Military Review

The state of Syria’s air defense and the prospects for its enhancement with the C-300 anti-aircraft missile system

118
Recently, against the background of successes of the Syrian government forces in the fight against various armed Islamist formations, American and Israeli air attacks have continued to strike objects in Syria. The reasons for this are very different, from protecting civilians from "chlorine attacks" to fighting terrorism and destroying warehouses from weapons Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah.




In order to understand what the Syrian air defense forces currently represent and how they are able to counter modern air attack weapons, let us go back to the past. The formation of a centralized air defense system in the Syrian armed forces began in the 60s, during the period of active confrontation between the Arab countries and Israel. At that time, a number of Middle Eastern states, such as Syria, Egypt and Iraq, received massive economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union. In parallel with the supply of small arms, artillery systems and tanks the most modern jet fighter planes, anti-aircraft guns with radar guidance, anti-aircraft missile systems and airborne control radars were sent to the Arab countries at that time. Since the Arab air defense calculations were not highly qualified, Soviet military advisers were always next to them, and often the anti-aircraft missile battalions covering the most important facilities were fully equipped with Soviet troops.

But we must pay tribute to the Syrians, from all the armies of the Arab coalition they turned out to be the most persistent soldiers, and after training in the Soviet training centers, the Syrian air defense calculations showed a good level of training. The Syrian air defense system, built on Soviet patterns, was constantly subjected to pressure from the Israeli Air Force. I must say that this confrontation came with varying success. As you know, in 1973, during the Doomsday War, the ground forces of the Arab coalition, despite the surprise of the attack and the initial success of the operation, were ineptly lost to the Israelis. At the same time, the Syrian air defense forces worked perfectly. The “Square” medium-range mobile air defense systems proved to be especially effective, which became an extremely unpleasant surprise for Israeli pilots. In Israel, like the United States, where the supplies were mainly from aviation equipment and weapons, at that time there were no active jamming stations capable of counteracting the Kvadrat mobile anti-aircraft missile system, which is an export modification of the Cube air defense system. Although the Arab armies were defeated in 1973, Israeli aircraft suffered heavy casualties in this conflict. According to various sources, from 18 to 100 Israeli combat aircraft were shot down in 120 days of active hostilities, another approximately two dozen heavily damaged fighters and attack aircraft were written off as unsuitable for recovery after returning to their airfields.

However, the Israelis quickly reached the appropriate conclusions and took appropriate measures. In June 1982, during Operation Medvedk 19, the Israel Defense Forces managed to defeat the Syrian air defense force deployed in Lebanon, which included the 24 anti-aircraft missile division: C-75, C-125 and Kvadrat. At the same time, the Israelis widely used the Scout and Mastiff UAVs, which conducted reconnaissance and observation of Syrian airfields, air defense system positions, revealed the location of radar posts and command and control points, and acted as false targets. The American-made anti-radar missiles AGM-45 Shrike and AGM-78 Standard ARM were widely used to defeat the radar review of the air situation and guidance stations for anti-aircraft missiles, and those air defense systems that could not be destroyed were suppressed by active interference. Israeli EW facilities were also able to disrupt the work of the radio networks that were under the control and coordination of the combat operations of the Syrian air defense. The Syrian anti-aircraft missile divisions, which are in range, have been heavily bombarded by Israeli artillery. After that, about a hundred fighter-bombers struck against anti-aircraft gun positions and radar posts. Already in the first two hours of the operation, the Israelis were able to destroy the 15 Syrian air defense system, which predetermined the further course of the hostilities.

After the defeat in June 1982, the Syrian air defense forces were strengthened by new supplies of equipment and weapons from the USSR. In particular, four C-200 long-range air defense systems went to Syria. At the first stage, after the deployment of “two hundred” in the Syrian Arab Republic, they were managed and serviced by Soviet military personnel of anti-aircraft missile regiments, which had previously been deployed under Tula and Pereslavl-Zalessky. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities, the Soviet calculations, in cooperation with the air defense units of Syria, were to reflect Israeli air raids. After the C-200 divisions were deployed in positions, and the radar lights began to take over Israeli aircraft to escort, Israeli aviation activity in the affected area of ​​the complexes dropped sharply.


5B28E anti-aircraft missile of the Syrian C-200ВЭ complex on the 5П72 launcher


For that time, the long-range air defense system of the C-200BE export version was quite an effective means of combating air targets. Its strength is insensitive to electronic interference effective against the C-75 and C-125 complexes. Thanks to the use of anti-aircraft missiles with a semi-active GOS as part of the C-200 air defense missile system, radio interference, previously used for blinding guidance stations with radio-command missiles, has become ineffective against it. On the air goal, putting a powerful noise interference, "two hundred" work even easier. In this case, it is possible to launch the rocket in the passive mode with the ROC turned off. Taking into account the fact that C-200 air defense systems were usually included in anti-aircraft missile brigades of mixed composition with C-75 and C-125 radio command, this circumstance significantly expanded the range of combat capabilities of brigade fire-fighting equipment. The C-200 complexes deployed in Syria made it possible to hit air targets over most of the country and beyond. The range of destruction of targets flying at medium and high altitudes with B-880E (5B28E) missiles is 240 km. The maximum height reach is 40 km, the minimum strike height is 300 m. In total from 1984 to 1988 year, the Syrian air defense forces received 8 C-200BE (channels), 4 technical positions (TP) and 144 B-880E missiles (5) ). Export version “Vegs” were deployed in positions around Homs, Tartus and Damascus.


The zone of destruction of the Syrian air defense missile system as of 2010 year. ZRK С-200 are marked in purple, С-75 - in red, С-125 - in blue, - "Square" - in green

Very numerous in the air defense forces of the SAR were the medium-range C-75М / C-75М3 "Volga" complexes. Before 1987, the Syrian anti-missile forces received the 52 C-75M and C-75М3 and 1918 B-755 / B-759 anti-aircraft missiles. Although by the beginning of the civil war, the age of the newest “seventy-fiveyears” had passed over 20 years, thanks to good care, timely maintenance and repair, they were in good condition, which was largely contributed to the dry climate. As of 2011, about three dozen C-75M / C-75М3 anti-aircraft missile divisions were in combat duty.

As part of military-technical cooperation with the Soviet Union, Syria received the 47 divisional kits of the C-125М / С-125М1А and 1820 SAM B-601PD systems. Approximately 10 years ago, it was agreed that part of the most recent low-altitude complexes would be upgraded in Russia to the C-125-2М “Pechora-2М” level, which will prolong the operational life and significantly increase the combat potential. Deliveries of the Pechora-2M air defense system began in 2013. In total, 12 of such systems was transferred to the Syrian air defense forces.

The state of Syria’s air defense and the prospects for its enhancement with the C-300 anti-aircraft missile system

Mobile launcher of the Syrian air defense missile system "Pechora-2M"


According to the data provided by the Military Balance, as of 2011, the year in Syria had two separate air defense regiments armed with long-range air defense systems C-200BE and 25 brigades armed with stationary air defense systems C-75М / М3 and С-125М / М1А / 2М. More 11 brigades were equipped with self-propelled SAM "Kvadrat" and "Buk-M2E." Three brigades were armed with self-propelled short-range air defense systems "Osa-AKM" and ZRPK "Pantsir-С1". Information on the number of mobile complexes is quite contradictory. Until the middle of the 80-s, more than 50 batteries of the Kvadrat SAM system were supplied from the USSR to Syria.


Mobile launcher 2P25 of the Syrian 2K12 "Square" air defense missile system with 3М9 SAMs


The battery consisted of one self-propelled unit for reconnaissance and guidance, a target designation booth, four self-propelled launchers and auxiliary equipment. At the time when the air defense systems of the Ground Forces of the Soviet Army began to receive the new-generation Buk air defense systems, export squadrons and new anti-aircraft missiles of the 3М9 family continued to be sent to Syria.



Apparently, some of this technology was lost during the fighting in 70-80-s and written off due to wear. According to information provided by the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), as of 2012, there were 27 Kvadrat anti-aircraft missile batteries in Syria. However, this number may be overestimated, or part of the air defense system with the developed resource was “in storage”. In the 21 century, the outdated Syrian "Squares" were planning to replace the new Buk-M2E complexes.


Self-propelled 9А317E installation of the Syrian Buk-M2E air defense system


According to data published by SIPRI, according to the contract concluded in 2008, Syria was to receive 8 Buk-M2 batteries and 160 ZNR 9М317 batteries, which were transferred to the Syrian side in the period from 2010 to 2013. All in all, before the outbreak of the civil war, the Syrian armed forces had more than 200 launchers for mobile anti-aircraft missile systems. In addition to the medium-range air defense systems Kvadrat and Buk-М2E, this number included the small-range Osa-AKM and Strela-10 complexes, which, according to various sources, were from 60 to 80 units. In 70, Syria received a number of short-range Strela-1 air defense missile systems, which, along with ZSU-23-4, staffed anti-aircraft divisions of motorized rifle regiments. However, at present, references to these obsolete complexes based on the BRDM-2 are not in reference books and they are not used by the Syrian army.

As part of the 2006 contract, it was planned to supply Pantsir-C1E anti-aircraft missile-gun systems to the SAR. In the period from 2008 to 2011, 36 ZRPK and 700 ZUR 9М311 were sent to CAP.


Syrian air defense missile system “Pantsir-S1E” firing from 30-mm guns


To enhance the combat capabilities of the target air defense system and to replace obsolete anti-aircraft complexes (primarily C-75М / М3), a contract was signed in 2010 for the supply of C-300PMU 2 anti-aircraft missile systems. According to American and Israeli data, Russia should supply four divisions worth $ 400 million and prepare Syrian calculations. However, under pressure from the United States and Israel, the execution of the contract was halted. According to V. Putin’s statement in an interview on 4 in September of 2013, individual components of the AAMS were delivered to the CAP, then the contract was canceled and the advance was returned to the customer.

To protect small units from low-altitude attacks of air attack weapons in the Syrian armed forces, there were about 2011 man-portable Strela-4000M, Strela-2 and Igla anti-aircraft missile systems in the 3. At present, due to the low immunity of the Strela-2 / 3 MANPADS, they no longer meet modern requirements, but due to their large number, they can still pose a threat to low-altitude air targets due to their mass use. The number of heat traps on a combat aircraft or helicopter is limited and at the required time they can simply be spent, and by and large it does not matter how many years the rocket hit the modern aircraft. However, at the moment most of the MANPADS manufactured in the USSR in the 70-80-ies are likely to be inoperable. This is due to the fact that the shelf life of disposable electric batteries, activated before launch, is long overdue. Simultaneously with the deliveries of the Buk-MHNUMXE, Pechora-2М and the Pantsir-C2E anti-aircraft systems in Russia, several hundred modern Igla-S MANPADS were purchased. In addition to the complexes with guided anti-aircraft missiles, the Syrian army had about 1 anti-aircraft guns and artillery systems of the 4000, 14,5, 23, 37 and 57-mm caliber. Their most valuable were ZSU-100-23 “Shilka”, towed by 4-mm doubles ZU-23 and 23-mm guns with C-57 radar guidance.

Control of the air situation over the territory of Syria, the issuance of target designation of the air defense system and the guidance of fighter aircraft to the middle of 2011, carried out more than 30 radar posts, 2 / 3 of which were deployed in the southwestern part of the country and along the coast. These were mainly old Soviet-made radars obtained in 70-80-s: П-15, П-14, П-18, П-19, П-37, PRV-13 and PRV-16.


Radio altimeter PRV-13 from the radio part, attached to the Syrian air defense system C-200VE


As part of the program to modernize the air defense system before the beginning of the civil war, several modern three-dimensional 36D6 radar were delivered to Syria. Most of the radar stations, as well as anti-aircraft missile systems, were located on the most probable flight routes of the Israeli aviation.


The layout of radar posts in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic


The central control center of the air defense system of the SAR is located in the vicinity of the Saigal air base near Damascus. The Syrian command and control system of air defense forces repeated the Soviet model adopted in the middle of the 80's. The headquarters of the air defense zones (North and South), control centers of anti-aircraft missile formations and units were united into a single network. The exchange of information between headquarters, command posts, anti-aircraft divisions and radio engineering divisions is carried out via VHF and HF radio channels. Before the outbreak of an internal armed conflict, tropospheric, radio-relay and wire communications equipment was widely used.

Despite the unprecedented high density of deployment of anti-aircraft missile systems of various types and a two or three fold overlap of the radar field in the south and east of the country, the combat capabilities of the Syrian air defense forces in the 21 century no longer met modern requirements. The available means of radar reconnaissance are not able to function in the general information space due to the lack of a single automated center for collecting and processing information. The collection and processing of information about the air situation using methods adopted by the USSR Air Defense Forces in 80-s leads to large inaccuracies and delays in the transmission of airborne data. This is due to the hopeless obsolescence of automation systems and control of combat work and low noise immunity of air situation radars and communications equipment. In addition, by the year 2011, many Syrian air defense missile systems and radars had exhausted their service life, and about a third were of the skyrooting due to equipment malfunction. There were major problems with the detection of air targets flying at altitudes of 100 – 200 m. Even in the most important areas, the ability to record low-altitude targets was focal. Without exception, the Syrian air defense radar facilities, with the exception of the Buk-М2E air defense missile system and the Pantsir-C1E air defense missile system, are poorly protected from passive interference and are practically not protected from active interference, and do not have special operating modes when the enemy uses highly accurate weapons. Although the Syrian air defense forces had modern models of equipment and weapons, their share at the time of the beginning of the internal armed conflict was no more than 15%. In general, as early as the end of 90, the ground component of the air defense system of the SAR did not meet modern requirements and could not withstand uninterrupted Israeli and American means of air attack.

As of 2011, the Syrian Air Force had three dozen MiG-25PD interceptors, fifty MiG-23МФ / MLD and about forty MiG-29А. Also, about a hundred hopelessly outdated light MiG-21bis fighters could also attract air targets. The media published information about the modernization of the part of the Syrian MiG-29A. However, a number of reputable foreign sources believe that the modernization disguised deliveries of MiG-29M, ordered by Damascus about 15 years ago.


Syrian MiG-21, prepared for combat mission


During the years of civil war, Syrian fighter aircraft suffered heavy losses. The fleet of MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighters, which were actively used to launch bombings and assault on militants, was reduced by about two times. The reasons for this were both combat damage, accidents and disasters associated with wear and equipment failures due to poor maintenance.

The MiG-25PD interceptors, due to the development of the resource and unsuitability for use as bombers in the initial phase of the civil war, were mothballed in fortified hangars at air bases. According to the published information, the main part of the interceptors suitable for further use is concentrated on the base of the Et-Tiyas air base, located in 4 km to the south-west from the eponymous settlement of Tiyas of the province of Homs.


Syrian interceptors MiG-25PD at Al-Tiyas air base


Later it was reported that part of the interceptors returned to the system. In the spring of 2018, photos of Syrian MiG-25PDs appeared on the network. It is reported that these cars allegedly participated in the reflection of the Israeli air raid, which struck at the alleged control point of the Iranian drones.

What kind of combat success was achieved by fighter-interceptors, the newest of which was built in the 1985 year, is unknown. But the MiG-25 at record height and speed of flight was always very expensive and difficult to operate. In addition, it is unclear how in the conditions of the most powerful radio-electronic interference and air supremacy of Israeli aviation, fighters with outdated airborne radar and communications equipment were aimed at the target. It can be assumed that several reanimated MiG-25 could be used for patrol and demonstration flights or conducted reconnaissance.


Satellite image of Google Earth: MiG-25 and Su-24 at Al-Tiyas air base


Judging by the satellite images of the Syrian air bases, where the MiG-25 was previously based, the bulk of these aircraft is a “real estate”, without any chance of returning to service. The once formidable three-wing interceptors are currently mostly abandoned on the outskirts of airfields outside the runway, or for several years they stand motionless next to arched concrete shelters. Only a few specimens were spotted near the hangars, where the Su-24M, Su-22M and L-39 are being serviced, which are still actively involved in delivering bombings to the militants.

Among the fighters of the SAR Air Force, the MiG-29 is the most valuable. These machines were also used to bomb the positions of Islamists, but very limited. Modern fighters capable of carrying air combat missiles P-27, in Syria, protect and try to prevent their losses. Although the MiG-29M is theoretically capable of withstanding the Israeli F-16I Sufa, the Israelis are outnumbered and better prepared. In addition, outdated ground-based radars are used to target fighters of the Syrian Air Force, and the Israeli Air Force has modern DRLO aircraft. At the beginning of the 21 century, the SAR leadership planned to upgrade its air force by purchasing heavy Su-30 family fighters from Russia. But due to the difficult financial situation and the internal armed conflict that began in Syria, these plans did not materialize.

The civil war that began in 2011 had disastrous consequences for the Syrian air defense system. As early as the summer of 2015, no more than 30% of deployed C-75 and C-125 ADMS were deployed in stationary positions. Also, the number of active radar posts has decreased by approximately two times.


Anti-aircraft missile B-759, destroyed on the CM-90 launcher in the vicinity of Aleppo


The main cause of losses was the hostilities that unfolded between the armed opposition and government forces. Several air defense missile systems and radar stations, which were in the midst of ground battles, were destroyed as a result of artillery and mortar attacks.


Radar destroyed in 2013 on Syrian air base Minnig captured by militants


Some part of the air defense equipment and weapons was in the hands of the militants. Fortunately, among the bearded Islamists, there were no specialists able to exploit C-75 and C-125 complexes that are rather difficult to maintain.


Early modification C-125 air defense system captured by Jaish al-Islam militants in the Eastern Guta area

After the beginning of the civil war, the system of repair and maintenance of air defense equipment created with the help of the USSR fell into disrepair. Prior to 2011, specialized maintenance bases and repair and rehabilitation enterprises, along with centers for training and calculating, made it possible, despite their advanced age, to maintain a sufficiently high degree of combat readiness of the existing anti-aircraft missile systems, radars, control equipment and data transmission equipment. On this infrastructure, technical measures of “minor modernization” and reconditioning of the hardware of the complexes were regularly carried out, anti-aircraft missiles were serviced in specially created arsenals.


Anti-aircraft missile B-759 Syrian complex C-75М3 on the CM-90 launcher


Currently, the eight most recent S-75М3 air defense missile systems built in the middle of the 80-i are in combat duty in the western part of the country and in the vicinity of the ports of Laktakia and Tartus and under Homs. Two C-75М3 complexes at the beginning of 2017 were deployed southwest of Damascus.


Satellite image of Google Earth: position of С-75М3 ЗРК to the south-west of Damascus, the picture was taken 17 January 2017 of the year

In connection with the exhaustion of the technical resource and the inability to maintain in working condition in 2012-2015, the medium-range C-75М air defense systems with the B-755 SAM and low-altitude C-125 with co-ordinated twin launchers were decommissioned. Since it was difficult to evacuate outdated equipment and old anti-aircraft missiles that turned out to be in a combat zone, they were often “disposed of” by exploding directly in the firing position, which made it possible to avoid falling into the hands of militants. As for the complexes, which had further prospects for use, they were taken to storage bases and airfields under the control of the government army. Currently, approximately 10 battalions of low-altitude air defense missile systems C-125М1 and Pechora-2М are deployed in the territory controlled by government Syrian forces.


Satellite image of Google Earth: position of the Pechora-2М system in the vicinity of the port of Lattakia


The same situation exists with the Strela-10, Osa-AKM and Kvadrat military complexes. Until the middle of 2011, the Syrian mobile military air defense systems were engaged in combat duty in the vicinity of military airfields and large military bases. However, judging by satellite images, already at the beginning of 2012, the mobile air defense systems left the places of their previous deployment and moved to shelters in territories free from Islamists. However, in October 2012, at least three Osa-AKM air defense systems with 9М33 missiles became trophies of militants of the Jaish al-Islam group.


OSR-Osa-AKM, captured by militants in 2013 year


Since July, 2013, captured by Islamists, the Osa-AKM SAM system has been used in combat against government aviation. It is reported that the militants managed to shoot down two transport helicopters Mi-8 and damage the combat Mi-25. According to information released by 15 on October 2015 of the year, Major General Igor Konashenkov, a representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense, hit the KAB-500 adjustable bombs, dropped from the Su-34 front-line bomber, destroyed the masked position of the Osa anti-aircraft missile system that had been captured by the militants who had previously been captured by the militants. the armed forces. The concrete shelter in which the air defense system was located was completely destroyed. Apparently, by the end of 2016, all the “Wasps” captured by the militants were destroyed or disabled.

As for the short-range complexes “Strela-10” and “Osa-AKM”, which remained at the disposal of the Syrian army, they have a rather high modernization potential and, after major overhaul and improvement of the electronic filling, they can be used for another 10-15 years. Variants of budget upgrading with simultaneous increase in combat performance are offered by Russian and Belarusian enterprises. Whether they will be implemented in the first place depends on whether there are financial resources for this in Syria.

Unlike the Strela-10 and Osa-AKM systems, the Kvadrat Syrian complexes are in the final stages of their life cycle. Already in the middle of the 80s, the Israelis had learned how to effectively effectively interfere with the radar equipment of a self-propelled reconnaissance and guidance unit. Unlike the Buk air defense missile system, the Kvadrat self-propelled launchers completely depend on the efficiency of the reconnaissance and guidance station and cannot direct anti-aircraft missiles on their own. In addition, the supply of anti-aircraft missiles 3М9 stopped in the middle of 80-x. Currently, stocks of air-conditioned missiles are almost exhausted. In the "Cube" complexes and its "Kvadrat" export version, rockets with a semi-active radar guidance system with a solid-state solid-fuel engine are used. The warranty storage line for the 3М9 SAMs is 10 years, after which the rocket must be serviced with the replacement of composite fuel and the testing of electronic components. The Kvadrat complexes themselves, created using the technologies of the end of 60-s, are built on the element base with a high percentage of vacuum tubes. Based on this, it can be assumed with a high degree of certainty that the Syrian "Squares" will soon be decommissioned and decommissioned. Syria has remained one of the few countries where mobile military air defense systems of the Cube - Kvadrat family are still in service. Most of the states that traditionally use Soviet and Russian air defense systems have switched to modern versions of the Buk air defense system.


1X91 Intelligence and Homing Station from the Kvadrat SAM System, captured by militants in the 2016 year


At the beginning of 2016, images captured by Islamists in the vicinity of Dair-ez-Zor SURN 1С91 and SPU 2П25 with ZUR 3М9 were published online. In this connection, fears were expressed that the Kvadrat that fell into the hands of terrorists could be a danger to military aircraft of the Russian Federation Air Force, operating in Syria. Subsequently, the Russian military aviation actively worked in this area and, most likely, elements of the captured air defense system were destroyed or disabled. In any case, more photos of the captured anti-aircraft complex was not published.

Much of the anti-aircraft artillery, available in the Syrian army, is used for firing at ground targets. First of all, this refers to 23-mm paired ZU-23 installations, which are mounted on different chassis and are quite an effective means of fire support.



During the fighting to clear the settlements from the militants, the ZSU-23-4 Shilka recommended itself well. To reduce losses from cumulative ammunition, home-made lattice screens were installed on a part of the combat vehicles.

Speaking about the current state of the air defense system of the SAR, it is impossible to ignore the most long-range Syrian air defense missile systems, the C-200BE, which cover about 70% of the country's territory and border areas of a number of neighboring countries. However, the mass and dimensions of the C-200BE air defense missile system, as well as the attached radar equipment: P-14, P-80 and PRV-13 are such that their placement requires well-prepared engineering sites. And the process of deploying C-200 from the march takes a day. In addition, launchers with missiles weighing more than 7000 kg and 11 m long are almost impossible to disguise and hide from satellite reconnaissance assets.


Satellite image of Google Earth: position of the C-200VE air defense system east of Damascus


With a record range and height of air targets, the export Vega is essentially stationary and cannot fire at targets flying at altitudes less than 300 m, which makes the “two hundred” practically useless against modern cruise missiles at low altitudes. In addition, the complex, originally designed to deal with strategic bombers, DRLO aircraft, high-altitude long-range reconnaissance aircraft and jammers, has a low probability of hitting a target when firing tactical and carrier-based aircraft that are maneuvering. Despite the high cost and complexity of servicing, the Syrian “dvuhsotki” remain “long arm”, which potential aggressors have to reckon with. The very presence of an anti-aircraft complex in Syria with a long-range 240 km defeat and capable of destroying targets at altitudes up to 40 km forces potential aggressors to take this into account.

Syrian C-200BE regularly participate in the reflection of Israeli air raids. For example, in March 2017, four Israeli Air Force aircraft that had invaded Syrian airspace were attacked with 5B28E anti-aircraft missiles. Missile debris fell on Jordan’s territory. The Syrians reported that, allegedly, one aircraft was shot down, the Israelis - that "... the safety of Israeli citizens or Air Force planes was not under threat."

October 16 2017 of the C-200BE air defense system in response to the destruction of the Osa-AKM air defense missile system on the Lebanese-Syrian border fired an Israeli aircraft in Lebanese airspace. According to the Syrian command, the plane was shot down. According to Israeli data, the response launch of anti-radar missiles disabled radar target illumination.

10 February 2018, the F-16I of the Israeli Air Force was hit by an anti-aircraft missile. The plane fell to the north of the Jewish state. The pilots ejected, the state of one of them is estimated as serious. According to representatives of the Israel Defense Forces, the aircraft was fired from the C-200VE and Buk-M2E air defense systems.

14 April 2018, the Syrian C-200BE, were used to counter the missile attack of the United States, Britain and France in the 2018 year. According to American data, eight missiles were fired, but they did not hit targets. That, however, is not surprising, as already mentioned, the ability of the C-200 air defense system to combat low-altitude targets is very limited.

10 May 2018, C-200BE, along with other air defense systems, were used to counter the attacks of the Israeli Air Force. According to the statements made by the Israeli representatives, one SAM system was destroyed by return fire. In the course of the air strikes, Israeli Air Force fighter-bombers used the Poi-Ai KR.

Until recently, eight C-200BE divisions were deployed in positions in Syria. According to information published in foreign media, during the last Israeli and American air strikes, part of the complexes was disabled. The network published photos of the destroyed radar illuminating the target 5H62 of the airborne, deployed in Er-Romandane, 10 km east of Damascus. Judging by the nature of the damage, the ROC received a direct hit by a rocket, and then caught fire.


ROC 5Н62 of the Syrian air defense missile system С-200ВЭ, destroyed on May 10 position in Al-Romandan


The target illumination radar is the most vulnerable element of the C-200 ADMS. In addition, the combat capability of the complex is sharply reduced in the case of the suppression or destruction of radar tools that issue target designation — the P-14 (P-80) standby radar and the PRV-13 radio altimeter.

A number of foreign and domestic experts indicate that even under the condition that the hardware of the C-200BE systems is operational, over the next few years, stocks of anti-aircraft missiles will be spent. According to some reports, on one launcher in Syria, there are 2-3 missiles. The launch of the 5B28 missile defense system was completed at the end of the 80-x, and Russia is not able to deliver workable missiles. In our country, the latest C-200 systems have been removed from combat duty and disposed of over 10 years ago. It is possible that Iran will be able to help with the preservation of the C-200BE in the combat structure of the Syrian air defense. As is known, the Islamic Republic also operates complexes of this type, and according to Iranian data, they have launched their own production of anti-aircraft missiles for them.

In general, the capabilities of the Syrian air defense system to protect its airspace are very limited. Although the Syrian leadership is making significant efforts to maintain control over the airspace of the country, in a state torn apart by internal conflict, the centralized command and control system of the air defense forces has been destroyed, many regional command posts, radar stations and communications centers have been damaged, and radio relay and cable lines have been damaged. Recent US and Israeli airstrikes have shown that outdated Syrian air defense systems are highly vulnerable to the effects of modern electronic jammers. To date, the Syrian air defense has a pronounced focal character. At times, the number of stationary positions of the air defense system and radar stations in the south and south-east of the country in the areas bordering Jordan, Israel and Lebanon has decreased. There are practically no means of air defense and air control in the north and west of Syria. The Air Force of unfriendly states: the USA, Israel and Turkey actively use these bresses.

The hopes of the Russian “patriotic” that the deployment of our fighters and various anti-aircraft systems at Khmeimim airbase will provide an anti-aircraft “umbrella” over the entire territory of the SAR have proved to be untenable. Russian air defenses in Syria ensure the security of the base itself and do not participate in repelling Israeli and American air strikes against Syrian targets. Thus, the air defense system of the SAR is forced to independently counteract an adversary with significant numerical and technological superiority. Recently, under various pretexts, the United States and Israel have been systematically destroying the Syrian military and industrial infrastructure and the direct air defense weapons. For example, on May 10 of Israel, 2018, during attacks on Iranian forces in Syria, attacked the C-75М3, С-200ВЭ, Buk-М2Э and Pantsir-C1E air defense missile systems. After that, the press service of the Israel Defense Forces published a video of the destruction of a Russian-made anti-aircraft missile-cannon complex with a Spike NLOS rocket.



Shortly before 14 on April 2018, under the pretext of retaliation for Syrian government forces using chemical weapons in the Duma and Eastern Ghouta, the United States, France and the United Kingdom launched a series of rocket attacks on government-controlled objects. In operation, cruise missiles of sea and air-based were used: BGM-109 Tomahawk, Storm Shadow, SCALP, AGM-158 JASSM.

According to the Russian MoD, 103 cruise missiles were detected in Syrian airspace. Of these, an 71 target was hit by fire from an air defense system. The total expenditure was 112 anti-aircraft missiles: C-200BE - 8; С-125М1 / Pechora-2М - 13; Buk-M2E - 29; "Square" - 21; Osa-AKM - 11; Strela-10 - 5; "Pantsir-С1E" - 25.

Thus, it turns out that the Syrian anti-aircraft complexes managed to knock down approximately 70% of cruise missiles, with an average expenditure of 1,6 missiles per target. That, given the current state of the air defense system of Syria, can be considered an outstanding result. However, the main task of the air defense forces is not the defeat of air targets, but the protection of covered objects. Apparently, the Syrian calculations failed to fulfill this task. According to the statements of the American, British and French military, all the objects selected as targets were destroyed, as satellite images of the objects before and after the strikes, as well as reports from the sites, clearly demonstrate. Concerning the effectiveness of Syria’s air defense against repelling missile strikes, there is alternative information. So, according to American data, the Syrians failed to shoot down a single aircraft that participated in the operation, and not one of the 105 launched cruise missiles. The official representative of the US Department of Defense, denying that the Syrians intercepted at least some of the number of missiles, confirmed that during the launching of the missiles, the Russian air defense systems were “active”, but did not attempt to intercept. At the same time in the air was a Russian aircraft AEW X-NUMXM. Apparently, the Russian military shared information about the air situation, provided target designation to the Syrian air defense missile system and some of the cruise missiles were actually intercepted. However, the statement that 50% of air targets that participated in the rocket attack was shot down is not credible.

After aviation and missile strikes began to be inflicted on the objects of government forces with enviable regularity, the question arose of improving the Syrian air defense system and Russian officials began talking about the possibility of supplying C-300P or even C-400 anti-aircraft systems. This in turn caused a flurry of publications in Russian print and online publications, the authors of which, apart from the existing realities, often quite loosely consider various versions of events and are confused in modifications of anti-aircraft missile systems.

On the "Military Review" the author, who regularly writes about the prospects for the deployment of C-300 AAMS in Syria, is Yevgeny Damantsev. A typical example of his work is the publication When will the Syrian C-300 wake up? As the Russian General Staff leads Israel and the USA around the finger. In it, Eugene hints at the possibility that the long-range Russian missiles are already at the disposal of the Syrians, and that the Israeli Air Force during the next raid could expect an unpleasant surprise. Dear author assumes that C-300P divisions can be secretly delivered to Syria and located on the eastern slopes of the Lubnan el-Sharqiya mountain range. At the same time, it is not clear which C-300P version is being discussed, since the text of the publication constantly mentions various options: C-300PS, C-300PMU1 and C-300PMU2.

To make it clear to readers, the difference between the various modifications of C-300P and the probability of their occurrence in the CAP, we consider them in the order of appearance. The adoption of the C-300PS into service took place in the distant 1982 year, and mass production was carried out before the start of the 90's. The system, which replaced the C-300PT with towed launchers, used the same 5В55Р missiles with a semi-active seeker and a maximum range of air targets 75-90 km. The main difference between C-300PS and C-300PT was the placement of launchers on the MAZ-543 self-propelled chassis. Due to this, it was possible to achieve a record short deployment time - 5 minutes.


Self-propelled launchers 5P85С and 5П85Д from the composition of the C-300PS air defense system


Prior to the start of mass deliveries of C-400 ZRSs, it was C-300PS, together with relatively small C-300PMs, which formed the basis of the Russian anti-aircraft missile forces. The C-300PS export version, known as the C-300PMU, from the second half of the 80-x was supplied to the allies under the Warsaw Pact - Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, and at the beginning of the 90-x in the PRC. In addition to some changes in the composition of electronic equipment, relating mainly to the system of state recognition, the export version is also different in that the launchers are offered only in the version transported on semi-trailers.

The C-300PS anti-aircraft missile system has been on combat duty for a long time and has proven itself well in the military. However, at the moment, the C-300PS is considered obsolete and should be replaced by a new generation of anti-aircraft systems. The age of most of this type of SRS has passed or is nearing 30 years. At the same time, the assigned resource of the hardware and mechanisms of the C-300PS is 25 years, and the warranty period for the storage of the freshest 5В55РМ anti-aircraft missiles expired in the 2013 year. The C-300PS operated in the VKS RF are mostly worn out and are in the final stages of the life cycle. In 2016, the equipment of several Russian divisions was donated to the CSTO allies - Belarus and Kazakhstan. At the same time, military observers noted that all transferred C-300PS air defense systems have a small stock of missiles and need to be repaired. It is clear that in this situation, the supply of C-300PS to the Syrian armed forces cannot be discussed.

In the 1989, the tests of the C-300PM ATP were completed. Thanks to the introduction of the 48H6 rocket and the increase in power of the multi-function radar, the target destruction range increased to 150 km. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union had the most negative impact on the volume of serial construction of the new anti-aircraft system. Although the C-300PM was officially put into service in 1993, in the conditions of massive reduction and reform of the air defense forces, production for the needs of its own armed forces lasted only a few years. By 2014, all the existing C-300PM AESs have undergone refurbishment and modernization, after which they received the designation C-300PM1. The export version of C-300PM was offered to foreign customers under the designation C-300PMU1. The buyers of this anti-aircraft system were Greece, China and Vietnam.



In the course of modernization, part of the anti-aircraft systems was transferred to towed launchers, which is not particularly important when carrying combat duty at stationary positions in peacetime, but is a step back in terms of mobility in case of need to hastily change the firing position. Since 2013, work is underway to fine-tune previously issued AAMS to the C-300PM2 “Favorite” level. At the same time, due to the introduction of the new 48H6E2 SAM in ammunition, the refinement of radar tools and guidance equipment, the launch range was extended to 200 km and the possibilities of hitting ballistic targets were expanded. The first regimental set of C-300PM2 air defense systems began combat duty in the Moscow region in December 2015. The export version of the C-300PM2 AAMS is known as C-300PMU2. This modification was delivered to China, Azerbaijan and Iran. The main external feature, which makes it easy to distinguish the C-300PMU2 from other modifications, is a towed launcher with a Russian-made BAZ-6402 tractor, which is also used for transporting the C-400 launcher.


Towed 5P85TE2 launcher from C-300PMU2 at a parade in Baku


Based on past experience, it is known that the process of fulfilling a contract for the construction of anti-aircraft systems of the C-300P family and training calculations takes 2-3 of the year. At the same time, the commercial value of the C-300PMU2 regimental kit (2 srdn) is estimated at no less than $ 300 million. Considering the fact that there is no information on concluding a contract and making new C-300PMU2 radars, the possibility of delivering this export modification to Syria should be considered as an unwarranted fantasy. In addition, several years ago, representatives of Concern EKR Almaz-Antey, OJSC, stated that the serial construction of the C-300П off-road missile system will be completed and all production facilities will be used for the production of C-400. An attentive reader may argue that Syria can be delivered with the S-300PM1 / PM2 air defense systems available in the Russian armed forces. This is certainly possible, but it will certainly be an irrational step, since it is impossible to quickly train the Syrian calculations and bear combat duty on them to the Russian military, which in turn is fraught with combat losses. It is naive to believe that the Israelis and the Americans will refrain from destroying the anti-aircraft systems that are located outside the Russian military base and threaten their combat aircraft. Yes, and the anti-aircraft cover of the most important strategic facilities on the territory of Russia is very far from perfect, and the donation of several modern and very expensive anti-aircraft missile systems to another country clearly will not benefit our defense capability.

Separately, I want to say about the probability of survival of C-300P in Syria. Statements about the possibility of placing an anti-aircraft division on the mountain slopes of those who are even slightly familiar with the requirements for the engineering arrangement of firing positions, does not cause anything but a smile. In the past, the Syrians had already practiced the organization of anti-aircraft missile ambushes in mountainous areas, where Israeli aircraft tried to hide behind the mountain ranges, being out of sight of ground-based radars. But the preparation of bases and the rise of the air defense system in the mountains were fraught with great difficulties. At the same time, Kvadrat and Osa-AKM military complexes were used, which are much less bulky and heavy than the C-300P. I would like to remind you that the 5P85С self-propelled launcher on the MAZ-543M chassis with four anti-aircraft missiles weighs more than 42 tons, with a length of 13 and a width of 3,8 meter and its cross-country maneuverability is very limited. Often, people far from the armed forces forget that the anti-aircraft division, in addition to the launchers, includes about a dozen multi-ton machines for various purposes: command and control radars, detection and guidance radars, antenna posts with tractors, transport-charging machines and mobile diesel generators . It is difficult to imagine how all this very vulnerable and cumbersome economy will be able to move freely around a country in the grip of a civil war, and how the presence of several antiaircraft battalions with long-range missiles in modern conditions can be hidden from intelligence, radio and space intelligence.

In the domestic media for the C-300P and C-400 AIRCRAPS a halo of “super-weapon” has been created, capable of equally successfully combating both aerodynamic and ballistic targets at long-range distances. At the same time, it is somehow not customary to say that the anti-aircraft systems that are certainly outstanding in their characteristics have some drawbacks. In the case of participation in the repulse of massed raids of enemy air attack weapons, the weak point of the long-range anti-aircraft systems is a long reload time. With a high fire performance of ZRS-300P and C-400 in a real combat situation, a situation may arise when all the ammunition in the launchers will be used up. Even if there are spare anti-aircraft missiles and transport-charging vehicles at the launch site, a lot of time will be needed to replenish the ammunition. Therefore, it is very important that heavy anti-aircraft systems are covered with short-range complexes, which is not always possible to put into practice.

It is no secret that the Americans and Israelis in the course of training their pilots pay special attention to training in the fight against the Russian C-300P and C-400. It is reliably known that the C-300P radar equipment is available at American test sites, and in the past, the Israeli Air Force, together with the US Air Force, worked on the destruction of Russian-made long-range air defense systems. In this case, C-300PMU / PMU1, available in Slovakia, Bulgaria and Greece, were used as a conditional enemy.

Currently, the possibility of providing C-300P to the Syrian armed forces is an argument in dialogue with our “partners” - the United States and Israel. However, this is unlikely to be implemented in practice. This step is capable of causing a further escalation of tension, and from a military point of view it is devoid of much sense. The vulnerability of costly and cumbersome anti-aircraft systems from sabotage actions in a country where government forces have not yet regained control over the entire territory is very high. And without proper support from the radio engineering divisions, the effectiveness of the C-300P will be significantly reduced. In practical terms, a more rational step, capable of really strengthening the Syrian air defense system, is the delivery of the latest export versions of the Buk and Tor systems. Unlike the C-300P air defense missile systems, the combat vehicles of these complexes, even if they do not have such a range of destruction, are capable of conducting combat operations autonomously, possess better mobility and the ability to effectively combat low-altitude, highly maneuverable targets. However, the solvency of Syria in the present conditions causes great doubts, and if the decision on the provision of modern anti-aircraft weapons will still be made, then the financial burden will ultimately fall on the Russian taxpayer.

Based on:
https://missilethreat.csis.org/systems/s-300p.html
http://geimint.blogspot.ru/2007/09/syrian-sam-network.html
https://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2013/09/130913_israel_yom_kippur_war_archives
https://southfront.org/syrian-air-defense-capabilities-pechora-2m-systems-photo/
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-air-defense-confirms-downed-israeli-warplanes/
http://spioenkop.blogspot.ru/2016/08/photo-report-syrian-arab-air-defence.html
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19143
https://petrimazepa.com/peekaboo
https://www.discred.ru/news/rossijskaja_aviacija_unichtozhila_v_sirii_zakhvachennyj_boevikami_zenitno_raketnyj_kompleks/2015-10-15-16291
https://www.discred.ru/2018/05/11/kto-vinovat-v-unichtozhenii-buka-i-pantsirya-v-sirii/
https://commentarii.ru/blog/43999997192/kadry-unichtozhennyh-rls-izrail-vyvel-iz-stroya-dva-diviziona-s-200
https://sputniknews.com/world/201509111026884045-russia-syria-air-defense-forces-supplies/
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syrian-air-defense-capabilities-and-the-threat-to-potential-u.s.-air-operat
https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/34248/
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Engagement-Fire-Control.html
Author:
118 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. Vard
    Vard 6 June 2018 05: 34 New
    +2
    There is air defense in Syria and it works ... Israelis and others who do not need to enter its area of ​​influence ... This time ... And the second .. That unhealthy excitement that swept some at the rumors of the S-300 delivery clearly shows that they there is nothing to answer yet ..
    1. Bongo
      6 June 2018 05: 44 New
      +20
      Quote: Vard
      There is air defense in Syria and it works ... Israelis and others who do not need to enter its zone of operation.

      Unfortunately, Syrian objects enter and regularly destroy.
      Quote: Vard
      That unhealthy arousal that has engulfed some in the rumors about the delivery of the C-300 clearly shows that so far they have nothing to answer ..

      Do you seriously think that several C-300P divisions can drastically influence the situation in the SAR? Please answer where do you offer them to take and who will manage them?
      1. Grandfather
        Grandfather 6 June 2018 05: 55 New
        +3
        P-19 radar, destroyed in 2013, at the Minnig Syrian air base captured by militants
        -first photo, doesn’t look like a P-19 ... where is the altimeter from? it’s rather a “radar landing system” RSP-10 or a modification of it. P-19
        1. Bongo
          6 June 2018 05: 59 New
          +6
          Quote: Dead Day
          the first photo, doesn’t look like a P-19 ... altimeter from where?

          PRV-13 as well as P-14 (P-80) is part of the radio equipment that give the exact target designation of the ROC. As for the P-19, after combat damage, it is difficult to judge what it is. The sources indicated that it was the P-19 that was destroyed at the aerodrome, although you may be right about the RSP-10.
      2. Vard
        Vard 6 June 2018 08: 13 New
        -1
        It seems ... this is about the S-300 ... you came from far away ... where there is no Internet ... And the whole epic with the supply of the S-300 to Syria and the Israeli dances about this has passed ... And the destruction will begin .. Freshly tradition ... but hard to believe ...
        1. Bongo
          6 June 2018 08: 48 New
          +12
          I do not argue, to you from SAR probably more clearly ...
          Quote: Vard
          And the whole epic with the supply of C-300 to Syria and the dances of Israel on this occasion have passed you ... And the destruction will begin ... The tradition is fresh ... but it's hard to believe ...

          So if you are better informed than me, then you can share what the alignment of the Syrian air defense system really is, and with the numbers on hand you will prove the fallacy of everything stated in this publication?
          1. Vard
            Vard 6 June 2018 08: 54 New
            -1
            So I was not mistaken ... you have no internet ... Pechalka ...
            1. Bongo
              6 June 2018 08: 59 New
              +11
              Quote: Vard
              So I was not mistaken ... you have no internet ... Pechalka ...

              And I was not mistaken with the facts you have tight. And you did not read this publication, but only looked at the pictures, or did not understand anything from the read. Pechalka.
          2. Safevi
            Safevi 6 June 2018 09: 23 New
            +8
            Thanks to the author for a very competent review.
      3. omit
        omit 6 June 2018 09: 46 New
        +7
        Bongo: "Unfortunately, Syrian objects come in and regularly destroy"
        Why "Unfortunately? Do you have relatives there? laughing
        1. Bongo
          6 June 2018 09: 59 New
          +10
          Quote: omit
          Bongo: "Unfortunately, Syrian objects come in and regularly destroy"
          Why "Unfortunately? Do you have relatives there?

          I have no relatives in Israel either. no But do you find it funny when rockets fall on your cities and towns? In my opinion, it is also regrettable.
          1. omit
            omit 6 June 2018 12: 59 New
            +4
            Bongo "I have no relatives in Israel either."
            And here I do not agree with you. Every "Soviet" in Israel has relatives, maybe not very close. You dig in. At least you definitely have acquaintances, but hardly in Syria.
            1. Bongo
              6 June 2018 13: 11 New
              +5
              Quote: omit
              And here I disagree with you. Every "Soviet" in Israel has relatives, maybe not very close ones. You rummage.
              I do not see anything shameful in Jewish roots, but alas ... request
              I have pictures of my great-grandfather from my father's line. In the 19 century, he moved to the Amur region from Ukraine. The rest are also of peasant origin, from the central Russian provinces.
              1. omit
                omit 6 June 2018 13: 27 New
                +4
                Bongo "The rest are all of peasant origin, from the central Russian provinces."
                Therefore, are you worried about Syria? And if your great-grandfather is from Ukraine, then there are definitely Jews in your relatives. Everyone mixed up there. I am a Siberian myself, and my parents are from Ukraine. And you have to worry about civilized people.
                1. Bongo
                  6 June 2018 13: 36 New
                  +6
                  Quote: omit
                  Therefore, are you worried about Syria? ... And it is necessary to worry about civilized people.
                  I don’t know if you served in the army, but the most notorious pacifists are often military, since it is they who best understand the possibilities of modern weapons and the kinds of evils it can bring.
                  I am against the fact that people would oppress or kill each other, no matter what motives they were guided by. And also against the division into "civilized" and "savages."
                  1. omit
                    omit 6 June 2018 15: 36 New
                    +2
                    Bongo
                    "I don’t know if you served in the army"
                    I served in the 10th Air Defense Army, in the control of the RTV regiment. But this does not apply. Do you think that Israel oppresses the Arabs from Russia, and I look from Israel, and I see that we are being forced to defend myself. I am also against the fact that people would oppress or kill each other, but you don’t know the Islamist mentality at all. I’m used to thinking for myself, and they do what the mullah orders them. If he said, go kill the wrong person, then they’ll do it. And what - to sit and wait? This will not happen. At this point I am finishing the dialogue. We need to work.
                    1. Bongo
                      6 June 2018 15: 52 New
                      +3
                      Quote: omit
                      I served in the 10 army air defense, in the management of the regiment RT.Vno this is irrelevant.

                      Well, you can tell a colleague.
                      Quote: omit
                      Do you think that Israel oppresses Arabs

                      Excuse me, where did I write that Israel undeservedly "appends the Arabs"?
                      Quote: omit
                      but you absolutely do not know the mentality of the Islamists.

                      Well, living in the Far East is difficult for me to study, although we also have enough "hardworking migrants" and they do not always behave acceptable.
                      Quote: omit
                      If he said go kill the wrong one, then they will.

                      Of course you know better. But since we are talking about Syria, tell me how until recently the positions of the Islamists in this country were strong and how are the Islamists related to the Syrian air defense?
                      Quote: omit
                      On this dialogue I finish. It is necessary to work.

                      It is a pity, I would talk.
      4. Vladimir 5
        Vladimir 5 30 July 2018 19: 51 New
        -3
        The article is clearly targeted, because the author Linnik clearly has a second Israeli passport (last name as the spouse of Prime Minister A. Medvedev), therefore you need to be critical. Why not put into operation the existing air defense systems, it is ten times cheaper, and if possible with modernization. The main conclusion is that the Israelis are aware of the existing air defense of Syria and not only everything, and are building actions ahead of schedule. The discharge of classified information on the face, such and such results. In support of this, the actions of Russian air defense in Syria are absolutely not opposed to frequent Israeli air strikes on Syrian territory .. Betrayal continues, and who is responsible for this?
        1. Bongo
          31 July 2018 11: 37 New
          +1
          Quote: Vladimir 5
          The article is clearly targeted, because the author Linnik, clearly has a second Israeli passport (last name as the wife of Premier A. Medvedev), therefore you need to be critical.

          It is critical to refer to such comments, since there is no doubt that only a "stupid person" can write this. wassat fool
    2. yehat
      yehat 6 June 2018 10: 58 New
      +6
      the presence of air defense in Syria is now only in a very small territory
      formal coverage does not give anything without the creation of a full-fledged defense, and
      there is no money for this and will not be in the near future. No less problems - competent staff. He is not there either. That is what Israel uses.
      And no point deliveries of c300, s400, s9999 will not change this in the near future.
      In fact, Syria’s air defense is now an inferior short-range point defense of objects.
      A small exception is the Hmeimim base. It effectively covers a radius of about 100-150 km.
      everything, more about any air defense against jet aircraft, it is not necessary to speak.
      there are manual complexes and various kinds of small-caliber artillery, but they just do not allow shooting point blank, no more.
    3. svp67
      svp67 6 June 2018 12: 26 New
      +6
      Quote: Vard
      Air defense in Syria is and it works ...

      The strange definition of the phrase "Air Defense" - IT ... do not find it immediately causes associations.
      Quote: Vard
      Israelis and others who do not need to go into its area of ​​coverage ...

      You, like Syrian air defense, live by the concepts and understanding of the battle of the last century. AND WHY should they enter the air defense coverage area if they have long had both tactical methods and means for working from long distances and, frankly speaking, SUCCESSFULLY operate
  2. Amurets
    Amurets 6 June 2018 07: 07 New
    +5
    In practical terms, the delivery of the latest export versions of the Buk and Tor air defense systems looks like a more rational step that can truly strengthen the Syrian air defense system. Unlike S-300P air defense systems, combat vehicles of these systems, even if they do not have such a destruction range, are able to conduct combat operations autonomously, have better mobility and the ability to effectively combat low-altitude highly maneuverable targets
    Sergey, thank you for a specific and clear analysis. Because the Israeli Air Force and the coalition operate without entering the S-200 air defense zone, air defense systems with pronounced abilities of low-altitude interception of cruise missiles are really needed here. It is clear that the old S-200; S-75s with their large-sized missiles are poorly adapted for low-altitude interception of cruise missiles.
    1. Bongo
      6 June 2018 08: 53 New
      +6
      Quote: Amurets
      Sergey, thank you for a specific and precise analysis.

      And to you, thanks for the kind words!
      Quote: Amurets
      According to how Israeli air forces and kaolitsi operate, without entering the C-200 air defense system, they really need air defense systems with pronounced capabilities of low-altitude interception of cruise missiles. It is clear that the old C-200; C-75 with their large-size missiles are ill-suited for low-altitude interception of cruise missiles.

      It is not only the lack of complexes capable of dealing with low-altitude and low-profile targets. The battle management system is in dire need of improvement. As is well known, the Israelis are very effectively jamming radar and radio networks with interference. But until the civil war in the SAR ends, it’s premature to talk about the global strengthening of air defense.
      1. Amurets
        Amurets 6 June 2018 09: 27 New
        +3
        Quote: Bongo
        But until the civil war ends in the SAR, it is premature to talk about a global strengthening of air defense.

        Here I fully agree with you and we must begin with the restoration of radar fields. Do you remember which network was in the 11 th air defense army? But in our open spaces not one SAR fit. In fact, in the SAR it is necessary to restore everything on new digital technologies, which is not always the case in Russia.
        1. Bongo
          6 June 2018 09: 49 New
          +3
          Quote: Amurets
          Here I fully agree with you and we must begin with the restoration of radar fields. Do you remember which network was in the 11 th air defense army? But in our open spaces not one SAR fit. In fact, in the SAR it is necessary to restore everything on new digital technologies, which is not always the case in Russia.

          In the Primorsky and Khabarovsk Territories, the equipment of a significant part of the radio engineering units was updated. But in the North, holes remained.
          1. Amurets
            Amurets 6 June 2018 09: 53 New
            +2
            Quote: Bongo
            In the Primorsky and Khabarovsk Territories, the equipment of a significant part of the radio engineering units was updated.

            We, too, seem to be updating. And here is where the 72nd Air Defense Corps stood, solid holes.
          2. Alex_59
            Alex_59 6 June 2018 12: 27 New
            +3
            Quote: Bongo
            In the Primorsky and Khabarovsk Territories, the equipment of a significant part of the radio engineering units was updated. But in the North, holes remained.

            We also updated. For the first time I saw live radar with headlight five years ago. At least some joy.
      2. Normal ok
        Normal ok 6 June 2018 16: 31 New
        +3
        Sergey, could you review Ukraine’s air defense? In its current state (as far as open sources allow).
        1. Bongo
          7 June 2018 02: 34 New
          +1
          Quote: Normal ok
          Sergey, could you make an overview of the air defense of Ukraine? In its current state (as far as open sources allow)

          Peter, I wrote about the air defense of Ukraine in 2016 year. Since then, little has changed.
          The current state of the air defense of the countries of the former Soviet Union republics. Part 2
          The current state of the air defense of the countries of the former Soviet Union republics. Part 3
          (clickable) hi
    2. yehat
      yehat 6 June 2018 11: 00 New
      +3
      the main problem is not even the quality of the missiles - the sky of Syria is corny not covered by reconnaissance equipment. There is no timely target designation.
    3. Mihail28
      Mihail28 14 August 2018 04: 00 New
      0
      Quote: Amurets
      It is clear that the old S-200; S-75 with their large missiles

      Strongly said, one might think that the C-300, C-400 have small-sized missiles.
      1. zyablik.olga
        zyablik.olga 27 August 2018 08: 59 New
        +2
        Quote: Michael28
        Strongly said, one might think that the C-300, C-400 have small-sized missiles.

        And compare the size and mass of the C-300P and C-200 missiles.
  3. merkava-2bet
    merkava-2bet 6 June 2018 07: 30 New
    +5
    Thank you for a very interesting material, I learned a lot of new things, I am waiting for new works.
    1. Bongo
      6 June 2018 08: 56 New
      +7
      Quote: merkava-2bet
      Thank you for a very interesting material, I learned a lot of new things, I am waiting for new works.

      I tried to express not biased, although in the past I served with people who participated in hostilities against the Israeli Air Force. In my opinion, in the interests of Assad will make peace with Israel, but then he will lose the support of Iran. But one way or another, the conflict cannot last forever.
  4. g1washntwn
    g1washntwn 6 June 2018 08: 02 New
    +1
    financial burden will ultimately fall on the Russian taxpayer

    Again 25 about the "starving pensioners." $ 800 a year from each, so as not to turn into a kind of "former fraternal" bits and raw material colonies, this is not so much, given that the US is tearing its taxpayers at $ 2800 (... the "God-chosen" did not hide from this figure? :) ) to keep the existing economic colonies in check and try to capture new ones.
    I would not raise the issue of SAR air defense in the first place. As the practice of the existence of nuclear weapons shows, gopniks are stopped only by the high probability of unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike. Protection is undoubtedly necessary, but for ATS, first of all, such striking means are needed that will allow such unacceptable damage to be inflicted on any kind of aggression. Iskander sets brains better than the C-300.
    They saw the Oka through the INF Treaty (although it was up to 500 km and should not have gotten into conditions), but it would be very useful there now, Point, anyway, is a bit short.
    1. yehat
      yehat 6 June 2018 11: 09 New
      +7
      You are a typical soldafon who prefers not to see anything beyond his logic.
      You indirectly vote for an arms race that you are guaranteed to lose.
      The only sane way to strengthen defense is to develop tactics and means of defense that are quite effective economically. Now they are stupidly gone. You need to invest money not in your stupidities, but in the technological leap of organizing more effective air defense. Distributed network of sensors, including passive (infrared, optical, etc.), location quality, frequency diversification, defense means against massive volleys of cruise missiles, cheap patrol location means.
      1. g1washntwn
        g1washntwn 6 June 2018 12: 01 New
        0
        Yes, this is my personal opinion (let’s leave about Saldafon’s, your trolling is so-so, at the level of preschool). Nonsense is trying to eliminate the consequences, not to prevent the cause.
        Best defense is attack. Competent air defense is good, but air defense only minimizes the damage caused by the strike, and does not prevent it at the decision-making level. The bulletproof vest has not yet stopped a single robber, but personal weapons, just demonstrated, very much. <- this is what I see and you do not see.
        1. parma
          parma 6 June 2018 13: 59 New
          +4
          I remember already screaming about a war in a foreign land ... Means of destruction are good when you can use them, and if you strike not the first, this is already a problem ... You are right, the bulletproof vest has not stopped anyone yet, but you allowed to use service weapons and after entering the carrier ...
          1. g1washntwn
            g1washntwn 6 June 2018 14: 18 New
            0
            Nuclear doctrine is also declared as a retaliatory strike, in the trash? But no one is in a hurry, do not tell me why?
            ATS cannot afford И body armor И PM. The question is OR you will be kicked on the head with your feet in spite of the dressed body armor OR you put your gun on the head of the attacker. The difference is felt, isn't it?
        2. yehat
          yehat 6 June 2018 14: 00 New
          +4
          you cannot retaliate with missiles in Washington in response to a raid in Syria.
          it is a reality to be reckoned with. Your tactics work only with a comparable balance of power. And if he is not, you can only achieve that it was not profitable to attack. The Germans, however, solved this problem in the years 44-45 with respect to Soviet tanks - they made a cheap and simple faustpatron, which put an end to attacks on settlements on the move.
          So our air defense needs a conditional “Faustpatron,” not a pair of tanks that the aggressor will not even notice.
          1. g1washntwn
            g1washntwn 6 June 2018 14: 20 New
            -1
            Comrade Kim Jong-un will not agree with you either.
            1. parma
              parma 6 June 2018 14: 48 New
              +5
              The United States can afford the position of the forces, and only they show reality ... Let's consider this option - suppose a US helicopter flies into the airspace of the SAR to pick up a special forces group after a sortie to destroy the leader of the militants (by air strikes, the Kyrgyz Republic or by the forces of the group itself, Do you propose to respond with Iskander’s launch, let’s say, at the base in Turkey? Missile defense at US bases in the region is sufficient to intercept a missile, as a result of which there is no physical damage, but this is a political spit in the United States that even Russia will condemn with a probability of 70 percent. As a result, the United States in response without losses (since the current air defense cannot be repelled), the complex itself and a couple of parts of the SAA will be bombed. This is followed by new launches by the SAR on US bases (unless of course there are still complexes), and, accordingly, an even greater reaction from the United States (by the way, which is important with the support of almost all! Countries) up to the ground operation and "forcing the SAR to peace "! In this situation, our country will not be able to intervene (greetings from Iraq in 1991), and Syria itself will have enough power for 2 days (and then, as in Iraq in 2003, a coalition led by the United States will re-shell damaged tanks so that they are definitely useless , and the military-industrial complex work) ..
              Strengthening e air defense will allow, if not stopping, then minimizing the violation of the borders of Syria, at least in areas controlled by the SAA ..
            2. yehat
              yehat 6 June 2018 15: 56 New
              +3
              in Syria, following the path of North Korea is simply suicide.
  5. Romario_Argo
    Romario_Argo 6 June 2018 08: 49 New
    -1
    preconceived article, nothing at all (!), only the opinion of the author is spelled out
    * And to I. Konashenkov, in general, there is no faith, according to the author
    1. Bongo
      6 June 2018 09: 02 New
      +12
      Quote: Romario_Argo
      preconceived article, nothing at all (!), only the opinion of the author is spelled out

      So expose the author of this "libel". I am sure you will not have any difficulty in the "fluff and dust" to break everything stated here. And indiscriminately shit rush mind is not necessary. negative
    2. zyablik.olga
      zyablik.olga 6 June 2018 14: 49 New
      +5
      Quote: Romario_Argo
      preconceived article, nothing at all (!), only the opinion of the author is spelled out

      In my opinion, the criticism should be not only constructive, but also substantive, and you forgive, apparently, are incapable of it. fool
      Quote: Romario_Argo
      And Konashenkovu I.E., in general, there is no faith, according to the author

      stop This is your opinion, not the author. Do not give him their own conjectures. Incidentally, with regard to our official "govorov heads," then there really is no trust in them, since they too often lie.
  6. Rokossovsky
    Rokossovsky 6 June 2018 09: 09 New
    +7
    Very high quality article! Thanks to Sergey for the work done! good
  7. Andrey VOV
    Andrey VOV 6 June 2018 09: 57 New
    +3
    Phew ... and I thought Damancev author ...
    1. Bongo
      6 June 2018 10: 14 New
      +5
      Quote: Andrey VOV
      Phew ... and I thought Damancev author ...

      Than Eugene did not please you, he sometimes writes funny things.
  8. Professor
    Professor 6 June 2018 10: 37 New
    +8
    After that, the press service of the Israel Defense Forces published a video of the destruction of a Russian-made anti-aircraft missile-gun complex by a Spike NLOS rocket.

    This is not a spike nlos.

    For the article as usual offset. good
    1. Bongo
      6 June 2018 13: 24 New
      +3
      Quote: Professor
      This is not a spike nlos.

      I also have doubts about the type of rocket used in the defeat of the "Shell". But a number of sources refer in this question to your military department.
      Quote: Professor
      For the article as usual offset.

      I’m still not going to write about Israel’s air defense and anti-missile defense systems, frankly speaking, there is not enough reliable data.
      1. Professor
        Professor 6 June 2018 13: 52 New
        +4
        Quote: Bongo
        I also have doubts about the type of rocket used in the defeat of the "Shell". But a number of sources refer in this question to your military department.

        Our MO never reported exactly what the blow was dealt to. Nevertheless, to calculate according to the "picture" with the GOS its affiliation is not difficult. This is not Spike.

        Quote: Bongo
        I’m still not going to write about Israel’s air defense and anti-missile defense systems, frankly speaking, there is not enough reliable data.

        I am sitting next to an Airman with a Patriot. I can ask him. Joke. He will not tell. wink
        1. Bongo
          6 June 2018 13: 58 New
          +2
          Quote: Professor
          I am sitting next to an Airman with a Patriot. I can ask him. Joke. He will not tell.

          Sorry, I would have many questions for him.
          By the way, you did not fulfill your promise regarding comments on the article about "Javelin".
          1. Professor
            Professor 6 June 2018 14: 55 New
            +5
            Quote: Bongo
            Sorry, I would have many questions for him.

            He is depressed. He 3 year on batteries served urgent and now the backup serves a month a year and he himself never had the opportunity to click on the "Start" button. All the "interesting" is not in his shift. lol

            By the way, I can share information about how the American Hawk was modernized and it was able to bring down the MiG-25. Upgraded it already sergeant technician.

            Quote: Bongo
            By the way, you did not fulfill your promise regarding comments on the article about "Javelin".

            Remind what exactly pliz talk about.

            PS
            Dessert
            https://news.walla.co.il/item/3163851
            1. Bongo
              6 June 2018 15: 07 New
              +2
              Quote: Professor
              He is depressed. He 3 year on batteries served urgent and now the backup serves a month a year and he himself never had the opportunity to click on the "Start" button. All the "interesting" is not in his shift.

              Bad luck... request Pleasant girls and alcohol in reasonable quantities are very helpful for depression.
              Quote: Professor
              By the way, I can share information about how the American Hawk was modernized and it was able to bring down the MiG-25. Upgraded it already sergeant technician.

              It would be interesting yes
              Quote: Professor
              Remind what exactly pliz talk about.

              I'm talking about this:
              Quote: Professor
              Waiting for an article about Javelina. That's where we break the spears.

              Quote: Professor
              Dessert
              https://news.walla.co.il/item/3163851

              Well I don't read Hebrew request What kind of rocket?
              1. Orakul2000
                Orakul2000 6 June 2018 16: 37 New
                +4
                Dear Sergey, this article is about a new Israeli rocket, with which a drone was shot down. It means that Israel, in addition to developing drones, is simultaneously developing means to combat them. On the video, confirmation is written.
              2. Professor
                Professor 6 June 2018 18: 34 New
                +3
                Quote: Bongo
                It would be interesting

                Skin in PM.
                Quote: Bongo
                I'm talking about this:
                Quote: Professor
                Waiting for an article about Javelina. That's where we break the spears.

                Looks like I missed an article about Javelina. Throw off the link pliz.

                Quote: Bongo
                Well, in Hebrew, I don’t read. What kind of rocket?

                The first is Barak-air defense / missile defense. The second is RCC.
                1. Bongo
                  7 June 2018 02: 37 New
                  +1
                  Quote: Professor
                  Looks like I missed an article about Javelina. Throw off the link pliz.

                  American infantry anti-tank weapons (part of 5)
      2. yehat
        yehat 6 June 2018 16: 00 New
        0
        Quote: Bongo
        I also have doubts about the type of missile used to defeat the Shell.

        it was a trained combat penguin, not a spike rocket - she would not have managed to get into a standing motionless defenseless target.
        1. Bongo
          6 June 2018 16: 04 New
          +3
          Quote: yehat
          it was a trained combat penguin, not a spike rocket - she would not have managed to get into a standing motionless defenseless target.

          Well, for a number of signs, I suspect another rocket, but this is my conjecture. request
          1. yehat
            yehat 6 June 2018 16: 09 New
            0
            I think it's percent on 80 some kind of Hellfire modification.
            1. Professor
              Professor 6 June 2018 18: 34 New
              +3
              Quote: yehat
              I think it's percent on 80 some kind of Hellfire modification.

              Since when did Helfire transfer a picture to a carrier?
              1. yehat
                yehat 6 June 2018 18: 39 New
                +1
                the picture was conveyed by a penguin :)
          2. Professor
            Professor 6 June 2018 18: 52 New
            +3
            Quote: Bongo
            Well, for a number of signs, I suspect another rocket, but this is my conjecture.


            1. mvg
              mvg 7 June 2018 21: 39 New
              +2
              hi In the 230 rocket + kg, and she didn’t even blow up the truck properly? Forgive me for confusing something.
              https://topwar.ru/9341-vysokotochnaya-krylataya-r
              aketa-delilah.html
              You are her fan)
              1. Professor
                Professor 8 June 2018 07: 50 New
                +2
                Quote: mvg
                In the 230 rocket + kg, and she didn’t even blow up the truck properly? Forgive me for confusing something.

                And what is her dry weight, but the mass of explosives?
                1. mvg
                  mvg 8 June 2018 17: 12 New
                  0
                  hi It depends on where you get the info. From your review or from the wiki. The data is slightly different. Payload about 54 kg, explosive mass about 22 kg. KAMAZ was supposed to fly into space, and there only the cabin was damaged.
                  Maybe that didn't work? All the same, the rocket is not young already, and the shelf life is 5 years.
                  1. Professor
                    Professor 9 June 2018 12: 54 New
                    +2
                    Quote: mvg
                    It depends on where you get the info. From your review or from the wiki.

                    wiki? What is this? laughing

                    Quote: mvg
                    KAMAZ was supposed to fly into space, and there only the cabin was damaged.

                    Duc there part in space and flew away.

                    Quote: mvg
                    Maybe that didn't work? All the same, the rocket is not young already, and the shelf life is 5 years.

                    Is the shell destroyed? So it worked.
  9. vvvjak
    vvvjak 6 June 2018 10: 51 New
    +5
    Thanks to the author. Personally, I was interested. A little bit was not positive when considering the future prospects of SAR air defense, which (as I understand it) turned out to be a hostage to Israel-Iran relations, and not the ability of the Russian Federation to influence the situation in the Middle East.
  10. Strashila
    Strashila 6 June 2018 11: 16 New
    +3
    Considering how much equipment fell into the hands of terrorists ... hence the Americans and Israelis, the number of defectors, though high-ranking in the first months of the confrontation ... while the Syrian air defense continues to give a fitting rebuff to the hodgepodge from around the world.
    1. parma
      parma 6 June 2018 14: 50 New
      +5
      To be honest, this team hodgepodge does not particularly try ...
  11. Lekxnumx
    Lekxnumx 6 June 2018 12: 06 New
    +5
    Thank you Sergey for the article, it was not enough to present the situation. And don’t listen to these “about experts” mother’s strategists. Many comrades have critical thinking atrophied by regular operations of divan-strategic views of the TV set. They proudly died the brave death in the war against TV.
  12. faiver
    faiver 6 June 2018 12: 07 New
    +3
    the author, as always, pleased with the quality review good
  13. Alex_59
    Alex_59 6 June 2018 12: 29 New
    +3
    As always, it’s nice to read the author’s materials, made with high quality and with love for the cause.
  14. sivuch
    sivuch 6 June 2018 13: 32 New
    +2
    Sergey, I have prepared a couple of fly in the ointment. You dont mind ? winked
    1. Bongo
      6 June 2018 13: 59 New
      +3
      Quote: sivuch
      Sergey, I have prepared a couple of fly in the ointment. You dont mind ?

      Igor, in the opinion of a competent person, I am always happy. yes
  15. A. Privalov
    A. Privalov 6 June 2018 14: 09 New
    +8
    A very worthy and serious article using extensive and high-quality factual material. Thanks to the author for the selection of materials, beautiful presentation and clear presentation. These days it is a big rarity.
    From myself I can only add that it is quite possible that a certain number of MIGs were mothballed in fortified hangars at air bases and some of the interceptors are still suitable for further use, but this one — apparently, has already flown off its 3108 board ...

    I’m storing this snapshot since 2016.
    1. A. Privalov
      A. Privalov 6 June 2018 14: 12 New
      +5
      I have another snapshot from the same series - the 2427 board:
      1. Bongo
        6 June 2018 14: 31 New
        +4
        Quote: A. Privalov
        I have another shot from the same series - the board 2427

        I also came across this picture. But it is clearly seen that the aircraft are not in flight condition and are stored outside the runway.

        It is possible that in both photographs cars have been captured for several years now on the ground in the northeastern part of the Al-Tiyas airbase.
        1. A. Privalov
          A. Privalov 6 June 2018 14: 48 New
          +3
          Right. This is no longer help. They stand on the ground, in 50 meters from the runways ...
  16. Prutkov
    Prutkov 6 June 2018 15: 00 New
    +2
    I think that at the moment, the supply of C-300 to the ATS or whatever they decide. But it would be possible to strengthen the air defense system to Iran with the delivery of C-300 complexes.
    1. Bongo
      6 June 2018 15: 27 New
      +2
      Quote: Rods
      I think that at the moment, the supply of C-300 to the ATS or whatever they decide. But it would be possible to strengthen the air defense system to Iran with the delivery of C-300 complexes.

      Sorry, C-300P and C-300В are not complexes, they are anti-aircraft systems. But this is so by the way. In Iran, C-300PMU2 is already there. More details here: Air Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran
  17. Nikolaevich I
    Nikolaevich I 6 June 2018 15: 18 New
    +2
    I agree with the Author that C-300 in Syria does not meet the expectations of "those who want to send C-300 to Syria ..."! My arguments are very similar to the arguments of the Author, therefore I will not be disseminated (my opinion is stated in previous comments to articles on the subject: "Air Defense / S-300 and Syria" ...) From "long-range" systems (more or less ... ) Syria will fit the Viking air defense system (real) and Vityaz (being developed ..... "still" and "still" ...)
    PSAs part of the system that replaced the C-300PT with towed launchers, the same 5В55Р rockets were used with a semi-active seeker and a maximum range of 75-90 km of air targets.
    5В55Р missiles are guided by the radio command method in the initial and middle sections, radio commands with "escort through the rocket" -on the final ... Instead GOS-so-called, "radar sight".
    1. Bongo
      6 June 2018 15: 32 New
      +2
      Quote: Nikolaevich I
      The 5ВХNUMXР missiles are induced by the radio command method at the initial and middle sections, the radio command command with "rocket tracking" at the final ... Instead of the GOS, the so-called "radar sight".

      At the initial inertial control. The radio commands were 5B55K. The C-300PS ZRS includes the on-load tap-changer 30Н6 (radar for illumination and targeting), how do you think it “highlights” and to whom? Vladimir, I don’t look good, but I’m really really interested in how the radar target works when you hover the missiles?
      1. Nikolaevich I
        Nikolaevich I 6 June 2018 16: 50 New
        +3
        Quote: Bongo
        how does the radar sight work when aiming missiles?

        An improved radio command method was adopted as the method of pointing the 5B55P missile to the target, which consists in organically connecting the radio command guidance in the initial and middle parts of the trajectory with the method of "tracking the target through the missile" on the final one. Guidance commands for the 5В55Р missile are generated according to the coordinates of the target and the rocket, measured by the on-load tap-changer, and according to the target tracking data from the airborne radar sighting radar, the target tracking method through the missile (a similar method is used in the American Patriot complex). This information is compared with that obtained using the on-load tap-changer, which continuously accompanies the target. The control center CVC processes information, generates guidance commands, which are then transmitted aboard the rocket. By comparing information from the on-load tap-changer and the radar sight of the missile, targets operating under the cover of radio interference can be detected. Thanks to this guidance method, it is possible to realize all the best both in the command guidance method and in the semi-active ......
        1. Bongo
          7 June 2018 02: 45 New
          +1
          Quote: Nikolaevich I
          The guidance commands for the 5B55P rocket are generated according to target coordinates and the rocket measured by the on-load tap-changer, and according to the target tracking data by the onboard radar sighting system Zur — target tracking method through the rocket ... . Thanks to this method of guidance, it is possible to realize all the best both in the command guidance method and in the semi-active .....

          Vladimir, this is actually a combination of guidance - semi-active + correction with the help of radio commands, which is used when firing at the end of the range.
          1. Nikolaevich I
            Nikolaevich I 7 June 2018 05: 22 New
            +2
            Quote: Bongo
            Vladimir, this is actually a combined guidance - semi-active + correction using radio commands, which is used when shooting at close range

            Not certainly in that way.! It seems, but ... "Fedot, but not that ..."
            1.Radio command with missile escort:
            In command telecontrol systems, missile flight control commands are generated at the guidance point and transmitted over the missile via a communication line (telecontrol line). Depending on the method of measuring the coordinates of the target and determining its position relative to the missile, the command remote control systems are divided into telecontrol systems of the first kind и telecontrol systems of the second type. In systems of the first kind measurement of the current coordinates of the target carried out directly by the ground guidance point, and in systems of the second type - by the onboard coordinator of the rocket with their subsequent transfer to the guidance point(radar sight!). The development of missile control teams in both the first and second cases is carried out [ground guidance point.
            2. Self-guidance is the automatic guidance of a rocket at a target, based on the use of energy from the target to the rocket.
            Missile homing offline provides target tracking, determines the mismatch parameter, and forms management teams
      2. omit
        omit 7 June 2018 18: 08 New
        0
        Bongo
        "On the initial inertial control"
        I dare to correct you - inertial control.
        1. Bongo
          8 June 2018 02: 20 New
          +1
          Quote: omit
          I dare to correct you - inertial control.

          You are absolutely right! yes When you write from the phone, the eyes are often "zamylyvayutsya." request
  18. sivuch
    sivuch 6 June 2018 16: 49 New
    +4
    Sergei .
    About the most modern aircraft, air defense systems, for - this is probably a joke. This, thank God, has never happened. Of course, compared to Vietnam, Ethiopians or other blacks, it, the technique, was modern, but nothing more. As for combat training, the Syrians are the best of the Arabs, if this can be considered a compliment. And the most cruel, by the way.
    I can’t say specifically about 36Д6, but Syria received 3 pieces CT-68U already in 83 year.
    Arrow-10 should be several tens. They wrote that - In addition, the period of technical suitability of missiles was extended from ten to twenty years. Confirmation of high reliability is the fact that in the period from 1998 to 2000 in the Syrian Arab Republic of 36 launches of 9M37M rockets of 1984, 35 hit targets (one was aimed towards the sun due to the fault of the operator)
    According to the Osam, there is information that the Syrians independently modernized them by adding some kind of infrared station. The source is Belingkot, but there is no need to lie to them.
    Mig-23 delivered about 40 MSs (they were probably decommissioned), 24 MFs (of which several were shot down) and 40-50 MLDs (in fact, not quite MLDs, but now it doesn’t matter). Later, Assad Sr. received a batch of MLD from Libya in exchange for the Su-24, and already in the 21st century another batch from Belarus. So if there are 23 alive now (fighters, not IS), then this is MLD.
    As for the radar, there were deliveries from the PRC, incl. meter and pretty modern.
    That F-16 was shot down by 200-koi, already, it seems, no one doubts.
    1. Bongo
      7 June 2018 03: 15 New
      +1
      Thanks for the interesting comment!
      Quote: sivuch
      About the most modern aircraft, air defense system, FOR - this is probably a joke.

      At the time of delivery, the Kvadrat SAM, C-125, C-75М / М3, С-200ВЭ and Osa-AKM were the most modern. We have until the end of the 80-x in the USSR exploited C-75М2 and C-200A.
      Quote: sivuch
      As for combat training, the Syrians are the best of the Arabs, if this can be considered a compliment. And the most cruel, by the way.

      I agree! yes
      Quote: sivuch
      I can’t say specifically about 36Д6, but Syria received 3 pieces CT-68U already in 83 year.

      I heard about 35D6, but forgot to mention it. My cant ... recourse
      Quote: sivuch
      Arrows-10 should be a few dozen.

      But how much is not known. request
      Quote: sivuch
      According to Osam, there is information that the Syrians themselves upgraded them, adding some IR station.

      I do not believe that on their own and that everything. But the SAM and hardware part probably remained old.
      Quote: sivuch
      Mig-23 was delivered around 40 MS (they were probably written off), 24 MF (of which several were shot down) and 40-50 MLD (in fact, not quite MLD, but now it does not matter).

      I agree! yes
      Quote: sivuch
      Later, Assad Sr. received the party MLD from Libya in exchange for Su-24 and already in the 21 century another party from Belarus.

      Somehow it passed me by ... request
      Quote: sivuch
      As for the radar, there were deliveries from the PRC, incl. meter and pretty modern.

      It is likely, given that there are a lot of Chinese radars in Iran. As for 36Д6, these stations have a lot in common with 35Д6 (СТ-68УМ) and could be delivered as part of the C-300П contract that was canceled later. Because They are for the given ZRS standard surveillance radar.
      Quote: sivuch
      That F-16 was shot down by 200-koi, already, it seems, no one doubts.

      But we cannot know for sure. request
      1. sivuch
        sivuch 7 June 2018 10: 33 New
        +2
        Come on in order. I do not agree with the definition of the most modern
        First about Cuba / Square. First, they assured me that the Cube and the Square were far from the same thing, in particular, in terms of noise immunity. But then, until 73, the Cube was really the most advanced air defense system of the air defense system, but when the batch of Squares was delivered after 82 years, then at that time they had already finished producing the Cub-M4 and began production of full-fledged Buk. The Arabs were not supplied with circles at all, although they were in VD countries. In year 73, Strel-1 was not in Syria and Egypt, just as there was no Strel-82 in 10. By the way, the latter could be the most dangerous - simple, but not primitive like S-1, just for playful Arab pens and quite effective against NLC. About the same with Osa - two dozen AKs were delivered in 81-82, i.e. when AKM was already produced in the Union. With the 75th, it’s even easier - just look at what modification arrived in Syria and what was in the Union at that time. The last 75s were delivered in the mid-80s, when 300s were already fully exploited.
        The same is true for. S-60s in Egypt and Syria were equipped with sleepyheads and paunchies, although in the Union they were quickly replaced by Vases.
        Similarly with airplanes - Papa Assad has been asking for ML since the mid-70s, i.e. the first version of the Mig-23, on which it was possible to fight on equal terms with phantoms and at least somehow - with the 4th generation. Well, who will give him. In 81 received 24 Mig-23MF.
        And to give the Syrians 2-3 Tu-126, so this is generally fantastic, although they have already been written off
        a few years .
        But the most interesting is the means of automated control systems and electronic warfare. As for the first, it can be clearly seen from the tablet - by the year 82, there was nothing in Syria except a couple of automatic control systems from Vietnam. But when the roasted rooster pecked, both the Lowlands and Pori and Vectors appeared. NEVA, with the ASU air defense system it was similar. I was still amazed how in the group of Fedya the combined air defense systems of air defense and the air defense of the country combined. But nothing, there was nothing to combine.
        About EW, I heard that in 82 in the damask airport there was one An-12PP, but no one tried to use it.
        And as for the IR bandura on Osa, it is unlikely that the Syrians put them on their own. If you remember, in the early 2000s they also hung Italian equipment on the T-72. I think there is something similar here.
        And finally I’ll say -
        In 82, as in all previous ones, Israel would have won anyway, even if the Syrians had the most modern Soviet equipment (at that time), and its service was at the level of the Czechs or Dederons. But the losses would be incomparably harder. like, but I don’t need such joy.
        1. Bongo
          7 June 2018 11: 42 New
          +1
          Quote: sivuch
          First about Cuba / Square. First, they assured me that the Cube and the Square are far from the same, in particular, in terms of noise immunity.

          I can’t say anything about the “Square” noise immunity, but there was nothing better in the west.
          Quote: sivuch
          But in 73, Kvadrat was indeed the most modern air defense system of the SAR

          Igor, I mean the time of delivery, of course by the year 82 he was no longer the last word of technology.
          Quote: sivuch
          Approximately the same with Osa - two dozen AKs were set up in 81-82

          According to my data, Osa-AKM was supplied to the SAR in 1982.
          Quote: sivuch
          And to give the Syrians 2-3 Tu-126, so this is generally fantastic, although they have already been written off
          a few years .

          Tu-126 was written off at the very end of 80's, but these are details. Another question is why would they be needed in Syria? MiG-23LD in the middle of the 80-x in the SAR even appeared, and this is how not cool at that time was the most perfect and brought modification of the front-line fighter. The MiG-29 was still raw.
          Quote: sivuch
          With 75, Coy is even simpler - just look at when a modification reached Syria and what was in the Union at that time.

          Well, then you can still compare with the fact that in the same years they were delivered to Vietnam. In Syria, there was definitely a much more modern and efficient machinery.
          Quote: sivuch
          In the 82 year, as in all previous ones, Israel would still have won, even if the Syrians had the most modern Soviet technology (at that time), and its service was at the level of the Czechs or dederons.

          I never argued with that! yes
          1. sivuch
            sivuch 10 June 2018 10: 15 New
            +2
            Late, of course.
            In Osam - before, in 81-82, they delivered 20 BM AK. After another 40 or 50 and these may have been AKM
            Tu-126s began to be decommissioned in the mid-80s and finished at the end. And they are needed for the same as Hokai. At least they saw NLC over the water (by the way, a hevre with a thief online claimed that Hokai had problems finding the NLC over land, and even over rough terrain - this is a 70cm wave)
            MLD, i.e. 23-18 with aerodynamic refinements - a second pair of fangs, a vortex generator, a new SU, a radar NO-08 without E and a complete body kit of electronics appeared in Syria already in post-Soviet times. By the way, there the Mig Design Bureau continued to frolic in the 90s. Something they tried to do with stealth, like we’ll cover the RPM and everything would hurt, we put spit spoilers on the keel and not on the back. In 82, they started to deliver to Syria 23-19, or 23-22 - hybrids 23-18 and 23-12A. At the same time, all earlier versions of the Mig-21 were replaced by LSI.
            And what antiquities went to Vietnam is not discussed at all. There, all the equipment stuck to the Chinese pens. Until Vietnam decided which of the older brothers is closer and dearer to him, there could not be any Shilok and Squares.
  19. VictorZhivilov
    VictorZhivilov 6 June 2018 17: 41 New
    +2
    SAR air defense status characterizes this video:
  20. marat2016
    marat2016 6 June 2018 22: 22 New
    +3
    Supplies of air defense systems of Syria.
    1. sivuch
      sivuch 7 June 2018 08: 44 New
      +2
      There is another sheet with historical data, there is a breakdown by years. But, I’m afraid, I can’t find it anymore.
      1. marat2016
        marat2016 7 June 2018 22: 24 New
        +2
        If you need a link to those tables write.
        1. Bongo
          8 June 2018 02: 22 New
          0
          Quote: marat2016
          If you need a link to those tables write.

          Sorry, but you have no data on the supply of mobile military complexes?
          1. sivuch
            sivuch 10 June 2018 08: 39 New
            +3
            ihtamnet. and nigdenet - otherwise I would find wink
            1. Bongo
              10 June 2018 11: 44 New
              0
              Quote: sivuch
              ihtamnet. and nigdenet - otherwise I would find

              They are there, "Squares" in the satellite images I found. tongue
              1. sivuch
                sivuch 10 June 2018 12: 18 New
                +2
                I'm talking about tables similar to those shown above. Moreover, even in those tables, the deliveries of the most massive radars are not indicated, i.e. P-12/18, P-15/19, P-35/37 and P-40.
          2. marat2016
            marat2016 11 June 2018 10: 36 New
            0
            Unfortunately. There is something, but very far from the laid out scan.
  21. zyablik.olga
    zyablik.olga 7 June 2018 02: 18 New
    +3
    Long time ago, the Military Review did not have such an interesting discussion of the publication, when the comments are no less interesting than the article itself. good
  22. gregor6549
    gregor6549 7 June 2018 06: 41 New
    +3
    No matter how Russia strengthens Syria’s air defense, there is little use of the means of reinforcement while the Syrians exploit them. In addition, strengthening Syria’s air defense can inadvertently strengthen the gangs of militants who are still marching around Syria. Already there was not only in Syria and I am not sure that it is necessary to step on the same rake again.
    If we talk about Israel, then he is not opposed to maintaining the Assad regime, because understands that in the East only a dictator can hold a multi-confessional country in his hands. Clinton also understood this at one time when, after the Gulf War, he did not liquidate Saddam Hussein. The only thing that Israel does not want is for Iran and Hezbollah to settle near the borders of Israel. Here he hits and does it right, because understands that the most effective missile defense is the destruction of enemy missiles before they take off.
    By the way, Russia does not really mind this. She also does not need Iran and Hezbollah in Syria. Yes, and Assad is mainly limited to warnings, because him the fate of Lebanon where the ball rules Hezbollah also does not smile. Of course, from time to time Syria has to demonstrate decisiveness to defend its airspace, but the sense from these demonstrations is still scanty and the tales of the incredible number of Israeli missiles allegedly shot down by Syrian air defense are nothing more than tales.
  23. race
    race 8 June 2018 22: 56 New
    +2
    I have long been waiting for an article on this topic. I can imagine how much work has been done to search, select and analyze information. I myself know how difficult it is.
    I express my gratitude to the author for an interesting and relevant review. Personally, I found a lot of useful information.
  24. hetzer250789
    hetzer250789 8 June 2018 23: 44 New
    +1
    In general, the whole case, especially with regard to the lack of experience of the Syrians and the losses that SAR air defense suffered in 5, atoms and all 6 years of the civil war. But the author mentioned the most important problem of the Syrians in providing air defense casual-relief. And not in terms of the difficulty of raising the hypothetical S-300 uphill) the S-200 and S-125 they crammed there perfectly, and these complexes are much more bulky than the 300ka. And in terms of the fact that the ATS relief by itself it doesn’t allow you to provide full radar coverage of the territory, especially at low altitudes. put patriots there, although samp-ts you still can’t close all the holes. It is unrealistic to do this without AWACS. Yes, and the author shouldn’t believe the Israeli Air Force so much. Seriously, they still sit there. They and the air defense system of the ATS completely destroyed 5 times this year alone and recaptured them in 73 and lost 15 f16 and f80 they were not shot down in the sky over Lebanon in the XNUMXs. In general, these gentlemen lie like they breathe). And the article + is definitely.
    1. Bongo
      9 June 2018 02: 12 New
      +2
      Thank you for the positive assessment of my work, but let's deal with it.
      Quote: hetzer250789
      But the main problem of the Syrians in providing air defense, the author mentioned only casual relief. And not in terms of the difficulties of raising hypothetical C-300 on high ground) C-200 and C-125 they shoved there perfectly, but these complexes are much more cumbersome, than 300.

      I know only two C-300PS located really in the high mountains - in Armenia on the border with Azerbaijan. These systems cover the corridor connecting with Artsakh. The placement of air defense systems in this place became possible only because in Soviet times a road was struck there and the Circle was placed there.
      As for Syria, let's understand. First with C-200BE. Here is the C-200BE position east of Damascus. Altitude 680 m.

      Position C-200BE north of Damascus. Height - 611 m.

      Next, Homs - 653 m

      These are average heights typical of most of Syria. At about the same height above sea level, the majority of Syrian airfields were built.
      Finally, the most high-altitude position north of Bayanis is 1227 m. But in this area there is a good road network in the highlands.

      Regarding C-125 and C-75, then 90% of the complexes are located at heights of no more than 600 m. Above, until 1800 m, only the Kvadrat and Osa systems were located.
      Quote: hetzer250789
      And the author shouldn’t believe the representatives of the Israeli Air Force so strongly.
      What made you decide that I unconditionally trust Israeli statements. This is not about Israeli aviation, but about the condition and capabilities of the air defense system of the SAR. It is reliably known that in 1982, the Syrian air defenses in Lebanon were defeated, and there is no doubt that the Israeli Air Force is currently delivering virtually unpunished attacks on Syrian targets.
      Yours! hi
  25. Sergei1982
    Sergei1982 9 June 2018 05: 45 New
    -1
    However, the statement that 70% of the air targets involved in the missile attack was shot down is not credible.
    And 76 KR for 3 Khrushchevs are credible? If there is video on the network how similar buildings add up to getting one KR. For me, 70% of those shot down believe so much more than 103 KP that hit the dubious objects, photos of which are on the network and the number does not smell there, following the tracks of 20-30 KP blows for the eyes.
    1. Bongo
      9 June 2018 07: 19 New
      +1
      Quote: Sergei1982
      For me, in 70,% of shot down people believe a lot more than in 103 KR, which fell on dubious objects

      Are you generally familiar with the statistics on the use of ZRV in local conflicts? And in what place of the publication it is stated that 103 KR hit the targets?
      1. Sergei1982
        Sergei1982 9 June 2018 12: 54 New
        0
        Quote: Bongo
        Are you generally familiar with the statistics on the use of antitrust agents in local conflicts?

        And in what edge of a local conflict did one of the parties have a modern air defense system and the help of a “big brother” in the form of DD with DRLOU, RTR and setting EW interference with modern complexes?
        Quote: Bongo
        And at what point in the publication is it claimed that 103 missiles hit the target?

        Well, the United States claimed this, as I understand you are not against the stated goals that the USA and its allies destroyed, any sound assessment says that they have 20-30 CR for their eyes, I can give a video of how such structures were formed from one KR or PSA. And after these The question of where the remaining 70-80% of the Kyrgyz Republic is ripening is pondering. Do you have an answer?
        1. Bongo
          9 June 2018 13: 08 New
          +1
          Quote: Sergei1982
          And in what edge of a local conflict did one of the parties have a modern air defense system and the help of a “big brother” in the form of DD with DRLOU, RTR and setting EW interference with modern complexes?

          You apparently can’t imagine how difficult the objectives of the CD are and you should not overestimate the Syrian command and control systems the newest of which has been 30 years old.
          Quote: Sergei1982
          Well, it was claimed by the USA, as I understand you are not against these goals that were destroyed by the USA and its allies, any sensible assessment says that 20-30 KR is behind them, I can give you a video of how similar structures were made of one KR or UAB.

          You please formulate your thoughts normally. Some sort of words. request
          Quote: Sergei1982
          And after these reflections, the question is about where the rest of 70-80% КР are gone.

          In my estimation, no more than 30% KR were shot down, which, taking into account the state of the Syrian air defense and the types of air defense missiles used, is an excellent result.
          1. Sergei1982
            Sergei1982 9 June 2018 13: 23 New
            0
            Quote: Bongo
            You apparently can’t imagine how difficult the objectives of the CD are and you should not overestimate the Syrian command and control systems the newest of which has been 30 years old.

            There is an opinion that the automated control systems were modernized by us and included in a single air defense system.
            Quote: Bongo
            According to my estimates, no more than 30% of missile systems were shot down, which, given the state of Syrian air defense and the types of air defense systems used, is an excellent result

            That is, based on your words, about 70 CDs have got? And these 70 cr for 3 small buildings, a couple of sheds made of tin 6 * 10 m and a bunker? Do you understand that this is absurd? On Courage and other forums, they came to the conclusion that they hit 20-30KR for the indicated purposes. The question arises, where are the rest 70-80KR? Do you have an answer to that?
            1. Bongo
              9 June 2018 13: 41 New
              +1
              Quote: Sergei1982
              There is an opinion that the automated control systems were modernized by us and included in a single air defense system.

              Yours I'm afraid that you are not authoritative enough for me. no
              Quote: Sergei1982
              That is, based on your words got around 70 KR? And these 70 cr on 3 small buildings, a couple of sheds made of 6 * 10 m and bunker?

              The list of goals is freely available. It is somewhat different from what you write.
              Quote: Sergei1982
              On Courage and other forums ...

              Killer argument! good
              Quote: Sergei1982
              The question arises, where are the remaining 70-80KR? Do you have an answer to this?

              Read what the Syrians themselves say on the number of shot down the CD. They cut the sturgeon heavily.
              1. zyablik.olga
                zyablik.olga 9 June 2018 14: 11 New
                +3
                Quote: Bongo
                Read what the Syrians themselves say on the number of shot down the CD. They cut the sturgeon heavily.

                According to the newspaper VIEW, the head of the military department Sergei Shoigu at one of the meetings reported that 35 percent of the missiles were shot down.
                https://vz.ru/politics/2018/4/25/873329.html
                1. Sergei1982
                  Sergei1982 10 June 2018 12: 46 New
                  0
                  Quote: zyablik.olga
                  https://vz.ru/politics/2018/4/25/873329.html

                  If the journalists of Vzglyad carefully watched the broadcast of the Moscow Region, then they would understand that 46 KR is under Damascus + another 20 near Homs, the data of the Moscow Region are cut by only 5 KR, which is quite possible because the first numbers were given on the first day, they could have been mistaken.
              2. Sergei1982
                Sergei1982 10 June 2018 12: 30 New
                0
                Quote: Bongo
                Yours I'm afraid that you are not authoritative enough for me.

                No, of course not mine.
                KUBIN / Moscow Region /, August 25. / TASS /. A unified air defense system (Air Defense) was created in Syria thanks to the efforts of Russian and Syrian military experts. This was announced at the Army-2017 International Military Technical Forum during a roundtable discussion on the Syrian experience, the chief of staff - deputy commander of the Air Force of the High Command of the Aerospace Forces (VKS RF) said Major General Sergey Meshcheryakov.

                More on TASS:
                http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4508089
                If he didn’t notice, then when we came to Syria, Assad lost, now he wins, his forces (under the guidance of our advisers) conduct operations to storm the fortified cities, against which Grozny seems like a toy. So there is nothing surprising that they worked on air defense.
                Quote: Bongo
                A list of goals is freely available. It is slightly different from what you write about.

                Well, does it lie, show you targets from the US Defense Department? Only 3 goals. Photo and size of these goals are in the internet.
                Quote: Bongo
                Killer argument!

                Yes, more than that, the sizes of objects are examined there, videos of the defeat of such objects are shown, funnels are calculated, there are even photos from the 2000s until the moment after the impact. If you did not see this and did not know, then request
                Quote: Bongo
                Read what the Syrians themselves say on the number of shot down the CD. They cut the sturgeon heavily.

                Do not tell me where?
              3. Sergei1982
                Sergei1982 10 June 2018 12: 43 New
                0
                The Americans specified the number of missiles launched by targets. From the very beginning, they claim that they struck at only three targets. The main blow came from the complex of buildings of the scientific center in Barz, on which 76 American missiles were fired - 57 Tomahawks and 19 AGM-158 JASSM, 22 missiles were fired by all three allies according to " chemical weapons warehouse "Shinshar in the province of Homs and 7 more missiles on a certain bunker in the same place.
                Everything is according to US Defense Ministry data 3. The center in Barz is three three-story buildings with a total length of 137 m along the meridimeter, that is, a complex of buildings like a not-so-large rural school and 76KR of them? Warehouse Chemical weapons
                With the institute, more or less clear, more curious are the goals in the province of Homs. Hereinafter, we will call the larger goal "object No. 1", and the smaller "object No. 2".
                In the first post I will consider the object number 1. The history of this object, which can be traced to Google Earth. In the picture 2011-12 (peak 1) there are no buildings. However, paths and an earthen embankment are present.
                There is a complete analysis of these objects from the satellite photo, if necessary I will post it.