Military Review

Secrets of the outbreak of war remain secrets

69
Secrets of the outbreak of war remain secrets


To this day, there are many, many unclear things we have in the coverage of the prewar half of the 1941 of the year, and especially of the last prewar and first military weeks ...

Say, the famous merit of the People's Commissar of the Navy Nikolai Kuznetsov in the timely bringing fleets into readiness No. XXUMX ... Nikolai Gerasimov insistently emphasized that he did this on his own initiative, without Stalin’s sanction. But isn’t everything here sewn with white thread?

QUESTIONS AND ONCE AGAIN QUESTIONS

The fact that the fleets were more or less ready for the German attack is a fact. But the unauthorized return by the Navy Commissar of the order to bring the Naval fleet in combat readiness is far from a fact. As well as the influence, by the way, of this order on the readiness of the fleets. There are secret and only recently declassified “Notes of the Sevastopol defense participant” captain 1943st rank Alexander Kiprianovich Evseev, from which it follows that full combat readiness on the Black Sea Fleet was announced after the first German bombs exploded on Sevastopol Seaside Boulevard.

But giving an order and its execution are different things. And I believe that Kuznetsov gave orders, although there are many strange inconsistencies in his descriptions of the last days before the war. Suppose he gave the order, the question is true - when? But could a people's commissar take such a step before the outbreak of hostilities without direct instructions from Stalin?

First of all, why would the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov start playing the alarm on their own? Was he, in addition to Stalin, informed about the exact date of the start of the war?

Secondly, the readiness number XXUMX is a “Big Gather” signal in the fleet bases, combat alert on ships, gallant Red Navy men and women lieutenants in white tunics, white trousers and white shoes running from their leave! In Sevastopol, Odessa, Leningrad, Riga, Tallinn ...

And the agents of the Abwehr are watching this commotion ... Yes - just the citizens of the Third Reich, who turned out to be in the Union on official business. The latter, however, very little remained on our territory before the war, but Kuznetsov did not know about it.

And the war suddenly take and June 22 not start. Let's say Hitler would have started another week! He was not going to poke around with us until the autumn thaw, he expected to complete everything before the fall and could donate for a week for one reason or another. The timing of the spring offensive in the West in 1940, he suffered almost 20 times! And what would we have then?

At a minimum - the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Reich NKID of the USSR And at most - the very reason for the attack, which Stalin was so afraid of.

That's it! Such actions of the country can go sideways, as they can go sideways and unauthorized initiators of such actions. Therefore, Kuznetsov would hardly have acted on his own peril and risk on the eve of the war. But there are many reasons to suppose that the army and the navy received Stalin’s first sanction for preparatory measures to repel a possible aggression in advance — somewhere 18 – 19 of June 1941 of the year.

But if it was done on time, even by the USSR Navy Commissar Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov? And even more so - Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army General of the Army Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. And even more so - all on the ground. There is a reason to assume that even in 1941, the burping of the conspiracy of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky was not eliminated. In the end, why did Hitler strike through Belarus, when, as everyone agrees, he needed Ukraine? Having occupied it with an enormous mass of troops, he could count on many things ... And Hitler struck through the Pinsk swamps ... Isn’t he because he knew: it was here that the traitors were disorganizing his resistance?

NO WITNESSES

I recall a long conversation with my comrade and colleague Belarus Anatoly Pokalo ... About 40 years ago, his fellow villagers, who were already adults in 1941, told him that on the eve of the war, someone warned them: on Sunday “they will begin to maneuver and throw aircraft barrels of burning fuel oil. " And in aviation the unit, which was based in the area of ​​the village of Kuplin, Pruzhany district, Brest region, removed all machine guns “for prevention” from military vehicles, leaving only three duty aircraft armed.

A modest but impressive monument to the deputy commander of the 33 squadron of the Fighter Aviation Regiment was set up in Pruzhany senior lieutenant Stepan Mitrofanovich Gudimov, who performed the 22 air ram on June 1941 of the year at 5 hours 20 minutes.

Is it because Gudimov was forced to go to the ram because he already had no aboard weapons not a single cartridge?

Simple people are simple people. Im falsification stories to nothing. And perhaps this ingenuous story convincingly than other studies proves: it was in Zapov, under the command of General of the Army Dmitry Pavlov, besides numerous stumbling heads, there were many direct traitors.

But who can confirm this today, if there were no witnesses of what happened at the top then?

The circle of persons in Moscow fully aware of the situation was extremely small.

The circle of the first persons in the three border Special Districts, which had the opportunity to see the situation of the last days before the war as a whole, was also, in general, small even at the level of cryptographers.

Let us evaluate this circle “on the ground” using the data from the first volume of the “History of the Great Patriotic War” of the 1961 edition of the year.

Baltic Special Military District (PSB): Commander Fyodor Isidorovich Kuznetsov; the chief of staff is not specified in the volume, but this is Peter Semenovich Klenov; member of the Military Council Pyotr Akimovich Dibrova; army commanders: 8-th - Petr Petrovich Sobennikov and 11-th - Vasily Ivanovich Morozov.

Kuznetsov District Commander 30 June 1941, removed, fought without much brilliance.

Chief of Staff Lt.-General P.S. Maples, 1892 year of birth, in July 1941, dismissed from the ranks of the Red Army, died 10 July 1941 year.

A member of the Military Council Dibrova held minor positions during the war.

The commander of the 8 th army Sobennikov had a dubious military fate, dropped in rank to a colonel, was conditionally convicted.

The commander of the 11 Army Morozov fought not in the best way either.

West PSB: Commander Dmitry G. Pavlov; Chief of Staff Vladimir Klimovskiy; Military Council member Alexander Yakovlevich Fominykh; Army commanders: 3 - Vasily Ivanovich Kuznetsov, 10 - Konstantin Dmitrievich Golubev, 4 - Alexander Andreyevich Korobkov.

District Commander Pavlov was shot in 1941 year.

The chief of staff of the Klimovskys was shot in 1941 year.

A member of the Military Council Fominyh after the start of the war hopelessly downgraded.

The commander of the 3 Army Kuznetsov valiantly fought, Hero of the Soviet Union.

The commander of the 10 th army Golubev left the encirclement in the year 1941, fought.

The commander of 4 Army Korobkov shot in 1941 year.


The commander of the Western PSB Army General Dmitry Pavlov was shot in 1941 year.
Photo from www.warheroes.ru


Kiev Special Military District: commander Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos; Chief of Staff Maxim Alekseevich Purkayev; Military Council member Nikolay Nikolayevich Vashugin; army commanders: 5 th - Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov, 6 th - Ivan Nikolaevich Muzychenko, 26 th - Fedor Yakovlevich Kostenko, 12 th - Pavel G. Podedelin.

District Commander Kirponos died in the fall of 1941 of the year.

From April 1943, the chief of staff of Purkaev commanded the troops of the non-military Far Eastern front.

Military Council member Vashugin 28 June 1941, shot himself.

Army commander Potapov was captured in the summer of 1941, in 1945, returned to his homeland, passed a special inspection in the NKVD and in December 1945 was reinstated in the frames of the Red Army.

The commander of the 6 Army Muzychenko was captured in the summer of 1941, in 1945, returned to his homeland, passed a special inspection in the NKVD and in December 1945 was reinstated in the personnel of the Red Army.

Kostenko’s army commander died in the spring of 1942.

12 Army Commander Ponedelin was captured in the summer of 1941, then was sentenced to death in absentia, returned to his homeland in 1945, after the investigation, which lasted until 1950, was shot.

That is, living reliable witnesses of the top-level command and control on the eve of 22 June 1941 almost did not exist even immediately after the war. And what was there in the districts after 18 of June 1941 of the year is now most likely impossible to establish at all - after the Khrushchev and Volkogon pogroms in the state archives.

But doubt the above list, I hope, adds.

SO EVER WHEN?

Let us return once more in the days on the eve of the war and see what is written about them in the memoirs of Admiral Kuznetsov, which are so called: "On the eve". Their enlarged edition Voenizdat released in 1990 year ...

Page 285: "In the second half of the day, 21 June became known: in the nearest night we can expect German attacks ..."

Page 299: “At around midnight 11 the telephone rang. I heard the voice of Marshal Tymoshenko:

- There is very important information. Come to me. ”

The question arises: so when it became known - in the afternoon of June 21 or around 11 in the evening?

We read page 299 further:

“... in a few minutes we (with Rear Admiral Alafuzov. –S.B.) were already on the second floor of a small mansion, where S.K. Tymoshenko.

Marshal, walking about the room, dictated ... Army General GK Zhukov sat at the table and wrote something ...

Semyon Konstantinovich ... without naming sources, said that it is considered possible the German attack on our country ...

Zhukov got up and showed us the telegram he had prepared for the border districts. I remember that it was lengthy - on three pages (and the “Directive No. 1”, which is now being put on public display, is very brief. - S. B.). It described in detail what the troops should undertake in the event of an attack by Hitler Germany.

I turn to Rear Admiral Alafuzov:

“Run to headquarters and immediately instruct the fleets about the total readiness number one ...”

Reporting this, Admiral Kuznetsov did not seem to understand that he himself was almost discrediting his “merit”! After all, by his own admission, he gave the notorious order when delaying his return would be tantamount to treason.

Further, if only five hours before the start of the war, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of General Staff bothered to sit down to write detailed instructions to the Armed Forces about what they "should undertake ... in the event of an attack by Hitler Germany", then such unfortunate bosses in three necks drive with shame is necessary. For criminal neglect of their duties!

Is not it?

And I am putting the theme of the notorious mobilization packages of the General Staff, the very idea of ​​which in the era of mobile wars and radio communications was hopelessly outdated and harmful, out of the question.

But that's not all! We are reading the 300 page: “Later I learned that the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff were summoned on June 21 around 17 hours to I.V. Stalin. Consequently, already at that time ... it was decided to bring the troops on full alert and in the event of an attack to repel it. So it all happened about 11 hours before the enemy’s actual invasion of our land. ”

And again the question arises: what does Kuznetsov mean by writing “this happened”?

It turns out that 11 hours before the attack "occurred" the last Stalin sanction to bring the troops on alert. But even by 11 hours of the evening 21 June "did not happen" sending a directive to the troops.

Why?

What, Stalin is to blame?

But that's not all! We read the 300 page further: “Not long ago I heard from General of the Army I.V. Tyulenev - at that time he commanded the Moscow Military District - that on June 21 around 2 hours of the day (my italics was bold - S. B.) he was called by I.V. Stalin and demanded to increase the combat readiness of air defense ".

It turns out, is not 17 hours, and two in the afternoon? But that's not all! We read page 300 further:

“That evening (June 21. - C. B.) to I.V. Stalin was called Moscow leaders A.S. Shcherbakov and V.P. Pronin. According to Vasily Prokhorovich Pronin, Stalin ordered ... to detain the secretaries of the district committees in their places ... "The Germans may attack," he warned ... "

And this is how to understand?

Rewind the tape of time a little back ...

From the Journal of Visitors' Account for Stalin’s office, we know that 11 June 1941 was from Tymoshenko, Zhukov, Commander PribOVO Kuznetsov, political workers Zaporozhets and Dibrova, and later on airmen Zhigarev, Stefanovsky and Kokkinaki from 21.55 to 22.55. And with Stefanovsky, who had already left in 1.45 12 of June, Stalin talked about something in private for half an hour.

The historian of the General Staff, General Yury Alexandrovich Gorkov, wrote in the 90-ies: “In an atmosphere of impending war 13 June S.К. Tymoshenko asked I.V. Stalin's permission to bring on alert and deploy the first echelons of cover plans. But permission has not been received. ”

I can believe ... Stalin, realizing that the country was not yet ready for a serious war, did not want to give Hitler a single reason for it. It is known that Hitler was very unhappy that Stalin could not be provoked, Yuri Gorkov himself writes about this. 13 June Stalin could still hesitate - is it time to take all possible measures to deploy the troops? That is why he began his own probes with a TASS statement, which he most likely wrote after talking to Tymoshenko. By the way, no one in the army TASS statement from 14 of June that Germany complies with the terms of the 1939 pact of the year has not been demobilized. In any case, all the clever and responsible military leaders - before the commanders and deputy political officers of the regiments - clearly understood that such a statement has a purely political meaning, and the military should always be ready for war.

Later, Marshal Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky argued that "it was necessary to bravely cross the threshold," but "Stalin did not dare to do it ..." Perhaps he did not dare - until a very specific day ... More precisely - until June 18 or a response to the proposal to urgently send Molotov to Berlin (the latter fact was recorded in the Military Diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the Land Forces of Germany General Franz Halder).

Here is another fact suggestive, from the memoirs of Marshal of Artillery Nikolai Dmitrievich Yakovlev, just before the war from the post of commander of artillery KOVO appointed by the head of the SAU:


The road to disaster - German soldiers cross the Soviet border. 1941 Photo of the Year


“By June 19, I had already finished handing over the affairs to my successor, and almost on the run I said goodbye to the now former colleagues. On the move, because the headquarters of the district and its administration these days just received an order to redeploy to Ternopil and hastily shut down their work in Kiev. ”

Does not diverge written with the book G.I. Andreeva and I.D. Vakurova "General Kirponos", published by the Politizdat of Ukraine in 1976 year: "... in the afternoon of June 19, the People's Commissar of Defense received an order for the district headquarters to redeploy to Ternopil."

So, not even two o'clock in the afternoon of 21 June, and the second half of the day 19 June?

But why did this district administration suddenly hurry to Ternopil, where the front command post was located in the building of the former headquarters of the 44 th rifle division? We are told that the "fool" Stalin allegedly did not allow Pavlov to withdraw his troops to the summer camps (in fact, the planned training went in the usual way), but here the district headquarters is being removed from its place! Who could give an indication of this, if not Stalin?

And what did the Kiev ObVO give the order to expand the field management of the district (that is, the front itself), but not the Western ObO not? Urgent instructions came to Kirponos in Kiev by the second half of 19 June, but didn’t they have time to Pavlov to Minsk and to June 21?

Let me disbelieve!

FLIGHT OF COLONNIK ZAKHAROV - STALIN'S LACMUS PAPER

It is very similar to the fact that before the war Stalin did more or less everything that was required from the head of state before the close war, but the generals ...

More than once I referred to a certain evidence, a certain fact, which in the true history of the war must be large printed in bold, but so far has not been awarded even the smallest petit. This evidence is sought in the book "I am a fighter" by Major General Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union Georgy Nefedovich Zakharov, before the war - the commander of the 43 th Fighter Division of the Western Special Military District.

Then Colonel Zakharov already had experience of fighting in Spain (six aircraft shot down personally and four in a group) and in China (three shot down aircraft himself). And this is what he writes:

“Somewhere in the middle of the last prewar week — it was either 17 or 18 on June 41 — I received an order from the aviation commander of the Western Special Military District (Major General Ivan Ivanovich Kopts. - S. B.) to fly over the western border . The length of the route was kilometers 400, and was to fly from south to north - to Bialystok.

I flew to U-2 with the navigator of the 43rd fighter air division, Major Rumyantsev. The border areas west of the state border were crammed with troops. In villages, on farms, in groves were poorly disguised, if not completely disguised Tanks, armored vehicles, guns. Motorcycles snooped along the roads, cars - apparently, headquarters - cars. Somewhere in the depths of the vast territory, a movement was emerging that was braking here, right at our border, abutting against it ... and about to lash through it.

The number of troops recorded by us by eye, at first glance, did not leave me any other options for reflection, except for one thing: war is coming.

Everything that I saw during the flight was layered on my previous military experience, and the conclusion I made for myself can be formulated in four words: “from day to day.”

We then flew a little more than three hours. I often put the plane on any suitable site, which might seem random if the border guard did not immediately approach the plane. The border guard appeared silently, silently taking the visor (that is, he knew in advance that our plane would soon get on with urgent information! - S. B.) and waited a few minutes while I wrote a report on the wing. Having received the report, the border guard disappeared, and we again rose into the air and, having passed 30 – 50 km, sat down again. And I wrote the report again, and the other border guard waited silently and then, with a salute, disappeared silently. By evening, in this way we flew to Bialystok and landed in the location of Sergei Chernykh's division "...

In such a mode, the “removal of information” by the border guards was possible only on the direct instructions of Beria — as Commissar of Internal Affairs, and on the instructions of Stalin himself.

Most likely, Stalin gave such an order after Hitler refused to accept Molotov. After that, it was not necessary to be Stalin to draw the same conclusion that Colonel Zakharov made: from day to day. And Stalin, apparently, instructed the People's Commissariat of Defense to provide urgent and effective aerial reconnaissance of the border area from the German side. Perhaps he gave such a task to Pavel Fedorovich Zhigarev, commander of the Red Army Air Force, who visited Stalin's office from 0.45 to 1.50 17 (actually, 18) of June 1941, and he called Minsk Kopts.

It is clear that an experienced high-level aviation commander was to conduct reconnaissance, and could Kopets choose a better candidate than Colonel Zakharov?

At the same time, Stalin instructed Beria to receive and transmit the information collected by this experienced aviator to Moscow in real time.

That is why Zakharov on the entire route of his flight in the zones of several border detachments under each bush was waiting for the border guard, without even asking what kind of aircraft he had landed in the border strip. He did not sit on the "suitable sites" on his own initiative. He was told beforehand that all information should be periodically transmitted through border guards, making landings through 30 – 50 km.

And necessarily periodically, and not once at the end of the flight!

Why is that?

Yes, because, first of all, time did not wait! Information from Zakharov was waiting for Stalin himself. At a speed of Y-2 (later renamed Po-2) at about 120 – 150 km per hour, the time factor on the 400-kilometer route was already significant.

And secondly…

Secondly, at some point the Germans could have shot down Zakharov. And then at least part of the operational information would still have reached Stalin.

She came altogether completely. And by the evening of June 18, Stalin knew for sure and definitively: the war was coming. And he began to give the relevant orders to the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NCB), the Navy (NC Navy) and the Interior (NKVD).

If we analyze how the war began, for example, the Odessa Military District, then once again we come to the idea that the timely directive on readiness was given no later than 19 June 1941 of the year.

Why the western military districts were not ready - for the time being it remains a mystery, which is still necessary to be solved.
Author:
Originator:
http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2015-07-10/14_mysteries.html
69 comments
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  1. moskowit
    moskowit 13 July 2015 19: 45
    +6
    Yes, indeed, everything is not so simple. The first books by Kuznetsov appeared in the mid-60s, "The Bells of Loud Battle" and later, in 1968, "The Course to Victory". But interestingly, there is almost nothing to describe the confrontation with the German fleet in the Northern theater of operations, where the Germans had initial success ...
    1. Baikonur
      Baikonur 13 July 2015 20: 02
      +3
      I think that this is all from the category:
      Stalin was gay!
      Lenin was a mushroom!
      And books written and published in those days are those that censorship passed and approved! (which means it’s unknown about the truth!)
      And now, in general, they write what they want!
      1. Mahmut
        Mahmut 14 July 2015 06: 04
        +1
        What a paranoid article. Enemies seem to be everywhere, conspiracies. How could the fleet commander declare readiness number 1 without the knowledge of Stalin. Yes, he could. Because the signal readiness number 1 is not a combat alert, but a training one. For 2 years of service I had to climb it 50 times. And it can be announced not only by the district commander, but also by the division commander in his unit. So this is normal. No need to look for a black cat in a dark room. You won’t find a cat; you’ll spray a current.
    2. jaguar
      jaguar 13 July 2015 21: 31
      +12
      Yes, indeed, it is not so clear. I agree with you. We don’t know much yet. For example, in 1941 Rudolf Hess fled to England. In 1984 he was supposed to be released, but to his misfortune he let slip that he would tell the world that everyone would start. He was killed in 84. So what did he know that even after 43 years he was not allowed to speak?
      1. sap
        sap 13 July 2015 22: 11
        +3
        He would have been killed even if he had not let slip.
        1. online
          online 21 July 2015 19: 14
          0
          For example, in 1941 Rudolf Hess fled to England
          I don’t think anyone ran away. His mission failed, so he was declared an escaped madman.
        2. The comment was deleted.
      2. Victor1
        Victor1 13 July 2015 23: 00
        +5
        The collusion of Germany and Britain (plus the USA) on the division of the USSR, most likely Hess agreed on this.
        1. kayman4
          kayman4 14 July 2015 05: 41
          0
          "Why the Western military districts were not ready is still a mystery, which still needs to be solved."


          I suggest the author 1) to learn to mobist 2) to go to mob work in some part 3) to study the experience of mobilization of Ukraine. 4) To study the experience of forming parts on a bare spot.

          I think then "secrets" will cease to be secrets.
  2. just a native
    just a native 13 July 2015 19: 57
    +9
    Yes here, Gorbachev and a hedgehog with them in general committed a betrayal! And hush and smooth surface! If there is no one to understand hot, then over the prescription of years even more so !!! Therefore, freedom of speech was allowed, grind, grind !!!
    1. Mahmut
      Mahmut 14 July 2015 09: 42
      -1
      And for what purpose archival materials 50 years old and even older were closed in the USSR. Military secrets with such a term have no value, state secrets too. But ideology and propaganda from the publication of those materials could suffer seriously. They always lied at all times, so there is no need to idealize the picture of the Soviet past.
  3. RiverVV
    RiverVV 13 July 2015 19: 58
    +9
    Kuznetsov did not need Stalin’s sanction to alert the fleet No. 1. Stalin at that time was the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and the functions of this organization did not include troop control. The Council of People's Commissars included the People's Commissar of Defense. So he had to give direct orders. If anyone is interested, it was S.K.Timoshenko. Whether he did this is unknown, but if not, then the fleet turns out to have fulfilled a nonexistent order.

    However, Tymoshenko’s directive was not needed to declare combat readiness. Any commander in a company, unit, formation, association entrusted to him is entitled at any time to announce a combat alert and enter any degree of combat readiness. Without looking back at the superior. Maybe at least a day in the first of January to order in the ranks of all personnel to stand and nothing for him will not. Kuznetsov was removed at the beginning of the war, but he went on an increase to Headquarters. Since 1945 - member of the GKO. Marshal, to put it on land.

    Actually, the article could not be read further ...
    1. krez71
      krez71 13 July 2015 21: 06
      +1
      Roughly think about the economic component of putting the fleets on alert and tell us more about the uselessness of coordination with Stalin! Yes, for these miles Kuznetsova would have driven more than one destroyer into the "bay"!
    2. krez71
      krez71 13 July 2015 21: 06
      0
      Roughly think about the economic component of putting the fleets on alert and tell us more about the uselessness of coordination with Stalin! Yes, for these miles Kuznetsova would have driven more than one destroyer into the "bay"!
    3. sap
      sap 13 July 2015 22: 16
      +2
      Also noted. It was written for the stats, and whoever at least served urgently knows about putting on combat alertness a little more than the author. I remember how I cut the messengers in Sevastopol with the announcement of an alarm to the officers.
    4. your1970
      your1970 14 July 2015 00: 06
      0
      companies, yes, maybe, by writing a plan, the regiment commander — in principle, yes, the division commander — isn’t very good, raising the entire fleet by alarm is already war .. Imagine that now NATO is raising the entire fleet by alarm and this fleet is heading for the Baltic ?
      To the personnel on the parade ground (although on January 1), the state practically does not cost anything, but warming up the vehicles at the ships is already dear
      You forgot about the economic component, such as fuel and oil consumption, the resource of engines and mechanisms, etc.
    5. Moore
      Moore 14 July 2015 05: 03
      +2
      Quote: RiverVV

      However, Tymoshenko’s directive was not needed to declare combat readiness. Any commander in a company, unit, formation, association entrusted to him is entitled at any time to announce a combat alert and enter any degree of combat readiness. Without looking back at the superior.

      Can you imagine what a "degree of readiness" is?
      And what measures are being taken to bring to any degree of combat readiness?
      And how far will the following officers send the same company:
      - Head of the weapons depot - when the company has a desire to lay ammunition in the fortified area’s structures or at least give ammunition to the fighters according to the standard (this is not stored in the company);
      - Head of the food warehouse - when the company sends the foreman for the CP and the products of the National Assembly;
      -zampotech, when the company comes to demand the re-conservation of the equipment put to him in the state?
      Putting a company in operation at night on the parade ground of the mind does not need much. It is necessary to bring it to the ability to carry out the tasks assigned to it.
      1. RiverVV
        RiverVV 14 July 2015 05: 58
        0
        Reading the kammenty of hamsters, I just want to ask: "In which regiment did you serve?" What else is the economic component ??? A new word in military science. :)))
        For tankers (who are on the IS-7): combat readiness is the ability of troops to start performing combat missions within a given time frame. Either everything is fine with the "economic component" and then the troops can be brought to combat readiness, or not, and then accordingly it is impossible. It is not necessary to "estimate" it. It just has to be.

        What kind of position is this: "warehouse chief" and why does it give the right to send the commander of a unit or formation? No, well, you can, of course, but the consequences in the normal part will be one: immediate removal from office. Hamsters don't know: the order is first executed and then discussed. Xena, if he is not, will not ask why the technique is being withdrawn. It is not his business - to be interested and generally to think is harmful, because the missiles could have already taken off.
        1. kayman4
          kayman4 14 July 2015 08: 14
          +1
          I participated in the actual deployment of the brigade, but stopped at two battalions - it turned out to be very problematic. 80% of people were not the ones assigned. And it’s good that cars from the "national economy" were not called, otherwise it would have been an ass. This herd only booted for a week, then it became less normal. Do not believe there were people whose wives begged not to be taken into the army! And even one opened his veins so that he would not go to the army (for two weeks !!!)

          But the funniest thing is that in case of war in the same territory along the way there would have to be a dozen or two parts to unfold - there simply is no place for so many equipment and people. And imagine what will happen at the railway stations - due to the need for loading and shipping. It is impossible to clearly plan the schedules because of the large volume they are by and large far-fetched and in case God forbid, war will still be a factor of confusion and urgency.
          1. RiverVV
            RiverVV 14 July 2015 09: 12
            0
            Damn ... Once again, combat readiness is the ability of troops to begin performing combat missions within a given time frame. Key words: "combat" and "terms". Nobody demands from newly called up reservists to carry out combat missions. Now is not 41 years old. In peacetime, cropped units have a maximum level of combat readiness - increased.

            However, there are exceptions. For example, explosives and border guards perform combat missions in peacetime. Such troops can be in full combat readiness all the time and combat alert there can be declared at any time, even in training units. But this is light infantry, performing strictly defined tasks. Fast deployment is the norm for her.
        2. Moore
          Moore 14 July 2015 09: 59
          0
          "Hamster", as you deigned to call me, due to the debt of his not the shortest service, for a long time developed combat documents - including documents on the combat readiness of the unit, the existence of which the non-hamster and the body outside the IS-7, apparently, does not even suspect.
          We eliminate the non-hamster's space in theory:
          1. To write down from Pedivikia the definition of combat readiness in a general sense, the body outside the IS-7 had enough effort, but to figure out how it is achieved, what degrees it has, why they are and what affects the "given time" - that's the trouble.
          That preparation for the "performance of combat missions" is achieved by coordinated in place and time the implementation of certain activities of the Ghost Plan in various degrees of combat readiness - on the scale of a separate unit, at least - this is, apparently, a dark forest for a non-hamster. Therefore, he writes with a comment above about the ability to bring in a state of readiness to perform combat missions at least a single company without a command from above.
          2. The head of the warehouse, of course, will not send either the unit commander or anyone higher. But he must receive a command to receive a company one or another property, and issue this same property on invoices specially prepared for such a case. Who gives such commands and where does the one who gives them receive himself?
          Summary:
          a) the Red Army units and formations began to be brought to the highest levels of combat readiness, as it should be for military units, and not for the Makhnovists, with the receipt of the General Staff Directive for that;
          b) the fact that somewhere this was done in full accordance with the schedules and plans, and somewhere quietly cherished - the competence of the relevant bodies of inquiry;
          c) to bring a unit / compound into full combat readiness (modern GB), it is necessary to spend a certain time, which was enough for someone, for someone not.
          1. kayman4
            kayman4 14 July 2015 10: 38
            0
            I think we need to look at what condition most of the districts were in - the units were just forming. Combat and mob documents have just begun to be worked out, and mob. documents can be worked out forever. I recommend asking about not even the parts of the rear parts of the districts that were only on paper, but about the rear of the "highly mobile" mechanized corps, where there was a shortage of reserves of NZ, equipment - part of which had to come from the "national" economy.
          2. RiverVV
            RiverVV 14 July 2015 11: 04
            0
            ... and then he got down from IS and smoked a ghost plan (sic!) ... But that was not at all about that. Once again, for those who got out of the tank: who was to give the order to bring the army and navy on alert? Stalin? No, Tymoshenko. Kuznetsov fleet brought to readiness? Cited. From your post, by the way, it follows that the order still arrived, that is, the article really can not be read.

            And in the same way, to bring the fleet into combat readiness, it was enough for Kuznetsov to give an order. Just a thing. Not plans to smoke, which long ago had to be prepared and implemented, not wait directives, but give a simple order. This is his right and his responsibility. In the same way, the company commander of the escort brigade, having received information about the escape from the zone, will first announce an alarm, and only then it will contact the headquarters and report on the situation. In fact, this is not necessary for the company, but this is another topic.
  4. unknown
    unknown 13 July 2015 20: 06
    +4
    The Tallinn Baltic Fleet crossing, compared to which Tsushima fades. Stupidity, or betrayal?
    1. wanderer987
      wanderer987 13 July 2015 21: 13
      +4
      Tallinn transition is rather the last and right step in the current hopeless situation!
      1. sap
        sap 13 July 2015 22: 18
        +4
        And carried out brilliantly. Cruiser Kirov still removed the gold reserve of the State Bank from Tallinn.
  5. Go __Boruy
    Go __Boruy 13 July 2015 20: 19
    -16
    Quote: Baikonur
    I think that this is all from the category:
    Stalin was gay!
    Lenin was a mushroom!
    And books written and published in those days are those that censorship passed and approved! (which means it’s unknown about the truth!)
    And now, in general, they write what they want!


    Lenin was a devil, ZhYd and Russophobe. He buried the Great Russian Empire, equated the titular Russian nation with the blockheads ... It’s just awful how people believed this c collar ...
    1. TsUS-Air Force
      TsUS-Air Force 13 July 2015 21: 51
      0
      and the revolution was held on German money in the program man and the law said
      1. Aleksey_K
        Aleksey_K 13 July 2015 22: 36
        +2
        Quote: NOC-VVS
        and the revolution was held on German money in the program man and the law said

        By the way, now you are also writing comments on the site containing German money. The address of this site is in Germany and there is not a single building on the map in this place. This suggests that in this place is the NATO military base. They forbid their military facilities to be shown on maps.
        1. Ile ham
          Ile ham 14 July 2015 00: 25
          +1
          And more specifically - the site address, coordinates, so that you can see on the map?
          1. Bakht
            Bakht 14 July 2015 00: 31
            0
            Quote: Ile Ham
            And more specifically - the site address, coordinates, so that you can see on the map?

            http://2ip.ru/whois/

            IP 185.26.97.208
            Host: dsde585.fornex.org
            City: Not defined
            Country: Germany
            IP range: 185.26.96.0 - 185.26.97.255
            Provider Name: www.fornex.com, Fornex Hosting SL
        2. Alexdark
          Alexdark 14 July 2015 04: 25
          0
          You repeat it like a mantra, by golly). That's right, but how do you feel confident that the site is maintained with German money? If the servers are located in Germany, this does not mean that it is German or is maintained at their expense. And by the way, I don’t see anything shameful in renting a host literally anywhere.
    2. Aleksey_K
      Aleksey_K 13 July 2015 22: 32
      +4
      Quote: Go__Boruy
      Lenin was a devil, ZhYd and Russophobe. He buried the Great Russian Empire, equated the titular Russian nation with the blockheads ... It’s just awful how people believed this c collar ...

      What difference does it make, if you like, call Lenin, but the February revolution was not organized by him, but by the liberals. And the empire ceased to exist in February 1917, when, under pressure from the liberals, the king abdicated the throne. And where is Lenin? In general, at that time he did not hit a finger on a finger.
      1. TsUS-Air Force
        TsUS-Air Force 14 July 2015 23: 29
        0
        pah damn it! I will no longer play here in the rating and shoulder straps. I will read current news and then filter them through self-awareness. Thanks for the info!
  6. decanter
    decanter 13 July 2015 20: 20
    +2
    Here is a book on this subject -
    Mukhin, Yuri Ignatievich
    If not for the generals!
    War Estate Problems
    1. Dawn
      Dawn 13 July 2015 22: 43
      -1
      That's just Mukhin is not necessary. Like Kurginyan, Starikov, etc. Mukhin riveted books, but that's only very doubtful. Found the authority, you would have asked the stall.
  7. sabakina
    sabakina 13 July 2015 20: 50
    +3
    If we are talking about the Northern Navy, then he was commanded by Golovko Arseniy Grigoryevich, who gave the order. And this helped not only to keep the direction, but also to hold. the Germans could not break the defense.
    Sorry it's so messy. transmission is. roofing felts on REN-TV, roofing felts "military secret" ... right now I do not remember.
    1. sabakina
      sabakina 13 July 2015 20: 54
      +4
      Oh, found ....
  8. twincam
    twincam 13 July 2015 20: 59
    +2
    in order to understand what happened - had to go to school.
    and to read utopian footcloths in which the whole story is shrunk to 7 pages in 12 fonts, this is the destiny of everyone personally.
    1. wanderer987
      wanderer987 13 July 2015 21: 10
      0
      Totally agree!
  9. wanderer987
    wanderer987 13 July 2015 21: 10
    +3
    Only suggestions until all the reports and reports of the prewar and the beginning of the first days of the warriors are completely declassified are all empty fortune-telling, but so far we can only judge what we were told, all the same there is definitely no clear picture of the events!
  10. starshina pv
    starshina pv 13 July 2015 21: 31
    +2
    Quote: wanderer987
    Only suggestions until all the reports and reports of the prewar and the beginning of the first days of the warriors are completely declassified are all empty fortune-telling, but so far we can only judge what we were told, all the same there is definitely no clear picture of the events!

    Yes, all reports and reports must have been destroyed! The archives were thoroughly cleaned!
    1. miv110
      miv110 14 July 2015 07: 35
      0
      So a number of questions arise:
      - What prevents to declassify these very archives?
      - Who really is so dangerous after 74 years?
  11. shooter cc
    shooter cc 13 July 2015 21: 35
    +2
    I can believe ... Stalin, realizing that the country is not yet ready for a serious war, did not want to give Hitler a single reason for it. It’s known that Hitler was very unhappy that Stalin could not be provoked,
    It was always funny to me when it was printed in serious publications, what was the occasion? Well, really, this is ridiculous. The reason for war is not how the bully provoked you and after 5 seconds you disfigured your facial features, so that after the occasion it is how much time you need to prepare it, at least several months. The maximum what would happen if the Wehrmacht did not stand on the border, it would be a diplomatic note of protest, no more. And if the order of Hitler had the beginning of the war on June 22, 1941. So it would not be earlier or later exactly at 4 o’clock and not a minute earlier. provoke them all the time, even if you play friendly round dances, everything starts a second per second, and not otherwise
    1. Aleksey_K
      Aleksey_K 13 July 2015 22: 46
      +3
      Quote: shooter cv
      .And if Hitler’s order had the beginning of the war 22 on June 1941. So it would not be earlier and no later exactly at 4 hours and not a minute earlier. Then at least provoke them all the time, at least make friendly round dance, everything will start second to second, and not otherwise

      Since May 1941, Hitler gave several such orders to begin the implementation of the Barbarossa plan, but then canceled it. This is a well-known fact. Just the Wehrmacht was not completely ready for warfare.
      1. Bakht
        Bakht 13 July 2015 23: 49
        +1
        All right. The war with the USSR was decided in the summer of 1940. But when exactly will it begin ....

        The signal "Dortmund" at the beginning of the war was given only on the evening of June 21st. Until that time, the dates could be postponed.
    2. Ile ham
      Ile ham 14 July 2015 00: 27
      +1
      Moreover, the plan "BARBAROSS" was planned LONG before the start of its implementation.
  12. TsUS-Air Force
    TsUS-Air Force 13 July 2015 21: 49
    -1
    very interesting, but where so much information? after all, the runoff of years has not been known for the details, but here eat
  13. erased
    erased 13 July 2015 21: 54
    +2
    I already read this material, but I don’t remember the author, it seemed to be different.
    About the conspiracies. Yes, there were several, not just one. This is well written by E. Prudnikova, deployed, with links to documents. Were Pavlov and his team traitors? H.Z. But by the way. After their execution, no one else in the Red Army was put up against the wall (from military leaders). Removed from posts, stripped of ranks, but did not shoot. Apparently, in addition to the extremely unsuccessful conduct of operations in June-July 1941, Pavlov was also charged with something else.
    By the way, at least ten conspiracies were being prepared against Hitler. Semi-successful can be considered a version of Stauffenberg. The rest simply did not reach the active phase.
    So vigilance is never superfluous. Especially now.
    1. sap
      sap 13 July 2015 23: 10
      0
      Quote: erased
      I already read this material, but I don’t remember the author, it seemed to be different.
      About the conspiracies. Yes, there were several, not just one. This is well written by E. Prudnikova, deployed, with links to documents. Were Pavlov and his team traitors? H.Z. But by the way. After their execution, no one else in the Red Army was put up against the wall (from military leaders). Removed from posts, stripped of ranks, but did not shoot. Apparently, in addition to the extremely unsuccessful conduct of operations in June-July 1941, Pavlov was also charged with something else.
      By the way, at least ten conspiracies were being prepared against Hitler. Semi-successful can be considered a version of Stauffenberg. The rest simply did not reach the active phase.
      So vigilance is never superfluous. Especially now.

      It’s just that recently a lot of research and journalism on this topic has started to come out, so everyone borrowed from everyone if not verbatim, then as in this case ideologically.
  14. Foxbed
    Foxbed 13 July 2015 22: 06
    -1
    Quote: sabakina
    Oh, found ....

    feel It very strange joins your nickname and avka ... wink
    PS: The main mistake of the Western Military District was that he himself was preparing for the attack. The troops were too close to the border and did not have echelons of cover. I am not a seer ... But Hitler attacked so "in time" and surgically flawlessly that you involuntarily think I think the Germans had their own "Stirlitz" or, more precisely, Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov ... The Soviet army, at the first stages of the war, was extremely poorly able to defend itself (with rare exceptions) because the doctrine of those times said: we will beat the enemy on his Although, if we take the examples of other wars (Mongolo-Tatars, Swedes, French), everything follows the standard scheme: "We harness for a long time, then we go quickly" ... wink
    1. Aleksey_K
      Aleksey_K 13 July 2015 23: 01
      0
      Quote: Foxbed
      the doctrine of those times stated: we will beat the enemy on its territory.

      You do not confuse military doctrine and political slogans for the simple Soviet people. Military doctrine is an official document describing the military-political goals of the state and its behavior in the event of aggression against the USSR. There simply cannot be such words there, otherwise no one would have signed a single peace treaty with the USSR.
    2. sap
      sap 13 July 2015 23: 16
      -1
      This fits very strangely with your nickname and avka.
      Maybe a transvestite? Is that a Freudian clause? laughing
      In general, for all the shortcomings of work, this kitchen is in the possession of A. Martirosyan. - June 22: Detailed anatomy of betrayal. Developed in detail.
      1. sabakina
        sabakina 14 July 2015 00: 12
        +2
        With this Freudian slip of the tongue, I will break through the shard and think "why?" So be careful in terms of SIR! About the avatar. Ava-princess Akatawa is a beautiful movie heroine. Why not fall in love? Or do you mind love between a man and a woman? about the nickname ... it's harder, but not fatal. There is a film with Shakurov, so this is from there ...
    3. The comment was deleted.
  15. Bakht
    Bakht 13 July 2015 22: 07
    +3
    Apparently, the order to advance to the battle lines was issued on June 16, 1941. The trigger was the silence of Germany on the note of TASS. But ... it was already late. The article is good, but Colonel Rookie intelligence number 8 is not indicated. There is also a lot of muddy water, but as of June 1, the German grouping on the Western border was not so saturated. The avalanche-like buildup of strike groups began 2 weeks before the war. And the leadership of the USSR reacted adequately. But ... it was too late.

    Here it is interesting to look at the whole. The schedule of the movement of German troops to the border, the schedule of the advancement of tank divisions, the reaction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the TASS report and the beginning of the advance of Soviet troops to the border.

    My opinion is that on June 16 the leadership of the USSR realized the inevitability of war and took action. But they were late. The troops were torn into three unconnected echelons and were routed in parts.
  16. 34 region
    34 region 13 July 2015 22: 12
    0
    I do not know. But he betrays some people by betrayal. After all, after Gorbachev was the second Chechen, 08.08.08/XNUMX/XNUMX. The army was ruined, the leadership was corrupt. But somehow they fought in the second Chechen and almost reached Tbilisi.
  17. VeterS
    VeterS 13 July 2015 22: 23
    +3
    Judging by how much shit there is in the army and navy today, for the sake of a penny in my personal pocket, I’m ready to send 24 boys to oblivion at once, this article has a deep rational kernel. The history of Russia, its struggle with the enemy, is the story of a series of bright victories, which are preceded by betrayal and outright gagging. It’s good when Nikolashka, Stalin, Yeltsin ..., Putin ... are to blame for everything.
  18. reut.sib
    reut.sib 13 July 2015 22: 26
    0
    "But isn't everything sewn here with white thread?"And in modern history there are not a few white threads, and witnesses are alive.
  19. tokens2
    tokens2 13 July 2015 22: 29
    0
    Most likely, the Soviet leadership understood that in the conditions of a maneuver war, the advanced units of the Red Army would be doomed.
    Perhaps the bet was on new types of weapons that will be created in the interior of the country after the outbreak of the war. The model evacuation of industry is amazing. The position of future allies at that time also remains a mystery.
    What could oppose the Red Army to an enemy who had superiority in vehicles? Every 10th soldier is potentially a driver. All equipment from all over Europe has been driven. Plus a huge number of horses.
    In fact, the Western Tatar-Mongol invasion was being prepared. The army, already trained in battles, was trained.
    something like this.
    1. 34 region
      34 region 13 July 2015 22: 48
      0
      Lexey2! 22.29. Are advanced units doomed? Why remove weapons from aircraft and castles from guns? Then it is better with the fanaticism of the doomed to inflict maximum damage to the enemy! Or not?
      1. tokens2
        tokens2 13 July 2015 23: 05
        0
        maximum damage to the enemy! Or not?

        For maximum damage, you will need not only locks to the guns, but that's all.
        I do not insist on this version. Much is still unknown.
        I repeat, Hess's flight left many questions.
        Well, or continue to believe in stupidity without borders? In 1941? Well, Stalin was not a fool.
        1. 34 region
          34 region 13 July 2015 23: 19
          0
          Lexey2! 23.05. Yes! Hess's flight is an interesting question. And the issue of locks to guns is different. After all, even under the leadership of a furniture maker with a bear, they were able to pull the army to Georgia! What thoughts cause such parallels?
          1. Bakht
            Bakht 13 July 2015 23: 55
            0
            According to the practice of that time, just the advanced parts were not doomed. The task of the covering armies was to hold the front for at least a week to mobilize and determine the directions of the main strikes. Exactly the same scenario was carried out both in the summer of 42 near Stalingrad and in the summer of 43 near Kursk on the Voronezh Front.

            Based on the results of these military operations, it was finally determined that the advancement of advanced detachments was not useful.

            A surprise for the Red Army was the transition to the offensive immediately with all the forces of the Wehrmacht. Do not forget that during the attack on the USSR, Germany left only 22 divisions in reserve. For comparison, in an attack on France, the reserve was 45 divisions.
            1. tokens2
              tokens2 14 July 2015 00: 08
              0
              According to the practice of that time, just the advanced parts were not doomed. The task of the covering armies was to keep the front for at least a week

              how to keep it? without mobilization? the Germans quickly changed the direction of the blows. the advanced parts of the Wehrmacht were generally perl pushing against the gas.
              So it was only possible to hold ... in the boiler.
              Doom was 100%
              1. Bakht
                Bakht 14 July 2015 00: 27
                0
                The cover armies were close in composition to wartime states. Cover plans all clearly painted. Only the density of troops was not taken into account. Once again, the exact same tactics of the advanced detachments were tested in July 1942 near Stalingrad. The task is to detain the enemy and identify the direction of the main blow. Only then it was decided that the idea did not justify itself.
        2. Bakht
          Bakht 14 July 2015 00: 00
          +1
          Flight of Hess - the main secret of the 20th century. And she will remain so for a long time, if not forever. In 1990, the archives of the British Foreign Ministry were to be disclosed on this issue. But they did not open. And then Hess died in prison very just in time. Despite the fact that the USSR did not object to the liberation of Hess back in the 70s. Against was Great Britain. The English archives for the flight of Hess decided to keep secret for another 50 years. So in the year 2040, secrecy can still be extended.

          And someone in the West is still talking about Soviet closed archives. They do not notice a log in their eye.

          An interesting picture, Hess died during the English guard, the Forin Office archives do not open, and then Rezun's books began to appear. About the fault of the USSR. Given Rezun’s low intellectual level, one can safely say that his opuses are written in MI-6.
  20. NordUral
    NordUral 14 July 2015 00: 04
    0
    Thanks! Please continue searching for the truth. Too many lies have read about the start of the war. And not only about this, but about our entire Soviet period.
  21. LPD17
    LPD17 14 July 2015 00: 13
    +1
    Hess was killed in Spandau prison in May 1987, and not in 1984.
    It is extremely strange that he did not participate in the main crimes of the period 1941-1945, but nevertheless he was in solitary confinement longer than all the other criminals convicted by Nuremberg. Apparently no one and nothing should have heard ANYTHING from him. And on the eve of the liberation, the old man who served from 1941 to 1987 i.e. FORTY SIX YEARS !!!! suddenly hangs himself?!? Incredible. He knew too much of both.
    By the way, Milosevic is immediately recalled ....
    It would be nice for the country of the anti-Hitler coalition to demand the trial of the death of war criminal Hess.
    And look at twisting other countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. By the way, the British guarded him ...
    But the current rulers will not ask this, as well as much more ...
  22. Homo sapiens
    Homo sapiens 14 July 2015 02: 35
    0
    Truly one comedian was right when he said that Russia is the only country in the world with an unpredictable past ...
  23. Mikhail m
    Mikhail m 14 July 2015 05: 19
    0
    A timely readiness directive was given no later than June 19, 1941.

    Is there no trace of this directive?
    1. Bakht
      Bakht 14 July 2015 09: 04
      0
      Colonel General of the tank forces P.P. Poluboyarov (former chief of the auto armored forces of PribOVO):

      June 16 at 23 p.m. the command of the 12th mechanized corps received a directive on putting the compound on alert. The corps commander, Major General N. M, Shestopalov was informed about this at 23 hours on June 17 upon his arrival from the 202nd Motorized Division, where he conducted a mobilization readiness check. On June 18, the corps commander raised the formations and units on combat alert and ordered them to be withdrawn to the planned areas. On June 19 and 20, this was done.

      On June 16, by order of the district’s headquarters, the 3rd Mechanized Corps (commander of the Major General of the Tank Troops A.V. Kurkin) was also put on alert, which concentrated at the same time in the indicated area.

      Lieutenant General P.P. Sobennikov (former commander of the 8th Army):

      On the morning of June 18, 1941 I went to the border strip with the chief of staff of the army to check the progress of the defensive work in the Šiauliai fortified area. Near Šiauliai I was overtaken by a car, which soon stopped. Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov (commander of the Baltic Special Military District) came out of it. I also got out of the car and approached him. F. I. Kuznetsov recalled me to my side and excitedly informed me that some German mechanized units were concentrated in Suwalki. He ordered me to immediately withdraw formations to the border, and deploy the army headquarters by the morning of June 19 at a command post 12 km southwest of Siauliai.
    2. Bakht
      Bakht 14 July 2015 09: 07
      0
      In addition, traces of the existence of the directive of June 18, 1941, are also present in the partially declassified materials of Pavlov’s criminal case. Namely, in the protocol of the court session of the military tribunal, which examined the case against Pavlov, Korobkov, Grigoryev, Klimovskys, where the interrogation of the defendant A.T.
      “Member of the court comrade Orlov. On l.d. 79 of the 4th volume, you gave the following testimony: “Leaving Minsk, the commander of the regiment of communications reported to me that the chemical troops department did not allow him to take combat gas masks from the NZ. The district artillery department did not allow him to take cartridges from the NZ, and the regiment had only a guard norm of 15 rounds per soldier, and the wardrobe department did not allow to take field kitchens from the NZ. Thus, even in the afternoon of June 18, the content departments of the headquarters were not oriented that the war was close ... And after the telegram from the Chief of the General Staff on June 18, the district’s troops were not put on alert. ”

      Defendant. All this is true ... "


      Source: http://ammoussr.ru/myfy/o-boevoy-gotovnosti-rkka/
    3. Bakht
      Bakht 14 July 2015 09: 23
      0
      For his part, the chief of the UPV NKVD of the BSSR, Lieutenant General I.A. Bogdanov, on June 18, 1941 decided to evacuate the families of border guards from the border. June 20 about this decision, Lieutenant General II. Maslennikov reported to Narkoma L.P. Beria: “The chief of the border troops of the NKVD of the BSSR, Lieutenant General Comrade Bogdanov, reported that, by order of the commander of the Baltic border district, families of commanding personnel of the Red Army units of the Taurogen direction were preparing for evacuation. T. Bogdanov asks for instructions on the evacuation of the families of the headquarters of the Shakiai [administration - in the city of Taurage] border detachment, about the preparation for which an order was given to them ... I ask for your instructions. "

      What was the answer of the People's Commissar - is unknown. Nevertheless, the evacuation of the families of the commanding and commanding composition of the detachments was nevertheless carried out, however, far from complete.

      On June 20, in order to strengthen border protection, the head of the UPV NKVD of the BSSR, Lieutenant General I. A. Bogdanov, ordered:

      "1. Until June 30.06.41, XNUMX, planned classes with personnel shall not be held.

      2. Personnel who are at the training camp at the outposts, immediately return to the linear outposts and not to call until further notice.

      3. Pass the entire personnel of the machine gunners through the three-day training camp at the training outposts, calling two machine gunners of each linear outpost.

      4. Do not provide days off to personnel before June 30.06.41, XNUMX.

      5. At the night time (from 23.00 to 5.00), send border guards consisting of three people each. Use all machine guns in night dresses, in the most important directions.

      6. The period of stay of the dress at night is 6 hours and daytime - 4 hours.

      7. The calculation of people for service should be built so that from 23.00 to 5.00 all people will serve at the border, with the exception of those returning from outfits by 23.00 and watch outposts.

      8. On separate, the most vulnerable flank directions, set up posts for ten days under the command of the assistant chief of the outpost.

      9. During the day, check the control strip with the cavalrymen consisting of two people each outfit; the service life is 8-9 hours of continuous movement to the left and right along the site.

      10. At night, check KP and each point to conduct at least one and a half hours. KP each outpost split into two or three areas.

      11. To place border guards not closer than 300 m from the border line. ”


      Source: http://www.istpravda.ru/bel/research/12838/

      If all this is not preparation for putting the troops on alert, then I don’t understand anything. And orders were given from Moscow between June 16 and 20.
  24. voyaka uh
    voyaka uh 14 July 2015 11: 21
    0
    May 15, 1941, right on Red Square landed
    German Junkers.

    There is very good reason to believe that a letter from Hitler was delivered on it
    personally to Stalin. Zhukov told the writer Simonov about this after the war.

    In which the Fuhrer "gave his word of honor" that he would not attack the USSR. What is deployment
    German troops on the Soviet border, allegedly "for their sudden transfer to the south - against
    British possessions in the Mediterranean "

    And this simple misinformation of German intelligence, Stalin, alas,
    "bought". After all, as you know, all leaders trust personal connections more than
    experts and intelligence data. From that moment on, all intelligence messages became
    meaningless - the "word of honor of the Fuehrer" outweighed them.
    1. Bakht
      Bakht 14 July 2015 11: 27
      +2
      Right on Red Square? :-) Or have you mixed up with Rust? Who told anyone you can listen to the OBS radio (one grandmother said). The fact that the correspondence was ongoing is a fact, that I may have brought a letter through diplomatic channels on May 15. So what? Do not forget that on May 10, Hess flew to England. It was necessary to somehow explain to Stalin what was happening.

      About personal connections. Not a single head of state doesn't trust personal connections. He trusts intelligence (his), analytical centers (his), reports of the General Staff (his). And those who trusted "personal connections" have long been in the grave and not for natural reasons.
      1. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 14 July 2015 12: 12
        0
        "Are you confused with Rust?" ////

        A bit: not on Red Square, but on the Central Airport of Moscow.

        The hypothesis allows us to explain Stalin's fantastic ignorance of the data personally.
        intelligence from various (and most reliable) sources.
        Army leaders were in a panic - they believed intelligence, and even gave
        belated orders on the preparation of troops. And Stalin was calm, like a rock.

        Do not forget that the Soviet trains with grain continued to arrive in Germany even on the day of June 22 (under German bombs). That is, the conviction that Germany did NOT attack was very strong with Stalin. Why would that be?
  25. Bakht
    Bakht 14 July 2015 12: 17
    +1
    Yes, this is ridiculous.

    But you wrote the word "hypothesis" well. A letter dated May 15 explained to Stalin the situation with Hess. Of course, she explained it unconvincingly, and Stalin did not believe him. Everything else is just a "hypothesis". My teacher used to say "from unrecognized hypotheses, my most correct one."

    Once and forever. Not a single head of state makes decisions based on his personal convictions. Especially Stalin. And even now, I assure you that Putin makes decisions not based on personal likes and dislikes. And even, scary to think, she doesn’t even know what we are writing here. He has intelligence, ministries, the General Staff, diplomats, think tanks and advisers. I'm afraid he doesn’t even have time to read topwar. who claims the opposite - just read delusional articles of recent times.
    1. voyaka uh
      voyaka uh 14 July 2015 14: 18
      0
      for Bakht:
      "I assure you that Putin makes decisions not based on personal likes and dislikes." ///

      God grant that you are right. But I have just that impression of Putin's decisions
      (I believe that he loves Russia, but does not understand the mechanisms of the economy):
      they are based on "the intuition of the leader" and not on a collective discussion involving experts.
      Otherwise, for example, the decision to join Crimea (emotionally intuitive, in my opinion) would hardly have been made: it is clear that Russia's strategic economic damage from it is much greater than short-term political benefits. Experts would figure it out very quickly.
      Again, I put forward a hypothesis, as you understand.
      1. Bakht
        Bakht 14 July 2015 14: 34
        +1
        Crimea is a special story. Here the economy does not smell. My hypothesis (!) Is that Crimea must be Russian. The economic benefits of its acquisition (reunification, annexation) whoever wants to and say so exceed all conceivable.

        So to speak. The Crimean peninsula holds the entire southern flank of NATO. Holds the Bosphorus and makes the Black Sea the Russian sea. And keeps violent heads from active actions. And any world is economically more profitable than war. So economists are wrong. Russian Crimea protects the country from military operations and cools hotheads.

        They didn’t put my report on the table, but I’m sure that the decision on Crimea was made on the basis of the country's military and political interests. And economically it is more than justified. Moreover, the benefits are not "short-term", but long-term. Maybe forever.
      2. Bakht
        Bakht 14 July 2015 14: 51
        +1
        For fun. It hardly relates to the topic. Or does it apply?

        What is the economic feasibility of joining the Golan Heights to the territory of Israel?
        1. voyaka uh
          voyaka uh 14 July 2015 15: 09
          0
          There is no special economic value - only agriculture is there.
          But the military, yes, exists: it’s a mountain plateau that dominates
          in the neighboring valleys.
          The Golan captured spontaneously in the general course of the chaotic war of 67, and not as a result of a previously developed plan. The Syrians have gotten over the years with constant shelling, so they sent up infantry ...
          The trick is that Israel has a developed modern industry - it doesn’t
          clamp down on sanctions. And Russia is not in a very good position in this regard.
          And Western technology would be very useful now, and they (along with loans) were cut off by sanctions.
          (as in the old joke about the crow and the bear: howl ... you can get on the plane only if you have wings).
  26. Bakht
    Bakht 14 July 2015 18: 11
    0
    What optimism ... I'm talking about industry. That is, a country with huge resources and developed industry (from galoshes to a space station) is easily amenable to sanctions. And you can’t take a little proud Israel .... Can you compare the industrial and technical potential of Russia and Israel? The country where Armata is launched and the country where they ride chariots. Oh well.

    And sanctions and loans - all this does not interfere with life. But it does not make it much easier. As for loans, all questions to the Greeks and Ukrainians. And according to the joke, the bear has wings. So maybe even .... I.
    --------
    So, the war of the 67th year was hardly chaotic. And then Syria was not Syria but the United Arab Republic and the Syrian army commanded, it seems Marshal Amer. Egyptian Marshal. But not the point.

    So, as a result of the 6-day war, large territories were captured. The most significant are the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. But only the Golan Heights were annexed. So, the true goal of the annexation of the Golan is purely economic, not military. But not a single Jew recognizes this. It is so important economically that they even violated the UN Charter. By the way, the annexation of the Golan according to UN documents is just like a seizure. So where is the Crimea. No referendum was held in the Golan. This region is so important economically that it repeatedly falls into intergovernmental agreements on the economy. At the highest level.