New Navy ships - a worthy trophy of the enemy
ten auxiliary vessels each!
(Replica visitor site topwar.ru)
The Navy's rearmament program for the most part consists of transports, “hydrographs,” and other logistics support tugs. A significant proportion of the allocated funds is spent on supporting projects fleet.
“Supporting” projects are comparable in scale with the construction of first-class warships. For example, the contract for the construction of a series of three vessels for the logistics of the 23120 project (the lead ship is Elbrus) cost the fleet 12 billion rubles. An amount comparable to the cost of building the frigate “Admiral Grigorovich” (13,3 billion rubles).
Of course, voiced in 2011-2012's. initial estimates were very far from the final cost. But the ratio remained unchanged: instead of the rocket ship of the far sea zone, three “tugs” under construction. In reality, only two of them were able to be completed, due to disruptions in the supply of foreign components for the third building.
As follows from the description of “Elbrus”, the main purpose of the vessel is the transportation and transfer of dry cargo, including on unequipped coast, combined with the function of the sea tug. The development of the Arctic infrastructure associated with projects in the offshore oil and gas industry, as well as the creation of military facilities in high latitudes, makes such vessels absolutely necessary as part of the Northern Fleet.
On the other hand, the domestic fleet has never experienced a shortage of transport and tow vessels. So much so that in the 2015 year, the Russian Federation (represented by the Federal Property Management Agency) even sold four similar vessels (“Tumcha”, Naftohaz-51, 57 and 61) to the Argentine naval forces. This is a “workhorse” built 1986-90. (compare with the age of most of the ships of the Navy!), which, due to the monotony of their tasks, are designed to operate for many decades.
Readers may rightly note that there is an acute need for rocking ships (for transporting wheeled and tracked vehicles) and container ships suitable for use as part of “Syrian express trains” and for supplying operations on the overseas shores. Everyone remembers history with urgent purchase of Turkish transports for the needs of the Black Sea Fleet? Unfortunately, the court of this class in the plans are not provided. State-owned companies show their interest only in projects of the tanker fleet, which is necessary for the developing oil and gas industry. As for the "Elbrus" and similar means, it is rather tugs than transport ships. For transportation of large volumes of goods they are not suitable.
(Deputy Minister of Defense Dmitry Bulgakov, 2016).
Even taking into account the amendment to the technical condition of some of the units listed on the balance sheet, a dozen auxiliary vessels are received for one combat-ready destroyer, frigate or SSBN of the domestic fleet!
Along with “Elbrusy” (23120 project), for the needs of the Navy, sea tugs of the 23470 project (“Andrey Stepanov” and “Sergey Balk”) were ordered, four rescue and tug vessels of 22870 Ave., the Yauza ice-class sea transport was deeply modernized. under the 550M project (80% of machinery and equipment replaced), a towing vessel of the 20180 ave. (“Zvezdochka”) was built, a series of vessels representing the further development of the “Zvezdochka” - “20183” marine vessels (“Akademik Aleksandrov”) is under construction.
From the abundance of projects of sea tugs just dazzled.
Despite the urgent need for warships, for some reason, priority is given to auxiliary units.
In view of the voiced facts and financial constraints, when combat-ready warships become a rare and exclusive phenomenon, an inexplicable desire to update the already numerous logistic support vessels looks like a criminal waste.
In addition to “Elbrus” and other transport-tug vessels, in the interests of the Navy many other contracts were concluded, the necessity and timeliness of which raise questions.
Last year, the Black Sea Fleet intensified with the experimental vessel “Viktor Cherokov” (20360 OS pr.). Initially, a floating crane ammunition loader worth 600 million rubles. and with a deadline in 2010 g. In the process it turned out that the ammunition loader was no longer needed. Seven years later, the ship was completed on the modified project as a stand for testing torpedo weapons.
Based on the design and purpose, the task of the “Viktor Cherokov” is to launch samples of experimental practical torpedoes (with a set of measuring devices installed instead of warheads) with their subsequent search and rise to the surface.
This is in conditions when the Navy is already in trial operation of several modern, but, for a number of reasons, limited combat-ready ships. For example, the B-90 submarine “Sarov” or the head diesel-electric submarine of the 677 pr. St. Petersburg, which is the best for testing mine-torpedo weapons. The identified deficiencies of the power plant in this context do not matter. Ships do not participate in combat services and spend all the time near their native shores. And once built - use with maximum efficiency.
Fully finished test benchesas close as possible to the design of warships of the Russian Navy.
In addition to these units, a whole series of torpedo boats are currently being built using the updated 1388 avenue.
Against this background, the emergence of another project of a floating stand for launching torpedoes looks like a redundant solution. Especially in a situation where the carriers themselves of “new types of torpedo weapons” can be counted on fingers.
Floating laboratories and trial vessels are a whole mainstream in the rearmament program of the Navy.
In less than a decade, for the needs of the Navy, a pair of 11982 vessels (Ladoga and Seliger) were built to conduct tests of special technical equipment, equipment and armaments. Along with them, an oceanographic vessel was built on the 22010 “Yantar” project for the study of the seabed. Very expensive programs.
In total, the value of the contract for the construction of “Yantar” and “Seliger” was 7 billion rubles. (initial estimate as of 2009).
“Measure seven times” sounds wise. Experiments allow to obtain knowledge about the real characteristics of objects, to confirm or deny their stated properties in certain conditions. But in the context of the military fleet, all these experiments and studies of the seabed make sense only if the accumulated body of knowledge can be applied on board warships. And here on this place the program of rearmament of the Navy is at odds with common sense.
The Americans, having a fleet of 70 destroyers, can afford to build auxiliary units for any purpose. In our case, the approach should be different. In view of the officially announced figures on the existing number of auxiliary vessels and the existing financial constraints, all forces and means should be given to re-equip divisions of warships.
As for trial vessels, the Japanese demonstrated an example of the most rational spending of funds by building a “trial vessel” that fully corresponded in size, energy, and seaworthiness to a serial destroyer. Differences - in the composition of weapons and electronic "stuffing".
JDS Asuka is designed for testing radars, elements of a CICS, launchers and various ship systems. Despite the experimental nature of this ship, in fact there is another unaccounted rocket destroyer in the composition of the Japanese Navy.
Cave Carriers - Fleet Shock Force
“Cherry on the cake” of this review will be a new generation of communications boats. Traditionally, boats of this class are intended for service trips when managing ships on raids, transportation of groups of persons, documents and small cargoes. But here behind the routine name completely different scales are hidden.
As it became known from official sources, a “boat” was built at the Sokolsky shipyard in the Nizhny Novgorod region with the factory number “403”
67 meters of length, displacement 1000 tons. In terms of its size and cost, the “cutter” surpassed the small rocket carriers carrying the “Calibrov”. Admirals have something to be proud of. The only question is what is the combat value of this vessel?
The new “communication boat” will be able to adequately demonstrate the flag at the quays of Monte Carlo casinos. And in terms of the richness of the internal equipment, this representative yacht should surpass the “ceremonial” communication boats of the 21270 Ave., which will be described a little later.
A few years ago, three “communication boats” of the 21270 Ave appeared at once in the Baltic Fleet, specially prepared for receiving naval parades. Each has six comfortable cabins: a main VIP cabin with a separate office and five cabins for lower-ranking officers, 20-room for banquets, as well as a restaurant-observation deck on the upper deck, allowing all those present to admire the parade of warships.
Curiously, the claimed magnificence of the 21270 project and various modifications of the 1388 pr. Remained out of work. At the naval parade in St. Petersburg in 2017, Vladimir Putin traditionally chose a more ascetic and brutal image. The President received the main parade from the board of a high-speed patrol boat of the 03160 pr. (“Raptor”), painted white and equipped with all the necessary equipment for this purpose.
Concerning
The only positive moment of this story is that they did not hesitate to build representative yachts at domestic shipyards. Following the military order, a reputation will appear, and then, for sure, orders from individuals. The German shipyard Blohm & Voss may lose its regular customers.
On the other hand, the number of ceremonial boats in the Baltic fleet will soon exceed the number of active warships. All this is similar to a curious story with the number of admiral posts in one famous naval power.
The result?
“Sawed the allocated funds, built instead of destroyers and submarines vessels of dubious purpose,” the outraged reader will say.
In fact, everything is different. As part of any kind of armed forces a significant part of the equipment falls on special-purpose equipment. For example, an order to build a series of 9 hydrographic vessels from the 19910 Ave., taking into account the length of Russia's maritime borders, seems to be a perfectly justified decision. The staging of navigation buoys, the maintenance and reloading of floating equipment for navigation equipment is the most important work package for ensuring the safety of navigation and the activity of ships, naval bases and landfills of the Navy.
There can be no doubt about the need for a so-called. communication vessels (sea intelligence officers) of project 18280 “Yuri Ivanov” and “Ivan Khurs”. Or ocean-class rescue ship “Victor Belousov” (Ave. 21300С) with the Bester-1 deep-sea craft. So that in case of emergency situations, you no longer have to turn to Norwegians and British for help. Another question is why such an important ship, giving a chance to rescue submariners in distress, was built in a single copy? But tugs - for all occasions!
Most of the reports on the renewal of the ship's personnel are related to the construction of ships, which are very far from the tasks and needs of military sailors. The Navy is a tool to protect the interests of Russia on the sea. And, no matter what the modern “philosophers” assert that the fleet begins with tugboats and support vessels, the Navy is first and foremost warships. It is their number and characteristics that determine the potential of any naval forces.
What is now being built in shipyards under the cover of the Navy rearmament program, for the most part, has nothing to do with the navy. In the present situation, numerous tugs, transports and “oceanographers” can only become an excellent trophy for the enemy.
Here we gain experience - and then! ..
Analogies with the post-war program of rearmament of the Navy of the end of the 40-x - the beginning of the 50-x. here are completely out of place. At that time, hundreds of ships of obsolete projects were built in shipyards with the main goal: to preserve the shipbuilding industry and gain experience in building ships on their own (as opposed to the pre-war years when all technologies were acquired abroad).
Now there is no need to build tugs. Tales about the lack of specialists and technologies will be left on the conscience of those who cannot (or do not want) to see the truth in emphasis.
And it is this: the shipbuilding industry of the Russian Federation and related research institutes and production facilities are ready to implement projects of any complexity, including the construction of an aircraft carrier. A striking example is the restructuring of the 270-meter “Gorshkov” into the Indian “Vikramaditya” with the replacement of the 243 hull sections, the 2300 km of cables, and the complete replacement of all mechanisms and equipment: GEM, deck configurations, and aircraft lifts.
Over the past 25 years, Russian shipyards built first-class warships for export: destroyers and submarines for the PRC, supplied long-range air defense systems for the Chinese fleet, one after another handed over Talvara’s customers, and took part in developing the newest destroyers for the Indian Navy. Among the eloquent examples: Indian submariners got into service the export “Calibres” (Club-S) ten years earlier than the domestic submarine fleet!
Why are programs of building warships for the Russian Navy being carried out with such tension and skidding? Why the allocated funds are redistributed in favor of projects far from the first importance? Who benefits from meaningless promises “to gain experience, to saturate the fleet with tugboats, so that while it turns out we build, and only then ...” Answers to these questions should be sought among those responsible for the distribution of funds.
There is no other explanation.
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