Why do we need the "Sarmatians" with one warhead in the mine?
So sometimes you don’t want to once again come back to issues of strategic stability, nuclear missile weapons and all that stuff, but you have to. Because across the expanses of world and domestic media resources, the shoals of various experts in this matter float, from time to time because of their overwhelming knowledge, they float up and delight us with regular revelations. Sometimes it is something clever and valuable, but often it is something that it is better to leave in yourself, not carrying in people. Unfortunately, these revelations are read not only by the military or industry experts, or at least by people who are more or less versed in the matter, but by ordinary people who can even believe an hour for them.
Here is another such revelation from a prominent specialist, one might even say, a hereditary specialist (father was also an academician) in matters of strategic stability, Alexei Arbatov. He now heads the Center for International Security at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. Speaking on the margins of the Luxembourg Forum in Geneva, he stated the following (quoted by RIA News"):
Interestingly, one has to talk about fairly simple things, obviously unknown to a respected scientist. If he considers the silos, in which 15А18М Р-36М2 "Voivode" heavy ICBMs are now, vulnerable, then let him show more protected ones and tell where and who they are from, and what kind of missiles they are there. Because there are simply no more secure silos in the world. Unfortunately, we will not build new ones, and this is not really necessary, so we use the existing ones. It should be noted that the program "Sarmat" in general is built very economically competently, and where possible, units and assemblies from predecessors are used there. This, of course, is not about the rocket units, but, say, transport-launch containers from old 15А18 (Р-36МУТТХ) and from 15А18М (to a lesser extent) left without reference, why not use them? Or transport and installation and other units may be new (and they are already tested), and existing ones from 15А18М may be used. As to the vulnerability of silos due to the fame of their coordinates, then everything is not so simple. The coordinates are known, but it’s not so easy to destroy the mine even with modern means. The object under the mountain Yamantau also knows where it is - so try to destroy it. Or, say, a bunker under the mountain of Cheyenne - it is unlikely to be able to destroy it, although, they say, because of the old construction, there are some vulnerabilities (exits) there.
As for the “modern accuracy of targeting”, it does not guarantee at all that a direct hit into the silo silo (that is, it gets into the crater from a nuclear explosion), and in general, Mr. Arbatov should have known that in order to ensure defeat of the silo mason if 2 warhead, and from different missiles. If from one, then there can be no talk of any guarantee - the rocket may not start, fall apart in the active part of the trajectory, not dissolve the warheads, but what happened? And with regard to our best silos, their resistance is so high that the probability of performing the silo mission (launching an ICBM) even with a direct hit may be higher than 0.5, that is, it would be better to assign an 3 unit (again, from different missiles). There is no data on the real persistence of our best silos, and not invented by someone in the West or extrapolated from the data obtained from the silos remaining in Ukraine, from "potential partners number one". And Arbatov, too, clearly does not have them, just as there are none of the ones discussed here in the articles of Hans Christensen.
In addition, our silos have been covering up for a long time with developed passive protection complexes (interference complexes in the optical, thermal, and radar ranges that literally overlap everything), and the complex of active protection was tested (and in two variations - from high-precision conventional and from the actual nuclear warheads). And the development of these technologies did not stop later, and there are various indirect data that the Sarmatov silo will hide behind them (if this is not already established somewhere - of course, no one officially informs about this and is unlikely to), which further increases the required outfit of forces for the destruction of a silo. But even 3 BBs from three missiles, or single-piece ICBMs "Minuteman-3" with 300ct W87, or the Trident-2 SLBM, and preferably not with StockX W76-1, and with more powerful W88 - already a lot for the cost of a single silo even if it contains an ICBM with 10 or more unguided BB (or several maneuvering and planning hypersonic Avangard). For the simple reason that there are quite a few rockets and BBs now, but there are many targets, and the ICBM is not enough that it is not guaranteed to be destroyed in the silo, so it’s most likely there will not be - our missile attack warning system now has no dead zones, its new orbital segment (in the form of an EKS system with a Tundra type of spacecraft) is also being recreated, and the automated command and control system (ASBU) of the new generation makes it possible to reduce the time taken to make any decisions to attack any targets. Which was previously very small. That is, in the event of an attack on Russia, our SNF will work in the opposite or counter-reciprocal variant and the mines will almost certainly be empty by the time they “visit” the enemy’s BB.
As for the idea of placing heavy MBRs with 1-2 BB inside (if this is not BB of super-large power, which may also be needed on a heavy rocket, and on BBNNXXX15M such a BB is available, or if it is not the above-mentioned guided vehicles of Avangard), then it gives obvious stupidity or sabotage. Why, then, need a heavy ICBM, for beauty? Heavy combat missile complexes have their own tasks, which cannot be solved by light complexes, and it is simply meaningless to unload these ICBMs to such an extent, except for the cases described above. It’s better not to build them then. By the way, we still have light YBR “Yars” in the silo, carrying up to 18 BB (on duty, obviously, with a smaller number of BBs, most likely with 6). Well, Arbatov does not declare them too "vulnerable"? Will the Americans have enough charges for all the mines and for the defeat of other targets? He did not try to count, from the current low potential?
Although Arbatov has always been a supporter of light ICBMs with 1 BB on board, despite the fact that such a “light” and “low-vulnerable” solution is also very expensive - to place 150 charges, 150 missiles are required, and not, say, 30-50 or 15.
Arbatov refers to Americans, they say, they have “Minutemen” in the same (in his opinion) vulnerable silo and with 1 BB inside. “Minuteman-3”, for starters, lightweight ICBM, and when he was carrying 3 BB, and when carrying 1 now. He even saw the Minuteman and Voivod's silos, but at least any of ours? American silos cannot be compared, they are equipped with much more vulnerable sliding lids (they are useless for any damage or falling asleep with the ground), unlike our hinged lids, do not have any clearing and cutting systems (in fact, self-digging of the mine installation and some of it) feed "through the ground), and the mechanisms for emergency removal of the cover also do not have. Yes, and it does not need the Americans, they have never been the main carrier of strategic nuclear forces, and in general their strategic nuclear forces have always focused on the first blow, in the Russian literature it was even accepted to call them not strategic nuclear forces, and the SNS - strategic offensive forces, not strategic nuclear forces . This, however, from a series of our intelligence officers and other spies.
And, despite the fact that the United States is now declaring that they are not going to be the first to use the SNF, this should not be believed, including because they have not even technically prepared for other options, except, of course, the counter and the response oncoming strikes. We will not broadcast about the excessive peace-loving nature of the USSR or the Russian Federation - the term "strike at the appointed time" in relation to its nuclear forces in the USSR appeared, despite the promise of no first use of nuclear weapons. And Russia did not take on such propaganda promises. It is clear that global thermonuclear or even limited war is not the case when some sentiments are permissible. Therefore, it is better not to bring this up.
But innovative ideas from Alexey Georgievich do not run out.
In his opinion, the Sarmatians, equipped with one or two warheads, could have a reserve of seats, so that Russia could quickly restore its return nuclear potential, if necessary, like the United States.
Well, duty with a reduced number of charges to fit into the limits of the START-3 Treaty is a matter of understanding and familiar, and is used by us, by the Americans, and by the British. But putting on duty a heavy ICBM with 1-2 charges, hoping that the pre-war situation will develop along the line of a gradual escalation of tension and will allow you to quickly and, most importantly, covertly, deliver all warheads - self-reliance. Even if it allows, then it will be very difficult to do it secretly - you will have to open the lid, and not all have mines at once, but in turn, and do it when there are no other satellites of the enemy over your head, in general, things can drag on. The submarine can still somehow secretly install charges, to the mobile soil complex - also (try to find out what is being done with it in the hangar, and most likely there won't be inspections in the pre-war period), but it is much more difficult for the ICBM. Not to mention the fact that the expression “to restore the return potential” is not an academician. You can restore the number of charges to the staff by realizing the return potential, which is that there is a place to put, and there is something to add.
But Arbatov offers something else:
Again, the "restoration of the return potential", how can that be? And it would be worthwhile for an academician to know that everything is quite difficult for Americans with return potential. There is something to put, but what to put is still there, but not as much as it seems to someone who is stuck, apparently, in 90's or the beginning of 2000's. So, for example, 450 MBR "Minuteman-3" in no way can have a "return potential" - there are simply no charges for retrofitting on them, although they once carried a charge of 3 instead of the current 1. Simply, those charges are taken from the untimely deceased ICBM MX “Piper”, which were 50 with 10 BB on each, that is, the remainder of the charges refers to the exchange fund and there are no other such.
And at the expense of what "this" - at the expense of setting on duty a heavy ICBM carrying less charges than a light one? This is what savings should bring us - does not Mr. Arbatov want to clarify his point of view? About the completion of all 5 "Boreev-A" before 2020 - no one has planned it for a long time, the 2-3 of the ship will be in time for the end of 2020 to be operational, this is quite enough, there is no rush, the rest should be in time for 2023. . In addition, it is planned to build more 6 ships of this type in the 2020s, they will be built and will be built before 2027, although it is unlikely that everyone will be able to complete by the end of the current HPV-2027.
In general, the distinguished member of the Russian Academy of Sciences wanted something very clever to offer, but it did not work out. But let us remember about the biography of Arbatov Jr. and his political preferences (anyone can look at Wikipedia or spend a little more time and figure out for himself the matter). And we conclude: his position does not look something surprising. His father also opposed the construction of aircraft carriers in the USSR and advocated the transfer of four islands of Japan, being, by the way, a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU since the time of Brezhnev. At the same time, Georgy Arbatov was a participant in the Great Patriotic War, participated in the parade on Red Square in 1941, fought before 1944, and if he hadn’t done anything good in life, that would have been enough.
And the son advocated the ratification of the START-2 Treaty, which, thank God, has not been ratified, which was not ratified by the Russian Federation. He is also a prominent member of the Yabloko party and the author of treatises like this: "Beware, rake!" Which, by the way, did not prevent him from receiving in the same 2016 a prize of the government of the Russian Federation in the field of mass media for “popularizing foreign policy issues”. Not everything, in general, is still fine with us in the state, since this is still happening.
Here is another such revelation from a prominent specialist, one might even say, a hereditary specialist (father was also an academician) in matters of strategic stability, Alexei Arbatov. He now heads the Center for International Security at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. Speaking on the margins of the Luxembourg Forum in Geneva, he stated the following (quoted by RIA News"):
New Sarmat missiles will be installed in vulnerable mine installations, which were known 30 years ago. They fall into the crater of a nuclear explosion with modern precision guidance. Therefore, in my opinion, if you deploy the "Sarmatians", then with one or two warheads, which makes them not a very attractive goal. But if you install ten or twenty warheads on them, then they become a profitable target, since they can be hit by missiles with one or two warheads.
Interestingly, one has to talk about fairly simple things, obviously unknown to a respected scientist. If he considers the silos, in which 15А18М Р-36М2 "Voivode" heavy ICBMs are now, vulnerable, then let him show more protected ones and tell where and who they are from, and what kind of missiles they are there. Because there are simply no more secure silos in the world. Unfortunately, we will not build new ones, and this is not really necessary, so we use the existing ones. It should be noted that the program "Sarmat" in general is built very economically competently, and where possible, units and assemblies from predecessors are used there. This, of course, is not about the rocket units, but, say, transport-launch containers from old 15А18 (Р-36МУТТХ) and from 15А18М (to a lesser extent) left without reference, why not use them? Or transport and installation and other units may be new (and they are already tested), and existing ones from 15А18М may be used. As to the vulnerability of silos due to the fame of their coordinates, then everything is not so simple. The coordinates are known, but it’s not so easy to destroy the mine even with modern means. The object under the mountain Yamantau also knows where it is - so try to destroy it. Or, say, a bunker under the mountain of Cheyenne - it is unlikely to be able to destroy it, although, they say, because of the old construction, there are some vulnerabilities (exits) there.
As for the “modern accuracy of targeting”, it does not guarantee at all that a direct hit into the silo silo (that is, it gets into the crater from a nuclear explosion), and in general, Mr. Arbatov should have known that in order to ensure defeat of the silo mason if 2 warhead, and from different missiles. If from one, then there can be no talk of any guarantee - the rocket may not start, fall apart in the active part of the trajectory, not dissolve the warheads, but what happened? And with regard to our best silos, their resistance is so high that the probability of performing the silo mission (launching an ICBM) even with a direct hit may be higher than 0.5, that is, it would be better to assign an 3 unit (again, from different missiles). There is no data on the real persistence of our best silos, and not invented by someone in the West or extrapolated from the data obtained from the silos remaining in Ukraine, from "potential partners number one". And Arbatov, too, clearly does not have them, just as there are none of the ones discussed here in the articles of Hans Christensen. In addition, our silos have been covering up for a long time with developed passive protection complexes (interference complexes in the optical, thermal, and radar ranges that literally overlap everything), and the complex of active protection was tested (and in two variations - from high-precision conventional and from the actual nuclear warheads). And the development of these technologies did not stop later, and there are various indirect data that the Sarmatov silo will hide behind them (if this is not already established somewhere - of course, no one officially informs about this and is unlikely to), which further increases the required outfit of forces for the destruction of a silo. But even 3 BBs from three missiles, or single-piece ICBMs "Minuteman-3" with 300ct W87, or the Trident-2 SLBM, and preferably not with StockX W76-1, and with more powerful W88 - already a lot for the cost of a single silo even if it contains an ICBM with 10 or more unguided BB (or several maneuvering and planning hypersonic Avangard). For the simple reason that there are quite a few rockets and BBs now, but there are many targets, and the ICBM is not enough that it is not guaranteed to be destroyed in the silo, so it’s most likely there will not be - our missile attack warning system now has no dead zones, its new orbital segment (in the form of an EKS system with a Tundra type of spacecraft) is also being recreated, and the automated command and control system (ASBU) of the new generation makes it possible to reduce the time taken to make any decisions to attack any targets. Which was previously very small. That is, in the event of an attack on Russia, our SNF will work in the opposite or counter-reciprocal variant and the mines will almost certainly be empty by the time they “visit” the enemy’s BB.
As for the idea of placing heavy MBRs with 1-2 BB inside (if this is not BB of super-large power, which may also be needed on a heavy rocket, and on BBNNXXX15M such a BB is available, or if it is not the above-mentioned guided vehicles of Avangard), then it gives obvious stupidity or sabotage. Why, then, need a heavy ICBM, for beauty? Heavy combat missile complexes have their own tasks, which cannot be solved by light complexes, and it is simply meaningless to unload these ICBMs to such an extent, except for the cases described above. It’s better not to build them then. By the way, we still have light YBR “Yars” in the silo, carrying up to 18 BB (on duty, obviously, with a smaller number of BBs, most likely with 6). Well, Arbatov does not declare them too "vulnerable"? Will the Americans have enough charges for all the mines and for the defeat of other targets? He did not try to count, from the current low potential?
Although Arbatov has always been a supporter of light ICBMs with 1 BB on board, despite the fact that such a “light” and “low-vulnerable” solution is also very expensive - to place 150 charges, 150 missiles are required, and not, say, 30-50 or 15.
Arbatov refers to Americans, they say, they have “Minutemen” in the same (in his opinion) vulnerable silo and with 1 BB inside. “Minuteman-3”, for starters, lightweight ICBM, and when he was carrying 3 BB, and when carrying 1 now. He even saw the Minuteman and Voivod's silos, but at least any of ours? American silos cannot be compared, they are equipped with much more vulnerable sliding lids (they are useless for any damage or falling asleep with the ground), unlike our hinged lids, do not have any clearing and cutting systems (in fact, self-digging of the mine installation and some of it) feed "through the ground), and the mechanisms for emergency removal of the cover also do not have. Yes, and it does not need the Americans, they have never been the main carrier of strategic nuclear forces, and in general their strategic nuclear forces have always focused on the first blow, in the Russian literature it was even accepted to call them not strategic nuclear forces, and the SNS - strategic offensive forces, not strategic nuclear forces . This, however, from a series of our intelligence officers and other spies.
And, despite the fact that the United States is now declaring that they are not going to be the first to use the SNF, this should not be believed, including because they have not even technically prepared for other options, except, of course, the counter and the response oncoming strikes. We will not broadcast about the excessive peace-loving nature of the USSR or the Russian Federation - the term "strike at the appointed time" in relation to its nuclear forces in the USSR appeared, despite the promise of no first use of nuclear weapons. And Russia did not take on such propaganda promises. It is clear that global thermonuclear or even limited war is not the case when some sentiments are permissible. Therefore, it is better not to bring this up.
But innovative ideas from Alexey Georgievich do not run out.
In his opinion, the Sarmatians, equipped with one or two warheads, could have a reserve of seats, so that Russia could quickly restore its return nuclear potential, if necessary, like the United States.
Well, duty with a reduced number of charges to fit into the limits of the START-3 Treaty is a matter of understanding and familiar, and is used by us, by the Americans, and by the British. But putting on duty a heavy ICBM with 1-2 charges, hoping that the pre-war situation will develop along the line of a gradual escalation of tension and will allow you to quickly and, most importantly, covertly, deliver all warheads - self-reliance. Even if it allows, then it will be very difficult to do it secretly - you will have to open the lid, and not all have mines at once, but in turn, and do it when there are no other satellites of the enemy over your head, in general, things can drag on. The submarine can still somehow secretly install charges, to the mobile soil complex - also (try to find out what is being done with it in the hangar, and most likely there won't be inspections in the pre-war period), but it is much more difficult for the ICBM. Not to mention the fact that the expression “to restore the return potential” is not an academician. You can restore the number of charges to the staff by realizing the return potential, which is that there is a place to put, and there is something to add.
But Arbatov offers something else:
Due to this, we could put on alert more systems such as Yars and Bulava, and build additional Borey boats: we apparently do not fulfill the plan in eight boats by the year 2020, so after this period to build, and no longer eight, but twelve. A reserve of warheads to keep on the Sarmats, as well as the United States, while maintaining a reserve of seats on the Trident and Minuteman missiles. Then we, like the Americans, will have the opportunity, quickly, if necessary, to restore our returnable nuclear potential.
Again, the "restoration of the return potential", how can that be? And it would be worthwhile for an academician to know that everything is quite difficult for Americans with return potential. There is something to put, but what to put is still there, but not as much as it seems to someone who is stuck, apparently, in 90's or the beginning of 2000's. So, for example, 450 MBR "Minuteman-3" in no way can have a "return potential" - there are simply no charges for retrofitting on them, although they once carried a charge of 3 instead of the current 1. Simply, those charges are taken from the untimely deceased ICBM MX “Piper”, which were 50 with 10 BB on each, that is, the remainder of the charges refers to the exchange fund and there are no other such.
And at the expense of what "this" - at the expense of setting on duty a heavy ICBM carrying less charges than a light one? This is what savings should bring us - does not Mr. Arbatov want to clarify his point of view? About the completion of all 5 "Boreev-A" before 2020 - no one has planned it for a long time, the 2-3 of the ship will be in time for the end of 2020 to be operational, this is quite enough, there is no rush, the rest should be in time for 2023. . In addition, it is planned to build more 6 ships of this type in the 2020s, they will be built and will be built before 2027, although it is unlikely that everyone will be able to complete by the end of the current HPV-2027.
In general, the distinguished member of the Russian Academy of Sciences wanted something very clever to offer, but it did not work out. But let us remember about the biography of Arbatov Jr. and his political preferences (anyone can look at Wikipedia or spend a little more time and figure out for himself the matter). And we conclude: his position does not look something surprising. His father also opposed the construction of aircraft carriers in the USSR and advocated the transfer of four islands of Japan, being, by the way, a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU since the time of Brezhnev. At the same time, Georgy Arbatov was a participant in the Great Patriotic War, participated in the parade on Red Square in 1941, fought before 1944, and if he hadn’t done anything good in life, that would have been enough.
And the son advocated the ratification of the START-2 Treaty, which, thank God, has not been ratified, which was not ratified by the Russian Federation. He is also a prominent member of the Yabloko party and the author of treatises like this: "Beware, rake!" Which, by the way, did not prevent him from receiving in the same 2016 a prize of the government of the Russian Federation in the field of mass media for “popularizing foreign policy issues”. Not everything, in general, is still fine with us in the state, since this is still happening.
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