The cooling of the German-Finnish relations in 1943-1944.
After the defeat of Germany at Stalingrad, Finland began to look for ways out of the war. Back in March, 1943. Germany demanded that the Finns sign a formal commitment to a military alliance with Germany under the threat of stopping supplies. weapons and food. The Finns refused, after which the German ambassador to Finland was recalled. In early June, Germany cut off supplies, but the Finns did not change their position. However, at the end of the month, without any conditions, German supplies resumed. Around the same time, at the initiative of Mannerheim, the Finnish SS battalion was formed, formed from volunteers in the spring of 1941, which participated in the hostilities against the USSR as part of the 5th tank SS division "Viking". In Finland, anti-war sentiment is beginning to show itself among the civilian population. In the fall of 1943, 33 people from among the famous citizens of Finland, including several members of parliament, sent a letter to the president with the wish that the government take measures to conclude peace. The letter, known as the “Appeal of thirty-three,” was published in the Swedish press. And in early November, the Social Democratic Party issued a new statement, which not only emphasized Finland’s right to leave the war at its discretion, but also noted that this step should be taken without delay.At the end of 1943, OKV took on the painful task of discussing the course of events south of Leningrad with the Finnish side. V. Keitel addressed K. Mannerheim with a letter in which he assured that Army Group North would continue to hold the line along the Luga River. He asked the marshal how the German side could help the Finns in compensation for the growing threat of the Soviet offensive. In response, K. Mannerheim suggested that the 20 mountain army expand its right flank south to the Ukhta area; thus, the Finnish army would be able to free up one division. The commander of the 20 Army, E. Dietl, sharply objected to this. He stated that by linking additional German units on a minor front line in Finland, Germany would be too dispersed in its forces that Finland could make a more significant contribution to the cause of total war. This country is fully capable of recruiting another division at the expense of its own reserves, "without putting this burden on Germany, on whose shoulders and so the whole burden of war rests." In addition, E. Dietl was annoyed by the recent protests of the Finnish side about the insignificant retreat of the German troops in Finland. E. Dietl had intended to ask K. Mannerheim not to object to the transfer of the maximum possible number of troops to Army Group North, "which also fights for Finland." However, the command of the OKW, bearing in mind the warnings received from Finland in the autumn of 1943, foresaw that the reaction of K. Mannerheim would be rather restrained. Therefore, E. Dietl received an order for his troops to take under their responsibility a plot in the Ukhta area.
During the conference in Tehran (November 28 - December 1 1943), F. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill informed I.V. Stalin, that they would like Finland to withdraw from the war before the Allied invasion of Western Europe planned for the spring of 1944 begins. In addition, they insisted that Finland should maintain its independence after a peace treaty was concluded. F. Roosevelt, as the representative of the only country out of three who was not at war with Finland, suggested trying to convince the Finns to appeal to the anti-Hitler coalition for a truce. I.V. Stalin remarked that in the light of the attempts of the Finns to probe the ground for the conclusion of peace, the Soviet Union does not have plans against the independence of Finland. At the same time, he added that the Soviet Union would require the restoration of the 1940 border. In addition, the Finns would have to cede Pechenga to Russians (the old Russian Pechenga was donated to Finland by Lenin’s government in 1920 and renamed Petsamo) and pay substantial reparation. February 6 February 200 Soviet aircraft bombed Helsinki.
The next day, the US State Department sent a note to the Finnish government stating that the longer Finland continues to participate in the war, the harder it will be for the terms of the peace treaty. On 8, a large editorial was published in the Soviet newspaper Izvestia. There, the question of a possible Soviet offensive against Helsinki was considered, and it was directly indicated that the Russians had more than enough strength for that. 10 February the text of the American note was published in Finnish newspapers. In the same place, in editorial articles, the view was almost unanimously in favor of looking for ways to make peace. That night, 150 Soviet bombers raided the Finnish city of Kotka. On February 12, the Finnish government sent the former Prime Minister and the last ambassador to the Soviet Union, Dr. Y. Paasikivi, to Stockholm, where the Soviet ambassador to Sweden, A.M. Kollontai was supposed to give him the conditions put forward by the Soviet side for the conclusion of peace.
The negotiations that began in Stockholm and the desperate situation in which the Army Group “North” fell, made the Germans think about how to maintain control of the Baltic Sea. As a result of the loss of Narva, the blockade of the Soviet Baltic fleet was greatly weakened. The Soviet-Finnish truce could knock out all remaining pillars from under German strategy in the Baltic. If Sursari Island (Hogland Island) and the Hanko Peninsula become neutral or fall into the hands of the Russians, they will no longer play the role of a cork that clogged Soviet warships in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. In addition, the enemy’s possible control over the Åland Islands made it possible to block the supply of iron ore from the Swedish island of Luleå. As soon as the Soviet navy can reach the open spaces of the Baltic Sea, the Germans will lose the opportunity to train their submariners there, which, in turn, will ultimately decide the fate of the German submarine fleet.
February 16 Hitler issued an order to occupy the island of Sursari and the Aland Islands in the event of a change in the Finnish policy. OKW began planning operations with code names Tanne West (Åland Islands) and Tanne Ost (Gogland Island - Sursari). The 416 Infantry Division deployed in Denmark and the Parachute Regiment were involved in the Tanne West operation. The seizure of the island of Gogland was to be carried out by the forces of the Army Group North. It was assumed that the Finnish troops at the same time provide no resistance. The overall management of the Tanne operations was entrusted to the RCC.
At the same time, the command of the 20 Mountain Army returned to the implementation of the Führer Directive No. 50 and began the development of an operation codenamed Birke. According to the Virke plan, the army offered to quickly withdraw its right flank to the line that ran from Kaaresuvanto, near the border with Sweden, to the highway leading to the Arctic Ocean, south of Ivalo. It was assumed that the maneuver troops will be carried out in two stages. At the first stage of the 36 and 18, the mountain rifle corps will retreat in the areas of Kandalaksha, Loukhi and Ukhta to Rovaniemi. East of Rovaniemi, Kemijärvi –Autinkyla’s intermediate line should have been created and maintained until the main force safely proceeded northward through Rovaniemi. At the second stage, the 36 th mountain rifle corps will be redeployed north, to a new section south of Ivalo, along the Arctic Highway, to a junction with the right flank of the 19 mountain rifle corps, the front section of which passed east and south of Pechenga. The 18 th mountain rifle corps was to retreat to the north-west, across the Rovaniemi-Shibotn road, and stop at the turn of the south-east of the border with Sweden, in the area of Kaaresuvanto.
The final version of the second phase of the operation could not be prepared in advance, because its implementation depended on the weather. In the summer, it could be carried out as envisaged by the plan. But in winter, the section of the Rovaniemi-Shibotn road on Finnish territory was impassable. Consequently, in winter, the 36 and 18 mountain hull corps would have to move north along the arctic highway. Further, the 18 th mountain corps would continue to advance to the territory of Northern Norway, and the troops of the 36 corps would be used to strengthen the line in the area of Kaaresuvanto.
The need to comply with the provisions of the Fuhrer directive No. 50 aroused deep discontent in the 20th Mountain Army. Immediately after receiving this order, the army command indicated that an attempt to keep the northern part of Finland would almost certainly be futile, since the sea route around the coast of Norway would be easily cut off, which would make it impossible to continue transporting copper-nickel concentrate from the Petsamo area as well as the rear supply of troops . When planning the operation of Birke, new difficulties emerged. The 20th Mountain Army did not have enough strength in advance to create a solid defense at the borders in the areas of Ivalo and Caaresuvanto. In addition, the Germans could not begin work there without first informing the Finnish side. The withdrawal of troops was to be carried out on just a few roads, impassable in the winter season and subjected to almost round-the-clock raids aviation the enemy in the summer. And finally, the front in Northern Finland was to be created under extremely severe weather conditions and in adverse terrain.
Finnish-Soviet negotiations were held in Stockholm for two weeks in complete secrecy. All this time, the Soviet bomber continued raids on Finnish cities. February 27 300 aircraft participated in a particularly powerful raid on Helsinki. Since 26 February, some information about the conditions that the Soviet side confronted the Finns leaked, and the 28 of the Soviet government published its requirements in full: 1) internment of the 20 mountain army either by means of the Finns themselves or with the help of Soviet troops; 2) restoring the border 1940 g .; 3) return to the Soviet side of all prisoners of war and civilian internees; 4) full or partial demobilization of the Finnish army, which was the subject of further discussion; 5) payment of reparations, the amount of which will be determined later; 6) discussion on the transfer of the Pechenga district to the Soviet Union. At the insistence of the Soviet side, points 2 and 3 concerning the border marking and the exchange of prisoners of war were to be completed before the conclusion of an armistice. 8 in March the Finnish government in a soft manner stated that these clauses are unacceptable as a precondition for an armistice. It also objected to the demand for the internment of the 20 Mountain Army, stating that its implementation is technically impossible. After the Soviet side defined March 18 as the deadline for receiving a final response from the Finns, the Finnish government rejected these terms on the 17 on the 10th, but expressed its intention to continue negotiations.
In fact, the demands of the Russians were more stringent than those of which I.V. Stalin spoke with F. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill at a conference in Tehran. Having received a refusal from the Finnish side, the Soviet government softened the tone of negotiations and a few days later announced that it intended to once again reconsider the conditions for concluding an armistice. March 26 Paasikivi and former Finnish Foreign Minister K. Enkel flew to Moscow. There, the Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov announced the new conditions, which this time fully complied with the obligations given to I.V. Stalin's allies at a conference in Tehran. In particular, the Soviet side refused to fulfill certain conditions even before the conclusion of an armistice. In addition, the Russians no longer insisted on the internment of the 20 Army.
Now the Finns simply had to remove all German units from their territory until the end of April 1944, and without the threat of "assistance" from the Soviet troops. On two points, the Soviet side adhered to strict requirements: it demanded reparations in the amount of 60 million dollars, and also insisted on the transfer of Pechenga to the Soviet Union. In exchange, the Finns returned to the Hanko peninsula, the question of renting which was one of the main reasons for the Soviet-Finnish conflict of 1939-1940.
18 April the Finnish side rejected the conditions of the Soviet side for the second time. At this time, the reason was the size of the reparations, which the Finns considered unbearable burdens for themselves. Still possessing considerable Soviet territory and not knowing the defeats of the army on the battlefield, they hoped to make peace on more favorable terms. In addition, anxiety, close to the panic that seized the population of the country in February and gave rise to the Paasikivi talks in Stockholm, gradually faded away after the troops of Army Group North had successfully withdrawn to the Panther line.
At the first stage of the negotiations, the German government kept restraint, believing that the Finns were not yet ready to make peace at any cost, and that only a list of Soviet demands would make them fearfully abandon such intentions. As the situation on the front of the Army Group North improved and the Finnish government was dissatisfied with the conditions of peace offered to it, Hitler began to put pressure on the Finns. Since March, he has reduced arms shipments to the Finns, and in early April he asked me to give K. Mannerheim that he intends to completely stop deliveries as long as there is a danger that they will surrender to the mercy of the enemy. From 13 in April, Germany stopped supplying grain to Finland, and from 18, the supply of weapons and ammunition to the Finnish troops was suspended. Officially, the Finns did not announce the introduction of an embargo. But its effect began to be felt very soon.
At the end of the month, the Chief of the General Staff of Finland was invited to the Fuhrer's headquarters. Here, for the second time after his visit to Finland, V. Keitel, A. Jodl, in a friendly tone informed him that an appropriate authoritative statement was needed, which would make it clear that the weapons supplied to the Finns would not fall into the hands of the Soviet Union. K. Mannerheim tried to reduce this to a personal letter addressed to Hitler. But he, having considered that the message was composed in an excessively cautious and diplomatic tone, refused to lift the embargo on the pretext that he did not want to supply the army with arms and ammunition, whose fighting capacity had clearly decreased.
All winter, as during the past two years, it was calm on the Finnish sector of the front. But in February, the Karelian Front began to concentrate forces on the site of the 20-th Mountain Army. By early March, the Soviet grouping in this area increased from 100 thousand to 163 thousand soldiers and officers, indicating clear preparations for a large-scale Soviet offensive, which could begin before the end of the month. Especially active preparations were made in front of the 36 section of the mountain rifle corps on both sides of the road, which led through the territory of Finland to the Gulf of Bothnia. There, the Soviet command concentrated up to two fresh divisions and four brigades that were supported by jet and barreled artillery. The right flank of the group was extended to the north-west in such a way that it formed a kind of springboard aimed at the rear of the German forward line of defense.
On March 22, the command of the 20 Mountain Army concluded that the concentration of Soviet troops was complete, and the offensive should be expected at any time. The threat of a Soviet offensive diminished as March drew to a close, and the time of spring snow melting approached. E. Dietl came to the conclusion that the Russians would go on the offensive if the Finns agreed to an armistice. In April, he proposed to conduct an operation in order to eliminate the threat on the flank of the 36 Mountain Corps and turned to K. Mannerheim for support. Marshal refused to attract the Finnish troops to the offensive, and the 20-th Mountain Army, which did not possess sufficient forces to conduct an offensive operation on its own, had to accept the fact that the tactical advantage remained in the hands of the Soviet side. Thus, the winter in this sector of the front did not bring any visible changes, but implicitly, the cooling of German-Finnish relations began to be felt.
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