Nuclear weapon Since the second half of the 20th century, nuclear power engineering has become an integral part of the cultural, military, and technological spheres of human civilization. As the development of nuclear technology and the creation of new types of nuclear weapons, attitudes towards them among the inhabitants, political and public figures, military, scientists and engineers changed.
Appearing as a “superweapon” in the United States in 1945, the atomic bomb almost immediately turned into an instrument of political pressure on the Soviet Union. However, after the advent of nuclear weapons in the USSR, the accumulation of reserves and the miniaturization of nuclear charges, it, along with the preservation of strategic objectives, began to be seen as a means of battlefield. First, in the USA, and then in the USSR, tactical missile systems and artillery shells with "nuclear filling" appeared. Nuclear warheads were equipped with anti-aircraft and aviation missiles, torpedoes and depth charges, nuclear mines were developed to create insurmountable obstacles to the advance of the enemy forces.
The number of nuclear warheads in the United States and the USSR / Russia
In the 60 of the last century, intercontinental ballistic missiles became the main means of solving strategic tasks, replacing long-range bombers in this role. During the years of confrontation between the two world systems, the accumulation of the number of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles continued until the second half of the 80-s. Their sharp decline occurred after the collapse of the USSR and the formal end of the Cold War. However, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, despite the predictions of some "humanist idealists" in the XXI century did not happen. Moreover, its role in ensuring the defense capacity of our country in the years of decline and endless "reform" of the Russian army even increased. The presence of nuclear weapons in Russia in many ways prevented our western and eastern "partners" from attempts to resolve political and territorial disputes by force. In addition to the strategic deterrent of the Russian nuclear triad, tactical nuclear weapons have played and are playing, largely devaluing the superiority in the field of conventional weapons of NATO and the PLA of the PRC. It is not by chance that the leadership of the United States has repeatedly raised the issue of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, offering to publish data on its locations, the exact quantitative and qualitative composition, as well as conclude an agreement on mutual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons.
Currently in the world at the disposal of official and unofficial members of the “nuclear club” there is an amount of fissile and fissile materials sufficient to create 15000 nuclear charges. About 5000 nuclear warheads quickly deployed on the carrier, or can be prepared for use within a few days. The Federation Of American Scientists estimates that only in the Russian armed forces as of the beginning of 2015, there were about 1800 deployed charges. About 700 strategic warheads are located in storage facilities separately from carriers. The number of nuclear charges awaiting their turn for recycling is estimated at 3200 units. Although these warheads are for the most part no longer suitable for combat use, the nuclear materials contained in them after reprocessing can be used to create new charges. In the arsenals of the United States and Russia is approximately 90% of all world stocks of nuclear weapons.
A vivid example of this is such countries as Iran and the DPRK. If the Iranian nuclear program, at least formally, thanks to the efforts of international diplomacy, was able to be transferred to a peaceful plane, then North Korea, due to excessive pressure from the United States, Japan and South Korea, on the contrary, demonstrates intractability. Apparently, the fate of the leaders of Iraq and Libya, who at one time for some reason refused to create their own nuclear weapons and eventually became victims of Western aggression, is a negative example for the leadership of the DPRK.
At various times, nuclear ambitions have shown: Argentina, Brazil, Libya and Sweden. At different stages of the development of their own nuclear programs, these countries refused to create an atomic bomb. Iraq was forced to stop developing nuclear weapons after the destruction of the Osirak nuclear reactor from France by the Israeli Air Force.
Work on the creation of the atomic bomb in Argentina began with the 1951 year in the period of the dictatorship of Perron. Prior to the start of the 70-x, four research reactors and a laboratory unit for the radiochemical processing of irradiated nuclear fuel were commissioned. In the 1973 year, about 1 kg of plutonium was obtained, but for foreign policy reasons, the production of plutonium in 1974 was discontinued. At that time, Argentina already had the necessary scientific and technical base and production facilities for obtaining heavy water, producing nuclear fuel, enriching uranium, radiochemical processing of spent nuclear fuel and separating plutonium.
After the military government headed by General Jorge Redondo came to power in 1978, it was officially announced that atomic weapons were being built in Argentina. According to the then leadership of the country, the implementation of the national nuclear program should not only enhance the prestige of Argentina, but also ensure national security in a competitive environment with Brazil for regional leadership. In the course of the implementation of the Argentine nuclear weapons program, factories have been set up for the production of uranium dioxide, nuclear fuel and heavy water. However, after the defeat of Argentina in the Falkland conflict, a civil administration came to power, and the process of cooperation with Brazil and the inclusion of Argentina in the international regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons began. After the signing of the Guadalajara Agreement on the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes in Argentina and Brazil in the 1991 year, the Argentine nuclear weapons program collapsed exclusively for peaceful purposes. After that, the leadership of Argentina has repeatedly declared that the creation of national nuclear weapons is contrary to the interests of the state, but the existing nuclear infrastructure in the country and qualified personnel will allow it to be done in a relatively short period of time.
For a sufficiently long period of time in Brazil, in parallel with peaceful nuclear research controlled by the IAEA, a secret nuclear weapons program has been conducted since 1957. An additional impetus for the development of the Brazilian nuclear industry was publicizing in 1983 the fact of the completion of the construction of the previously classified uranium enrichment plant in Argentina. At the beginning of the 80's in Brazil, industrial mining of uranium and its enrichment began. In the 1986 year, uranium was obtained, enriched to 20%. At the same time, a laboratory facility for the extraction of plutonium from SNF came into operation.
After the end of the military rule and the civilian administration came to power in 1985, as in Argentina, Brazil began a gradual process of joining the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. In the middle of 90, Brazilian representatives officially announced the existence of a nuclear weapons program under the code name “Project Solimoes” in 70 – 80. Within the framework of this program, the 300 meter shaft, “officially” closed by Brazilian President FK, was created to conduct nuclear tests in a remote region of the country near Kachimbo (in the jungles of the Amazon). de Melo 17 September 1990 of the year. At the time of the signing of the 18 on July 1991 by Brazil and Argentina of the Guadalajara Agreement on the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes in Brazil, the Air Force representatives developed designs of two nuclear bombs with a design capacity of 12 kt and 20 – 30 kt, but they were not assembled.
As in neighboring Argentina, in Brazil at the moment there is the possibility of creating their own nuclear weapons in a relatively short time perspective. In the municipality of Reseda (pc. Rio de Janeiro), a uranium enrichment plant was launched in 2006. Its production capacity is sufficient to produce fuel assemblies for light-water reactors with a capacity of 1000 MW, or to create approximately 30 uranium nuclear charges per year. Brazilian specialists have the necessary qualifications and they have at their disposal spent nuclear technologies for all key elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. In the case of the adoption of an appropriate decision by the leadership of the country in Brazil, it is possible to proceed relatively quickly to the production of fissile materials of a high degree of enrichment, followed by the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices on their basis.
Shortly after 1970 came to power, the leader of the Libyan revolution, M. Gaddafi, began to show nuclear ambitions. Since the country lacked the necessary scientific and industrial base, he turned for help in creating an atomic bomb, first to China, and then to the USSR. But these appeals did not meet with understanding. In 1975, Libya joined the NPT, and then in 1977, the Soviet Union helped establish a research laboratory and set up a light-water research reactor with a capacity of 1981 MW in 10, along with highly enriched uranium.
But Libya could not create an atomic bomb with her own forces in the foreseeable future. Attempts to acquire a heavy-water reactor in the USSR, equipment for the production of heavy water, a line for radiochemical processing of irradiated nuclear fuel, despite the proposed 10 billion at the end of 70-x, were not successful. Due to US opposition, deals with Belgian and German companies were thwarted. As a result, Libya offered significant financial assistance to Pakistan in the hope of gaining an "Islamic nuclear bomb." Unable to purchase the necessary equipment and materials legally, Libya turned to the black market for nuclear technology. In recognition of the “father” of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, Abdul Kadir Khan, through an illegal network created by him, 20 centrifuges for enriching uranium and technical documentation on the design of a nuclear charge were delivered to Libya. At the same time, Libyan representatives made illegal purchases of uranium.
However, the weakness of the Libyan scientific and technological base and international sanctions did not allow Libya to seriously advance in the production of weapons-grade fissile materials. In 2003, Libya, in exchange for a promise to lift the sanctions, announced it was refusing to implement a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA inspections that followed confirmed the lack of production of weapons-grade nuclear materials in Libya. The available special equipment and materials violating the non-proliferation regime were removed from the country. How it ended up for M. Gaddafi, we all know.
Shortly after the nuclear bombing of Japan, on the initiative of the military-political leadership of Sweden, nuclear research began in the country. In 1946, all work in this area was concentrated at the Swedish National Center for Defense Studies. Initially, the purpose of the research was to find out how Sweden could defend itself against an attack with a nuclear weapon. As a result, the leadership of the Swedish armed forces came to the conclusion that the best defense against aggression would be the possession of its own atomic bomb.
At the end of 40, Sweden made a number of attempts to gain access to US nuclear secrets, including uranium enrichment technology, but received a polite refusal. After that, the Swedish leadership simply tried to buy ready-made nuclear warheads in the United States. In 1955, the projected purchase volume — 25 nuclear bombs — was even announced.
The Americans agreed to go to the meeting, but with two fundamental conditions. One of them was the preservation of American control over Swedish nuclear warheads, according to another - Sweden had to conclude a treaty on defense with the United States and abandon neutrality. Both of these conditions were unacceptable for the government of Sweden and the deal did not take place. After the breakdown of the nuclear agreement with the United States, the Swedish leadership decided to create an atomic bomb on its own. I must say that for this in Sweden there was everything you need - scientific, laboratory, industrial and raw materials base.
The national Swedish nuclear weapons production program called for the creation of 100 plutonium bombs weighing 400-500 kg and power 20 CT. To this end, uranium enrichment plants were built in Kvarntorp and Ranstad, and the first heavy-water nuclear reactor was launched in Stockholm in 1954. Heavy water for the reactor was imported from Norway.
After signing a bilateral cooperation agreement with the United States in the field of civilian nuclear energy under the US Peaceful Atomic Program, the R-1956 research reactor was installed in 2. In addition, Sweden has the opportunity to access American research in the field of nuclear energy. Enriched uranium and heavy water began to come from the USA in small quantities at prices lower than from Norway. Moreover, the agreement separately stipulated that Sweden could not use the information and materials received from the Americans to create nuclear weapons.
In 60, nuclear research in Sweden advanced far enough, and the IBM 7090 semiconductor computer imported from the United States seriously helped. In 1964, the Agesta reactor, independently created in Sweden, began operations. This reactor with a thermal capacity of 68 MW could produce up to 2 kg of plutonium per month, which already opened up real possibilities for creating nuclear weapons. It was planned to receive even larger volumes of plutonium at the reactor under construction in Marviken, but this reactor, in view of the refusal to create nuclear weapons, was never launched.
In the second half of 60, Sweden’s nuclear program advanced so much that in a relatively short time it was possible to accumulate the necessary amount of weapons-grade plutonium and start assembling nuclear explosive devices. By that time, with the use of significant volumes of conventional explosives in the river basin of Nausta, a nuclear test method had already been worked out and a place for the construction of adits had been selected for underground tests on the Kjelen Highland in Lapland. To begin assembling a nuclear charge and conducting tests, all that was missing was a political decision by the country's leadership.
The Swedish government understood that the creation and maintenance of a nuclear arsenal would put a heavy burden on the economy. In addition, the country's nuclear status in the event of a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact could have led the Soviet Union to launch a preventive nuclear strike on Sweden. In this regard, protest anti-nuclear sentiments grew in Sweden itself. In 1968, Sweden joined the NPT, and 9 in January, 1970 ratified it. However, work on the weapons program was finally folded only in 1974 year. Recently, Sweden has not shown interest in the possession of nuclear weapons, but the country's scientific and production potential makes it possible to create completely modern types of nuclear weapons in a relatively short time.
Special mention deserves the Iranian nuclear program. In 50-60-s of the last century, the Iranian Shah Reza Pahlavi attempted to rebuild life in the country on a European scale. In 1957, Iran joined the US Atom for Peace program and joined the IAEA. In 1967, a research reactor from the United States began operation at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. In 70-ies, Iran acquired technological equipment for uranium enrichment and fuel cell production and launched a program in the field of nuclear energy.
The 1979 Islamic Revolution seriously slowed down the work in this area, not only all foreign specialists left the country, but also many Iranian physicists and engineers. In 80-ies, the Iranian nuclear program, which received weapons-oriented, began to be implemented with the help of China and Pakistan. In the second half of 80-s in Isfahan, a nuclear research center began operating on the basis of a reactor supplied from the PRC. However, the agreement with China on the construction of light-water reactors in the same place under US pressure was canceled.
In 90-ies, Iran illegally received centrifuges for uranium enrichment from Pakistan and a package of technical documentation. The exact date of the start of uranium enrichment in Iran is not known, but in Fordo near the city of Qom in the rocks at a depth of 80-90 meters in 2012, there was a production line from about 2000 centrifuges. The first unaccounted Iranian centrifuges were discovered by the IAEA inspectors in Iran in 2004 year. After 2005, the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, became Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the country's position on nuclear issues became tougher. Iranian representatives at international negotiations insisted on the need to create a full range of enrichment and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. Russia took the initiative to enrich Iranian uranium and recycle waste materials from the Bushehr nuclear power plant at its facilities. This would exclude the possibility of extracting weapons-grade plutonium from spent fuel at nuclear power plants.
Google Earth Snapshot: Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant
After international negotiations involving France, Germany and the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia and the PRC came to a standstill, the UN Security Council adopted six resolutions demanding that Iran stop enriching and processing uranium, four of them provided for the introduction and tightening of sanctions against this country.
Despite the imposed international sanctions, Iran did not make concessions. Moreover, heavy water production facilities were put into operation in 2006, and cooperation with the IAEA was limited at 2009 and plans were announced to build ten new uranium enrichment plants in the country. In 2010, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that the first batch of uranium enriched up to 20% was received at the nuclear center in Natanz, and that the country has the opportunity to produce uranium with a higher degree of enrichment. In the second half of 2011, the IAEA experts issued a conclusion that Iran is increasing its uranium enrichment capacity and works are underway that can be interpreted as producing nuclear weapons.
In April, 2013, Iran announced the 15-year program for the construction of a cascade of 16 nuclear power plants.
By 2010, a set of research and laboratory centers and uranium mining and enrichment factories were formed in Iran. Iran’s nuclear industry relies on mines in Sagand and Gachin, uranium enrichment plants in Ford and Erdekan, nuclear centers in Isfahan, Tehran, Natanz and Parchin. According to IAEA estimates, Iran, while maintaining the enrichment rate of uranium at the level of 2013, could have had several uranium nuclear charges by the year of 2020.
Tensions associated with the Iranian nuclear program began to decline at the end of 2013, after Hassan Rouhani replaced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president of the country. At the talks in Geneva, it was possible to adopt a joint action plan, according to which Iran undertook to stop enriching uranium over 5% and destroy all reserves of nuclear materials enriched above this threshold, as well as to stop building new uranium enrichment facilities. In response, the sanctions against Iran, which seriously impeded the development of the Iranian economy, were weakened. The agreement for a period of six months entered into force on January 20 2014 of the year, subsequently its validity was extended twice - first to November 24 of 2014 of the year, then to June 30 of 2015 of the year. Following inspections by Iranian nuclear enterprises and the positive conclusion of the IAEA, international sanctions against Iran in January 2016 were lifted.
Simultaneously with the nuclear one, a missile program was being implemented in Iran. The first ballistic missiles, which are North Korean copies of the Soviet P-17, appeared in Iran in the second half of the 80. They were actively used at the closing stage of the Iran-Iraq war to attack Iraqi cities. In 90, Iran’s cooperation in the missile area with the DPRK continued. That ballistic missiles were to be the main means of delivery of Iranian nuclear weapons.
Based on the missiles received from the DPRK, Iranian specialists have developed their own ground-to-ground missiles of the Shahab family. Thanks to the increased capacity of the fuel and oxidizer tanks and the new North Korean engine, the Shahab-3 rocket, in service with the 2003 of the year, reached the flight range of 1100 — 1300 km with a warhead weight of 750 — 1000 kg.
Launch of Iranian ballistic missile Shahab-3
In August, the 2004 of the year passed the tests of the modernized Shekhab-3M MRSD, the Iranian specialists, by reducing the size of the head part of the rocket and increasing the power of its propulsion system and the capacity of the fuel tanks, achieved the launch range of 1600 km. But the accuracy of these Iranian missiles is low (the QUO is approximately 2,5 km), their effective combat use is possible only against such area targets as the enemy’s cities. According to Israeli estimates, the IRI has about 600 BR family "Shehab". They are placed both on the mobile chassis and in disguised silos. At a military parade in September 2007, the Gadr-1 rocket was demonstrated with a range of up to 2000 km. According to Iranian sources, it is a further development option for Shehab-3M.
With the use of propulsion systems of rockets, working on liquid fuel "Shehab", the launch vehicle "Safir" was created, its third stage is solid propellant. February 2 The improved Safir-2009, launched from the Semnan missile range, launched the first Iranian Omid satellite into orbit.
Google Earth Snapshot: Iranian Semnan Missile Range
In November, a solid single-stage MRSD "Sajil-2008" was launched from the Semnan test site at a distance of about 2000 km. The two-stage Sajil-1 rocket in May 2 of the year demonstrated the launch range of 2009 km. Unlike Iranian medium-range liquid-propellant missiles, which require several hours to refuel and prepare to launch, Sajil solid-fuel missiles lack this disadvantage. According to the Iranian military, it is planned to create mobile solid-propellant missile systems that will be constantly on combat patrols, thus, it is intended to carry out missile deterrence of Israel and guarantee the survival of Iranian MRBD in the event of a sudden disarming strike.
Work on the creation of nuclear weapons were carried out at one time in Spain, Romania, Norway, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Algeria, Myanmar, South Korea, Switzerland and Taiwan. After the collapse of the USSR, nuclear weapons remained in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, according to the Lisbon Protocol signed in the 1992 year, they were declared to be countries without nuclear weapons, and in 1994 — 1996 they transferred all nuclear weapons to Russia. In addition to countries that have tried to create nuclear weapons purposefully, there are at least two dozen states in the world that can, if desired, create their own nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. First of all, these are European industrialized countries, such as Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as Japan, Australia and Canada. Many countries have accumulated large stocks of plutonium recovered from SNF. For example, stocks of fissile materials accumulated in Germany and Japan are sufficient to create more than a thousand nuclear charges, which is comparable to the nuclear potential of Russia or the United States.
Nuclear proliferation data as of 2010 year
Despite the reduction in the number of nuclear warheads in Russia, the United States, France and Great Britain, the armed forces of the states where there are nuclear weapons regularly conduct trainings and trainings at which training for the use of nuclear weapons and protection against them are worked out. In developed countries where there are no nuclear weapons, they are preparing their army to act in conditions of nuclear war. Despite the declared end of the Cold War and the moratorium on nuclear testing, the improvement and creation of new types of nuclear weapons did not stop. This is due to the fact that the military and political leadership of nuclear states continues to consider possible scenarios of nuclear war.
Sadly, one must admit that nuclear war is possible. In the event of a global nuclear conflict between the United States and Russia, to which American NATO allies (including the United Kingdom and France) will undoubtedly be connected, the parties can use nuclear warheads against each other up to 4000. This will have disastrous consequences for the developed countries of the world. In a short time period, about 700 million people will die, most of the industrial and infrastructural potential of “Western civilization” will be destroyed. However, according to modern studies, this will not lead to the destruction of life on the planet and even to the complete destruction of humanity. The nuclear charges available to the United States and Russia are enough to turn a country the size of France into a zone of continuous destruction. But, apparently, the global "nuclear winter" will not come, and the radiation contamination of the area will not be as destructive as it is considered to be.
Without a doubt, the emission into the atmosphere of millions of tons of soot and dust may have some effect on the amount of sunlight falling on the earth’s surface, this will somewhat lower the temperature in temperate latitudes for a short time, but it will not be as significant as is commonly believed in gloomy apocalyptic forecasts. . Changes in temperature in the coastal and subtropical zones will be almost negligible. This is confirmed by long-term observations of the consequences of large-scale forest fires and large volcanic eruptions, during which large volumes of solid particles are also ejected into the atmosphere. The main mass of soot during forest and man-made fires does not reach the stratosphere, and is quickly washed out from the lower layers of the atmosphere.
The opinion that several thousand nuclear explosions could split the planet is also untenable. Since 1945, on Earth, nuclear explosions have thundered around 2500, of which 12 with a capacity from 10 to 58 MT, but this has not led to any global changes. During large volcanic eruptions, the amount of released energy exceeds the power of a bomb dropped ten times on Hiroshima, only in the 20 century there were more than 3500 volcanic eruptions, but this did not have a noticeable effect on population growth on earth.
The greatest destructive effect in a nuclear explosion is achieved in the case of an air detonation of a nuclear charge. Modern nuclear warheads have a high utilization rate of fissile and fissile materials, and in the absence of their contact with the ground during an air blast a minimum amount of radionuclides is formed, subsequently falling as radioactive fallout. So after testing on Novaya Zemlya in 1961, a thermonuclear charge with a power of 58 Mt, participants in the tests arrived at the point over which a thermonuclear explosion occurred, after two hours, the radiation level in this place was not very dangerous. At present, the radiation background in the places where aerial test nuclear explosions were carried out, has little different natural values.
A nuclear explosion produces a complex mixture of more than 200 radioactive isotopes of 36 elements (from zinc to gadolinium), the most active are short-lived radionuclides. So, through 7, through 49 and through 343 days after the explosion, the SPP activity decreases by 10, 100 and 1000, respectively, compared to the activity one hour after the explosion. In addition to nuclear fission products, radioactive contamination of the locality is due to radionuclides of induced activity and the scattered part of the nuclear charge, which did not participate in the fission reaction. In aerial nuclear explosions, 20-25% of fission products falls in the immediate vicinity. Part of the radionuclides lingers in the lower part of the atmosphere and under the action of the wind moves long distances, remaining approximately at the same latitude. They can be in the air for about a month, gradually fall to the Earth at a considerable distance from the point of explosion. The main part of the fission products formed during an air explosion is thrown into the stratosphere (to an altitude of 12-15 km), where their global dispersion and, to a significant degree, decay occur. It is worth noting that in the case of a land-based nuclear explosion, radiation contamination of the area may be ten times more. The greatest danger is nuclear strikes at operating NPPs and nuclear enterprises, in this case, radiation contamination of a locality may indeed be of catastrophic long-term nature.
It is obvious that in the case of a global nuclear war, humanity, having suffered huge losses, will not disappear. It can be assumed that the centers of civilization after the Third World will be the relatively underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, Central and South America, as well as Australia, untouched in a nuclear conflict. The prophecies that the “Fourth World War” will be conducted “with stones and sticks” are untenable, since the accumulated knowledge and skills base ensures that humanity will preserve the technological path of development.
Nuclear bomb V61
Unlike global nuclear war, the use of tactical nuclear weapons seems more likely in future military conflicts. It is warranted that the improvement of nuclear weapons leads to a decrease in the threshold of their use. So at the present time in the USA the B61-12 nuclear bomb is being tested. After being put into service, this nuclear munition should oust most of the armed bombs (except B61-11) of this family: B61-3, B61-4, B61-7, B61-10.
Thanks to the use of a satellite or inertial guidance system, the accuracy of the B61-12 bombing should increase several times, which, in the opinion of the US military, along with the possibility of stepwise control of the explosion power (0,3, 5, 10, and 50 CT) will allow using it both tactically and strategic weapons. And also to minimize collateral damage from its use for their troops.
Another way to improve nuclear weapons can be the creation of charges based on nuclear isomers, for example, a hafnium bomb based on hafnium-178m2. According to the destructive effect, one gram of hafnium can be equivalent to 50 kilograms of TNT and at the same time there is practically no radiation contamination of the area. However, studies that were conducted at the United States Agency for Advanced Defense Research and Development with 1998 to 2004 have shown that, using current technologies, the release of excess energy from the hafnium-178m2 core is not yet possible. But one way or another, nuclear weapons have been in military arsenals for more than 70 years and will not be abandoned in the near future.