Do not disrupt the program, or Underwater Accounting
The disruption of the defense order, the collapse of the defense industry, the lack of necessary production capacity, outdated equipment, no money, the Ministry of Defense makes its demands, manufacturers do not agree with them, and so on. Familiar theses from the recent past. The notorious five percent of GOZ-2011? According to some experts, they could have resulted in the failure of the entire rearmament program planned before 2020 of the year (LG-2020). But the remaining contracts were nevertheless concluded and it seems that no problems are foreseen. But only "like", because 280 billion rubles allocated to the very same contracts - not the last in the program. If only because eight years remain until its completion, which means that in the future there may also be problems with agreements, quotations and other production and economic things.Most of the funds allocated this year will go to the construction of submarines. And the main item of expenditure is the construction of four submarines of the project 885М "Ash" - 164 billion or about 60% of the total amount. Another about 13 billion will be received by Malachit SPMBM for finalizing the project. Also about 40 billion are planned to be allocated to Rubin Central Design Bureau to upgrade the Borey project to the 955A state. The remaining, much smaller, shares of the allocated 280 billions will be spent on the repair of existing boats and the construction of surface vessels.
What we want and what we have
The amounts are considerable, and therefore require special attention. Given the fact that contracts for the renewal of projects and the construction of new ships have already been concluded, it can be concluded that the Defense Ministry has no complaints about the total amounts and their components. In absolute terms, the money allocated for submarines does not look good or bad, but a comparison with other government spending changes the impression. So, for example, before the 2015, the Emergencies Ministry will receive more than forty billion rubles to upgrade its fleet of vehicles, thanks to which the current 30% will turn into 15% in the 80 year. At the same time, almost the same amount should go to the construction of just one boat of the 885M project, even if it is the head ship or for the modernization of the Boreas. Another point that clearly does not add clarity to the distribution of money lies in the essence of updating projects. If everything is more or less clear with 955 (four more will be added to the missile launchers for 16 and the equipment and design will be adjusted accordingly), the situation is more complicated with Yasen. There are almost no open data, and sometimes you have to rely even on rumors. The latter argue that most of the innovations in the project will concern the use of domestic materials, assemblies, etc. At the same time, there is reason to believe that the upgrade will affect not only the origin of the components: the 885 project is still not entirely new and therefore requires major improvements.
Total it turns out, in the composition of our naval fleet will include new boats of two projects. However, those boats that are only planned to be built, to some extent differ from the existing ones. So, for example, at least three boats of the Borey project will correspond to the original project, and the rest will be built as 955A. A similar situation exists with the Yasen project - the Severodvinsk currently under test was built according to the original 885th, and Kazan (built since 2009) corresponds to the 885M project. It turns out that the fleet will have new boats of two projects, but of four “subspecies”. There are reasons to fear some problems with financing and operation due to a relatively small degree of unification.
Indeed, the number of types of equipment operated directly affects the costs. In the past couple of decades, our country has to seriously overpay for the construction of the submarine fleet. Due to the lack of normal financing, normal and understandable views on the fate of the fleet and a clear strategy, for some time, only the main ships of various projects were built. For obvious reasons, it all cost much more than mass production. In turn, the lack of plans for the development of our own fleet can be considered a consequence of the “reforms” of the end of 80-x and the beginning of 90-x. Then, by a strong-willed decision of the country's leadership, the spent system, which connected the customer, developers, scientists and production workers, was destroyed. Research institutes (Central Research Institute named after Academician A.N. Krylov, Central Research Institute of Shipbuilding Technology, etc.) carried out all relevant research on the prospects of the fleet and thus helped both the Ministry of Defense and the design bureau. Thus, the system made it possible to thoroughly work through all the problems associated with the fleet development strategy and the creation of equipment for this strategy. After the destruction of this whole system, the material part update has become easier, but not profitable. The Navy issued to the developer requirements, and he created a project for them. Alternative options and proposals are now almost ceased to be considered. In addition, the market economy forced each project or production organization to “pull the blanket over itself”. Extreme in the new situation was the fleet - many different types at a great price.
But not only the destruction of the system of interaction of organizations associated with the fleet had a bad effect on the state of the entire Navy. In the 80s of the last century, some people from this environment have already felt the need to update the very concept of the Soviet navy, as noted by some people from this environment. The principle of opposition to the whole world demanded an increase in the fleet's combat strength. The industry coped with this, but the accompanying infrastructure often lagged behind the pace of military equipment. By the beginning of Perestroika, there was a need to revise the doctrine of fleet application, but the country's leadership had other priorities. In 1990, the management of the Central Research Institute for them. Krylova made a last attempt to push through the Ministry of Shipbuilding the idea of updating the views on the fleet. This attempt was unsuccessful - at first, the responsible workers considered the proposal to be premature, and then it was far from the best period for the fleet, for industry, and for the country as a whole. Since the beginning of the 2000-ies there has been a number of positive trends. Among other things, at this time, the restoration of the existing interaction system gradually began. At present, the general management of production for the fleet is carried out by the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the Military-Industrial Commission under the Government. Coordination of various projects is carried out by the Central Research Institute for them. Krylov - his main task is to ensure that work in one direction is not duplicated, and that the projects proper meet the requirements of the customer.
In general, there is some reason for optimism: funding is being restored, again many organizations are working together on many projects, and the government is showing its intentions to continue the directions that have been started. The main thing is that optimism does not turn into hats, as is often the case. In particular, the total tonnage of the planned construction looks like a “dangerous section” in an optimistic aspect. From open sources it is known that only new ships before 20 will be built on 500 thousand tons. In the second half of the 2000-x was built almost ten times less. And the last argument against optimism in the plans concerns the assessments of the prospects of domestic shipbuilding. According to the report of the President of the United Shipbuilding Corporation R. Trotsenko (Marine Industry of Russia Forum, May 2011 of the year), our shipbuilding, if the current development trends continue, will hardly be mastered by 2020 thousand tons. And from this figure it is necessary to take away the export and civil construction.
Five points of academician Pashin
How to achieve the necessary volumes? There is an absolutely logical, but controversial way: cut plans to reasonable limits. A more complex and effective method implies greater attention to the development of the shipbuilding industry. But perhaps the most interesting and complete proposal was presented by the scientific director-director of the Central Research Institute of them. A.N. Krylova, academician of RAS V.M. Pashin. He published his views on efficiency improvement, consisting of five points, in the article “Boat disparity”. These five directions look like this:
1. Strategy. As a matter of urgency, we need to revise the concept of the domestic navy and create a rearmament program before the 2040 year. Some HPV-2020 need not be included in it, but it is necessary to take it into account. You should also reduce the types of ships under construction without compromising the required class composition. We are currently building or repairing about 70 types of ships, submarines, boats, etc. equipment used in power structures. For comparison, in the United States before the 20 year, it is planned to build one aircraft carrier, 16 destroyers, 36 small ships, 4 amphibious assault ships, 2 dock transport and 18 submarines. A total of half a dozen types, planned with a constant reduction in defense spending.
It is also possible to start reducing classes and nomenclatures, but this is much more complicated. Central Research Institute for them. Krylova has already offered to create a single basic platform submarine, which can be equipped with both cruise and strategic missiles. This proposal did not go beyond the initial research. But recently the United States announced the launch of its own project of such a platform. It is promised that such a boat of American manufacture will cost up to one and a half times cheaper than the original one.
According to Pashin, the reduction of the types of equipment being operated and planned should significantly reduce the cost of building ships - in this case, the equipment will be built serially, and not in single lead copies. Thanks to the launch into mass production, it will be possible to create clear fixed price lists for all necessary work, even if taking into account inflation and other factors. As a result, it is possible to reduce the price of a serial boat 1,5-1,7 times relative to the head.
2. Reasonable approach to equipment. One of the main factors that influenced the duration of the Yury Dolgoruky submarine's tests is often called the lack of knowledge of its main armament. Similarly, the situation is often the case with other boats and ships. Equipment that has not yet been tested is installed on the ship that is already under construction, and, as a result, its permanent improvements have the most direct effect on the final cost of the ship itself. All over the world, the use of no more than 20-30% new equipment is considered optimal. And even with such a share, the total cost of various electronics comes to 80% of the ship price. But in the end, it is not only the customer’s wallet that suffers - almost always, along with the cost, they “float away” and the dates.
3. Forecasts and projects. It is required to complete the creation of a system that coordinates the creation of forecasts, the development of the required fleet appearance and the development of new projects. In this direction, several steps have already been taken, including by the Military-Industrial Commission under the Government, Regulations have been issued concerning the procedure for creating projects and the conditions for the supply of shipbuilding products within the framework of the State Defense Order. In these documents Central Research Institute. Krylov plays a leading role in all measures of planning, evaluation, project appraisal, etc. Pashin believes that now the Regulations should be given the status of a Government Decree, thanks to which the decisions of the Krylov Institute will be no less important than the opinion of the naval leadership. As a result, the system of forecasting and generating technical tasks should work more efficiently.
4. Pricing. No production man will argue that a generous customer is good. But, as the experience of some states shows, with the excessive generosity of the customer, the price of the final product can take simply indecent values. As for the production workers, they will be happy to master all the allocated funds. To combat the financial “overblown”, Pashin proposes to confront a leading shipbuilding Central Research Institute with a new task: the development of standards for the cost of all types of work. From time to time, they will need to be adjusted in accordance with forecasts and a three-year budget.
In addition, it is necessary to stop producing civilian ships for private customers at state defense factories due to the nature of the latter’s economy. It is unlikely that the private owner will pay the indirect costs of the enterprise and, as a result, the plant will be forced to transfer the lost amounts to military contracts. If the Ministry of Defense does not intend to indirectly "sponsor" commercial organizations, then military shipyards should produce only military products, and civilian only civilian. If only because the pricing principles in these areas are quite different.
You can take advantage of foreign experience. Since 2005, the US Navy has been heading for cost cutting. First of all, the US fleet requires manufacturers to reduce "associated" costs and optimize processes. Thanks to all the measures taken in 2020, the Virginia-type boat is expected to cost almost two times less than the lead ship of the project. In addition, the duration of construction will be significantly reduced. Very useful undertaking that should be taken over.
5. Discipline. To ensure the due diligence of the customer and the contractor, Pashin proposes to introduce a system of fines. Industry should be punished with a ruble for disrupting the construction deadlines and failure to meet tactical and technical requirements. The military, in turn, must be responsible for violation of the financing schedule, delays in signing contracts, as well as for changing requirements after construction has begun. It is possible that someone will consider these methods too rigid, however, this is how it is possible not only to ensure the fulfillment of construction plans, but also instill in the customers and performers the notorious mutual respect.
And again you can turn to the American experience. In US law there is a so-called. the Nunn-McCurdy amendment. It was accepted at a time when defense expenditures began to take on large and dubious dimensions. The main essence of the amendment is as follows: when the program cost on 15% exceeds the planned one, the commander-in-chief of the type of armed forces for whom the project is being developed is called to Congress. The commander-in-chief should explain to congressmen why additional funding is required and prove its expediency. If the cost is exceeded by a quarter, the project closes immediately. Its preservation is possible only if the Minister of Defense of the country proves to the congressmen the importance of the project for the security of the state and gives personal guarantees that the executor will cope with the task.
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Yet the implementation of the "Five points Pashin" does not guarantee the full implementation of all plans. But it is certainly possible to raise productivity with the help of this technique. If, however, there is not enough own production capacity, then it may be decided to place some orders that are not of strategic importance in overseas factories. Our country already had experience in building machinery for the fleet abroad. At the same time, political motives at the beginning of the 20th century led to very serious consequences for the fleet of imperial Russia. So, before placing an order abroad, all its aspects should be checked twice or even three times and, of course, you should not trust secret technologies to foreigners.
Summing up and understanding the complexity of providing the domestic fleet with new equipment, I would like to hope that the Ministry of Defense, the Military Industrial Commission and other agencies have a clear plan of action. Perhaps there is already a complete and specific program, but for whatever reasons it simply is not published. But the fact of publication, it should be noted, is not so important - the main thing is that the responsible persons should do everything as it should.
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