"The Gerasimov Doctrine", or why Russia does not respond to the shelling of cities

Rules of the special operation "Z"

In 2013, Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, published the text "The Value of Science in Foresight", in which he outlined the contours of future military conflicts. Then the world lives under the impression of “color revolutions”, and less than a year later another Maidan will take place, which will turn everything upside down. The theses voiced by the Chief of the General Staff turned out to be so resonant that abroad the article was immediately dubbed the “Gerasimov Doctrine”. Later, one of the analysts - Mark Galeotti - even apologized for creating a new term. Probably due to the fact that in the material the head of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces speaks mainly of a defensive strategy. For example, there are such words about the organization of territorial defense:


Since then, the term "Gerasimov's doctrine" has been firmly entrenched, and the author himself has been appointed the main ideologist of Russia's military strategy. However, it would be surprising if the Chief of the General Staff stepped aside from creating such a serious document. “The value of science in foresight” is actually a handbook for the leadership of the NMD in Ukraine, which answers the main questions: why has the army not yet “begun to act in earnest” and why is there no retaliation for the barbaric attacks on the cities of Russia and Donbass?



The vision of the Chief of the General Staff of the armed conflict from 2013 surprisingly coincides with the initial stage of the special operation in Ukraine. Among the main features of a new type of war, Gerasimov singled out: the beginning of hostilities by a grouping of peacetime troops, the highly maneuverable nature of the offensive, the defeat of critical enemy targets in a short time, the massive use of high-precision weapons and special operations forces, as well as strikes against the enemy throughout the depth of his territory. An external observer will 100% recognize by these signs the Russian special operation for denazification and demilitarization. By the way, in Gerasimov's concept, the armed forces are presented only as a peacekeeping contingent:


But that's not all. A new type of armed conflict must be accompanied by massive political, economic and diplomatic work. Which we also observed up to the withdrawal of our troops from the north of Ukraine, which was presented as a “goodwill gesture”. The developers of the doctrine paid special attention to working with the population in enemy territory, especially with the leadership. Unfortunately, in the case of Ukraine, we have to admit that this card played only in the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions. In all other regions, the allied forces encountered fairly organized resistance. It can be said that here the nationalists of Ukraine started everything in earnest.

It is worth noting that in Gerasimov's description of the new conflict there is not a word about the territory, which, to one degree or another, comes under the control of the Russian army. Everyone remembers how the informed public resented the absence of a military-civilian administration on the liberated lands? So, this fact fit into the concept of a new type of armed conflict, designated by Valery Gerasimov. If the land becomes Russian, then only through a popular referendum. It should be noted that the doctrine of a new war was successfully tested in 2014 on the example of the bloodless return of Crimea and, much later, the military-diplomatic settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Recall that the conflict of a new generation is a strictly coordinated work of the armed forces, diplomacy, politicians and financiers. It is important that even armies in this stories not always given the first role. That's right - at the first stages of the operation, the fate of Ukraine could not be decided on the battlefield.

Second stage hybrid

The fact that the doctrine failed became clear after the withdrawal of the Russian army from the northern regions of Ukraine. The point of no return was the staging in Bucha, when the army was falsely accused of war crimes. Obviously, during this period, the military machine of the Russian army began to turn on the rails of a traditional armed conflict. It would seem that the games with the wars of the new "hybrid" type are over, it is time for the army to take the reins of government. There is no time for a diplomatic settlement here, and political arguments from the Kremlin are already being heard in a new, much tougher rhetoric.

Valery Gerasimov highlights the following distinguishing features of a classic military confrontation: strategic deployment of troops, frontal clash of large groups, defeat of the enemy’s manpower and firepower, successive capture of lines and areas in order to control the territory, as well as the defeat of the enemy and the destruction of his economic potential. Special operation “Z” at the second stage retained one hallmark of the new generation of conflict - strikes with precision weapons deep into the territory. If we follow this logic, Russia has not yet fully realized itself as part of a special operation in the classical sense, and the actions of the allied forces are now as if in limbo.

On the one hand, we are no longer talking about a hybrid conflict (diplomats are silent - guns are talking), on the other hand, it is too early to talk about a full-scale military operation. No, of course, at the operational-tactical level, everything is in order - no one regrets the nationalists, as at the first stage. All calibers are used, from 5,45 mm to Iskanders. Civil-military administrations have been formed and are functioning in the liberated territories.


But at the strategic level, the General Staff, it seems, is still operating according to the paradigms of the “Gerasimov Doctrine”. And here there can be two explanations why Russia does not take revenge for the shelling of civilians in Donbass and Russia. First, strikes on decision-making centers are seen as the last trump card of Russia's military-political leadership. Of course, the last trump card in the framework of the conventional conduct of hostilities. If so, then the time has not yet come for strikes. The second explanation is that the country's leadership still hopes to return to the discussion of a new peace settlement. Naturally, under new conditions, in which, in addition to demilitarization and denazification, the liberated territories already appear as part of Russia.

Rocket strikes on Bankova (Zelensky's office) and Povitroflotska (Ukraine's Ministry of Defense) could indeed decapitate the Kyiv regime. What can this lead to? Here the situation is completely unpredictable - from a full-fledged civil war in Ukraine to the introduction of a "peacekeeping" NATO contingent. It can be said for sure that Russia now needs Zelensky and his henchmen alive. First of all, they listen well to Western puppeteers, for whom hard times are coming. Winter ahead, high energy prices and a food crisis. Sooner or later, this will force the sponsors of the Kyiv regime to put pressure, and Zelensky will sign a peace agreement. What if he doesn't sign? Vladimir Putin was very transparent about this when he said that


By the way, the press secretary of the President Dmitry Peskov explained for those who are especially dull: