Hypersonic race continues
The American television channel CNBC, who recently adores “merging” various insights about the RF Armed Forces of various degree of inventiveness, issued another one the other day. He said, referring to US intelligence, that "after 2024, intercepting military units of the Russian SLBM Bulava will become impossible because the Bulava will be equipped with hypersonic combat ones (in a number of our translations they were lowered by volitional decision to" supersonic "). Immediately I wanted to find out: whether on American television again people have some kind of regular revelations of madmen, or is there something sensible here, but they just distorted the essence?
It’s worth starting with the fact that in the CNBC report, as is customary in the Western press (and sometimes in ours, which is to hide), there is a manipulation. The fact is that a philistine far from the problems of the SNF, after reading that BB "Bulava" will become invulnerable in as many years as 8, calmly (if American, if ours are indignant), you might think that now you can intercept them. And this, of course, is not so: for now neither the GBI nor the SM-3 of any “unit” intercepts the ICBMs and SLBMs, and so it will be very long. Not to mention the launch in real combat conditions, when 4 (as they are on duty now) or 6 compact and possessing extremely low BB signatures of a new design, divorced according to the objectives, accompanied by a complex of means to overcome the missile defense system - this is an unreal task at all. Another issue is that the introduction of planning and maneuvering BBs will dramatically further increase the security of the combat missile complex and expand the possibilities of using it.
At the same time, it should be noted that CNBC made a lot of mistakes in the material, in particular, they write that it is planned to build only Boreev 8. Moreover, Russia is building Borei, according to the authors, "reducing allocations for other projects, for example, on a surface fleet." This is not so: the construction of the SSBN is in itself, the surface shipbuilding is in itself, together with all its problems, such as protracted.
In fact, in the 3 SSBN of the 955, 5, 955A (Borey-A) project in construction or in construction, and also 6 cruisers are included in the armament program before 2027, and also the 955 project. In addition, according to their opinion, the cruiser is already carrying 20 units - they still have the stupid myth that Borei-A will have 20 mines instead of 16, although the photos of the main Borea-A have long been published. Probably, they have not yet been delivered to television in the USA, the Russian Post has failed. As well as information that the "Mace" is not 10 BB, as they believe, but so far 6. Moreover, they believe that new, planning and maneuvering BBs, which will appear, according to SNBC sources on the Bulava by 2024, will also fit in the number of 10 pieces. Although it is absolutely clear that aeroballistic planning hypersonic guided combat equipment cannot have the same size and dimension as a normal combat unit. Even a heavy candy bar. A typical example is the Avangard 15YU71 AGOBO (aeroballistic hypersonic military equipment), which is located on the UR-100NUTTH ICBM (15А35) only in a single person, and in such a way that it is not possible to place a converted ICBM in its old mine, they will not get a cover, they will not make a cover, they will not make a cover, need a larger silo. However, Avangard is for heavy ICBMs, and it does not fit the Bulava in any way. And at CNBC, the speed of hypersonic planning guided warheads is of the order of 5M, which, of course, is not nearly right, but much more. Obviously, they are confused with the lower limit, beyond which, in one opinion, hypersound begins and supersonic ends.
So what's up with the Bulava and the AGGBO for her to 2024? Did the TV crews lie, as with the rest? Probably not quite. They just sing the gorgeous Italian opera tenors with the voices of Odessa binderyuzhnik with a characteristic change of accent.
As you know, the Army-2018 forum announced the signing of a contract with the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT) to conduct the ROC with the code Anchar-RV, and this is a "long-range hypersonic device". Of course, such an announcement was not without purpose, and was intended for the ears of "probable partners number one." Like the fact that it was emphasized that the work went out of the research stage and went into the ROC stage.
What is it? There are different versions, but the author seems to be most likely the following - given that MIT is the developer of the Bulava P-30 SLBM and to some extent (in particular, in the field of BB and HF) unified with it the Yars military missile system with mine and movable options (and so far suspended by the development of a "relative" - BZHRK "Barguzin"). Just as Avangard is the brainchild of the NPO Mashinostroenia from Reutov, as well as it used as an ICBM base (in the case of the heavy Sarmat ICBM, the lead developer is Miase’s Makeyev State Research Center, and the NPO Mashinostroenia also participates in the work), it is logical to assume that As it was before, for its complexes MIT itself will develop a new AGBA, more compact, albeit with a smaller charge, but placed on the Mace and, probably, on the Yars modification. The Avangard was run in on the old 15А35 ICBMs (in order to put it on the vodka previously exchanged for vodka from the already dry neighbors of the dry 1535, that is, with the state of the new ones. And Anchar-RV (if this is really UGBO for lighter MBRs and SLBM) is likely to be practiced during the launches used for testing new combat equipment, experimental carriers "Topol-E".
Western sources also made similar assumptions, moreover, some in the West argue that one of the recent test launches has already been related to this topic. Even called the probable index of the new product. That's probably about this product and heard from some friends at the Pentagon figures from CNBC and distorted as they could, in his article. Separately, it is worth noting that hardly anyone will re-equip the entire Bulava or Yarsov park for a similar product - at the moment, AGPO is not an obligatory equipment element guaranteeing a successful delivery of what they deserve. And this, of course, is also a means of guaranteed accurate delivery, but much more it is a means of expanding the capabilities of the SNF (for example, for effective strikes on a fast flat trajectory, not coming as close to the enemy as you would have to do without such a device). In general, "backward" Russia put on stream the process of creating new UGSs and new hypersonic aeroballistic or cruise missiles, until the Americans reach any specific results, and not rare flights, of technology demonstrators of different success, and with frequent changes of projects. . Of course, it is early to write off the United States in this area, but you cannot catch up on such a start and such a head start quickly, if at all possible.
Moreover, there are other options for expanding the capabilities and increasing the invulnerability of the complexes. For example, Mr. Solomonov has long spoken about switching to a “no-bus” BB breeding scheme, that is, when warheads are not induced one at a time by their breeding step, while they themselves “run” along their goals like cockroaches when they turn on the light - quickly and organized, and without help. Such warheads will have their own propulsion systems, but they can hardly be considered maneuvering. But the rejection of the "bus scheme" greatly increases the invulnerability of the rocket and its equipment from interception in this area of the trajectory, because it is believed that the faster the OUT (active part of the trajectory) ends and the faster the units and means for overcoming missile defense are better, better.
Given the emerging unpleasant circumstances for the United States, such as a lag in managed hypersonic technologies weapons, the inability to create new nuclear munitions, "holes" in the field of medium-range facilities, it is rather strange to hear that the US administration doubts whether they should extend the START-2021 Treaty after 3, which will require considerable efforts, because in the Russian Federation I also understand more and more that with people who cannot agree among themselves, apart from the desire to podgadit the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, I somehow do not want to extend the contract. Even necessary to the world and myself. Why are there "bells" distributed here and there, indicating the likelihood of non-renewal of this treaty by Russia. Like the same 6 additional "Boreev-A", which will be extremely difficult to meet in the limits of START-3, given the ICBM and bombers. But the Russian Federation does not have these problems listed above.
Naturally, Americans are blaming Russia for "violating" the Treaty, for example, with the same hypersonic devices or intercontinental thermonuclear torpedoes, which are not mentioned in the Treaty and are not a violation. In general, Americans are behaving inadequately, and their attempts to harm us increasingly turn out to harm themselves, which has already been mentioned more than once in relation to strategic stability.
But it is worth mentioning that recently the US State Department announced that the country does not intend to leave the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (DAMAS) for the time being. Andrea Thompson, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, said this in a speech to the Senate. She also answered the question from representatives of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who asked about the consequences of Washington’s withdrawal from the treaty if the United States decides to take this step, accusing Russia of “substantial violation” of the INF.
What does this mean? It is possible that the leadership of the United States nevertheless realized that going out of the INF Treaty would look like an attempt to frighten a porcupine by landing on it, because it is the Russian Federation that has the potential for rapid and relatively inexpensive deployment of new medium-range missiles, and there are no nuclear weapons for them. . In the United States, in both aspects, things are completely different. And so, for the time being, they have decided not to untie Russia's hands in this, as happened with missile defense or hypersonic technologies.
And while they themselves will try to develop something in this area, however, there are few options. First of all, the same problem with nuclear equipment for these missiles is not there and there is really no place to take it. Is it possible to disfigure the long-suffering BB W76-1, by cutting off the power dozens of times and try to shove on a new rocket? But here it is not so simple. Missiles to develop in the US can. So, there is a competition for the creation of Precision Strike Missile - a tactical missile with a range of more than 400 km. Someone is a product that will be launched, as well as OTR ATACMS, from MLRS launchers, we have already dubbed in the media the American Iskander. No, this is not an Iskander! The rocket is small, its range is increased to a large extent by further reducing the power of the warhead (it is pushing that it is weak, but, they say, accurate), that is, reducing combat effectiveness. Yes, and the ability of "Iskander" to overcome the air defense-missile defense is not. And the nuclear warhead will not be there. That is, it is necessary to take into account these weapons, as well as the announced preliminary studies on the "1000-mile rocket", that is, this is not a topic of nuclear forces.
Another worth mentioning is the strange report that the United States is considering the issue of equipping the future promising subsonic airborne missile launcher LRSO ... F-35 fighter. Moreover, it is unlikely that this missile can be used in the compartment of the fighter, which deprives it of its known advantages. It is clear that if we were talking about non-nuclear Raman weapons of the JASSM series, but LRSO will have a nuclear charge, and this is already a direct violation of START-3. Probably, this option, if worked out, is in case of non-renewal of the contract and non-conclusion of its replacement. In this case, the Americans should expect similar surprises. For example, the new KR X-50 (aka X-SD), officially non-nuclear, which our operational tactical planes can also use aviation, like Su-34, Su-30SM, Su-35S or Su-57, in this case, too, probably, will change its status to "strictly non-nuclear."
It is possible to live and develop in the absence of contractual restrictions: in the 50-60-s both superpowers have existed. But the world will not become safer from this, unfortunately.
It’s worth starting with the fact that in the CNBC report, as is customary in the Western press (and sometimes in ours, which is to hide), there is a manipulation. The fact is that a philistine far from the problems of the SNF, after reading that BB "Bulava" will become invulnerable in as many years as 8, calmly (if American, if ours are indignant), you might think that now you can intercept them. And this, of course, is not so: for now neither the GBI nor the SM-3 of any “unit” intercepts the ICBMs and SLBMs, and so it will be very long. Not to mention the launch in real combat conditions, when 4 (as they are on duty now) or 6 compact and possessing extremely low BB signatures of a new design, divorced according to the objectives, accompanied by a complex of means to overcome the missile defense system - this is an unreal task at all. Another issue is that the introduction of planning and maneuvering BBs will dramatically further increase the security of the combat missile complex and expand the possibilities of using it.
At the same time, it should be noted that CNBC made a lot of mistakes in the material, in particular, they write that it is planned to build only Boreev 8. Moreover, Russia is building Borei, according to the authors, "reducing allocations for other projects, for example, on a surface fleet." This is not so: the construction of the SSBN is in itself, the surface shipbuilding is in itself, together with all its problems, such as protracted.
In fact, in the 3 SSBN of the 955, 5, 955A (Borey-A) project in construction or in construction, and also 6 cruisers are included in the armament program before 2027, and also the 955 project. In addition, according to their opinion, the cruiser is already carrying 20 units - they still have the stupid myth that Borei-A will have 20 mines instead of 16, although the photos of the main Borea-A have long been published. Probably, they have not yet been delivered to television in the USA, the Russian Post has failed. As well as information that the "Mace" is not 10 BB, as they believe, but so far 6. Moreover, they believe that new, planning and maneuvering BBs, which will appear, according to SNBC sources on the Bulava by 2024, will also fit in the number of 10 pieces. Although it is absolutely clear that aeroballistic planning hypersonic guided combat equipment cannot have the same size and dimension as a normal combat unit. Even a heavy candy bar. A typical example is the Avangard 15YU71 AGOBO (aeroballistic hypersonic military equipment), which is located on the UR-100NUTTH ICBM (15А35) only in a single person, and in such a way that it is not possible to place a converted ICBM in its old mine, they will not get a cover, they will not make a cover, they will not make a cover, need a larger silo. However, Avangard is for heavy ICBMs, and it does not fit the Bulava in any way. And at CNBC, the speed of hypersonic planning guided warheads is of the order of 5M, which, of course, is not nearly right, but much more. Obviously, they are confused with the lower limit, beyond which, in one opinion, hypersound begins and supersonic ends.
So what's up with the Bulava and the AGGBO for her to 2024? Did the TV crews lie, as with the rest? Probably not quite. They just sing the gorgeous Italian opera tenors with the voices of Odessa binderyuzhnik with a characteristic change of accent.
As you know, the Army-2018 forum announced the signing of a contract with the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT) to conduct the ROC with the code Anchar-RV, and this is a "long-range hypersonic device". Of course, such an announcement was not without purpose, and was intended for the ears of "probable partners number one." Like the fact that it was emphasized that the work went out of the research stage and went into the ROC stage.
What is it? There are different versions, but the author seems to be most likely the following - given that MIT is the developer of the Bulava P-30 SLBM and to some extent (in particular, in the field of BB and HF) unified with it the Yars military missile system with mine and movable options (and so far suspended by the development of a "relative" - BZHRK "Barguzin"). Just as Avangard is the brainchild of the NPO Mashinostroenia from Reutov, as well as it used as an ICBM base (in the case of the heavy Sarmat ICBM, the lead developer is Miase’s Makeyev State Research Center, and the NPO Mashinostroenia also participates in the work), it is logical to assume that As it was before, for its complexes MIT itself will develop a new AGBA, more compact, albeit with a smaller charge, but placed on the Mace and, probably, on the Yars modification. The Avangard was run in on the old 15А35 ICBMs (in order to put it on the vodka previously exchanged for vodka from the already dry neighbors of the dry 1535, that is, with the state of the new ones. And Anchar-RV (if this is really UGBO for lighter MBRs and SLBM) is likely to be practiced during the launches used for testing new combat equipment, experimental carriers "Topol-E".
Western sources also made similar assumptions, moreover, some in the West argue that one of the recent test launches has already been related to this topic. Even called the probable index of the new product. That's probably about this product and heard from some friends at the Pentagon figures from CNBC and distorted as they could, in his article. Separately, it is worth noting that hardly anyone will re-equip the entire Bulava or Yarsov park for a similar product - at the moment, AGPO is not an obligatory equipment element guaranteeing a successful delivery of what they deserve. And this, of course, is also a means of guaranteed accurate delivery, but much more it is a means of expanding the capabilities of the SNF (for example, for effective strikes on a fast flat trajectory, not coming as close to the enemy as you would have to do without such a device). In general, "backward" Russia put on stream the process of creating new UGSs and new hypersonic aeroballistic or cruise missiles, until the Americans reach any specific results, and not rare flights, of technology demonstrators of different success, and with frequent changes of projects. . Of course, it is early to write off the United States in this area, but you cannot catch up on such a start and such a head start quickly, if at all possible.
Moreover, there are other options for expanding the capabilities and increasing the invulnerability of the complexes. For example, Mr. Solomonov has long spoken about switching to a “no-bus” BB breeding scheme, that is, when warheads are not induced one at a time by their breeding step, while they themselves “run” along their goals like cockroaches when they turn on the light - quickly and organized, and without help. Such warheads will have their own propulsion systems, but they can hardly be considered maneuvering. But the rejection of the "bus scheme" greatly increases the invulnerability of the rocket and its equipment from interception in this area of the trajectory, because it is believed that the faster the OUT (active part of the trajectory) ends and the faster the units and means for overcoming missile defense are better, better.
Given the emerging unpleasant circumstances for the United States, such as a lag in managed hypersonic technologies weapons, the inability to create new nuclear munitions, "holes" in the field of medium-range facilities, it is rather strange to hear that the US administration doubts whether they should extend the START-2021 Treaty after 3, which will require considerable efforts, because in the Russian Federation I also understand more and more that with people who cannot agree among themselves, apart from the desire to podgadit the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, I somehow do not want to extend the contract. Even necessary to the world and myself. Why are there "bells" distributed here and there, indicating the likelihood of non-renewal of this treaty by Russia. Like the same 6 additional "Boreev-A", which will be extremely difficult to meet in the limits of START-3, given the ICBM and bombers. But the Russian Federation does not have these problems listed above.
Naturally, Americans are blaming Russia for "violating" the Treaty, for example, with the same hypersonic devices or intercontinental thermonuclear torpedoes, which are not mentioned in the Treaty and are not a violation. In general, Americans are behaving inadequately, and their attempts to harm us increasingly turn out to harm themselves, which has already been mentioned more than once in relation to strategic stability.
But it is worth mentioning that recently the US State Department announced that the country does not intend to leave the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (DAMAS) for the time being. Andrea Thompson, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, said this in a speech to the Senate. She also answered the question from representatives of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who asked about the consequences of Washington’s withdrawal from the treaty if the United States decides to take this step, accusing Russia of “substantial violation” of the INF.
"The consequences of a significant violation are set forth in the contract. The contract provides for various options for action; such discussions would be held in cooperation with our technical experts here, as well as with partners and allies. We have not reached this point yet," said Thompson.
What does this mean? It is possible that the leadership of the United States nevertheless realized that going out of the INF Treaty would look like an attempt to frighten a porcupine by landing on it, because it is the Russian Federation that has the potential for rapid and relatively inexpensive deployment of new medium-range missiles, and there are no nuclear weapons for them. . In the United States, in both aspects, things are completely different. And so, for the time being, they have decided not to untie Russia's hands in this, as happened with missile defense or hypersonic technologies.
And while they themselves will try to develop something in this area, however, there are few options. First of all, the same problem with nuclear equipment for these missiles is not there and there is really no place to take it. Is it possible to disfigure the long-suffering BB W76-1, by cutting off the power dozens of times and try to shove on a new rocket? But here it is not so simple. Missiles to develop in the US can. So, there is a competition for the creation of Precision Strike Missile - a tactical missile with a range of more than 400 km. Someone is a product that will be launched, as well as OTR ATACMS, from MLRS launchers, we have already dubbed in the media the American Iskander. No, this is not an Iskander! The rocket is small, its range is increased to a large extent by further reducing the power of the warhead (it is pushing that it is weak, but, they say, accurate), that is, reducing combat effectiveness. Yes, and the ability of "Iskander" to overcome the air defense-missile defense is not. And the nuclear warhead will not be there. That is, it is necessary to take into account these weapons, as well as the announced preliminary studies on the "1000-mile rocket", that is, this is not a topic of nuclear forces.
Another worth mentioning is the strange report that the United States is considering the issue of equipping the future promising subsonic airborne missile launcher LRSO ... F-35 fighter. Moreover, it is unlikely that this missile can be used in the compartment of the fighter, which deprives it of its known advantages. It is clear that if we were talking about non-nuclear Raman weapons of the JASSM series, but LRSO will have a nuclear charge, and this is already a direct violation of START-3. Probably, this option, if worked out, is in case of non-renewal of the contract and non-conclusion of its replacement. In this case, the Americans should expect similar surprises. For example, the new KR X-50 (aka X-SD), officially non-nuclear, which our operational tactical planes can also use aviation, like Su-34, Su-30SM, Su-35S or Su-57, in this case, too, probably, will change its status to "strictly non-nuclear."
It is possible to live and develop in the absence of contractual restrictions: in the 50-60-s both superpowers have existed. But the world will not become safer from this, unfortunately.
Information