The circular defense of Russian armored vehicles bursting at the seams
In addition to the tank-counter-tank system, there is a tank-tank-tank-building system
Failure to create a new tank The T-95 is accompanied by the useless modernization of the T-72, since the weapons, defense, command control of this machine (even after modernization) will not meet the requirements of the new generation wars. The ongoing organizational confusion in the management of research institutes, design bureaus, factories, as well as the technical helplessness of the customer and manufacturers do not allow putting things in order in tank building, which can exist only as a market for used armored vehicles.
T-72, T-80, T-90 - KAMIKAZE
What strange events occur in the Russian tank building. At one time, the head of the Main Automobile and Armored Directorate (GABTU) Sergey Mayev and the Deputy Minister of Defense, Army General Nikolai Makarov, informed the public that in 2010, the new T-95 tank would be adopted (see NVO No. 12, 2010 and No. 16, 2009 year). There is evidence that this tank did not pass the state tests. It remains a secret that either tactical and technical requirements (TTT) for its development became outdated by 2010, or tank builders for some reason did not fulfill the technical specifications of the Ministry of Defense. But the reality is that, as a result of the failure to carry out the SAP-2010, the Ground Forces Brigade will remain with old tanks that are not suitable for the new conditions for a long time to come.
In the June issue of one of the metropolitan newspapers, the correspondent asked what the fate of our tanks was, is there a decision in the Ministry of Defense on this subject and which of the most promising domestic combat vehicles do you prefer, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov replied: “We discussed this problem several months ago , met with the designers. At the same time raised the question of opening the ROC to create a new tank. But when I was told that at the same time old practices and backlogs would be used on 60%, we decided not to start the project until we finally understand what we need. ”
It turns out that until now the customer, in relation to the creation of a new tank, did not understand what he needed. Further, answering the question of what means in the event of war the Russian army will conduct military operations, Anatoly Serdyukov said: “With what we have available.” In other words, the Minister of Defense does not care that the tank crews when using old armored vehicles will face the fate of the kamikaze. It is not difficult to imagine that in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, reports to the Supreme Commander will begin to receive reports of the thousands of dead tankmen of T-72, T-80, T-90 armored vehicles. In this case, it is too late to set up commissions to investigate the unsatisfactory protection of old tanks.
In May of this year. a statement was published by Lieutenant General Yuri Kovalenko, the former first deputy chief of GABTU, that “from 2015, a new main tank will appear in the Armed Forces with fundamentally new tactical and technical characteristics, with the deployment of ammunition in an armored vehicle, with the removal of ammunition from the fighting compartment ". In other words, the ex-deputy head of GABTU confirmed the fact of work on the creation of a new tank under the code "Armata". The statement of Yuri Kovalenko differs from the opinion of the Minister of Defense, who suspended the new tank project for a time, until the Ministry of Defense understands what he needs. And it was necessary to understand it in 2000, when forming HPV-2010. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense does not even dream of the necessary pace of rearmament with new tanks, which should remain the main striking force of the Ground Forces.
Thus, the contradictory statements of military leaders, who are representatives of the customer, indicate the absence of a clear long-term technical policy in tank construction. In this case, a characteristic feature of the aforementioned statements is the lack of binding a new tank to the conditions of contactless wars. Attention is drawn only to the technical characteristics of the new armored vehicle, and the requirement of the basic law of contactless and network-centric wars (not individual models of weapons win on the battlefield, but systems combining percussion means with reconnaissance, communications, navigation, control and maintenance) without attention.
The development of foreign long-range highly effective anti-tank weapons, combined with the inability to ensure the tank is equally protected from all sides, necessitates the strengthening of collective protection of tank units. When using tanks in the conditions of the sixth generation of wars, the mandatory use of mobile short-range air defense systems is required, but not old, created back in Soviet times. Since foreign aviation carriers will not enter the air defense zone; new systems require the ability to hit aircraft anti-tank ammunition. In this case, the tank units should correspond to the required number of produced short-range air defense mobile systems. In other words, new tanks and air defense systems, electronic warfare (EW), etc. must be combat ready kit that meets the requirements of non-traditional wars.
DISABILITY OF TAXPAYERS
Vyacheslav Khalitov, deputy general director of the Uralvagonzavod research and production corporation, recently made an equally strange statement: “The result of the battle depends on many factors, and all factors must be taken into account, and not pulling out any incomprehensible elements. Yes, we do not have a dry closet in the tank. Do not forget that the tank is a combat vehicle. And it is intended to fight, and not to arrange in her hotel "Europe Plus".
At the same time, Vyacheslav Khalitov announced that the Uralvagonzavod corporation had entered into a contract with the Ministry of Defense for the modernization of the T-72, which would significantly increase the combat potential of the tank. However, the deputy director does not indicate the quantitative indicators of this potential. It is worth recalling that the former head of the GABTU, Vladislav Polonsky, noted (see “NVO” No. 38, 2010 year) that the national fleet in 1,2 – 1,9 is inferior in terms of military-technical level to tank fleets of developed foreign countries. The values of the coefficients of the military-technical level given by Vladislav Polonsky are as follows: for the T-90, the coefficient is 1,5, and for the М1А2 - 2,2. It is doubtful that after this upgrade T-72 after modernization will surpass the T-90 tank.
Further, Vyacheslav Khalitov, without comparing the combat and technical characteristics of specific foreign and domestic tanks, disorients taxpayers on the results of the modernization of the T-72. The question is whether it is advisable to carry out multimillion-dollar expenditures on the modernization of T-72 tanks, which does not take into account the fact that technical solutions that improve the combat properties of this armored vehicle have limitations in terms of technological implementation. The T-72 tank in terms of its combat properties can reach after upgrading the МХNUMXА1, Leopard-1 and Challenger levels, that is, the 2-s level of the last century (see NVO No. 80, 38 year). It does not take into account that the M2010А1, "Leopard-1" and "Challenger" tanks turned into the МХNUMXА2 SEP "Abrams", "Leopard-1А2", "Challenger-2" with increased combat characteristics, and non-chimers, and no chiming chimes, and chiming 6-2. On this basis, the modernization of the T-72 in order to improve the combat properties is hardly advisable.
According to Vyacheslav Khalitov, an increase in the combat potential of the T-72 will be provided by the modernization developed by Uralvagonzavod, which covers firepower, security, mobility and command control. These promises do not correspond to the new generation of wars.
FRONT PITCHING
The inclusion of Soviet tanks of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) into ammunition was supposed to solve the following problem. Domestic armored vehicles could hit "Abrams" and "Leopards" at a distance of 5 km, and those, in turn, our tanks - only at 2 km. This advantage would increase the survival rate of domestic tanks with weaker protection than that of foreign armored vehicles. But the combat characteristics of the Soviet ATGMs included in the tank ammunition (see “NVO” No. 4, 2011 year) were not up to par (they do not pierce the frontal hull and turret parts of the M1X2 SEP, Leopard-2X6 tanks and poorly overcome dynamic protection). At the same time, it should be borne in mind that, for example, the West European theater of war has a landscape that allows firing at a distance of no more than 2 – 3 km. For this reason, the advantage of the “long arm” disappears immediately.
The decision taken by the Soviet developers in installing 1976 to install an armament complex that provides anti-tank missiles for firing through the barrel of a tank cannon should be considered unjustified. However, a number of limitations associated with the caliber of the gun, does not allow to increase the armor penetration of ATGM and to supplement its design with devices for overcoming tandem dynamic protection (DZ). Americans still in 1972, tested on the tank M60A2 rocket-gun armament. At the same time it was installed 152-millimeter gun, which was also used as a launcher for guided missiles "Shellla." To abandon the idea of using missile-gun armament, the Americans needed a lot of 60А2 in the number of 540 machines. Currently, ammunition of foreign countries solve the problem of reliable destruction of tanks with the help of long-range ATGM with a tandem warhead (CU), having a diameter of 150 – 180 mm, using aircraft and ground carriers.
The T-72 tank ammunition consists of the very old 9М119М Invar with tandem warheads, which were designed to destroy tanks М1 and М1А1, equipped with DZ. As applied to the defeat of the M1А2 and “Leopard-2А6” tanks with the 9М119М rocket, the probability of a head-on defeat will not exceed 0,2 due to the poor overcoming of the DZ and insufficient armor penetration of the main cumulative charge. Completion in foreign countries of work on the creation of the newest active defense systems (SAZ) of tanks М1А2 SEP and Leopard-2А6 leaves no chance for the 9М119М missiles to destroy these armored vehicles.
Armored-piercing sub-caliber projectiles (BPS) 3BM42 “Awaretas Systems, 3BM32“ Vant ”, 3BM48“ Svinets ”have armor 420 mm, 500 mm, 600 mm - these values are less than the level of software systems; For this reason, it is difficult to expect its reliable defeat. The defeat of this machine mentioned BPS is possible only when firing into the board.
Of greatest interest are the results of evaluating the effectiveness of firing a projectile 3BM48 on the tank М1А2. In this case, the shooting was carried out on the frontal, most protected areas of the hull and tower, not equipped with remote sensing. The probability of hitting the M1А2 tank when firing from the T-72 tank with the 3BM48 projectile will be for the 1 km range; 1,5 km; 2 km - 0,21; 0,17; 0,06 respectively. These results indicate the poor state of the T-72 firepower, which is the basis of the Russian tank fleet.
The low effectiveness of tank gun fire on ground targets has long been known. The main reasons for this are the large dispersion of the points of fall of high-explosive fragmentation projectiles (OFS) in range and the unfortunate specificity of the fragmentation of fragments. Thus, it is completely unclear how Vyacheslav Khalitov will fight fire infirmity. Recall that NIMI, responsible for the creation of BPS and OFS, is currently not able to create high-performance ammunition.
ROOF - THE MOST WEAK PLACE
With regard to the protection of more Soviet tanks, complexes were created that should provide:
- prevention of targeted hit of second-generation anti-tank missiles into the armored vehicle (Blind) optoelectronic suppression system;
- defeat anti-tank ammunition flying up (including from above) (Arena active defense complex);
- a sharp decrease in the armor-piercing effect of cumulative ammunition and BPS (mounted systems and built-in DZ).
Under these conditions, the eternal problem of “shell-armor” has gained new outlines. The active struggle with anti-tank weapons begins as soon as you approach the armored vehicle and continues until the start of direct interaction with the tank's armor. At first glance, it seems that a complex of measures has been taken to create a reliable tank protection, but in reality everything is different. The “Curtain” complex is intended only for influencing second-generation missiles with feedback using a tracer. On the third-generation missiles, this complex has no effect.
In this case, there is still hope for active protection of the Arena if the microwave weapon the enemy will not disable it. It should be recalled that the complex AZ "Arena" is not able to deal with BPS and shock cores. Since most of our tanks are not equipped with the Arena and Shtora complexes, foreign ATGMs with tandem warheads will reliably overcome mounted and built-in remote sensing systems.
Note that the DZ of our tanks remained at the level of 1985 of the year and today such protection no longer ensures the survival of Russian armored vehicles on the battlefield. Firstly, this is due to the fact that all foreign ATGM with tandem warheads overcome mounted and built-in remote sensing systems with a probability of at least 0,8. And secondly, the armor penetration rate of the majority of foreign ATGM warheads is superior to the durability of the protection of our tanks. Thus, the armor penetration of the main charge of Hellfire, NOT2T, Eryx, Milan2T and Javelin tandem warheads is 1200 mm, 1100 mm, 950 mm, 880 mm and 750 mm, respectively. A significant excess of the armor penetration rate of the warheads of these missiles over the armor-resistant T-72 protection testifies to their high anti-armor effect, as a result of which the ammunition explodes and the thin-walled fuel tanks ignite (see NVO No. 38, 2010 year).
The weak protection of the upper part of the hull and turret of the tanks led to the development and adoption of anti-tank missile systems (ATGM) of the short range Predator and long range TOW-2B (USA), which are equipped with warheads on the principle of the shock core. Missiles of these complexes hit the target when flying over it. The TOW-2B ATGM showed itself well during the fighting in the Persian Gulf zone in 1991. At the same time, the weak protection of the roof of tanks predetermined the creation abroad of self-targeting cluster (SPBE) and self-guided (SNBE) combat elements with which various ammunition are being filled.
For example, in the field of aviation cluster weapons to combat armored vehicles in the USA, Germany, France and the UK, programs have been implemented to create containers with SPBE launched outside the air defense zone. Current trends in the conduct of hostilities contributed to the creation abroad of artillery shells, equipped with SPBE (Skeet - USA, SMArt-155 - Germany, BONUS - Sweden, etc.). SPBE operate on the principle of "shot-forgotten", that is, the processes of autonomous detection, capture and targeting of ammunition are implemented. The warhead of a self-targeting combat element forms a shock core, which strikes the tank roof.
For all foreign controlled anti-tank weapons, the height and dimensions of our tanks are irrelevant. In this case, attacks on T-72 will be applied in the depth of our defense against an unprotected roof, as well as with the help of remote mining on weak protection from the bottom. In other words, our tanks from the side of the roof and the bottom remain practically unprotected in the context of non-traditional wars.
TANKS IN THE HANDS OF DOLLERS
Vyacheslav Khalitov’s statements on enhancing the combat potential of the T-72 are based on old ideas about the nature of past generations of wars. In the conditions of the sixth generation wars abroad, the system of fighting against tanks is constantly being improved. Today, with the modernization of the T-72 and the creation of a promising armored vehicle of the Armata type, it is already unacceptable to use only the characteristics of firepower, security and mobility. These characteristics in relation to the new generation of wars are not enough to determine the survival of domestic armored vehicles in combat conditions.
The use of highly effective means of reconnaissance and destruction of tanks by the enemy causes the presentation of new updated TTTs to the air defense of the Ground Forces. Specified requirements should determine how to disrupt the detection of our armored vehicles and what should be reliably knocked down to protect against damage to tanks located in the operational and tactical zones. It should be borne in mind that enemy aircraft will carry out attacks by armored vehicles without entering the air defense zone of the air force. The appearance of the specified TTT, firstly, will determine the increased responsibility and higher activity of the SV air defense troops in the protection of tank units. And, secondly, it will help to account for the high effectiveness of foreign anti-tank weapons, especially those operating on the roof of the armored vehicles. At the same time, it is necessary to revise the instructions of the air defense of the SV in terms of ensuring the collective protection of domestic armored vehicles in the new generation of wars.
At present, foreign space reconnaissance assets (radar, television, infrared, optical) exceed the measures taken to reduce the visibility of domestic tanks. Therefore, the presence of Russian armored vehicles in the operational and tactical zones will be recorded by foreign radar reconnaissance satellites with an accuracy of coordinates of several tens of centimeters in dense cloud conditions. It should be expected that the intelligence potential of the NATO countries will significantly increase due to unmanned aerial vehicles with a long duration of flights.
After the discovery of tank reconnaissance, they will be attacked by anti-tank weapons delivered by tactical missiles, aircraft, multiple rocket launchers and artillery. To repel this attack, short-range mobile complexes of the Tor-М1 air defense system, Osa-AKM air defense system, Tunkusk-M air defense missile system, Strela-10М2 (М3) air defense system are of the greatest importance. Recall that these complexes were created in the last century in the Soviet Union.
In the promotional materials for the listed air defense systems, airplanes, helicopters, precision-guided munitions, cruise missiles and UAVs are designated as target targets. The developers of the TOR-M1 SAM, for example, claim (see “NVO” No. 44, 2007 year) that, based on the results of target firing on analogues of the main types of enemy targets, this system can effectively hit: anti-radar missiles (PRR) of the type “ Harm "; Walley type aerial bombs; "Maverick" aircraft guided missiles; tactical aircraft F-15, F-16, A-10.
The Tor-M1 air defense missile system was put into service in 1991 as a result of the modernization of the Tor torrent. The Tor-M1 system has an enemy target hit area in range 1,5 – 12 km, in height - 0,01 – 6 km. In turn, the American PRR "Harm" is the most advanced of the existing missiles of this type. Over the past 20 years, the United States and its NATO allies, participating in military conflicts, have been testing high-precision weapons, reconnaissance, control, communications, electronic warfare and other systems. Thus, during Operation Freedom for Iraq in 2003, the “Harm” ". The obtained combat experience allowed the creation of a more advanced AGM-400E HARM rocket, which will soon be adopted. This rocket is equipped with a multi-mode hsn (active and passive) and an inertial control system with correction according to the NAVSTAR CRNS signals. The question arises: do the technical characteristics obtained by upgrading the Tor-M88 ground-to-ground missile systems succeed in advancing the AGM-1E HARM technical characteristics in terms of homing, noise immunity, etc.?
From the submission of the Central Research Institute of Defense as a target - an analogue of the PF “Harm”, the Russian-made air-to-surface missile X-29L (see table), which is used for radar tests and exercises, was adopted according to radar visibility. Recall that the X-29L rocket was put into service in the 1980 year.
The data in the table indicate that the launch mass and diameter of the X-29L missile exceed similar characteristics of the Harm RDR. It can be assumed that the X-29L radar visibility is higher than that of Harm. Therefore, testing with the participation of X-29L leads to an overestimation of the results of the operation of domestic radars.
It is appropriate to recall the words of the commander of the air defense forces of the Air Force, Major General Mikhail Krush,: “The proportion of military air defense assets that most meet modern requirements and provide decent resistance to promising means of air attack among the troops is extremely small. And in the coming years, this situation is likely to remain unchanged. " In passing, it should be noted that in the wars of a new generation, the level of EW significance will be sharply increased.
At the same time, the events in South Ossetia in August 2008 of the year, by forcing Georgia to peace, revealed the absence in our army of modern EW facilities and means of high-precision destruction of radio-emitting elements in the enemy’s territory. Our EWs did not manage to “hammer” the enemy’s radio network with interferences and prevent the anti-aircraft missile guidance tools from which they lost (according to various estimates) from 4 to 8 Russian aircraft. At the same time, the Georgian side created radio interference that impeded the management of our troops.
It should be recalled that as a result of the operation “Allied Force” in YNGX in Yugoslavia, NATO anti-radar missiles destroyed almost every source of any radio emission. Thus, the survival rate of domestic tanks depends on the survival rate of the abovementioned air defense missile systems during firing on the PI.
In the new conditions of confrontation, it is necessary to interfere with all means of foreign intelligence and WTO guidance systems, as well as with the help of military air defense to protect tanks in operational and tactical zones from aviation precision weapons. In turn, the opposing side will attack our air defense missile with anti-radar missiles, for which the EW troops must be responsible. The electronic component plays an important role in these weapon systems. Therefore, success will be accompanied by those armed forces whose electronic systems correspond to a new generation of wars. Unfortunately, in this direction, we continue to lag since Soviet times, which casts doubt on the quality of work performed on the LG-2020 for all offensive and defensive weapons systems.
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