The value of Lend-Lease for the USSR
Almost everybody knows about American supplies to the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. “Studebakers” and an American stew, nicknamed “second front” by Soviet soldiers, immediately come to mind. But these are rather artistic-emotional symbols, which are actually the tip of the iceberg. The purpose of this article, the author puts the creation of a general understanding of the Lend-Lease and its role in the Great Victory.
In the initial period of the Second World War in the United States acted the so-called act of neutrality, according to which the only opportunity to assist any of the belligerents was the sale of weapons and materials exclusively for cash, and the transportation was also assigned to the customer - the system "pay and take" (cash and carry). At that time, Great Britain became the main consumer of military products in the United States, but very soon it exhausted its monetary resources. At the same time, President Franklin Roosevelt was well aware that in the current situation, the best way out for the United States was full economic support for countries fighting against Nazi Germany. Therefore, he actually “pushed” 11 March 1941 of the year in the Congress “The United States Protection Enforcement Act”, also referred to as the Lend-Lease Act. Now, any country whose defense has been recognized as vital to the United States, weapon and strategic raw materials were provided under the following conditions:
1. Weapons and materials lost during hostilities are not payable.
2. Remaining after the end of the war, property suitable for civilian purposes must be fully or partially paid on the basis of long-term loans provided by the United States.
3. Equipment that has not been lost after the war must be returned to the USA.
After Germany attacked the USSR, Roosevelt sent his closest assistant, Harry Hopkins, to Moscow, because he wanted to find out "how long Russia will last." This was important, because in the United States at that time the opinion prevailed that the resistance of the USSR would not be able to offer significant resistance to the Germans, and the weapons and materials supplied would simply fall to the enemy. On July 31, Harry Hopkins met with Vyacheslav Molotov and Joseph Stalin. Following their results, the American politician departed for Washington with the firm conviction that the Germans would not have a quick victory and that the supply of arms to Moscow could have a significant impact on the course of military operations.
However, the USSR was included in the Lend-Lease program only in October-November 1941 of the year (up to this point, our country paid for all American military supplies). It took Roosevelt this long period of time to overcome the resistance of a sufficiently large number of American politicians.
Signed on October 1, 1941, the first (Moscow) protocol provided for the supply of aircraft (fighters and bombers), tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, trucks, as well as aluminum, toluene, TNT, petroleum products, wheat and sugar. Further, the quantity and range of supplies was constantly expanding.
Cargo delivery took place along three main routes: Pacific, trans-Iranian and Arctic. The fastest, but at the same time dangerous, was the Arctic route to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. The ships were escorted by the British fleet, and on the approaches to Murmansk, protection was strengthened by the ships of the Soviet Northern Fleet. At first, the Germans practically did not pay attention to the northern convoys - their confidence in an imminent victory remained so great, but, as the fighting became protracted, the German command pulled more and more forces into bases in Norway. The result was not long in coming.
In July 1942, the German fleet in close collaboration with aviation practically defeated convoy PQ-17: 22 transport ships out of 35 died. The heavy losses, as well as the need to attract a large number of ships to escort ships with supplies for besieged Malta, and then prepare for the landing in North Africa, forced the British to stop escorting the northern convoys before the polar nights. Since 1943, the balance of power in the Arctic waters gradually began to shift towards the Allies. There were more convoys, and their wiring was accompanied by less losses. In total, 4027 thousand tons of cargo were transported along the Arctic route to the USSR. Losses did not exceed 7% of the total.
The Pacific route was less dangerous, along which 8376 was delivered by thous. Tons. Transportation could only be carried out by ships under the Soviet flag (the USSR, unlike the United States, did not fight with Japan at that time). Further, the received cargo had to be transported by rail through almost the entire territory of Russia.
The trans-Iranian route served as a definite alternative to the northern convoys. American transport ships delivered cargo to the ports of the Persian Gulf, and then they were delivered to Russia by rail and road. In order to ensure full control over transport routes in August 1941, the USSR and Great Britain occupied Iran.
In order to increase capacity, we carried out a large-scale modernization of the ports of the Persian Gulf and the Trans-Iranian Railway. Also, General Motors has built two factories in Iran at which the vehicles intended for delivery to the USSR were assembled. During the war years, 184 112 vehicles were manufactured and sent to our country at these enterprises. The total freight traffic through the ports of the Persian Gulf for the entire period of the trans-Iranian route was 4227 thousand tons.
From the beginning of 1945, after the liberation of Greece, the Black Sea route began to function. This way the USSR received 459 thousand tons of cargo.
In addition to those noted above, there were two more air routes along which aircraft were distilled "under their own power" in the USSR. The most famous was the Alsib air bridge (Alaska - Siberia), through which they transferred 7925 airplanes. Also, the aircraft flew from the United States to the USSR through the South Atlantic, Africa and the Persian Gulf (993 aircraft).
For many years in the works of domestic historians it was stated that the supply under Lend-Lease constituted only about 4% of the total volume of output of Soviet industry and agriculture. And, although there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of this figure, nevertheless “the devil is in the details.”
It is well known that the strength of a chain as a whole is determined by the strength of the weakest link. Therefore, in determining the range of American supplies, the Soviet leadership sought, first and foremost, to close the "weak points" in the army and industry. This is especially clearly seen in the analysis of the volumes of strategic raw materials supplied to the USSR. In particular, the thousands of tons of explosives received by our country 295,6 amounted to 53% of all produced in domestic enterprises. Even more impressive is the ratio of copper - 76%, aluminum - 106%, tin - 223%, cobalt - 138%, wool - 102%, sugar - 66% and canned meat - 480%.
No less attention should be paid to the analysis of deliveries of automotive vehicles. Total USSR received a Lend-Lease 447 785 cars.
It is significant that during the war years the Soviet industry produced only 265 thousand cars. Thus, the number of machines received from the allies more than 1,5 times exceeded its own production. In addition, these were real army vehicles adapted for use in front-line conditions, while the domestic industry supplied the army with ordinary national economic machines.
The role of land-lease cars in the fighting is difficult to overestimate. To a large extent, they ensured the success of the victorious 1944 operations of the year included in history as "ten Stalin strikes."
Considerable merit of the Allied deliveries and in the successful functioning during the war years of the Soviet railway transport. The USSR received 1900 locomotives and 66 diesel-electric locomotives (these figures are especially vivid against the background of their own production for 1942 – 1945 years in the 92 locomotive), as well as 11 075 cars (own production - 1087 cars).
Parallel functioned and "reverse lend-lease". During the war years, the Allies received from the USSR 300 thousand tons of chromium and 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, as well as wood, gold and platinum.
During the discussions on the topic “Could the USSR have managed to do without Lend-Lease?” Many copies were broken. The author believes that, most likely, he could. Another thing is that now it is not possible to calculate what the price of this would be. If the volume of weapons supplied by the allies to one degree or another could well be compensated by domestic industry, then with regard to transport, as well as the production of a number of types of strategic raw materials without the supply of allies, the situation would very quickly become critical.
The lack of rail and road transport could easily paralyze the supply of the army and deprive it of mobility, and this, in turn, would reduce the pace of operations and increase the growth of losses. The lack of non-ferrous metals, especially aluminum, would lead to a decrease in the output of armaments, and without food supplies it would be much more difficult to fight hunger. Surely our country could stand and win even in such a situation, but it is not possible to determine how much the price of victory would increase.
The Lend-Lease program was terminated on the initiative of the US government 21 August 1945, although the USSR requested to continue deliveries on credit terms (it was necessary to restore the country destroyed by the war). However, by that time F. Roosevelt was no longer among the living, and the new era of the Cold War was loudly knocking on the door.
During the war, the payment of supplies under the Lend-Lease is not made. In 1947, the United States estimated the USSR’s debt for deliveries to 2,6 billion dollars, but a year later the amount was reduced to 1,3 billion dollars. It was planned that the repayment will be made within 30 years with the accrual of 2,3% per annum. I.V. Stalin rejected these accounts, saying that "the USSR paid off the lend-lease debt in full." As a justification of its point of view, the USSR cited a precedent for writing off debts for lend-lease supplies to other countries. Besides I.V. Stalin quite reasonably did not want to give the means of a war-ravaged country to a potential enemy in the Third World War.
Agreement on the procedure for repayment of debts was concluded only in 1972 year. The USSR undertook to pay up to 2001 of the year 722 million dollars. But after the transfer of 48 million dollars payments again stopped due to the adoption of the US discriminatory Jackson-Vanik amendment.
Again this issue was raised in 1990 at a meeting of the presidents of the USSR and the USA. A new amount has been established - 674 million dollars - and the final maturity date is 2030 year. After the collapse of the USSR, obligations for this debt went to Russia.
Summing up, we can conclude that for the US, Lend-Lease was primarily, according to F. Roosevelt, "a profitable investment of capital." Moreover, it is not the profits directly from supplies that should be assessed, but the numerous indirect benefits that the American economy has gained after the end of World War II. It was a pleasure for history to dispose of the post-war well-being of the United States to a large extent paid for with the blood of Soviet soldiers. For the USSR, Lend-Lease was almost the only way to reduce the number of victims on the way to Victory. Here is a "marriage of convenience" ...
In the initial period of the Second World War in the United States acted the so-called act of neutrality, according to which the only opportunity to assist any of the belligerents was the sale of weapons and materials exclusively for cash, and the transportation was also assigned to the customer - the system "pay and take" (cash and carry). At that time, Great Britain became the main consumer of military products in the United States, but very soon it exhausted its monetary resources. At the same time, President Franklin Roosevelt was well aware that in the current situation, the best way out for the United States was full economic support for countries fighting against Nazi Germany. Therefore, he actually “pushed” 11 March 1941 of the year in the Congress “The United States Protection Enforcement Act”, also referred to as the Lend-Lease Act. Now, any country whose defense has been recognized as vital to the United States, weapon and strategic raw materials were provided under the following conditions:
1. Weapons and materials lost during hostilities are not payable.
2. Remaining after the end of the war, property suitable for civilian purposes must be fully or partially paid on the basis of long-term loans provided by the United States.
3. Equipment that has not been lost after the war must be returned to the USA.
Joseph Stalin and Harry Hopkins, 1941 Year
After Germany attacked the USSR, Roosevelt sent his closest assistant, Harry Hopkins, to Moscow, because he wanted to find out "how long Russia will last." This was important, because in the United States at that time the opinion prevailed that the resistance of the USSR would not be able to offer significant resistance to the Germans, and the weapons and materials supplied would simply fall to the enemy. On July 31, Harry Hopkins met with Vyacheslav Molotov and Joseph Stalin. Following their results, the American politician departed for Washington with the firm conviction that the Germans would not have a quick victory and that the supply of arms to Moscow could have a significant impact on the course of military operations.
However, the USSR was included in the Lend-Lease program only in October-November 1941 of the year (up to this point, our country paid for all American military supplies). It took Roosevelt this long period of time to overcome the resistance of a sufficiently large number of American politicians.
Signed on October 1, 1941, the first (Moscow) protocol provided for the supply of aircraft (fighters and bombers), tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, trucks, as well as aluminum, toluene, TNT, petroleum products, wheat and sugar. Further, the quantity and range of supplies was constantly expanding.
Cargo delivery took place along three main routes: Pacific, trans-Iranian and Arctic. The fastest, but at the same time dangerous, was the Arctic route to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. The ships were escorted by the British fleet, and on the approaches to Murmansk, protection was strengthened by the ships of the Soviet Northern Fleet. At first, the Germans practically did not pay attention to the northern convoys - their confidence in an imminent victory remained so great, but, as the fighting became protracted, the German command pulled more and more forces into bases in Norway. The result was not long in coming.
In July 1942, the German fleet in close collaboration with aviation practically defeated convoy PQ-17: 22 transport ships out of 35 died. The heavy losses, as well as the need to attract a large number of ships to escort ships with supplies for besieged Malta, and then prepare for the landing in North Africa, forced the British to stop escorting the northern convoys before the polar nights. Since 1943, the balance of power in the Arctic waters gradually began to shift towards the Allies. There were more convoys, and their wiring was accompanied by less losses. In total, 4027 thousand tons of cargo were transported along the Arctic route to the USSR. Losses did not exceed 7% of the total.
The Pacific route was less dangerous, along which 8376 was delivered by thous. Tons. Transportation could only be carried out by ships under the Soviet flag (the USSR, unlike the United States, did not fight with Japan at that time). Further, the received cargo had to be transported by rail through almost the entire territory of Russia.
The trans-Iranian route served as a definite alternative to the northern convoys. American transport ships delivered cargo to the ports of the Persian Gulf, and then they were delivered to Russia by rail and road. In order to ensure full control over transport routes in August 1941, the USSR and Great Britain occupied Iran.
In order to increase capacity, we carried out a large-scale modernization of the ports of the Persian Gulf and the Trans-Iranian Railway. Also, General Motors has built two factories in Iran at which the vehicles intended for delivery to the USSR were assembled. During the war years, 184 112 vehicles were manufactured and sent to our country at these enterprises. The total freight traffic through the ports of the Persian Gulf for the entire period of the trans-Iranian route was 4227 thousand tons.
Aircraft in the framework of the program Lend-Lease
From the beginning of 1945, after the liberation of Greece, the Black Sea route began to function. This way the USSR received 459 thousand tons of cargo.
In addition to those noted above, there were two more air routes along which aircraft were distilled "under their own power" in the USSR. The most famous was the Alsib air bridge (Alaska - Siberia), through which they transferred 7925 airplanes. Also, the aircraft flew from the United States to the USSR through the South Atlantic, Africa and the Persian Gulf (993 aircraft).
For many years in the works of domestic historians it was stated that the supply under Lend-Lease constituted only about 4% of the total volume of output of Soviet industry and agriculture. And, although there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of this figure, nevertheless “the devil is in the details.”
It is well known that the strength of a chain as a whole is determined by the strength of the weakest link. Therefore, in determining the range of American supplies, the Soviet leadership sought, first and foremost, to close the "weak points" in the army and industry. This is especially clearly seen in the analysis of the volumes of strategic raw materials supplied to the USSR. In particular, the thousands of tons of explosives received by our country 295,6 amounted to 53% of all produced in domestic enterprises. Even more impressive is the ratio of copper - 76%, aluminum - 106%, tin - 223%, cobalt - 138%, wool - 102%, sugar - 66% and canned meat - 480%.
General A.M. Korolev and Major General Donald Connelly, shake hands against the background of the train, which came as part of the lend-lease supplies.
No less attention should be paid to the analysis of deliveries of automotive vehicles. Total USSR received a Lend-Lease 447 785 cars.
It is significant that during the war years the Soviet industry produced only 265 thousand cars. Thus, the number of machines received from the allies more than 1,5 times exceeded its own production. In addition, these were real army vehicles adapted for use in front-line conditions, while the domestic industry supplied the army with ordinary national economic machines.
The role of land-lease cars in the fighting is difficult to overestimate. To a large extent, they ensured the success of the victorious 1944 operations of the year included in history as "ten Stalin strikes."
Considerable merit of the Allied deliveries and in the successful functioning during the war years of the Soviet railway transport. The USSR received 1900 locomotives and 66 diesel-electric locomotives (these figures are especially vivid against the background of their own production for 1942 – 1945 years in the 92 locomotive), as well as 11 075 cars (own production - 1087 cars).
Parallel functioned and "reverse lend-lease". During the war years, the Allies received from the USSR 300 thousand tons of chromium and 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, as well as wood, gold and platinum.
During the discussions on the topic “Could the USSR have managed to do without Lend-Lease?” Many copies were broken. The author believes that, most likely, he could. Another thing is that now it is not possible to calculate what the price of this would be. If the volume of weapons supplied by the allies to one degree or another could well be compensated by domestic industry, then with regard to transport, as well as the production of a number of types of strategic raw materials without the supply of allies, the situation would very quickly become critical.
The lack of rail and road transport could easily paralyze the supply of the army and deprive it of mobility, and this, in turn, would reduce the pace of operations and increase the growth of losses. The lack of non-ferrous metals, especially aluminum, would lead to a decrease in the output of armaments, and without food supplies it would be much more difficult to fight hunger. Surely our country could stand and win even in such a situation, but it is not possible to determine how much the price of victory would increase.
The Lend-Lease program was terminated on the initiative of the US government 21 August 1945, although the USSR requested to continue deliveries on credit terms (it was necessary to restore the country destroyed by the war). However, by that time F. Roosevelt was no longer among the living, and the new era of the Cold War was loudly knocking on the door.
During the war, the payment of supplies under the Lend-Lease is not made. In 1947, the United States estimated the USSR’s debt for deliveries to 2,6 billion dollars, but a year later the amount was reduced to 1,3 billion dollars. It was planned that the repayment will be made within 30 years with the accrual of 2,3% per annum. I.V. Stalin rejected these accounts, saying that "the USSR paid off the lend-lease debt in full." As a justification of its point of view, the USSR cited a precedent for writing off debts for lend-lease supplies to other countries. Besides I.V. Stalin quite reasonably did not want to give the means of a war-ravaged country to a potential enemy in the Third World War.
Agreement on the procedure for repayment of debts was concluded only in 1972 year. The USSR undertook to pay up to 2001 of the year 722 million dollars. But after the transfer of 48 million dollars payments again stopped due to the adoption of the US discriminatory Jackson-Vanik amendment.
Again this issue was raised in 1990 at a meeting of the presidents of the USSR and the USA. A new amount has been established - 674 million dollars - and the final maturity date is 2030 year. After the collapse of the USSR, obligations for this debt went to Russia.
Summing up, we can conclude that for the US, Lend-Lease was primarily, according to F. Roosevelt, "a profitable investment of capital." Moreover, it is not the profits directly from supplies that should be assessed, but the numerous indirect benefits that the American economy has gained after the end of World War II. It was a pleasure for history to dispose of the post-war well-being of the United States to a large extent paid for with the blood of Soviet soldiers. For the USSR, Lend-Lease was almost the only way to reduce the number of victims on the way to Victory. Here is a "marriage of convenience" ...
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