P-9: hopelessly late excellence (part of 1)

25
What thorns did the creators of the Soviet Union’s last oxygen intercontinental missile have to go through?

P-9: hopelessly late excellence (part of 1)

Rocket R-9A on a pedestal at the Central Museum of the Armed Forces in Moscow. Photos from http://an-84.livejournal.com



In the long list of domestic intercontinental ballistic missiles, a special place is occupied by rockets created in OKB-1 under the guidance of legendary designer Sergey Korolev. And all of them share a common property: each at one time was not just a breakthrough in its class, but a real leap into the unknown.

And it was predetermined. On the one hand, the Soviet rocket engineers were unlucky: during the "division" of the German rocket inheritance, the allies got a much more significant part of it. This also applies to documentation and equipment (you can remember how terrifying the crushing state left the factory workshops and rocket platforms left in the Soviet occupation zone), and of course, the German rocket engineers themselves - the designers and engineers. And therefore we had to comprehend a lot of things empirically, making all the same mistakes and getting the same results that the Germans and Americans made and got for several years earlier. On the other hand, this made the creators of the missile industry of the USSR go not trodden paths, but take risks and experiment, deciding on unexpected steps, due to which many results were achieved that were perceived as impossible in the West.

It can be said that in the missile sphere Soviet scientists had their own, special way. But this path had a side effect: the solutions found very often forced the designers to hold on to them until the last. And then paradoxical situations arose: the products, which were based on such solutions, finally reached the present perfection - but by the time when it was obviously outdated. This is exactly what happened with the P-9 rocket, one of the most famous and at the same time unlucky rockets created in the Sergey Korolev design bureau. The first launch of this “product” took place on 9 on April 1961 of the year, three days before the real triumph of the Soviet rocket industry - the first manned flight. And the “nine” has virtually remained forever in the shadow of its more successful and successful female relatives - both royal, Yangelev and chelomee. Meanwhile story its creation is quite remarkable and worth it to tell about it in detail.


Rocket R-9 on the transport trolley at the site Tyr-Tam (Baikonur). Photo from http://www.energia.ru

Between space and the army

Today it’s no secret for anyone that the famous Vostok carrier rocket, which raised the cosmic heights of the first cosmonaut of the Earth, Yuri Gagarin, and with it the prestige of the Soviet rocket industry, was in fact the conversion version of the R-7 rocket. And the G7 became the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile, and this was clear to everyone since October 4 1957 of the year, since the launch of the first artificial satellite of the Earth. And this championship, apparently, did not give rest to the creator of the P-7 Sergey Korolev and his associates.

Academician Boris Chertok, one of Korolev's closest associates, very openly and self-critically recalled this in his book “Rockets and People”. And the story about the fate of the "nine" can not do without the extensive quotations from these of his memories, since there is little evidence left from those who were directly related to the birth of Р-9. Here are the words with which he begins his story:

“To what extent should the Queen develop combat themes after brilliant victories in space? Why did we create difficulties for ourselves on the path to space that opened up before us, while the burden of building a nuclear missile "sword" could be placed on others?
In the event of the termination of the development of combat missiles, we released design and production facilities to expand the front of space programs. If Korolev had reconciled with the fact that Yangel, Chelomey and Makeyev were enough to create combat missiles, neither Khrushchev, nor even Ustinov, who in December 1957 was appointed deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the military industrial complex, wouldn’t force us to develop new generation of intercontinental missiles.

However, having created the first intercontinental P-7 and its modification P-7А, we could not abandon the gambling race for the delivery of nuclear charges to any part of the world. What happens in the target area, if we throw a real charge with a capacity of one and a half to three megatons there, none of us thought much of it at that time. The implication was that this would never happen.

In our team there were more than enough supporters of work on combat missiles. Disconnection from the combat issue threatened to lose the much-needed support of the Ministry of Defense and the favor of Khrushchev himself. I was also considered a member of the informal party of rocket "hawks", which was headed by Mishin and Okhapkin. The very process of creating combat rockets fascinated us much more than the ultimate goal. The natural process of losing the monopoly on the creation of intercontinental strategic missiles was experienced by us without enthusiasm. Jealousy was caused by the work of our subcontractors with other major ones. ”


The assembly shop of the P-9 missiles at the Progress plant in Kuibyshev. Photos from http://kollektsiya.ru

P-16 comes on the heels of the Queen

In these very frank words of academician Chertok, alas, some slyness is also hidden. The fact is that space issues alone were not enough to develop successfully and receive government subsidies and support at the highest level. In the most terrible war in its history that the Soviet Union ended a little more than ten years ago, everyone and everything had to work on defense. And the missilemen, first of all, were assigned precisely defense tasks. So, Sergei Korolev simply could not afford to switch from the subject of intercontinental ballistic missiles to exclusively space. Yes, space was also considered as an area of ​​military interests. Yes, almost all manned flights of Soviet cosmonauts (like all others, by the way) had purely military tasks. Yes, almost all Soviet orbital stations were designed as combat ones. But the first and foremost were rockets.

So Sergey Korolev, from whom his deputy Mikhail Yangel had left shortly before, to head his own missile at OKN-586 in Dnepropetrovsk, had every reason to worry about the fate of his team. The difficulties of personal relationships overlap with the danger that the new competitor will become too strong a rival. And it was necessary not to stop, not to stop efforts to create not only space, but also intercontinental ballistic missiles.

“Yangel went to Dnepropetrovsk not to improve the Queen’s oxygen missiles,” writes Boris Chertok. - The rocket P-12 was created there in a very short time. 22 June 1957 of the year in Kapiyar began its flight tests. It was confirmed that the range of the rocket will exceed 2000 km.

The P-12 rocket was launched from a ground-launch device, on which it was installed in an uncharted form with a docked nuclear warhead. The total preparation time for launch was more than three hours. A purely autonomous control system provided a circular probable deviation within 2,3 km. This missile immediately after the launch of the 1959 in March was launched at the plant in a large series and became the main weapon for the Strategic Missile Forces created in December of the 1959 of the year.
But even earlier, in December 1956 of the year, with the direct support of Ustinov, Yangel obtained the issuance of a decree of the Council of Ministers on the creation of a new intercontinental missile P-16 with the start of flight design tests (LCI) in July 1961. The first intercontinental P-7 has never flown, and Khrushchev has already agreed to develop another rocket! Despite the fact that our "seven" was open "green street" and we had no reason to complain about the lack of attention from above, this decision served us as a serious warning. "


Ground launch complex "Desna N", created specifically for the P-9 missiles. Photo from http://www.arms-expo.ru

Need a long-lived rocket!

The turning point was January 1958 of the year, when a commission was working with might and main to discuss the draft design of the P-16 rocket. This commission, which was headed by Academician Mstislav Keldysh, was collected at the insistence of specialists from the Scientific Research Institute-88, which was actually the same fiefdom of Sergei Korolev as his OKB-1, and where Mikhail Yangel worked until recently. At one of the meetings, the general designer of the new rocket OKB-586, who felt strong support from above, came out with very harsh criticism of Korolev and his commitment to liquid oxygen as the only oxidant for rocket fuel. And judging by the fact that no one broke off the speaker, it was not just the personal position of Yangel. It was impossible not to notice this, and OKB-1 urgently needed to prove that their approach not only has the right to exist, but is the most justified.

To do this, it was necessary to solve the most important problem of oxygen missiles - an unacceptably long preparation time for the launch. Indeed, in the filled state, taking into account the fact that liquefied oxygen at a temperature above minus 180 degrees begins to boil and evaporate intensively, the rocket on such fuel could be stored for tens of hours - that is, a little more than its refueling took! Say, even after two years of intensive flights, recalls Boris Chertok, the preparation time for the P-7 and P-7А for the start could not be reduced more than to the 8-10 hours. And the Yngele R-16 rocket was designed taking into account the use of long-lasting rocket fuel components, which means it could be prepared for launch much faster.

Given all this, OKB-1 designers were required to cope with two tasks. First, significantly reduce the time of preparation for the launch, and secondly, at the same time increase the time that the rocket could be in combat readiness without losing a significant amount of oxygen. And surprisingly, both solutions were found, and by September 1958, the design bureau brought to the conceptual design its proposals for the P-9 oxygen rocket with intercontinental range.

But there was another condition that seriously limited the creators of the new missile in the approaches - the requirement to create a secure start for it. After all, the main drawback of the P-7 as a combat missile was an extremely complex and completely open start. That is why it was possible to create only one combat starting station of the “sevens” (except for the capabilities of the combat launch from Baikonur), having built the Angara object in the Arkhangelsk region. This structure had only four launchers for the P-7A, and immediately after the United States began to use the Atlas and Titan intercontinental ballistic missiles, it turned out to be almost defenseless.


Diagram of the Desna B-type silo launcher developed for the P-9 missiles. Photos from the site http://nevskii-bastion.ru

After all, the main idea of ​​using nuclear missiles weapons in those years, and even many years later, it was to have time to launch your missiles immediately after the enemy launches its intercontinental ballistic missiles - or to secure the possibility of a nuclear strike, even if the enemy’s warheads have already exploded on your land . At the same time, it was considered and considered that one of the priority targets of the strike would certainly be nuclear missile forces and their deployment and launch sites. So, in order to have time to strike back immediately, it was necessary to have excellent quality missile early warning equipment and such a system to prepare the missiles for launch, so that it takes minutes, and even better - seconds. According to the calculations of that time, the attacked side had no more than half an hour to launch its missiles in response to the attack and make the enemy hit the empty launch pads. The second required protected launch sites that could survive a close nuclear explosion.

Angara’s combat starting position didn’t meet either the first or the second, and couldn’t meet because of the peculiarities of the P-7 pre-launch preparation. Therefore, in the eyes of the Soviet leadership, it looked so much quicker to prepare and much more durable Yangelevskaya P-16. And therefore, OKB-1 needed to offer its own missile, not inferior to the "sixteenth" on all counts.

Exit - supercooled fuel!

At the end of 1958, Soviet intelligence obtained information that Americans use liquid oxygen as the oxidizer in their newest intercontinental ballistic missiles, Atlas and Titan. This information has seriously strengthened the position of OKB-1 with its “oxygen” predilections (in the Soviet Union, alas, they did not outlive the practice of looking at the decisions of the likely adversary and following their course). Thus, the initial proposal to create a new oxygen intercontinental ballistic missile P-9 received additional support. Sergei Korolev was able to take advantage of this, and on May 13 of the year 1959 issued a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers to begin work on designing an oxygen-powered Р-9 rocket.

The resolution stipulated that it was necessary to create a rocket with a launch weight of 80 T capable of flying 12 000-13 000 kilometers and at the same time having an accuracy within 10 kilometers subject to using a combined control system (using autonomous and radio subsystems) and 15 kilometers - without her. Flight tests of the rocket, according to the decree, were to begin in the 1961 year.


P-9 rocket launch from the Desna N test site at the Tyr-Tam test site. Photos from the site http://www.energia.ru

It would seem, here it is, the opportunity to break away from competitors from Dnepropetrovsk and prove the advantage of liquid oxygen! But no, above, apparently, they were not going to make life easier for anyone. In the same decree, as Boris Chertok recalls, “in order to accelerate the creation of the R-14 and R-16 missiles, it was prescribed to free OKB-586 from developing missiles for the Naval Fleet (with the transfer of all work to SKB-385, Miass) and stop all work on the subject of S.P. Queen".

And again on the agenda, the question arose of what other ways could be improved, improved future P-9. And then for the first time the idea arose to use not just oxygen, but supercooled oxygen as an oxidizing agent. “At the very beginning of the design it was clear that there could not be an easy life, which we allowed ourselves in the distribution of mass on the G-7,” wrote Boris Chertok. - We needed fundamentally new ideas. As I recall, Mishin was the first to come up with a revolutionary idea about using supercooled liquid oxygen. If instead of minus 183 ° С, close to the boiling point of oxygen, lower its temperature to minus 200 ° С, and even better - to minus 210 ° С, then, firstly, it will take a smaller volume and, secondly, it will sharply decrease evaporation losses. If this temperature can be maintained, it will be possible to carry out a high-speed refueling: oxygen, getting into a warm tank, will not boil violently, as it happens on all our missiles from P-1 to P-7 inclusive. The problem of obtaining, transporting and storing supercooled liquid oxygen turned out to be so serious that it went beyond the purely rocket framework and acquired Mishin at the suggestion, and then the All-Union national economic importance, which the Queen joined in solving these tasks. ”

This is exactly how one of those simple and at the same time very elegant solutions was found that eventually made it possible to create a P-9 rocket, which, with all the advantages of using liquid oxygen as an oxidizing agent for rocket fuel, had all the necessary capabilities for long-term storage and a quick start. Another advantage of the "nine" was the use of the so-called central drive: the rocket control system using the deflection of the main engines. This solution turned out to be so successful and simple that it is still used even on heavy energy-type rockets. And then it was just revolutionary - and greatly simplified the P-9 scheme, and most importantly, eliminated the need to install additional steering engines, which made it easier to weight the rocket.

Продолжение следует ...
25 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +2
    April 10 2017 08: 04
    Unfortunately, Sergei Pavlovich’s craving for liquid oxygen and rejection of solid fuel subjects played a cruel joke in principle, not only in terms of military missiles, but also indirectly to the failure of the lunar program
    1. +1
      April 10 2017 09: 13
      But didn’t Sergey Pavlovich deal with RT-1 and RT-2?
    2. +2
      April 10 2017 14: 13
      Unfortunately, Sergei Pavlovich’s craving for liquid oxygen and rejection of solid fuel subjects played a cruel joke in principle ...[i] [/ i]
      You are wrong, each SRT has its pros and cons. An oxygen-kerosene liquid propellant rocket is the correct vector for the development of civil space exploration and this has been confirmed by time. Something we don’t buy solid fuel engines from the Americans (and we don’t need this), unlike the purchase of our RD-180, 181 and NK-33. This is what we lose in the hydrogen theme - it's a fact. There is a very good UI, and here we have to catch up with the future for hydrogen, there is room to grow, and the kerosene engines are now almost at the peak of perfection. Thanks to the USSR and Energomash, and the former SNTK "Kuznetsova".
      1. 0
        April 13 2017 11: 30
        Colleague, about the hydrogen theme, you are wrong. Remember what fuel the Energy flew on?
        It is in Russia with this direction, the trouble is now, but in the USSR, there was no such trouble.
        1. 0
          April 13 2017 11: 34
          The production technology of the 120 engine is unfortunately lost, and so the first stage of oxygen-kerosene RD-170, the second hydrogen. But I wrote that we are lagging behind, and not that we don’t have anything at all, and what is yours here - the absence of trouble with hydrogen in the USSR ???? I say lagging behind
    3. +3
      April 10 2017 14: 14
      Solid rockets are good for military tasks, but they have nothing to do with the lunar program. Korolev was let down by engine drivers who could not provide his projects with engines with the necessary traction and high reliability.
  2. +1
    April 10 2017 11: 46
    Interesting, thanks.
    still used even on heavy rockets like "Energy"

    Sloppy formulated.
    Quote: Old26
    rejection of solid fuel subjects ... lunar program

    That's about Rttt and the moon did not understand.
    1. +1
      April 10 2017 15: 55
      and this is beyond understanding
      rather, the moon needs UDMH + AT:
      - repeated inclusion
      - self-ignition
      - controlled traction
      all this is not available at the RTTT
  3. +1
    April 10 2017 12: 15
    Not always our talented designers were at heart military. Therefore, sometimes they simply strived for simple technical progress, without delving into the fact that this technical progress is unacceptable in this variant for the military art of the current day, in particular for the strategy of winning the future war with one touch of the red button.
  4. +2
    April 10 2017 12: 43
    But on the basis of P9 there could be a light launcher on "clean" components instead of the poisonous "Cosmos". :(
    1. +1
      April 10 2017 15: 50
      wanted to say - Proton
  5. +3
    April 10 2017 13: 36
    “Look back at the developments of a probable enemy and follow in their line ....” I have long begun to be surprised that it is worth the Americans to adopt any new type of weapon, as after some time this appeared in the USSR .... but much more rarely, on the contrary. There have been cases when a new type of weapon was offered in the Union, an analogue of which was not in the world; but the "high authorities" blocked work on the grounds that the Americans did not.
    1. 0
      April 13 2017 11: 31
      Yes, this is sabotage, in its purest form.
  6. +2
    April 10 2017 18: 15
    Quote: kugelblitz
    But didn’t Sergey Pavlovich deal with RT-1 and RT-2?

    There are exceptions to any rule. Judging by the memoirs of his associates, the soul of S.P. to solid rockets. This is even indicated by the fact that the time between the start of development and the start of testing was almost 7 years (while the time between the creation and testing of the R-7 was 3-4 years). RT-2 began to experience after the death of the Queen,

    Quote: mkpda
    Solid rockets are good for military tasks, but they have nothing to do with the lunar program. Korolev was let down by engine drivers who could not provide his projects with engines with the necessary traction and high reliability.

    Not certainly in that way. The same Glushko was ready to create an engine with the necessary parameters, but only on high-boiling fuel components. Korolev insisted on oxygen-kerosene. Glushko refused to do this. As a result, Kuznetsov took up the engines, who was able to create an engine, but alas with a thrust of about 150 tons. And 27-30 engines on the stage led to a deplorable result

    Quote: Octopus
    That's about Rttt and the moon did not understand.

    Why not understand it. I wrote.
    Craving for liquid oxygen and rejection of solid fuels played a cruel joke not only in the chat of military missiles, but also indirectly to the failure of the lunar program

    This does not mean that we must put an equal sign between military missiles and the lunar program. Solid fuel theme would allow the Queen to be again in the forefront among other designers. And the rejection of high-boiling components and craving for oxygen led to the indirect failure of the lunar program.
    The RT-2, the first Soviet serial ICBM, was by no means Korolev's beloved brainchild. He did not engage in solid fuel issues. RT-2, although it was created in its design bureau under the leadership of Sadovsky, but its modification is already EMNIP in TsKB-7. He began to make (having bet) on the R-9 ICBM, again with oxygen ...
    The same is true with oxygen engines for the lunar program. Glushko was ready to create a much more thrust engine, but not oxygen. Korolev was against it. As a result, 3 dozen engines on the N-1 could not work synchronously

    Quote: dla94
    But on the basis of P9 there could be a light launcher on "clean" components instead of the poisonous "Cosmos". :(

    Could. But the "Cosmos" was already worked out, and the R-8 was released in a very small series. And in parallel to make a rocket with approximately the same performance characteristics as that of the "Cosmos" no one would.

    Quote: Nikolaevich I
    “Look back at the developments of a probable enemy and follow in their line ....” I have long begun to be surprised that it is worth the Americans to adopt any new type of weapon, as after some time this appeared in the USSR .... but much more rarely, on the contrary. There have been cases when a new type of weapon was offered in the Union, an analogue of which was not in the world; but the "high authorities" blocked work on the grounds that the Americans did not.

    Perhaps you are right, but with respect to the start of work on solid fuel issues, we lagged behind the Americans. As a result, their vehicles have been in service for 30-35 years and are being modernized by the complete replacement of all components. We write off, because we do not have the same experience in replacing bonded charges for ICBMs.
    Sometimes following in line with the Americans could bear fruit, sometimes we really did “like the Americans” without hesitation.
    1. 0
      April 10 2017 20: 22
      Quote: Old26
      Why not understand it.

      You combined in one phrase the solid rocket engine and the moon. It seemed strange to me. Now it’s clearer.
    2. +1
      April 13 2017 12: 16
      Quote: Old26
      with respect to the beginning of work on solid fuel issues, we lagged behind the Americans.

      You're right ... and about the "solid fuel theme" I do not argue and did not argue! In my “comment” I meant other “some things”.
  7. +1
    April 10 2017 20: 45
    Quote: Old26
    Unfortunately, Sergei Pavlovich’s craving for liquid oxygen and rejection of solid fuel subjects played a cruel joke in principle, not only in terms of military missiles, but also indirectly to the failure of the lunar program

    As far as I know, with solid-fuel rockets the problem was not in the soul, but in the chemical industry, which for a long time could not provide the required fuel.
  8. 0
    April 10 2017 21: 24
    Quote: bk0010
    As far as I know, with solid-fuel rockets the problem was not in the soul, but in the chemical industry, which for a long time could not provide the required fuel.

    In any case, rejection. Well, Sergei Pavlovich did not like high-boiling components and solid-fuel engines. Therefore, he did the same RT-1 and RT-2, since there was an order of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee. But just to be called "untied", by the time of protection of the EP complex 8K98 compound fuel formulations had already been developed. But the tramp on creation lasted another 6 years
  9. +1
    April 11 2017 11: 46
    [/ quote] Not quite so. The same Glushko was ready to create an engine with the necessary parameters, but only on high-boiling fuel components. Korolev insisted on oxygen-kerosene. Glushko refused to do this.

    The same with oxygen engines for the lunar program. Glushko was ready to create a much more thrust engine, but not oxygen. Korolev was against it. As a result, 3 dozen engines on the N-1 could not work synchronously [quote]

    Probably not all readers know that the high-boiling components are AT + UDMH, the same amyl with heptyl. Korolev was absolutely right. Imagine the scale of the catastrophe in the event of an emergency launch of a rocket with a launch mass of more than 2000 tons!
    So I consider Glushko one of the main destroyers of the lunar program of the USSR. And a ghoul to whom human lives were not at all interested. You can also recall his "fun" with fluorine as an oxidizing agent, which have no practical significance. Ambition for him was above all.
    1. +1
      April 11 2017 15: 10
      This is a difficult topic.
      Of course, Glushko made the RD-25 after 170 years, but at what cost!
      At the same time, the 600-ton engine on the stinky Glushko would probably have managed to make it for the N-1 and Leonov would be the first to fly to the moon.
  10. 0
    April 11 2017 16: 44
    "... Mishin was the first to express the revolutionary idea of ​​using supercooled liquid oxygen."
    This idea is now being realized by Musk in his rockets. Only the problem of boiling oxygen and water hammer in the supply pipelines until recently has not been solved, which is why the catastrophe occurred last year.
  11. 0
    April 11 2017 16: 55
    Quote: dla94
    Probably not all readers know that the high-boiling components are AT + UDMH, the same amyl with heptyl. Korolev was absolutely right. Imagine the scale of the catastrophe in the event of an emergency launch of a rocket with a launch mass of more than 2000 tons!

    The scale of the catastrophe in the explosions of N-1 with oxygen-kerosene engines was no less. The question is different. On the "stink" it was possible to make a fairly powerful engine and do without 30 pieces in the first stage.

    Quote: dla94
    So I consider Glushko one of the main destroyers of the lunar program of the USSR. And a ghoul to whom human lives were not at all interested. You can also recall his "fun" with fluorine as an oxidizing agent, which have no practical significance. Ambition for him was above all.

    Ghoul? So the ghouls were Yangel and Chelomei. For their "lunar" carriers were precisely on this fuel pair. About fluoride. The development showed the promise of this pair, but alas, the technologies have not reached the level so that we can safely use fluorine as an oxidizing agent. Although his specific impulse was higher than the EMNIP than that of oxygen-hydrogen.
    Ambitions were not only Glushko, but also the Queen. Neither one nor the other wanted to concede. And if there were Glushko’s paths then (technical) difficulties in creating an engine of such power, then the queen simply had ambitions. "I do not want a stink and that's it"
    And by the way, do you think the Chinese are ghouls who were also uninteresting in human lives? After all, their manned flights take place on carriers on this fuel pair: heptyl-amyl?

    Moreover, an accident did not allow our astronauts to fly around the moon first. And the ship was supposed to start on the "Proton". And nothing, no one stuttered about the destroyer of human souls Glushko
    1. 0
      April 17 2017 13: 12
      Well, no need to dissemble. And at the same time, the Queen is portrayed as a dim-witted tyrant.
      “The scale of the catastrophe in the explosions of N-1 with oxygen-kerosene engines was no less.” - this refers to the contamination of the area with poisonous components, and not just the destruction caused by a rocket explosion. And you understand that.
      Chelomeevsky "Proton" is the UR500 - a military missile in its origin (like the Great Campaigns). There, the use of "stinks is justified. The Chinese are already turning from AT-UDMH in their new launch vehicles in favor of kerosene and oxygen. Korolev is right again!
      https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A7%D0%B0%D0%BD%
      D1%87%D0%B6%D1%8D%D0%BD_(%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%B5
      % D1% 82% D1% 8B)
      For fluorine - there was no need to bring to fire tests and poison people. Achieving 400 s of specific impulse is not an achievement that it can justify.
  12. 0
    April 15 2017 09: 35
    Thank you, I saw the start of 8K75 at 31 sites in Plesetsk. And the barrels for supercooled oxygen, they were chopped down to metal in the 90s. The start was peculiar.
  13. 0
    April 17 2017 21: 14
    Quote: dla94
    Well, no need to dissemble. And at the same time, the Queen is portrayed as a dim-witted tyrant.

    And who portrays his petty tyrants? But the fact that he did not like engines with high boiling components is a well-known fact. There is not a single product with such a fuel pair. A solid propellant rocket is the only one, and that’s because it was the decision of the Central Committee. In addition to this solid fuel product he did not have. All this in total led to the fact that he lost the military segment. His missiles, no matter how perfect they were, were not suitable as military ones.

    Quote: dla94
    “The scale of the catastrophe in the explosions of N-1 with oxygen-kerosene engines was no less.” - this refers to the contamination of the area with poisonous components, and not just the destruction caused by a rocket explosion. And you understand that ..

    AND? Fortunately, the amount of fuel on the Proton is not comparable with the amount on the same N-1. And the consequences of the explosion were rather big. The number of explosions at the start of the Proton is minimal. Although yes, infections are sufficient in area.

    Quote: dla94
    Chelomeevsky "Proton" is the UR500 - a military missile in its origin (like the Great Campaigns). There, the use of "stinks is justified. The Chinese are already turning from AT-UDMH in their new LVs in favor of kerosene and oxygen. Korolev is right again! Https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A7%D0%B0%D0% Bd%
    D1%87%D0%B6%D1%8D%D0%BD_(%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%B5
    % D1% 82% D1% 8B).

    So what, what is the combat origin? R-7 is also military in origin. The transition to oxygen-kerosene and oxygen-hydrogen for space carriers is quite an acceptable option. But so far, the bulk of them is not on these components, but on UDMH + AT. Technologically, now the Chinese have come to the use of these CMT in space carriers

    Quote: dla94
    For fluorine - there was no need to bring to fire tests and poison people. Achieving 400 s of specific impulse is not an achievement that it can justify.

    Why? It might have made sense, but technologically then we were not ready for this pair. Now, by the way, too. The same thing happened with a nuclear engine. Make done, but there was no opportunity to bring

    Quote: KamalovRA
    Thank you, I saw the start of 8K75 at 31 sites in Plesetsk. And the barrels for supercooled oxygen, they were chopped down to metal in the 90s. The start was peculiar.

    Are you sure from the 31st site? R-9 launch was next to FIRST platform. Area 51