How secure is the Atlas cryptographic phone?
FSUE "Scientific and Technical Center" Atlas "solved the problem of secure communication for 115 000 rub., When any fool could solve it for 1 000 000.
Ensuring communication security for government agencies and enterprises of the military-industrial complex (DIC) is one of the most important components of a common system of measures to preserve state and military secrets.
This year, the Ministry of Defense of Russia joined the list of departments that use cell phones with cryptographic protection of information in their activities. For officers with access to documents of the highest category of secrecy, domestic M-633C Atlas codes were purchased at the price of 115 thousand rubles. News instantly spread through the media, causing controversial public reaction.
Some argue about the paramount importance of maintaining military secrets. Another part of the public expresses displeasure at the inexplicably high cost. “Shifrofon” is reproached for its primitive functionality (not a smartphone), forgetting that every telephone has one key function. The phone must be able to call. The cryptograph, in addition to the call, must be able to keep the confidentiality of conversations. And this is the main value and purpose of the Atlas device.
On the pages of the “Military Review”, there was already a discussion of a “chiffon” for 2 thousand dollars, but, in my opinion, that discussion was conducted in the wrong plane. The scandalous comparison with cheap Chinese “analog” did not make sense. Even if among the goods from China there is an externally similar model, the very purpose of the Atlas, like its manufacturer (before renaming, NTC Atlas of the FSB of Russia), clearly indicates non-standard hardware and software of the device.
The main question of all is: how high is the cryptostability of the domestic “chiffophone”? Is he able to perform the functions assigned to him related to the protection of especially sensitive information?
In 2012-13, when it was not related to the orders of the Ministry of Defense, the “chiffon” was focused on an order of magnitude less attention. In the open press periodically appeared interviews with developers and more detailed information about M-633С. At least, this designation is found in the news of the time.
In 2013, in an interview with the newspaper “Izvestia”, Deputy Director of FSUE “Atlas”, Alexander Alferov, commented on the decision to purchase encryption systems for Roscosmos enterprises. The most unexpected was the statement about the use of foreign electronics in devices designed to conduct secret negotiations of national importance.
(The direct link is at the bottom of the article.)
Among other features: cryptographic protection is provided only for the voice channel, SMS is transmitted in clear text. Also from the publication it becomes clear that the M-633C is supplied to various security agencies, at least from the year 2012. What is confirmed by other, earlier information about the purchase of “spy cell phones” for the Investigative Committee of Russia (see the link).
In this regard, as a person who is inexperienced in the field of cryptographic protection and information security, I have two interrelated questions.
1. How safe is the use of foreign-made chips in domestic code numbers designed to negotiate secret topics?
2. If the "stuffing" does not matter, and it can be safely purchased in Taiwan, then what is the point of such a cipher phone? If cryptographic protection is provided by a special program, then why not install it as an application on any smartphone.
From the description of “Atlas” it is clear that it is not intended for making calls on the battlefield, where there is no mobile communications. Moreover, any mobile connection is not suitable - for the work of the “spy phone”, only “Megaphone” is required. M-633С is designed for daily use in conventional GSM networks. Any exceptional technical capabilities, signal strength, range of work or computational capabilities, it is not different. The only difference from other mobile phones and smartphones is call encryption.
In the civilian market there are many available (and free) applications for secure information sharing. Among the most famous are: Signal (rumored to be cooperating with the US authorities), Silent Phone (quiet phone, a hint is clear), WhatsApp (standard description: end-to-end encryption), domestic Telegram and a great variety of monotonous Chat Secure, SecureChat, etc. Available for any smartphones and working on any platforms.
(Not an advertisement!)
Most secure messengers use end-to-end encryption technology, in which the keys for decryption are available only on two devices on which the connection was made. Keys are used only once, and with each new session, new ones are automatically generated. The seriousness of the level of concealment of information in these programs is evidenced by the loud altercations of their creators with state structures around the world.
- News, 2017 year.
Obviously, the all-seeing and terrible NSA simply did not have enough capacity and computing power to decrypt messages.
Returning to the domestic cipher telephone with Taiwanese electronics, we note: really, the FSUE “Scientific and Technical Center Atlas” could not create a set of secure applications for negotiation and text messaging? Of course, without placing them in the public domain (AppStore). Access and download of such applications - only from secure servers of state structures.
As practice demonstrates, this is the most obvious, simple and quite effective solution.
Approximately the same opinion is shared by State Duma deputy, member of the security committee Ilya Kostylev. In his opinion, in modern conditions the protection of contextual analysis of conversations is more important. Foreign intelligence does not have the opportunity to listen to each one individually, but they are able to analyze thousands of keyword calls, getting a large-scale picture of what is happening. In this direction it is necessary to build protection.
In other words, five years ago, when Atlas was a "novelty" and only appeared on the market of secure communications, the Ministry of Defense was not interested in acquiring such devices. The expert speaks about the usual mobile phones with special programs. Now, after five years, the opinion of the Ministry of Defense has changed dramatically.
The production of the same model of a chiffon over at least 6 years can hardly contribute to maintaining the required level of security. Over the past years, US intelligence probably had the opportunity to study the element base, having received information and samples of "secret" chips directly from the manufacturer.
We do not deny the importance of conducting confidential negotiations, but the listed features and story the emergence of M-633 “Atlas” is alarming for the preservation of state secrets.
Links to materials:
https://iz.ru/news/553727
https://vpk.name/news/74355_sledstvennyii_komitet_pokupaet_shpionskie_mobilniki.html
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