Secrets of the outbreak of war remain secrets
To this day, there are many, many unclear things we have in the coverage of the prewar half of the 1941 of the year, and especially of the last prewar and first military weeks ...
Say, the famous merit of the People's Commissar of the Navy Nikolai Kuznetsov in the timely bringing fleets into readiness No. XXUMX ... Nikolai Gerasimov insistently emphasized that he did this on his own initiative, without Stalin’s sanction. But isn’t everything here sewn with white thread?
QUESTIONS AND ONCE AGAIN QUESTIONS
The fact that the fleets were more or less ready for the German attack is a fact. But the unauthorized return by the Navy Commissar of the order to bring the Naval fleet in combat readiness is far from a fact. As well as the influence, by the way, of this order on the readiness of the fleets. There are secret and only recently declassified “Notes of the Sevastopol defense participant” captain 1943st rank Alexander Kiprianovich Evseev, from which it follows that full combat readiness on the Black Sea Fleet was announced after the first German bombs exploded on Sevastopol Seaside Boulevard.
But giving an order and its execution are different things. And I believe that Kuznetsov gave orders, although there are many strange inconsistencies in his descriptions of the last days before the war. Suppose he gave the order, the question is true - when? But could a people's commissar take such a step before the outbreak of hostilities without direct instructions from Stalin?
First of all, why would the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov start playing the alarm on their own? Was he, in addition to Stalin, informed about the exact date of the start of the war?
Secondly, the readiness number XXUMX is a “Big Gather” signal in the fleet bases, combat alert on ships, gallant Red Navy men and women lieutenants in white tunics, white trousers and white shoes running from their leave! In Sevastopol, Odessa, Leningrad, Riga, Tallinn ...
And the agents of the Abwehr are watching this commotion ... Yes - just the citizens of the Third Reich, who turned out to be in the Union on official business. The latter, however, very little remained on our territory before the war, but Kuznetsov did not know about it.
And the war suddenly take and June 22 not start. Let's say Hitler would have started another week! He was not going to poke around with us until the autumn thaw, he expected to complete everything before the fall and could donate for a week for one reason or another. The timing of the spring offensive in the West in 1940, he suffered almost 20 times! And what would we have then?
At a minimum - the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Reich NKID of the USSR And at most - the very reason for the attack, which Stalin was so afraid of.
That's it! Such actions of the country can go sideways, as they can go sideways and unauthorized initiators of such actions. Therefore, Kuznetsov would hardly have acted on his own peril and risk on the eve of the war. But there are many reasons to suppose that the army and the navy received Stalin’s first sanction for preparatory measures to repel a possible aggression in advance — somewhere 18 – 19 of June 1941 of the year.
But if it was done on time, even by the USSR Navy Commissar Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov? And even more so - Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army General of the Army Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. And even more so - all on the ground. There is a reason to assume that even in 1941, the burping of the conspiracy of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky was not eliminated. In the end, why did Hitler strike through Belarus, when, as everyone agrees, he needed Ukraine? Having occupied it with an enormous mass of troops, he could count on many things ... And Hitler struck through the Pinsk swamps ... Isn’t he because he knew: it was here that the traitors were disorganizing his resistance?
NO WITNESSES
I recall a long conversation with my comrade and colleague Belarus Anatoly Pokalo ... About 40 years ago, his fellow villagers, who were already adults in 1941, told him that on the eve of the war, someone warned them: on Sunday “they will begin to maneuver and throw aircraft barrels of burning fuel oil. " And in aviation the unit, which was based in the area of the village of Kuplin, Pruzhany district, Brest region, removed all machine guns “for prevention” from military vehicles, leaving only three duty aircraft armed.
A modest but impressive monument to the deputy commander of the 33 squadron of the Fighter Aviation Regiment was set up in Pruzhany senior lieutenant Stepan Mitrofanovich Gudimov, who performed the 22 air ram on June 1941 of the year at 5 hours 20 minutes.
Is it because Gudimov was forced to go to the ram because he already had no aboard weapons not a single cartridge?
Simple people are simple people. Im falsification stories to nothing. And perhaps this ingenuous story convincingly than other studies proves: it was in Zapov, under the command of General of the Army Dmitry Pavlov, besides numerous stumbling heads, there were many direct traitors.
But who can confirm this today, if there were no witnesses of what happened at the top then?
The circle of persons in Moscow fully aware of the situation was extremely small.
The circle of the first persons in the three border Special Districts, which had the opportunity to see the situation of the last days before the war as a whole, was also, in general, small even at the level of cryptographers.
Let us evaluate this circle “on the ground” using the data from the first volume of the “History of the Great Patriotic War” of the 1961 edition of the year.
Baltic Special Military District (PSB): Commander Fyodor Isidorovich Kuznetsov; the chief of staff is not specified in the volume, but this is Peter Semenovich Klenov; member of the Military Council Pyotr Akimovich Dibrova; army commanders: 8-th - Petr Petrovich Sobennikov and 11-th - Vasily Ivanovich Morozov.
Kuznetsov District Commander 30 June 1941, removed, fought without much brilliance.
Chief of Staff Lt.-General P.S. Maples, 1892 year of birth, in July 1941, dismissed from the ranks of the Red Army, died 10 July 1941 year.
A member of the Military Council Dibrova held minor positions during the war.
The commander of the 8 th army Sobennikov had a dubious military fate, dropped in rank to a colonel, was conditionally convicted.
The commander of the 11 Army Morozov fought not in the best way either.
West PSB: Commander Dmitry G. Pavlov; Chief of Staff Vladimir Klimovskiy; Military Council member Alexander Yakovlevich Fominykh; Army commanders: 3 - Vasily Ivanovich Kuznetsov, 10 - Konstantin Dmitrievich Golubev, 4 - Alexander Andreyevich Korobkov.
District Commander Pavlov was shot in 1941 year.
The chief of staff of the Klimovskys was shot in 1941 year.
A member of the Military Council Fominyh after the start of the war hopelessly downgraded.
The commander of the 3 Army Kuznetsov valiantly fought, Hero of the Soviet Union.
The commander of the 10 th army Golubev left the encirclement in the year 1941, fought.
The commander of 4 Army Korobkov shot in 1941 year.
The commander of the Western PSB Army General Dmitry Pavlov was shot in 1941 year.
Photo from www.warheroes.ru
Photo from www.warheroes.ru
Kiev Special Military District: commander Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos; Chief of Staff Maxim Alekseevich Purkayev; Military Council member Nikolay Nikolayevich Vashugin; army commanders: 5 th - Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov, 6 th - Ivan Nikolaevich Muzychenko, 26 th - Fedor Yakovlevich Kostenko, 12 th - Pavel G. Podedelin.
District Commander Kirponos died in the fall of 1941 of the year.
From April 1943, the chief of staff of Purkaev commanded the troops of the non-military Far Eastern front.
Military Council member Vashugin 28 June 1941, shot himself.
Army commander Potapov was captured in the summer of 1941, in 1945, returned to his homeland, passed a special inspection in the NKVD and in December 1945 was reinstated in the frames of the Red Army.
The commander of the 6 Army Muzychenko was captured in the summer of 1941, in 1945, returned to his homeland, passed a special inspection in the NKVD and in December 1945 was reinstated in the personnel of the Red Army.
Kostenko’s army commander died in the spring of 1942.
12 Army Commander Ponedelin was captured in the summer of 1941, then was sentenced to death in absentia, returned to his homeland in 1945, after the investigation, which lasted until 1950, was shot.
That is, living reliable witnesses of the top-level command and control on the eve of 22 June 1941 almost did not exist even immediately after the war. And what was there in the districts after 18 of June 1941 of the year is now most likely impossible to establish at all - after the Khrushchev and Volkogon pogroms in the state archives.
But doubt the above list, I hope, adds.
SO EVER WHEN?
Let us return once more in the days on the eve of the war and see what is written about them in the memoirs of Admiral Kuznetsov, which are so called: "On the eve". Their enlarged edition Voenizdat released in 1990 year ...
Page 285: "In the second half of the day, 21 June became known: in the nearest night we can expect German attacks ..."
Page 299: “At around midnight 11 the telephone rang. I heard the voice of Marshal Tymoshenko:
- There is very important information. Come to me. ”
The question arises: so when it became known - in the afternoon of June 21 or around 11 in the evening?
We read page 299 further:
“... in a few minutes we (with Rear Admiral Alafuzov. –S.B.) were already on the second floor of a small mansion, where S.K. Tymoshenko.
Marshal, walking about the room, dictated ... Army General GK Zhukov sat at the table and wrote something ...
Semyon Konstantinovich ... without naming sources, said that it is considered possible the German attack on our country ...
Zhukov got up and showed us the telegram he had prepared for the border districts. I remember that it was lengthy - on three pages (and the “Directive No. 1”, which is now being put on public display, is very brief. - S. B.). It described in detail what the troops should undertake in the event of an attack by Hitler Germany.
I turn to Rear Admiral Alafuzov:
“Run to headquarters and immediately instruct the fleets about the total readiness number one ...”
Reporting this, Admiral Kuznetsov did not seem to understand that he himself was almost discrediting his “merit”! After all, by his own admission, he gave the notorious order when delaying his return would be tantamount to treason.
Further, if only five hours before the start of the war, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of General Staff bothered to sit down to write detailed instructions to the Armed Forces about what they "should undertake ... in the event of an attack by Hitler Germany", then such unfortunate bosses in three necks drive with shame is necessary. For criminal neglect of their duties!
Is not it?
And I am putting the theme of the notorious mobilization packages of the General Staff, the very idea of which in the era of mobile wars and radio communications was hopelessly outdated and harmful, out of the question.
But that's not all! We are reading the 300 page: “Later I learned that the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff were summoned on June 21 around 17 hours to I.V. Stalin. Consequently, already at that time ... it was decided to bring the troops on full alert and in the event of an attack to repel it. So it all happened about 11 hours before the enemy’s actual invasion of our land. ”
And again the question arises: what does Kuznetsov mean by writing “this happened”?
It turns out that 11 hours before the attack "occurred" the last Stalin sanction to bring the troops on alert. But even by 11 hours of the evening 21 June "did not happen" sending a directive to the troops.
Why?
What, Stalin is to blame?
But that's not all! We read the 300 page further: “Not long ago I heard from General of the Army I.V. Tyulenev - at that time he commanded the Moscow Military District - that on June 21 around 2 hours of the day (my italics was bold - S. B.) he was called by I.V. Stalin and demanded to increase the combat readiness of air defense ".
It turns out, is not 17 hours, and two in the afternoon? But that's not all! We read page 300 further:
“That evening (June 21. - C. B.) to I.V. Stalin was called Moscow leaders A.S. Shcherbakov and V.P. Pronin. According to Vasily Prokhorovich Pronin, Stalin ordered ... to detain the secretaries of the district committees in their places ... "The Germans may attack," he warned ... "
And this is how to understand?
Rewind the tape of time a little back ...
From the Journal of Visitors' Account for Stalin’s office, we know that 11 June 1941 was from Tymoshenko, Zhukov, Commander PribOVO Kuznetsov, political workers Zaporozhets and Dibrova, and later on airmen Zhigarev, Stefanovsky and Kokkinaki from 21.55 to 22.55. And with Stefanovsky, who had already left in 1.45 12 of June, Stalin talked about something in private for half an hour.
The historian of the General Staff, General Yury Alexandrovich Gorkov, wrote in the 90-ies: “In an atmosphere of impending war 13 June S.К. Tymoshenko asked I.V. Stalin's permission to bring on alert and deploy the first echelons of cover plans. But permission has not been received. ”
I can believe ... Stalin, realizing that the country was not yet ready for a serious war, did not want to give Hitler a single reason for it. It is known that Hitler was very unhappy that Stalin could not be provoked, Yuri Gorkov himself writes about this. 13 June Stalin could still hesitate - is it time to take all possible measures to deploy the troops? That is why he began his own probes with a TASS statement, which he most likely wrote after talking to Tymoshenko. By the way, no one in the army TASS statement from 14 of June that Germany complies with the terms of the 1939 pact of the year has not been demobilized. In any case, all the clever and responsible military leaders - before the commanders and deputy political officers of the regiments - clearly understood that such a statement has a purely political meaning, and the military should always be ready for war.
Later, Marshal Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky argued that "it was necessary to bravely cross the threshold," but "Stalin did not dare to do it ..." Perhaps he did not dare - until a very specific day ... More precisely - until June 18 or a response to the proposal to urgently send Molotov to Berlin (the latter fact was recorded in the Military Diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the Land Forces of Germany General Franz Halder).
Here is another fact suggestive, from the memoirs of Marshal of Artillery Nikolai Dmitrievich Yakovlev, just before the war from the post of commander of artillery KOVO appointed by the head of the SAU:
The road to disaster - German soldiers cross the Soviet border. 1941 Photo of the Year
“By June 19, I had already finished handing over the affairs to my successor, and almost on the run I said goodbye to the now former colleagues. On the move, because the headquarters of the district and its administration these days just received an order to redeploy to Ternopil and hastily shut down their work in Kiev. ”
Does not diverge written with the book G.I. Andreeva and I.D. Vakurova "General Kirponos", published by the Politizdat of Ukraine in 1976 year: "... in the afternoon of June 19, the People's Commissar of Defense received an order for the district headquarters to redeploy to Ternopil."
So, not even two o'clock in the afternoon of 21 June, and the second half of the day 19 June?
But why did this district administration suddenly hurry to Ternopil, where the front command post was located in the building of the former headquarters of the 44 th rifle division? We are told that the "fool" Stalin allegedly did not allow Pavlov to withdraw his troops to the summer camps (in fact, the planned training went in the usual way), but here the district headquarters is being removed from its place! Who could give an indication of this, if not Stalin?
And what did the Kiev ObVO give the order to expand the field management of the district (that is, the front itself), but not the Western ObO not? Urgent instructions came to Kirponos in Kiev by the second half of 19 June, but didn’t they have time to Pavlov to Minsk and to June 21?
Let me disbelieve!
FLIGHT OF COLONNIK ZAKHAROV - STALIN'S LACMUS PAPER
It is very similar to the fact that before the war Stalin did more or less everything that was required from the head of state before the close war, but the generals ...
More than once I referred to a certain evidence, a certain fact, which in the true history of the war must be large printed in bold, but so far has not been awarded even the smallest petit. This evidence is sought in the book "I am a fighter" by Major General Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union Georgy Nefedovich Zakharov, before the war - the commander of the 43 th Fighter Division of the Western Special Military District.
Then Colonel Zakharov already had experience of fighting in Spain (six aircraft shot down personally and four in a group) and in China (three shot down aircraft himself). And this is what he writes:
“Somewhere in the middle of the last prewar week — it was either 17 or 18 on June 41 — I received an order from the aviation commander of the Western Special Military District (Major General Ivan Ivanovich Kopts. - S. B.) to fly over the western border . The length of the route was kilometers 400, and was to fly from south to north - to Bialystok.
I flew to U-2 with the navigator of the 43rd fighter air division, Major Rumyantsev. The border areas west of the state border were crammed with troops. In villages, on farms, in groves were poorly disguised, if not completely disguised Tanks, armored vehicles, guns. Motorcycles snooped along the roads, cars - apparently, headquarters - cars. Somewhere in the depths of the vast territory, a movement was emerging that was braking here, right at our border, abutting against it ... and about to lash through it.
The number of troops recorded by us by eye, at first glance, did not leave me any other options for reflection, except for one thing: war is coming.
Everything that I saw during the flight was layered on my previous military experience, and the conclusion I made for myself can be formulated in four words: “from day to day.”
We then flew a little more than three hours. I often put the plane on any suitable site, which might seem random if the border guard did not immediately approach the plane. The border guard appeared silently, silently taking the visor (that is, he knew in advance that our plane would soon get on with urgent information! - S. B.) and waited a few minutes while I wrote a report on the wing. Having received the report, the border guard disappeared, and we again rose into the air and, having passed 30 – 50 km, sat down again. And I wrote the report again, and the other border guard waited silently and then, with a salute, disappeared silently. By evening, in this way we flew to Bialystok and landed in the location of Sergei Chernykh's division "...
In such a mode, the “removal of information” by the border guards was possible only on the direct instructions of Beria — as Commissar of Internal Affairs, and on the instructions of Stalin himself.
Most likely, Stalin gave such an order after Hitler refused to accept Molotov. After that, it was not necessary to be Stalin to draw the same conclusion that Colonel Zakharov made: from day to day. And Stalin, apparently, instructed the People's Commissariat of Defense to provide urgent and effective aerial reconnaissance of the border area from the German side. Perhaps he gave such a task to Pavel Fedorovich Zhigarev, commander of the Red Army Air Force, who visited Stalin's office from 0.45 to 1.50 17 (actually, 18) of June 1941, and he called Minsk Kopts.
It is clear that an experienced high-level aviation commander was to conduct reconnaissance, and could Kopets choose a better candidate than Colonel Zakharov?
At the same time, Stalin instructed Beria to receive and transmit the information collected by this experienced aviator to Moscow in real time.
That is why Zakharov on the entire route of his flight in the zones of several border detachments under each bush was waiting for the border guard, without even asking what kind of aircraft he had landed in the border strip. He did not sit on the "suitable sites" on his own initiative. He was told beforehand that all information should be periodically transmitted through border guards, making landings through 30 – 50 km.
And necessarily periodically, and not once at the end of the flight!
Why is that?
Yes, because, first of all, time did not wait! Information from Zakharov was waiting for Stalin himself. At a speed of Y-2 (later renamed Po-2) at about 120 – 150 km per hour, the time factor on the 400-kilometer route was already significant.
And secondly…
Secondly, at some point the Germans could have shot down Zakharov. And then at least part of the operational information would still have reached Stalin.
She came altogether completely. And by the evening of June 18, Stalin knew for sure and definitively: the war was coming. And he began to give the relevant orders to the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NCB), the Navy (NC Navy) and the Interior (NKVD).
If we analyze how the war began, for example, the Odessa Military District, then once again we come to the idea that the timely directive on readiness was given no later than 19 June 1941 of the year.
Why the western military districts were not ready - for the time being it remains a mystery, which is still necessary to be solved.
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