Why "Armata" did not go to the troops
Campaign to promote promising Russian troops tank “Armata” has recently taken an unexpected turn. Statement by Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov at the end of July (“... why flood all the armed forces with Armata, our T-72 is in great demand in the market, everyone takes it ...”) about the inappropriate procurement of the Armata tank for the army its high cost was unexpected for many.
After winning statements at the highest level about the creation of a promising tank, it suddenly became clear that it was not really necessary for the army. It was previously announced the planned purchase of 2300 tanks, then this number was reduced to 100 tanks; Now they are talking about purchasing an experimental batch of 20 tanks. In addition, according to the Ministry of Defense, in the 2018-2019 years it is planned to purchase only the upgraded T-80 and T-90 tanks.
A natural question arises: what happened and why the plans for this tank changed so drastically?
I can assume that the matter here is not only in the cost of the tank, apparently there are organizational and technical problems. The whole epic with the tank "Armata" - from the rejection of this project by the military at the beginning of development to the rapid production of an experimental batch - raises many questions.
It is still unclear whether the full cycle of factory and state tests envisaged by the standards was carried out, whether the tank accepted the interdepartmental commission and the most important question: whether this tank was adopted by the Russian army or not.
Without holding these events, talking about the creation of a tank is not serious, but for some reason there is no reliable information on these issues. It is only known that such a tank has been developed, has undergone some tests, a small batch of tanks is shown from 2015 on parade on Red Square, and various officials verbally state that it is about to be launched into mass production. Also, little is known about the technical characteristics of the tank, information is mostly sketchy and often contradictory.
It should be recalled that the former Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who was replaced by General Yuri Borisov in April of this year, was actively promoting this tank. It is not excluded that the new Deputy Prime Minister decided to carry out the actions provided for by the regulatory documents on the full test cycle of the tank and after that take the final decision on his fate.
If the entire test cycle was carried out, and the specified characteristics of the tank were confirmed, before the start of mass production, as was customary earlier, it was possible that they decided to carry out complex troop tests. They check the car in real conditions of operation in the army, drive it through different climatic zones and make sure that it meets the specified requirements.
History The development of this tank was not so simple. The start of work was announced in 2011, although this concept of the tank was discussed earlier. There were a lot of questions about this concept, and, as I recall, the military did not approve of it. Then, somehow, a batch of such vehicles was quickly manufactured, and everyone announced the creation of a fundamentally new tank. In such a short period of time it is difficult to go through all the stages of development and testing, especially since several dozens of different organizations had to deal with this.
The events occurring around “Almaty” mean that a fundamentally new machine is not so easy to be born, there are too many new nodes and systems in it that require appropriate refinement and testing. On the tank everything is new: the power plant, the gun, sighting systems, the protection system, TIUS, ammunition, the control system of the tank unit. All this is developed by different organizations, and with the failure of work on some node or system of the tank as a whole will not.
Of course, a promising tank for the army is needed, after the T-64 the tank of the new generation did not appear. An attempt to create such a tank in the framework of the “Boxer” project in connection with the collapse of the Union was not fully completed, and other proposals were limited only to the modernization of the existing generation of tanks and did not receive development.
The Armata project is truly a new generation tank project. Yes, the concept of this tank has a significant disadvantage, but we must look for ways to eliminate it and get a new quality. In this tank, too many new ideas, developed in previous years through the systems and units of the tank, are implemented, and they should not die.
According to the concept of the Armata, there are many different opinions, and at the very beginning of its development I had to debate on the Internet with Murakhovsky, an ardent supporter of everything, whatever Uralvagonzavod would develop. Our opinions diverged. When evaluating any technical solution, at least, one should strive for objectivity, regardless of likes or dislikes of the structures offering it, which is not always the case.
“Armata” has one fundamental technical solution, which calls into question the whole concept of the tank. This is an uninhabited tower, controlled only by electro-optical means. With this layout of the tank, two problems arise: low reliability of control of all tower systems using only electrical signals and the impossibility of implementing an optical channel for observing, aiming and firing from a tank.
The control of all turret systems using only electrical signals sharply reduces the reliability of the entire tank as a whole. When a power supply system or its individual elements fail, it becomes completely non-viable.
The tank is a battlefield combat vehicle, and there is more than enough power loss. In addition, there is a weak link in the power supply system: a rotating contact device located on the bottom in the center of the tank, through which all power supply to the tower is provided.
All the talk about the same thing being done on airplanes does not hold water. The aircraft is not a tank, and its conditions of operation are the most severe. In addition, to provide 3- and 4-fold redundancy is too expensive for a tank, and it is almost impossible to do so.
The problem of VKU in a tank is a pretty serious question. For example, when upgrading the American tank M1A2 SEP v.4, they try to solve this problem by non-traditional methods of transmitting signals through devices in pursuit of a tower, allowing to ensure reliable and interference-free transmission of signals to the tower.
In the adopted layout, the image from the observation and aiming devices can be transmitted to the crew members only by an electronic tele, heat, radar video signal. Most experts are inclined to the impossibility of providing modern electron-optical systems with the same level of visibility as traditional optical channels.
Electronic means of video transmission and three-dimensional image have not yet reached the level of resolution of the optical channel. Therefore, the sighting system without such a channel will have certain disadvantages. In this regard, the tanker “Boxer” with the full duplication of the actions of the gunner and the commander, we additionally installed the simplest double-gun sight for firing in case of failure of all systems of the tank.
Conducted experiments on the use of only a television channel for driving a tank showed that because of the flat television picture, it was almost impossible to conduct a tank. The driver did not feel the track, the slightest obstacle, even in the form of a puddle, put him in a dead end and did not allow him to assess the terrain.
This problem of constructing a circular volumetric image has not been solved. Closest to her decision on the Israeli tank "Merkava". In the Iron Vision system developed for the tank, which receives signals from many video cameras located around the tank’s perimeter, a three-dimensional picture is created via a computer and displayed on the helmet display of the operator.
About the work on the creation of a three-dimensional television image and unconventional ways of transmitting electrical signals to the tower in the framework of the development of the tank "Armat" nothing was heard. This lack of "Almaty" remained. He is very serious and can cast doubt on the whole project. To eliminate these shortcomings, it is necessary to conduct a cycle of development, research and testing, which will allow to evaluate all the pros and cons of such a tank concept.
This tank is trying to implement many promising developments of science and industry, obtained in previous years. It is possible to note interesting solutions for complex protection, when a curtain-type curtain-type curtain-type curtain system works against ATGM, and active defense is taken to remove armor-piercing projectiles with a dovorot tower, but how much is realizable with the enormous difference in speeds BPS and tower drive, still need to check .
The tank implements elements of a tank information control system, the concept of which I developed and laid into the tanker Boxer. Even after so many years, not everything can be realized. The main thing is that a tank division control system is implemented, which takes tanks to a completely different level, allowing them to interact in the course of the battle and provide the commander of various levels with the possibility of effective target designation and target distribution.
In general, the project "Armata" continued implementation of the network-centric tank, the concept of which was developed at the beginning of 80-x and laid in the tank "Boxer". With the collapse of the Union, the project could not be completed until years later, much is being implemented in the Armata tank, and individual systems of this tank can be used to upgrade the existing generation of tanks.
With all the problematic issues of the tank "Armata" it contains a number of promising solutions that really make it a tank of a new generation. Instead of propaganda campaigns with the display of the tank at parades, it is necessary to work out the concept of the tank, eliminate shortcomings and strive to realize all its advantages.
After winning statements at the highest level about the creation of a promising tank, it suddenly became clear that it was not really necessary for the army. It was previously announced the planned purchase of 2300 tanks, then this number was reduced to 100 tanks; Now they are talking about purchasing an experimental batch of 20 tanks. In addition, according to the Ministry of Defense, in the 2018-2019 years it is planned to purchase only the upgraded T-80 and T-90 tanks.
A natural question arises: what happened and why the plans for this tank changed so drastically?
I can assume that the matter here is not only in the cost of the tank, apparently there are organizational and technical problems. The whole epic with the tank "Armata" - from the rejection of this project by the military at the beginning of development to the rapid production of an experimental batch - raises many questions.
It is still unclear whether the full cycle of factory and state tests envisaged by the standards was carried out, whether the tank accepted the interdepartmental commission and the most important question: whether this tank was adopted by the Russian army or not.
Without holding these events, talking about the creation of a tank is not serious, but for some reason there is no reliable information on these issues. It is only known that such a tank has been developed, has undergone some tests, a small batch of tanks is shown from 2015 on parade on Red Square, and various officials verbally state that it is about to be launched into mass production. Also, little is known about the technical characteristics of the tank, information is mostly sketchy and often contradictory.
It should be recalled that the former Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who was replaced by General Yuri Borisov in April of this year, was actively promoting this tank. It is not excluded that the new Deputy Prime Minister decided to carry out the actions provided for by the regulatory documents on the full test cycle of the tank and after that take the final decision on his fate.
If the entire test cycle was carried out, and the specified characteristics of the tank were confirmed, before the start of mass production, as was customary earlier, it was possible that they decided to carry out complex troop tests. They check the car in real conditions of operation in the army, drive it through different climatic zones and make sure that it meets the specified requirements.
History The development of this tank was not so simple. The start of work was announced in 2011, although this concept of the tank was discussed earlier. There were a lot of questions about this concept, and, as I recall, the military did not approve of it. Then, somehow, a batch of such vehicles was quickly manufactured, and everyone announced the creation of a fundamentally new tank. In such a short period of time it is difficult to go through all the stages of development and testing, especially since several dozens of different organizations had to deal with this.
The events occurring around “Almaty” mean that a fundamentally new machine is not so easy to be born, there are too many new nodes and systems in it that require appropriate refinement and testing. On the tank everything is new: the power plant, the gun, sighting systems, the protection system, TIUS, ammunition, the control system of the tank unit. All this is developed by different organizations, and with the failure of work on some node or system of the tank as a whole will not.
Of course, a promising tank for the army is needed, after the T-64 the tank of the new generation did not appear. An attempt to create such a tank in the framework of the “Boxer” project in connection with the collapse of the Union was not fully completed, and other proposals were limited only to the modernization of the existing generation of tanks and did not receive development.
The Armata project is truly a new generation tank project. Yes, the concept of this tank has a significant disadvantage, but we must look for ways to eliminate it and get a new quality. In this tank, too many new ideas, developed in previous years through the systems and units of the tank, are implemented, and they should not die.
According to the concept of the Armata, there are many different opinions, and at the very beginning of its development I had to debate on the Internet with Murakhovsky, an ardent supporter of everything, whatever Uralvagonzavod would develop. Our opinions diverged. When evaluating any technical solution, at least, one should strive for objectivity, regardless of likes or dislikes of the structures offering it, which is not always the case.
“Armata” has one fundamental technical solution, which calls into question the whole concept of the tank. This is an uninhabited tower, controlled only by electro-optical means. With this layout of the tank, two problems arise: low reliability of control of all tower systems using only electrical signals and the impossibility of implementing an optical channel for observing, aiming and firing from a tank.
The control of all turret systems using only electrical signals sharply reduces the reliability of the entire tank as a whole. When a power supply system or its individual elements fail, it becomes completely non-viable.
The tank is a battlefield combat vehicle, and there is more than enough power loss. In addition, there is a weak link in the power supply system: a rotating contact device located on the bottom in the center of the tank, through which all power supply to the tower is provided.
All the talk about the same thing being done on airplanes does not hold water. The aircraft is not a tank, and its conditions of operation are the most severe. In addition, to provide 3- and 4-fold redundancy is too expensive for a tank, and it is almost impossible to do so.
The problem of VKU in a tank is a pretty serious question. For example, when upgrading the American tank M1A2 SEP v.4, they try to solve this problem by non-traditional methods of transmitting signals through devices in pursuit of a tower, allowing to ensure reliable and interference-free transmission of signals to the tower.
In the adopted layout, the image from the observation and aiming devices can be transmitted to the crew members only by an electronic tele, heat, radar video signal. Most experts are inclined to the impossibility of providing modern electron-optical systems with the same level of visibility as traditional optical channels.
Electronic means of video transmission and three-dimensional image have not yet reached the level of resolution of the optical channel. Therefore, the sighting system without such a channel will have certain disadvantages. In this regard, the tanker “Boxer” with the full duplication of the actions of the gunner and the commander, we additionally installed the simplest double-gun sight for firing in case of failure of all systems of the tank.
Conducted experiments on the use of only a television channel for driving a tank showed that because of the flat television picture, it was almost impossible to conduct a tank. The driver did not feel the track, the slightest obstacle, even in the form of a puddle, put him in a dead end and did not allow him to assess the terrain.
This problem of constructing a circular volumetric image has not been solved. Closest to her decision on the Israeli tank "Merkava". In the Iron Vision system developed for the tank, which receives signals from many video cameras located around the tank’s perimeter, a three-dimensional picture is created via a computer and displayed on the helmet display of the operator.
About the work on the creation of a three-dimensional television image and unconventional ways of transmitting electrical signals to the tower in the framework of the development of the tank "Armat" nothing was heard. This lack of "Almaty" remained. He is very serious and can cast doubt on the whole project. To eliminate these shortcomings, it is necessary to conduct a cycle of development, research and testing, which will allow to evaluate all the pros and cons of such a tank concept.
This tank is trying to implement many promising developments of science and industry, obtained in previous years. It is possible to note interesting solutions for complex protection, when a curtain-type curtain-type curtain-type curtain system works against ATGM, and active defense is taken to remove armor-piercing projectiles with a dovorot tower, but how much is realizable with the enormous difference in speeds BPS and tower drive, still need to check .
The tank implements elements of a tank information control system, the concept of which I developed and laid into the tanker Boxer. Even after so many years, not everything can be realized. The main thing is that a tank division control system is implemented, which takes tanks to a completely different level, allowing them to interact in the course of the battle and provide the commander of various levels with the possibility of effective target designation and target distribution.
In general, the project "Armata" continued implementation of the network-centric tank, the concept of which was developed at the beginning of 80-x and laid in the tank "Boxer". With the collapse of the Union, the project could not be completed until years later, much is being implemented in the Armata tank, and individual systems of this tank can be used to upgrade the existing generation of tanks.
With all the problematic issues of the tank "Armata" it contains a number of promising solutions that really make it a tank of a new generation. Instead of propaganda campaigns with the display of the tank at parades, it is necessary to work out the concept of the tank, eliminate shortcomings and strive to realize all its advantages.
Information