What to learn? What war to prepare for?
But in connection with the decision not to accept statements from those who want to devote life to the martial cause, many questions arise this year or next. Yes, it is possible that we really have an excess of officers (the only explanation that came from the representative of the Ministry of Defense), but this does not mean that now they are not needed at all. In addition, it is not known where to go now young people who want to become, for example, combatant commanders or military engineers? No one knows how long to wait until the enrollment in high schools of the Moscow Region is resumed, or is it necessary to go to civilian schools? What should teachers of colleges, institutes, academies of the Ministry of Defense without cadets do, even if they continue to accrue money? And how will such a gap in continuity affect the combat readiness of the Armed Forces?
CAN'T WITHOUT EXTREME
In the course of the current reform, the officer corps has already been cut beyond measure, and mostly the best, not the worst, have left it. Here you will remember one precedent. After the defeat in the First World War, Germany almost lost its army, since it was allowed to maintain only the 100-thousandth Reichswehr. But she was able to save the officer corps. And when the situation changed, it became the basis of the command structure of the Wehrmacht, unswervingly striking striking success until the middle of the Second World War. In the end, it was simply crushed by the masses, it was impossible to fight simultaneously against the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, but even in these impossible conditions the Germans were several times on the verge of a common victory. And thanks in large part to their officers. There are officers - there is an army, there are no officers - there is no army. It is absolutely obvious.
True, we are now going to deploy mass training of sergeants and petty officers. Their actual absence in our Armed Forces since the end of the 60s is an unprecedented phenomenon in the military practice of all times and peoples. It gave rise to another shameful phenomenon - hazing. Therefore, the restoration of the institution of junior commanders is of paramount importance. At the same time, I would like to note that sergeants and foremen can not completely replace officers.
It seems that in Russia there is no way without extremes. 40 years there were no sergeants and sergeants, but now they will be. Interestingly, the command of the brigades and ships also entrust them?
In addition, I am sure that not every young man who dreams of officer uniform, will go to sergeants - this is a completely different level of competence, a completely different character of a military career. However, you can set a rigid rule: if you want to become an officer, first serve as a private conscript, and then as a sergeant (foreman) under the contract. It seems that it would be advisable, but so far no one has said anything about such an innovation (and it’s probably premature to raise this question).
However, there is one more fundamentally important aspect in this problem, which for some reason practically no one notices, although, in my opinion, it is the most important one. What should Russian officers learn? What kind of war is necessary to prepare the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation? This, I believe, should determine not only the content of higher military education, but also, in general, all military construction in Russia. And these questions I would like to discuss.
FROM THE CLASSICAL WAR TO THE MUNICIPAL WAR
From about the middle of the 17th century (the birth of the “Westphalian system”), war was traditionally thought of as an armed confrontation between two or more states with regular armies. This type of war, which systematized and in some way canonized Clausewitz, dominated almost until the end of the 20th century. The clearest embodiment of this type of military conflict is the armed struggle of 1939-1945. And the failed clash on the battlefields of the NATO troops and the Warsaw Pact was also seen by both sides as “World War II with missiles and an atomic bomb.” "Rehearsals" of this war took place in the course of local conflicts. The most ambitious and, apparently, the last stories The October II 1973 war in the Middle East turned out to be a classic war (after it, Iran and Iraq, Ethiopia and Eritrea fought each other, and hot spots in other parts of the world burned with fire, but the level of those who fought was too primitive). The first changes in the nature of the classic war appeared in June 1982, when the Israeli Air Force attacked the grouping of Syrian air defense forces in the Bekaa Valley, using a number of completely new tactical and technical techniques. However, the Desert Storm, an operation in which the United States and its allies defeated Iraq at the beginning of 1991, became a crucial turning point. The classical war has become a high-tech war, after which over the past two decades has evolved into a network-centric war. In the "MIC" this process is described in sufficient detail in the article "Instead of" small and large "-" many and small "(see No. 13, 2010), it probably does not make sense to repeat.
Meanwhile, back in the middle of the 50, a first-wave Russian émigré Colonel Yevgeny Messner, who lived in Argentina, formulated the concept of a “world-wide mint-green” in which not only and not so much the army and the state would take part, but also psychology , agitation and propaganda will be more important weapons. However, practically no one noticed Messner’s foresight even in the West (there’s nothing to say about the USSR). And until now, his name is almost unknown, although in fact he is a genius, Clausewitz of the 20th century.
Nowadays, myatvezhevoyna really acquired the character of a global disaster. Most conflicts now take place in this form. Moreover, it is such a routine that they almost do not pay attention to it. For example, at the very border of the United States, south of the Rio Grande, blood is literally flowing today. In the confrontation between the drug mafia and the Mexican government in the last four years alone, at least 25 thousands of people died, and the situation is constantly deteriorating. The number of victims is growing rapidly. In Mexico, so many people are killed that everything that happens in this country is quite comparable with the Iraqi and Afghan campaigns.
Numerous wars in Africa demonstrate how the line between classic war and anti-war erases. The most graphic example is the war on the territory of the former Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), in which several regular armies of neighboring countries participated and many local and foreign irregular formations. She even deserved the name of the First World War of Africa.
If the high-tech and network-centric wars destroy the concept of classical war "from above", then the anti-war war "from below".
HAPPY HOPES
Alas, the Russian army is currently not ready for a high-tech war. Unfortunately, it has practically nothing of what helped the Americans so quickly and effectively defeat Saddam Hussein’s troops. It does not yet have comparable characteristics in terms of performance characteristics with the world's best ACS models that allow efficient management of varietal groups. The GLONASS global navigation system is in the deployment stage, so you have to use the American GPS system. There is no real-time ability to receive data from space reconnaissance. Space communications have not yet been brought to the level of a battalion. High precision aviation weapons are presented, as a rule, in several copies for demonstration at exhibitions. Air- and sea-based cruise missiles are armed only with nuclear warheads, which makes it impossible to use them in local wars. Several AWACS aircraft can only transmit information about the air situation to fighter aircraft and are unable to detect ground targets. A huge minus is the lack of special RTR and EW aircraft. Frontal and army aviation (except for Su-24 bombers) is not able to fly and use weapons at night. Tactical UAVs seem to be present, but they are almost as exotic as an airplane in 1914, to say nothing of operational and strategic drones. Two dozen tanker aircraft carry out several aerial refueling of strategic bombers several times a year; for front-line aircraft, air refueling is an absolutely exceptional thing. And it’s clearly premature to talk about network-centricity in relation to our aircraft.
Domestic military theorists have long realized that we are unable to resist the United States in a high-tech war, and the situation is quickly aggravated, but continue to see America as the main, if not the only, potential enemy. Some time ago, in our military tops, the idea was born of imposing on the enemy a “Russian warship, our hand-to-hand combat,” that is, a classic war. This was explicitly written in the “Actual Development Tasks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”: “The importance of creating sufficiently strong and well-defended ground forces and forces that are capable of not only repelling an enemy attack after delivering massive air strikes, but also be ready to the immediate management (possibly by individual autonomous detachments or groups) of offensive actions in direct contact with the ground forces of the aggressor or his allies ikov. At the first stage, it is required to turn the “contactless” war into the “contact” war as the most undesirable for an enemy equipped with a long-range WTO ”.
It may be recalled that it was in this way that the Iraqi army attempted to operate in March 2003. However, the United States Air Force, which had complete air and air domination, bombed it before it could enter into “direct contact with the ground forces of the aggressor or its allies.” And in those few cases when Saddam’s warriors still managed to “turn the“ contactless ”war into“ contact ”as the most undesirable for the enemy, it turned out that it was not so“ undesirable ”for the Americans: the Iraqis were constantly completely defeated. Here, by the way, it should be noted that the thesis, which is very popular both in Russia and in a number of foreign countries - Americans “do not know how to fight” - has no historical evidence.
If the overseas "foe" decides to remove our strategic nuclear forces with the help of cruise missiles (and this is the most likely scenario), then its ground forces will not be involved in principle. We simply will not be given a "happy" opportunity to "turn the" contactless "war into a" contact "...
... Russia won the last classical war today. This is about the events of August 2008 in the Caucasus. However, do not flatter yourself - because of the moral and combat qualities of the Georgian army is not a full-fledged enemy. However, the actions of Russian aviation (the most high-tech type of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) showed that in the war against a strong enemy who has the most modern weapons, we have no chance. Allied Forces of NATO army and fleet of Russia today can not resist either in quantitative or qualitative parameters. The only thing that comforts is the psychological unpreparedness of the Europeans for a serious war, but you cannot seize psychology. In addition, it is impossible not to notice that the armed forces of the European countries of NATO are declining very quickly, nevertheless, so far their quantitative superiority over us is very significant, and the quality is only increasing.
No matter how sad it is to state, but a similar situation exists in the confrontation with China. As for the quantity, everything is clear, but the quality of weapons of the PLA, with our help, almost completely eliminated its lag. It is maintained only for individual classes of weapons and military equipment. In general, the Chinese weapons are no worse than ours. This is especially true of the armaments and military equipment of the ground forces, where China has completely overcome the qualitative lag behind Russia, and at the same time has a huge quantitative superiority. Moreover, the PLA, faster than the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, is beginning to implement the principles of network-centric warfare.
TWO OPTIONS
At the end of September 2009, Lieutenant-General Sergei Skokov, Chief of Staff of the Land Forces of the Russian Federation, told about where and how our army will have to fight in the foreseeable future.
“The methods of conducting operations and combat operations of a potential enemy in various theaters of operations — western, eastern and southern — are fundamentally different,” the general said. According to him, in the western strategic direction, Russian groups can be counteracted by innovative armies with contactless forms and methods of applying the latest forces and means.
“If we are talking about the east, then it can be a multi-million army with traditional approaches to the conduct of hostilities: straightforward, with a large concentration of manpower and fire weapons in certain areas,” Skokov said. “As for the south of Russia, there we can be confronted by irregular formations and sabotage and reconnaissance groups fighting against the federal authorities using methods of partisan war.”
Thus, both NATO and China were named as potential Russian opponents. At the same time, it is absolutely clear that our Armed Forces today cannot wage war with this or that. Neither the classic nor the more high-tech. It remains to hope only for nuclear weapons, only it is not necessary to absolutize them, as “MIC” wrote in the article “The Illusion of Nuclear Deterrence” (No. 11, 2010).
Of course, to the greatest extent our army is now ready for a rebellion, since for a quarter of a century it has been participating in it almost without interruptions. The army acquired a unique experience of counter-guerrilla warfare in the mountain-desert (Afghanistan) and mountain-wooded (Chechnya) areas. We can even teach some Americans in this regard, especially considering the fact that the importance of technological superiority in such a war is significantly reduced compared with the army’s war against the army.
Moreover, we unexpectedly created a type of troops for such a war - the Airborne Forces (although initially they, of course, were built under the great classical war). It is clear that the landing with its "aluminum tanks”(BMD), without normal artillery and air defense (MANPADS can not be considered such), a normal combined arms battle with a strong modern army cannot be fought. Moreover, our Air Force (neither military nor military transport aviation) is currently unable to organize any major landing operations (neither the transfer of a sufficient number of paratroopers, nor the provision of air supremacy on the flight route and over the landing site). But the airborne forces are perfectly “imprisoned” under the brutal contact war with irregular formations in the most diverse climatic conditions. There is a huge experience of such a war, and psychological readiness for it. And mobility for this type of war, in general, is enough.
However, on its territory, the task of combating irregular formations must nevertheless be solved by the Internal Troops. The Airborne Forces can strengthen them, moreover, their task is to participate in the cereal batches outside Russia (but hardly outside of Eurasia). And, of course, the trend today in the West is completely unacceptable for Russia, when the Armed Forces completely reorient themselves to the “fight against terrorism”, losing the ability to wage a classic war (no matter whether it is high-tech or not). However, objectively speaking, the Europeans can afford this, because they have no one to defend their own country. And to us - is from whom.
That is why it is necessary to understand what kind of aircraft we need. The current, oversubscribing for a rainy-beige is absolutely not enough for a classical war. With the armament and military equipment available today, they, unfortunately, are not able to wage a high-tech war and can obviously be considered only as an army and navy of a transitional type. The question is where?
Apparently, there are two options for further construction of the aircraft.
The first is to concentrate most of the forces and means on the development of SNF and TNW, officially declaring that any aggression against themselves, even using only conventional weapons, Russia will respond first with a limited nuclear strike against enemy force groupings, and if that does not help - a massive nuclear strike on the complete destruction of the enemy. In this case, the task of the ground forces, air force and air defense will be to cover the SNF and the tactical nuclear forces carriers from the ground and air. In addition, a grouping of troops in the North Caucasus will be needed, since local conflicts are possible only in this region, where nuclear weapons are unlikely to be applicable.
The second is to create modern Armed Forces capable of waging an armed struggle only with the use of conventional means of destruction. Obviously, in any case, they cannot be equal to either the NATO forces or the PLA even separately: we do not have the resources for this. But they must be such as to create both very serious problems for those in the case of a conventional war. This option is more costly, but more effective, reliable and realistic in terms of defense. Naturally, this option does not imply the abandonment of nuclear weapons. But in this case, the country's leadership should significantly increase defense spending. Otherwise, high-tech army will not work.
Only after selecting one of the construction options for the Armed Forces can one seriously plan a military-technical policy. And based on this, develop military education. From this point of view, the current break in the recruitment of cadets could even be considered correct - after all, officers should not be taught what they are taught now. And if the army is brilliantly ready for a war that it will never have to wage, but is not at all ready for the war that it is really facing, then it is simply uselessly devouring people's money.
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