Plans and the ratio of forces of the Soviet and German sides to the beginning of 1945.
For Germany, the situation that had developed by the end of 1944 did not look as disastrous as it was, for example, in the summer of that year. Common ticks threatened by the Allies and the Soviet Union still have not closed. And although the offensive in the Ardennes did not turn into a strategic strike against the Allied forces and did not allow Germany to completely liberate forces for the Eastern Front, the Germans seized the initiative in the West, and it took the Allies some time before they could resume their movement deep into the Reich. In the area north of the Carpathians, the Russians have not undertaken a major offensive for two and a half months. This made it possible for Army Group South, which was almost defeated in August, to strengthen its position in Hungary so much that deblocking Budapest no longer seemed impossible. Army Group "E" has taken the final stage of the withdrawal of its troops from Greece, Albania and South Yugoslavia. In Italy, Army Group C stopped the offensive of British and American troops on the Gothic Line (Green Line).
Hitler stubbornly continued to try to keep all captured territories. He decided to spend his last meager military reserves to free his hands in the West, but could not achieve this. The Führer could only try to delay the inevitable defeat, and he knew about it. At the end of December, he told one of his generals: “This war will no longer last as long as it did before. It’s absolutely certain. No one can stand it anymore: neither we nor the enemy. The only question is who can hold out longer "Only the one who puts everything at stake will succeed." But he hardly understood that he actually had much less time than he could have imagined. The ability of the German side to continue the war was rapidly declining. Both in the East and in the West, the adversaries of Germany had an undeniable advantage in resources. Industrial production in Germany had to be carried out in conditions of devastating bombing aviation the enemy. The country was able to successfully resist the raids of enemy aircraft, but each time the restoration took more and more time.
In September 1944, German aviation enterprises fired 3 thousand fighters, the largest number for the entire time of the war. In October, production of fighter jets began. In December, it was still possible to maintain a higher level of production than in any month until May 1944. Production of armored vehicles, primarily tanks, assault guns, peaked in wartime. In December 1944, 1854 units of armored vehicles were produced, however, mainly due to the advance preparation of a large number of main components, which were delivered to the conveyors several months before the start of production. At the same time, the production base was gradually collapsing. The powerful bombing of the Ruhr district in December 1944 led to a reduction in the production of pig iron, non-hardened steel and rolled products this month to a level of 50% compared to September of that year and about 30% compared to January 1944.
According to the US strategic aviation command, aerial bombardment of the Allies by the end of 1944 destroyed the German railway network so much that "the country could not expect to maintain high rates of industrial production for a long period of time." Enterprises with a short period of production have already felt the influence of these adverse factors. Automotive production has significantly suffered from both bombing and the destruction of the railway network. In October and November, 1944 assembly companies produced 12 thousand trucks. This was achieved by restoring all the failed cars that could be found in Germany. In December, it was possible to produce all 3300 trucks with the needs of 6 thousand new cars. 70% of them Hitler threw to secure an offensive in the West. In January, the equipment of tank and motorized divisions by motor transport had to be reduced by 25%. Part of the personnel of the motorized divisions had to be transplanted into bicycles. Hitler tried to console himself with the thought that in tank divisions there were too many vehicles anyway, that the times of rapid maneuver were a thing of the past and that in many cases infantry divisions were moving faster than the so-called mobile connections that had only created traffic jams.
From a military point of view, the most dangerous was the catastrophic decline in fuel production, which began in May 1944. Despite the top priority of the so-called Geilenberg program, which provided for the repair and dispersal of the existing ones, and the creation of new synthetic fuel production enterprises, its production declined during the summer. In September, artificial fuel plants did not work because of the actions of the Allied bomber aircraft. In late August, oil fields were lost in Romania. In October and November, the production of synthetic fuel was resumed, but its release was insignificant. But by the end of December, as a result of the new bombings, all large fuel manufacturing enterprises, except for one, and 20% of smaller factories were disabled.
Army Group South was keeping oil fields in the area of Nagykanizsa in Hungary, but as a result of the loss of oil refineries in Budapest and the sabotage of workers, the production of fuel did not even meet the needs of the army group itself. In June, the German Air Force 1944 consumed 180 thousand tons of aviation gasoline. For the rest of the war, the volume of aviation fuel supplies amounted to no more than 197 thousand tons. Despite the fact that until the end of the year, the country was able to maintain high rates of production of combat aircraft, the Air Force did not have enough fuel to properly prepare the flight crews and to effectively use the existing aircraft. The shortage of fuel for ground equipment was almost as acute, and the army had similar problems with the use of armored vehicles.
German ground forces first began to experience a shortage of personnel, and only then came the decline in the production of military equipment. Until the end of 1944, a number of ways were tested to maintain the required army strength, some of which gave results, and others did not, the Germans could not provide enough reinforcements for the army to quickly thaw its ranks. From June to November 1944, the total irretrievable losses of the Germans on all fronts amounted to 1 million 457 thousand people, of whom 903 thousand soldiers and officers were on the Eastern Front. As of 1 in October 1944, the number of personnel on the Eastern Front was 1 790 138 people (in total, on the Eastern Front, by the beginning of 1945, the Germans had, including Hungarian formations and other units, 3,7 million, 56,2 thousand guns and mortars , 8,1 thousand tanks and assault guns, 4,1 thousand aircraft (History World War II, t. 10. with. 37), including about 150 thousand soldiers of auxiliary troops from the composition of Soviet citizens.
This was 400 thousand less than in June, and almost 700 thousand less than in January 1944, when the Western theater could be viewed as something like a source of replenishment for the Eastern Front. The shortage of personnel was most pronounced in the old divisions that had more experience in combat operations. Between September 1 and 31 December 1944, one-third of the replenishment for all fronts, up to 500 thousand people, was sent to create new connections or re-form old ones. By the end of this period, the shortage of personnel in the old divisions amounted to more than 800 thousand people, and this is taking into account the reduction of X-NUMX personnel in 1944 thousand people.
In August, 1944. Hitler set the task for I. Goebbels, as authorized for a total war, to search through party channels 1 million men as a replenishment for the army. They were supposed to be used to create new compounds. This appeal was unplanned, without regard to the previous calls. By the end of the year, I. Goebbels was able to provide a call up to 300 thousand recruits. Approximately another 200 thousand men were sent to the front from the rear army services. In October, Hitler ordered the Volkssturme - civilian paramilitary units at their place of residence under the leadership of party functionaries. These included men between the ages of 16 and 60 years who, for whatever reason, could not be recruited into the army. The members of the Volkssturm should, if possible, be supplied with military uniforms. In the absence of such an opportunity, they wore either party uniforms or civilian clothes. In addition, Hitler approved the Gneisenau and Blucher programs, according to which approximately 200 thousand men were to join the territorial divisions in the eastern military districts. In November, for the first time, he agreed with the idea of using military formations from among Russian collaborators on the Eastern front, thereby legitimizing long conversations about the creation of the Russian Liberation Army under the command of General Vlasov. 10 February 1945. Vlasov received under his command the newly formed first division, in the new compound the lack of uniforms was 55%, and the vehicles and vehicles - 85%.
In an attempt to maintain the level of manning of the army units, Hitler overlooked some of the juggling in the regular organization and strength. He sanctioned the creation of artillery corps, the real power of which was equal to one brigade, tank brigade of double battalion and tank "Jäger" brigade of one battalion. In the period from August to December, the number of those drafted into the army (1 million 569 thousand people) only slightly exceeded its losses on the battlefield. Moreover, upon closer examination, it turned out that approximately 956 thousand conscripts would not get to the front earlier than 1 in January 1945.
In October and November 1944, the OKH organizational department demanded reports on the status of troops from armies and army groups. As expected, after reviewing these reports, it became clear that the troops most urgently needed replenishment. In addition, the reports pointed to a drop in the morale of the soldiers as a result of the losses incurred and in connection with the entry of the enemy into pre-war German territory in the West and in East Prussia in the East. The "air raids of intimidation" that the allies organized also affected. In general, the troops still believed in victory, but for the most part such faith was based solely on hopes of receiving a new one in the near future. weapons, which will stop the attacks of enemy aircraft and do away with the superiority of the enemy on the ground. How serious was the situation of Germany, Hitler imagined much better than the poor militia and grenadier soldiers, who continued to seriously believe in the secret miracle weapon. In addition, he knew exactly what he was going to take in the future. In fact, many people knew about it. In the past, the German Fuhrer often came into a state of nervous shock, close to failure, even in days when fortune was on his side. But Hitler did not experience any hesitation at the moment when she turned away from him.
28 December 1944 in Admhorst (Eagle's Nest) in an address to the division commanders who were to launch an offensive in the Northern Alsace on New Year's days, he admitted that the offensive in the Ardennes had failed, and henceforth Germany would have to fight for the very fact of its existence. Then the Führer continued: “I would like to expressly say, gentlemen, that I don’t want you to conclude at least in the least that I admit the thought that the war has been lost. Never in my life have I tried to find out that means the word “surrender.” I belong to those people who were making their way into life from nothing. Thus, the circumstances in which we now find ourselves are nothing new to me. I had to go in different life situations, sometimes much worse. I declare that only You will be able to judge why I achieve my goals with such fanaticism, and why nothing can stop me.However, restless thoughts may also haunt me, and as far as I can judge, my health can be seriously undermined as a result. But this will not affect my determination to fight to the end, until the pan is rocked again in our direction. "
It was still the same old song, but in former times, even in the same speech to the generals, before the offensive in the Ardennes, these words had a basis in a political and strategic sense. Then Hitler was still speaking as a statesman and strategist, and his will was used to achieve specific, clearly expressed goals. Now his will was something that should be perceived as a separate factor; only she mattered. Armies and battles became something secondary. The only important thing was that his will, and he himself did not weaken. He continued to tell the generals that the story refutes the view that the looming defeat should be considered only from a purely military point of view. With a careful analysis it turned out that the outcome of wars was decided by the strength and determination of the leadership. He cited the example of Cannes, as well as the "miracle of the Brandenburg House", when Frederick the Great, who was defeated in the Seven Years War, managed to achieve the Hubertusburg Peace and returned all lost territories and even more after the collapse of the coalition of winners. Millions of people were to die at a time when Hitler intended to wait for the same miracle. At the same time, Germany’s casualties were killed, it’s estimated, since 1944 has not been accurately counted since December, according to various researchers, from January to May 1945 are from 2 to 3 million, and this is only in battles!
5 January 1945 G. Guderian visited the headquarters of Army Group South in Esterhaz. The next night, he traveled by train through Czechoslovakia to the headquarters of Army Group South to Krakow. It was not just an inspection trip. Mr. Guderian was in deep concern. The operation of deblocking Budapest took longer than the Germans could afford. In the middle of the month, an unprecedentedly powerful Soviet offensive was expected at the sites of Army Groups “A” and “Center”. Since the end of summer, the situation on the Eastern Front, in the region north of the Carpathians, has not undergone significant changes. In the period between Christmas and the New Year, Army Group North in Kurland managed to repel the third in three months the attempt of the Soviet troops to break through the front. From the beginning of November, there was a lull on the whole front. This happened after, as a result of the German 4 Army's counterblow east of Gumbinnen, Soviet troops in East Prussia managed to stay here only on the 25 km / 80 km section.
The presence of five Soviet bridgeheads, Ruzhansky and Serotsky on Narev, Magnushevsky, Pulavsky and Sandomirsky on the Vistula, was most characteristic of the front sections of Army Groups “A” and “Center”. Like huge splinters, they were wedged into the German defense. In November, the 9 Army was transferred to Army Group A; a section of the front of the army group ran from Modlin to the northern border of Hungary. Her armies — 9, 4, tank, 17, and the Heinrici Army Group (1, Tank Army, and Hungarian 1, Army) blocked the way to Germany. Army Group Center as part of the 3 Tank, 4 and 2 Armies was deployed at the turn that covered East Prussia and the Danzig region (Gdansk). The lull months gave the army groups time to build a complex network of defenses, stretching from Narew and Vistula to the rear - to the Oder. The main road junctions were connected to the defense system and designated as "fortresses".
In the Department of Foreign Forces of the East, OKH initially assumed that the purpose of the next Soviet offensive would be to seize East Prussia and reach into the huge mites of Upper Silesia and the area of Vienna, including the territory of Czechoslovakia. In December, these assessments changed: now the officers of the department believed that the Soviet side would concentrate its main efforts on the sections of the 1 Belarusian and 1 Ukrainian Fronts against Army Group A; offensive will develop in the western and north-western direction. In addition, it was expected that the Soviet command was simultaneously planning to strike against Army Group Center, perhaps with more limited objectives than seizing the entire territory of East Prussia, since the task of defeating Army Group North (in Kurland) was still not completed . By the beginning of January, it seemed that the Russians might be inclined to the “big solution” variant at the site of Army Group “Center”, which envisaged an offensive in the lower reaches of the Vistula. And at the front of Army Group A, they will deal a deeper blow, perhaps to Berlin itself. The comparison of the forces of the sides to the beginning of 1945 was: against the 169 German divisions on the Eastern Front (of which 22 tank and 9 motorized), 20 brigades, 16 Hungarian divisions (including 2 tank), total - 3,7 million, 56,2 thousand guns and mortars, 8,1 thousand tanks and assault guns, 4,1 thousand aircraft, the Soviet command concentrated 414 connections in the first echelon, 261 connection in front reserves and 219 - in a strategic reserve.
By this time, the Red Army had 6,7 million people, 107,3 thousand guns and mortars, 12,1 thousand tanks and SPG, 14,7 thousand combat aircraft on the Soviet-German front. In addition, 501,1, thousand people, 6883 guns and mortars, 520 tanks and SPGs, 464 combat aircraft (History of the Second World War, v. 10, p. 37-38) were in reserve at Headquarters. The Soviet 2 and 3 Belorussian fronts concentrated 1 million 669 thousand soldiers and officers, 25 426 artillery guns and mortars, 3859 tanks and SPG, which gave them superiority in manpower 2,1: 1 in artillery - 3,1: 1, in armored vehicles - 5,5: 1. The 1 th Belarusian and 1 Ukrainian Fronts opposing Army Group A had 2 million 200 thousand soldiers and officers, 6400 tanks and SAU, 46 thousand artillery guns, including heavy mortars and rocket artillery systems. Against them, the German 9-I, 4-I tank and 17-I armies could put about 400 thousand soldiers and officers, 4100 guns and 1150 tanks.
At the breakout sites and on the 1 bridgeheads, the Byelorussian and 1 Ukrainian Fronts outnumbered the Germans in terms of 9: 1 ratio, in artillery - 9-10: 1, in tanks and in ACS - 10: 1. On the Magnushevsky bridgehead, only the 1 th Belarusian Front concentrated 400 thousand soldiers and officers, 8700 guns and mortars and 1700 tanks. By January 1 1945, the Germans could fly 1900 aircraft on the Western Front and 1875 aircraft on the Eastern Front. The main efforts they still made in the West. North of the Carpathians, the German 1 and 6 air fleet had about 1300 airplanes. The Soviet side had more than 10 thousand cars.
Upon the arrival of G. Guderian in Krakow, the headquarters of Army Group “A” was ready to hand him his plan. The assessment of the staff officers, regardless of what the army group takes, was unfavorable. In December, immediately after the transfer of two divisions from the reserve to the Army Group South, the Chief of Staff of the Army Group held a war game. Its results showed that the Russians were able to break through the front and reach the border with Silesia during the six days of the offensive; while nothing guaranteed that they can be stopped even on the Oder. A subsequent study of the issue showed that the maximum that the army group was capable of was to ensure what was called the opportunity to fight. The first major milestone, the so-called Hubertus, ran approximately 8 km beyond the leading edge. Then he walked almost in a straight line to the north, towards the western tip of the Magnushevsky bridgehead.
An army group offered two days before the offensive to withdraw troops to the Hubertus line. This would allow the 4 Tank and 9 Armies to avoid the threat of encirclement on the internal flank. In addition, the 4-I tank army would be able to withdraw its right flank from the front edge of the Sandomierz bridgehead before the artillery preparation of the Soviet troops began, the front line would be reduced, and the army group could create some reserve. Mr. Guderian reviewed the plan and January 8 approved it, but it was hardly worth hoping that Hitler would do the same. On January 9, after receiving a proposal from the command of Army Group Center to withdraw troops from the Narev River to the line that ran along the border with East Prussia, G. Guderian set out with a report on the Fuhrer's headquarters, Eagle's Nest. As G. Guderian later recalled, Hitler refused to believe intelligence data about the alleged Russian forces. He stated that their author, whoever he was, deserved to go to conclusion. In addition, the Fuhrer rejected both proposals emanating from the headquarters of army groups. Hitler said that for the offensive the Russians would need at least a threefold superiority in tanks, that the enemy could not have such a large number of guns, which G. Guderian was talking about. The Russians could not have so much artillery, and even if they had guns, how many shots were they able to make? No more 10-12 per gun. Speaking, obviously, about the plan of the headquarters of Army Group “A”, the Fuhrer cried out: “This operational plan of retreat on this sector (and he showed on the map) leads to the creation of two groups. A further transition of these forces to the offensive will become doubly dangerous.”
Whether Hitler wanted it or not, the respite was over. January 3 Führer officially abandoned the objectives of the operation in the Ardennes. On 8, he ordered the SS 6, retreating in the first echelon, to retreat. The army became a reserve in case of Allied counterattacks. The German offensive in the Northern Alsace was still ongoing, but it turned into a hindrance rather. On January 7, Army Group A spotted the movement of fresh Soviet forces to the front on the western flank of the Sandomierz bridgehead. On the Pulavsky and Magnushevsky bridgeheads, the Russians increased their artillery forces. Obviously, final preparations were made for the offensive.
The Soviet Stavka prepared an offensive at two sites, geographically separated from one another by the Vistula flow west of Warsaw. The 1 Byelorussian and 1 Ukrainian Fronts, with the support of the right wing of the 4 th Ukrainian Front, were supposed to start a bigger one between Warsaw and the Carpathians. The 1 Belorussian Front, commanded by G.K. Zhukov was supposed to strike a blow from the Pulawski bridgehead in the direction of Lodz and from the Magnushevskiy bridgehead on Kutno. At the same time, the encirclement of Warsaw was envisaged by the forces of the right wing of the front. 1-th Ukrainian Front under the command of I.S. Konev was to break from the Sandomierz bridgehead in a westerly direction, deploying part of the forces to the north-west in order to destroy, in cooperation with the left flank of the 1 of the Belarusian Front, the grouping of German troops in the region of Kielce and Radom. The other grouping of the front was to continue the offensive in the south-western direction to Krakow and the industrial region in Upper Silesia. Then planned the simultaneous advance of both fronts in the western and north-western direction on the Oder.
To the north of the bend of the Vistula, the 2 of the Belarusian Front, commanded by K.K. Rokossovskogo had to attack from Serock and Ruzhansky bridgeheads to the north-west, to the coast of the Baltic Sea, cut off East Prussia and clear the area of the lower Vistula from the enemy. To the right of troops K.K. Rokossovskogo 3-th Belarusian Front, under the command of I.D. Chernyakhovsky was to advance strictly to the west south of the Pregel River in the direction of Königsberg, cut off the German 3 Tank Army from the main forces of Army Group Center and surround the 4 Army in the area west of the Mazury lakes. From the point of view of strategy, the Stavka planned no less than to finish the war in the course of successive operations, which, according to its calculations, took 45 days to implement. According to the then standard practice of the General Staff, only the initial stage of the attack was planned in detail. His success was considered indisputable, and 15 days were allocated for its implementation. The implementation of the tasks of the second stage could require additional time and effort, but not too significant. The headquarters knew that the central sector of the Eastern Front, in the zone of responsibility of Army Group A, was dangerously weakened.
The German troops on its flanks, especially the Army Group Center, which was defending East Prussia, seemed to be somewhat more powerful, but under the most favorable conditions they turned out to be paralyzed. Therefore, the second stage, for which 30 was assigned for the day, should have followed the first one without an operational pause. The stake was hoping to carry out a frontal attack on Berlin and the Elbe by the forces of the 1 of the Byelorussian and 1 of the Ukrainian Fronts. For four months from September 1944 to January 1945, the Soviet High Command provided large-scale logistical support measures for the planned offensive. The railway track in Eastern Poland was changed to the Soviet standard, and in the area of the Wislen bridgeheads, the railway tracks were laid across the river. The 1 Belorussian Front received 68 thousand carloads of freight, which was only 10% less than all four fronts that participated in 1944’s summer offensive against Army Group Center. More than 64 thousand freight wagons were sent to the 1-th Ukrainian Front.
On the Magnushevsky bridgehead, the troops of the 1 of the Byelorussian Front stored 2,5 million shots for artillery and mortars; another 1,3 million shells were stockpiled on the Pulawski bridgehead. For comparison: for all the time of the Stalingrad operation, the Don Front consumed less than 1 million artillery and mortar shells. The total reserves of gasoline and diesel fuel in the warehouses of the 1 of the Byelorussian and 1 of the Ukrainian fronts amounted to more than 115 thousand tons. The 2-th and 3-th Belarusian fronts, which were supposed to operate outside the main railways and highways and which were assigned less significant tasks, were to save a little on fuel and food, but not on ammunition. In the warehouses of these two fronts, up to 9 million artillery and mortar rounds were accumulated, two-fifths of which were supposed to be expended to create a movable firing shaft at the initial stage of the offensive.
In preparing the offensive, the Soviet command revised the political slogans that were put before the troops. Over the past year and before, the main call was the liberation of Soviet territory. But from that moment on, the Soviet armies had to fight on foreign lands. The new slogan could be expressed in one word: retribution! This word was repeated at rallies, in appeals, on posters that were hung along the roads, in articles and leaflets written by famous Soviet writers. Political officers again and again repeated the stories about the crimes that the Germans committed against Russian women and children, the looting and destruction in the territory of the Soviet Union. Soldiers and officers talked about what was happening with their own families. The offensive was originally scheduled for January 20. But after Jan. 6 addressed Churchill to I.V. Stalin, with a personal request to do everything possible in order to delay part of the German troops to the East and ease the pressure on the allies, it was decided to launch the offensive on January 12, eight days before the earlier appointed date.
From the point of view of the Western Allies, in December, on all sectors of the Eastern Front, with the exception of events in the Budapest region, the situation was surprisingly calm. In the middle of the month I.V. Stalin informed A. Harriman of the American ambassador in Moscow about the planned winter offensive, but did not give him any more precise information. 15 January I.V. Stalin had a conversation with the Chief Marshal of Aviation Arthur V. Tedder, who led the delegation of the Supreme Staff of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, sent to Moscow to familiarize themselves with the intentions of the Soviet side. He explained that the offensive was delayed due to weather conditions, but it still began ahead of schedule due to Allied difficulties in the West. The aim of the offensive is the exit of the Soviet troops to the Oder.
German intelligence data confirmed that after mid-December, the Soviet headquarters apparently was expecting a change in the weather. Winter was colder compared to the previous one, but snow, fog and clouds made it difficult for aviation and artillery reconnaissance. The Soviet command, undoubtedly, sacrificed much, having begun the offensive ahead of schedule. On the other hand, on the eve of the Yalta Conference, for I.V. Stalin was not at all superfluous in setting his armies in motion and establishing the Soviet order in Poland, setting up the Polish government created in Lublin with Soviet support in Warsaw. At the same time, the Allies should have felt obligated for the favor done by the Soviet leader at a difficult time.
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