The Aster-30 anti-aircraft missile is equipped with an advanced high-explosive fragmentation warhead with directional fragmentation of the fragmentation field, its mass is about 20 kg. Even in those rare cases when Aster-30 doesn’t hit the target with a direct hit, the deviation from the target rarely exceeds 3-4 m, which means that a dense field of fragments moving with high hypersonic speed will in most cases trigger the ballistic warhead enemy missiles
In the future, the rocket will be deeply upgraded to the version "Aster-30 Block 1NT" (NT, - New Technology). This modification will be able to work on medium-range ballistic missiles (up to 1500 km). Over the next 5 — 12 years, a promising modification of the Aster-30 Block II will be developed. The flight performance of this interceptor missile can reach the level of interceptor missiles of the type 40Н6 or “THAAD”, which will allow intercepting endo-atmospheric targets at altitudes of 100 km and distances of 300 — 500 km. The agreement to develop the Aster-30 Block 1NT version between France and Italy was signed in early November of the 2016 year. The specialists of the French and Italian divisions of the Thales and MBDA companies are faced with the task of increasing the power and working period of the 1 th (accelerating) stage of the Aster-30 rocket, as well as developing an entirely new high-potential X-band radar imaging system with a detection range of up to 500 km to meet the long-range characteristics of a new generation Aster missile defense system. Obviously, the results will be used on the radar type "SMART-L" and "Sampson". SAMP-T is regularly upgraded and its deployment in Georgia poses a real threat to our air attack assets, including Iskander.
In addition, even the existing version of the air defense missile system can become much more dangerous due to the pairing of the command and control center (ARU) and the Arabel MRLS with powerful radar detectors of the decimeter range such as LANZA and RAT-31 DL / M. Detecting ballistic and aerodynamic targets at much longer distances (100-150 km), these radars have the ability to target the SAMP-T PBU much earlier than the Arabel MRLS does, which will significantly shorten the response time for high-speed targets. .
As you can see, even the SAMP-T 3 or 4 batteries radically change the alignment of forces in the airspace of the Caucasian theater of military operations in terms of the defense of NATO military facilities, which will be deployed in Georgia. To parry such a missile defense system, it is necessary to have a significant number of Iskander in the Southern Military District, as well as to equip tactical fighter aircraft at air bases in the Krasnodar Territory and the Republic of Crimea with tactical missiles such as X-59М2 / МКХNUMX Ovod. Missiles of this family have enormous advantages in defeating command posts and multi-purpose radar SAMP-T. Virtually the entire flight of the Ovods of various versions takes place in the rounding mode of the terrain at an altitude of 2 to 30. The Arabel’s MRLS has large radio horizon limits here, since the standard equipment of the air defense system usually does not allow the antenna post to be lifted to a universal tower with 100-22 height m (the station is located directly on the van with a command and control unit FCU, Fire Control Unit). The height of the PAR lights above the 27 — 6 m surface, and therefore, the radio horizon for low-altitude cruise missiles does not exceed 7 km.
It is quite possible to suppress the “SAMP-T” batteries, but only with the complex and massive use of the WTO of various classes, both land and air-based.
ARMENIAN AIRCRAFT DOESN'T LACK
As it was found out during the detailed review, the strike potential of the Armed Forces of Armenia is one of the strongest in the South Caucasus. In addition to the huge number of volley fire systems of various calibers, as well as an even greater number of receiver artillery and operational-tactical missile systems Elbrus, Tochka-U and Iskander-E, which are in service with the Armenian army, The gunners of the 992 artillery regiment, attached to the 102 Russian military base located in the city of Gyumri, also contribute to the component. The main purpose of this base is to deter military formations of unpredictable states such as Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia on the southern borders of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, as well as joint military operations with the Armenian armed forces if Baku decides to conduct a large-scale offensive on the Nagorno-Karabakh lands. Karabakh Republic.
The arsenal of artillery of all units of the 102 military base of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus is dominated by artillery units. Thus, the 922 artillery regiment is armed with: 3 batteries 122-mm howitzer D-30 (18 guns), MLRS BM-21 "Grad" jet division (18 machines-PU); and in the armament of three motorized rifle regiments (123, 124, 128) a total of: artillery division from 18 SAU 2X1 "Gvozdika", as well as three divisions D-30 (54 guns). Totally in service with the entire 102 base, there are 108 units for MLRS, SAU and transported howitzers. For all of this arsenal you need an excellent cover with the help of a layered air defense system. Does Armenia have such a cover?
First, in June 2016 of the year in Armenia, the agreement on the formation of a common air defense system with the Russian Federation in the framework of the CSTO was ratified. This means that in case of aggravation of the situation in NKR or the threat of air strikes from the Azerbaijani Air Force or strikes of rocket artillery, the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces may urgently transfer to Armenia the required number of Triumph C-400 “Triumph”, C-300B4 anti-aircraft missile divisions , "Buk-М2", as well as batteries of self-propelled anti-aircraft missile and anti-aircraft missile and artillery complexes "Tor-М2" and "Pantsir-S 1". These air defense systems are capable of easily intercepting 300-mm NURS, launched by the T-300 "Qasirqa" system. MLRS T-300 MO of Azerbaijan has been purchasing the Turkish company ROKETSAN since January 2013. The Qasirqa range is 100 km, and the combat qualities are similar to the Smerch MLRS.
There are other scenarios. For example, many Armenian observers are alarmed by the opinion of the director of the Center for Strategic Conjuncture Ivan Konovalov, who in May of this year noted a lot of ambiguities in the Azerbaijani defense program. He claims that in addition to the 12 “OTK-U” PTRK 9K79-1 launchers, Azerbaijan could have time to include in the “Israeli contract” a decent amount of 306-mm EXTRA tactical ballistic missiles that have much in common with the Belarusian- Chinese development "Polonaise". The range of EXTRA high-precision missiles is estimated at about 150 km, and up to 8 missiles can be deployed on a single launcher in 2 quadruple transport-launch modules. No one doubts the appearance of these missiles in the Azerbaijani Armed Forces since in early July 2014-year the entire Middle East and the Caucasus circled a video report from the AzTV television channel, on which the Azerbaijani crew fired these missiles from a modular launcher “Lynx” on its own the ground, hitting targets at a distance of 42 km. It is known that Extras is manufactured by Israel Military Industry (IMI) and has a circular probable deviation (QUO) of 10 m, plus a heavy high-explosive or cluster warhead intended for the destruction of manpower and lightly armored vehicles. Given the large caliber of the rocket, more serious equipment can be used, represented by self-aiming cumulative ammunition, capable of destroying heavy armored vehicles. Such equipment “Extras” brings it to the same dangerous level as the MLRS “Smerch”. Guidance of OTBR is represented by a satellite correction module.
Theoretically, “EXTRA” is capable of causing significant damage to the infrastructure of the Armenian Armed Forces. But its large caliber and radar signature contribute to a simpler interception of modern Russian anti-aircraft missile systems. At the moment, EXTRA is the only ballistic missile that poses a certain threat to the population and strategic objects of Armenia with its massive use of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. But on the “misty horizon” there may appear another “surprise” in the form of middle-range ballistic missiles “Hatf-4” purchased from Pakistan. There is no official information on the availability of these missiles at present in Azerbaijan, but various sources have long reported on plans or even the implementation of a similar strategic deal between Islamabad and Baku.
If the presence of “Hatf-4” (“Shahin-1A”) in the armed forces of Azerbaijan is confirmed, you must be ready for the most unexpected turn of events. The fact is that Khatf-4 is no longer an operational-tactical ballistic missile, it is a full-fledged, upgraded version of the Shahin-1 medium-range ballistic missile (MRSD). The range of “Hatf-4” can range from 2 to 3 thousand km. Interestingly, the distance from Baku to Yerevan is only 460 km. Why Azerbaijan may need MRSD, it is not quite clear yet ...
One of the options under consideration is a threat to Russia and its military-industrial capacities in the Eastern European part after Moscow intervenes for Yerevan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But here we also see a complete lack of logic, since the entire European part of Russia very quickly acquires "fresh" divisions and Triumph C-400 brigades, and soon will be replenished with Buk-M3 and C-300В4 divisions, which are able to knock down “Khatfa” with an efficiency of more than 85% (“Shahin-1А” are not equipped with advanced missile defense systems, as well as with gas dynamic systems for performing anti-aircraft maneuvers). Yes, the Azerbaijani Armed Forces will never decide to fire at us, because, firstly, they know the response measures, and secondly, most of the defense contracts of Baku are concluded directly with Rosoboronexport, including further maintenance of equipment and supply of spare parts (as is known, sells weapons to Azerbaijan to maintain parity in the region). From this point on, the goal of possible deliveries to Azerbaijan “Hatf-4” becomes even less clear, and everything starts to resemble a big theater of the absurd. Next, we return to the air defense of Armenia.
In addition to the Russian missile defense system, which can be quickly deployed on the territory of Armenia at the time of the escalation of the conflict, there is already a sufficiently powerful anti-air component, represented by the anti-aircraft missile defense divisions of the Russian contingent on the 102 military base, as well as ZRDN belonging to the military Air Force of Armenia. The environs of the 102 military base cover the 2 of the C-300В air defense missile system. According to the “Caucasian Knot” resource, the composition of each division is represented by 2 9А83 launchers for launching 9М83 medium-range interceptor missile launch vehicles, as well as just one 9A85 launch-charging installation (ROM), also used for storing and launching an VUR program, which is used for storing and launching an VURP system. Thus, noticeable drawback of range indicators of these "ante" since no starting and puskozaryazhayuschie installation 9A83 and 9A82 designed to store and run "large caliber" of S-9V - interceptors 84M300 having longer range (9 km) speed (82M). The battery is incomplete. And this points to another shortcoming - a smaller target channel of incomplete batteries.
The positions of the 9А83 quadruple launchers with the 9М83 SAM and radar for target illumination, which are part of the C-300В anti-aircraft missile regiment near Gyumri. The rocket has a maximum speed in 988 km / h, interception height - 4320 km and 25 km range. This anti-aircraft missile is a “small caliber” of the C-75В air defense missile system, and is not capable of providing adequate anti-missile capabilities at a distance of more than 300 km. In the 50 year, the 2013-th anti-aircraft missile regiment received a more modern medium-range air defense system "Buk-M988-1" instead of the outdated "Cube" complexes, which could not work on ballistic targets
The fact is that not only multichannel radar is responsible for highlighting aerodynamic and ballistic targets in the С-300В complex, which, regardless of the number of PUs, provides simultaneous bombardment of 6 targets (such a principle is implemented in the C-300PS family), but specialized single-channel continuous-radar radars located directly on the 9A82 and 9A83 launchers. The two “Anteyevs” defending the 102 military base have a total of 4 launchers with 9A83 radar. In other words, C-300В in this configuration is 4-x-channel, and even with the absence of the “main caliber” - 9М82 SAM. This is not enough to provide a powerful missile defense system of the union state with which Turkey and Azerbaijan are neighbors.
The situation is saved by two modifications of “Three Hundreds” that are in service with the Armenian Air Force. The first modification is C-300PT-1 in the number of 3 divisions with 12 transported launchers of type 5P851A. The total ammunition of the 3 divisions is 144 anti-aircraft guided missiles, which is quite enough to cover major transport interchanges, as well as strategic facilities of Armenia from attacks by Azeri MLRS T-300, as well as the Toch-U OTRK. The three C-300PT-1 divisions have a total target channel - 18 simultaneously attacked by air attack weapons. The range of the C-300PT-1 aerodynamic target is 75 km, and the speed of the targeted objects - 1200 m / s. Ballistic objects can be destroyed at a distance of 35-40 km. Considering that C-300PT-1 have semi-trailed transported elements, they were deployed as a stationary multi-channel anti-missile defense system in the vicinity of the capital of Armenia - Yerevan. Three C-300PT-1 divisions are combined into a single air defense system, and are also capable of targeting auxiliary Cube, Osa-AKM, Shilka, and Strela-10 complexes. The last three are involved in the defense of the "dead zones" of the Three Hundreds divisions.
The second modification is the more advanced C-300PS. This system has similar firing characteristics, similar to 5ВХNUMXР interceptor missiles, as well as identical parameters of radar facilities. The Armenian Air Force has 55 C-2PS with 300 launchers of 24P5D and 85P5C types with a total number of ready-to-fight missiles - 85 units. (not counting the unknown number of 96B5P arsenals in warehouses). The range of the complexes is 55 km, although some sources claim its increase to 75 km. Similar to the C-90PT-300, the long-range radar detection function is performed by highly automated two-way radar S-band 1D36-M. The station is capable of detecting ballistic missiles of the “Tochka-U” type over the territory of Azerbaijan, not to mention larger fighter-type objects, which are detected at a distance of 6-240 km.
The main advantage of the C-300PS divisions is their mobility, as well as the time taken from the marching to the combat position and back (5 minutes). This became possible thanks to the deployment of radar, fire and command equipment of the complex on its own off-road chassis of types MAZ-543М / 537. Due to the high mobility of C-300PS, their divisions were decided to be deployed in the vicinity of the cities of Goris and Sisian, which is approximately in 40 — 50 min drive from NKR. If necessary, 2 divisions can quickly be moved closer to Nagorno-Karabakh to protect the territory of the republic from attacks of the WTO by the Air Force of Azerbaijan. And even being near these cities of Armenia, the calculations have the possibility of fire control of the airspace of most of the NKR without the need to perform an 60-kilometer march to the east.
An important detail of all C-300PT-1 / PS Armenian air defense divisions is the presence of low-altitude detectors (NVO) 5Н66. The station can detect and track up to 180 low-altitude targets with 0,02 m2 EPR, moving at 2665 km / h speed within the range of radio horizon increased to 30 km. Thanks to these stations, the possibility of detecting Azerbaijani reconnaissance UAVs appearing in the NKR mountains is increasing. At the moment, the Armenian air defense has a balanced structure with the capabilities of a territorial missile defense system: the abilities to intercept almost all air attacks of neighboring states are realized. At the same time, there is some lagging behind the Air Defense Forces of Azerbaijan, which have C-XNUMPPMU-300 and Iron Dome, which have much less restrictions on the minimum EPR goal (2 м0,05 - for С-2ПС, 300 м0,02 - for С-2ПМУ -300 and less 2 - for “Iron Dome”). All the air defense missiles of the air defense system of Armenia are to receive the elemental upgrade package up to the C-0,01PM300 level, as well as the new Buk-M1 complexes.
“EYES” OF AZERBAIJAN RADIO ENGINEERING EXPLORATION
Let's return to the Azerbaijani air defense. She has excellent tactical abilities. aviation enemy, low-altitude means of air attack, as well as unmanned reconnaissance and strike aircraft. The basis is formed by complexes S-300PMU-2, Buk-M1-2, as well as Barak-8. The first two complexes are highly effective in the destruction of operational-tactical ballistic missiles 9M79-1 Tochka-U, as well as 8K14 (R-17) Elbrus. The Armenian army is armed with 32 8K14 missiles with 8 9K72 Elbrus complexes and the Tochka-U division. All of these missiles are not equipped with gas-dynamic maneuvering systems on approach to the target and built-in electronic warfare modules, and therefore can be destroyed in the air by existing air defense systems of Azerbaijan.
In terms of the availability of tactical missile attack warning systems, as well as radar-early warning systems, Azerbaijan’s air defense system is distinguished by their great abundance, technological perfection and flexibility of use. First of all, these are radar facilities assigned to the Favorit and Iron Dome complexes. The “Three Hundreds” 64H6E radar detector, represented by a two-sided PFAR, operates in decimeter S-band and is able to detect P-17 type OTBRs on the ascending trajectory at a distance of more than 500 km (including parts of the airspace over Armenia), and the main MRLS of the complex has the same parameters Iron Dome - EL / M-2084. But this seemed little to the Azerbaijani General Staff: as early as 2012, a contract was signed for the purchase of an Israeli radar for early warning radar and EL / M-2080 "Green Pine" radar, and then the Belarusian RADAR-50 radar and Ukrainian 80К6, built based on the digital antenna array (CAR). The last station, developed by the Ukrainian NPK Iskra, station 80K6 operates in the S-band and is able to detect a fighter-type target (EPR near 3 m2) at a distance of about 350 km. Its bandwidth reaches 200 m, and the height of the detected targets - 40 km.
AND AGAIN ISRAEL'S “TRACE”
Very rare photos of perspective modification of the Israeli radar early warning system and target designation EL / M-2080 Block-B «Super Green Pine». In comparison with the standard version of the station, this product has a much larger antenna array fabric (approximately 8х15 m), as well as a higher energy potential, which allows detecting ballistic missiles at a distance of 900 km. For servicing the station's receiving and transmitting modules, information reading systems, and the cooling system, a platform is installed on the back of the antenna post, moving in a vertical plane, and the entire antenna array is divided into 56 cells with flaps
A more interesting acquisition is the Israeli Green Pine. In the Israeli Arrow-2 family of missile defense systems, the Green Pine radar operates as an early detection and targeting system for Hetz-2 interceptors. In Azerbaijan, it will be used as the main radar control system for controlling the aerospace sector of space over the NKR and part of Armenia. It is this radar that will become the main element of the alert in the level of the EWS of Azerbaijan in case of the forced use by Armenia of “Dots”, “Elbrus” and “Iskander”. “Green Pine” automatically becomes the target of “No.1” for the Russian and Armenian Iskander in case of aggression from Baku.
The EL / M-2080 “Green Pine” radar complex developed by Elta is represented by active phased array from 2300 MRP operating in decimeter L-band with 1-2 GHz frequency and 15-30 wavelength, see. This is not enough to use complex in the illumination of air targets, but it is quite acceptable for target designation of the command and control points of the air defense system, or automated control systems of the anti-aircraft missile brigade. Computing facilities of Green Pine allow you to track targets moving at speeds up to 11000 km / h. Its throughput is over 30 air targets.
The territory of Azerbaijan is an ideal place to control huge areas of aerospace over Iran approximately 600-700 km inland, and therefore in the future, Israel may well deploy advanced Super Green Pine stations in this country.
Looking at such an excessive generosity of the Department of Arms Export of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, which sells anti-ballistic and radar systems of strategic importance to Azerbaijan, a lot of speculation and questions begin to turn around. One of these questions: what is the reason for such generosity on the part of Tel Aviv, which usually saves its defense technology like the apple of an eye? You can find the answer to this by looking at news reports for 2012, at the same time starting from the fact that the 1,6 billion defense contract with Baku (taking into account the supply of Green Pine) was concluded in 2011.
As the American magazine Foreign Policy reported at the end of March 2012, the Israeli Defense Ministry secretly rented one of the Azerbaijani airfields to the needs of Hel Haavir. The goal of owning an air base off the coast of the Caspian Sea, without any doubt, is 5-minute flight time to Iran’s airspace, against which the security forces of the Jewish state have for many years been developing an air strike strategy to destroy Iran’s military-industrial and nuclear infrastructures. The fact is that Tehran, knowing the main rocket-threatening (western and north-western) air directions, formed the “belt” of early radar warning near the western borders of the state. No such attention was paid to the Northern VN. And tiny Israel decided to try to take Iran by surprise. There was no other way, except for a request for the use of military facilities in Azerbaijan, from Tel Aviv. But here's a bad luck: the American administration, which received information from its own special services, cracked all fanfare on Israel’s cunning “secret” operation. As we know, States of arbitrariness on the part of their “sheep” in the Middle East are trying to prevent. Nevertheless, the transactions were carried out, and today a kind of “barter” has been established between Israel and Azerbaijan, which is strategically important for both sides. Israel keeps all Iran’s northern air borders under conditional control, and Azerbaijan receives modern weapons, which can partially repel powerful retaliatory artillery strikes from the Armenian armed forces.
Meanwhile, neither Azerbaijan nor Israel were able to achieve 100% of the assigned tasks. Over the past 3 years, the air defense and missile defense system of Iran has been strengthened several times: 5 S-300PMU-2 battalions were finally received from Russia, which almost completely blocked the western and north-western air defense systems of the country, and on the northern air defense system Iran now has the opportunity to deploy its own long-range air defense missile systems. range of the "Bavar-373" type, the characteristics of which are not inferior to the S-300PS or even the S-300PM1. It will be extremely difficult for the Israeli Air Force to "break through" this level of air defense even with the help of the F-5I "Adir" stealth fighters of the 35th generation purchased today, not to mention the more noticeable F-15I "Ra'am" and F-16I "Sufa".
Baku’s plan to establish an impenetrable aerospace “shield” over Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was partially covered with a copper basin: one battery of the Iron Dome complex would provide only positional protection of individual ground forces from moderate artillery strikes of the Armenian Armed Forces , and 3 of C-XNUMPPMU-300 and Buk-М2-1 battalions will be covered with Scuds (Elbrusami) and Point-U. Decapitating strikes of the Iskander-E / M missile systems to the Azerbaijani air defense forces will have nothing to repel: such a strategic failure due to the refusal of the French SAMP-T.
The modern theater of the South and North Caucasus is notable for the numerous intricacies of the various weapons systems of the parties, which are often designed to “play” on several fronts at once due to the fact that several regional military-political superpowers have here purely personal interests. In our plans, it remains to keep the situation under complete control, not allowing countries such as Turkey, Israel, Azerbaijan and Georgia to shift the strategic balance in their favor.