Programmed rout

Defeat in a war or defeat at some time during the war often has an explanation. As a rule, the head of state, defense industry, foreign policy, military leadership, etc. can be guilty here. This article deals with completely unexplained actions or inactions of the military leadership of the Red Army in the pre-war period, that is, since March 1939. But before proceeding to the presentation of these actions or inactions, let us briefly recall some of the main military-political events of the two pre-war years.

HITLER ALL DECEIVED

March 1939 should be considered as an important starting point. This month, Hitler deceived his partners in the autumn negotiations in Munich and occupied the Czech Republic. In contrast to the lands previously annexed to Germany, Hitler first occupied the territory with a non-German population, and also very important geopolitically and economically. The leaders of Great Britain and France realized that they were thrown in Munich, as they say now, and began to take emergency measures. Britain immediately introduced universal military duty, and France immediately increased the service life of conscription. The situation in the world began to quickly heat up. That same spring, fascism won the Spanish Civil War.

The Soviet Union also realized that the time had come for decisive action to strengthen the country's defense. Purges, arrests and executions in the country has become much less. Began a rapid increase in the size of the army. At the same time, Stalin began to pursue an active foreign policy. In the summer of 1939, a very successful, albeit risky, military campaign was conducted against the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol.

On September 1, 1939, after attacking Poland, Germany launched World War II. On the same day, we are adopting a new law on universal conscription. And on September 17, the Red Army troops begin the liberation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, or, as others believe, the occupation of the eastern regions of Poland. The main thing is not in terms, but that it was a necessary military-political decision, even from Churchill's point of view. The next year, the USSR managed to get 1940 in time, that is, before the onset of the spring thaw, to end the war with Finland, and then, taking advantage of the situation, that is, Germany’s defeat of France, join the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.

Unprecedented attention in these years, Stalin pays designers and manufacturers weapons. And a completely backward economically country creates and launches quite decent main types of weapons, although they are still very raw. Commanders who distinguished themselves in combat conditions are appointed to high command positions. The defense industry of the country goes to martial law.

In 1941, events in Europe also developed rapidly. Germany invades Greece and Yugoslavia. At this time, Russia was conducting a partial and covert mobilization, as a result of which nearly 800 thousand reservists were drafted into the army. In the second half of May, a strategic regrouping of the Red Army began - over 40 divisions moved or prepared to move to the western borders of the country, new divisions and brigades quickly formed. Stalin’s diplomatic efforts were not in vain. In the spring of 1941, a non-aggression pact was concluded with Japan, and the likelihood of war in the Far East declined sharply. Finally, in the last days before the war, many divisions made hidden marches to the border, the headquarters of the border districts moved to front-line command posts, in many divisions in Tanks loaded ammunition and fuel, and aviation preparing for dispersal at field airfields. It seemed that everything was right in the country before the war. Then what is the reason for the heavy defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, and who is to blame?

The answer is unequivocal. The military leadership of the Red Army is to blame for it. It made many difficult-to-explain decisions before the war. That's about these solutions, large and not very, and will be discussed. No wonder they say that the devil is in the details and that the main thing can be determined from these details. Including determine the causes of the defeat of the Red Army at the beginning of the war. Below is a list of only some, large and small, but completely inexplicable actions or omissions of the military leadership of the Red Army before the war. So, let's begin.

Misunderstandings with tanks

In the Belarusian Special Military District, the 6 th mechanized corps was the main attack force. It consisted of over 1000 tanks, including 114 heavy tanks KV-1 and 238 medium tanks T-34. The corps was stationed in the Belostok ridge, that is, in the border bag. According to the terrain conditions, heavy 50-ton tanks KV and 28-ton T-34, due to their mass, could hardly attack anywhere. Unless to the northeast, and that at engineering preparation on a number of small small rivers. Why was the strike force of the Red Army deployed in a border bag, surrounded by swamps and rivers? As a result, the 6 th mechanized corps was actually shot by enemy aircraft and artillery in a few days. A lot of incomprehensible was in the dislocation of other parts of the district. So, there were almost no military units near the bridges across the Neman, that is, in 20 km from the border. Naturally, the bridges were captured on the first day of the war. By the way, it’s not the commanders of the military districts that are to blame for the choice of locations for military units, as is often the case here. The deployment of any part of the claimed General Headquarters of the Red Army and the Commissar of Defense.

It is interesting to look at the tank composition of some divisions stationed, for example, in the Kiev Special Military District. The 10 Tank Division included the following tanks: 63 tank KV, 38 tanks T-34, 61 tank T-28, 181 tank BT, and 22 tank T-26. The 8 Tank Division had 50 KV tanks, 140 T-34 tanks, 68 T-28 tanks, 31 BT tanks and 36 T-26 tanks. In the 43 Tank Division - 5 KV tanks, 2 T-34 tanks and X-NUMX T-230 tanks. In the 26 Tank Division - 4 tank KV-31 (with 2-mm cannon, weight tank 152 tons), 55 light tank T-383 and one tanketka T-26. And this is without taking into account the various modifications of the T-37 and BT tanks.

To which bridge and how many kilometers can heavy and light tanks pass? And how can this divisional tank kaleidoscope be maintained at all? Can anyone understand the logic of military leaders when bundling tank divisions? At the same time, crew training was mainly conducted in combat units, and not in training centers. It is no secret that at the beginning of the war, due to the difficulties with the maintenance of completely different types of tanks and the unpreparedness of crews, armored vehicles were lost in the divisions much more than from enemy fire. By the way, even the cases of refueling of tank diesel engines with gasoline were not very rare. It is completely obvious that before the war tanks were delivered to the troops in an absolutely chaotic and completely illogical manner. And an indirect confirmation of this fact is that already on the third day of the war, government decree No. 1749-756 was issued, which established the order for sending tanks and armored vehicles to the front only as part of "formed, manned and collectively mouths".

One more thing. In the Red Army in the summer of 1940, 20 tank divisions were formed. And 40 tank units 20 motorized divisions began to form in the spring of the year 1941. I wonder where the military leaders were going to get tanks and other equipment to actually simultaneously form the 60 new tank and motorized divisions? Only tanks needed to release at least 10 thousand units. Naturally, the equipment and combat capability of a large number of divisions created in 1941 was, to put it mildly, extremely low. Moreover, many new divisions were formed at the expense of a sharp weakening of the relatively efficient tank divisions created earlier.

AVIATION TRADE AND SHORTAGE OF AIRCRAFT

For a variety of reasons, the numerous Red Army tank forces were unable at the initial stage of the war to give a fitting rebuff to the enemy. 1940 Photo of the Year

An interesting situation occurred before the war and in aviation. This is what General Sandalov, Chief of Staff of the 4 Army, writes in his memoirs about a trip to military units of the 21 district in June 1941 of the year. He reports that the air regiment in Pruzhany received two new MiG fighters two days ago, and the rest of the fighters in the regiment are old, that 20 June unloaded the dismantled Yak-20 fighters from the echelon 1 and that the first two Il-2 received in the assault regiment. Each piece arrived and disassembled in the troops and other types of aircraft. Interestingly, did the specialists in engines, mechanics or electrics of these new airplanes come with two MiGs or two Elahs? Or were the military technicians so qualified that they could properly prepare the aircraft of a new design for a combat flight, and did the pilots fly confidently at once? It is also interesting, were there pilots who had already flown MiGs or Ilahs in the border regiments? Judging by the memoirs of Pokryshkin, there were almost no such pilots. It seemed that problems with the development of new aircraft should not be. They prepared a squadron in the training regiment for flights on new aircraft, and she departed to the combat unit with her technicians, means of support, etc. But the command of the Red Army Air Force, obviously, had its own very original method of training the flight personnel.

On the same trip, that is, 21 June 1941, General Sandalov learned from the commander of the air defense district, Colonel Belov, that all his anti-aircraft units were under fire in Minsk and cover neither the army headquarters, nor the mechanized corps headquarters, nor Aircraft on the ground there is nothing. Note that in the last days before the war, in the border districts, including in the Western District, a number of divisions were advanced by night marches towards the border, in secrecy, the headquarters of the border districts urgently moved to front field command posts, loaded ammunition and fuel into tanks. And at the same time, all the anti-aircraft units of the Western District are on firing somewhere near Minsk.

We go further. Before the war, in the divisions of the Red Army, there should be an anti-aircraft division consisting of eight anti-aircraft guns of caliber 37 mm and four anti-aircraft guns of caliber 76 mm. And even such units with a small number of guns were by no means in all divisions. In fact, the divisions did not have air defense weapons. As a result, the Red Army, first of all its tank and motorized divisions, suffered huge losses from air strikes, especially from Yu-87 dive bombers. But large-caliber anti-aircraft guns DShK, by the way, very effective in the fight against Yu-87, were created in the 1938 year, adopted by the 1939 year and launched in the 1940 year ... in small-scale production. Before 22 June 1941, they were released about 2 thousand. In addition, these machine guns were not in those parts where they should be in the first place, that is, in tank and motorized divisions. By the way, the Germans considered the DShK machine guns to be a very valuable trophy and adopted it.

Record non-stop flights of Stalin falcons to the Far East and America, of course, raised the prestige of the country. But the long-range, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft in our country have not been created until the end of the war. By the way, German high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, even in the summer of 1943, flew with impunity over Moscow.

Another example.

At the beginning of the 1937, after testing the prototypes, it became clear that it was urgent to put an 76-mm cannon on the BT tanks, and on the base of the T-26 tank it was convenient to produce self-propelled artillery units. At the same time, the driving characteristics of the tanks almost did not deteriorate. And in the same year, these machines launched ... in a single production. Before the war, they released all 30 self-propelled guns based on T-26 and 130 BT-7 tanks, that is, with an 76-mm cannon. As a result, about 15 thousand BT and T-26 tanks with 45-mm guns and anti-bullet armor in combat were ineffective against the German medium tanks T-3 and T-4, and are also defenseless even from the fire of light 37-mm field guns. Not so many chances for BT and T-26 in battle and against light tanks 38 (t) and T-2, which had thicker frontal armor.

Large forces and funds were spent in the Soviet Union on the creation and serial production of multi-turbo tanks T-35 and T-28. They were released even in 1940 year, in total more than 600 pieces. Although the question of effectiveness in the battle of such mastodons was clearly resolved at the end of the First World War.

Another interesting fact is that, as you know, anti-tank guns were created in the First World War and then proved themselves well. In our country, such guns were developed three years before the outbreak of the war, but they were launched into mass production only after the war began.

The problem was in part of the weapons of the Red Army small arms. By the beginning of the war the main small arms were the Mosin rifle and the Maxim machine gun. But after all, these types of weapons were created 50 years ago and became obsolete even in the First World War. Since the end of the 20s, various new types of small arms have been chaotically developed and released in small batches in the country, but before the war the Red Army had almost no new weapons. Naturally, urgently launched into mass production machines, light machine guns, etc. had a number of serious flaws. And the military leadership of the country, which even in such a very simple matter could not decide in time, is to blame for the situation.

DOWNLOAD END OF LINKOROMANIA

In the middle of the 30-s, Soviet leaders decided to create a powerful fleet. From October 1935 to January 1941, 13 cruisers were under construction right away. Construction proceeded very slowly, and by the beginning of the war only four cruisers were built. Two more cruisers at the end of the war were completed in the Far East. Despite the obvious unpreparedness of the shipbuilding industry to build even cruisers, at the end of the 30-s, the Soviet Union decided to build more powerful ships. Four battleships and two heavy cruisers were laid at once. At the same time, for the entire Soviet time in the country at the time of the laying out of the battleships, only one light cruiser, the Kirov, was built, and even that was built according to Italian documentation.

But what should we build a battleship! At the end of the 30s, thousands of specialists worked on a heavy, and not really necessary for the country program for the construction of cruisers, as well as on a completely unnecessary program for the construction of battleships. By the beginning of the war, tens of thousands of tons of armored steel had gone only to fragments of cruiser and battleship corps. Huge funds and efforts of thousands of specialists were spent on the creation of main caliber guns, powerful power plants, various tests, etc. And the problems in the army and on navy at that time without battleships and cruisers was enough. It is possible that the construction of a powerful fleet is Stalin's whim. But the leadership of the Navy, it seems, also dreamed of cranes, that is, of battleships.

And here are two more interesting facts that happened in the first half of October, 1941, which are mentioned by General Lelushenko in his book “Moscow – Stalingrad – Berlin – Prague”. He writes that in the motorcycle regiment, standing in the city of Noginsk, there was one tank T-34. There were no tanks in any motorcycle regiment of the Red Army. Not supposed to have such regiments of tanks in the state. And in this regiment was a tank T-34. I wonder how he got there? Also, General Lelushenko reports in his memoirs that, on his initiative, in early October 1941 of the year at the Mozhaysky range, his assistants found 16 T-28 tanks, i.e. tanks with an 76-mm gun, but without engines. Lelyushenko obviously went to this range more than once and knew about the state of affairs there. Interestingly, how many non-powered tanks were at that time at different ranges of the Red Army?

With the role of cavalry, all the leading European countries were already determined in the middle of the First World War. After that war, cavalry in the European armies was virtually gone. In the fall of 1939, the war in Poland again clearly confirmed the conclusions of the First World War. And what did our military leaders have been waiting for for almost two years? True, several cavalry divisions were disbanded, and several more were reformed, or rather, renamed ... mountain cavalry! Still, at the beginning of the war in the Red Army there were at least seven cavalry divisions in the border districts alone.

However, there were problems with another kind of troops. Thus, in the Red Army in the prewar year, they managed to form five airborne corps and a number of separate airborne units. That is all in all the Airborne Forces had over 60 battalions. And the entire military transport aviation of the country in 1941 could lift two battalions in one flight at best. As a result, at the beginning of the war, most of the landing corps of the Red Army fought as light rifle units, that is, virtually without artillery, mortars, etc. Upstairs, it was obviously decided that heavy weapons are not necessary for brave soldiers.

LESSON OF MILITARY GEOGRAPHY

The right bank of the Western Dvina River, as is known, was a serious and well-prepared defensive line in the First World War. There were even rokadnye railways and highways. It is obvious that at the main bridges across this river the Red Army was obliged to place at least a few units to cover them. But by 22 June 1941, on the banks of the Western Dvina, many bridges had virtually no military units. Upstairs probably believed that the Red Army would have time to cover the bridges. Miscalculated. Bridges across the Western Dvina at Jekabpils and Dvinsk (Daugavpils), the German troops took the run. But in the Baltic Military District on the eve of the war there were 26 divisions.

In the Kiev Military District, the direction from the border protrusion in the Ustyluh-Sokal area, that is, the shortest direction to Kiev, was covered by relatively weak forces of the Red Army. It is not surprising that the Germans here struck the main blow, tearing the front into two parts. I wonder where the Red Army expected the brunt of the Germans? Through the Carpathians or through the marshes of the Pripyat River?

The list of unexplained actions or omissions of the high command of the Red Army in the development and production of weapons, in the staffing of divisions with personnel and equipment, in the placement of units in border districts, etc. You can, of course, continue. And immediately recall the law on the transition of quantity into quality, the phrase "obvious - incredible", etc. Of course, there were quite a few miscalculations in the German army before the war. But inexplicable actions or omissions in military construction are hard to find.

When considering the failures of the Red Army in the initial period of the war, attention is often drawn primarily to the mistakes of Stalin. Of course, Stalin had both operational, and military-industrial, and other mistakes. There were monstrous repression. Serious miscalculations were also made by the leaders and designers of the country's defense industry. And in the initial period of the war, the leadership of the Red Army also made many operational mistakes, including difficult to explain. But, nevertheless, in the defeats of the Red Army in the initial period of the war with Germany, the guilty party was above all the top military leadership of the country, which, even before the start of the war, was distinguished by its "inexplicable actions or inactions." Stalin, who in the prewar period did not actually control the activities of senior military leaders on purely military issues, was also to blame.

There is, if I am not mistaken, an ancient Roman proverb, the meaning of which lies in the fact that, starting a war, you need not only to succeed in it, but it is important that the enemy do foolish things. Yes, the German army in the summer of 1941, was very strong. But the leadership of the Red Army also “distinguished”. The Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff, the commanders of the districts and other responsible military ranks are obliged to form, deploy, train and arm the army in accordance with common sense, and not according to their own departmental concepts. Unfortunately, the leadership of the Red Army succeeded more in its inexplicable actions or inactions before the war. In any case, do not make the military leadership a multitude of inexplicable prewar mistakes, the Red Army, perhaps, could have stopped the enemy on the Western Dvina-Dnieper line by the winter of 1941.

And further. In the military department of our country and before the war with Germany, inexplicable actions or inactions were committed. And there were a lot of them. Such examples can be found in stories Crimean War, and in the history of the Russian-Japanese War, and in the history of the First World War. But even now the times have not changed much. More recently, a few years ago, we witnessed further unexplained actions or omissions in the Russian army and the subsequent emergency removal of the country's defense minister. The question now is how long the army will be built in the right direction.

Comments

[Andrey Yuryevich]

mmmda ... Author Igor Perov, just a design engineer, but undertook to judge the military policy of the USSR, and it was extremely derogatory. Everything is wrong, everything is bad, mediocrity, traitors ... and the ships are not the same, and there are a lot of tanks and everything is wrong ... I would rather be engaged in my own business-design, but would not go into analytics. Not yours ...

[mark1]

The author is confused in something, but on the whole the train of thought is correct and historical parallels are very appropriate.

[Vladimir.z.]

Quote: mark1

The author is confused in something, but on the whole the train of thought is correct and historical parallels are very appropriate.

Now everyone here is smart, but how would he behave at that time ...

[mark1]

Quote: Vladimir.z.

Now everyone here is smart, but how would he behave at that time.

I want to believe that with grenades on the tanks. And how would you behave?

[captain]

You can agree with the author, you can not, but the person expressed his opinion. He is outraged by the operational formation of our troops in the Western theater of operations. And before the war, in January 1941, Zhukov was our chief of staff (he hosted the Victory Parade), before him the same future Marshal Meretskov was in charge. Zhukov could not determine the direction of the main attack of the Germans. Judging by the operational structure of the troops, we did not prepare to defend at all. Those who studied at the Frunze Academy remember Triandafilov and his theory of deep operation. We did not prepare to defend ourselves, so our mechanized corps ended up in "inconvenient places" in the author's opinion. We were preparing to attack and crush the enemy on his territory. Therefore, the airfields were near the border and, for example, a large number of troops were concentrated in the Bialystok ledge, which were surrounded. We did not draw a conclusion from the German offensive operations in Europe, after which the Germans reduced the number of tanks in their tank divisions and increased the number of motorized infantry. Our tank divisions were very cumbersome and poorly controlled, I'm not talking about the Mech corps (during the Second World War, at us 1031tank even tank armies did not have) You can list many mistakes and shortcomings and the author sounded a number of them. It's bad that our historians and politicians are afraid to write the truth, while the people say that they won with human blood, it's bad that our bosses do not draw conclusions and repeat these mistakes in every war. Not to be unfounded, let me remind you of the events in Afghanistan; fought in the mountains, but we did not have real mountain infantry. I myself was the commander of the 3rd mountain MRB in 177 MRP 108 MRD. Everyone in the mountains carried on themselves, the difference in armament and equipment between the regular and mountain battalions was that we had the AKS in service and the anti-tank platoon had a flamethrower squad. Spirits in Pandsher DShK and mortars were transported by mullahs, and we were transported by our soldiers. And during the war years, the Red Army included the GDS divisions and they included mountain pack units. When I, at one of the briefings before Pandsher, asked a question about the creation of mountain-pack units in mountain battalions, Colonel-General Meremskoy laughed at me. He was the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. Then there was Chechnya, and only after Chechnya did they start talking about the war in the mountains. And how many people were killed during all this time, no one will remember and will not answer for it. The most amazing thing that turns out to be the formation of mountain units in the modern army, insisted Putin personally, a man very far from the army. By the way, regarding the author's remark about the Airborne Forces before the war, he says that only two battalions could have landed by parachute at the same time. Do not be surprised, we now have 4 Airborne Forces and 4 Airborne Forces, and we parachute can't even have one division. In our army, people do not like people with their own opinion, and if it is different from the opinion of the chief, then woe to that person.

[corn]

Quote: captain

Our army does not like people with their own opinions, and if it is different from the opinion of the boss, then woe to this person.

Is it only in the army? Is it only with us? Ignorance is always aggressive and inclined to pack. And it’s very difficult to go against a collective or crowd (who likes which word more). And it’s easy enough to call democracy - shit democracy, there will be no significant consequences. Try to call a tyrant a tyrant.

[16112014nk]

Well, a jester can call. And more than once!

[Uncle]

Quote: captain

we weren’t getting ready to defend ourselves

This is understandable, but why did they start to oversleep the beginning of the war? Frankly, I believe that command at all levels was completely devoid of the ability to think and make decisions. The general state of fear deprived people of a critical assessment of the situation, just to make mistakes ...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: captain

Who studied at the Frunze Academy remembers Triandafilov and his theory of deep operation

I did not study at the Frunze Academy, but I read Triandafillov. There is no theory of deep operation in his writings. The organizational structure of the tank forces according to Triandafillov is the most primitive possible (the actions of separate, purely tank formations without infantry and artillery)

Quote: captain

We did not conclude from German offensive operations in Europe, after which the Germans reduced the number of tanks in their tank divisions and increased the number of motorized infantry.

We just knew nothing about all this. According to our intelligence, Germany in the years 1940-1941 could throw 10-12 thousand tanks or even more into the USSR.
Best regards,

[ASK505]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

According to our intelligence, Germany in the years 1940-1941 could throw 10-12 thousand tanks or even more into the USSR.

It is no coincidence that Stalin did not believe such scouts worthless. According to the data cited by B. Muller-Gillebrand in his book “The German Army. 1933-1945. " Germany began the war against the Soviet Union, with 3582 tanks and assault guns on the Eastern Front. Of these, about 180 T-I, 746 T-II, 772 Pz-38 (t), 965
T-III, 439 T-IV, 230 commander and about 250 assault guns. (Together with the allies, the tank fleet totaled 3712 units).

R

[Mikado]

We also did not prepare to advance, otherwise the buildings would be brought together with a clear mission. The group at the time of the German attack was neither defensive nor offensive. The blow was inflicted on a peacetime army.
I did not like the statement about small arms that we were all armed with outdated rifles and machine guns. For some reason, the author forgets about hundreds of thousands of self-loading rifles SVT and automatic ABC (if you take the story, during the war only 2 armies were armed with large numbers of self-loading rifles - the USSR at the beginning of the war, and the United States). Yes, the weapon was more difficult to operate than the three-ruler. And the author also forgets that the main weapon of the Wehrmacht infantryman throughout the war was a rifle, or rather, a Mauser carbine.
The article is a minus.

[Scraptor]

Almost all of these SVT with cartridges for them were captured by the Germans in border warehouses, and then they fought against us ...

[Mikado]

In warehouses - not in warehouses, this is a rhetorical question ... But the Germans were struck by the abundance of self-loading in the Red Army (they could not create their own decent self-loading rifle), they put the captured rifles into their armament, and assigned their index (like PPSh). The Germans were generally distinguished by the fact that they put into service everything that goes and shoots, modernized something, for some successful captured weapons, even ammunition was fired.
As an example, pardon the verbosity, there is a wonderful old movie "Skylark". The German guns, which are being tested according to the plot, are the 7,5 cm PaK 97/38, a 75 mm French cannon, rearranged on the carriage of a 50 mm German anti-tank gun. And only these weapons were thousands.

[Scraptor]

not rhetorical at all, whoever stored them there for them ...

[Mikado]

Well, someone and part of the troops brought to the training grounds. Someone and airplanes heaped together.
I am not a supporter of conspiracy theory. The Americans at Pearl Harbor did exactly the same thing, sleepy soldiers locked in munitions, even supplied electricity to ships from the shore. A blow to an unprepared army. And the one who seizes the initiative reaps the trophies.
Was the Red Army ready to attack Hitler at 41? All supporters of this theory should only think about vehicles. I'm not saying that even by state, the mechanized corps of the Red Army were not balanced in terms of the ratio of people-tanks-other military equipment-cars-radio stations (it was hardly possible to supply such a bulk with the required number of trucks, mainly "one and a half"), but this there were no cars. They only had to be obtained by mobilization from the national economy in case of war. IMHO, all successful operations of the Red Army began in 1943, including due to the fact that the necessary amount of transport was accumulated. And his, and Lend-Lease.

[Scraptor]

So - a participant ...

The American elite had to bring the people into the war. Not one of their aircraft carriers was in the bay.

No, it wasn’t. She was unable to mobilize before the enemy, as in the WWII.
In addition, the USSR would immediately receive a war with Japan in the Far East (Anti-Comintern Pact Rome-Berlin-Tokyo).

They began in 1943 because they made enough aircraft to gain air supremacy, which was achieved in the air battle over the Kuban.
And the Allied aviation did not participate in it at all, and LL aircraft in the Soviet Air Force were 9%.

[Mikado]

Before the WWII, the army was not subject to such large-scale reforms as the Red Army since 1940.
Conclusions for the reform were made following the results of the Finnish war, after a large-scale meeting with the present Stalin. The conclusions were about the training of troops, about their supply, tactics. The conclusions were fundamentally correct.
Marshal Timoshenko was appointed People's Commissar of Defense, who showed himself in preparing the troops for the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" (including building models of fortifications and driving each battalion through them).

The troops received new equipment. But even such wonderful cars for the 41st year, like the KV and T-34, needed well-trained crews and competent service. To do this, brigades of technicians were sent from the factories, but there weren’t enough for all of them, and there were cases, for example, the T-34 engines failed due to refueling with gasoline and not diesel fuel (an example cited by the leading tank historian Svirin. He died this year , blessed memory of him!) The release technique itself after 1940 suffered from childhood diseases. For example, HF in its basic model could not be brought to a reliable state, because it is overloaded.

About the American elite ... They needed September 11th as well. But, nevertheless, a blow at Pearl Harbor was dealt to the sleeping fleet and the peacetime army.

You're right. It seems that in the 43rd everything came together: the troops and commanders gained the necessary combat experience, the aircraft achieved air superiority, the supply was established, finally, large quantities of equipment were received, there was enough ammunition (an important point - in the offensives of winter-spring 42 the year was clearly not enough, some commanders even removed 120 mm mortars from the front and took them to the rear; there weren’t any), the year itself began with a big victory, which also had great moral significance.

The Soviet Union withstood the blow of the BEST and UNBEATABLE at that time army of the world with enormous combat experience, stopped it, despite enormous casualties, and finished it off in its den.

[Scraptor]

From the Stalin purges, the state of the army improved. It was about that the distance to the west is less and the condition of roads is better, and the population density is greater.

Sep 11 on the contrary, not everyone came to the workplace in the morning ... It wouldn’t be asleep would not have had such an effect and it would have been harder to rock the Americans to fight not only for Hawaii 3,5 years (and a couple of the same islands in revenge).

All that mattered was that its own aviation appeared in sufficient numbers. Without it, modern warfare is impossible.
The victory at the beginning of the year was reached in bad weather, as the Germans counter-attacked in the Ardennes.

With heavy losses, and as soon as America did not oppose this, supplying the endless LL to the Reich strategic materials, and without even introducing a formal embargo, although there was a state of war since the end of 1941.

"If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia is winning, then we should help Germany, and thus let them kill as much as possible ..."
- Harry Truman (New York Times, 24.06.1941)

Senator, head of the federal government's armament research program emergency committee, Freemason, next US President. He also bombed Hiroshima later ...
The den wasn't quite there, actually. But it made sense too. At least what is not behind the "puddle". Japan which they trolled Russia and the USSR from 1904 to 1941, in 1945, they also took back on a leash quickly, simply by separately occupying it.

[derik1970]

you have an asterisk on uniform but you can’t understand the content of your speech, a set of words ... watch the movie Aloha, the same thing there, the characters are talking and talking, but the meaning of their conversation is unclear ...

[ASK505]

Quote: captain

Our army does not like people with their own opinions, and if it is different from the opinion of the boss, then woe to this person.

It's not just in the army. This is some kind of hereditary disease in our generals. Stalin, for example, was never able to defeat this general's mafia of liars, swindlers and careerists. After the war, about 100 generals-order bearers were under investigation until his mysterious death for their "deeds" during the war. But for Nicholas II there was a problem finding admirals for the war with Japan in 1905. And Chechnya is no exception. Titles, privileges - yes, but to die in war - no.

[fif21]

Quote: Vladimir.z.

but how would he behave at that time ...

Here is the key to the answer.

[vladimirZ]

Now I’m reading the memoirs of Chief Aviation Marshal Alexander Golovanov, before the war, a civilian, an Aeroflot pilot, a former head of the East Siberian Civil Aviation Administration, before the war, Aeroflot chief pilot.

Golovanov before the war drew attention to the fact that in the Red Army there was practically no Long-Range Aviation (ADD), the pilots of long-range bomber aviation of the Red Army for the most part did not know how to fly at night, using radio navigation equipment, on instruments used by civilian pilots in Aeroflot.
I wrote a letter to I.V. Stalin in January 1941. Stalin called Golovonov, a conversation took place, after which Golovanov, a civilian who did not even have a military rank, was offered to create military strategic aviation - ADD, practically from scratch.
In February 1941, Golovanov was appointed commander of the future 212 long-range bomber regiment, recruited from civilian pilots - the future basis of the Red Army Long-Range Aviation.
And then from the 212nd regiment, using its personnel, the 1941st long-range aviation division is created in August 81, which, due to the inability of the high command of the Air Force to use long-range aviation, is already transferred to the direct submission of the Supreme High Command Headquarters in December 1941. personally I.V. To Stalin under the name of the 3rd long-range air division of the Supreme High Command.
And in February 1942, Golovanov was appointed commander of long-range aviation (ADD) of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, a new type of troops in the Red Army, which he creates.
In February 1941 E.A. Golovanov, who did not have any rank, was immediately assigned the military rank of "lieutenant colonel" when he was appointed commander of the regiment he created, and in August 1944, he was already Chief Marshal of Aviation, Commander of Long-Range Aviation, later commander of long-range aviation of the USSR.
After the war, when the need for Golovanov A.E. passed, he is suspended from business, although in 1950 he graduated from the combined arms department of the Academy of the General Staff with a gold medal.
After the death of Stalin, in 1953, he was sent to the reserve. Since 1958, he worked as deputy chief of the Civil Aviation Research Institute for Flight Service.

Now ask yourself the question what was the highest military command of the USSR before the war?
Command, marshals and generals who did not see obvious things consciously or inability to work.

And 29 mechanized 1000-tank corps created by the Chief of the General Staff Zhukov and the people's commissar of defense Tymoshenko?
Mechanized corps, for which there were not so many tanks in the state, and those that were created, due to the large number of tanks in them, could not move normally on existing roads due to constantly arising "traffic jams". Corps, which lacked the proper number of repair and serviced vehicles, because of which the Red Army in the first days of the war lost all its tank potential.

In our history, the states objectively did not fully understand the reasons for the poor preparation of the Army for the war, the defeats of 1941-42, blamed everything on I.V. Stalin, leaving the specific culprits of the defeat - the generals and marshals, not involved in these crimes, making them "Marshals of Victory". And the fact that these are crimes, military and state, due to which millions of people died, remained even beyond the scope of a simple discussion.

[Valentine]

Since 1934, German intelligence has been eating its bread for a reason, introducing its employees into all spheres of industry, the army, including the defense industry. Stalinist repression - countermeasures
German special services, when "the forest is being cut, the chips are flying." And this "felling" gave little, in the sense of neutralizing
foreign agents, we were not ready for war in every sense of the word, neither technically nor psychologically,
although patriotism was enormous, and only thanks to him we survived.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Valentine

Since 1934, German intelligence has been eating its bread for a reason, introducing its employees into all spheres of industry, the army, including the defense industry.

I don’t know where you got it from. I strongly recommend that you read Tippelskirch, the man most directly involved in reconnaissance before the attack on the USSR.
In Germany nothing was known about the USSR. The calculation of the strength of the Red Army was done like this - they took the number of tanks, guns, machine guns. divisions of the French army, divided by the size of the French population, multiplied by the population of the USSR.

[Scraptor]

Where did you get that no? And what is your relationship with a German agent tippelskirch?
In what year were they recruited?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Scraptor

Where did you get that no?

Why not? German spies under your bed?

Quote: Scraptor

And what is your relationship with a German agent tippelskirch?

If only they would google who Tippelskirch is. Well, in the order of another educational program - since 1938, Kurt von Tippelskirch served as the head of the intelligence department of the general staff of the ground forces.

Quote: Scraptor

In what year were they recruited?

I'll tell you everything as a family. Password: "A flock of polar frogs flies to bomb the Kremlin", the secret map is in the sole of the rear right boot, and the submarine is waiting in square 243/15.

[Scraptor]

In your look. Better yourself.

You won’t send the Russian Buk there?

Say and subscribe as cute, with your hand ...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Scraptor

In your look. Better yourself.

What for? I already know that they are not there

Quote: Scraptor

You won’t send the Russian Buk there?

Where? Under the bed? In the year 1938?

Quote: Scraptor

Say and subscribe as cute, with your hand ...

Subscribe, subscribe

[Scraptor]

And your curator tippelskirch too?

In 1937.

It will be necessary for him to hit that you also work for the British, and then perhaps even ink will have to not be spent ...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Scraptor

In your look. Better yourself.

What for? I already know that they are not there

Quote: Scraptor

You won’t send the Russian Buk there?

Where? Under the bed? In the year 1938?

Quote: Scraptor

Say and subscribe as cute, with your hand ...

Subscribe, subscribe

[Uncle]

Quote: vladimirZ

leaving the specific culprits of the defeat - the generals and marshals, not involved in these crimes, making them "Marshals of Victory"

Zhukov’s talent is unconditional, at least against the background of other leaders. It was not for nothing that the IVS transferred him from one section to another, precisely because of staff shortages. And the fate of Leningrad is not known, if not Zhukov. And everyone makes mistakes. In general, as a Christian, I believe that not everything is in human hands, the Lord is creating a lot.

[go21zd45few]

Hope for God, but don’t be bad.

[pazuhinm]

extremely true. And all these minuses are the exceptional "blah blah" of our exceptional "marshals". admitting your flaws is okay. And to beat everyone with helmets is a favorite action of our star commentators in VO.

[science fiction writer]

did not go into analytics. not yours is ...

I agree, I drove the blizzard on topics where venerable historians did not put all the points over i to the end.

[Good me]

Quote: Andrey Yurievich

mmmda ... Author Igor Perov, just a design engineer

Yes, a design engineer writing:

By the beginning of the war, the main small arms were the Mosin rifle and Maxim's machine gun. But after all, these types of weapons were created 50 years ago and became obsolete back in World War I.

At the same time, the Mauser 98k rifle (kurtz, shortened), and being an "alteration" of the Mauser 98 rifle, model 1898, the Germans, for example, did not consider "obsolete" ...

You can argue a lot about the merits and demerits of a particular type of weapon, but the final point in the debate is only the experience of their use, and how the troops treated them ...

It is noteworthy that to this day "Mosinka" is kept in warehouses, "just in case" ...
And many snipers who have tested this rifle in practice, still prefer its SVD, precisely for its accuracy characteristics and incredible reliability and survivability.

Here, "junk", in a new "frame", but unfortunately not ours, but the American company Archangel Manufacturing.

[The boat]

Quote: Good Me

Here, "junk", in a new "frame", but unfortunately not ours, but the American company Archangel Manufacturing.

Come on, it doesn't mean anything. She is not armed with the National Guard) This group is engaged in modding weapons, which is quite an ordinary thing for America. They tune Mosberg, Mauser Kar98, AK, M16, SKS, and Remington. Bring arisaka - they will tune it too. This is interesting to gun fans and has nothing to do with the eternal cry "by the beginning of the war they came with a Mosin rifle and a Maxim machine gun - here we are losers!" does not have.

[Good me]

Quote: Das Boot

Come on, it doesn't mean anything. She is not armed with the National Guard) This group is engaged in modding weapons, which is quite an ordinary thing for America. They tune Mosberg, Mauser Kar98, AK, M16, SKS, and Remington. Bring arisaka - they will tune it too. This is interesting to gun fans and has nothing to do with the eternal cry "by the beginning of the war they came with a Mosin rifle and a Maxim machine gun - here we are losers!" does not have.

I have you CUTTED, you are CUT TO me ...

The thing is that even now, ballistic and other characteristics of rarity are quite consistent with modern requirements.

And the author writes about the "mosinka", that they say it is outdated already in WWI ...

[Awaz]

you need to understand that by that time the tactics and conditions of the battle have changed. Mosinka, it still might not work badly in conditions of defensive battles at long distances, but in close combat it was already inferior to the automatic pistols that the Germans successfully used, not allowing the Red Army soldiers to conduct effective retaliatory fire. Not without reason, in the end, the Red Army also switched to automatic weapons.

[The boat]

Quote: Good Me

The thing is that even now, ballistic and other characteristics of rarity are quite consistent with modern requirements.

for members of shooting clubs traveling weekend to the shooting range? Well yes, why not.

[Good me]

Quote: Das Boot

for members of shooting clubs traveling weekend to the shooting range? Well yes, why not.

You are dense ... To indecent disgrace.

Come on, enlighten:

In tests of the modern “three-ruler” at a distance of 100, m bullets fell into a circle with a diameter of 3,5 cm. But with a modern sniper rifle Dragunov, this circle ideally is 8 cm, really much more! An acceptable aiming range of 1300 m, almost a third higher than that of the army SVD! The reliability of the rifle in combat conditions was not in doubt; it was tested by two world wars. In 2000, the OC-48 sniper rifle was put into production. The OC-48 rifle is made by remaking a sniper version of the Mosin rifle. These rifles were selected after shooting from the mass of "ordinary" by accuracy.

Posted by: Mikhail Gruzdev
Source: http://shkolazhizni.ru/archive/0/n-50674/
© Shkolazhizni.ru

[The boat]

Quote: Good Me

Come on, enlighten:

So what? I think there is a lot of junk on preservation and warehouses that is waiting for its enthusiasts to remake. Anyway, the argument is about anything - it all depends on the shooter's personal preferences. About OTs - it's just marketing. Canned food with good liquidity gained a second life. Why not? Specialists are rather skeptical of OTs-48K. It’s one thing to hang the trunks of the 37-38th year with new stocks and send them to hunting stores, and the production of a full cycle for the Ministry of Internal Affairs is another thing. So my phrase

Quote: Das Boot

for members of shooting clubs traveling weekend to the shooting range? Well yes, why not.

applies to OC.

[Uncle]

Quote: Good Me

ballistic and other characteristics of a rarity, completely correspond to modern requirements

Darling, what are the "other characteristics"? WWII is the era of automatic weapons. So the dagger can be considered a modern weapon, it works the same way as 2 thousand years ago.

[Good me]

Quote: Uncle

Darling, what are the "other characteristics"

Reliability and ease of maintenance and development of drugs, for example ...

[Scraptor]

her fuse was very uncomfortable

strained more:

... and aviation was preparing for dispersal at field airfields. It seemed that everything was done right in the country before the war.

aviation was dispersed at field airfields.
someone ordered her to fly back two days before the Germans attack. zeitkas were removed from airfields for training exercises at the training grounds, weapons were removed from the aircraft for testing from some even engines ...

[23 region]

Quote: Scraptor

someone ordered her to fly back two days before the Germans attack. zeitkas were removed from airfields for training exercises at the training grounds, weapons were removed from the aircraft for testing from some even engines ...

It was so. My grandmother told me. She lived near Minsk before the war, next to the airfield. All residents and military were waiting for the war.
And when the aircraft were dismantled, they all cursed and were indignant, but there was an order. Such a time. For failure to put to the wall.
By the way, l / s were released on leave, but almost all remained in a position - they waited for it to start.
My grandmother worked in an orphanage, everything was assembled for them, and with the first bombing they set off east. True, almost all the time on foot, with a bunch of kids. Got it.

[Scraptor]

And shot, and planted. Only now it is still unknown which of the headquarters on the advanced airfields handed it out orally ... and they’ll probably try to make fun of you here (under one of such articles in August this year it already happened, but didn’t look further).

[bairat]

If the author believes that the 50-year-old Mosin rifle was inappropriate on the sidelines of the WWII, then what about our current weapons? Kalashnikov has long stepped over this anniversary. Tu95, t72 are also rooted far back in the last century. Compare this with the scale of pre-war modernization: tanks, planes, cannons, personal weapons - basically everything was no older than 10 years old, and in most cases it exceeded foreign analogues. Another thing is that they did not have time to master combat use.

[Good me]

Quote: bairat

Another thing is that they did not have time to master combat use.

I agree three times. And I will add that the rearmament program, akin to the one that was conceived and is being carried out NOW, we were not allowed to finish. "Shot down on takeoff" ...

I would like to believe that the nuclear triad, and "one more thing" as a deterrent factor, will give us the opportunity to "reshape" the army in all respects.

[The boat]

Quote: Good Me

rearmament program ... we were not allowed to finish. "Shot down on takeoff" ...

nonsense. What "takeoff" is? Mantra # 2 is after "perfidious and sudden." The Red Army possessed a sufficient arsenal to stop the Wehrmacht, which, by the way, cannot be called "rearmed" either. Before the Second World War, our tank tactics trampled on the level of Ernst Volkheim's doctrines of the 20s (Guderian looked rather pale against his background as a theoretician at that time), and already in 37, Swift Heinz voiced the doctrine of tank wedges. Why not study? The Germans also had considerable work on anti-tank defense. It was necessary to learn from an eventual opponent. AND

Quote: Good Me

"Shot down on takeoff"

- It’s quite a universal excuse for any period of our history.

[alekc75]

not enough time for rearmament

[avt]

Quote: Das Boot

Yes, come on, it does not mean anything.

We will give up, we will certainly give up. But only when you tell Az to a sinner than the actual ordinary Wehrmacht infantryman was massively armed. Jokes about the fact that, the Germans are all with machine guns, and we with the three-line "do not offer. Well, and if you also add which two countries in the World before the Second World War were massively put into service with self-loading rifles, which the engineer" did not he knows if the feverish delirium writes about rifles and machine guns, then you might want to know about the "machine gun drama" and why I had to put the MAXIM back into the series, and the three-line too.

[Good me]

Quote: avt

Jokes about the fact that "the Germans are all with machine guns, and we with the three-line" do not offer.

You're right. The myth of the general "automation" of the Wehrmacht has been debunked, as is the myth of the "three-line for five" ...

[The boat]

Quote: avt

We’ll give up, we’ll certainly give up. But only when you tell Az to the sinner than the rank and file infantryman of the Wehrmacht was massively armed

Dear, my remark was related to the American tuning of the Mosin-Nagan. Why did you drag the Wehrmacht?

Quote: avt

Jokes about the fact that, the Germans are all with machine guns, and we with the three-line "do not offer

I think it's not a shkolota gathered here, do not juggle. Although, in this thread I came across a commentary complaining that, they say, "instead of the general armament of the PPSh infantry ..." Well, these are the costs, again, of hobbies for heroic cinema. And, here, I found:

Quote: faridg7

Private Vasya Pupkin, and instead of PPSh, they stuck a mosin in his hands with the words a fool bullet, a bayonet

[avt]

Quote: Das Boot

Dear, my remark was related to the American tuning of the Mosin-Nagan.

Well, it’s possible and specifically about this modernization. What is wrong with her? Not - I didn’t hold this particular specimen in my hands, but it’s no worse than the options that Tulaks make of it, including bullpup. Convenient in contrast to the standard aglitskgo, a box with a pistol grip and an adjustable butt, a magazine from the SVD, a fuse, again, and no need to come off, well, but the barrel is simply high-quality, especially in a sniper version, which was something specific users said after real battles. The only thing I don’t know is does plastic -50 hold? If yes, then it's gorgeous. Well, and that comment is where

Quote: faridg7

the author is right about outdated designs for that period. ballistic requirements are not all that needs to be attached to infantry small arms.

What can I say? Only if you ask its author.
The author of the article, however, like you are in the know

Quote: avt

which two countries in the world before the Second World War massively used self-loading rifles

Quote: faridg7

, this is done by private Vasya Pupkin, and instead of PPSh they put a mosin in his hands with the words a fool bullet, a bayonet - well done

Yeah, but on the other hand, Hans Schmulke got an old Mauser and a wish - do you want an automatic machine gun? Take it from Vasya Pupkin.

[faridg7]

Yes, at least modernize with the mosin, and it will not be possible to create the necessary density of fire in defense, and even more so in the offensive, with its help, therefore, the author is right about the outdated samples for that period. ballistic requirements are not all that needs to be attached to infantry small arms. Yes, accurate and long-range weapons are necessary to equip snipers, but not a sniper defends and even less an offensive (he only provides support, albeit not unimportant), this is done by private Vasya Pupkin, and instead of PPSh they put a ruler with the words bullet in his hands fool, bayonet - well done

[Mikhail3]

Quote: Good Me

And many snipers who have tested this rifle in practice, still prefer its SVD, precisely for its accuracy characteristics and incredible reliability and survivability.

It's funny that you yourself answered. Yes, a good battlefield sniper. And a rather inferior rifle for mass weapons in the conditions of the Great Patriotic War. Long, heavy ... well, etc.
On this topic. If you look at the issues raised by the author not from the point of view of preparation for war, but from the point of view of the report and career growth, everything immediately becomes much clearer. As many tanks as possible! Much more! For reporting on the steady growth of the tank "population" you can always fool encouragement, promotion, and even a medal. What tanks? What's the difference? Stalin does not read all the reports, and so on top of the most such are sitting ... hot about beautiful reports.
And it looks completely different in the report "useless mouse fuss". All sorts of despicable rembats, tractors, transport, supplies. Who will award a medal for painstaking work on coordinating cruising speeds? And no one will allow this agreement to be dealt with! Because a peppy report on this subject, which is obscure to the top management, will not work. The elders simply will not understand the terms, they did not study for that.
The attitude towards "all sorts of" mechanics, engineers and technicians amusingly discerned from the mass of materials of that time. The understanding that by wounding an engineer of a tank repair plant you had an impact on the situation at the front, equal to the destruction of at least a tank regiment, this understanding did not even come close to the army leadership. Not to mention, to plan some kind of operations or bring information to subordinates.
Here Putin is an officer, albeit a scout. And Shoigu is a specialist in rescue operations, that is, first of all, as an organization of logistics schemes from scratch. And we look at the difference in the organization of the outbreak of hostilities. For example, the Finnish War and the Syrian operation. Impressive, isn't it?

[avt]

Quote: Andrey Yurievich

. Author Igor Perov, just a design engineer,

Yah!?? Really chtol? Where does infa come from? I would never have guessed after reading this

At the beginning of 1937, after testing the prototypes, it became clear that it was urgent to put a 76-mm cannon on BT tanks, and on the basis of the T-26 tank it was convenient to produce self-propelled artillery installations. At the same time, the driving performance of the tanks almost did not deteriorate.

Rather, a talker is a talker who believes that he has already been born with knowledge of everything and everyone. Where can I see real documents on the same tanks, or read collections of extracts from those who read the documents.

Quote: Andrey Yurievich

I would do better with my business-design,

And what does that design?

Quote: mark1

on the whole, the train of thought is true and historical parallels are very appropriate.

And what is actually true? In the fact that the author, knowing the result, adjusts the solution to the answer and shakes generously with shit? Well, even in this it is not original, it just gives a brief squeeze from Bushkov’s two-volume book about Stalin. And even with an aplomb of an intellectual - a carrier beyond which he knows one thing, well, genius, he teaches Putin’s campaign

And further. In the military department of our country, before the war with Germany, unexplained acts or omissions took place. And there were a lot of them. Such examples can be found in the history of the Crimean War, and in the history of the Russo-Japanese War, and in the history of the First Pestilence. But even now, times have not changed much. More recently, a few years ago, we witnessed yet another inexplicable action or inaction in the Russian army and the subsequent emergency removal of the country's defense minister. The question now is how long the army will be built in the right direction.

[mark1]

Quote: avt

Quote: mark1
on the whole, the train of thought is true and historical parallels are very appropriate.

And what is actually true?

And what is not true? Do not confuse the club of lovers of alternative history with an attempt to analyze the events of the past in order to prevent the repetition of the same mistakes in the future.

[avt]

Quote: mark1

? Do not confuse the club of lovers of alternative history with an attempt to analyze the events of the past in order to prevent the repetition of the same mistakes in the future.

AnAl from this definitely should not be confused with reality, and you, too, will spread in your thoughts without knowing the facts. Seek and find. Well, at least the minutes of the meeting of the NCO on May 9 from 1938, and then you look and still want to look for something from real documents. And who exactly on it made a proposal for a tank with a 76mm gun and at least 30mm armor. Here is the name of this "traitor" you name, then we will speculate about the "alternative history" and who exactly is gushing it here.

[pilot8878]

Quote: avt

Here is the name of this "traitor" you will name, then we will speculate about the "alternative history"

Pavlov Dmitry Grigorievich? And the article, unfortunately, is empty. Put a minus and regretted the time spent.

[avt]

Quote: pilot8878

Pavlov Dmitry Grigorievich?

And after Gishpanii in January 1938, 76mm is the smallest thing that he required from Kulik for tanks, and 107mm or 122-152mm howitzers

[pilot8878]

Quote: avt

after Gishpanii in January 1938, 76mm is the smallest thing that he demanded for Kulik for tanks

Wait, isn't it with fall 1937 he was the head of the ABTU when Koshkin issued TZ to a new wheeled-tracked tank with 20 mm armor, which later became the T-34? It’s a pity, before the war, the burden was heavy. Maybe later Katukova would have been no less famous, having gained experience of command.

[avt]

Quote: pilot8878

Wait, but wasn’t he the head of ABTU since the autumn of 1937

I don’t remember the exact date of the appointment, and I’m too lazy to look for it, but he participated in the fate of 34ki. Then there was a big argument, well, remember - to put a new tank on wheels or not, well, when Stalin ordered both options not to interfere. And minus the campaign you crept up on the author articles added.

[pilot8878]

Quote: avt

And minus the campaign, the author of the article crept up to you.

Empty, God give him health.

[varov14]

Well, right away, it’s not yours, just an excuse for a possible current headache. How not to step on the rake, not order, not ours.

[Amurets]

And the article is controversial and the comments are controversial. Probably this is good. As for the lack of weapons, I still agreed with V. Rezun. The fact is that he gives links to memoirs. How he interprets them is his business. But the fact is that the weapons depots and the equipment was indeed relocated to the Western districts of the USSR. V.N. Novikov, who became Deputy People's Commissar for Small Arms in 1941, writes in his book "On the Eve and in the Days of Testing", he organized the production of a three-line in Izhevsk, as the army did not have enough weapons Now, specifically according to the models. In 1915-16, our Great gunsmith Fedorov wandered around the world in search of weapons. So already at that time he drew attention to the density of light automatic weapons in the ranks of Russia's western allies. Fedorov, in 1912, drew attention to excessive power. cartridge of 1908 for automatic weapons and raised the question of an intermediate cartridge of a reduced caliber for automatic weapons. Yes, the rifles did not give the necessary density of fire, but at the same time, the accuracy of the battle was re-lines made and makes it an indispensable sniper weapon. New automatic and self-loading rifles were highly valued by the Germans and Finns for their relatively low weight and reliability. was not in the army. The father of my friend served in the border troops. And he said that neither the DS machine guns nor the ABC or SVT rifles refused them. Nearby in the UR they were not popular with the soldiers due to the fact that they had to be cleaned more often and And during the assault on the Japanese fortifications, they used only ABS and SVT, since having greater power and range, these rifles made it possible to solve the tasks of suppressing firing points from a safer distance than PPSh. I would like to do a more complete analysis, but let us dwell on this. There are many reasons and it is necessary to write a book to analyze these reasons. All are given arguments and they are all acceptable. But they must be combined together with the article and analyzed. Because the shortcomings of our industry are not taken into account. .Only not necessary about the heroism of the people. The people on their shoulders endured the hardest war. The mistakes were that the production of many strategically important materials was not organized in the required quantities.

[Nehist]

In many ways, I do not agree with the author; apparently, he does not have enough information about the situation in the Red Army at that time.

[Russian Uzbek]

the author has read Rezun and thinks that "tore off the veils";)

[apro]

Itself once decided to understand why the Great Patriotic War passed this way and not otherwise, it brought out for itself one miracle that we won after such defeats and losses, and this miracle was made personally by IVStalin and the CPSU (b), other explanations like the whole people, weather conditions, the best weapons, and the icons of some mother, the help of the allies, and other inventions. They simply forget what Russia was like in the last 50-70 years before the Second Great European Civil War, whose participation in this massacre did not correspond at all to the interests of the state of the peoples of Russia , Russia was a lump of contradictions of mutual distrust, backwardness, the deep Middle Ages backwardness and poverty, inability to satisfy the basic needs of the population and, as a result, passivity and betrayal. IVStalin’s errors are quite predictable, well, he couldn’t make people’s thinking yesterday comparable to European with they are no longer one generation with a nationwide education and bourgeois industrial thinking.

[Ostwest]

Tell me the skins went to the population, bast shoes were worn on holidays and lived in dugouts.
Terrible Stalin spread rot, terrorized and prevented development. Etc. Do not forget about the concentration camps.
But the fact is that just about 20 years ago, strangers came to power in the country: ovskys and German adorers. Terrorists, murderers and executioners carried out other people's plans and did it effectively, the country was on its knees. It was unlikely that anyone could overcome this plague and get completely ready for the next tests, except for Stalin. No one considered the issue of military invasion paired with that criminal interference in the life of our country in the event that something does not work out for internal enemies, as it was in the pre-war years. Unfortunately, Stalin was simply not able to cope with this multi-headed hydra, pretending to be an international friend.
There was a purge in the Army, n / a, party, top management, but unfortunately Stalin did not have the opportunities that appear in wartime.
Thank God, Stalin succeeded, won, and with him the whole nation, but the victory was very difficult, then again the Trotskyist Perlamunder (Khrushchev) came to power. Even in wartime, they were able to mimic, so that later they would again conduct their destructive work.
How many people have died since they came to power in 1917 are not calculable. None of the people could stand such a thing, but we survived and the merit in this was not only the courage, steadfastness, ingenuity of our people, but also the wisdom and vision of the Stalinist government, which is now being implemented by the Chinese successors.
The USSR was merged for a long time, in 1991, finally, a Judo affair happened.
We were lucky with Putin, but what will happen next? God forbid again some kind of fucking or tagged or corn, etc. etc.

[corn]

Quote: OstWest

but also the wisdom and vision of the Stalinist government, today implemented by the Chinese successors.

??

[corn]

Enlightened minuser.
At least a couple of insights or wisdom comrade. Stalin, which is now being implemented by Chinese successors.

[Uncle]

Quote: OstWest

The USSR was merged for a long time, in 1991, finally, a Judo affair happened.

But it seemed to me that the USSR was rotten from the inside. And yesterday was ravaged by communists into separate states.

[Mountain shooter]

The author, understand, is easy to criticize THEN when you know everything that happened and the mistakes became clear. The main thing that happened in the summer of 41 was that the soldiers of the Red Army were NOT READY for war morally. Those clashes with Japan and Finland do not count. Really rested - only in Stalingrad. Even in the battle of Moscow, the readiness of the officer corps to fight in a new way was still visible. And technology - and what is technology? When soldiers are controlled by poorly trained commanders who quickly lose touch with higher headquarters and lose initiative, the result is always disastrous. Everything - the Crimean tragedy, and the border battles, and Kharkov - all these are consequences of the moral unwillingness to stand to death in every section where you stand. It is a pity, but this readiness is given only by time and this time was not given to our army.

[mark1]

Quote: Mountain Shooter

The author, understand, is easy to criticize THEN when you know everything that happened and the mistakes became clear.

Errors must be studied and analyzed, everything has the property of repeating itself and is not necessary in the form of a comedy.

[Bayonet]

Quote: Mountain Shooter

The author, understand, is easy to criticize THEN when you know everything that happened and the mistakes became clear.

This is not a criticism, but an attempt to analyze the situation that had developed before the war. The author expressed his opinion. But answers like “Don't go in, it's not yours” cannot be called constructive. If you think otherwise, provide counter arguments. In a dispute, truth is born.

[The boat]

Quote: Bayonet

In a dispute, truth is born.

alas, on VO more often in the dispute labels are born "liberasts" and "hurray-patriots"
As for the sacred theme of the outbreak of war and the summer catastrophe, neither Soviet literature on military construction suffered from objectivity, nor does modern "experts" suffer from it. Important, IMHO, is the initial message. But with the fact that military construction was very multi-vector, and some of these vectors turned into rudimentary - I think, indisputable.

[Bayonet]

Quote: Das Boot

alas, on VO more often in the dispute labels are born "liberasts" and "hurray-patriots"

That's right - a favorite pastime.

[Belgorod]

Guys, the desire to analyze the beginning of the Second World War is commendable, but ...
And this is the whole thing. author -> author -> author (as you say) burns. My opinion: I heard a ring, but don’t know where he is
Personally, I have long studied this issue (1941), read everything that came across, searched the Internet
And now a few facts
1 In-Arms
According to the states of 1941, the German company had-, 47 pistols, 16 pistol-guns, 132 carbines, 12 manual guns. A bullet
In the company of the Red Army -104 self-loading. screw. CBT, 11 screw. Mosin, 9 carbines, 2 snipes. screw, 27 pistol-guns, 22 pistols, 2 machine tools. machine gun, 10 man. a bullet.
Interesting, huh?
The Germans have carbines, and the Unas SVT. Now screams will begin that there were no SVT in the troops. And they were. Search the Internet, and also type captured weapons in the Wehrmacht
Add SVT was released about 1,5 million units.
2 Cavleria
In the Red Army, the cavalry was of the DRAGON type, that is, the horse served as a means of transportation. There weren’t enough cars in the army, but there wasn’t any armored personnel carriers. The Red Army was able to conduct offensive operations to great depths only after the troops were saturated with American and English equipment. And the cavalry corps were disbanded to create tank armored units.
3 Tanks
Tanks is a separate song, my love. I began to study the history of the Second World War from tanks. But in short ..
In 1940, there were 9 tank corps in the Red Army, and then in 41 they began to form another 21. There are 1031 tanks in each corps. (For a march, a throw of 100 km, according to the standard, 48 hours were allotted.) Tank battalions were withdrawn from the infantry divisions. Former kovallerists were appointed commanders, and they then commanded the tanks like horses (anyone interested can go to the site "I remember" and read the memoirs of the tankers)
And believe me about tanks, I can write so many facts ...
I put a minus to the author (it’s a pity that I can’t put it very bold). Yes, it is necessary to raise the topic of the defeat of the Red Army in 1941, but do not write nonsense !!!!!

[Mikado]

According to SVT, a bunch of photos of fighters with them remained in 41-42 years. It is clear that the armament of the rifle company could be significantly different from the states you cited, but the author really wrote something wrong. In fact, the production of SVT was reduced in favor of the production of PPSh in 1941, as a necessary measure, to saturate troops with automatic weapons, but less labor-intensive and expensive to manufacture than SVT. Then, after the losses incurred, the quantity was more important.
Thank you so much for mentioning the cavalry tactics, so that no one would think that we rushed at tanks with drafts.
If we take into account the "tank disputes", I liked how Svirin and Isaev put this issue on the shelves.

[Scraptor]

And the Germans got a bunch of CBT right from the warehouses. More than 90%. In the USSR, only the Marines were massively armed with them.
On the shelves of tanks, the Germans simply knocked out Soviet aircraft concentrated by the traitor from headquarters at the main airfields, then knocked out tanker tankers remaining yueh fighter cover. Most of the tanks they got intact, intact for the development of fuel, they usually converted them into self-propelled guns.
The rout was very programmed and controlled ...

[Russian Uzbek]

"" "There are much fewer purges, arrests and executions in the country" ""
and before that, apparently, they were only doing this - they were cleaning, arresting and shooting! the author apparently desired fame Madame Aleksievich
because of such articles here I call the site "yellow"

[Petrof]

Quote: Russian Uzbek

and before that, apparently, they were only doing this - they were cleaning, arresting and shooting!

exactly
scale of repression
I read the Red Army man and the Red Navy magazine, for the thirties, and for the sake of interest on the Internet, I followed the fate of the authors of the articles and those who were written about (this is a matter of minutes) - more than half were repressed, or rather 90 percent, and these were all military.
flaunts today in a magazine - and in a month .... of that
I know the same thing from my family

[MrK]

Quote: Petrof

exactly
scale of repression
I read the Red Army man and the Red Navy magazine, for the thirties, and for the sake of interest on the Internet, I followed the fate of the authors of the articles and those who were written about (this is a matter of minutes) - more than half were repressed, or rather 90 percent, and these were all military.

The scale of the repression went off scale, say. How some colleagues like to repeat liberal dogma.
Let's get a look. Until now, there are allegations of a "decapitated" army, which is directly depopulated. Fantastic, wild, unmatched figures - almost 43 000 of “executed” officers and generals in two years. According to Volkogonov.
Alas, alas ... Despite the numerous anecdotes, statistics are still science accurate. In 1937, with the number of officers in the 144 300 officers corps, about eight percent were repressed and excluded from the army of 11 034 people — about eight percent! In 1938, from 179 000 commanders and generals were repressed and not restored to the rights of 6742 man - three with a small percentage! So, in 1937-38 years about 20 thousand people were dismissed from the army. But it was returned to operation after the change of leadership of the NKVD in 1939 year - 12,5 thousand. It turns out about 60%.

Those. were arrested - 8122 officer and general. And far from all on political charges, and far from all were shot.
By 1940, the Red Army had grown from 500 000 (in 1930 year) to 4,9 million people. How many officers did it take? Statistics show that the percentage of officers in the troops in the 1938 year increased by 5%, in 1939 - by 7,5%. And with a higher military education - by 12%. And this despite the repression [
But we must also take into account that “repressions” often did not concern politics: other comrade commanders were thrown out of the army for embezzlement, drunkenness, or one or another omission in the service. Do you seriously believe that under Stalin the quartermasters didn’t grab public property, and the brave warriors didn’t shoot drunk from personal weapons somewhere in dances? Girls not raped? Muzzles "spacers" did not beat? Wow! In the old archives such arts are remembered, which will not be let down in any army of the world.
From the book: [Kurlandchik A.– “THE CURSED SOVIET AUTHORITY” ... on Proza.ru]

[Petrof]

Quote: mrark

the quartermasters didn’t grab public property, and the brave warriors didn’t shoot drunk from personal weapons somewhere in the dance?

Hapali and scorched, as at all times, about which there are corresponding orders
and nevertheless - find the magazine indicated by me on the Internet and see for yourself, it will be best to see with your own eyes.

"... as we move forward, the resistance of the capitalist elements will increase, the class struggle will intensify, and the Soviet government, whose forces will grow more and more, will pursue a policy of isolating these elements, a policy of disintegrating the enemies of the working class, and finally, a policy suppression of the resistance of the exploiters ... "(c) Stalin

What do you think - should the relevant authorities comply with this instruction?
did not hear about Yezhov’s hands?

We are the protection of millions
We are the protection of all countries
From traitors, spies,
Arsonists of war.
To saboteurs - there is no mercy!
Our squad is invincible
Drop by drop blood if necessary
We will give the people!
(C)

yeah sure



In his memoirs, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.I. Eremenko described the repressions in the Red Army as follows:

Comrade Stalin was significantly guilty of exterminating the military personnel before the war, which affected the combat effectiveness of the army.

Opinion of the Army General A.V. Gorbatov:

It was believed that the enemy was advancing so quickly due to the surprise of his attack and because Germany had placed industry in almost all of Europe at its service. Of course it was. But I was swept up by my previous fears: how will we fight, having lost so many experienced commanders before the war? This, undoubtedly, was at least one of the main reasons for our failures, although they did not talk about it or presented it as if 1937-1938, having cleared the army of "traitors", increased its power.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky believed that the repressions of 1937 played a significant role in the history of the USSR:

Without the thirty-seventh year, perhaps there would have been no war at all in the forty-first year. In the fact that Hitler decided to start the war in the forty-first year, an important role was played by the assessment of the degree of defeat of the military personnel that we had.


According to Rokossovsky’s great-granddaughter, who referred to the stories of Marshal Kazakov’s wife, Rokossovsky was tortured. The head of the Leningrad UNKVD Zakovsky took part in these tortures. Rokossovsky was knocked out several of his front teeth, three ribs were broken, he was beaten on the toes with a hammer, and in 1939 he was taken to the prison yard for execution and was given a blank shot. (from)

but read about the creator of SAMBO Oshchepkova - how could a Japanese spy, but without him we would not have had this fight

[Russian Uzbek]

"" "find the magazine indicated by me on the Internet and see for yourself" "- will you be convinced of what?
no one here disputes that the purges were, do not agree with the scale! you need to see the coast a little - Mr. Petroffff ...
and then you apparently imagined that here is the site "Grani" or "echo of Moscow" and you can write any bileberd ...
here, of course, "jaundice" but not to the same degree!

[Petrof]

Quote: Russian Uzbek

disagree with the scale!

if in the military magazine where both the ordinary military and the military elite are published, most of the authors were shot - this says that the scale was

Quote: Russian Uzbek

and you can write any bilieberda ..

and the above mentioned military is also probably in your every rubbish wrote about the repression
and why would it?

[Russian Uzbek]

"" and the abovementioned military, too, probably, according to your nonsense, wrote about the repression ""
they wrote that the repressions WERE ... and that TOGETHER WITH THE ENEMIES were repressed and innocent ...
or do you want to say that they wrote like you: "the scale of the repression went off scale" ???
tell your fables to someone else
"" "if in a military magazine where both ordinary military and military elite are published, most of the authors were shot - this says that the scale was still" ""
so the repression mainly affected the top commanding staff ... starting with the regimental commanders! You at least get acquainted with the essence of the matter and at the same time with the history of the Motherland ... for what these people were generally repressed! and then you are poking everyone a magazine and even a communist one ... and this is your "reinforced concrete" argument?

[Petrof]

Quote: Russian Uzbek

or do you want to say that they wrote like you: "the scale of the repression went off scale" ???

that’s what they wrote
they cannot be understood in any other way, as if the Stalinists did not want to

[Russian Uzbek]

Well, that moment has come;)
who wrote and where? quote link to the studio!

[Petrof]

My God, and for whom did I give links before?

Well, for example:
Army General A.V. Gorbatov

It was believed that the enemy was advancing so quickly due to the surprise of his attack and because Germany had placed industry in almost all of Europe at its service. Of course it was. But I was swept up by my previous fears: how will we fight, having lost so many experienced commanders before the war? This, undoubtedly, was at least one of the main reasons for our failures, although they did not talk about it or presented the case as if 1937-1938, having cleared the army of "traitors", increased its power.
Years and wars
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/gorbatov/06.html


without Stalin ... maybe there would have been no war ”and even that“ without the thirty-seventh year, perhaps there would have been no war at all in the forty-first year. In the fact that Hitler decided to start the war in the forty-first year, an important role was played by the assessment of the degree of defeat of the military personnel that we had ... (From an interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilyevsky A.M. Konstantin Simonov, 1967 Simonov KS “ Through the eyes of a person of my generation ")

[Russian Uzbek]

Well...
and what is Gorbatov reflecting on? about the "loss of experienced commanders"! you were given the numbers above how much it was in percentages and numbers
I’ll repeat it once again: the repressions in the army mainly touched the highest commanders! The same Gorbatov might never have become a general if the top army had not been repressed ... look at what ranks the WWII commanders had in 36-37 ...
if you wrote "the scale of repression among the ruling elite went off scale" - you would hit the mark;)

[Petrof]

Quote: Russian Uzbek

the numbers given to you above are how much was it in percent and numbers

the general of the army says that the punitive bodies shot a lot of experienced commanders, "traitors" - pay attention in quotes because of what the defeat and disaster

Vasilevsky - the marshal of victory, yes - says that without a mass execution of military commanders by Stalin and war, there could have been no

and you say that you know better than them (people who lived, fought, commanded) the situation
great what can you say

[Russian Uzbek]

"" without Stalin ... maybe there would be no war "" "
you don’t distort the phrases here, write down completely what he said ... without your distortions
"" "Vasilevsky is the marshal of victory, yes - he says that without the mass execution of military leaders by Stalin, the war might not have been" ""
maybe there was not ... "maybe" not an argument
Vasilevsky, by the way, nowhere condemns Stalin - on the contrary - he writes that "Victory is Stalin"
but how do you juggle phrases and quotes taken out of context that the school gives you know ...
in principle, talking with you, I realized - that put you on a par with the Nobel laureate Aleksievich quite rightly
you can be proud;)

[Petrof]

what is taken out of context?

What about the consequences for the army of the thirty-seventh to thirty-eighth year? You say that without the thirty-seventh year there would have been no defeats for the forty-first, and I will say more. Without the thirty-seventh year, perhaps there would have been no war at all in the forty-first year. In the fact that Hitler decided to start the war in the forty-first year, an important role was played by the assessment of the degree of defeat of military personnel that we had. What can I say, when in the thirty-ninth year I had to be on the commission during the transfer of the Leningrad Military District from Khozin to Meretskov, there were a number of divisions commanded by the captains, because everyone who was above was arrested without exception.
(C)
Through the eyes of a person of my generation: Reflections on I.V. Stalin
Conversations with the Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky

author Simonov

what can you somehow understand differently than what I said?

as I understand it, there is nothing to say about Army General Gorbatov

[Russian Uzbek]

So what did Vasilevsky condemn Stalin? said "Stalin was wrong when he repressed all these people"?
he just said "if there were no repressions, the war COULD BE, and it had not begun" ... or maybe it began ... history does not know the subjunctive mood
this is your distortion
"" without Stalin ... maybe there would be no war "" "
here’s another example - Vasilevsky didn’t say that you turned the phrase
Vasilevsky generally spoke as a military man, from the point of view of the military ... no political sense should be attributed to his words

[Petrof]

Quote: Russian Uzbek

So what did Vasilevsky condemn Stalin? said "Stalin was wrong when he repressed all these people"?

that's exactly what he said
once again his quote is -
and I will say more. Without the thirty-seventh year, perhaps there would have been no war at all in the forty-first year. In the fact that Hitler decided to start the war in the forty-first year, an important role was played by the assessment of the degree of defeat of military personnel that we had. (from)

who is to blame for this, who else but Stalin can be to blame for this?

the defeat of military personnel - what does it mean in your opinion?

[Russian Uzbek]

So what did Vasilevsky condemn Stalin? said "Stalin was wrong when he repressed all these people"?
Well, where is it in the quote you quoted?
I tell you once again Vasilevsky as a military man said, taking into account the past war
"" "who is to blame for this, who, if not Stalin, can be to blame for this?" ""
all this is your personal, backed up only by speculation taken out of context phrases, Vasilevsky didn’t say so ... Gorbatov, by the way, too

[vladimirZ]

So what did Vasilevsky condemn Stalin? said "Stalin was wrong when he repressed all these people"
- Russian Uzbek (1)

All these marshals and generals in post-war memoirs, in order to preserve their posts, to please Khrushchev and his followers, hiding their miscalculations and mistakes, poured mud on Stalin as best they could, putting the blame on him.
An exception that did not betray I.V. Stalin Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky and Chief Marshal of Aviation Golovanov A.E., who refused to defame I.V. Stalin, and to confirm Khrushchev's lie that "Stalin directed military operations on the globe."
For this, Khrushchev and his singers pursued the unbroken Rokossovsky and Golovanov, depriving them of their posts, dismissing Golovanov from the Army, and Rokossovsky into the group of "honorary pensioners" - the general inspectors of the Ministry of Defense.
So that it is necessary to read the memoirs of our marshals and generals, taking into account this feature of a weak human character, subject to pressure from the power-owning leaders of our state and to conceal their miscalculations and errors in their activities in the prewar and war years.

[Mikado]

Let me express my humble opinion about whether the war would have happened, if there had not been repressions of the 37th year.
Hitler tensed a little after Khalkhin-Gol, for the defeat of the Japanese was quick and crushing, moreover, in the operation planned and imposed on us by the Japanese themselves.
Hitler’s opinion of our army was rather spoiled by the Finnish war.
Training, the condition of the troops, and commanders including, in the 30s left much to be desired. The army was built from scratch, not really knowing how to do it. And it was precisely the shots of the civil war that prepared it.
Again, it was precisely following the Finnish War that the army carried out a number of reforms and innovations, improved training, but there was very little time left ..

As Isaev wrote remarkably, the situation about the construction, training, training of our army compared to the Wehrmacht resembled the following analogy: a boy is engaged in boxing in a village club. They learn it somehow, the simulators are unimportant, he makes certain successes, even wins over the same ones. And at one point, a professional boxer calls him to battle.

Well, as for the personnel - it seems to me that few of the commanders of the Civil War proved themselves properly in the Great Patriotic War. so to speak, these were people of a different time, and the Civil War school rather negatively affected their military talents.

Best regards

[avt]

Quote: Petrof

"... as we move forward, the resistance of the capitalist elements will increase, the class struggle will intensify, and the Soviet government, whose forces will grow more and more, will pursue a policy of isolating these elements, a policy of disintegrating the enemies of the working class, and finally, a policy suppression of the resistance of the exploiters ... "(c) Stalin

Did you cite this as evidence of Stalin’s paranoid? And you don’t want to remember the year 1991? Well, who turned out to be right? What did History show in the end?

Quote: Petrof

Without the thirty-seventh year, perhaps there would have been no war at all in the forty-first year. In the fact that Hitler decided to start the war in the forty-first year, an important role was played by the assessment of the degree of defeat of the military personnel that we had.

And if you think about it without Svanidzemlechinskopivovar's chants? Well, just think? Maybe without Chamberlain's Munich Agreement? When exactly from that moment they threw sweet pieces to him in the East direction, and Stalin was forbidden to lead troops through Poland to fulfill the agreement of mutual assistance signed with Czechoslovakia?

[Petrof]

Quote: avt

Do you want to remember 1991?

But is it not the Communists who arranged the collapse of the country?
where does the class struggle and the exploiters
ordinary palace coup

Quote: avt

Svanidzemelechskopivarovskih chants

this is the marshal of victory said
and there would be no repression, thought, thought Hitler
Yes, and would go to England
Sea lion jumped - they would write in our newspapers

and Comrade Stalin would send the Red Army to Afghanistan and India

But we still get to the Ganges,
But we still die in battles,
So from Japan to England
My Motherland shone.

(C)

[avt]

Quote: Petrof

But is it not the Communists who arranged the collapse of the country?
where does the class struggle and the exploiters
ordinary palace coup

Yeah? And who jumped into the capitalists from the party committees? Or is there a class of proprietors that is missing in our country? Well, when and where did the palace coup end with the breakdown of the social system in our case with the appearance of the aforementioned class of capitalists ??

[ASK505]

Quote: Petrof

Without the thirty-seventh year, perhaps there would have been no war at all in the forty-first year. In the fact that Hitler decided to start the war in the forty-first year, an important role was played by the assessment of the degree of defeat of the military personnel that we had.

For a long time, they put an end to supposedly killed innocently. And you are for the old, in unison with our sworn friends.
“Who says I'm going to start a war, like these fools did in 1914? - asked Hitler, referring to the First World War, and explained: - We will have friends who will help us in all enemy states. We will be able to make such friends. Confusion in the minds, conflicting feelings, indecision, panic - these are our weapons ...
So could Stalin allow the Germans in the Soviet Union to repeat their exploits at the expense of local traitors?
In the years 1937-1938, Joseph W. Davis was the US ambassador to the USSR. After the German attack on the USSR, he wrote in his diary on July 7, 1941:
“... Today, we know, thanks to the efforts of the FBI, that Hitler’s bodies acted everywhere, even in the United States and South America. The German entry into Prague was accompanied by active support from the Helena military organizations. The same thing happened in Norway (Quisling), Slovakia (Tiso), Belgium (de Grem) ... However, we do not see anything like this in Russia. "Where are the Russian accomplices of Hitler?" - they ask me often. “They were shot,” I reply. Only now are you beginning to realize how far-sighted the Soviet government did during the years of purging. ”

After all, he is accused of repressions against the "fifth column" of Nazis in the USSR, that is, they are accused of using which he saved both the USSR and all of Europe from German Nazism. Indeed, at that time, all the countries that succeeded did the same thing as Stalin did - they cleaned their countries of the “fifth column” without any court or investigation. And after its own mass repressions in their countries, the West accuses Stalin of repressing the “fifth column” ?! How else to call it, if not an extreme degree of meanness?

[pilot8878]

Mrs. Petrof, for the sake of general development and interest, now look at the years of publication of the "revelatory masterpieces" you indicated - all of them were published under the unforgettable Nikita the maize worker. Without such attacks, the memoirs would not have appeared at all.
At the same time, ask about K.K. Rokossovsky. Yes, he was arrested, tortured, but at the same time, he NEVER allowed himself insulting attacks on Stalin, moreover, this was one of the reasons for the poor relationship between Marshal and Khrushchev. Rokossovsky perfectly understood that the bestiality of the investigator did not give grounds for insulting Stalin.

[Russian Uzbek]

Well, I’m saying: with Aunt Alexievich next to you, sit down and cry to each other in a vest ...

[ASK505]

Dear Julia, the beginning of the sentence, proper names, the name of cities, countries and continents in Russian and other foreign languages ​​is written with a capital letter. Offers end with a period. By the way. Why? In relation to each person’s own language, one can absolutely accurately judge not only his cultural level, but also his civic values. True love for your country is unthinkable without love for your language. And like Pushkin: “... we’ll part for this, forgive me!”

[sl22277]

A serious analysis is needed, because not only the Red Army, but also the armies of Western countries were inferior to the Hitler war machine, which was gaining strength and experience in the war, initially with Europe. I do not agree with the author, it is not for him to give an assessment to Stalin and the leaders of the Red Army. Who won this war, and did not lie under the Germans, the same example is Europe.

[Petrof]

Quote: sl22277

not him to give an assessment to Stalin and the leaders of the Red Army.

and to whom?

[MrK]

Quote: Petrof

and to whom?

Only to you.

[Petrof]

Quote: mrark

Only to you.

but I think that all people living in the Russian Federation

[The lead]

Bullshit, not an article. Just to write something. How was the 6th mechanized corps with its thousand tanks shot by aviation and, oh god, artillery? Well, at least I didn’t write about V-2. The reason for the corps’s defeat was this ( a friend’s father fought on t-34 at 6mk): the command took the equipment out of the camp and the Germans airstrike fell on an empty field. A package was opened with orders in case of the outbreak of hostilities, which was ordered to advance in the direction of Brest. It was assumed that the enemy would wedge into the defense of rifle divisions, it will strike at the front with a strike of 14mk, and at the flank of 6mk. However, a difficult situation developed near Grodno, which was revealed to the high command, so an order was issued to counter-strike 6mk towards Grodno. 6mk at that time was moving on Brest, therefore, turned 180 degrees and went to Grodno. While he was carrying out all these maneuvers, a thousand tanks and the darkness of cars and tractors burned up the remaining fuel, which ended, and 6 mk did not reach Grodno. The fact is that aviation it immediately destroyed the fuel reserves of 6 microns, and the nearest warehouses were in the east of Belarus and could not be delivered, as enemy aircraft dominated the roads, and railway junctions were subjected to continuous bombardments.

[alicante11]

M-yes, everyone imagines himself a strategist seeing the battle from the side.
The problems of the Red Army in the 1941 year can be represented as follows. The first is growth problems.
Due to the first problem, the Red Army did not have enough high-quality command personnel. Well, we did not have a system in place, as in the Reichswehr Sect, when each ordinary student studied for sergeant major, and each non-commissioned officer. As a result, if it was necessary to deploy new divisions, the Germans simply took a frame - the backbone of the existing division, replenished it with reservists. This seriously reduced the time required to prepare combat-ready divisions created during mobilization and did not have a serious impact on the combat effectiveness of the first-line divisions, since the excess of trained personnel made it possible to qualitatively replace the vacancies formed. In the Red Army, this was not and could not be. Because we did not intend to attack anyone, but when attacking us, it’s already very problematic to remove the shot from the division that is fighting.
For this reason, the quality of management was very low, especially in the link from the division and above. And there was no interaction between the combat arms.
The second problem is the strategic and tactical surprise of the attack. The rearmament program of the Red Army was planned until 1943. Taking into account the experience of WWI and its experience in the Finnish campaign during the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line", the Soviet leadership believed that it had this time. This led to a reshaping of the structure of the connections. Especially in the tank forces. As a result, it turned out that the divisions had several types of tanks, a general tank kit, a second set of aircraft at airfields, etc. Therefore, the tank troops and aviation just could not play a decisive role in the border battle. At the same time, for the sake of forming the 30MK, the rifle divisions were left without their tank battalions, which, naturally, weakened them, and also disbanded tank brigades that could interact with infantry units. Hence the fear of mobilizing, because they remembered from WWI - mobilization is a war. And they hoped to provide additional time with diplomatic maneuvers. Hitler failed to achieve operational surprise. Parts of the western districts were raised in alarm and began to take up positions under the cover plan. The tightening of reserves also began. Well, tactical surprise is quite simple to provide. Only he knows the exact date of the enemy's advance. And even then not always, for example, the Germans initially planned an offensive in May 41, but the situation in Yugoslavia confused the plans and forced to postpone the attack.
You can cite a whole range of reasons that have already been discussed more than once - from the great experience of the Wehrmacht, which has already conquered all of Europe, and to the "dampness" of our latest developments in the field of weapons, when indeed more tanks were lost due to malfunctions on the marches than due to the impact of the enemy.

[The boat]

Quote: alicante11

The problems of the Red Army in the 1941 year can be represented as follows. The first is growth problems.
Due to the first problem, the Red Army did not have enough high-quality command personnel.

undoubtedly. As well as the depressing general preparation of the Red Army. As well as inept command and control. But this conclusion was made already in 1940 after the Winter War - the only one at that time modern the war in which the USSR participated. By the beginning of the Second World War, nothing in this regard had changed dramatically - as in the Winter War, I had to learn to fight "in the field."

Quote: alicante11

The second problem is the strategic and tactical surprise of the attack.

The mantra about "treacherous and sudden" is, of course, very convenient from the point of view of propaganda and school textbooks. It seems to me very doubtful that the successes of the Wehrmacht in 41-42 years. are based on the fact that he fell upon us without a preliminary "I go to you".

[Petrof]

Quote: Das Boot

the only one at that time in the modern war in which the USSR participated

and Halkin goal showing for example the importance of aviation?
has something changed since then? never mind
Smushkevich was shot

[The boat]

Quote: Petrof

and Halkin Goal

sorry but i talked about the war. What does the Hal have to do with itхin-Gol? By the way, Iosif Vissarionych did not consider this incident a "war".

[Bayonet]

Quote: Das Boot

By the way, Iosif Vissarionych did not consider this incident a "war".

Wow "incident" - by the beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive, the 1st army group of Zhukov had about 57 thousand people, 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft.

[The boat]

Quote: Bayonet

Wow "incident"

Small episodes in Manchuria, near Lake Hassan or in Mongolia - this is nonsense, this is not war - these are separate episodes on a patch of strictly limited. Japan was afraid to start a war, we didn’t want that either, and some test of strength on the patch showed that Japan had failed. They had 2-3 divisions and we have 2-3 divisions in Mongolia, the same number on Hassan. Our army has not yet waged a real, serious war. Stalin I.V. From "Speech at a meeting of the commanding staff on summarizing the experience of military operations against Finland" April 17, 1940

[Petrof]

interesting and those who participated there - they also believed that they were not in the war, what do you think?

According to official Soviet data, the losses of the Japanese-Manchu troops during the battles from May to September 1939 amounted to more than 61 thousand people. killed, wounded and taken prisoner (of which about 20 thousand - actually Japanese losses). Soviet-Mongolian troops lost 9831 Soviet (together with the wounded - more than 17 thousand) and 895 Mongolian soldiers.

The officially declared losses of the Kwantung Army: 18 thousand people. Independent Japanese researchers give figures up to 45 thousand people. (from)

isn't it too cool for an incident?
not a simple shootout of border guards yet

Song of the wind rush over the country
To hear the Soviet people
About the brave sons,
Khalkhin Gola Fighters
About a mighty and formidable campaign

In a roadless, waterless desert
They brought the glory of the country.
The enemy found the grave
On the Khalkhin Gol River
On the borders of Mongolian land.

(C)

in any case, it was necessary to make changes - they did not
the dominance of Japanese aviation in the air at the beginning of the conflict taught nothing, then all this repeated with much worse consequences

[The boat]

Quote: Petrof

interesting and those who participated there - they also believed that they were not in the war, what do you think?

Quote: Petrof

Song of the wind rush over the country

Dear, if this is a matter of terminology, then personally for me it is completely closed by Comrade Stalin and my grandfather, who took part in the conflict. Besides,
as personal experience shows, arguing with a lover of heroic-patriotic poetry is a thankless task. Take for sim and so on.

[Petrof]

Quote: Das Boot

argue with a lover of heroic-patriotic poetry

poetry poetry but you didn’t see it?

in any case, it was necessary to make changes - they did not
the dominance of Japanese aviation in the air at the beginning of the conflict did not teach anything, then all this repeated with much worse consequences (c) of self-citation

or in your local wars do not need to learn?

[The boat]

Quote: Petrof

the dominance of Japanese aviation in the air at the beginning of the conflict taught nothing, then all this repeated with much worse consequences

?
In mid-June, the forces of the RKKVF were twice as superior to the Japanese and equal in numbers to all Japanese fleet located in Manchuria and Korea in general... Superiority in the air as a whole was from the beginning of the conflict until its end. By definition, the Japanese did not have any "domination" in the air. Another thing is that Khalkhin-Gol became the epitaph for the I-15 and the kawasaki ki-10 - biplane fighters went down in history. Plus the tactics of fighting the Japanese. Plus, their underestimation of bomber aviation and ground attack. Etc. On the whole, I agree that the air war over Khalkhin Gol was unparalleled - right up to the Second World War / WWII. But the "Japanese" lessons did not work against the Luftwaffe.

[Petrof]

Quote: Das Boot

There was no "domination" in the air of the Japanese by definition

from 4. 50 look, there it is told about it

[The boat]

Quote: Petrof

from 4. 50 look, there it is told about it

facespalm. However, Julia (by the way, excuse me for contacting you with a gender error) is excusable. I would also understand if Sekigava or Kutsevalov were brought as an argument, but these craftsmen of the television men ... thank you, I closed the topic.

[Petrof]

[

Quote: Das Boot

but these do-it-yourself TV stuff

May 28, the commander of the 57th Special Rifle Corps, Commander N.F. Feklenko in a combat report on the progress of battles in the Khalkhin-Gol river region reported to B.M. Shaposhnikov the following:

"Please give your answer immediately, as this is related to the planning of the battle on May 29:

1. Enemy aviation dominates the air.

2. The west bank of the river. Khalkhin-Gol is completely open and does not give any maneuver, with the exception of the Dzuk-Khan-Ula mountain region, where the terrain is easily rugged.

3. Our aircraft are not able to cover the ground forces before capturing the crossing ...

4. It is possible to keep the eastern bank of the Khalkhin-Gol river, but with heavy losses from enemy aircraft.

5. I ask that after dark, withdraw units to the west bank and defend it by conducting bombing of the enemy ...

The most radical measures were taken. On May 29, three Douglas-class passenger planes took off from Moscow on a special flight to Mongolia. On board there were 48 most experienced Soviet pilots who had completed combat training in the skies of Spain and China. Among them were 22 Heroes of the Soviet Union. The group of domestic aces was headed by the deputy commander of the Air Force of the Red Army Corps Commander Ya.V. Smushkevich. A few days later the Douglases landed at the Tamtsak-Bulak airfield. (from)

[The boat]

Quote: Petrof

May 28, the commander of the 57th Special Rifle Corps, Commander N.F. Feklenko ... the following:

oh yes - Feklenko Of course. Had this loser stayed a little longer as Corps Commander-57 - Khalkhin-Gol would have inevitably been merged, including because of the "Japanese domination in the air" and other things "boss, everything is gone!" By the way, it's amazing how his not ... However, not about that.
On 27.05.1939/XNUMX/XNUMX our air group in Mongolia consisted of 203 machines: 48 I-15bis; 51 I-16; 88 SB: 16 P-5. Japanese: 52 fighters, 6 scouts, 6 light bombers; total - 64 cars. Ok, let's leave the Kwantung reports on the downed and Feklenko's panic - where is the Japanese domination? Or let's start with the "ki-27 vs I-16"?

[Petrof]

From the story of fighter pilot Anton Yakimenko: “The war began unsuccessfully for us. The Japanese managed to seize dominance in the air. Why did it happen? We met Japanese veterans over Khalkhin Gol, who had fought in China for two years before that. We had no combat experience and were not ready to kill yet. ”
http://topwar.ru/21990-samurayskaya-mogila-halhin-gol.html

Thus, the May battle was 17: 1 in favor of Japanese aviation. After this defeat, Soviet fighters did not appear over Khalkhin Gol for more than two weeks, and "Japanese bombers bombed our troops with impunity."
Moscow responded immediately by taking emergency measures to strengthen our aircraft in the conflict zone. Already on May 29, a group of the best Soviet aces headed by the deputy chief of the Red Army Air Force flew to Mongolia
(c) I fought with samurai. From Khalkhin Gol to Port Arthur

[w3554152]

Quote: Petrof

Smushkevich was shot

Sadness, but for the cause they shot, like Pavlov, Tukhachevsky and many others with and without stripes. And those millions of soldiers who fell on the battlefield because of the Tukhachev’s Smushkevichs and Pavlov’s do you feel sorry?

[alicante11]

undoubtedly. As well as the depressing general preparation of the Red Army. As well as inept command and control. But this conclusion was already made in 1940 after the Winter War - the only modern war at that time,

And what could be drastically changed over the remaining year and a half?

It seems to me very doubtful that the successes of the Wehrmacht in 41-42 years. are based on the fact that he fell upon us without a preliminary "I go to you".

This is not the main reason, but very significant. Moreover, tactical surprise is less terrible. Strategic surprise brought more problems. Which led to the fact that army reform planning was attributed to 1942-1943gg. As a result, the old staff structures were destroyed and the new ones did not have time to create.

[creak]

Quote: alicante11

M-yes, everyone imagines himself a strategist seeing the battle from the side. The problems of the Red Army in 1941 can be represented as follows. The first is the problem of growth. Due to the first problem, the Red Army did not have enough high-quality command personnel

And this is the first and main - the Commander of the Kiev Special Military District Kirponos during the Finnish War commanded the division ... He commanded the Golden Zveeda well and deservedly. But after a short command of the rifle corps, he received a district where four armies and eight mechanized corps were stationed ... Was he ready to manage such a colossus with experience - of course not ... This was noted in his memoirs by Rokossovsky and Bagramyan serving under the command of Kyroponos ..
And although the catastrophe did not happen there in the early days, it nevertheless occurred in mid-September where Kirponos died in the Kiev boiler ...
PS This happened despite the fact that many units showed stamina and fought very worthily ...
It was not fault, but the misfortune of many commanders - no personal courage can replace the corresponding experience and knowledge of military art ....
Other important factors also played a role, and converging together they formed a critical mass that determined what happened in the summer of 1941 with the Red Army ...

[alicante11]

And although the catastrophe did not happen there in the early days, it nevertheless occurred in mid-September where Kirponos died in the Kiev boiler ...

I basically agree.
The catastrophe did not happen, mainly because the Germans did not deliver the main blow at the front of the Southwestern Front. If there were not one tank group, but two and two air fleets against the SWF, then the situation would not be much better than what happened in the WWF.
Well, plus Potopov with his 5 Army did a lot in order not to turn the border battle into a rout of the South Front.
And in September there is not Kirponos’s wine there. He sent the front lines to the east, and requested a retreat. But Shaposhnikov and the IVS were banned. In principle, this victim was justified by the delay in Guderian’s advance on Moscow. But for those who sacrificed from this is not much easier.

[creak]

Quote: alicante11

And in September there is not Kirponos’s wine there.

But let me disagree with this - how could the Kleist group be allowed to cross to the left bank of the Dnieper in the Kremenchug region? This crossing lasted long enough (even during the day) and no measures were taken to liquidate the Kremenchug bridgehead ... It was from this bridgehead that Kleist began to advance towards the Guderian tank group advancing from the north. Connecting Kleist and Guderian and closed the ring around the South-West Front troops in district of Lokhvitsy, Romny in mid-September.
And at the disposal of Kirponos was a serious group of over 600 thousand people. which got into the Kiev boiler ...
Kirponos made the most serious mistake that a military leader can make - a loss of control as a result of which formations and units were mixed up and no one really led their retreat - this led to the tragedy ...
Even Kirponos didn’t leave the encirclement with the bulk of the troops, but with a group of headquarters staff and guards who didn’t take measures to organize a breakthrough, he had more than enough troops at his disposal and the encirclement was not so strong (Baghramyan was able to go through him), and the Germans had already suffered serious losses by this time ..
And how can one then say that Kirponos’s guilt in the defeat of the South-West Front troops in September is not and to blame everything on Moscow?

[alicante11]

But let me disagree with this - how could the Kleist group be allowed to cross to the left bank of the Dnieper in the Kremenchug region?

Well, the condition of the front units was deplorable, divisions were cut into sections on the basis of their regular strength, while their combat strength was reduced to several battalions. As a result, it was very difficult to stay even on the river. At the same time, the bridgehead was already in the north, to which all reserves were thrown. Well, Guderian’s exit to the rear of the SWF still meant a disaster.

And at the disposal of Kirponos was a serious group of over 600 thousand people. which got into the Kiev boiler ...

There is an opinion, especially if you look at the state of the field army forces, that these were mainly the rear units of the armies (front lines were withdrawn). You also need to consider almost a hundred thousand mobilized, who were stuck in Kiev, without even getting a weapon. The warheads themselves were very small in numbers.

Even Kirponos didn’t leave the encirclement with the bulk of the troops, but with a group of headquarters staff and guards who didn’t take measures to organize a breakthrough, he had more than enough troops at his disposal and the encirclement was not so strong (Baghramyan was able to go through him), and the Germans had already suffered serious losses by this time ..

Perhaps this was a mistake, but at the same time, most divisions of the Kiev URA got out of the circle. But the same Baghramyan left with a detachment, which was moved as a deceitful maneuver to ensure the exit of the front headquarters.

And how can one then say that Kirponos’s guilt in the defeat of the South-West Front troops in September is not and to blame everything on Moscow?

I am only talking about the fact that the time of departure was lost and why it was done.

[creak]

Quote: alicante11

At the same time, the bridgehead was already in the north, to which all reserves were thrown.

In the north, the breakthrough of Guderian's tank group was not fought by the South-Western Front, but by the Bryansk Front under the command of Eremenko, who promised Stalin "By all means to defeat the scoundrel Guderian" - the truth turned out exactly the opposite ...

And if the majority of divisions from the Kiev UR, located on the right bank of the Dnieper, left the encirclement, then why the troops on the Left Bank didn’t leave it? east?
And the Kremenchug bridgehead on time was not liquidated, not because there was no strength (they were enough), but because they were unable to unravel the plan of the German command in time and assess what danger it poses ...
And to summarize, it is indisputable that Kirponos could not bear the burden ... But as they say, the dead have no shame, he paid for his mistakes with life.
Thank you for the exchange of views.

[Hey]

The correctness of the author of the article is confirmed by such a vivid example, albeit from a feature film about General Gorbatov. When he was forced to take the village forehead. And a conversation at a military council when he asked how many guns and shells were needed to crush the enemy’s defenses. Where directly, to the higher authorities, he speaks of their ignorance and gives specific figures.
Simply, in other matters, as always, as long as there is no war, at the top is the dominance of parquet generals and toads, far from pressing army problems.
War clears this husk, but it takes time. And from here irreparable losses.

[Good me]

Quote: MUD

The correctness of the author of the article is confirmed by such a vivid example, albeit from a feature film about General Gorbatov.

You are still "Inglorious at **** kov", give as confirmation of something there ...

[Awaz]

General Gorbatov is a real officer and the film about him is based on real facts. He was one of the many (moreover) real military officers, on whose hump they were drawn in that war. Due to his not simple and direct nature, he and other officers similar to him had many problems, but in any case they honestly performed their duty, despite the fact that the so-called "parquet" ones put a spoke in their wheels. By the way, the story about the fact that he refused to take on the forehead has some details. The famous Rokossovsky made him do it.
It is worth not forgetting that the catch phrase "The grave of the hunchback will fix it" is just about him, expressed by Stalin. Stalin treated Gorbatov very well and this can be found in the historical chronicles.

[The boat]

Quote: AwaZ

It is worth not forgetting that the catch phrase "The grave of the hunchback will fix it" is just about him

I learn a lot of new things at VO ... So, in 1898, Anton Palych Chekhov had in mind him, using this idiom ????

[creak]

Quote: AwaZ

General Gorbatov is a real officer and a film about him is based on real facts. This was one of many (and) real combat officers, on the hump of which they pulled in that war.

My late father, a career soldier, fought in the 3rd Army, commanded by Gorbatov. And he and his colleagues considered Gorbatov the best commander of the Second World War, who was very protective of his soldiers and enjoyed their unconditional respect ...
By the way, an interesting moment - General Gorbatov did not drink or smoke ...

[alicante11]

I also want to argue with the author at some points.

With the role of cavalry, all the leading European countries decided in the middle of the First World War. After that war, the cavalry in the European armies actually died.

Well, Belov and Dovator were not aware that the cavalry sucks and they forgot to tell their opponents about it. As well as German tank generals, who stomped under Mokra for two days at the beginning of the Polish campaign, by the way, also against the cavalry brigade. It was just that cavalry needed to be used correctly. As an ersatz-motorized infantry, the cavalry operated quite at the level of the year until 43, until the normal mechanization of the infantry began in large numbers.

As a result, at the beginning of the war, most of the landing corps of the Red Army fought as light infantry units, that is, practically without artillery, mortars, etc. Upstairs, it was obviously decided that brave soldiers did not need heavy weapons.

Indeed, light and highly trained infantry fought quite well. For example, during the counterattacks of the 5 Army, when its interaction with the army artillery was established. But when the Airborne Forces were put on the defensive, then the absence of heavy weapons seriously made itself felt. Like cavalry, the Airborne Forces should have been used wisely.

Miscalculated. German troops took the bridges across the Western Dvina from Jekabpils and Dvinsk (Daugavpils) on the move. But in the Baltic military district on the eve of the war there were 26 divisions.

And how many divisions were there in GA Sever? And we ourselves needed the bridges for the advancement of mechanized units for a counterattack.

In the Kiev Military District, the direction from the border protrusion in the Ustyluh-Sokal area, that is, the shortest direction to Kiev, was covered by relatively weak forces of the Red Army. It is not surprising that the Germans here struck the main blow, tearing the front into two parts. I wonder where the Red Army expected the brunt of the Germans? Through the Carpathians or through the marshes of the Pripyat River?

For the author, the Red Army adopted the doctrine of maneuver warfare. And instead of substituting infantry units that are weaker in any case, to stop this fist, this fist was supposed to be stopped by counterattacks by our mechanized troops.

[Nyrobsky]

It is written floridly with a claim to originality and fits perfectly into the liberals' policy of de-Stalinization and de-communization ....
What again should someone repent?
MINUS.

[Petrof]

Quote: Nyrobsky

What again should someone repent?

Our government had many mistakes, we had moments of desperate situation in 1941 - 42, when our army retreated, left our native villages and cities of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the Leningrad Region, the Karelian-Finnish Republic, left because there weren’t another way out. Some other people could say: you did not live up to our hopes, we will set up another government that will conclude peace with Germany and provide us with peace. This could happen, keep in mind.

But the Russian people did not agree to this, the Russian people did not compromise, they showed unlimited trust in our government. I repeat, we had mistakes, the first two years our army was forced to retreat, it turned out that we did not master the events, did not cope with the situation. However, the Russian people believed, endured, waited and hoped that we would cope with events.

It is for this trust in our government that the Russian people have shown us, thank you very much! (c) Stalin

[Captain nemo]

Quote: Petrof

Some other people could say: you did not live up to our hopes, we will set up another government that will conclude peace with Germany and provide us with peace. This could happen, keep in mind.

No, it was the Russian people, during the 1st World War in 1917, who were "tired of fighting" with the Germans, who set themselves a "new government" from the beginning of Kerensky, and then Leninsky, in which Stalin was also, which concluded the Brest Peace with Germany. And then Rizhsky. And it was all the Russian people, and not any other. And the defirambs to sing about the fact that this did not happen in the 2nd World War, I would to the Russian people after what had already happened.
And people like Stalin will always praise those who followed the Leninist path and "did not betray" them at a difficult moment for them. While Stalin himself, in 1917, did it with his party comrades, easily and simply.
I understand that it is bitter and not pleasant to read such words. But only in such an interpretation of the fait accompli by me, do I see a causal connection between what was happening at that time.

[Petrof]

The Military Council of the Baltic Special Military District signed a directive to the troops to put them on combat alert at 2 a.m., and it was sent to the army headquarters by telegraph only at four o'clock in the morning. The troops were ordered: “I. During the night on 25 g ........ Antitank mines and subtle obstacles to put immediately (s)

and what didn’t they put before? because it’s like preparing for defense
and how much can one catch in the confusion, in the middle of the night, for less than two hours before the start of the war

[provincial]

The author is afraid of a repetition of that period, and therefore writes like this. There is common sense in the article, if you carefully and thoughtfully read it.

[Old warrant officer]

Tanks had a resource of only a few hundred kilometers or 100-150 hours, and they were forced to make marches of 150-200 km along the front.

[rotmistr60]

In any case, if you didn’t do the military leadership of many inexplicable pre-war mistakes, the Red Army, perhaps, could stop the enemy on the Western Dvina-Dnieper line by the winter of 1941.

Here it is. And where were you then (Author Igor Perov)? With your analysis of events, it turns out that the USSR could have won earlier ?. But another question interests me - where do you get so smart from? Not otherwise with the HSE.

[The boat]

Quote: rotmistr60

Here it is.

Well, yes, now it sounds fantastic, taking into account the subjunctive mood and our common Soviet mentality with immersion in tragedy, sacrifice, heroization, and so on. And I agree with the author here - we could.

[alicante11]

And I agree with the author here - they could.

Could. Fashi were objectively better in all respects. There was only one chance - to turn the war into a protracted one and see who ran out of steam ahead. We succeeded and the Fashis ran out of steam first.

[Petrof]

Quote: alicante11

There was one chance

or maybe it would be worth mine the borders of millions of mines
pull troops directly from the border, airfields were clogged with planes, and without any disguise — although dispersal orders and disguises were repeatedly issued, they were scored — and all this was destroyed by the very first blows

then maybe there wouldn’t be a war

[alicante11]

or maybe it would be worth mine the borders of millions of mines

Have you heard anything about mine clearance?

draw troops directly from the border

Well, actually, this was done, for example, in KOVO. Where the main blow of the Nazis was supposed. But the ZVO was to launch a counterattack in order to pull the German divisions from the south and ease the position of the South-Western Front, so the troops were on the border. What is in Brest, what is in the Bialystok ledge.

airfields were jammed with airplanes, and without any disguise -

I'm already tired of talking here about the reasons for the location of aviation at major airfields. Our communications were not so developed as to operate aviation at alternate aerodromes. And there weren’t so many of them, because there was a transition to concrete airfields from earthen. And they did not have time to build them stupidly.
Question HOW to disguise aircraft at the airport?

and all this was destroyed by the first blows

Do not talk garbage, dear. Aviation in the ZVO (ZF) was destroyed during the air operations of 22-24 in June due to the superiority of fascists in this direction. They had 2 air fleets in the GA Center. At the same time, the aviation of the same SWF operated quite successfully and no one bombed it at airfields.

[Captain nemo]

Quote: rotmistr60

Here it is. And where were you then (Author Igor Perov)?

Physically in the 40s, he was here and only his molecules and atoms were scattered throughout the planet in water, air and land. But the moment came when his molecules and atoms gathered in the DNA of his father and mother, and only after that there was Igor Petrov, who did not choose and could not choose the time of his birth, like every one of us living or previously dead. Igor Petrov during his life can move in space on this planet, but he cannot physically move himself in time. But this does not deprive him of the right to name the deceased neighbor, a flayer from the 20s, to call him a flayer, although he never in his life disjointed because the flayer died before his birth.

[The boat]

Quote: Captain Nemo

Physically in the 40s, he was here and only his molecules and atoms were scattered throughout the planet in water, air and land.

God, what kind of nonsense ??? IN

Quote: Captain Nemo

land

??? In dumplings and dry rations of the Trinidad army ????

[Captain nemo]

Quote: Das Boot

God, what kind of nonsense ???
In sushi ???
In dumplings and dry rations of the Trinidad army ????

Do not pretend to be, you know that it’s not about your overseas cuisine here, but that part of the land that is not filled with water. Type calcium, magnesium, potassium, other minerals, metals, and more.
Quantum mechanics can help you, I hope. Well, if you only did not arise from the "Holy Spirit" then, yes, here I take off my hat in front of you.

[The boat]

Quote: Captain Nemo

then, yes here I take off my hat to you.

Yes, even remove the scalp, but first re-read your comment from this place:

Quote: Captain Nemo

Physically in the 40s, he was here and was only

easier to remove ...

[Captain nemo]

Don't you really feel confused by the word "here", to understand the surface of this planet, where both inanimate and living nature exist, this is its minimum and maximum size?
After all, I did not mean Topvar's site or the territory of the USSR in the 40s. Well, if only according to grammar between the words "was, only", I should have put a comma, well, this is an insignificant formality and nothing more.

[Erg]

I don’t know about the tanks, but the author is not at ease with the history. Hence terms such as "inexplicable".

[Altona]

The USSR was called Russia, which at the time was at least incorrect, did not read further ...

[Alexl]

USSR it was Russia.

[Altona]

Quote: AleksL

USSR it was Russia.

------------------
No, the USSR was the USSR-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it was he who waged the war with Germany, there was no need to juggle his miserable minuses ... It was legally that way, modern Russia is the successor of the USSR, and not vice versa ... If you have I mean the Russian empire, then it didn’t die at the end of World War ... And we need to write about the USSR, and not about Russia, referring to the Second World War ...

[Captain nemo]

Quote: Altona

The USSR was called Russia, which at that time was at least incorrect

Within the USSR, the grammar of the Russian language will most likely be incorrect. However, in the west, during the entire existence of the USSR, it was almost always called Russia. The Germans in the GDR called all the soldiers "Russians", despite the fact that in the GSVG half of the soldiers in the 80s had clearly Asian facial features that were very different from those of the European part of the USSR, and in the GSVG units they were not considered and were not Russian.

[Black cat]

A lot of extra comments in the article. For example, the same T-28s were quite effective, with reasonable use, at least despite the deterioration, they were more reliable than the T-34. The 76mm cannon on the BT is tin, the problem was not the guns, but the shells, so the 45mm cannon completely penetrated any German tank armor in the 41st. To be honest, I did not understand about the mechdivisions. So formed after the arrival of G.K. Zhukov in a large number of mechanized corps, this really was a disaster. The trouble is, not because the tanks were different, the Germans were different, too, and in principle there were enough tanks, for reference, the USSR built more tanks than the whole world combined, but because there were no crews, technical support, and perhaps most importantly trained motorized rifle compounds. I will not continue further, but the author’s idea as a whole is correct.

[The boat]

Key phrase:

Quote: Black cat

when used wisely

[bairat]

Quote: faridg7

Yes, at least modernize with the mosin, and it will not be possible to create the necessary density of fire in defense, and even more so in the offensive, with its help, therefore, the author is right about the outdated samples for that period.

By the way, Mosinka took to the stage when forming new divisions, and before that she lay in warehouses waiting for re-melting. The army at the outbreak of the war was armed with much more effective weapons, self-loading SKS and SVT carbines, which the Germans enjoyed using.

[Petrof]

Quote: bairat

SKS self-loading carbines

Adopted in 1949

and for mass use of SVT education was not enough
there are reports that officers cannot master the TT pistol — there is no relevant experience, military skill, and there is simply no knowledge.

[The boat]

Quote: Petrof

there are reports that officers cannot master the TT pistol — there is no relevant experience, military skill, and there is simply no knowledge.

link please.

[Petrof]

I read for a long time, I don’t remember exactly where
it was about the pre-war period, that is, before the Second World War and about army officers who had just graduated from the school.

but I remember the memoirs of a pilot (Shmelev "From Low Heights") where he says that all the pilots of his regiment (or whatever it was called there) - did not know how to use a compass and a map in flight and to find out where they are actually - they had to sit down and interview the local residents.

[bober1982]

Lord, what a foolish thing to say, Petrof- well, everywhere, and everywhere, and about compasses, because oh-oh!
not too lazy, looked at the comments, laudable of course, but there is no need to talk about the pilot Shmelev, and about the locals, etc.

[bairat]

Yeah, wrong, ABC 36.

[Alexl]

For some reason, all the bumps are reset to the military command, but it is forgotten that the military command (i.e., the NPO and the General Staff) did not work in isolation from the country's top political leadership - Stalin, the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars.

[NordUral]

It seems very much that there was everything - both inability and betrayal. Therefore, the bitter 41. They cleared out the traitors and learned to fight already in the course of the war. And many thanks to them, the heroes of the battles and the workers of the rear!

[The boat]

Quote: NordUral

They cleared the traitors and learned to fight already during the war

about "cleared out traitors during the war" in more detail, please. Just curious. The thesis that they learned to fight during the war is not new and does not cause doubts. So, in fact, it has always been - we did not come prepared for any war. Actually, this is not a reason for joy, IMHO.

[w3554152]

Tell me, uncle ... Yu.M. Lermontov
The author, like Goebbels' hidden grandson, coached the facts in the form of gossip, mixed them, and arguments below the belt. And what did he want to play in his school essay? In the end, everything came down to Stalin's guilt. He shot at Stalin, but shot at Russia. For me today, the attitude towards Stalin is a criterion of mind and honesty: an anti-Stalinist is either illiterate or a scoundrel. There is no third. But if everything is clear with the scoundrels rushing to Stalin to get to Russia, then you can’t say much about the phenomenon of illiterate fools in the narrow space of the forum. Minus definitely

[The boat]

Quote: w3554152

Author as Goebbels' hidden grandson

what a powerful image ... "The illegitimate son of the fifth column. All."

Quote: w3554152

For me today - attitude to Stalin is a criterion of mind and honesty: an anti-Stalinist is either illiterate or a scoundrel.

nda ... Reductio ad Stalinum ... Maybe you personally don’t

Quote: w3554152

scoundrel

But

Quote: w3554152

illiterate

- for sure. I agree with one in the match:

Quote: w3554152

you can’t say much about the phenomenon of illiterate fools in a narrow forum space

Yes, in fact, it is not required - they speak for themselves.

[skeptic31]

Writing correctly, of course, is necessary, but to use this as some kind of argument ... it's you for nothing.
“Great education. Knows four languages. Writes poems. Absolute nerd. ” The phrase, which was so diligently extorted and extinct by foreign language experts, is “philologists” from Shakespeare’s comedy “Twelfth Night.” It is understandable, otherwise they will have nothing to rely on in their claims to their omniscience.

[skeptic31]

Writing correctly, of course, is necessary, but to use this as some kind of argument ... it's you for nothing.
“Great education. Knows four languages. Writes poems. Absolute nerd. ” The phrase, which was so diligently extorted and extinct by foreign language experts, is “philologists” from Shakespeare’s comedy “Twelfth Night.” It is understandable, otherwise they will have nothing to rely on in their claims to their omniscience.

[ASK505]

Quote: Das Boot

Reductio ad Stalinum ... Maybe you personally don’t

Another refined polyglot boatman with a claim to originality. According to the dictionaries they won’t run around here. Then for whom are these foreign letters: Reductio ad? Just want to pour mud from around the corner of Stalin? Not new. Not, but the second is for sure.

[Scraptor]

But he doesn’t have Marinesco or Lunin in the photo ...

[ASK505]

He clearly wrote in German his nickname - the boat. In the photo fitz.

[Scraptor]

The Germanized Slav is actually ...

[Turkir]

Better bitter truth than sweet lie is a good principle.
The author made an analysis that lovers of labeling call criticism (!) So as not to repeat mistakes in the future that people have to pay for.
From what positions is the analysis made? With patriotic.
Why blame him?
-----------
I am especially touched by the reproaches to the author that it is easy to write to him, "later," after the events.
Following their logic, the analyst should write "before" events or not write at all.
There is a third option - to write only that which is pleasant to listen to and lulls the mind.
The author wrote about this.

[Black cat]

Quote: Das Boot

Key phrase:
Quote: Black cat
when used wisely

I will specifically explain: a reasonable use is not to throw tanks on the terrain inaccessible for their use without infantry, artillery and air support on the undeveloped enemy defenses. So not a unique weapon that can defeat everyone and everything, tank troops must be used in cooperation with all other types of troops. With regards to the same T-28, it is well protected in terms of booking the latest upgrades: forehead up to 80mm, side up to 40mm. The armament is a short-barreled 76mm cannon (45mm on early versions) and 4 7,62mm machine guns. At the same time, unlike the "raw" T-34s, it was more reliable and mastered by the crews in terms of operation. Of the minuses, one can single out too large a crew and dimensions. The tank is not bad, to put it mildly, not worse than its German counterparts, and in some ways even better. Now, with regards to the T-35, it makes no sense to give the characteristics, since it did not participate in the battles, having got the Germans as a trophy, there were only 56 of them released, believe me, the tank is not to blame for being thrown to the enemy without a fight.

[gammipapa]

And what is the moral of this opus? why did a person write so many beeches? Did the gentlemen screaming not pay the grant to the author, let's condemn communism, it’s the communists who have killed so many people, let's repent. What bastards killed so many people, let's repent. Is this the idea the writer wanted to convey to us ???

On my own, I’ll say one thing, be that as it may, but the USSR won the war, defeated everyone and the Japs at Khalkhin Gol and the Germans with the whole united Europe, and the Americans showed Kuzkin their mother with their atomic bomb. Glory to such ancestors and respect.
Everyone crashes, hardships, mistakes, but if the share of glorious deeds is as significant as the Soviet leadership had, then people forgive mistakes and value achievements and this is right. If someone says that this is not so and you need to cut your neck for every wrong step - this is not our person, Russian people are generous and fair.

[Zomanus]

The man simply painted the jambs in the case when the weapon is not stolen.
That is, dofiga weapons, but they can’t competently dispose of them.
Take the first Chechen one ... exactly the same situation.
We learned to fight in the field, but had to fight in the city.
Afghan, the first call of our troops. From the memoirs of the participants, too, a bunch of tinsel,
which I had to get rid of quickly.
It’s just that the author showed, in my opinion, that in addition to having weapons and fighters,
one must have appropriate thinking.
Again, what years are these?
Try to take the initiative, they can even call the enemy of the people ...
So you shouldn’t blame the author,
it is worth making conclusions and not allowing repetition.

[tasha]

An article at the yellow press of the 90's. During this time, a large number of articles, books, and comments have been written. Author, read ...
What else is hooked. If the author is really a design engineer, then the passages from the category "something is not done, this is not done, that is not created ..." is surprising. Everything has reasons, design and technological ... The author, for the sake of interest, study the materials on 37-mm assault rifles, the history of their creation and production.

I support the very first comment.

[iouris]

That's right. The defeat of the Red Army at the first stage of the war was programmed. Question by whom and why. I believe that Stalin understood that success in the war at its first stage would lead to the fact that the USSR would be left without allies alone against all. Germany cannot win the war without the support of Russia or the United States.

[RoTTor]

G.K.Zhukov was just the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, i.e. he was responsible for these misses and for military intelligence by job ...
And there are a lot of uncomfortable questions about his service in KOVO.
But he shaved his head under the people's commissar Tymoshenko