Belarusian trace in Iranian events
With time story American intercepted by the Iranians drone somehow forgotten. Perhaps this audience news intercepted more recent events, and perhaps the matter is in the extreme scarcity of available information. Nevertheless, in the few weeks that went into a thorough study of the Iranian press release, a great many versions were put forward. And their number is slowly but surely increasing.
Shortly after the announcement of the capture of the RQ-170 Sentinel UAV, the Christian Science Monitor published an interview with an engineer who allegedly had a direct relationship to the interception. This material ultimately served as the basis for most versions, conjectures and suggestions on the topic. According to this source, the interception was carried out in two stages. First, with the help of electronic warfare equipment (EW), the radio channel through which data was transmitted between the drone and its control panel was muted. No longer receiving commands, the RQ-170 turned on the autopilot. It is alleged that in the event of a loss of signal, these devices independently return to the base. For navigation it uses satellite positioning system GPS. The Iranians, the engineer claims, knew about this and at the right time “slipped” the wrong signal to the drone to the drone. As a result of these actions, Sentinel mistakenly began to “think” that one of the Iranian airfields is American, located in Afghanistan. The absence of an inertial navigation system played a cruel joke with the drone — if the Iranian engineer really had to do with the operation, then orientation exclusively on GPS became the main factor affecting the entire interception as a whole.
But Americans deny this scenario. According to official data of the Pentagon, the unmanned vehicle was lost due to a malfunction of the onboard equipment, and it did not crash due to a lucky coincidence. Although a lot of the US military, including those with “big stars,” frankly doubt that the device presented by Iran is really a working RQ-170, and not a skillfully made mockup. In addition, the version of an anonymous engineer can be refuted using the GPS architecture. Recall that it has two levels - L1 and L2 - intended for civil and military use, respectively. The signal in the L1 range is transmitted openly, and in L2 it is encrypted. Theoretically, it is possible to hack it, but how practical is it practical? At the same time, it is not known what range the equipment of the American drone used, military or civilian. After all, the Iranians could have drowned out the encrypted signal with interferences, and a civilian with their own, with the necessary parameters. In this case, the Sentinel autopilot would have searched for any available signal from the satellite and would have taken for it the one that the Iranian radio-electronic engineers had “planted” on it.
And here we come to the most interesting aspect of this whole unmanned epic. Iran has never been seen in the creation of world-class military electronics. The conclusion about the help from abroad suggests itself. In the context of the Iranian operation, the Russian radio electronic intelligence complex 1Л222 Avtobaz was repeatedly mentioned. But can only Russia be "involved" in the interception? Complex 1Л222 by and large is only an element of a large and complex radio-electronic system. In Soviet times, not only enterprises located in the territory of the RSFSR were engaged in the creation of such equipment. So after the collapse of the USSR, developments on relevant topics could remain in the now independent states. Not all such enterprises could survive the hard times of the nineties, but those that remained continued to work. In particular, several design offices at once remained in Belarus. Immediately it is worth making a small reservation: this country is regarded as a possible “accomplice” primarily because it, like Iran, is often considered unreliable. But in general, good equipment in this case is in some way an addition to the political side of things.
The leading Belarusian enterprise in the field of radio-electronic equipment for military use is the Minsk Design Bureau Radar. The range of its products is quite wide: from radio source detection stations to cellular jamming systems. But of all the “jammers” in the context of the story with the RQ-170, the Optima-3 and Fog complexes look the most interesting. They are originally intended for jamming the signal of the American satellite positioning system GPS. "Optima-3" creates a dual-frequency interfering signal of complex structure, which allows you to reliably drown out all components of the satellite signal. However, the Optima might not have been used by Iranians. The fact is that Belarusian GPS jamming stations have compact dimensions and are adapted for fast transfer from place to place. This affected the signal strength. According to the specifications, Optima-3 produces a signal of more than 10 watts. On the one hand, a kilowatt is also more than ten watts, but the stated figures may not be enough for reliable operation on targets at high altitude. At the same time, the stated range to 100 kilometers.
But the aforementioned “Fog” looks like a more realistic option for suppressing the navigation signal. The system "Fog" is designed to operate on the frequencies of the GPS and GLONASS navigation systems. Its modification called "Fog-2" - to suppress satellite telephony Inmarsat and Iridium. The main difference between the "Mists" and "Optima" lies in the method of installation. "Optima-3" is a purely ground station jamming, and "Fog" is installed on helicopters, airplanes or even unmanned aerial vehicles. The structure of the emitted signal of the air-based system is approximately the same as the ground one. The range of the "Mists" is still the same one hundred kilometers. With proper preparation for the operation, both Belarusian GPS suppression systems could with equal efficiency prevent navigation of the American drone, although there are some doubts regarding the practical use and characteristics.
With the suspects, like, figured out. However, not everything is simple. If that anonymous Iranian engineer really is an Iranian engineer and is really connected with intercepting RQ-170, then it remains to find the system that “put” the wrong coordinates to the drone. Theoretically, the station jamming can not only clog the air with noise, but also transmit a signal of certain parameters. This is a theory, and it is not known how applicable it is with respect to the Belarusian “jammers”. It is quite possible that the Minsk engineers have foreseen such an opportunity, but they are trying not to talk about it.
As you can see, not only the United States and the Russian Federation have their own production equipment for jamming or replacing the signal of GPS satellites. But for some strange reason, most US military and analysts continue to nod toward Russian equipment. Only one story with the "Autobase" is worth something. For example, the former US ambassador to the UN, J. Bolton, recently very well appreciated the characteristics of Russian EW equipment, although he did it very indirectly. His statement looked like this: if Russian equipment for jamming gets into Iran, then America will have very serious problems. For some reason, he did not say about Belarusian electronics. Maybe he just does not know about it. But they can know about it in Tehran. Or even not only to know, but also to exploit. So, the December RQ-170 can be not only the first, but not the last.
Shortly after the announcement of the capture of the RQ-170 Sentinel UAV, the Christian Science Monitor published an interview with an engineer who allegedly had a direct relationship to the interception. This material ultimately served as the basis for most versions, conjectures and suggestions on the topic. According to this source, the interception was carried out in two stages. First, with the help of electronic warfare equipment (EW), the radio channel through which data was transmitted between the drone and its control panel was muted. No longer receiving commands, the RQ-170 turned on the autopilot. It is alleged that in the event of a loss of signal, these devices independently return to the base. For navigation it uses satellite positioning system GPS. The Iranians, the engineer claims, knew about this and at the right time “slipped” the wrong signal to the drone to the drone. As a result of these actions, Sentinel mistakenly began to “think” that one of the Iranian airfields is American, located in Afghanistan. The absence of an inertial navigation system played a cruel joke with the drone — if the Iranian engineer really had to do with the operation, then orientation exclusively on GPS became the main factor affecting the entire interception as a whole.
But Americans deny this scenario. According to official data of the Pentagon, the unmanned vehicle was lost due to a malfunction of the onboard equipment, and it did not crash due to a lucky coincidence. Although a lot of the US military, including those with “big stars,” frankly doubt that the device presented by Iran is really a working RQ-170, and not a skillfully made mockup. In addition, the version of an anonymous engineer can be refuted using the GPS architecture. Recall that it has two levels - L1 and L2 - intended for civil and military use, respectively. The signal in the L1 range is transmitted openly, and in L2 it is encrypted. Theoretically, it is possible to hack it, but how practical is it practical? At the same time, it is not known what range the equipment of the American drone used, military or civilian. After all, the Iranians could have drowned out the encrypted signal with interferences, and a civilian with their own, with the necessary parameters. In this case, the Sentinel autopilot would have searched for any available signal from the satellite and would have taken for it the one that the Iranian radio-electronic engineers had “planted” on it.
And here we come to the most interesting aspect of this whole unmanned epic. Iran has never been seen in the creation of world-class military electronics. The conclusion about the help from abroad suggests itself. In the context of the Iranian operation, the Russian radio electronic intelligence complex 1Л222 Avtobaz was repeatedly mentioned. But can only Russia be "involved" in the interception? Complex 1Л222 by and large is only an element of a large and complex radio-electronic system. In Soviet times, not only enterprises located in the territory of the RSFSR were engaged in the creation of such equipment. So after the collapse of the USSR, developments on relevant topics could remain in the now independent states. Not all such enterprises could survive the hard times of the nineties, but those that remained continued to work. In particular, several design offices at once remained in Belarus. Immediately it is worth making a small reservation: this country is regarded as a possible “accomplice” primarily because it, like Iran, is often considered unreliable. But in general, good equipment in this case is in some way an addition to the political side of things.
The leading Belarusian enterprise in the field of radio-electronic equipment for military use is the Minsk Design Bureau Radar. The range of its products is quite wide: from radio source detection stations to cellular jamming systems. But of all the “jammers” in the context of the story with the RQ-170, the Optima-3 and Fog complexes look the most interesting. They are originally intended for jamming the signal of the American satellite positioning system GPS. "Optima-3" creates a dual-frequency interfering signal of complex structure, which allows you to reliably drown out all components of the satellite signal. However, the Optima might not have been used by Iranians. The fact is that Belarusian GPS jamming stations have compact dimensions and are adapted for fast transfer from place to place. This affected the signal strength. According to the specifications, Optima-3 produces a signal of more than 10 watts. On the one hand, a kilowatt is also more than ten watts, but the stated figures may not be enough for reliable operation on targets at high altitude. At the same time, the stated range to 100 kilometers.
But the aforementioned “Fog” looks like a more realistic option for suppressing the navigation signal. The system "Fog" is designed to operate on the frequencies of the GPS and GLONASS navigation systems. Its modification called "Fog-2" - to suppress satellite telephony Inmarsat and Iridium. The main difference between the "Mists" and "Optima" lies in the method of installation. "Optima-3" is a purely ground station jamming, and "Fog" is installed on helicopters, airplanes or even unmanned aerial vehicles. The structure of the emitted signal of the air-based system is approximately the same as the ground one. The range of the "Mists" is still the same one hundred kilometers. With proper preparation for the operation, both Belarusian GPS suppression systems could with equal efficiency prevent navigation of the American drone, although there are some doubts regarding the practical use and characteristics.
With the suspects, like, figured out. However, not everything is simple. If that anonymous Iranian engineer really is an Iranian engineer and is really connected with intercepting RQ-170, then it remains to find the system that “put” the wrong coordinates to the drone. Theoretically, the station jamming can not only clog the air with noise, but also transmit a signal of certain parameters. This is a theory, and it is not known how applicable it is with respect to the Belarusian “jammers”. It is quite possible that the Minsk engineers have foreseen such an opportunity, but they are trying not to talk about it.
As you can see, not only the United States and the Russian Federation have their own production equipment for jamming or replacing the signal of GPS satellites. But for some strange reason, most US military and analysts continue to nod toward Russian equipment. Only one story with the "Autobase" is worth something. For example, the former US ambassador to the UN, J. Bolton, recently very well appreciated the characteristics of Russian EW equipment, although he did it very indirectly. His statement looked like this: if Russian equipment for jamming gets into Iran, then America will have very serious problems. For some reason, he did not say about Belarusian electronics. Maybe he just does not know about it. But they can know about it in Tehran. Or even not only to know, but also to exploit. So, the December RQ-170 can be not only the first, but not the last.
Information