Russian Federation is stubbornly waiting for the Armed Forces to take into account "their own mistakes" and significantly "increase their combat potential." And then what ???
    1. Jerk
      Jerk 2 October 2018 06: 55
      +2
      And then kirdyk resource. Now you can already see for example pictures of the APU in their news - and try to find at least one heavy machine gun on them. It’s easier to find a black man.
      1. CERBERFOL
        CERBERFOL 2 October 2018 07: 16
        +2
        Further complete dependence on the US military-industrial complex. And happy Poroshenko.
      2. Antares
        Antares 3 October 2018 11: 12
        +1
        Quote: Jerk
        Now you can already see for example pictures of the APU in their news - and try to find at least one heavy machine gun on them

        on technology. eg
        APU scored in the search engine-2018, photo machine guns

        blacks are held ... winked
    2. self-propelled
      self-propelled 2 October 2018 09: 53
      +1
      Quote: avia12005
      There is a strong impression that the Russian Federation is stubbornly waiting for the Armed Forces to take into account "their own mistakes" and significantly "increase their combat potential"

      that's exactly what happens. you can laugh for a long time at the losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2014-15; over all kinds of "shushpanzers" made "on the knee" for lack of anything better; over the "avatars"; over worms in dry rations; over the stupidity of the generals who send soldiers to the cauldrons for slaughter ... but
      ... like any other army, the Armed Forces of Ukraine learn from their own mistakes and eventually increase their combat potential ...
      ... further will be no laughing matter. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are slowly "accumulating fat", analyzing (perhaps not without the help of "partners") the enemy's actions ... in a word, they are preparing for war request recourse
  2. KVU-NSVD
    KVU-NSVD 2 October 2018 07: 39
    +4
    95% of operational information is transmitted through the mobile phones of generals, officers, and soldiers, and the remaining 5% comes from foreign digital stations for special forces.
    That is, according to the author, regular radio communication, radio relay communication, wire communication was not used at all? But the second and third type of communication is most resistant to interception and violation, and the bearing is not at all affected. Although in the Soviet configuration there were a lot of all such means, and a lot should have remained.
    Practice shows that during communication during the march, the radio signals of AFU units are easily detected by militias
    Indeed, only radio communication is used on the march, and even ZAS is not used on all channels due to the lack of such means on many types of equipment. But there are three simple rules for the movement of the column - 1) Basic control according to the principle of an example - do as the leader, if he does not signal a breakdown. 2) All radio traffic is reduced to a minimum and at the minimum required transmission power 3) All radio commands are conditional and are reduced to a short exchange of conditional signals - for example. "Wheel" - the command of the divisional commander to start moving, the answer "131st Wheel" - my answer about the beginning of the movement of my platoon, and only I take part in the radio exchange, and the other machines of the platoon listen to the exchange of the division in standby mode and without extreme need it is not poke around. And I think that the Ukrainian army was quite familiar with these rules, it's another matter if they were killed ...
    1. self-propelled
      self-propelled 2 October 2018 10: 09
      0
      Quote: KVU-NSVD
      That is, according to the author, regular radio communication, radio relay communication, wire communication was not used at all?

      in the first two years of the war, they were practically not used. originally planned a "light walk" ("... ATO should last not months, but hours ..." - the famous words of the guarantor), without the involvement of significant RTR forces. then, when it pecked, it turned out that it wasn’t so simple - saving on the army affected the state of the materiel and the availability of specialists.
      at the moment the situation is changing - foreign experts and foreign funds have been attracted (they won’t steal everything, let something remain wink ) to modernize the army. and there we will see
      1. KVU-NSVD
        KVU-NSVD 2 October 2018 10: 20
        0
        Quote: self-propelled
        in the first two years of the war, they were practically not used. initially they planned a "light walk" ("... ATO should last not months, but hours ..." - the well-known words of the guarantor), without the involvement of significant forces of the RTR.

        And here is RTR? we are talking about the standard means of communication that are installed on almost all military equipment, not to mention the KShM - and what didn’t they use? I don’t believe ... I’m ready to believe and admit to gagging and neglecting the rules (for I myself have watched it many times), but I DO NOT BELIEVE not using or not being able to use regular radio stations or TAPS ...
        1. Glory1974
          Glory1974 2 October 2018 21: 57
          +1
          but I DO NOT BELIEVE I do not believe in the non-use or inability to use regular radio stations or TAPS ...

          Well, in vain that you don't believe. In all honesty, we had the same mess in 94. I have repeatedly witnessed that soldiers cannot work at radio stations. If you configure everything for them, they work. But any deviation puts them in a stupor. It was not for nothing that old Soviet radio stations had shields on the front panel of the radio station: I closed it and you don't have to worry that they will press the wrong thing. For example, on the R-163-50U, they pressed the "TLK" button and went into the telecode information transmission mode, as a result there was no telephone connection.
          The riot police somehow tuned in a radio station on an armored personnel carrier, they themselves could not, etc.
          To prepare a normal fighter, how much time is needed? And then there was a mess, as we have in 90 and suddenly everyone was ordered to go to war. Half of the fighters probably didn’t know how to shoot, not to mention working on communications.
    2. RuslanD36
      RuslanD36 2 October 2018 10: 51
      0
      Untrained personnel. We used the communication randomly. You can search for entries on the Internet.
      1. KVU-NSVD
        KVU-NSVD 2 October 2018 20: 06
        -1
        We used the communication randomly.
        In order to use radio communication at random, you need to be able to set up a radio station and connect it to the desired remote control, and accordingly there is a communications network, which, either by explanations or by "driving in," will explain that if you want to live, then follow the rules ... 2014-15 were so Papuan-like, I do not take NSU, but in the Armed Forces they could not be like that - I can judge, because I found the bottom of our army, which only began to improve a little, and even then only in the payment of salaries ...
  3. Sergeevi4
    Sergeevi4 2 October 2018 12: 27
    +9
    I've never written comments on VO. Most of the commentators have very little idea of ​​what is really happening in the Armed Forces. I recently spoke with a man who had been doing maintenance of tanks and other armored vehicles for three years. He quit due to his complete unwillingness to serve in such conditions. People leave and don't even keep their salaries. The technique is used very badly. This was especially pronounced in the years 14-15. The mechanics deliberately put out of action tanks, armored personnel carriers, automobiles. There are very few or no spare parts for tanks and armored personnel carriers. The current contract servicemen serve on the principle "I ate the butter, the day has passed." So don't idealize the APU. There is no one to draw conclusions. To my question: "What if tomorrow is war?", He grinned and waved his hand. The majority have not the slightest desire to fight.
  4. Vitas
    Vitas 2 October 2018 12: 32
    0
    Tochka-U could have become a panacea for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, although the mere use of such weapons during the civil war is a rash. But in the army, it seems, there are no specialists left to work with such equipment: rocket launchers cannot correctly enter the flight program. The Americans tried in vain to help guide the missiles with their own satellite system, but the age of Tochka-U electronics in this case played into the hands of the militias.

    At one time, missilemen with "Tochka" were located in B.C near Kiev. The order in their unit was awesome, the standards overlapped. But, after checking, an order came to disband the unit, we took property from them. It may be a coincidence, but American officers were present at the unit's last exercises. I remember in our unit, and this is the 72nd brigade, the self-propelled gunners worked well, so they also waited for the 122 mm to be handed over to the warehouse, after some "NATO members" were spitting on the part. But the MLRS before the conflict in Donbass (judging by two parts of the 72nd brigade and 30th brigade) did not shoot at the exercises, only the battalion commanders went to shoot at the Devichki training ground once a year, the rest did theoretically. In 2014, I met a senior member of the 30s, so after serving for 5 years, he never fired from standard equipment, only he had practice at the Sumy School.
    1. g1v2
      g1v2 2 October 2018 16: 37
      +4
      At the points the deadlines are out. Shortly before the Maidan, 50 missiles were certified and extended their terms. But these missiles have already been shot. Point dots definitely will not be a panacea. In the Lugansk region, the entire moon was used once, but no more was heard about it.
      Well, so a 30-40-year-old equipment will not fight for a long time without proper maintenance. It is possible to put it in operation of the malech by playing the shaman, but you should not expect from it the fulfillment of tasks. But there is no new one. I doubt any strong gain in the near future. Again, as history shows, trench warfare is corrupting the army. YES AND FAVORITES ARE INTERESTING ALREADY LONG LONG LONGER TO BUZET MONEY BACK AND MONEY WRENCH THAN FROST IN THE FRONT OF THE ZADA.
  5. Antares
    Antares 3 October 2018 11: 19
    0
    it is strange that 2014-2015 was chosen, when then there was no army, as an end. It is clear that when something is missing, they are sent into battle - there were no results (although any army is better than non-kombanats until it meets another army, which happened with the "winds")
    APU and so jumped above his head, returning 2/3 of the lost territory. And the problems, who without them then ..