T-60 - suicide tank
Counteroffer
In May 1941, Moscow Plant No. 37 was tasked with mastering serial production of the lung tank the new generation of the T-50, which caused a shock among the management of the enterprise, whose modest production capabilities clearly did not correspond to the new facility. Suffice it to say that the T-50 had a complex planetary eight-speed gearbox, and gear cutting production has always been a weak point in this factory. At the same time, workers at Plant No. 37 concluded that it was possible to create a new light tank for direct infantry escort. At the same time, the use of a used engine-transmission installation and the chassis of the floating T-40 tank was assumed. The case was supposed to have a more rational shape, reduced size and enhanced booking.
Convinced of the feasibility and advantages of such a solution, the chief designer N. A. Astrov, together with the senior military representative of the enterprise, Lt. Col. V.P. Okunev, wrote a letter to I.V. Stalin, in which he substantiated the impossibility of releasing the T-50 tank and, on the other hand, the reality of a quick mastering the production of a new tank. The letter in the prescribed manner was lowered into the mailbox at the Nikolsky Gate of the Kremlin in the evening, Stalin read it at night, and already in the morning the deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. A. Malyshev arrived at the plant, who was entrusted with the new machine. He examined the tank’s model with interest, approved it, discussed technical and production problems with the designers, and advised replacing the DShK machine gun with a much more powerful 20 mm ShVAK automatic gun, well mastered in aviation.
Already in the evening of July 17, 1941 was signed by the Resolution of the State Defense Committee No. 179 “On the production of T-60 light tanks at plant No. 37 Narkomsredmash”. It should be noted that this decree was not about the classic “sixties”, but about the T-60 (030) tank, which is apparently identical to the T-40 except for the hull's stern sheet and better known under the unofficial designation T-30.
For T-60 (already in the 060 version), designer A. V. Bogachev designed a fundamentally new, more durable all-welded case with a much smaller volume than the T-40, reserved by volume and low silhouette - with a height of just 1360 millimeters, and feed sheets made of homogeneous rolled katana. The smaller dimensions of the hull made it possible to increase the thickness of all frontal sheets to 15 – 20 millimeters, and then using shielding and 20 – 35, onboard - to 15 millimeters (later to 25), and fodder - to 13 millimeters (then in places to 25). The driver was located in the middle in the forward protruding cabin with a frontal shield and upper landing hatch reclining in a non-combat situation. The driver's viewing device - a quick-changeable mirror glass block “triplex” with a thickness of 36 millimeters was in the front shield (initially and on the sides of the wheelhouse) behind a narrow slit covered by an armored guard. In the bottom thickness of six - ten millimeters there was an emergency hatch.
The new tower with a height of 375 millimeters, designed by Yu. P. Yudovich, had a cone-shaped octahedral shape. It was welded from flat armor plates with a thickness of 25 millimeters located at large angles of inclination, which markedly increased its resistance to shelling. The thickness of the front zygomatic armor plates and weapon masks subsequently reached 35 millimeters. In the roof there was a large hatch commander with a round lid. In the side faces of the tower, to the right and left of the arrow, narrow slots were made, equipped with two triplex-type viewing instruments. The tower was shifted to the left side.
On the second prototype T-60 (060), instead of DShK, we installed a quick-firing 20-mm SHVAK-tank gun with caliber 82,4 barrel length, created on the basis of the wing and turret versions of the ShVAK-20 air cannon. Refinement of the gun, including the results of front-line use, continued in parallel with the development of its production. Therefore, it was officially put into service only on December 1, and on January 1, 1942 of the year received the designation TNSh-1 (Nudelman's tank - Spit) or TNSh-20, as it was later called.
For ease of targeting, the gun was placed in the turret with a significant offset from its axis to the right, which made it necessary to introduce amendments to the readings of the TMFP-1 telescopic sight. The tabular range of the direct shot reached 2500 meters, the sighting - 700, the rate of fire - up to 750 rds / min, the mass of a second volley of armor-piercing shells - 1,208 kilogram. The gun had a tape feed capacity of 754 projectile (13 boxes). The ammunition consisted of fragmentation-tracer and fragmentation-incendiary shells and armor-piercing-incendiary shells with a carbide-tungsten core and a high initial velocity Vo = 815 m / s, which made it possible to effectively hit light and medium-armored targets, as well as machine gun points, anti-tank guns and manpower of the enemy. Subsequently, the introduction of the subcaliber armor-piercing incendiary projectile increased the armor penetration to millimeters 35. As a result, the T-60 could fight at short distances with the German medium tanks Pz.III and Pz.IV of early versions when shooting at the side, and at distances up to 1000 meters - with armored personnel carriers and light SAUs.
To the left of the cannon, a DT machine gun with 1008 ammunition ammunition (16 disks, later 15) was housed in a single unit mounted with it.
Manufacturers
15 September 1941 Moscow plant number 37 released the first serial T-60, but due to the evacuation that followed soon after, production was already stopped on October 26. In total in Moscow made 245 T-60 tanks. Instead of the originally assumed Tashkent enterprise, the enterprise was sent to Sverdlovsk, where it soon earned a new tank factory number 37. Collected on it from 15 December 1941, mainly from parts brought from Moscow, the first two dozen T-30 and T-60 passed 1 January 1942 on the Sverdlovsk streets. In total, up to September, 1942 T-1144 was built in the Urals by 60, after which the plant No. 37 was converted to manufacture components and assemblies for T-34, as well as ammunition.
The workshops of the Kolomna Kuybyshev Machine-Building Plant were involved in the production of armored hulls of the T-60 tank. In October, 1941 of the year, part of them, including those that produced the hulls of the T-60 tanks for Plant No. 37, were evacuated to Kirov, to the site of the local machine-building plant named after 1 May. A new plant No. 38 was created here, and already in January of the 1942, the first T-60 came out of its gates. Since February, 38 began their planned production, while at the same time supplying the rest of the enterprises with cast tracks of tracks, which were previously made only by the FCZ. In the first quarter, an 241 machine was produced, until June, another 535 unit.
Attracted to the production of T-60 and the plant number 264 (Krasnoarmeysky Shipyard in the city of Sarepta near Stalingrad, previously produced river armored boats). He received technical documentation for the tank in a timely manner, but later drove the car on his own, without resorting to the help of the parent company, but not trying to modernize it. 16 September 1941 was joined to the factory team by workers of the evacuated XTZ, who were familiar with tank building, and began working on the production of T-60 in Kharkov. They arrived at 264 with the already prepared reserve of tools, patterns, dies and tank blanks, so the first armored shell was welded to 29 in September. The transmission and undercarriage units were to be delivered to the FCZ (Plant No. 76). The T-34 and B-2 diesel engines loaded by the manufacturer, also at the end of 1941 of the year, their only producer, the Stalingrad enterprise and supplying the T-fours to X-NUMX T-264 for the Thirty-Four, couldn’t pay the same weight to the light T-60 attention. Nevertheless, in December, managed to collect the first 52 machine. In total to June 1942, the 830 T-60 was released here. A significant part of them participated in the Battle of Stalingrad, especially in its initial phase.
GAZ became the head and the largest factory producing T-60, where in October 16 of the year NN A. Astrov came to full-time work with a small group of Moscow colleagues for design support of production. Soon he was appointed deputy chief designer of the enterprise for tank design, and at the beginning of 1941, he received the Stalin Prize for creating T-1942 and T-40.
In a short time, GAZ completed the manufacture of non-standard technological equipment and from October 26 began mass production of T-60 tanks. Armored hulls for them in increasing quantities began to be supplied by the Vyksa Crushing and Milling Equipment Plant (DRO) No. 177, and later - the Murom Locomotive Repair Plant. Dzerzhinsky number 176 with its powerful boiler production, technologically similar tank hull, and, finally, the oldest armor factory number 178 in the city of Kulebaki. Then they were joined by part of the Podolsk Plant No. 180, which was evacuated to Saratov on the territory of the local steam engine repair plant. And yet, armored hulls were chronically short, which held back the expansion of the mass production of T-60. Therefore, soon their welding was additionally organized at GAZ. In September, only three T-60 tanks were manufactured in Gorky. But in October - 215, in November - 471. Until the end of 1941, 1323 machines were released here.
In the 1942 year, despite the creation and adoption of a more efficient lightweight tank T-70, the production of T-60 parallel with it was maintained at GAZ until April (just for 1942 - 1639 machines), at the Sverdlovsk plant No. 37 - until August , at the factory number 38 - to July. For 1942, the 4164 tank was made at all plants. The last 55 machines plant number 37 handed over at the beginning of 1943-th (until February). In total, 1941 T-5839 was released from 60, the army adopted 5796 machines.
Baptism of fire
The first massive use of T-60 refers to the battle for Moscow. They were available in almost all tank brigades and individual tank battalions defending the capital. 7 November 1941 of the year in the parade on Red Square was attended by 48 T-60 from the 33 Tank Brigade. It was a Moscow-made tank, Gorky T-60 first entered the battle near Moscow only December 13.
On the Leningrad front, T-60 began to arrive in the spring of 1942, when 61 vehicles with crews were allocated to form the 60 tank tank brigade. Curiously story their delivery to the besieged city. Tanks decided to transport on barges with coal. It was not bad in terms of disguise. The barges carried fuel to Leningrad, became familiar to the enemy, and not every time they were actively hunted. In addition, coal as a ballast provided the necessary stability for river vessels.
The combat vehicles were loaded from the pier above the Volkhov hydroelectric station. Timber decks were laid on coal, tanks were placed on them, and the barges set off from the shore. Enemy aviation failed to detect the movement of our military unit.
The baptism of the 61 Tank Brigade fell on January 12 1943 - the first day of the operation to break the blockade of Leningrad. Moreover, the brigade, as well as the 86 and 118 tank battalions, which were also armed with light tanks, operated in the first echelon of the 67 army and forced the Neva across the ice. The units equipped with medium and heavy tanks were brought into battle only on the second day of the offensive, after a bridgehead of two or three kilometers was captured, and the sappers reinforced the ice.
T-60 fought on the Southern Front, especially actively in the spring of 1942 in the Crimea, participated in the Kharkov operation and in the defense of Stalingrad. T-60 was a significant part of the combat vehicles of the 1 tank corps (commander - Major General M. E. Katukov), together with other units of the Bryansk Front, which reflected the German offensive on the Voronezh direction in the summer of 1942.
By the beginning of the counter-offensive of the Stalingrad, Don and South-Western Fronts 19 in November 1942, quite a few combat vehicles of this type remained in the tank brigades. The insufficiently armored and weakly armed T-60 had very low stability on the battlefield, becoming easy prey for the enemy’s medium and heavy tanks. For the sake of justice, it must be admitted that the tankers did not particularly like these lightly armored and weakly-armed vehicles with fire-hazardous gasoline engines, calling them BM-2 - a mass grave for two.
The last major operation in which T-60 was used was the lifting of the Siege of Leningrad in January 1944. Thus, 88 T-1 was among the 21 machines of the 60 tank tank brigade of the Leningrad Front, 220 were in the 18 tank brigade, and only 124 of the Volvo Tank Regiment in the 16 of January 1944 was available combat vehicles: two T-10, two T-34, five T-70 and even one T-60.
Based on the T-60, the BM-8-24 (1941) jet installation was produced, and prototypes of the tank with the 37-mm ZIS-19 gun, 37-mm anti-aircraft self-propelled gun (1942), 76,2-mm self-propelled artillery installation, anti-aircraft tank T-60-3 with two twin 12,7-mm machine guns DShK (1942) and self-propelled artillery installation OCU-76 (1944). All these machines were not very successful, as the T-60 tank was clearly not suitable for use as a base for self-propelled guns.
Why were these cars produced?
Usually T-60 is compared with a “colleague” in armament - the German light tank Pz.II. This is all the more interesting because these machines met in real combat. Analyzing the data of these tanks, we can say that the Soviet tank builders managed to achieve almost the same level of protection with the German machine, which, with a smaller mass and dimensions, significantly increased the invulnerability of the T-60. Almost similar and dynamic characteristics of both machines. Despite the high power density, the Pz.II was not the fastest "sixties". Formally, the weapon parameters were the same: both tanks were equipped with 20-mm cannons with similar ballistic characteristics. The initial velocity of the Pz.II armor-piercing projectile was 780 m / s, T-60 - 815 m / s, which theoretically allowed them to hit the same targets.
In fact, everything was not so simple: the Soviet gun TNSh-20 could not fire single shots, and the German KwK 30, as well as KwK 38, could, which significantly increased the accuracy of shooting. Even when firing in short bursts, the T-60 cannon recoil aside, which did not allow for the effective firing of infantry or group targets (for example, a cluster of vehicles). "Two" was more effective on the battlefield and due to the size of the crew, consisting of three people and who also had a much better overview of the tank than the crew of the T-60. An important advantage was the presence of a radio station. As a result, Pz.II as a front-end car was significantly superior to the "sixties". Even more, this advantage was felt when using tanks for reconnaissance, where the inconspicuous, but “blind” and “mute” T-60 was practically useless. The situation was no better when using the T-60 as an infantry escort tank: the “sixties” armor too weak was easily hit by almost all anti-tank weapons and heavy weapons Wehrmacht infantry.
As a result, we can conclude that the T-60 tank was absolutely not needed by the Red Army, since no TTT (if they were developed for it at all) did not correspond. These machines, rarely surviving one attack, are often called suicide tanks. Nearly six thousand T-60 literally burned in the furnace of war. Moreover, they burned almost without a trace: there are relatively few front-line photographs of these vehicles left, little is stored in archives and documents about their combat use. To this day literally survived several tanks of this type.
The question naturally arises: why were they released at all? Plant motivation number 37 is clear, but why the Supreme Command rate agreed with this motivation? The latter circumstance can be explained by the desire to make up for the huge losses in the tanks - on the one hand, and the greatly overestimated number of the German tank fleet - on the other. Imagine that the Germans, having five times fewer tanks than the Red Army, succeed thanks to a well-designed organizational structure of tank formations, excellent cooperation with other branches of service, good controllability and advanced tactical methods of their use. could Alas, at that time we could not oppose anything except a quantitative advantage.
Well, if not T-60, then what? Yes, what the Red Army badly lacked throughout the war was armored personnel carriers! Imagine something resembling a T-60 chassis, but without a turret, or, say, with a pivot or turret (which is better) installation of a DT or DShK machine gun and an anti-tank rifle in addition, capable of carrying at least four to five infantrymen. This is the way the lend-lizov tracked armored personnel carrier “Universal” was equipped, valued fighters worth its weight in gold. And we got them only two thousand. If instead of the T-60, as, by the way, and the subsequent T-70, the 14 of thousands of tracked armored personnel carriers came to the troops, then really, they would be much more confused.
But the history of the subjunctive has not. That was, that was, and nothing can be fixed. And do not resurrect the carriages of mass graves for two. Eternal memory to them, eternal glory to them!
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