Military Review

Nuclear era. Part 6

Nuclear era. Part 6


Until the beginning of the 60s of the last century, close allied relations were maintained between the USSR and the PRC, and our countries conducted close military-technical cooperation. Significant amounts of weapons were delivered from the Soviet Union to China - missile, aviation and armored vehicles. Licenses were transferred and assistance was provided in the production of the most modern models of military equipment and weapons at that time. In exchange for the USSR were: agricultural products, consumer goods, non-ferrous metals and silver.

But at the request of the Chinese leadership for the supply of nuclear weapons invariably followed an unequivocal categorical refusal. Nevertheless, it is difficult to overestimate the role of the USSR in the creation of the Chinese atomic bomb. Even taking into account the fact that the Chinese have walked on their own to go all the way to build nuclear potential, without thousands of scientists and specialists trained and trained in the Soviet Union, and without the supply of scientific and special equipment, the implementation of the Chinese nuclear project would be hardly possible. Technological and scientific documentation on issues of interest to Chinese specialists was also transferred. Until the time of exacerbation of relations between our countries, the Chinese still managed to obtain a sufficient amount of theoretical information, which allowed them to avoid many mistakes and dead ends in research.

At the end of 1956, the Third Ministry of Mechanical Engineering was created to implement the atomic program in the PRC. The turning point for the Chinese nuclear program was 1958, then, with the help of the USSR, construction of uranium enrichment plants began in Baotou, Hengyang, Jiuqiang, Lanzhou and the first Chinese experimental heavy water nuclear reactor and cyclotron were launched. Mining of uranium ore was carried out in the mines: Dapu, Chenxiang, Henshan and Shangrao. A radiochemical plant was built in Jiuquan, where plutonium extraction began. In addition to the production base, with Soviet assistance, research centers and laboratories were created, such as the Northwest Arms Development Center in Qinghai and the Beijing Institute for Nuclear Research. A railway branch was laid in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, which made it possible to create a similar testing ground of the same name northwest of the Salt Lake Lobnor. At the beginning of 60, Chinese physicists conducted more than a thousand full-scale explosive experiments, simulating and investigating the processes that occur when a nuclear charge is detonated.

In the 1960 year, due to the deterioration of bilateral relations, all Soviet specialists who worked in the Chinese nuclear program left the PRC. But by that time, most of the work on nuclear issues either entered the final stage, or advanced far enough, and the departure of Soviet consultants to their homeland did not change much.

After the end of the Korean War and the Taiwan crisis, during which the US repeatedly threatened to use an atomic bomb against China, the Chinese leadership, despite the extremely low standard of living of the population, spent enormous resources on a national nuclear program. According to the CIA, the creation of a nuclear weapon cost China $ 4,1 billion, at the rate of the beginning of the 60-s. About 900 enterprises and organizations were involved in the work on the nuclear project. Mao Zedong believed that without China’s possession of nuclear weapons, the whole world would treat China with disdain. In particular, he said: “In the current world, we cannot do without this thing, if we want it not to offend us”.

In the second half of 1964, specialists from the Jiuquan nuclear complex began assembling the first nuclear charge. The long-awaited moment for the Chinese leaders was 16 on October 1964, when an experimental nuclear charge (project “102”) based on uranium-596, 235 CT was exploded at the Lobnor test site, on a metal tower with a height of 22 meters. On the same day, State Council Premier Zhou Enlai told the Chinese people and the whole world about the successful testing of the first atomic bomb in China.

The nuclear tests in the PRC came as a surprise to the American intelligence services. According to their reports, it was not until the 1969 of the year that the appearance of the Chinese atomic bomb would be expected. However, with the forecasts on the timing of the creation of Soviet nuclear weapons, the Americans also made a mistake.

A snapshot of the test site of the first Chinese nuclear charge, taken from an American reconnaissance satellite

By the time of the first test, a quantity of fissile materials was accumulated in the PRC, sufficient to produce several more charges. Taking into account the fact that the Chinese nuclear scientists had at their disposal data on tests in the USSR and the USA, they largely followed the beaten track, which greatly facilitated and accelerated the work.

A snapshot of the test tower at the Lobnor test site, taken from an American reconnaissance satellite

In addition to the first 16 explosion of October 1964, two more charges were exploded at the Lobnor test site on the towers. At the same time, Chinese specialists managed to quickly create a sample suitable for practical use.

Google Earth snapshot: test site at Lobnor test site

14 May 1965, the first successful test of a combat model took place in Lobnor - a free-falling aerial bomb with a capacity of 35 CT. A uranium bomb dropped from a Tu-4 bomber exploded at an altitude of 500 m.

Mockups of the first Chinese nuclear bombs

Back in the 1953, 25 from the USSR was supplied by the long-range piston bombers Tu-4, which, in turn, were an unlicensed copy of the American B-29. By the middle of the 60-s, they were hopelessly outdated, but, nevertheless, the aircraft of this type were operated in China until the beginning of the 80-s. More modern carriers were the jet front bombers Harbin H-5 (copy IL-28) and long-range bombers Xian H-6 (copy Tu-16), but they could perform mainly tactical tasks. Being vulnerable to modern air defense systems, these planes did not have the range necessary for hitting strategic targets.

Just three years after the test of the first nuclear device, 17 June 1967, a successful test of a Chinese thermonuclear bomb took place, which could be used for combat purposes. This time, the H-6 jet bomber was involved in the tests. The bomb exploded at an altitude of about 3 km, the power of the explosion was 3,3 Mt. At the end of December 1968, a test of a thermonuclear charge was carried out in China for the first time, using weapons-grade plutonium.

Thus, China became the fourth in the world after the USSR, the USA and the UK possessor of thermonuclear weapons, ahead of France for more than a year. It is indicative that the time interval between the creation of the atomic and hydrogen bombs in the PRC was smaller than in other countries.

At the Chinese site Lobnor 1100 square. km total 47 test nuclear explosions were carried out. Of these: 23 explosion in the atmosphere and 24 underground. The last atmospheric test in China took place in 1980 year, further tests were performed only underground. In July, 1996, China declared a moratorium on nuclear testing and signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. But this treaty in the PRC has not yet been ratified, which leaves a loophole for further testing.

Google Earth snapshot: dips and craters at the Lobnor test site resulting from underground nuclear explosions

October 27 The 1966 of the Year in the PRC was a fairly risky test using nuclear weapons. The medium-range ballistic missile DF-2 (Dongfeng-2) was launched with a real nuclear charge of 20 CT. Having flown almost 900 km, she successfully hit a conventional target at the Lobnor test site.

Medium range ballistic missile DF-2

It is believed that when creating the liquid DF-2 MRBR, technical solutions of the Soviet P-5 rocket were used. To launch a rocket from a technical state of constant readiness, it took about 3,5 hours. Before transportation to the starting position, the missiles were stored in a concrete arch-type shelter. At the beginning of the 70-x missiles DF-2 equipped with a thermonuclear one-piece warhead power 700 CT. These missiles were deployed along the borders with the Soviet Union and Mongolia. According to the results of experimental test launches, their reliability coefficient was low - no more than 0,8, and the CSP when firing at the maximum range of 1250 km - about 3,5 km. Approximately 1979 DRF DF-70 and advanced DF-2A were on combat duty until 2.

In the first half of the 70-x, the PLA Second Artillery Corps received a single-stage MRSD DF-3 - from low-boiling LRE (oxidizer - nitric acid, fuel - kerosene), with a launch range of up to 2500 km.

At the time of the issuance of a technical project for development, the American targets in the Philippines, Clark and Subic Bay, were considered priority targets for the DF-3 missiles. But after the start of mass production, most of the BRSD was deployed along the Soviet-Chinese border.


In 1986, the production received an improved modification - DF-3A with a launch range of 2800 km (up to 4000 km with a lightweight head part). DF-3A was capable of hitting targets around 50% of the USSR. Currently, the PRC missiles DF-3 / 3А are removed from combat duty, but they are actively used in various kinds of tests created in China for early warning systems and missile defense.

Almost simultaneously with the DF-3, the so-called “Moscow missile”, the DF-4, began to arrive on combat duty. It had a lot in common with the DF-3, but was two-step. The launch range of the DF-4 BR was enough to “get” American bases in the Pacific Ocean and “sweep” the entire territory of the USSR. A missile of length 28 m and weighing more than 80000 kg, was able to hit a thermonuclear warhead with a power of 3 Mt, the target is at a distance of 4800 km.

DF-4 was the first Chinese missile to be placed in a protected mine. True, it was only kept there, before the launch the rocket was lifted by a special hydraulic lift onto the launch pad. Currently, all DF-4 removed from combat duty.

At the beginning of the 80-x, the first truly intercontinental three-stage heavy-duty ICBM DF-5 was adopted in the PRC. Asymmetric dimethylhydrazine is used as a fuel in the engines of the rocket, and nitrogen tetroxide is used as an oxidizing agent. The launch weight of the DF-5 is within 185-190 m. The missile carries a thermonuclear warhead with a capacity of up to 3 Mt, KVO at the maximum launch range - 13000 km about - 3,5 km. Objects throughout the USSR, the USA and Europe were within the reach of Chinese ICBMs.

Test run MBR DF-5

According to its characteristics, the DF-5 ICBM roughly corresponded to the Soviet intercontinental missiles of the end of the 60-s. The preparation time for the launch of the DF-5 MBR from the moment of receiving the launch command is 20 minutes. The DF-5 rockets did not become massive, in the amount of about 20 units they were placed in silo at bases in the Xuanhua and Liaoning areas.

In the second half of the 80-x, the upgraded ICF DF-5А came into service. Its main difference from the early model was the introduction of a new warhead with blocks of individual guidance (MIRVI IN). The rocket carries up to five warheads with a charge power of 350 Kt, while the launch range decreased to 11000 km. A new astronavigational guidance system is provided by the KVO around 500. According to American sources, as of the beginning of the 21st century, the People's Republic of China built around 30 DF-5A missiles, while around 20 ICBMs were on combat duty.

A characteristic feature of the Chinese mine launchers is their excellent masking on the ground and the presence of numerous false positions. It is common practice to build light props over the top of the rocket mines, which are quickly demolished by the engineering services in the process of preparing the rocket for launch. Even knowing the areas of deployment, it is almost impossible to reliably determine whether it is a false position or a real one using satellite images. This is partly due to the small number of Chinese ICBMs, and the worst protection of silos in comparison with Russian and American missile mines, which made them vulnerable in the event of a sudden “disarming strike”.

Wishing to reduce the vulnerability of their strategic nuclear forces, in the People's Republic of China, as in the USSR, they took the path of creating mobile soil complexes. At the end of the 80-x, the PLA began launching a mobile launcher with the DF-21 MRBM. The new missile system first of all entered the missile regiments armed before that DF-3, replacing old types of liquid missiles.

The DF-21 rocket, weighing 15 t, is capable of delivering a single-piece 300 ct warhead to a range of up to 1800 km. Thanks to the progress in the field of radio electronics, Chinese designers have managed to create a new, more advanced rocket control system. Because of this, the CER was reduced to 700 m, which was a very good indicator in the 80-s. Combined with a powerful warhead, such accuracy allowed to solve most strategic tasks. Placing missiles on mobile off-road launchers provides the possibility of evading DF-21 MRBM from a “disarming strike” by means of air attack, cruise and ballistic missiles.


A further development option was the DF-21С, which entered service at the start of the 2000-x. On the upgraded rocket, the QUO is reduced to 500 m, and when used in hovering the warhead of the satellite positioning signals, the KVO is 40-50 m. As reported in the Chinese media, this accuracy allows the use of missiles for non-nuclear missions. Recently, a reference to a new version of the DF-21 complex with a launch range increased to 3500 km appeared in the PRC. Chinese MRBRs are practically useless in confrontation with the United States, but they cover a significant part of the territory of Russia.

If DF-21 is in some way a Chinese conceptual analog of the Soviet Pioneer medium-range RSD-10 complex (SS-20), then the DF can be considered an analogue of the Russian mobile soil complex Topol (SS-25) with a PC-12М rocket. -31.

The creation of a solid-fuel rocket for a mobile complex has become a serious achievement for Chinese designers. Thanks to the use of solid fuel on DF-31 rockets, the pre-launch preparation time was reduced to 15-20 minutes.


The first successful launch of the DF-31 took place in the 1995 year, but the tests were difficult, emergency situations occurred repeatedly, including with human victims. Apparently, the first DF-31 were produced in small quantities and were in trial operation. Approximately 10 years ago, satellite intelligence assets recorded in the central regions of China the beginning of the construction of concrete platforms for launching mobile ICBMs. They are designed for upgraded DF-31A missile systems with a launch range of more than 11000 km. The real characteristics of this missile are unknown, but according to American experts, the DF-31A can carry a single nuclear warhead with a capacity of up to 1 Mt, or three individual targeting warheads with 20-150 power, CVT is, according to various estimates, from 100 m to 1 km . According to the characteristics of the drop mass, the DF-31А roughly corresponds to the Russian Topol ICBM. But compared to the Russian mobile soil complexes DF-31, located on an eight-axle towed chassis, seriously inferior to them in all terrain. For this reason, Chinese missile systems are able to travel only on paved roads.

Google Earth Snapshot: DF-31 Mobile ICB Launchers at the launch site in Qinghai Province

In September, 2014, a public demonstration of a new modification of the Chinese mobile missile system DF-31В took place. It is a further development of the DF-31A. In 2009, the open reference to the first mention of a new Chinese solid-fuel ICBM - DF-41. Supposedly, the DF-41 with mass-dimensional characteristics increased in comparison with other Chinese solid-fuel ICBMs is intended to replace the old DF-5 mine-based liquid missiles. According to Western experts, the new ICBM can have a launch range of up to 15000 km and carry a divided warhead containing up to 10 warheads and missile defense weapons. But, apparently, in the future, mobile soil complexes will be the basis of the strategic nuclear forces of China. It is known that the rocket bases of the DF-21 and DF-31 mobile complexes for the most part are located not far from the mountain ranges. A network of transport tunnels is equipped in these mountains, in which mobile launchers can hide from a preemptive nuclear strike. Of course, information about hundreds of kilometers of tunnels in the depths of mountains, which tens dozens of Chinese launchers roll over, most likely does not correspond to reality, but a tunnel with a length of 2-3 km with several disguised and reinforced exits for this purpose is sufficient. In this way, the strategy of “nuclear retaliation” is being implemented in the PRC. At present, the Chinese strategic nuclear forces are not capable of implementing counter-onslaught, but, according to the Chinese defense doctrine, the launching of nuclear counter-attacks by Chinese ballistic missiles can last for about a month, as the launchers gradually withdraw from the shelters.

Chinese ballistic missile range

It is obvious that the Second Artillery Corps of the PLA largely repeats the path made in its time by the Russian Strategic Missile Forces. At the end of 2015, it became known about the test in the PRC of the DF-41 rocket in the railway-based variant. Taking into account the fact that the length of railway tracks in the People's Republic of China exceeds 120 thousand km, the creation of a combat railway missile system seems to be quite justified. In the opinion of American intelligence, China acquired documentation on the railway missile system in Ukraine, where the Molodets Soviet BZHRK with the R-23 UTTH ICBM was developed at the Dnepropetrovsk Yuzhnoye design bureau.

In addition to the secrets concerning the Soviet BZHRK, the Chinese received from Ukraine X-55 cruise missiles, which were once armed with the strategic bombers Tu-160 and Tu-95MS, based near Poltava. On the basis of the X-55 in China, its own air-launched cruise missile CJ-10A with a nuclear warhead was created.

Up to six CJ-10A cruise missiles can be hung on the upgraded H-6K long-range bomber. This aircraft has greater combat effectiveness compared with early versions of the H-6. In addition to the new avionics and electronic warfare station, the upgraded bomber received the economical Russian D-30KP-2 engines, which made it possible to increase the range from 1800 to 3000 km, and the bomb load to 12000 kg.

However, by modern standards, even the modernized H-6K is, of course, an outdated machine. In this regard, several years ago, the Chinese leadership tried to agree on the supply from Russia of supersonic Tu-22М3 bombers, but was refused. It is known that, at present, two projects of the promising long-range bomber H-8 and H-10 are being developed at once in the PRC.

So, according to the Chinese Internet community, the new Chinese bomber will look

At the beginning of the current millennium, the PRC began to form the maritime component of the nuclear triad. Prior to this, the PLA Navy had a single SSNB of the 092 Pr “Xia”, which, in fact, was in trial operation and, due to low data and reliability problems, was not involved in combat patrols. In 2013, the boat of the 092 Pr. "Xia" was retooled for testing new missiles.

SSBN pr.094 "Jin"

In 2004, the first Chinese SSBN of the new generation, 094 Jin, was put into operation. According to information published in the Chinese media, in 2011, the 6-I was launched on the account of a boat of this type. The main armament of submarines Ave 094 are 12 ballistic missiles (SLBMs) ​​JL-2 with a launch range 8 000 km. Externally, the Chinese boats of the 094 Ave are very reminiscent of Soviet SSBNs of the 667BDRM Dolphin Ave.

Snapshot of Google Earth: boat 094 Ave. in Hainan's base, the covers of the rocket mines are open

According to American data, in 2014, the Chinese SSBNs of the 094 Ave began executing combat patrols, but so far it mostly takes place on its banks under the cover of surface forces and aviation.

On Chinese ropes, construction is being carried out on SSBNs of the 096 Pr. Teng with improved stealth characteristics. It is assumed that she will be armed with 24 SLBMs with a range of up to 11000 km. Given the growing economic power of the PRC, it can be assumed that by the year 2020, the PLA Navy will have at least 8 submarine rocket carriers Ave 094 and 096, with the 100 SLBM of intercontinental range. This roughly corresponds to the number of missiles on Russian SSBNs that are on duty personnel.

Special mention deserves the Chinese tactical nuclear weapons. For a long period, the main carriers of the Chinese tactical atomic bombs with a 5-20 kt were the H-5 bombers and the Q-5 attack aircraft. Currently, these aircraft as carriers of tactical nuclear weapons replaced by fighter-bombers JH-7A and J-16.

Chinese tactical nuclear bomb power 5 CT shortly before the test explosion at the site Lobnor

Information in open sources about the Chinese "nuclear artillery" is not, but work on this topic in the PRC were certainly conducted, and it is impossible to exclude the presence of large-caliber long-range artillery "nuclear projectiles" in service with large-caliber artillery. But in the PRC, not a single major military parade is complete without the demonstration of tactical and operational-tactical missile systems.


The first such DF-11 complex with a single-stage solid-fuel rocket entered service at the end of the 80's. The 4200 kg rocket is placed on a wheeled chassis, which strongly resembles the Soviet MAZ-543. The missile is equipped with an 500-kg warhead and has a launch range of up to 300 km. The upgraded version of the DF-11A with a range of 500 km entered service in the 1999 year. The number of PLA DF-11 / 11A in the PLA is estimated at 130 launchers, most of which are located near the Taiwan Strait.

At the beginning of the 90-x another OTRK entered into service - DF-15. A solid-fuel rocket complex weighing 6200 kg capable of delivering 500 kg warhead to a range of 600 km. An eight-wheel platform is used to transport the rocket, which provides high mobility and maneuverability of the complex. By the year 2000 in the People's Republic of China, about 200 OTRK DF-15 was produced.


In 2013, the military parade demonstrated the OTRK DF-15В. The external difference between the new complex was a rocket with a modified head, strongly resembling the American MGM-31C Pershing II. In China, OTRK of the DF-15 family are considered to be analogous to the Russian Iskander OTRK.

Another Chinese tactical nuclear delivery vehicle is the DH-10 ground-based cruise missiles (CRRF). They, as well as aviation CJ-10A, are based on Soviet X-55 received from Ukraine.

Mobile PU DH-10

Adoption of the KRNB DH-10 occurred at the end of 2009. Three missiles in transport and launch containers are located on a four-axle all-terrain chassis. The same mobile launcher can be used to launch anti-ship missiles - YJ-62А with a launch range of 400 km. Thus, in the PRC there is a unified ground-based and air-based cruise missile, which, depending on the type of guidance system, is capable of striking enemy ships at a considerable distance from the coast and hitting ground targets with conventional and nuclear warheads. Most of the Chinese KRNB is located along the east coast of China, not far from Taiwan.

In addition to the listed carriers of nuclear weapons, the PRC has a number of tactical charges for torpedoes, depth charges and anti-aircraft and possibly anti-ship missiles. The total number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons of the People's Republic of China is estimated at approximately 250-300 units, it could be much larger, but so far limited by the number of carriers. In the coming 5 years, as new SSBNs and solid-propellant ICBMs with HSRP IN are commissioned, this figure may exceed 500 units. The number of Chinese tactical nuclear warheads by American intelligence is estimated at about the 300 warheads. In terms of the number of tactical nuclear weapons, the PRC is approximately at the same level as the United States and is somewhat inferior to Russia. But, unlike the Russian TNW stored mainly in the warehouses of 12 GUMO, most of the Chinese tactical charges are either installed on carriers (CR, OTR, Zour), or located in protected nuclear cellars and can be placed on carriers at any time (tactical nuclear bombs).

In the past, the production of nuclear warheads in the PRC was limited to a shortage of uranium ore. Own reserves of uranium ores in the country as of 2010 year were estimated at 48800 t, which, by Chinese standards, is clearly not enough. The situation changed in the middle of 90, when China was able to import raw materials for the nuclear industry from Africa and Central Asia.

According to Western expert estimates, the amount of plutonium obtained in the PRC to the end of 80-x was approximately 750 kg. This volume is quite enough for the production of several hundred nuclear bombs (3-5 kg of plutonium are contained in nuclear warheads). However, due to the fact that for a number of reasons, the lifespan of Chinese nuclear warheads in 70-80s was limited to 10s for years, there were relatively few warheads in service with the PRC. Production facilities allow the assembly of 70 nuclear charges per year.

In 80-90, France made a major contribution to the development of Chinese atomic energy. The CPR-1000 power reactors, first launched at the Guangdong NPP, are a China version of Areva’s CPY reactor. Plutonium is a by-product of the CPR-1000 reactors. As of November 2015, the 31 industrial nuclear reactor operated in the PRC.

At present, weapons-grade plutonium in the PRC is being produced at enterprises in Jiuquan, Gansu Province and Guangyuan Province, Sichuan Province. The exact amount of plutonium produced in the PRC is not known, but, according to estimates by the Global Security Institute (GSI), it has been obtained about 60 kg since the middle of the 2500-s. This volume is sufficient for assembling 600 warheads.

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  1. Magic archer
    Magic archer 15 January 2016 06: 21
    A good series of articles. I’ll add from myself. The Chinese in Ukraine bought documentation not only of the X-55 and BZHRK but also of the Tochka complex. The newspaper wrote in secret about this. Ukraine has always looked like a bazaar.
  2. Valery 1966
    Valery 1966 15 January 2016 07: 00
    The Chinese do not need an atomic bomb !!! If a war starts, then every Chinese, by a central radio signal, will jump from a cockroach from which a mega earthquake and mega tsunami will form !!!
  3. Valery 1966
    Valery 1966 15 January 2016 07: 03
    Then someone objected that China would prefer Russia, and agree with the United States. I doubt it, and that's why. China is well aware that any stable agreement with the United States is impossible. Americans will begin to divide them, as they have already shared a lot in the world, they are like Jews, just an even more chosen nation, and their democracy is always right, it’s in their blood, no matter what treaties there are. Therefore, China is uniting with Russia, whose sense of elbow is much better developed. Also, anyone knows that the US currency does not belong to the state. The abolition of the currency, or even some sort of crisis-schmise for laundering world money - and the United States will pull to the bottom all with whom it is tightly connected. The USA also has almost no gold left, that is, they are in fact bankrupt, so whoever owns the world banks can soon choose another pet. In the case of a quarrel between China and Russia, everyone understands that a nuclear attack cannot be avoided - China will crush a huge army of infantry, Russia with equipment and a huge space for maneuvers, and so on, in general, this will not lead to anything unless nuclear ... So they will not attack each other - they are neighbors, and a nuclear attack on each other will affect everyone. In addition, it will be easier to cover China in a nuclear winter and losses will be enormous in view of the high population density, and getting China in the first place will be much more difficult - our missile defense is not equal, and secondly, covering the entire territory is much more difficult. But the common Sino-Russian borders are phenomenal in terms of stability against any out-of-union threat, all-round defense. Russia and China can become the new and only world pole, and at the same time do not quarrel, because their interests are quite reconciled in fact, and they historically have little to do with the expansion of other states, unlike Europe or the United States, which are built on this. The psychology is different. No matter how much the West now scratches about democracy, they have always shown it in practice to others much less than the East. A.
    1. Bongo
      15 January 2016 09: 18
      Quote: Valery 1966
      Then someone objected that China would prefer Russia, and agree with the United States. I doubt it ...

      It's your right ... but the Chinese will do as they see fit. I assure you, for the most part they "love" Russians as well as Americans.
      Quote: Valery 1966
      In the case of a quarrel between China and Russia, everyone understands that in the event of an attack, a nuclear one cannot be dispensed with,

      In the event of a hypothetical conflict between the Russian Federation and the PRC, our country will most likely have to use nuclear weapons on its territory to repulse aggression in order not to provoke a large-scale nuclear strike by numerous Chinese infantry brigades in Moscow. Several years ago, at the exercises held in the Far Eastern Federal District, such a scenario was worked out.

      Fears about a "nuclear winter" are greatly exaggerated, and only Moscow is limitedly covered by the A-135 missile defense system.
      1. bootlegger
        bootlegger 15 January 2016 12: 09
        All the same, our help to China in setting up nuclear weapons in those years was correctly dosed. It was dangerous to overdo it and give them too advanced technologies. But if they were 10 years late, we would now have pro-American China stuffed with NATO bases.
      2. Vadim237
        Vadim237 15 January 2016 22: 48
        And will their ballistic missiles reach Moscow? Now the missile defense system A 135 can shoot down 41 warheads of ICBMs.
    2. Fat
      Fat 15 January 2016 16: 38
      I agree with you. The strategic interests of the PRC and the Russian Federation are in the same sector - the containment of the USA. Periodically, the PRC leadership makes attempts to "teach" its neighbors, India, the USSR (Tamansky Island). Vietnam ... from the famous, but soon enough everything returns to normal. When Taiwan and the PRC find a consensus, then the world will cease to be "unipolar" again.
  4. Zaurbek
    Zaurbek 15 January 2016 09: 59
    In China, the population is concentrated along the coastal line, as are industrial centers. They are also very vulnerable to massive nuclear weapons. China may not survive our blow.
    1. Bongo
      15 January 2016 10: 16
      Quote: Zaurbek
      China may not survive our blow.

      Like us them ... belay
      1. Vadim237
        Vadim237 15 January 2016 22: 52
        China has little ICBMs, and our anti-aircraft defense will cope with the ballistic missile defense — our strike on China will be 5 times more powerful than them on us, and the Chinese understand this very well.
  5. Mountain shooter
    Mountain shooter 15 January 2016 13: 05
    China - will not attack Russia. But the falling one will push. He will not give a helping hand. In the Great Chinese mentality, all - who are not Chinese - are subhuman. Alien and barbarian - in Chinese - synonyms. Therefore, while we are strong and self-sufficient, they will reckon with us. It is worth stumbling - beware ...
    1. Mordvin 3
      Mordvin 3 16 January 2016 00: 23
      I also studied the history of China a little, and I realized that they consider themselves to be civilization, and all the rest as moral monsters. I didn’t believe it. My disbelief continued until I rolled over to a pretty Chinese woman. As she looked at me, her fists still itch.
  6. antiexpert
    antiexpert 15 January 2016 15: 05
    photographer Chelyabinsk monument Kurchatov

    few people notice how the transfer of nuclear technology from the USSR to China took place.
    Stalin was a consistent opponent of the transfer of any secrets, and only Khrushchev began to do this, and hypocrisy should be appreciated - in words Khrushchev was an adversary of China, and in his affairs it was he who organized and conducted the operation of technology transfer and training a huge number of personnel.
    It was the same with North Korea.
    1. Fat
      Fat 15 January 2016 18: 35
      There is no need to deny the Stalinist administration such a trifle as hypocrisy (even insulting). Even my father (1922-1993, fought in Stalingrad, 62, later the 8th Guards Army) spoke about the transfer of technology to the Chinese: "They refused, but they helped - well done, that's the way to do it," and otherwise he scolded Khrushchev with bad words ... We did it right, yes! And in a timely manner. And Mao asked for something ready, I think there would be an opportunity - they would give it.
      1. antiexpert
        antiexpert 16 January 2016 13: 45
        You have voiced an interesting conclusion: Throughout the history of China, there is not a single example where China benefited from cooperation except one. This is a real friendship with the USSR. Nuclear weapons (and many other nishtyaks) are a real example of this relationship. And, a very funny thesis is given here - it is nuclear weapons that are the basis of today's China phenomenon. Or who will object? Would the Anglo-Saxons clatter with China if the latter did not have, even fake, but nuclear weapons? Dear tea drinkers, tell me, aren't the Anglo-Saxons used to taking for free where you can not pay? So it turns out that all (very dubious) prosperity of China rests solely at the expense of its primitive, backward, but nevertheless - nuclear weapons, a gift of the USSR that was unheard of in its generosity.
  7. Gormenghast
    Gormenghast 15 January 2016 15: 50
    Interesting, after all. Shorter-range missiles, medium-range missiles, ground-based cruise missiles, weapons-grade plutonium reactors. In Russia, all this is prohibited and eliminated. There is still a question regarding the reasonableness of various restrictive agreements in the field of nuclear weapons.
  8. ivanovbg
    ivanovbg 15 January 2016 18: 31
    An excellent series of articles, many thanks to the author!
  9. zyablik.olga
    zyablik.olga 16 January 2016 06: 27
    With the current state of the armed forces, the PRC can afford to declare the refusal of the first use of nuclear weapons. Now no one would think to attack China. Russia, on the contrary, cannot do without nuclear weapons now.
  10. Old26
    Old26 16 January 2016 10: 42
    Quote: Vadim237
    and our air defense will cope with the ballistic missile defense

    And we have a lot of air defense systems that can intercept the Chinese anti-aircraft missile systems?

    Sergei! An excellent series of articles. Thanks. And once again you are convinced how "closed" in terms of information the East is for us. We know more about American, French, English, even about our nuclear weapons than about the same Chinese, Pakistani or Indian nuclear weapons
    1. Bongo
      16 January 2016 11: 01
      Quote: Old26
      Sergey! Great series of articles. Thanks.

      Thank you!
      Quote: Vadim237
      China has little ICBMs, but our anti-aircraft defense will cope

      There’s nothing to comment on ... fool
      Quote: Old26
      And once again you are convinced how "closed" in terms of information the East is for us. We know more about American, French, English, even about our nuclear weapons than about the same Chinese, Pakistani or Indian nuclear weapons

      This is for sure, however, something appears on English-language sites and in the open reports of Western intelligence services ...
  11. opus
    opus 16 January 2016 13: 19
    Quote: Bongo
    Weapon-grade plutonium in the PRC produce at enterprises in Jiuquan, Gansu and Guangyuan, Sichuan.

    Is it?
    1.China stop it completelyl production weapons grade plutonium (in my opinion in 2010 or 2011), but its accumulated reserves are unknown
    "concerned" wrote the same about it


    2.China launched experienced a plant for the extraction of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel elements of a nuclear power plant, as well as a breeder fast neutron reactor capable of producing plutonium (negotiations are also ongoing with Russia on the purchase of two more such reactors)
    Quote: Bongo
    This is a Chinese version of Areva’s French CPY reactor. A byproduct of the CPR-1000 reactors is plutonium.

    Project CPR-1000 is a pressurized water-water reactor, a clone of the French project M310.
    CPY series, with layouts CP1 (common engine room for two reactors) and layout CP2 (separate engine room for each reactor)

    In France, CP2, in China CP1.
    but it doesn’t matter .. Such are the majority in the world (Fukushima is the same)
    However, this is NOTHING about:
    Plutonium is formed in any nuclear reactor, working on natural or low enriched uraniumcontaining mainly the 238U isotope when it captures excess neutrons .....
    Only here is the "trouble": 239Pu (weapon-grade) cannot be "taken out" from the reactor. It "burns out" very quickly to: 240Pu, 241Pu and 242Pu.
    And although nuclear explosive devices from "reactor" plutonium were successfully tested, however, in ammunition, where compactness, light weight, reliability and durability play an important role, exclusively specially produced weapons-grade plutonium is used. The critical mass of metallic 240Pu and 242Pu is very large, 241Pu is slightly larger than that of 239Pu. However, 242 and 241 have a significantly shorter half-life.
    In general, this is garbage, not a weapon component
    (Otherwise, France and Japan would sell arms 239Pu right and left)

    Quote: Bongo
    but so far limited by the number of carriers.

    I do not think that China ("the factory of the World") is not able to technologically, economically rivet the carriers, as much as needed (in 2014 it was infa that the production cycle of the S-300 SAM clone in China is 2,7 times LESS than ours ) ...
    The point is politics.
    The leadership of the CCP is simply wandering (because it knows the history well: its own, the world, the USSR)
    Chinese political leadership traditionally tightly controls its nuclear forces, without leaving them entirely to the care of the military. Such a policy is incompatible with the presence of a large fleet of autonomous nuclear missile carriers or a large number of launchers of ICBMs. ... Chinese nuclear warheads, in any case, officially, they are stored separately from missiles and can only be connected to them if a military threat arises.
    1. Bongo
      17 January 2016 08: 40
      Quote: opus
      Is it?

      Anton, you can discuss this topic for a long time and still each of us will remain in our opinion. wink Sources of information are indicated, maybe they are not perfect, but you cannot find 100% reliable information about the development of the Chinese nuclear industry. request
      Please send me your e-mail address, now I am working on a part of Pakistan, DPRK and others I have visited. If there is something to do, you can familiarize yourself with the draft. I'm interested in your opinion, well, you can catch outright "shoals". hi
      1. opus
        opus 18 January 2016 13: 05
        Quote: Bongo
        but you will not find 100% reliable information on the development of the Chinese nuclear industry.

        After 3 days, the Chinas will come: I’ll ask. yes
        Quote: Bongo
        Please give me your email address,

        threw off
  12. Old26
    Old26 16 January 2016 19: 13
    Quote: Bongo
    This is for sure, however, something appears on English-language sites and in the open reports of Western intelligence services ...

    Exactly, something. By the way, Sergey! Marking on Chinese bombs - in particular A2923 and N639-23 / or 11639-23 (XZ) mean something, do not know?
    1. Bongo
      17 January 2016 08: 33
      Quote: Old26
      Exactly, something. By the way, Sergey! Marking on Chinese bombs - in particular A2923 and N639-23 / or 11639-23 (XZ) mean something, do not know?

      Apparently these are purely conventional abbreviations for uranium and plutonium bombs; I did not find exact information on this topic request So the first exploded experimental nuclear charge was designated as the project or Type "596".
  13. Fat
    Fat 17 January 2016 04: 25
    Quote: Gormengast
    Interesting, after all. Shorter-range missiles, medium-range missiles, ground-based cruise missiles, weapons-grade plutonium reactors. In Russia, all this is prohibited and eliminated. There is still a question regarding the reasonableness of various restrictive agreements in the field of nuclear weapons.

    Beloyarsk NPP. The BN-6oo reactor (on fast neutrons - "breeder"), in addition to electricity, reproduces Pu-239 (+ 20-40%). In December 2013, the physical launch of the BN-800 power unit was carried out ... What a wonderful campaign about Russia - "nuclear waste disposal site" - we will not give it! And the question was - what was given, we will take it. So the "progressive community" and prevented ... Apparently, unsuccessfully. wink
  14. Old26
    Old26 17 January 2016 15: 33
    Quote: Bongo
    Apparently these are purely conventional abbreviations denoting uranium and plutonium bombs, I did not find exact information on this topic. So the first exploded experimental nuclear charge was designated as Project or Type “596”.

    Thank you, Sergey. I roughly assumed that this is something not directly related to Chinese ammunition. The project number is probably the only thing that is known. The rest is "terra incognito"
  15. voyaka uh
    voyaka uh 19 January 2016 12: 24
    With China Strengthening Treaty Revisions Inevitable
    on the limitation of nuclear weapons between Russia and the United States.
    It is necessary to include China in the negotiations. Otherwise they will
    big trouble. Against China, Russia needs
    hold a special nuclear deterrence group. The best thing
    for this would be suitable BDSD, which are prohibited by contract.
    But Americans will probably understand if you agree that
    such missiles will be only in Asia beyond the Urals, preferably on one
    large base and with monitoring.