How to arrange a nuclear armageddon
The general conditions for entering the United States Armed Forces (AF) into a war were named in 1984 – 1986 by then Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger. Here is their summary.
First, the US armed forces should not start a war unless the vital interests of the country and its allies are at stake. What was meant by life interests? Weinberger explained this in the following way: “American interests are not carved anywhere in stone”, “we should never be tempted to determine the perimeter of vital interests”, “our vital interests can only be determined by us and our definition of interests”.
Secondly, the use of the US Armed Forces should be the last resort and should be made only after using the vital interests of the United States and its allies to protect the diplomatic and political. economic and other efforts. "We must never again use the forces of the United States in a war in which we do not intend to win," the head of the Pentagon pointed out.
Thirdly, to win a victory, it is necessary to use a sufficient number of forces with appropriate support.
Fourth, before entering the US armed forces into the war, it was necessary to clearly define political and military objectives.
In addition, before the US Armed Forces launched overseas, the US government had to enlist the support of the people and their elected congressional representatives.
Of course, the statement by the US Secretary of Defense to Congress about the conditions for launching the US Armed Forces in the war did not mention the American interpretation of the right to self-defense (in the form of preemptive use of military force) and that state survival is not a matter of law. Incidentally, with the end of the Cold War, the United States became ardent admirers of the laws and customs of warfare (for example, proportionality of the use of military force, the distinction between military and civilian objects), trying to impose its rules of the game based on the use of temporary advantages of the latest American military technology to potential opponents.
“Starting a war is easier than ending it,” an American American author of the Big Strategy study, John Collins, stated in 1973. Consider the features and problems of the issue of the termination of the use of nuclear weapons (CLP).
MYTH ABOUT IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE NUCLEAR WAR
Obviously, as long as nuclear weapons exist, there is the possibility of a nuclear war, which can move away or approach, depending on the prevailing situation. It is equally clear that a nuclear war, if it starts, cannot be infinite and should ever end. Putting your head in the sand, arguing that nuclear war is impossible, seems unreasonable.
In the US Department of Defense Nuclear Review 1994 of the year, it was said about "maintaining the possibility of a military conflict with the Russian Federation if a government hostile to the United States comes to power". The 2001 Nuclear Survey of the Year has already stated that "a military conflict with the Russian Federation is possible, but not expected." And in the next 2010 Nuclear Survey of the year, it is stated that “the threat of a global nuclear war has become remote”, while “the risk of a nuclear attack on NATO countries is at the lowest historical level”, and Russia and the United States are no longer “opposed,” and the outlook military confrontation in recent decades have declined. " However, in the report of the Secretary of Defense of the United States prepared in 2013 on the strategy of using nuclear weapons of this country, the following words were said: "The threat of a global nuclear war has become distant, but the risk of a nuclear attack has increased." If the risk of a nuclear attack on the US has increased, then the risk of the use of nuclear weapons by the US Armed Forces also increases.
At the same time, the US president has the sole right to use and terminate the use of nuclear weapons, guided by the interests of national security.
The primary interests of US national security are the survival of the nation and the prevention of catastrophic attacks. US nuclear weapons, in simple terms, are designed, firstly, to prevent a nuclear attack on their country, secondly, to “survive” their opponents during a nuclear war and, thirdly, to ensure the cessation of nuclear warfare for the United States. .
In a normal war, victory can be different. This is an "absolute" victory, accompanied by the complete surrender of the enemy. This is a “Pyrrhic victory”, becoming almost a defeat for the defeated opponent. This is a “nominal” victory, meaning for the loser to turn non-win into achievement.
In American political circles, it is generally accepted that victory in a nuclear war is impossible, but in the military spheres it is allowed to end the nuclear war only on conditions favorable to the USA. Here are some quotes from US official military documents of different periods.
“In the event of a strategic nuclear war with the Soviet Union, the United States should be able to force the Soviet Union to cease hostilities as soon as possible under conditions advantageous for the United States” (“Defense Minister Guidelines for 1984 – 1988 Financial Years” of 1982).
The range of capabilities of the US Armed Forces should provide for “large-scale destruction of the enemy’s military and economic infrastructure while at the same time minimizing the enemy’s ability to retaliate”. "Provide top management with a range of options designed to manage the escalation and end the conflict on favorable conditions for the United States and its allies." “The goal of the strategy to end the war should be to end the conflict at the lowest possible level of destruction in accordance with national interests” (“Doctrine of Joint Nuclear Operations” of the US armed forces 1993 of the year).
"End the conflict under conditions favorable to the United States and its allies." "The stage of ending the war may initially include the completion of nuclear activities, but not necessarily the completion of all aspects of the conduct of hostilities with conventional weapons." “The goal of the termination strategy is to end the conflict with the lowest level of destruction, achieving national goals” (the project “Doctrines of Joint Nuclear Operations” of the US Armed Forces 2005).
CONDITIONS OF TRANSITION TO PEACE
Judging by the cited provisions for the cessation of a nuclear ignited nuclear facility, a nuclear war should be stopped:
- on conditions favorable to the USA,
- at the lowest level of mutual destruction,
- at a possibly earlier stage,
- until the end of hostilities with conventional weapons or simultaneously with the end of hostilities with conventional weapons,
- in accordance with national interests in achieving national goals.
Favorable conditions imply that the enemy has more damage than the United States, the enemy’s ability to retaliate is limited, the United States retained a superior nuclear reserve to continue the pressure on the enemy by its center of gravity and vulnerabilities, the military-political leadership of the enemy realized the senseless continuation and the escalation of the conflict, the United States and its allies regained control of previously lost territory or captured part of the enemy’s territory. The smallest level of destruction is possible in case of refusal to defeat or to continue the defeat of objects of the economy. Termination of the NLP at the earliest possible stage of the conflict reduces the damage that could have been done over the entire period of the conflict.
Termination of the NPS can be carried out:
- after a demonstrative demonstration of the power of a nuclear weapon to the enemy (“signal” nuclear explosion outside / near / on the territory of the opponent);
- after selective (limited) use of nuclear weapons on the enemy, designed to play the role of the last warning;
- after or during a counter-force strike on the enemy;
- during or after a counter-strike against the enemy;
- after the completion of a joint counter-force and counter-critical strike on the enemy during subsequent nuclear operations.
Why after or during strikes?
After a demonstrative or selective strike short in duration, the enemy is given time to “think again”, weigh everything and everyone and decide either to negotiate or continue military operations under the threat of a counter-force strike.
A counter-force strike is manifold (it can be aimed at objects of all or individual subcategories of one or several categories of military objects) and differs in the duration of execution (one-time or in series of blows). With the sequence of its execution, creating a kind of “escalation”, the enemy gets an opportunity after completing each stage of such escalation and after finishing the assessment of the situation to decide on negotiations and to offer negotiations on the termination of the PNO. The same is possible after a one-time full-blooded counter-force strike.
With a counter-strike, its definite duration, consistency, and methodical approach to the destruction of objects in cities gives the enemy a chance to reduce damage with the earliest possible proposal to mutually terminate the NLP. A few examples of these options.
One of the memoranda of the year, 1974, said that in a limited nuclear war, the United States would seek to end it as soon as possible on terms acceptable to them and their allies, as long as its scale is as limited as possible. In 1981, US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said that control over the NPL escalation was provided in order to ensure the prospect of ending hostilities before they escalate into a general nuclear war.
Photo: Reuters
TIME FOR NEGOTIATIONS
In 1985, the American researcher Bruce Blair believed that “after the Soviet attack, even a large-scale attack, there would be a constant need to influence the decision-making process by the opponent to restrain the rest of his forces with intimidation or otherwise force him into restraint at that time when attempts are made to negotiate a truce. " He also mentioned the opinion of “many” that the strategic nuclear reserve should become a lever for such negotiations even after the exchange of strategic nuclear strikes, which would destroy a significant part of the population and economic resources of both countries.
Regarding the time of the beginning of negotiations on the termination of the NWP, the memorandum of the Chairman of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff (NSC) of the US Armed Forces of 1969 is of interest. It follows from the document that negotiations on the cessation of hostilities “on the most favorable” conditions for the United States were expected after the United States launched a pre-emptive or retaliatory nuclear strike against three categories of objects (nuclear forces, military facilities outside cities, military forces and military resources) industrial facilities in cities), or a preemptive or retaliatory nuclear strike simultaneously against objects of two categories (nuclear forces, military facilities outside cities). And negotiations on the cessation of hostilities “on favorable” terms for the United States were expected after a preemptive nuclear strike by the United States against objects of one category — the nuclear forces of the USSR. In the latter case, Moscow could be excluded from the list of military facilities to ensure the survival of the Soviet leadership with the aim of negotiating. Negotiations with the goal of de-escalation would be envisaged after the selective use by the United States of several nuclear warheads to demonstrate determination to use nuclear weapons or to strike at the airfields of our Far aviation in the Arctic. Finally, negotiations were expected to cease hostilities after the selective implementation of the NATO SSP plan (for the option of delivering nuclear strikes only against the allies of the USSR, excluding objects on the territory of the USSR).
How did it become possible to stop using nuclear weapons at any time? At the dawn of the “atomic age”, in the 40 and 50 years of the last century, the United States only thought about how to start and wage a nuclear war. Plans for the use of nuclear weapons were drawn up by the types and even kinds of arms of the Armed Forces and changed with kaleidoscopic speed as the forces saturate with nuclear weapons. In 60-s, strategic offensive nuclear forces were created, a system of global operational management of these forces, a single plan for the destruction of strategic stationary objects with nuclear weapons for all types of Armed Forces (regional NAL plans were coordinated with it). A provision was put into effect on the automatic termination of the NZD after a strictly defined time for completing the nuclear strike plan. Then this practice received an addition. This supplement has expanded the president’s ability to manage a nuclear war. If earlier he could control the start and escalation of the PNO and was actually a hostage of plans, the flywheel of which execution was quickly and simultaneously stopped unrealistic, now he had the ability to manage also the de-escalation and termination of the PNO and gained confidence that his orders for de-escalation and upon termination of the NPL, they will be executed exactly and on time. The timeliness of communicating to the perpetrators of plans for a nuclear war an order to terminate the NWP has become just as important as bringing the order to the NWP.
CONTRIBUTION OF ADVISERS
As is known, the decision of the US President regarding the use of nuclear weapons is based on the advice of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders of the joint commands and the recommendations of the allies, and clear "orders for nuclear weapons are transmitted from the President and the Minister of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Committee"
In order to formalize the presidential decision, it is necessary both the documents that regulate the compilation and distribution to the performers of orders relating to nuclear forces and changes in the level of readiness of these forces, and the authorities invested with the right to compose and send such orders. In the United States, the compilation of such documents is the Emergency Action Message Procedures (EAMP). This multivolume document defines: the procedures for the actions of the command center during nuclear operations; the order of compilation, signature, authentication and distribution of formalized orders for emergency actions related to the use of nuclear weapons; procedures for reporting on the use of nuclear weapons, etc.
The drafting of a documented and properly certified order for the use of nuclear weapons was assigned, even at the birth of the global operational management system, to the emergency section at the National Military Command Center and in the stationary and mobile emergency command and control centers of the United States. The transfer of orders for the use and cessation of the use of nuclear weapons from the section to the executors is provided for using modern and “ancient” types and kinds of communications of the operational management system.
In a nuclear war, the president leads the country and the Armed Forces through the surviving spare mobile and stationary command centers. Continuously summarized in such centers, reports on the progress of the implementation of plans for nuclear ignited nuclear installations (missile launches and bomb dropping), the results of the destruction of enemy targets (intelligence data), the extent of damage caused by the United States nuclear weapons (military and FEMA estimates) allow the president or his successor to see a general picture of the consequences of the exchange of nuclear strikes, to evaluate the success of each party’s actions, to come to a decision on the continuation of the PNO or on offering the enemy a truce (the decision on a unilateral demonstration effective termination of the NPL is considered unlikely).
Here, probably, it is time to recall the saying of the eighteenth-century American-French revolutionary Thomas Paine: “Only an idiot will oscillate between peace and the continuation of war, when it is obvious that peace will bring more benefits than even victory.” But in order to negotiate the cessation of the NPL, there is little desire of one side; such a desire must be shared by the adversary. At the same time, according to some researchers in the field of the “theory of termination”, one should not drive the enemy into a corner. The outcome of the negotiations should have been a decision to suspend or end a nuclear war.
In this regard, I recall an interview given by Admiral William Crow, then Chairman of the U.S. Chief of Staff Committee, to American Time magazine 1988: “I had several war games involving limited nuclear strikes, and in this hypothetical atmosphere very quickly on both sides there was a lot of pressure to stop using nuclear weapons. These were speculative games. But they show that our leaders understand the horrors of nuclear annihilation and will make strenuous efforts to avoid it. ”
In a non-nuclear war, a cease-fire can lead to a temporary cessation of hostilities (truce) or to their final end (armistice). In a nuclear war, termination of a NPL (cessation, termination) can be partial, temporary, complete, and final. A partial cessation of the NPL would be the suspension of nuclear strikes on certain geographic areas or on objects of certain categories and subcategories. A temporary complete cessation of the NPL would mean the suspension of the NPL for a certain period of time, followed by the resumption of the NZP or the subsequent conversion of the temporary complete cessation of the NZO to the final one.
RIGHT TO ORDER
Nuclear war spares no one, not even the presidents. The right to give an order to the NLP and the termination of the NLP in the event of the death of the US President, his removal from office or the inability of the President to fulfill his duties is used by his successor. The chain of succession to the successors of the US President begins with elected persons (vice president, leaders of the House of Representatives and the Senate) and ends with appointed persons (ministers). The existence of such a chain of continuity of power gives both parties, who have begun negotiations on the termination of the PNO, confidence that the negotiations are conducted at the proper level.
In one of our military publications in 1990, it was reported that the order of taking emergency measures and decisions of a military nature in emergency situations and in wartime is set by a special directive issued by each president: “As experience shows, in most cases the right to decide measures to ensure the security of the country (up to the use of nuclear weapons in response) in the event of the death of the president or lack of communication with him is given in order of priority to the vice-president, Nistru Defense, First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. " If this provision remains in force in our time, then it can be assumed that one of these four will also propose the start of negotiations on the termination of the NPL.
It is obvious that at the beginning of negotiations it is necessary to certify (with the help of predetermined methods) the identity of those entering into negotiations and to confirm their official position. In addition, in the negotiations, mutual conviction in the ability of the negotiating officials of both states to ensure the implementation of their joint decision to terminate the NLP is necessary.
It is clear that agreement should immediately be found regarding:
- the content of the nuclear armistice (will the termination of the NZP be partial or complete, temporary or final);
- the timing of the entry into force of the agreement (the time of issuance of the order to terminate the PNO and the time of commencement of the order for the executors to partial, temporary or final termination of the PNO);
- mutually informing each other about the progress of the process of termination of the NLP and on compliance with / violation of the regime of termination of the NLP.
The United States will also have to maintain contact with its allies who have or use national or American nuclear weapons.
MUTUAL SOLUTION
Mutual determination to terminate the NZD can turn into the will to do so only if the main parties to the nuclear conflict have a permanent direct two-way communication. Traditional ways to establish contacts to start negotiations (through diplomatic, trade and intelligence channels through third countries or through intermediaries in third countries) are not suitable because of the short-lived changes in the situation. It is no coincidence that, as early as in 1963, a closed direct connection was established between the USSR and the USA “for use in emergency circumstances by the heads of governments of these countries”, and since 1971, the improvement of direct communication lines between the USSR and the USA began. During the Cold War, the media once reported that there was one city in the United States and the USSR that were not allowed to strike nuclear weapons: through the means of communication installed there, the possibility of direct negotiations during a nuclear war was provided. Undoubtedly, the development of information technology should expand the possibilities of maintaining a direct connection of the heads of state in any conditions of warfare, and not only from the reserve national command centers.
The strategy to terminate the NPL in execution is complex both politically, militarily and technically. However, it provides for and provides solutions to many issues. It is impossible to exclude the circumstances when the adversary uses his political decision to terminate the NPL to prepare for the resumption of a nuclear war. It is impossible to exclude, at the appointed time of the truce, cases of unauthorized single or group use of nuclear weapons from one’s own side or from the side of the enemy due to weakening of military control over the demoralized consequences of nuclear war by personnel. Technical failures cannot be ruled out when, for example, a failed recall from a flight of an aircraft carrying a nuclear weapon would lead to a nuclear strike after an armistice and thus violate the regime for the termination of the use of nuclear weapons by one of the parties. It is impossible to exclude the case when one or several nuclear countries - allies of the United States refuse to terminate the NPL with their own national nuclear forces. Cessation of a NLP by two opponents requires each to maintain continuous two-way communication, iron discipline at all levels, mutual trust, mutual restraint, and, in possible isolated cases, unauthorized NLP by the enemy or on its own and unilateral tolerance subject to assurance from the wrongdoing country that such action.
STRATEGIC REPETITIONS
The system of operational control of the US armed forces (control is the setting of tasks from top to bottom and the presentation of reports from bottom to top) has existed for a long time and functions continuously.
In 2013, an authoritative US magazine covering the life of the Air Force reported that the United States Joint Strategic Command (USC) nuclear forces rehearsed “nuclear operations scenarios” several times a day for the teams of the United States Chief of Staff and the USC Global Operations Center (KNS conducts checks three times a day). USC nuclear forces also participate in periodically held “communications exercises at the strategic level”. In the 1993 year, a newspaper published in France published information that the US nuclear forces “ten times a day” are trained in actions related to the use of nuclear weapons.
During the hot years of the Cold War, all types of termination of the NPL took part in a certain percentage of such rehearsals by the US nuclear forces; this gave the participants confidence that, thanks to the established operational management system, such an order would be executed depending on the situation in a period of ten minutes to one or two hours from the time it was returned.
As you can see, in the United States they prefer to be prepared for what may not be, than not to be prepared for what might happen.
From the existing “rules of the game” among Americans, it can be concluded that they propose to wage a nuclear war on a limited scale, more civilized and more humane. Obviously, the limitation of the scale of nuclear war is caused, firstly, by a reduction in the number of strategic bombers, launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs (for example, from 2500 in 1990, in the USSR to 898 in 2015, in the Russian Federation), secondly, in a decrease in nuclear ammunition (The US military in 1990 had 21 392 nuclear warheads, 2014 left 4717 in the year), thirdly, by a multiple decrease in the megatonnage of the general and active nuclear ammunition of both countries, fourthly, the primary focus of nuclear weapons on nuclear military facilities (without US MB Which are lure for the strategic nuclear forces of Russia, a nuclear war would be transformed from a limited to a full-scale counterforce targeting with kontrtsennostnym targeting).
Civilization is ensured by the fact that the United States "does not rely on a counter-strategic strategy" and "will not intentionally target civilians and civilian objects." Humanity is expressed in the need for the United States to "apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and strive to minimize the collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects."
As nuclear war becomes more limited, more civilized and more humane, it is believed that the chances of early negotiations on ending the use of nuclear weapons to end it from a position of force are possible as soon as possible with the least destruction, casualties and other consequences. This requires the existence and improvement of the “Cessation Strategy” of the Strategic Nuclear Formation with its complex of predetermined and carefully developed measures. The implementation of a strategy for terminating a NPL is facilitated by the maintenance of technical means for negotiating, the availability of methods of entering into negotiations and negotiation, the advance preparation of agreement formats, the existence of procedures for issuing a presidential order to terminate a PNO, a system for ensuring that such orders are communicated to the executors, preparedness and the reliability of the executors of the order to stop the use of nuclear weapons, the survivability of the nuclear reserve.
“To govern is to foresee,” said Napoleon Bonaparte. It is unlikely that anyone will doubt the effectiveness of this situation in the nuclear age.
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