Destroy or save
Shock aviation and air defense - a hundred years of confrontation
Past in Moscow historical the conference dedicated to the 100th anniversary of air defense, in terms of the content of the speeches, was more cheers-patriotic than scientific. The listed results and figures did not follow conclusions about the role of aviation and air defense forces in armed confrontation. The author considers the proposed analysis as a step towards global work, the purpose of which is to determine the place of the air defense forces in the structure of the armed forces, taking into account the balance of forces in modern warfare.
With the advent of aviation and the beginning of its use in military operations in the first two decades of the 20th century, specialists saw in it a new promising means of warfare, drastically changing the balance of forces of the warring parties. Initially, the aircraft were used for reconnaissance and communications, but already in the Italian-Turkish and Balkan wars of the 1911 – 1913 years they were used for bombing. In the First World War, this experience was used not only on the battlefield, but also in the operational rear of the enemy, to destroy its infrastructure. The capitals of the warring states — London and Paris — large objects deep in Germany — were repeatedly subjected to air strikes.
Compared to 1913 year
The ability to solve problems on the battlefield and behind enemy lines that are inaccessible to other forces and equipment has stimulated a significant increase in the number of aircraft and improved aircraft performance in all belligerent states. By November 1918, their fleet increased more than tenfold. Military aviation had more than 3300 machines in France, over 2700 in Germany, around 2000 in the UK, and no less than 1000 in Russia.
“The air war against the industry and communications of the enemy is much more effective than the air support of his army on the battlefield”
A new means of warfare demanded the creation of special countermeasures, the organization of measures to protect the troops and objects from air strikes. That is, the organization of air defense, which became known as air, and later air defense (air defense). Special anti-aircraft guns and machine guns were created. We began to organize points and systems for detecting and alerting about an enemy air attack. By the end of World War I, in the armies of Germany, Italy, and France, there were 4500 anti-aircraft artillery guns, in Russia - 247 anti-aircraft 2 batteries — 4-guns. Fighters accounted for about 40 percent of military aircraft in almost all countries.
The emergence of fundamentally different in their properties means of destruction of enemy aircraft led to different tactics of their use. Fighter aircraft had the task of destroying them on the approaches to the defended objects and groups of troops and to pursue on the return routes. Ground-based anti-aircraft weapons directly covered the objects of defense, not allowing to produce targeted bombing.
At that time, the leadership of the warring countries did not have a clear assessment of the contribution of those and other means to the overall effectiveness of air defense. After the war, it was estimated that during its course, 25 percent of all downed aircraft were hit by anti-aircraft artillery, and 75 percent - by fighter aircraft. That is, the latter showed that by virtue of its maneuverability and a considerable range, it turned out to be the main means of dealing with enemy aircraft.
The effectiveness of anti-aircraft artillery due to the short range compared with the fighters, the weakness of the organization of observation, limited visual posts, and the lack of control systems was low. But in general, she played an important role in reducing damage to defended facilities and troops. Anti-aircraft artillery systems significantly reduced the capabilities of bomber aircraft for aimed bombing.
Despite the fact that during the First World War, the results of aviation and air confrontation were mainly of tactical importance, after it ended, a number of authors made the first conclusions about the significant impact of air strikes and the actions of air defense forces on the overall results. Aviation and air defense systems continued to flourish and be used in all military conflicts.
Significant conclusions about the importance of aviation and air defense troops were made from the experience of the Spanish Civil War 1936 – 1939. The opposing sides had both aviation and ground anti-aircraft defense systems. Here, experience was gained in using the latest models of airplanes and small arms and cannon armaments, as well as solving tactics for carrying out air strikes, conducting air combat, the joint use of aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery.
First of all planes
The Italian general Julio Due was advanced and developed the theory of strategic air warfare. She assumed air strikes to gain supremacy in the sky, as well as on the state and economic centers of the country to withdraw it from the war. However, in the Soviet Union, this theory was rejected.
Nevertheless, experience has shown that aviation has become one of the most powerful means of warfare. Its use was subordinated primarily to the maintenance of ground forces. With this in mind, the construction of aviation was carried out in most developed countries (especially in Germany).
Awareness of its role led to the understanding by the leadership of several countries of the importance of air defense. Accordingly, the construction of air defense systems was carried out. In the Soviet Union, the turning point was the 1932 year. The Chief of Staff of the Red Army, Alexander Egorov, deeply penetrated the problems of air defense and outlined them in a report to the Revolutionary Military Council. It was decided to submit the issue to a meeting of the Defense Committee under the Government of the USSR. Council of People's Commissars in its resolution of April 5 1932 of the year recognized the state of the country's air defense unsatisfactory and outlined specific measures to strengthen the air defense. As a result of the development of aviation and air defense systems before the attack of fascist Germany in June, 1941 in the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union numbered about 33 300 aircraft, including about 30 percent of fighters. For the air defense of the country 40 fighter aviation regiments were allocated - 1500 aircraft, about 4000 anti-aircraft artillery guns and 650 anti-aircraft machine guns.
It is believed that the main weapons World War II are Tanks and artillery. However, this is not entirely true, for example, the USA, Great Britain and Japan developed aviation and navy to a greater degree. Germany in the groupings of troops during the attack on France had 2580 tanks and 3824 combat aircraft, during the invasion of the Soviet Union - 4300 tanks and up to 5000 combat aircraft. The Japanese attack on the American naval base Pearl Harbor was attended only by aircraft carrier aircraft. In the Battle of England, only aviation, missiles and air defense forces took part on both sides.
The military leadership of Germany adopted one of the main tenets of the theory of Douai that the primary task of its own aviation was the quickest destruction of enemy aircraft. With the onset of aggression, she inflicted sudden massive strikes primarily on airfields — without significant opposition from the air defense systems, and only then on groups of troops and other objects. This made it possible to win air supremacy and ensure a successful offensive by the ground forces, the same vaunted Guderian tank wedges. So the aircraft of Poland and France was practically destroyed in the first days on the airfields of peacetime by the strikes of the German Air Force. Immediately after this, the efforts of the German air force were focused on attacking communications. As a result of these actions, due to the absence of any significant air defense system in both Poland and France, insurmountable difficulties arose in the implementation of mobilization. The command and control of the troops was completely paralyzed in places, which led to the defeat.
From the course of military operations against Poland and France, important conclusions should have followed that, firstly, any aviation state would make the greatest mistake if during a tense international situation, when war could break out every day, leave its warplanes on peaceful airfields time and without a powerful air defense system; secondly, the decisive and long-lasting success of all land and sea operations can only be achieved if there is superiority (domination) in the air. The Poles and the French did not have this knowledge and, therefore, in 1940, they made serious mistakes. The Soviet Union, in spite of their bitter experience, repeated such mistakes in 1941. The strength of the air forces of the western border military districts of the Soviet Union surpassed the German Air Force grouping created to attack the USSR more than 1,6 times. However, as a result of the sudden strikes of German aviation on 66 border airfields and the absence or non-readiness of air defense forces and weapons on the first day of the war, about 1200 of our aircraft were destroyed. This gave the aggressor the opportunity to immediately achieve operational air supremacy on the main lines, and then the strategic one, which he held almost until the middle of the war.
Thus, the forces and means of air defense of the states that were subjected to aggression at the beginning of World War II (except Great Britain) did not fulfill their main task - to protect the strike response potential. The aggressor solved the tasks not only of defeating the aviation component of the opposing side, but also of the air defense of his groupings of troops. The country attacked didn’t have anything to retaliate as a result of the loss of the aircraft.
English recipe
The most successful character of the actions of aviation and air defense forces in World War II took place in the battle for England. Repeated attempts by German aviation to crush its military and economic potential have come to nothing. The German Air Force suffered huge losses from the British air defense system and they did not have the strength to decide the outcome of the confrontation in their favor. If the air defense could be suppressed, nothing would have prevented the German invasion of the islands both by air and by sea. The high stability of the air defenses allowed the British and then the US Air Force to gradually move from purely defensive to active operations to attack German targets.
The German air defense had a significant number of fighters in 1943, which made it possible to cause serious damage to the Anglo-American aircraft. In some cases, it reached 15 – 20 per cent of the aircraft involved in the bombing. The high losses suffered by the Anglo-Americans forced them to improve the tactics of using their aircraft, which made it possible for the distracting actions of specially designated forces to conceal the true targets of strikes and to protect the bombers in flight with long-range fighters. Significant difficulties for the German air defense system were created by the use of special air connections, which dropped aluminum tapes and used special jamming equipment. The measures taken significantly increased the losses of the German fighter aircraft, which required the redistribution of anti-aircraft artillery from the cover of troops to military and industrial facilities.
During the war, the German city was subjected to massive air bombardments (up to 10 – 30 times). In January, February and March of 131, 1945 thousand tons of bombs were dropped on the territory of Germany. The blows of this magnitude led to the fact that the German military industry by the middle of April 329-th virtually ceased to exist. Railway communication in a number of areas has ceased, traffic on highways was extremely limited. Many parts of Germany experienced severe food shortages. German ground forces lost mobility every day, the transfer of orders was extremely difficult or even impossible.
How critical the situation in Germany was already in December 1944, can be judged from the following excerpt from the report of Reich Minister of Weapons and Ammunition Speer to Hitler: “These figures show that we can not provide troops with ammunition, coal, neither our shipping, nor rail transport, nor gas plants and power plants, nor industry and agriculture. Therefore, we can confidently expect the final collapse of the entire German economy in 4 – 8 weeks. After this catastrophe, further warfare will become impossible. ” The complete defeat of Germany came in seven and a half weeks.
From Pearl Harbor to Midway
The facts confirmed one of the provisions of the theory of Douai, who argued that air strikes with the aim of destroying objects of the economy and infrastructure of the state in strategic terms are more effective than the troops. This was confirmed in post-war local conflicts.
The course of World War II in the Pacific also demonstrated the decisive influence of air combat on naval operations and operations. A striking example is the Japanese air raid on the US naval base Pearl Harbor, when eight battleships and three light cruisers were sunk or seriously damaged due to inaction of the air defense system. Of 304 American aircraft, Japanese aircraft destroyed 188 (57%). Three days after the raid on Pearl Harbor, on December 10, 1941, the English Pacific Fleet, whose air defense did not significantly counter Japanese aviation, lost the Prince of Wales and Ripals battleships. The loss of the two most powerful units of the English fleet was irrefutable evidence that ships not provided with air defense were doomed to defeat.
Aviation played a crucial role at the Pacific Theater and in May-June of the 1942 year. The battle in the Coral Sea will remain in the history of the fleet as the first one, the outcome of which was decided by aviation. The parties fought, being out of the reach of naval artillery. US planes were able to sink two Japanese aircraft carriers. Near Midway Island, American dive bombers succeeded in a sudden raid on three aircraft carriers of the imperial fleet, which had almost no resistance. Within a few seconds, the ships were disabled: one sank immediately after the attack, the other was abandoned by the team and sunk by the Japanese themselves, the third was damaged, and then finished off by an American submarine. With the loss of aircraft carriers, the Japanese fleet became defenseless from the air, which decided its fate.
The subsequent course of events showed that it is aviation that becomes the decisive factor in the confrontation at sea. She is assigned the main role both in defeating the enemy’s fleet and in defending her forces against enemy actions.
Air defense must be systemic
Summarizing the experience of the Second World War, above all the struggle for air supremacy on the Soviet-German front, the Battle of England, the US and British air strikes on Germany’s facilities, operations in the Pacific, leads to the conclusion: even then, the pattern of dependence on the course and outcome was quite clear military operations of the army and navy from the result of the confrontation in the sky. Britain was the first, whose leadership appreciated the importance of operational and strategic use of aviation and air defense forces. It is precisely because of the presence of a strategic air defense system that the country was able to repel Germany’s aviation and rocket attacks and go on to retaliate against enemy cities and communications centers.
These conclusions should be made to the leadership of all leading states. But for the postwar period, they were too revolutionary. Guderian's “wedges” and breakthroughs of the tank armies of Rybalko, Rotmistrov, Katukov were obscured by the fact that successful actions of mass groups of armored vehicles, ground forces and fleet forces took place only when they won complete air supremacy.
In general, aviation became the main means of dealing with an air enemy in World War II. Of the 77 thousands of German aircraft lost on the Eastern Front, the Soviet Air Force destroyed 57 thousands, including thousands of fighter aircraft. Such a significant contribution to the struggle for air supremacy was due to its properties: maneuverability and a significant range of action compared to anti-aircraft artillery.
It should be noted that the destruction of air attack weapons is not an end in itself of the air defense system. Some authors speculate on victory in determining their contribution to victory. For example, they detract from the role of air defense in the Great Patriotic War, claiming that the air force destroyed 57 thousands of German aircraft, and the air defense forces - just over 7300. But in fact, the main goal of the air defense system’s actions is not to destroy the enemy’s air attacks, but to preserve the defensive objects. In particular, during the defense of Moscow, only 229 German aircraft broke through to the city, which is 2,6 percent of the total number of sorties. That is, German aviation, while countering Moscow’s powerful air defense system, was unable to realize numerical superiority. The defended objects were saved. The prevented damage was several times higher than the cost of the entire German aircraft involved in the strikes.
An important role here is played by strike aircraft, which attack enemy vehicles on airfields and aircraft carriers. In some cases, it was the only means of combating air attack weapons. In particular, the successful method of fighting the German V-2 was only the destruction by British aircraft of launch sites, supply bases and industrial enterprises that produced missiles.
Unfortunately, the Soviet military art did not immediately notice the new laws, otherwise how can one explain the preferential development and production in the post-war period of hundreds of thousands of tanks (most of which were taken outside the Urals, where they rusted) and other weapons of the Ground Forces, as well as in the heat of the set of reorganizations of the Armed Forces of Russia, the reduction of aviation and the destruction of the strategic air defense system of the state.
The modern concept of war involves the interaction of all types of armed forces, and none of them can develop without taking into account the general structure of the state’s army. This is of primary concern to the troops, whose task is to protect the country and the armed forces from attacks from the sky.
The first part of the article deals with the history of the confrontation between strike aviation and air defense forces from the moment of their appearance until the end of the Second World War. By that time, it was concluded that the air defense system should be a system that closely interacts not only with aviation, but also with other types of armed forces.
The main battlefield is the sky
After World War II, each subsequent local war was characterized by an increasing share of participation in the armed confrontation between aviation and air defense, its growing influence on the course and outcome of hostilities. At the same time, new achievements in the field of the development of means of struggle in airspace began to affect the balance of forces. There were jet aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles. Significantly expanded theater space.
In the Korean War (1950 – 1953), jet aircraft were used for the first time on a large scale. Massive air strikes against the US Air Force were opposed by large air defense forces, primarily fighter aircraft. The confrontation in Korea confirmed the decisive influence of the result of the confrontation in the air sphere on the overall course and outcome of the war and the decisive role in the air defense of fighter aircraft, which destroyed the 1097 of enemy aircraft. On account of anti-aircraft artillery - 212 aircraft.
The US war with North Vietnam (1965 – 1973) was the first, the content of which was only the confrontation between aviation and air defense forces. Then, for the first time, anti-aircraft missile systems delivered from the USSR were used, which forced the US command to proceed to the massive use of its aircraft (up to 200 aircraft simultaneously) and to plan special actions to overcome the air defense system. There has been an increase in the number of air assault vehicles (EAS), electronic warfare systems were widely used, the first high-precision weapon appeared. Despite all the measures taken by the Americans, in general, the actions of the Vietnamese air defense system are marked as successful, which decided the overall outcome of the war in his favor. The appearance of missile systems by anti-aircraft gunners has dramatically increased their overall contribution to the effectiveness of air defense. Data on US aviation losses in Vietnam vary significantly from one source to another (from 8612 to 2500 aircraft and helicopters). ZRV destroyed 1350 US aircraft.
Air defense as a priority goal
In the Arab-Israeli wars from 1967 to 1982, the confrontation between aviation and air defense forces was fought with varying success. In June 1967, the Israeli side, after careful preparation, launched sudden simultaneous air strikes on all elements of the Egyptian air defense system, its anti-aircraft weapons and fighter aircraft were caught by surprise due to poor intelligence and were almost completely destroyed. However, in October 1973 th Israeli aviation, despite careful preparation of its actions, faced in the Suez Canal area with effective resistance from a powerful anti-aircraft missile group of a mixed composition deployed on positions prepared in advance in engineering terms. Forces and means of air defense ARE and Syria for 18 days destroyed a total of about 110 aircraft. The general objectives of the war Israel did not reach.
His airstrikes against Syria’s air defense force grouping in the Bekaa Valley in 1982 showed that the opposing side had a sufficiently powerful air defense system that required planning a special operation to suppress it. In this case, all aviation forces are involved only in the fight against air defense. And regardless of the outcome of their confrontation, aviation cannot simultaneously carry out other tasks of military operations in support of ground forces and delivering attacks on targets. That is, the air defense system before its suppression largely or even completely prevents damage to the defended objects and groups of troops.
In the Anglo-Argentine conflict (March - June 1982), a mobile air defense system was created to support the landing and operations of the UK expeditionary forces on the Falkland Islands, consisting of three areas, and constant reconnaissance and interaction of anti-aircraft weapons of ships and aviation was organized. This led to the fact that despite the sixfold superiority in aviation, Argentina’s aircraft losses were three times more than those of Great Britain.
In the actions of US aviation against Libya in 1986, the idea of achieving surprise by striking aircraft at night from remote bases with several air refueling was embodied. The striking of objects was carefully planned. The air defense system was overcome bypassing the zones of reconnaissance and fire (strike from the south), its electronic and fire suppression (strike from the north). Libya's air defense grouping did not cope with the tasks due to the lack of necessary intelligence, low combat readiness and passiveness of aviation.
Space as a trend
The war in the Persian Gulf (1991 in winter) very clearly showed the crucial importance of the course and outcome of the struggle in the air for achieving success in general. It was after this war that this pattern was first recognized by the Soviet (in fact, already Russian) military art. It was noted that the air defense had long overgrown the tactical framework and turned into the most important operational and strategic factor in the defense of any state, and that the use of air attack and air defense systems is effective in ensuring their actions with space systems.
The multinational force (MNF) carefully prepared the actions of the IOS, primarily based on data from space reconnaissance, and by carrying out the so-called air campaign during 38 days they solved all the main strategic tasks of the war. At the same time, aviation activity was maintained at the level of 400 – 850 sorties per day. 88 500 tons of bombs of various types were dropped on Iraqi sites, which is comparable in scale to the entire Eastern European phase of World War II. For the suppression of objects and air defense systems, for the first time, cruise missiles and low-profile aircraft made under the Stealth program were used massively for the first time in a separate echelon. Iraq’s air defense system was built as an integrated, layered system with fairly modern aircraft. However, reconnaissance and anti-aircraft calculations could not lead to combat air attack weapons in the conditions of electronic and fire suppression with high-precision weapons. As a result, there was practically no resistance. The use by Baghdad of operational tactical missiles of the SCUD type forced the MNF to create elements of missile defense using space reconnaissance, communications and navigation systems. The MNF ground troops entered the battle at the final stage and no more than 100 hours operated.
The operation of the US and British Armed Forces in Iraq "Fox in the Desert" (17 – 20 in December 1998) was carried out only by means of air attack. During the operation, rocket-air strikes were successively inflicted with high-precision weapons only at night to a depth of up to a thousand kilometers with intervals of three hours and a duration of one to three hours. At the same time, more than 100 facilities in Iraq were consistently hit.
In the military actions of the United States and other NATO countries against Yugoslavia in 1999, all tasks were accomplished and the goals were achieved only by means of air attack and space support systems without the involvement of other forces. The actions of the IOS began with the application of two massive air strikes, after which the alliance acted selectively with an intensity of about 50 – 70 aircraft per day. Aviation and missiles worked in groups for a significant number of objects. During the 78 day of war, NATO aircraft made 38 000 sorties, and about a thousand air-launched and sea-based cruise missiles were launched.
The actions of the Yugoslav air defense forces in view of the low capabilities were in the nature of "partisan" tactics and could not cause significant damage to the EHF attackers. As a result of the actions of the NATO EHE in Yugoslavia, the main stationary military and industrial facilities, electronic media, communications nodes, and state and military control were destroyed. The country's leadership was forced to accept all the demands of the aggressors.
During the “Enduring Freedom” counter-terrorist operation in Afghanistan in 2001, the American command from the very beginning, applying the principle of “central network combat”, struck the detected objects with a variety of forces and means - from modern laser-guided weapons systems to conventional bombs. This made it possible to solve the assigned tasks with minimal losses of ground forces and special operations forces.
In Operation Freedom of Iraq in 2003, the overall superiority of aviation in terms of quantity and quality of the coalition forces did not give the enemy the ability to effectively counter it. This allowed the 200-thousandth Allied land grouping to attack Baghdad and achieve a decisive advantage in any battle. Only a half-day break in the aviation support of their forces because of the sandstorm caused the ground forces of the Americans and the British to suspend the advance, which could be associated with significant human and material losses.
The experience of internal conflicts also shows the crucial importance of the confrontation in the air sphere. For example, in the North Caucasus in the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya in 1999 – 2000, on average, every second object of bandit formations was struck by attack aircraft from the group of federal forces. When the guerrilla mobile air defense system appeared in the militants, the actions of aviation were practically paralyzed.
In an operation to force Georgia to peace in August 2008, despite the shortcomings of command and resistance of the air defense system, air strikes on the objects of the armed forces of the aggressor played an important role.
The actions of the coalition forces of NATO countries in Libya in 2011 began with air strikes to create a no-fly zone in order to support the actions of ground forces groups.
A global challenge requires an adequate response.
At present, the development of airborne and missile attack systems has been the creation of hypersonic aircraft: manned hypersonic aircraft of various purposes, guided missiles with a long range at altitudes 40 – 60 kilometers, planning warheads for ballistic missiles. Such devices can be used for reconnaissance, destruction of important objects in any region of the world, interception of aerospace targets, launching, servicing and de-assigning military satellites.
The implementation of these programs leads to the complete erasure of the brink in the means and conduct of hostilities in air and outer space, which becomes a single area of warfare. Air-defense, anti-missile and anti-space defense systems are being developed, they are being integrated into a single aerospace defense system (WKO).
The leading nations of the world spend up to 50 – 60 percent of their military budgets on the development of aerospace attack and aerospace defense equipment. This leads to a further increase in the role of armed struggle in the aerospace sphere.
Thus, the forces and means of air and missile attack, primarily the United States and NATO, became the main means of waging war. They are capable, in the absence of an effective countering of the air defense and missile defense systems (EKR) of the opposing side, to deliver a disarming strike to any state and solve all the strategic tasks of the war within a few days. The main deterrent to such an attack on Russia are its strategic land-based and sea-launched missiles and long-range aviation (strategic nuclear forces). As long as the country is capable of delivering unacceptable damage to the aggressor in a counter or counterstrike, the attack on it is unlikely. To preserve the “potential of retribution”, first of all, the air and missile defense of Russia should be built in the general EKR system.
Restraining aggressors from unleashing large-scale wars and armed conflicts, preventing their escalation is the main task of the strategic nuclear forces and the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region. To do this, they must monitor the state and activities of groups of aerospace attack forces of potential adversaries, provide timely leadership of the state (the President of the Russian Federation - the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) with reliable information about the aerospace situation for making relevant decisions, and protect the response forces and means strike for causing unacceptable damage to the aggressor.
Aviation and the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region are called upon to solve other tasks of ensuring the security of the state in the aerospace sphere. With the beginning of the war, aviation must win and maintain air superiority; to violate the military and state administration of the enemy, the functioning of the objects of the rear and the military-economic potential of the enemy; to combat aviation, nuclear missile, air, land, ship groupings and reserves of the enemy; provide air support for troops and forces; to land and provide airborne assault forces; transport troops, weapons and military equipment and other materiel by air; to fight the air and sea landing of the enemy; perform special tasks.
EKR troops should continuously monitor the use of airspace and prevent violations of the flight regime and the state border of the Russian Federation in airspace. And with the onset of local or regional aggression - notify troops, agencies and command posts about the air situation, repel (weaken) the attacks of the enemy’s aerospace attack, prevent them from gaining air superiority, ensure deployment of a group of forces of the Russian Federation, protect military facilities and troops , population and economy.
At present, the balance of forces and means of aviation and aerospace defense, capable of leading a confrontation with the most serious of the likely opponents, looks extremely unprofitable for Russia. Therefore, the problem should be solved in a complex. The fight against the aerospace enemy is realized as a strategic operation. Because of its importance in the initial period of hostilities, all troops, forces and means capable of opposing an aerospace attack are attracted. They are used for reconnaissance, destruction and suppression of enemy funds, both in flight, and on land and sea.
The creation of aerospace forces by combining the Air Force and the East Kazakhstani Army will simplify, at the level of the Armed Forces, the general coordination of the actions of the shock and defensive forces to fight the aerospace enemy, subject to the strategic tasks of organizing such a struggle on the top command of the VCS.
Past in Moscow historical the conference dedicated to the 100th anniversary of air defense, in terms of the content of the speeches, was more cheers-patriotic than scientific. The listed results and figures did not follow conclusions about the role of aviation and air defense forces in armed confrontation. The author considers the proposed analysis as a step towards global work, the purpose of which is to determine the place of the air defense forces in the structure of the armed forces, taking into account the balance of forces in modern warfare.
With the advent of aviation and the beginning of its use in military operations in the first two decades of the 20th century, specialists saw in it a new promising means of warfare, drastically changing the balance of forces of the warring parties. Initially, the aircraft were used for reconnaissance and communications, but already in the Italian-Turkish and Balkan wars of the 1911 – 1913 years they were used for bombing. In the First World War, this experience was used not only on the battlefield, but also in the operational rear of the enemy, to destroy its infrastructure. The capitals of the warring states — London and Paris — large objects deep in Germany — were repeatedly subjected to air strikes.
Compared to 1913 year
The ability to solve problems on the battlefield and behind enemy lines that are inaccessible to other forces and equipment has stimulated a significant increase in the number of aircraft and improved aircraft performance in all belligerent states. By November 1918, their fleet increased more than tenfold. Military aviation had more than 3300 machines in France, over 2700 in Germany, around 2000 in the UK, and no less than 1000 in Russia.
“The air war against the industry and communications of the enemy is much more effective than the air support of his army on the battlefield”
A new means of warfare demanded the creation of special countermeasures, the organization of measures to protect the troops and objects from air strikes. That is, the organization of air defense, which became known as air, and later air defense (air defense). Special anti-aircraft guns and machine guns were created. We began to organize points and systems for detecting and alerting about an enemy air attack. By the end of World War I, in the armies of Germany, Italy, and France, there were 4500 anti-aircraft artillery guns, in Russia - 247 anti-aircraft 2 batteries — 4-guns. Fighters accounted for about 40 percent of military aircraft in almost all countries.
The emergence of fundamentally different in their properties means of destruction of enemy aircraft led to different tactics of their use. Fighter aircraft had the task of destroying them on the approaches to the defended objects and groups of troops and to pursue on the return routes. Ground-based anti-aircraft weapons directly covered the objects of defense, not allowing to produce targeted bombing.
At that time, the leadership of the warring countries did not have a clear assessment of the contribution of those and other means to the overall effectiveness of air defense. After the war, it was estimated that during its course, 25 percent of all downed aircraft were hit by anti-aircraft artillery, and 75 percent - by fighter aircraft. That is, the latter showed that by virtue of its maneuverability and a considerable range, it turned out to be the main means of dealing with enemy aircraft.
The effectiveness of anti-aircraft artillery due to the short range compared with the fighters, the weakness of the organization of observation, limited visual posts, and the lack of control systems was low. But in general, she played an important role in reducing damage to defended facilities and troops. Anti-aircraft artillery systems significantly reduced the capabilities of bomber aircraft for aimed bombing.Despite the fact that during the First World War, the results of aviation and air confrontation were mainly of tactical importance, after it ended, a number of authors made the first conclusions about the significant impact of air strikes and the actions of air defense forces on the overall results. Aviation and air defense systems continued to flourish and be used in all military conflicts.
Significant conclusions about the importance of aviation and air defense troops were made from the experience of the Spanish Civil War 1936 – 1939. The opposing sides had both aviation and ground anti-aircraft defense systems. Here, experience was gained in using the latest models of airplanes and small arms and cannon armaments, as well as solving tactics for carrying out air strikes, conducting air combat, the joint use of aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery.
First of all planes
The Italian general Julio Due was advanced and developed the theory of strategic air warfare. She assumed air strikes to gain supremacy in the sky, as well as on the state and economic centers of the country to withdraw it from the war. However, in the Soviet Union, this theory was rejected.
Nevertheless, experience has shown that aviation has become one of the most powerful means of warfare. Its use was subordinated primarily to the maintenance of ground forces. With this in mind, the construction of aviation was carried out in most developed countries (especially in Germany).
Awareness of its role led to the understanding by the leadership of several countries of the importance of air defense. Accordingly, the construction of air defense systems was carried out. In the Soviet Union, the turning point was the 1932 year. The Chief of Staff of the Red Army, Alexander Egorov, deeply penetrated the problems of air defense and outlined them in a report to the Revolutionary Military Council. It was decided to submit the issue to a meeting of the Defense Committee under the Government of the USSR. Council of People's Commissars in its resolution of April 5 1932 of the year recognized the state of the country's air defense unsatisfactory and outlined specific measures to strengthen the air defense. As a result of the development of aviation and air defense systems before the attack of fascist Germany in June, 1941 in the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union numbered about 33 300 aircraft, including about 30 percent of fighters. For the air defense of the country 40 fighter aviation regiments were allocated - 1500 aircraft, about 4000 anti-aircraft artillery guns and 650 anti-aircraft machine guns.
It is believed that the main weapons World War II are Tanks and artillery. However, this is not entirely true, for example, the USA, Great Britain and Japan developed aviation and navy to a greater degree. Germany in the groupings of troops during the attack on France had 2580 tanks and 3824 combat aircraft, during the invasion of the Soviet Union - 4300 tanks and up to 5000 combat aircraft. The Japanese attack on the American naval base Pearl Harbor was attended only by aircraft carrier aircraft. In the Battle of England, only aviation, missiles and air defense forces took part on both sides.The military leadership of Germany adopted one of the main tenets of the theory of Douai that the primary task of its own aviation was the quickest destruction of enemy aircraft. With the onset of aggression, she inflicted sudden massive strikes primarily on airfields — without significant opposition from the air defense systems, and only then on groups of troops and other objects. This made it possible to win air supremacy and ensure a successful offensive by the ground forces, the same vaunted Guderian tank wedges. So the aircraft of Poland and France was practically destroyed in the first days on the airfields of peacetime by the strikes of the German Air Force. Immediately after this, the efforts of the German air force were focused on attacking communications. As a result of these actions, due to the absence of any significant air defense system in both Poland and France, insurmountable difficulties arose in the implementation of mobilization. The command and control of the troops was completely paralyzed in places, which led to the defeat.
From the course of military operations against Poland and France, important conclusions should have followed that, firstly, any aviation state would make the greatest mistake if during a tense international situation, when war could break out every day, leave its warplanes on peaceful airfields time and without a powerful air defense system; secondly, the decisive and long-lasting success of all land and sea operations can only be achieved if there is superiority (domination) in the air. The Poles and the French did not have this knowledge and, therefore, in 1940, they made serious mistakes. The Soviet Union, in spite of their bitter experience, repeated such mistakes in 1941. The strength of the air forces of the western border military districts of the Soviet Union surpassed the German Air Force grouping created to attack the USSR more than 1,6 times. However, as a result of the sudden strikes of German aviation on 66 border airfields and the absence or non-readiness of air defense forces and weapons on the first day of the war, about 1200 of our aircraft were destroyed. This gave the aggressor the opportunity to immediately achieve operational air supremacy on the main lines, and then the strategic one, which he held almost until the middle of the war.
Thus, the forces and means of air defense of the states that were subjected to aggression at the beginning of World War II (except Great Britain) did not fulfill their main task - to protect the strike response potential. The aggressor solved the tasks not only of defeating the aviation component of the opposing side, but also of the air defense of his groupings of troops. The country attacked didn’t have anything to retaliate as a result of the loss of the aircraft.
English recipe
The most successful character of the actions of aviation and air defense forces in World War II took place in the battle for England. Repeated attempts by German aviation to crush its military and economic potential have come to nothing. The German Air Force suffered huge losses from the British air defense system and they did not have the strength to decide the outcome of the confrontation in their favor. If the air defense could be suppressed, nothing would have prevented the German invasion of the islands both by air and by sea. The high stability of the air defenses allowed the British and then the US Air Force to gradually move from purely defensive to active operations to attack German targets.
The German air defense had a significant number of fighters in 1943, which made it possible to cause serious damage to the Anglo-American aircraft. In some cases, it reached 15 – 20 per cent of the aircraft involved in the bombing. The high losses suffered by the Anglo-Americans forced them to improve the tactics of using their aircraft, which made it possible for the distracting actions of specially designated forces to conceal the true targets of strikes and to protect the bombers in flight with long-range fighters. Significant difficulties for the German air defense system were created by the use of special air connections, which dropped aluminum tapes and used special jamming equipment. The measures taken significantly increased the losses of the German fighter aircraft, which required the redistribution of anti-aircraft artillery from the cover of troops to military and industrial facilities.
During the war, the German city was subjected to massive air bombardments (up to 10 – 30 times). In January, February and March of 131, 1945 thousand tons of bombs were dropped on the territory of Germany. The blows of this magnitude led to the fact that the German military industry by the middle of April 329-th virtually ceased to exist. Railway communication in a number of areas has ceased, traffic on highways was extremely limited. Many parts of Germany experienced severe food shortages. German ground forces lost mobility every day, the transfer of orders was extremely difficult or even impossible.
How critical the situation in Germany was already in December 1944, can be judged from the following excerpt from the report of Reich Minister of Weapons and Ammunition Speer to Hitler: “These figures show that we can not provide troops with ammunition, coal, neither our shipping, nor rail transport, nor gas plants and power plants, nor industry and agriculture. Therefore, we can confidently expect the final collapse of the entire German economy in 4 – 8 weeks. After this catastrophe, further warfare will become impossible. ” The complete defeat of Germany came in seven and a half weeks.
From Pearl Harbor to Midway
The facts confirmed one of the provisions of the theory of Douai, who argued that air strikes with the aim of destroying objects of the economy and infrastructure of the state in strategic terms are more effective than the troops. This was confirmed in post-war local conflicts.
The course of World War II in the Pacific also demonstrated the decisive influence of air combat on naval operations and operations. A striking example is the Japanese air raid on the US naval base Pearl Harbor, when eight battleships and three light cruisers were sunk or seriously damaged due to inaction of the air defense system. Of 304 American aircraft, Japanese aircraft destroyed 188 (57%). Three days after the raid on Pearl Harbor, on December 10, 1941, the English Pacific Fleet, whose air defense did not significantly counter Japanese aviation, lost the Prince of Wales and Ripals battleships. The loss of the two most powerful units of the English fleet was irrefutable evidence that ships not provided with air defense were doomed to defeat.
Aviation played a crucial role at the Pacific Theater and in May-June of the 1942 year. The battle in the Coral Sea will remain in the history of the fleet as the first one, the outcome of which was decided by aviation. The parties fought, being out of the reach of naval artillery. US planes were able to sink two Japanese aircraft carriers. Near Midway Island, American dive bombers succeeded in a sudden raid on three aircraft carriers of the imperial fleet, which had almost no resistance. Within a few seconds, the ships were disabled: one sank immediately after the attack, the other was abandoned by the team and sunk by the Japanese themselves, the third was damaged, and then finished off by an American submarine. With the loss of aircraft carriers, the Japanese fleet became defenseless from the air, which decided its fate.
The subsequent course of events showed that it is aviation that becomes the decisive factor in the confrontation at sea. She is assigned the main role both in defeating the enemy’s fleet and in defending her forces against enemy actions.
Air defense must be systemic
Summarizing the experience of the Second World War, above all the struggle for air supremacy on the Soviet-German front, the Battle of England, the US and British air strikes on Germany’s facilities, operations in the Pacific, leads to the conclusion: even then, the pattern of dependence on the course and outcome was quite clear military operations of the army and navy from the result of the confrontation in the sky. Britain was the first, whose leadership appreciated the importance of operational and strategic use of aviation and air defense forces. It is precisely because of the presence of a strategic air defense system that the country was able to repel Germany’s aviation and rocket attacks and go on to retaliate against enemy cities and communications centers.
These conclusions should be made to the leadership of all leading states. But for the postwar period, they were too revolutionary. Guderian's “wedges” and breakthroughs of the tank armies of Rybalko, Rotmistrov, Katukov were obscured by the fact that successful actions of mass groups of armored vehicles, ground forces and fleet forces took place only when they won complete air supremacy.
In general, aviation became the main means of dealing with an air enemy in World War II. Of the 77 thousands of German aircraft lost on the Eastern Front, the Soviet Air Force destroyed 57 thousands, including thousands of fighter aircraft. Such a significant contribution to the struggle for air supremacy was due to its properties: maneuverability and a significant range of action compared to anti-aircraft artillery.
It should be noted that the destruction of air attack weapons is not an end in itself of the air defense system. Some authors speculate on victory in determining their contribution to victory. For example, they detract from the role of air defense in the Great Patriotic War, claiming that the air force destroyed 57 thousands of German aircraft, and the air defense forces - just over 7300. But in fact, the main goal of the air defense system’s actions is not to destroy the enemy’s air attacks, but to preserve the defensive objects. In particular, during the defense of Moscow, only 229 German aircraft broke through to the city, which is 2,6 percent of the total number of sorties. That is, German aviation, while countering Moscow’s powerful air defense system, was unable to realize numerical superiority. The defended objects were saved. The prevented damage was several times higher than the cost of the entire German aircraft involved in the strikes.
An important role here is played by strike aircraft, which attack enemy vehicles on airfields and aircraft carriers. In some cases, it was the only means of combating air attack weapons. In particular, the successful method of fighting the German V-2 was only the destruction by British aircraft of launch sites, supply bases and industrial enterprises that produced missiles.
Unfortunately, the Soviet military art did not immediately notice the new laws, otherwise how can one explain the preferential development and production in the post-war period of hundreds of thousands of tanks (most of which were taken outside the Urals, where they rusted) and other weapons of the Ground Forces, as well as in the heat of the set of reorganizations of the Armed Forces of Russia, the reduction of aviation and the destruction of the strategic air defense system of the state.
The modern concept of war involves the interaction of all types of armed forces, and none of them can develop without taking into account the general structure of the state’s army. This is of primary concern to the troops, whose task is to protect the country and the armed forces from attacks from the sky.
The first part of the article deals with the history of the confrontation between strike aviation and air defense forces from the moment of their appearance until the end of the Second World War. By that time, it was concluded that the air defense system should be a system that closely interacts not only with aviation, but also with other types of armed forces.
The main battlefield is the sky
After World War II, each subsequent local war was characterized by an increasing share of participation in the armed confrontation between aviation and air defense, its growing influence on the course and outcome of hostilities. At the same time, new achievements in the field of the development of means of struggle in airspace began to affect the balance of forces. There were jet aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles. Significantly expanded theater space.
In the Korean War (1950 – 1953), jet aircraft were used for the first time on a large scale. Massive air strikes against the US Air Force were opposed by large air defense forces, primarily fighter aircraft. The confrontation in Korea confirmed the decisive influence of the result of the confrontation in the air sphere on the overall course and outcome of the war and the decisive role in the air defense of fighter aircraft, which destroyed the 1097 of enemy aircraft. On account of anti-aircraft artillery - 212 aircraft.The US war with North Vietnam (1965 – 1973) was the first, the content of which was only the confrontation between aviation and air defense forces. Then, for the first time, anti-aircraft missile systems delivered from the USSR were used, which forced the US command to proceed to the massive use of its aircraft (up to 200 aircraft simultaneously) and to plan special actions to overcome the air defense system. There has been an increase in the number of air assault vehicles (EAS), electronic warfare systems were widely used, the first high-precision weapon appeared. Despite all the measures taken by the Americans, in general, the actions of the Vietnamese air defense system are marked as successful, which decided the overall outcome of the war in his favor. The appearance of missile systems by anti-aircraft gunners has dramatically increased their overall contribution to the effectiveness of air defense. Data on US aviation losses in Vietnam vary significantly from one source to another (from 8612 to 2500 aircraft and helicopters). ZRV destroyed 1350 US aircraft.
Air defense as a priority goal
In the Arab-Israeli wars from 1967 to 1982, the confrontation between aviation and air defense forces was fought with varying success. In June 1967, the Israeli side, after careful preparation, launched sudden simultaneous air strikes on all elements of the Egyptian air defense system, its anti-aircraft weapons and fighter aircraft were caught by surprise due to poor intelligence and were almost completely destroyed. However, in October 1973 th Israeli aviation, despite careful preparation of its actions, faced in the Suez Canal area with effective resistance from a powerful anti-aircraft missile group of a mixed composition deployed on positions prepared in advance in engineering terms. Forces and means of air defense ARE and Syria for 18 days destroyed a total of about 110 aircraft. The general objectives of the war Israel did not reach.
His airstrikes against Syria’s air defense force grouping in the Bekaa Valley in 1982 showed that the opposing side had a sufficiently powerful air defense system that required planning a special operation to suppress it. In this case, all aviation forces are involved only in the fight against air defense. And regardless of the outcome of their confrontation, aviation cannot simultaneously carry out other tasks of military operations in support of ground forces and delivering attacks on targets. That is, the air defense system before its suppression largely or even completely prevents damage to the defended objects and groups of troops.
In the Anglo-Argentine conflict (March - June 1982), a mobile air defense system was created to support the landing and operations of the UK expeditionary forces on the Falkland Islands, consisting of three areas, and constant reconnaissance and interaction of anti-aircraft weapons of ships and aviation was organized. This led to the fact that despite the sixfold superiority in aviation, Argentina’s aircraft losses were three times more than those of Great Britain.
In the actions of US aviation against Libya in 1986, the idea of achieving surprise by striking aircraft at night from remote bases with several air refueling was embodied. The striking of objects was carefully planned. The air defense system was overcome bypassing the zones of reconnaissance and fire (strike from the south), its electronic and fire suppression (strike from the north). Libya's air defense grouping did not cope with the tasks due to the lack of necessary intelligence, low combat readiness and passiveness of aviation.
Space as a trend
The war in the Persian Gulf (1991 in winter) very clearly showed the crucial importance of the course and outcome of the struggle in the air for achieving success in general. It was after this war that this pattern was first recognized by the Soviet (in fact, already Russian) military art. It was noted that the air defense had long overgrown the tactical framework and turned into the most important operational and strategic factor in the defense of any state, and that the use of air attack and air defense systems is effective in ensuring their actions with space systems.
The multinational force (MNF) carefully prepared the actions of the IOS, primarily based on data from space reconnaissance, and by carrying out the so-called air campaign during 38 days they solved all the main strategic tasks of the war. At the same time, aviation activity was maintained at the level of 400 – 850 sorties per day. 88 500 tons of bombs of various types were dropped on Iraqi sites, which is comparable in scale to the entire Eastern European phase of World War II. For the suppression of objects and air defense systems, for the first time, cruise missiles and low-profile aircraft made under the Stealth program were used massively for the first time in a separate echelon. Iraq’s air defense system was built as an integrated, layered system with fairly modern aircraft. However, reconnaissance and anti-aircraft calculations could not lead to combat air attack weapons in the conditions of electronic and fire suppression with high-precision weapons. As a result, there was practically no resistance. The use by Baghdad of operational tactical missiles of the SCUD type forced the MNF to create elements of missile defense using space reconnaissance, communications and navigation systems. The MNF ground troops entered the battle at the final stage and no more than 100 hours operated.The operation of the US and British Armed Forces in Iraq "Fox in the Desert" (17 – 20 in December 1998) was carried out only by means of air attack. During the operation, rocket-air strikes were successively inflicted with high-precision weapons only at night to a depth of up to a thousand kilometers with intervals of three hours and a duration of one to three hours. At the same time, more than 100 facilities in Iraq were consistently hit.
In the military actions of the United States and other NATO countries against Yugoslavia in 1999, all tasks were accomplished and the goals were achieved only by means of air attack and space support systems without the involvement of other forces. The actions of the IOS began with the application of two massive air strikes, after which the alliance acted selectively with an intensity of about 50 – 70 aircraft per day. Aviation and missiles worked in groups for a significant number of objects. During the 78 day of war, NATO aircraft made 38 000 sorties, and about a thousand air-launched and sea-based cruise missiles were launched.
The actions of the Yugoslav air defense forces in view of the low capabilities were in the nature of "partisan" tactics and could not cause significant damage to the EHF attackers. As a result of the actions of the NATO EHE in Yugoslavia, the main stationary military and industrial facilities, electronic media, communications nodes, and state and military control were destroyed. The country's leadership was forced to accept all the demands of the aggressors.
During the “Enduring Freedom” counter-terrorist operation in Afghanistan in 2001, the American command from the very beginning, applying the principle of “central network combat”, struck the detected objects with a variety of forces and means - from modern laser-guided weapons systems to conventional bombs. This made it possible to solve the assigned tasks with minimal losses of ground forces and special operations forces.
In Operation Freedom of Iraq in 2003, the overall superiority of aviation in terms of quantity and quality of the coalition forces did not give the enemy the ability to effectively counter it. This allowed the 200-thousandth Allied land grouping to attack Baghdad and achieve a decisive advantage in any battle. Only a half-day break in the aviation support of their forces because of the sandstorm caused the ground forces of the Americans and the British to suspend the advance, which could be associated with significant human and material losses.
The experience of internal conflicts also shows the crucial importance of the confrontation in the air sphere. For example, in the North Caucasus in the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya in 1999 – 2000, on average, every second object of bandit formations was struck by attack aircraft from the group of federal forces. When the guerrilla mobile air defense system appeared in the militants, the actions of aviation were practically paralyzed.
In an operation to force Georgia to peace in August 2008, despite the shortcomings of command and resistance of the air defense system, air strikes on the objects of the armed forces of the aggressor played an important role.
The actions of the coalition forces of NATO countries in Libya in 2011 began with air strikes to create a no-fly zone in order to support the actions of ground forces groups.
A global challenge requires an adequate response.
At present, the development of airborne and missile attack systems has been the creation of hypersonic aircraft: manned hypersonic aircraft of various purposes, guided missiles with a long range at altitudes 40 – 60 kilometers, planning warheads for ballistic missiles. Such devices can be used for reconnaissance, destruction of important objects in any region of the world, interception of aerospace targets, launching, servicing and de-assigning military satellites.
The implementation of these programs leads to the complete erasure of the brink in the means and conduct of hostilities in air and outer space, which becomes a single area of warfare. Air-defense, anti-missile and anti-space defense systems are being developed, they are being integrated into a single aerospace defense system (WKO).
The leading nations of the world spend up to 50 – 60 percent of their military budgets on the development of aerospace attack and aerospace defense equipment. This leads to a further increase in the role of armed struggle in the aerospace sphere.
Thus, the forces and means of air and missile attack, primarily the United States and NATO, became the main means of waging war. They are capable, in the absence of an effective countering of the air defense and missile defense systems (EKR) of the opposing side, to deliver a disarming strike to any state and solve all the strategic tasks of the war within a few days. The main deterrent to such an attack on Russia are its strategic land-based and sea-launched missiles and long-range aviation (strategic nuclear forces). As long as the country is capable of delivering unacceptable damage to the aggressor in a counter or counterstrike, the attack on it is unlikely. To preserve the “potential of retribution”, first of all, the air and missile defense of Russia should be built in the general EKR system.
Restraining aggressors from unleashing large-scale wars and armed conflicts, preventing their escalation is the main task of the strategic nuclear forces and the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region. To do this, they must monitor the state and activities of groups of aerospace attack forces of potential adversaries, provide timely leadership of the state (the President of the Russian Federation - the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) with reliable information about the aerospace situation for making relevant decisions, and protect the response forces and means strike for causing unacceptable damage to the aggressor.
Aviation and the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region are called upon to solve other tasks of ensuring the security of the state in the aerospace sphere. With the beginning of the war, aviation must win and maintain air superiority; to violate the military and state administration of the enemy, the functioning of the objects of the rear and the military-economic potential of the enemy; to combat aviation, nuclear missile, air, land, ship groupings and reserves of the enemy; provide air support for troops and forces; to land and provide airborne assault forces; transport troops, weapons and military equipment and other materiel by air; to fight the air and sea landing of the enemy; perform special tasks.
EKR troops should continuously monitor the use of airspace and prevent violations of the flight regime and the state border of the Russian Federation in airspace. And with the onset of local or regional aggression - notify troops, agencies and command posts about the air situation, repel (weaken) the attacks of the enemy’s aerospace attack, prevent them from gaining air superiority, ensure deployment of a group of forces of the Russian Federation, protect military facilities and troops , population and economy.
At present, the balance of forces and means of aviation and aerospace defense, capable of leading a confrontation with the most serious of the likely opponents, looks extremely unprofitable for Russia. Therefore, the problem should be solved in a complex. The fight against the aerospace enemy is realized as a strategic operation. Because of its importance in the initial period of hostilities, all troops, forces and means capable of opposing an aerospace attack are attracted. They are used for reconnaissance, destruction and suppression of enemy funds, both in flight, and on land and sea.
The creation of aerospace forces by combining the Air Force and the East Kazakhstani Army will simplify, at the level of the Armed Forces, the general coordination of the actions of the shock and defensive forces to fight the aerospace enemy, subject to the strategic tasks of organizing such a struggle on the top command of the VCS.
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