Does defense spending harm your state?
Twenty trillion rubles. To put it mildly, the amount is rather big. Almost immediately after the announcement of plans for the development of the defense industry, voices sounded that they could not give that much money to the military and production workers. They say that the USSR has already allocated huge sums for defense needs, but it still collapsed. And here is the old conclusion that says that it was precisely military spending that killed the Union. Sometimes they even say that if modern Russia finances its defense-industrial complex the same way as the USSR, then the same fate awaits it. Frankly, optimism does not blow. But let's try to figure out what's what.
For the first time, statements about the dangers of high defense expenditures began to talk in Perestroika. Then, first in conversations, a figure appeared in 19% of the gross national product, then in M. Gorbachev's speeches she grew to 20%, and as a result, by the “efforts” of the first deputy chief of the General Staff, V. Lobov, 30% appeared, which came into use. A little later, A. Sobchak added fuel to the fire, saying that the defense industry "milks" as much as two thirds of the entire national economy. By this time, talking about a “third of the budget” became an axiom for a certain part of the population and the political elite. True, then some of the then first state officials recognized that all these figures were ambiguous and contradictory. So, for example, E. Gaidar in his book "The Death of the Empire" suggested that large percentages arose because of problems with mixing up various budget items. Another version, no longer owned by Gaidar, says: 30% - a result of the reluctance of the country's leadership to delve into the details.
Word statistics
What was really? Take, for example, 1985 year. The figures are based on the work of V. Shlykov “What killed the Soviet Union? General Staff and Economy. The GNP of the USSR this year amounted to 776 billion rubles, and the official defense budget - 19,1 billion. Thus, military expenditures for 85 a year are less than 2,5% of the national domestic product. Let us remember this figure and see what was written to the CIA at the expense of Soviet military spending. In their report for the 85 year, the estimate appears in 6-8%. A large number can be explained in two ways: first, American intelligence officers did not have access to Soviet documents of the appropriate level and could only roughly estimate the expenses of the USSR, and secondly, if we take into account the purchasing power parity, the defense budget share will be somewhere around 5-6%. At the same time, one more thing should not be forgotten. From the middle of 70's, the CIA was forced to check and recheck their assessments - then it turned out that the guys from Langley, using the testimony of a Soviet defector, almost doubled the estimate for the size of the Soviet defense budget. It got to the point that a group of senators demanded that the Directorate be dispersed, because, because of the overestimated estimates of the enemy’s economy, they had to increase funding for their own military.
Thus, in two independent sources there are approximately the same figures, and the differences between them are quite explicable. With the amount of expenditure seems to be sorted out. Now consider another thesis that appeared in the Perestroika and re-entered into circulation: the civilian industry sector suffered from the production of military products. Here we need to recall one simple truth, which says that the defense complex is always the leader of progress and “pulls” all other industries. In 2010, President D. Medvedev said that our defense industry should become the main “innovation generator”, and not only the military itself. It should be noted, similar thoughts have already arisen with the leadership of the country - it was the notorious conversion of 80's. A good idea as a whole did not lead to the planned result. The most popular explanation of failure concerns the ill-considered nature of this “reform.” It turned out that the defense industry can make equipment for purely civilian industries or household appliances not worse than foreign firms, but because of the sharpening of enterprises for another sphere of the national economy, the price of peaceful products came out unattractive. In addition, as many analysts believe, the civilian sector of the Soviet economy had low efficiency: planning with mistakes, strange logistics, etc. So, given the relatively small defense spending, it was necessary to optimize the "peaceful" economy. What did the leadership of the country? It began to plug holes in the civilian sector at the expense of defense. This was especially vivid in the middle of 90-x, when the Defense Ministry received less than half of the required amounts, which affected not only the army itself, but also enterprises that received less money for their products. Enterprises had a debt to suppliers, wages were not paid, etc. All the same V. Shlykov, known for his dislike for the Soviet system, compares 80-e and 90-e, coming to the conclusion that only after the collapse of the USSR, the choice of “oil or guns” appeared, and before him there was both.
Немного stories
That defense industry, which "destroyed the USSR", to 80-m had a mature and harmonious structure. Overall management was carried out by four organizations:
- Department of Defense Industry of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Coordinated the entire industry. I must say, the department did it efficiently, but legends still speak about methods. In particular, the phrase I. Serbin, 23, who headed this organization, “You Cannot? Party cards on the table! Perhaps the words of the leader, nicknamed Ivan the Terrible, sounded harshly, but the organization coped with its responsibilities.
- Gosplan. His task was to coordinate defense spending with the rest of government spending and to maintain a peculiar balance between them.
- Defense Department. Determined the general directions of development of the defense industry.
- The commission on military-industrial issues under the Council of Ministers. If I may say so, the "executive power" of the industry. The Commission included representatives of all defense ministries, employees of various research institutes, design bureaus, acceptance departments, etc.
The first of the "defense four" dropped out Gosplan. Upstairs they decided that the market would do everything, and the planned economy did not justify itself. Then nine separate defense ministries were merged into one. Then they will be repeatedly converted. After the changes in the first half of the 90's, defense issues were not resolved jointly, but in a more confusing way. The relevant departments of the Ministry of Defense sent documents regarding purchases or orders to the defense department of the Ministry of Finance. Further, financiers with representatives of the Government linked the demands of the military with the budget, after which everything was approved by the Prime Minister and the President. A slightly more complicated scheme than before, but the problems were not due to its structure. The country did not have the right amount of money, which led to disastrous consequences.
In 2003, in addition to the existing defense departments in charge of procurement, a State Committee on Defense Order was established. A year later, he was transformed into the Federal Service, but she still didn’t carry out actual work on orders. But the organization watched the orders and pricing, due to which the military prosecutor's office increased work. In 2006, Rosoboronzakaz was finally made a supervisory organization. At the same time, the Federal Agency for Arms Procurement (Rosoboronpostavka) was created under the government. It was planned that the Military-Industrial Commission, revived in 99, would plan the ordering strategy, Rosoboronpostavka to implement, and Rosoboronzakaz to control. True, this system for several reasons in the first few years almost did not work.
Who is to blame and what to do?
Now, perhaps, we can return to talking about the danger of increasing defense spending. Based on the foregoing, this can be answered with three theses:
1. Our country does not have a catastrophic experience associated with expenditures on the defense complex - contrary to popular belief, in the collapse of the USSR this sector of the economy, if it is to blame, is only indirectly.
2. Reducing financing for the military-industrial complex is not a direct prerequisite for improving the overall quality of life in the country.
3. Management efficiency has a far greater impact on the economy than the share of spending on the industry. In this regard, there is some reason for optimism: a few contracts that were supposed to be concluded in the 2011 year turned out to be signed only in the late fall. The defense ministry explained this with problems with pricing and unwillingness to pay more than the cost of certain jobs.
In general, the work of the military-industrial complex, as well as all other spheres of the economy and production, is influenced not only and not so much by the amount of funding. An equally important component of managing an industry (an enterprise or even an entire country) is the efficiency and optimization of the system itself. And the creation of such a business is not easy and slow. However, if the state wants to have a combat-ready army and a normal defense-industrial complex, it simply has to rebuild and adjust this system.
For the first time, statements about the dangers of high defense expenditures began to talk in Perestroika. Then, first in conversations, a figure appeared in 19% of the gross national product, then in M. Gorbachev's speeches she grew to 20%, and as a result, by the “efforts” of the first deputy chief of the General Staff, V. Lobov, 30% appeared, which came into use. A little later, A. Sobchak added fuel to the fire, saying that the defense industry "milks" as much as two thirds of the entire national economy. By this time, talking about a “third of the budget” became an axiom for a certain part of the population and the political elite. True, then some of the then first state officials recognized that all these figures were ambiguous and contradictory. So, for example, E. Gaidar in his book "The Death of the Empire" suggested that large percentages arose because of problems with mixing up various budget items. Another version, no longer owned by Gaidar, says: 30% - a result of the reluctance of the country's leadership to delve into the details.
Word statistics
What was really? Take, for example, 1985 year. The figures are based on the work of V. Shlykov “What killed the Soviet Union? General Staff and Economy. The GNP of the USSR this year amounted to 776 billion rubles, and the official defense budget - 19,1 billion. Thus, military expenditures for 85 a year are less than 2,5% of the national domestic product. Let us remember this figure and see what was written to the CIA at the expense of Soviet military spending. In their report for the 85 year, the estimate appears in 6-8%. A large number can be explained in two ways: first, American intelligence officers did not have access to Soviet documents of the appropriate level and could only roughly estimate the expenses of the USSR, and secondly, if we take into account the purchasing power parity, the defense budget share will be somewhere around 5-6%. At the same time, one more thing should not be forgotten. From the middle of 70's, the CIA was forced to check and recheck their assessments - then it turned out that the guys from Langley, using the testimony of a Soviet defector, almost doubled the estimate for the size of the Soviet defense budget. It got to the point that a group of senators demanded that the Directorate be dispersed, because, because of the overestimated estimates of the enemy’s economy, they had to increase funding for their own military.
Thus, in two independent sources there are approximately the same figures, and the differences between them are quite explicable. With the amount of expenditure seems to be sorted out. Now consider another thesis that appeared in the Perestroika and re-entered into circulation: the civilian industry sector suffered from the production of military products. Here we need to recall one simple truth, which says that the defense complex is always the leader of progress and “pulls” all other industries. In 2010, President D. Medvedev said that our defense industry should become the main “innovation generator”, and not only the military itself. It should be noted, similar thoughts have already arisen with the leadership of the country - it was the notorious conversion of 80's. A good idea as a whole did not lead to the planned result. The most popular explanation of failure concerns the ill-considered nature of this “reform.” It turned out that the defense industry can make equipment for purely civilian industries or household appliances not worse than foreign firms, but because of the sharpening of enterprises for another sphere of the national economy, the price of peaceful products came out unattractive. In addition, as many analysts believe, the civilian sector of the Soviet economy had low efficiency: planning with mistakes, strange logistics, etc. So, given the relatively small defense spending, it was necessary to optimize the "peaceful" economy. What did the leadership of the country? It began to plug holes in the civilian sector at the expense of defense. This was especially vivid in the middle of 90-x, when the Defense Ministry received less than half of the required amounts, which affected not only the army itself, but also enterprises that received less money for their products. Enterprises had a debt to suppliers, wages were not paid, etc. All the same V. Shlykov, known for his dislike for the Soviet system, compares 80-e and 90-e, coming to the conclusion that only after the collapse of the USSR, the choice of “oil or guns” appeared, and before him there was both.
Немного stories
That defense industry, which "destroyed the USSR", to 80-m had a mature and harmonious structure. Overall management was carried out by four organizations:
- Department of Defense Industry of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Coordinated the entire industry. I must say, the department did it efficiently, but legends still speak about methods. In particular, the phrase I. Serbin, 23, who headed this organization, “You Cannot? Party cards on the table! Perhaps the words of the leader, nicknamed Ivan the Terrible, sounded harshly, but the organization coped with its responsibilities.
- Gosplan. His task was to coordinate defense spending with the rest of government spending and to maintain a peculiar balance between them.
- Defense Department. Determined the general directions of development of the defense industry.
- The commission on military-industrial issues under the Council of Ministers. If I may say so, the "executive power" of the industry. The Commission included representatives of all defense ministries, employees of various research institutes, design bureaus, acceptance departments, etc.
The first of the "defense four" dropped out Gosplan. Upstairs they decided that the market would do everything, and the planned economy did not justify itself. Then nine separate defense ministries were merged into one. Then they will be repeatedly converted. After the changes in the first half of the 90's, defense issues were not resolved jointly, but in a more confusing way. The relevant departments of the Ministry of Defense sent documents regarding purchases or orders to the defense department of the Ministry of Finance. Further, financiers with representatives of the Government linked the demands of the military with the budget, after which everything was approved by the Prime Minister and the President. A slightly more complicated scheme than before, but the problems were not due to its structure. The country did not have the right amount of money, which led to disastrous consequences.
In 2003, in addition to the existing defense departments in charge of procurement, a State Committee on Defense Order was established. A year later, he was transformed into the Federal Service, but she still didn’t carry out actual work on orders. But the organization watched the orders and pricing, due to which the military prosecutor's office increased work. In 2006, Rosoboronzakaz was finally made a supervisory organization. At the same time, the Federal Agency for Arms Procurement (Rosoboronpostavka) was created under the government. It was planned that the Military-Industrial Commission, revived in 99, would plan the ordering strategy, Rosoboronpostavka to implement, and Rosoboronzakaz to control. True, this system for several reasons in the first few years almost did not work.
Who is to blame and what to do?
Now, perhaps, we can return to talking about the danger of increasing defense spending. Based on the foregoing, this can be answered with three theses:
1. Our country does not have a catastrophic experience associated with expenditures on the defense complex - contrary to popular belief, in the collapse of the USSR this sector of the economy, if it is to blame, is only indirectly.
2. Reducing financing for the military-industrial complex is not a direct prerequisite for improving the overall quality of life in the country.
3. Management efficiency has a far greater impact on the economy than the share of spending on the industry. In this regard, there is some reason for optimism: a few contracts that were supposed to be concluded in the 2011 year turned out to be signed only in the late fall. The defense ministry explained this with problems with pricing and unwillingness to pay more than the cost of certain jobs.
In general, the work of the military-industrial complex, as well as all other spheres of the economy and production, is influenced not only and not so much by the amount of funding. An equally important component of managing an industry (an enterprise or even an entire country) is the efficiency and optimization of the system itself. And the creation of such a business is not easy and slow. However, if the state wants to have a combat-ready army and a normal defense-industrial complex, it simply has to rebuild and adjust this system.
Information