Fallen by death of the brave: the commander of the South-Western Front, General Kirponos

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The names of famous marshals and generals, who became direct blacksmiths of the Great Victory, are known to many. Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev, Malinovsky ... It is unlikely that there is anyone in Russia who does not know these names. The merits of these and many other Soviet military leaders were repeatedly described in historical and memoirs. Much less fortunate in this regard were those Soviet military commanders (as well as ordinary officers and soldiers) who fell in the first days, weeks and months of the war without ever realizing the joys of victory over the Nazis. But we all owe them no less than those who reached Berlin. After all, it was these people, real heroes and patriots of their homeland, who fought to the last, trying to contain the onslaught of an enemy superior in armament and technical equipment at the borders of the Soviet country. This article will discuss one of these heroes.

Fallen by death of the brave: the commander of the South-Western Front, General Kirponos


The Kiev Special Military District in the period preceding the beginning of World War II was considered by the High Command as one of the key military districts of the country. The Kiev military district was created on May 17 of the year 1935 - as a result of the division of the Ukrainian military district into the Kiev and Kharkov military districts. In 1938, it was decided to transform the Kiev Military District into the Kiev Special Military District (hereinafter - KOVO). In the western direction, its role was decisive, since it covered the strategically important territory of the Ukrainian SSR. By 1941, it covered Kiev, Vinnitsa, Zhytomyr, Kamenetz-Podolsk, Stanislav, Ternopil, Chernivtsi, Rivne, Volyn, Lviv and Drohobych regions of the Ukrainian SSR.

The district was border, and this determined its strategic importance for the defense of the Soviet state. The largest grouping of Soviet troops in the western direction was stationed on the territory of the district. Naturally, a worthy and credible man should have commanded such an important district. Since the formation of the Kiev Special Military District, the post of commander has been occupied by such renowned Soviet commanders as commander of the 2 rank Semen Konstantinovich Timoshenko (in 1938-1940) and Army General Georgy Zhukov (1940-1941).
28 February 1941, George Zhukov, who became the winner of two major military games, worked out the Soviet offensive in the western direction and, accordingly, the defense in the western direction, was nominated by Joseph Stalin for the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. There was a question of who would replace Georgy Konstantinovich as commander of the Kiev Special Military District. It should have been a no less worthy and talented military leader. Ultimately, Stalin chose Lieutenant-General Mikhail Petrovich Kirponose. A forty-nine-year-old Lieutenant-General Kirponos, before being appointed commander of the Kiev Special Military District, commanded the Leningrad Military District. He was a military leader with great combat experience, who received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union during the Soviet-Finnish war.

From peasant son to red commander

Like many Soviet military leaders, Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was, as they say, a man of the people. He was born on January 22 (January 9 old style) 1892, in the town of Vertievka, Nezhinsky district, Chernihiv province, in a poor peasant family. His education was reduced in adolescence to the year of the parish and three years Zemsky school. Since the family had not so many funds, they had to stop their studies and, like many of their peers from the village, go to work. Since 1909, Kirponos worked as a watchman, a forester in the forest areas of the Chernigov province. In 1911, he married the saddler’s daughter Olympiad Polyakova (he later divorced her in 1919, leaving behind two daughters and married Sofya Piotrovskaya in the same year, 1919). When World War I began, Mikhail Kirponos was already 22 of the year.

In 1915, a young man was called up for military service. He graduated from instructor courses at the Oranienbaum officer rifle school, after which he was assigned to the 216 reserve infantry regiment stationed in Kozlov (now the city of Michurinsk in the Tambov region). In 1917, the town of Kirponos replaced the military specialty - he graduated from the military medical assistant school, and in August of the same year he was sent to the Romanian front as part of the 258 Olgopol Infantry Regiment. Mikhail Kirponos, 25, becomes chairman of the soldiers 'regimental committee, and in November of the same year becomes chairman of the soldiers' council of the 26 Army Corps.

Apparently, during these years young Kirponos not only sympathized with the revolutionary movement, but also tried to take an active part in it. So, he organized fraternization with Austro-Hungarian soldiers, for which he was arrested and in February 1918 was demobilized from the Russian army. Then he became a member of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Returning to his homeland, where German and Austro-Hungarian troops were in charge, Mikhail Kirponos joined the partisan struggle and created a small detachment that fought both against the Germans and the Austrians, and against the forces of the Central Council. Joining 1918 in August to the Red Army, Kirponos almost immediately (next month in September), as an experienced soldier, was appointed company commander for the 1-th Soviet Ukrainian Rifle Division. The division, by the way, was commanded by the legendary divisional commander Nikolai Shchors.

In the Red Army, Kirponos’s career went swiftly - in December, two months before that, having commanded a company, he became the battalion commander, and then the chief of staff and commander of the 22 Ukrainian Infantry Regiment as part of the 44 Infantry Division. In this capacity, the regiment commander Kirponos took part in the battles for the capture of Berdichev, Zhytomyr and Kiev. In July, 1919 received a new appointment as an assistant to the chief of the divisional school of senior officers (red commanders) of the same 44 rifle division. Here begins the temporary decline of Kirponos, apparently related to his lack of military education. So, in May 1920, he became an assistant to the head of the 2 economic team of the Kiev school of senior officers, and in June, 1921, a year later, became the head of the economic part, then an assistant commissioner of the same school. In 1922, the town of Kirponos graduated from the 2 Kiev School of Hearts, thus receiving a military education without leaving the service at the school.

After receiving military education, Kirponos continued to serve in the Kharkov school of senior officers (October 1922 - September 1923) for a year, where he held the position of assistant chief in political affairs. This was followed by studies at the Military Academy of the Red Army. Mv Frunze, which Kirponos graduated from in 1927 and was distributed by the battalion commander to the 130 th Bogunsky infantry regiment. However, as early as December 1928, he again returned to the system of military schools - this time as an assistant chief - the head of the training unit of the Kharkov military school of the foremen. VCIK. From April 1929 to March 1934 Kirponos served in the 51 of the Perekop rifle division - first, until January 1931, as an assistant and then as chief of staff of the division.
In March, 1934 Mr. Mikhail Kirponos was appointed head and military commissar of the Tatar-Bashkir United Military School. CEC Tatar ASSR. Kirponos led this military school for more than five years - from March 1934 to December 1939. During this time, the school underwent several renames - in December, 1935 was renamed Tatar-Bashkir Military Infantry School named after the CEC of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, in April 1936 - in Kazan Infantry School. CEC of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, in March 1937 - in the Kazan Infantry Military School. CEC Tatar ASSR and, finally, in March 1939, in the Kazan Infantry School. Supreme Council of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Since March 1937, the military school has become all-union and young people from all the Union republics of the USSR have been able to enter it. During the five years that Kazan School was led by Kirponos, many worthy commanders received training and were sent to the troops, some of them were awarded high awards, including the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Kirponos himself during the management of the school and college has grown in ranks. 26 October 1935 g. He was awarded the title of kombriga, and after four years, 4 November 1939 g. - The title of divisional division.

The cadets of the school recalled Kirponos as an excellent commander and educator - military pedagogical activity was his real vocation. In addition, Kirponos, being the head of the school, was also involved in administrative work, because at that time, organizing the normal supply of the school was also quite difficult and, at the same time, very necessary. Party-political activity remained the most important for Kirponos - from the time of the end of the First World War, when he was elected chairman of the regimental soldier’s committee, Kirponos was actively engaged in social activities. A convinced Communist, he took an active part in all party meetings of the school and college. Naturally, in the spirit of the time he had to participate in the exposure of "enemies of the people." At the same time, it should be noted that Kirponos always, what is said, “knew the measure” - where there were real oppositionists to the Soviet course, and where by chance suspected people. For some cadets, commanders and teachers of the school, he played the role of advocate. The fact that Kirponos was an active communist and unequivocally supported the Stalinist policy, of course, also played a role in his subsequent rapid military career. In particular, if we consider that at the end of 1930's. many commanders of the Red Army were repressed and their posts required to be replaced by someone.

Soviet-Finnish War and Growth

In the meantime, the military-political situation on the Soviet borders has become significantly aggravated. In the north-western direction, the Soviet Union came into conflict with Finland. 28 November 1939 was denounced the Non-Aggression Pact, and 30 November 1939 Soviet troops stationed on the Soviet-Finnish border were ordered to go on the offensive. The official reason for the outbreak of hostilities was the shelling of Soviet territory from the territory of Finland. An impressive Soviet group of troops was concentrated against Finland as part of the 7, 8, 9 and 14 armies. From the first days of the beginning of the war, the need for literate and talented commanders began to be felt, in connection with which the USSR Defense Commissariat turned to the practice of transferring top commanders from other military units and military schools to the army. In December, the division commander Mikhail Kirponos, head of the Kazan Infantry School at that time, received a new assignment — commander of the 1939 Infantry Division, which was part of the 70 Army of the Red Army. Thus, the head of the school, who actually did not have, apart from short-term participation in the Civil War, the actual experience of commanding military units, was given high confidence and, as it were, opened up opportunities for further advancement of the career ladder in the event of a successful command of the entrusted infantry division.

The Seventh Army was concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. By November 1939, its structure included, in addition to the army headquarters, the 19th and 50th rifle corps and in their composition the 24th, 43rd, 49th, 70th, 90th, 123rd , 138th, 142nd and 150th Infantry Divisions, three tank brigades, six artillery regiments of the RGK, three artillery battalions of high power RGK. The Army Air Force included the 1st and 68th Light Bomber, 16th High-Speed ​​Bomber, and 59th Fighter aviation brigades consisting of 12 aviation regiments and 644 aircraft.

The 70th Infantry Division, which was to command the divisional division Kirponos, was part of the 19 Infantry Corps of the 7 Army and included three rifle regiments (68, 252 and 329), two artillery regiments (221 Light Artillery Regiment and 227 th Howitzer Artillery Regiment), 361 Tank Battalion, 204 Chemical Tank Battalion. In February, 1940 was included in the division 28-th tank regiment on the T-26. 30 November 1939 The division entered the territory of Finland. The division of Kirponos, which received 25 on December 1939, replaced its previous commander, Colonel Fedor Aleksandrovich Prokhorov. To the credit of the latter, it can be said that he prepared his fighters well and the division was considered one of the best in the army in the field. Under the command of Kirponos, she 11 February 1940 began to participate in the breakthrough of the famous "Mannerheim Line". From 11 to 14 in February, divisions of the division occupied part of the field fortifications of the Karhul district, in February 17 participated in the “battle for the islands”, and in February 21-23 in the seizure of the island of Liisaari (North Birch). February 26 from the 19 Infantry Corps division was transferred to the 10 Infantry Corps. Her fighters managed to occupy part of the Koivisto Peninsula (Kiperort), the islands of Pukinsaari (Kozliniy) and Hannukkalansaari (May).

February 29 division was transferred to the 28 th infantry corps, in which participated in the battles for the city of Trongzund (Vysotsk), then - for the island Ravansaari (Small Vysotsky). The most famous feat of the division was crossing the ice of Vyborg Bay at night. Having completed a six-day raid to the rear of the enemy, in March 1940, the division occupied a bridgehead on the northern shore of the bay and took control of the Vyborg-Hamina road. This throw of the division played a crucial role in the storming of Vyborg, which could not be ignored by the higher command. The division was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the 252 th infantry and 227 th howitzer artillery regiments were awarded the Orders of the Red Banner. Division commander Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos 21 March 1940, was awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union and received the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

The successful command of the 70 Infantry Division, which showed its valor and combat training in the Soviet-Finnish war, became the “high point” of the division commander Kirponos in the literal and figurative sense. It is from this time begins his rapid, but, unfortunately, short-term, climbing the steps of the command posts of the Red Army. Prior to this, Kirponos led a military school for five years, and during the next four years he increased only by one rank. But the feat 70 th Infantry Division contributed to the fact that the divisional commander noticed. In April 1940 of the year, a month after the forcing of Vyborsk Bay, Mikhail Kirponos was appointed commander of the 49 Infantry Corps, which was part of the Kiev Special Military District. However, already in June of the same year, two months after being appointed corps commander, Kirponos was waiting for the next huge increase - he was appointed commander of the Leningrad Military District. 4 June 1940 Mr. Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was given the military rank of “Lieutenant-General” (in connection with the introduction of the general ranks in the Red Army).

Kiev Special Military District

However, Mikhail Kirponos also served a short time as commander of the Leningrad Military District. As early as February 1941, less than a year after his appointment to the LVO, Kirponos was appointed commander of the Kiev Special Military District. 22 February 1941 Mr. Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was awarded the next military rank of "Colonel General". The appointment of the Kiev Special Military District shows that the High Command trusted Mikhail Kirponos and, apparently, it was after his successful leadership of the 70 Infantry Division during the Soviet-Finnish war that he saw him as a promising commander capable of well-prepared troops of the strategically important district and effectively command them.



Apparently, Stalin, appointing Kirponos as commander of the most important military district in the defense system of the western direction, hoped that Kirponos would be able to prepare the district for the impending war, without arousing suspicion from the enemy. After all, Kirponos in the years of the Civil War had a rich experience of participating in the partisan movement - first commanding his own insurgent detachment, and then service in the Shchors division. The command of the partisan formation requires the creativity of thinking, versatility, the ability to make decisions independently, which sometimes lacks the commanders of the regular army units. Moreover, Kirponos had to combine not only military and political leadership, but also the functions of an administrator and supplier. In general, it should be noted that there was no mistake in choosing Kirponos for the post of commander of the district - the colonel-general in fact matched his hopes for his personal and professional qualities. Although, nevertheless, there was one flaw in the new commander - the experience of the command of the operating combat units that was too small in time.

In fact, if you do not take into account the time of participation in the Civil War in the Shchors division, and later in the Soviet-Finnish war, most of the military service of Mikhail Petrovich fell on military-pedagogical activity - he held various positions in military schools. Army General Georgy Zhukov, from whom Kirponos assumed command of the Kiev Special Military District, also drew attention to this shortcoming: “I was glad that the Kiev Special Military District was given to such a worthy commander. Of course, he, like many others, did not yet have the necessary knowledge and experience to lead such a large border region, but life experience, hard work and natural witness ensured that a first-class commander of the troops would be developed from Mikhail Petrovich (Quoted from: Meretskov KA. In the service of the people. SPb., 2003). That is, despite the lack of experience, Zhukov, nevertheless, recognized Kirponos as a promising commander and was convinced that the colonel general would be able to fully disclose his leadership talent, having penetrated into the nuances of the district command.
Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan, while serving as a colonel, served as chief of operations, deputy chief of staff of the Kiev Special Military District, recalls the appointment of Kirponos as commander of the district: “Soon after his arrival, the new commander went around headquarters. Apparently, he wanted to quickly get acquainted with the situation, with people. He visited us in the operations department. His lean, well-fitting figure was tightly wrapped in a carefully ironed tunic. On the chest glittered golden star of the Hero. Pale, smoothly shaved face with almost no wrinkles. Black eyebrows hung over large blue eyes. Dark, thick hair is carefully combed into the middle. Only light gray hair on the temples and deep folds in the corners of the lips showed that this youthful man was under fifty ”(quoted in Bagramyan I.Kh. So the war began. M. 1971).

The commander Kirponos paid much attention to the questions of combat training of troops. Understanding perfectly, the most likely opponent of the Soviet Union is Germany, the command of the Red Army paid great attention to the training of military units and formations of the Kiev Special Military District. First of all, the task was to work out actions in the event of an enemy tank attack. On the other hand, emphasis was placed on improving the preparation of their own tank units. Thus, the most frequent guest was that the commander of the district, Colonel General Kirponos, was in mechanized corps, where he tested the ability of crews to control tanks, and tank units to act cohesively in combat.

In addition to combat training, the most important activity of the troops of the Kiev Special Military District remained the construction and equipment of fortifications in the border areas. However, despite all the efforts of the commander, the district experienced a lot of problems characteristic of the entire Red Army in the prewar period. First of all, we are talking about weak armament and lack of personnel in units and formations. According to the memoirs of I.Kh. Bagramyan, only in the Kiev Special Military District didn’t have enough 30 thousands of servicemen. And this was despite the fact that military schools were transferred from a three-year to a two-year study period, and junior lieutenant courses were created for accelerated training of commanders. As for the provision of troops with weapons and equipment, there was widespread lack of weapons, communications and special equipment, vehicles. It didn’t seem possible to fill all this overnight - the national economy of the country and so worked to the limit.

War

22 June 1941 Hitler’s Germany and its satellites attacked the Soviet Union. Among the first, the military units and formations that were part of the Kiev Special Military District received their blow. On the day the war began, the Kiev Special Military District was transformed into the South-Western Front. Colonel-General Mikhail Kirponos was appointed commander of the South-Western Front. The troops of the South-Western Front numbered 957 thousands of soldiers and officers. The district was armed with 12,6 thousand artillery guns and mortars, 4783 tank and 1759 aircraft. Against the South-Western Front, Hitler’s Army Group South was concentrated in 730 thousands of soldiers and officers, 9,7 thousands of artillery guns and mortars, 799 tanks and 772 aircraft. That is, at first glance, the Soviet troops had a significant superiority not only in manpower, but also in armament. However, in reality, the situation looked different. First, almost immediately after the start of the war, Army Group South was reinforced by 19 divisions, and was also joined by Hungarian, Romanian, Italian, and Slovak troops. The southwestern front did not receive reinforcements in such numbers, and the state of its technical fleet, although at first glance superior to German in numbers of tanks, aircraft and artillery, left much to be desired. Secondly, only a few Soviet divisions were stationed in close proximity to the border, while the enemy hit all at once with the "fist" of Army Group "South", securing numerical superiority over Soviet troops in the border area and leveling the capabilities of the Southwestern Front troops for more the later stages of the hostilities, since they entered the hostilities alternately and, accordingly, could not use their advantages to a larger number of personnel.

The headquarters of the Supreme Commander 22 on June 1941 ordered Colonel General Kirponos to order Soviet forces to counter-attack the 5 and 6 armies and take Lublin. By itself, this task was difficult, but Kirponos had nothing to do but try to accomplish it. In the command of the front there were opposite points of view. Corps Commissar Nikolai Nikolayevich Vashugin, a member of the Military Council of the Front, spoke in favor of the immediate execution of the order of the Supreme Commander’s Headquarters on the offensive. Lieutenant-General Maxim Alekseevich Purkaev, chief of staff of the front, adhered to the opposite position. He understood that the front forces simply would not have time to concentrate for delivering a retaliatory strike and offered to organize defense, holding the enemy back for as long as possible in order to create fortified areas in the inner territories of the district.



Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos came up with a slightly different idea - he proposed to strike at the base of the German grouping aimed at Kiev by the forces of three mechanized corps and rifle divisions of the 5 and 6 army. The task of the counterattack would be the complete destruction of the enemy’s avant-garde and maximum containment of the 1 tank army commanded by General Ewald von Kleist (the tank army included five Wehrmacht tank divisions). However, the offensive strike of the Soviet troops was unsuccessful. There was no interaction between the mechanized corps. Organizational failures led to the depletion of the resource part of the old armored vehicles, which were mainly equipped with mechanized corps of the front. Finally, the 34-I tank division was surrounded and was able to break through to its own, only after losing all its tanks. Speaking about the reasons for organizational failures, P.V. Burkin draws attention to the lack of practical experience of General Kirponos in the management of large military units. After all, as a matter of fact, before becoming the commander of the district, he commanded only a rifle division, which, moreover, did not have tank divisions. Accordingly, Kirponos had no experience in organizing the interaction of mechanized compounds (See: P. Burkin. General Kirponos: Experience of Historical and Anthropological Research).

However, to a certain extent, the troops of the South-Western Front still managed to significantly impede the enemy's advancement towards Kiev. Although the counteroffensive plan failed, but Soviet troops stopped the units of the Wehrmacht in 20 km. west of Kiev. This forced the Nazis to change the tactics of the offensive. The Wehrmacht command temporarily refused to storm Kiev and sent all forces to the left flank of the front. The enemy pushed the 6 and 12 Soviet armies to the south of Ukraine, gradually cutting them off from the main forces of the South-Western Front. In the area of ​​Tarashchi the retaliatory offensive of the 26 Army was conceived, but in the end it was stopped by the enemy. The Wehrmacht threw the 26 Army to the northeast, after which the position of the South-Western Front deteriorated further. Connections of the enemy came close to Kiev. The High Command demanded the immediate retention of the capital of Soviet Ukraine. 8 August Kirponos organized a counterattack on enemy positions, throwing at him all the forces at his disposal — 175, 147-rifle divisions that participated in the defense of Kiev, reserve 206 and 284-th, 2 and 6- airborne brigade. On August 9, the 5 I Airborne Brigade and the Kiev Militia joined the battle. As a result, the Wehrmacht began a gradual retreat from Kiev. By August 16, the enemy was pushed back to the initial positions by the heroic efforts of the Soviet troops. The defense of Kiev played a crucial role in the first stage of the Great Patriotic War, significantly slowing the advance of enemy troops into Soviet territory and forcing the Hitlerite command to change the trajectory of the main forces of the Wehrmacht. Thus, for a whole month, which in the conditions of the war was of very great importance, the nazi offensive was delayed towards Moscow.

Since the Nazi troops were redirected from Moscow to the southern direction, the main task was to retreat from near Kiev. Kirponos himself and Marshals Budyonny and Shaposhnikov insisted on this. However, Stalin did not give permission for the withdrawal of troops. As a result, by September 14, the 5, 21, 26, and 37 armies were surrounded. Tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers died in the environment or when trying to break through. The troops of the South-Western Front were divided and surrounded by the enemy. September 20 to the Dryukovshchina farm, which is in 15 km. south-west of Lokhvitsy, the headquarters of the South-Western Front and the 5 Army came with escort forces. Here they were attacked by units of the Hitlerite 3 Panzer Division. The commander of the artillery of the 5 Army, Major General Sotensky, and his staff officers were captured. The total strength of the staff column at this point was about a thousand people, including about 800 commanders - generals and staff officers, as well as a commandant company.

The column retreated to the Shumeikovo grove. The front commander himself was General Kirponos, Tupikov, the chief of the front headquarters, Burmistenko and Rykov, members of the Front Military Council, Potapov, commander of the 5 army, and other top commanders of the front. Parts of the Wehrmacht attacked the Shumeikovo grove in three directions. The fight lasted five hours. Colonel-General Mikhail Kirponos was wounded in the leg, then fragments of a mine fell into his chest, which caused him to die. Subordinates buried the front commander here, in the grove. The chief-of-staff Tupikov, a member of the Military Council Burmistenko, and many other commanders were also killed in the battle. The commander of the 5 Army, General Potapov, was captured.

In December 1943, the remains of Colonel-General Hero of the Soviet Union Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos were reburied in Kiev in the Botanical Gardens of them. A.V. Fomina, and in 1957 g. - moved to the Park of Eternal Glory. General Kirponos did not fully succeed in uncovering his talent, of course, present. He died at the very beginning of the war, finding its most tragic moments - the retreat of the Soviet troops, the occupation of a large part of the territory of Soviet Ukraine. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that General Kirponos made a huge contribution to the defense of the country against the aggression of Hitler's Germany. Having detained the German troops near Kiev, he postponed the attack on Moscow, giving the opportunity to consolidate the forces of the Red Army to protect the Soviet capital. Despite all the mistakes and miscalculations in the leadership of the troops, which are paid attention to by many modern historians, General Kirponos passed his way of the Soviet soldier with honor and died on the battlefield, in battle, not surrendering to the enemy. It only remains to conclude the article with the words from Marshal of the Soviet Union Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko about Colonel-General Kirponos: “He was a brave man militarily and showed himself a brave and strong-willed commander ... a brave, courageous general died in the days of difficult trials, leaving behind Good and bright memory in the hearts of those who knew him ... ”(Moskalenko K.S. In the southwestern direction. M., 1975).
54 comments
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  1. +14
    5 January 2015 06: 46
    Yes, the defeat of the Southwestern Front and the largest encirclement of enemy troops in the entire history of warfare ... this is, alas, our history. And I am not going to "throw stones" at General Kirponos, since "the dead have no shame", but it is necessary to study those lessons so as not to forget. Just like the enemy is now at our borders.
    1. Pervusha Isaev
      -7
      5 January 2015 09: 32
      After all, it was these people, real heroes and patriots of their homeland, who fought to the last, trying to contain the onslaught of an enemy superior in armament and technical equipment at the borders of the Soviet country


      The troops of the Southwestern Front totaled 957 thousand soldiers and officers. The district was armed with 12,6 thousand artillery pieces and mortars, 4783 tanks and 1759 aircraft. Against the South-Western Front, Hitler's Army Group South was concentrated with a strength of 730 thousand soldiers and officers, 9,7 thousand artillery guns and mortars, 799 tanks and 772 aircraft

      However, the offensive blow of the Soviet troops was unsuccessful. There was no interaction between the mechanized buildings. Organizational miscalculations led to the depletion of the resource part of the old armored vehicles, which were mainly equipped with front mechanized corps.


      in general, it’s time to put an end to the monstrous defeat at the beginning of the war. And this defeat has its own specific names.
      According to various sources, the USSR had tanks from 15-20 thousand old T-26s prevailed, but at the time of the war, these tanks already had 12 thousand different modifications, with tanks with cannon armament 45 mm and a machine gun prevailing
      The southwestern front had BT-7 -5-7 thousand units, and new KV-1 tanks -900 units, 34-600 units, KV-2- 40 units and all the others. In general, the USSR's ADVANTAGE over Germany was overwhelming. And only the complete mediocrity of the red commanders led our country to the catastrophe of the first days of the war. That this author, that probably 90% of all other "researchers" of the beginning of the war, do not pay attention to the fact that the USSR had a great OVERVIEWING ADVANTAGE in tanks before the war. Reading such "historians" as this Ilya Polonsky, you can't help but marvel at the style of presenting information, how did the South-Western Front turn out to be unable to resist the Germans? Why is the BIGGEST DUBNINSKY BATTLE in terms of the number of tanks not mentioned, in which not only the front command and staff, but Marshall Zhukov himself took part directly? This battle historians simply bypass the silenced realities of that war. Therefore, some researchers, such as Kuptsov, Mukhin quite reasonably raise the question of CHANGE in the ranks of the front command, and Zhukov too ...
      1. +8
        5 January 2015 10: 25
        And why not recall the length of the land border of the USSR, in which Germany, although it was, was still not the only border state?

        For some reason, we forget British India, Japan, Persia and Turkey. They probably were just honest and innocent bunnies that even mimimi sushyushu and just do not need to keep troops on the border with them. Plus, consider that military intelligence was no in the beginning.

        And yes, the same Mukhin speaks of the loss of control at the beginning of the war, as I recall.

        Continuing on technology, there is a concept of non-combat losses — losses on the march didn’t start up stupidly (situevina was about the largest and most powerful army group at the time of the collapse of the USSR, and what was left of it?)
      2. 0
        5 January 2015 10: 43
        To this we can add that parts of the Odessa and Baltic special districts in the early days of the war were able to carry out offensive operations on enemy territory.
      3. +9
        5 January 2015 11: 27
        Quote: Pervusha Isaev
        ... The southwestern front had BT-7 -5-7 thousand units, and new tanks KV-1 -900pcs, t34-600pcs, KV-2- 40pcs ... In general USSR ADVANTAGE over Germany was overwhelming. Only complete mediocrity of the red commanders led our country to a catastrophe of the first days of the war ...

        From the payroll of the equipment, the ABILITY of the army does not follow.
        The combat readiness and, accordingly, the advantage of someone over someone is an integral indicator. In which the giftedness / competence of the commanders is also one of the components (combat effectiveness).
        The unique advantage of the Wehrmacht over all European armies was demonstrated in the summer of 1940. When the forces of the parties (France / Germany) were approximately equal, and everything ended after 40 days.
        1. Pervusha Isaev
          -7
          5 January 2015 13: 07
          Quote: BigRiver
          The combat readiness and, accordingly, the advantage of someone over someone is an integral indicator.


          this is only a theory, but before the war, Stalin created primarily the HEAVY INDUSTRY, and he succeeded and the state in every way pumped up his army with the most advanced equipment, the TANK, and this was also done. Therefore, the calculation was correct. A QUANTITATIVE advantage over the enemy’s armies in the best armaments could and should give an advantage in the event of a collision, but what Stalin could not figure out was the inability of the high command to manage the winning situation for various reasons, and one of them is that the commanders were on their mind and not for the country and for the people ...
          1. The comment was deleted.
          2. -2
            5 January 2015 14: 35
            Quote: Pervusha Isaev
            this is only a theory, but before the war, Stalin created primarily the HEAVY INDUSTRY, and he succeeded and the state in every possible way pumped up his army with the most advanced technology - TANKS


            Did the vast number of tanks die in battles in 1941? No, they simply broke down in their mass (very weak transmission) or stopped without fuel.
            So a huge advantage over the Nazis in tanks was actually paper.
            1. Pervusha Isaev
              -1
              5 January 2015 14: 42
              Quote: Aleksander
              No, the bulk of them simply broke down (very weak transmission) or stopped without fuel.


              and this in your opinion happened out of the blue? and the command was completely unaware that the tanks had a small resource? any commander should know the capabilities of his troops, but that’s not the point, but a big advantage over the Germans, he should manage reasonably even lesser forces against the advancing enemy, and later to tighten the reserve and success MUST BE SECURED, because there were simply more of ours, but everything was done to prevent this from happening ...
          3. +5
            5 January 2015 14: 36
            Dear Pervusha Isaev.
            The reasons for the defeat of the Red Army can be discussed for a long time. Everyone has their own opinion. I ask you to familiarize yourself with the works of your namesake Alexei Isaev, Yuri Mukhin and other research authors (including the same Rezun-Suvorov, Mark Solonin). It just seemed to me that you have a certain categoricality (said how it printed :)).
          4. +3
            5 January 2015 20: 45
            Quote: Pervusha Isaev
            and one of them is that the commanders were on their minds, and not for the country and for the people ...

            Dear Mr. Isaev. - not necessarily a traitor. I assure you that among the dead by their own stupidity, because of indecision, because of the completely repelled ability to make a decision, because of the inexperience of commanders of all levels of traitors, there were not so many. I put you for the first post +. Because he is also dissatisfied with the publication. In the text
            onslaught of superior enemy weapons and technical equipment
            , as if it is not clear that the catastrophe is in the absence of an existing management system. But do not try to convince us of universal betrayal.
      4. Pervusha Isaev
        0
        5 January 2015 18: 26
        military review turns into a site where they do not discuss topics and do not look for evidence, but as ghosts anonymously come in quietly, click on the minus and just as quietly evaporate - this is disgusting ...
      5. The comment was deleted.
        1. 0
          5 January 2015 21: 19
          I have never encountered this before:
          Quote: veteran66
          I completely agree with you, moderators plus do not give more

          Quote: veteran66
          Moders plus they don’t give yet
        2. 0
          5 January 2015 21: 19
          I have never encountered this before:
          Quote: veteran66
          I completely agree with you, moderators plus do not give more

          Quote: veteran66
          Moders plus they don’t give yet
      6. +4
        5 January 2015 20: 45
        Quote: Pervusha Isaev
        The southwestern front had BT-7 -5-7 thousand units, and new tanks KV-1 -900sht, t34-600sht, KV-2-40sht and all the rest. In general, the USSR'S ADVANTAGE over Germany was overwhelming.

        So where were these tanks? 150-250 km from the front line. And the Germans have 2 times less but on the front line. Learn strategy. The chapters are preemptive in deployment and defeat in parts. And find out for yourself in what kind of equipment and weapons the Wehrmacht had an advantage and how the Wehrmacht realized it. And it is customary for idiots to scold "fools of commanders". An example in Ukraine-ogrebli near Illovaisk-so the commanders are fools! It is a shame for the colonial infantry to admit that their militias and "quilted jackets" gave them their fill.
        1. Pervusha Isaev
          +1
          5 January 2015 21: 30
          Quote: Rivares
          And it is customary for idiots to scold "fools of commanders".


          I wrote at the very beginning that there is ALWAYS a specific character in defeat. It does not happen that the investigation was without a reason. If the tanks were far from the border, then this is not at all the reason that they were destroyed. If 200 km of Russian land were drained, then it was possible to rally forces and defend the rest of the land, but this was not done, intelligence was not set up and communication was not made, then who is to blame? Stalin again? Mukhin conducted an analysis and revealed the aspect ratio and the main miscalculations, and all this lies only with the front command and Zhukov, who actually led the battle of Dubna ...
          1. 0
            7 January 2015 15: 25
            Quote: Pervusha Isaev
            I wrote at the very beginning that defeats ALWAYS ARE a specific character
            There is such a saying, victory has many fathers and commanders, and only defeat remains an orphan. In my opinion, victory and defeat is a combination of a BIG COMPLEX OF FACTORS (communication, organizational structure, identity of commanders at all levels, supply, training of troops, interaction of troops, the level of technology in the troops, etc.), you think that there is always a specific culprit -commander. In the book of Mukhin to which you refer from all these factors, only the ONLY is considered:
            "The first book of the series, which will analyze the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war of 1941-1945. Considered the moral and professional qualities of the generals of the Red Army and the obvious facts of his betrayal with the subsequent distortion of the history of the Great Patriotic War."
            I highly recommend reading literature from other authors. I did not read Mukhin, but the annotation in his book speaks for itself. The book considers only 1 aspect of the many. In the German army, by the way, there were also a bunch of traitors, and, surprisingly, they appeared when the Wehrmacht was defeated!
      7. 11111mail.ru
        +2
        6 January 2015 09: 04
        Quote: Pervusha Isaev
        The southwestern front had BT-7 -5-7 thousand units, and new tanks KV-1 -900sht, t34-600sht, KV-2-40sht and all the rest. In general, the USSR'S ADVANTAGE over Germany was overwhelming.

        It was also necessary to be able to use these advantages, and the Red Army did not have such a skill at that time. As historians write, in the above-mentioned battle near Dubno our troops failed to "close the ticks", they did not reach only 12 km. The connection was below the baseboard.
    2. +7
      5 January 2015 13: 57
      Quote: svp67
      I am not going to "throw stones" at General Kirponos, as "the dead have no shame",

      Of course, but nevertheless he, most likely, was not able to command the front in his morally business.
      “The command post of the front ended up in Brovary, on the eastern bank of the Dnieper. I spent the rest of the night at the front headquarters, and in the morning I introduced myself to the front commander, Colonel-General MP Kirponos. I was extremely surprised by his sharp confusion. , he tried to let himself be calm, but he did not succeed.He either absentmindedly listened to my concise information about the situation in the sector of the 5th Army and the corps, then often interrupted, running up to the window with exclamations: “What is the air defense doing? .. Airplanes fly, and no one knocks them down ... Disgrace! " He immediately ordered to give an order to intensify the activity of the air defense and to summon its chief to him. ”Yes, it was confusion, since in the current situation, another front commander, in my opinion, would not have time for the air defense.
      True, he tried to solve more important issues. So, several times over the phone I gave orders to the headquarters to transfer orders to someone about decisive counterattacks. But all this sounded uncertain, fussy, insecure. When ordering to throw either one or two divisions into battle, the commander was not even interested in whether the named formations could counterattack, did not explain the specific purpose of their use. The impression was that he either did not know the situation, or did not want to know it.
      In those minutes I finally came to the conclusion that such voluminous, complex and responsible duties are beyond the capacity of this man, and woe to the troops entrusted to him. With [51] this mood, I left the headquarters of the Southwestern Front heading for Moscow "
      K.K. Rokossovsky, Soldier's duty.
      1. -1
        7 January 2015 15: 43
        Do you really naively believe that the order to withdraw is taken solely by the front command, especially from the city that Stalin decided not to hand over? The front commander had freedom of choice, but obeyed directives from the headquarters.
        And at least not only the front commander, but also the BET is responsible for the defeat.
  2. +15
    5 January 2015 07: 12
    Last year, we went to Sumy from Boryspil on the Naftogazovskaya Niva. I look - a pointer to Piryatin.
    I took something and blurted out that they say here in the 41st tragedy broke out. The beginning Department, a young guy, - neither by sleep, nor by the spirit about those events, but she drove in the know. Moreover, he said that in this tract (I don’t remember the name ...) there is a memorial. At my request, wrapped there. There is a BA-10 armored car on a pedestal (with traces of breaking through the armor ...) and a map that shows the movements of military groups trying to get out of the encirclement. And not a flower, even a dried one, not a wreath, or any other traces of a mass visit to people ... I took a picture and we set off on the road further. For the young man, everything he saw and heard from us was a whole revelation. Like this...
    If Kirponos trusted Bagramyan, he would also leave the encirclement, but he made a different decision ...
    1. +6
      5 January 2015 09: 11
      Quote: retired
      If Kirponos trusted Bagramyan, he would also leave the encirclement, but he made a different decision ...
      In his situation - the most true, so at least he died as a hero, and not as a traitor, like Pavlov. The realities of life. Someone had to answer FOR SUCH a defeat. By the way, Baghramyan was "fooled" for a very long time, he escaped purely by accident.
      1. +11
        5 January 2015 12: 45
        Quote: svp67
        Quote: retired
        If Kirponos had trusted Baghramyan, he would have also left the encirclement, but he had made a different decision ... In his situation, it was the most correct, since at least he died a hero, and not a traitor like Pavlov. The realities of life. Someone had to answer FOR SUCH a defeat. By the way, Baghramyan was "fooled" for a very long time, he escaped purely by accident.

        One of the most "researched" pages of the Great Patriotic War ...
        Almost ALL memoirs of military commanders and commanders, which describes the tragedy of the Kiev boiler, were written (or published) AFTER the ever-memorable XIX Congress ...
        That is why lines like "Stalin forbade retreat ..." so often pop up. A very good trick, which was later used by German memoirists, in the spirit of "Hitler was all about..ral ..."
        No wonder Marshal Tymoshenko, in response to a request to write his memoirs, said that he was not going to write nonsense, but would not let him write the truth.
        1. +3
          5 January 2015 14: 21
          Quote: stalkerwalker
          AFTER the ever-memorable XIX Congress ...

          Ilyich! You probably had in mind all the same the Twentieth Congress ... Hello! hi drinks
          1. +3
            5 January 2015 14: 33
            Quote: retired
            Ilyich! You probably had in mind all the same the Twentieth Congress ... Hello!

            Who cares?
            Already in the XNUMXth, it was clear that new fighters did not particularly appreciate the memory of the late leader ...
            hi
            1. +3
              5 January 2015 14: 53
              Quote: stalkerwalker
              Already in the XNUMXth, it was clear that new fighters did not particularly appreciate the memory of the late leader ...

              Fear God Ilyich! Stalin spoke at the XNUMXth Congress! Yes True, he looked rather poorly, although he was awake ...
              1. +6
                5 January 2015 15: 15
                Quote: retired
                Fear God Ilyich!

                Yes, Yuri .... I forgot ... recourse
                It is no wonder "... how many of them fell into this earth ..." laughing
                I forget to celebrate my birthdays. And here is the number of the "memorable congress" fellow
  3. malikszh
    -5
    5 January 2015 07: 40
    Kirponos did not have any experience in commanding the Front, but there is experience in commanding a division but not the front. But it was not his fault, it was the repression of all experienced commanders that was blamed and there was no replacement, so everyone who commanded the divisions to the post of military districts who commanded the battalion had to be appointed commander.
    1. +11
      5 January 2015 08: 32
      Uguk. Personally by Stalin.
      And the fact that the army has grown ten times in less than three years is a vital trifle.
      1. +2
        5 January 2015 09: 12
        Quote: ShadowCat
        ... And the fact that the army has grown ten times in less than three years is a vital trifle.

        Not typed "ten times" winked
        Somewhere 3,3 times.
        Here is the number of military establishments preparing the command staff, yes, it has grown about 10 times since 1937.
    2. +9
      5 January 2015 09: 09
      Quote: malikszh
      Kirponos did not have any experience in commanding the Front, but there is experience in commanding a division but not the front.

      Are there many in the Red Army, at that time there were commanders with experience in commanding such structures? In addition to repression, it should be understood that at that time the Red Army "was growing by leaps and bounds."
  4. +2
    5 January 2015 08: 50
    That's who you need to know about "new ukroevropeytsam".
  5. +3
    5 January 2015 09: 03
    one of the most important forces of our time is the media, as it will be presented, as the majority will perceive.
  6. +9
    5 January 2015 09: 43
    Since the Nazi troops were redirected from Moscow to the south, the main task was to retreat from Kiev. Kirponos himself, and Marshals Budyonny and Shaposhnikov insisted on this.However, Stalin did not give permission to withdraw troops.

    Here, the author compares the Khrushchev-Zhukovsky story.
    Relatively: who offered what and what, Shaposhnikov’s correspondence with Kirponos has long been published.
    Initially, at the end of August, Stalin and Shaposhnikov proposed a plan for the withdrawal of the Southwest Federal District to the border of the Psel River, with the allocation of part of the forces to the north to slow down Guderian. The Bryansk front of Eremenko also focused on Heinz. But, right up to the turn of 1TGy of Kleist to the north (the southern claw of the future boiler), Kirponos himself refused to leave. He wrote about this to Shaposhnikov, saying that he did not see the need for withdrawal. Obviously the heroic divisional commander simply did not own the emerging situation.
    Most of the tragedies, boilers, failed counterattacks of the 41st are from here. From ignorance of the situation, from the lack of data from air and army intelligence.
    1. +10
      5 January 2015 11: 09
      Most likely not correspondence but negotiations on BODO. Indeed, Budyonny was the first to sound the alarm as the commander of the South-West direction. He went to Stalin with a proposal to withdraw the Kiev group from near Kiev. Stalin replied that he would speak with the chief of the General Staff. Later, Stalin contacted and agreed, but with the clarification of Gen. The headquarters. Create a screen from the Kiev garrison. Create defensive structures on the other side. And after that, secretly withdraw troops to prepared defense lines. But then Kirponos intervened. They say there is no threat of encirclement, the troops will stand and asked for more reinforcements. Stalin was at a loss. The commander of the direction says one thing, the commander of a group of forces is different. Negotiations again. As a result, the decision to leave everything as it is. By the way, now there is a version based on the recollections of eyewitnesses that Kirponos did not die in the battle, but shot himself. If this is so, then it is a logical step, if the troops were withdrawn from under Kiev there would not be such a rout and Kirponos understood this perfectly. By the way, at that time the decision was made, there really was no data from our generals about the transfer of tank units of the Germans from Moscow to the south. And Budyonny, in principle, hypothetically stated that if the Germans had reinforcements, then the troops would not withstand the blow under the flanks. But he was right. Due to panic, Budyonny was then removed from his post and sent by the reserve army commander.
      I just don’t understand why Kirponos was so categorically against the withdrawal of troops and insisted and proved that Budyonny was wrong and, in principle, Stalin himself, because he convinced the Supreme in the opposite? It seems to me the fault of personal ambitions. How is it through his head? After all, he commands the group directly.
      1. +4
        5 January 2015 11: 39
        Quote: Snoop
        Most likely not correspondence but negotiations on BODO.

        Yes, most likely. I remember that, it seems, Isaev had abundant quoting of telegrams from Kirponos / Shaposhnikov
        Quote: Snoop
        I just don’t understand why Kirponos was so categorically against the withdrawal of troops ... It seems to me that personal ambitions are to blame for everything ...

        Probably a complex of reasons. And one of the main - the situation did not see him threatening. After all, the north, in theory, was covered. Eremenko promised to "defeat the scoundrel Guderian." But Kleist, his sharp turn, was simply overslept. And the situation changed very dramatically.
        1. -1
          7 January 2015 21: 44
          I would add that the transfer of the tank group (analogue T.A.) was carried out by the Germans in just 1 day. Intelligence simply did not have time to reveal this fact.
  7. +5
    5 January 2015 11: 00
    He did not surrender, he fought to the last.
    He certainly had mistakes, but the dead do not have a shame.
    Everlasting memory...
  8. 0
    5 January 2015 11: 00
    First they appropriated the lieutenant general, then they promoted to colonel general. Is this like this?
  9. +10
    5 January 2015 11: 03
    Eternal memory to General Kirponos. Eternal glory? - Hardly. Unfortunately, the fate of Kirponos is a typical and striking example of the fact that the Red Army was not able to massively train commanders capable of leading troops in the current war at that historical stage. And the Wehrmacht - smog, and its military machine smeared the South-Western Front in accordance with all the rules of military science. The Germans ideally quickly developed new methods of military strategy and tactics based on a sharp change in the level of capabilities of military equipment that occurred in 1938-39. And ours did not have time. However, not only ours. The same thing happened with the unafraid Britain, Holland, etc., which were smeared by the Japanese. The same thing happened with France, on a nightmarish scale. Insufficient qualifications of the commanders of the middle and top echelons of the Red Army is the talk of the town. What was, what was. But you shouldn't forget your opponent either. In France, for example, there was no such repression and emasculation of the command staff. Conclusion - the advancement of military science and preparation for war on the part of the Wehrmacht - this is the true reason for their victories, and the colossal result of military development, causing genuine envy. Learned to fight, you bastards. In 1941 there was a fight between a yard flywheel and a trained master of sports in kickboxing. The result is logical. And Kirponos, being a circumstance himself, fell victim to circumstances. just the Soviet military school turned out to be objectively weaker at that time. And the point is not in "repressions", I believe that under the Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Egorov, Uborevich it would have been even worse. The Crimean example of Kozlov-Mehlis speaks for itself. It was impossible to fight the Germans even at full strength, super-efforts were needed, for which the leadership of the Red Army was not trivially prepared, even from a moral point of view.
    1. 0
      5 January 2015 20: 57
      Quote: andrew42
      Conclusion - the advancement of military science and preparation for war by the Wehrmacht - this is the true reason for their victories, and the colossal result of military construction, causing genuine envy.

      I want to draw attention to the request for revenge from the people of Germany. That is, the Germans at the beginning of the war had a higher fighting spirit than ours.
  10. +9
    5 January 2015 13: 42
    A muddy story. A muddy figure. Ryabyshev, Rokossovsky, Yenko wrote about the destructiveness of orders signed by Kirponos. N. Popel recalls this most vividly "In a difficult time". Our slightest success was methodically and consistently turned into failure by the front-line leadership. They were forced to look for German tanks on the right flank of the 5th Army in Polesie, when the Germans were rushing eastward at the left junction with the 6th Army. abandoned front-line warehouses in Sknilov. 8 Mechanized Corps were torn apart by orders. The same Vashugin, prowling the roads with the tribunal and the prosecutor in search of treason, creates Popel's detachment and throws it on Dubno to the rear of Kleist. Everything is done without the knowledge of the front. And there and then a magical success, the German fuel trucks broke through, burned. But the front quickly takes control of the situation. There they are now waiting for a German strike south of Dubno, as if the Germans were deploying their tank divisions by 90 degrees. Our units, marching north to Popel, were forced to retreat south to the "created line of defense." In this insane retreat, the last tanks of the 4,8,15th mechanized corps were abandoned. Meanwhile, the Germans are closing the breaches with infantry. Tank divisions do not even think about turning somewhere. They rush to the east Dubno-Rovno-Berdichev-Belaya Tserkov, in front of them is a golden bridge, the road is open. And returning to the UEF headquarters, N.N. Vashugin shoots at himself. The investigation is terminated by N.S. Khrushchev. Disputes with Kirponos did not go well. The further history of the SWF is even worse. Almost always, the troops of the front operate in isolation from each other, the general situation and the plans of the command are not clear to them, but the Germans always understand everything, they have complete information, in the flesh to who was in which ravine in the Shumeikovo tract.
    1. Pervusha Isaev
      -1
      5 January 2015 14: 23
      Quote: vladim.gorbunow
      They were forced to look for German tanks on the right flank of the 5th Army in Polesie, when the Germans rushed east at the left, junction with the 6th. They pulled the mechanized corps. threw front warehouses in Sknilovo. Tore 8 Mehkorpus orders to pieces


      in general, what kind of commander was he who could not identify the direction of the main attack and concentrate troops there? or vice versa, hit the flanks of the advancing enemy and cut off the offensive? Kirponos, along with Zhukov, drove tanks with limited motor resources and filled up tanks with holes from Germans breaking through, knowing in advance that the tanks simply won’t reach the battlefield? this is no longer unprofessionalism and incompetence, but something more, and I don’t want to talk about the Dubnin battle, the Germans outplayed our weak tanks in all respects ...
      1. -1
        7 January 2015 15: 53
        Quote: vladim.gorbunow
        Almost always, the front troops operate in isolation from each other, the general position and plans of command are not clear to them. But the Germans always understand everything, they have complete information, in the flesh to who was in what ravine in the tract Shumeykovo.

        Lines worthy of critic Nirazu who did not command anything.
        Quote: Pervusha Isaev
        in general, what kind of commander was he who could not identify the direction of the main attack and concentrate troops there?

        Only a narrow-minded civilian could write like that. After identifying the direction of the main attack, they fought with a counterattack in FLANGI, and not by throwing troops under the steam rink of the main attack.
  11. +4
    5 January 2015 14: 08
    Quote: ShadowCat
    Uguk. Personally by Stalin.
    And the fact that the army has grown ten times in less than three years is a vital trifle.

    It grew in number, but was not sufficiently trained and equipped with the necessary, in particular, experienced command personnel. The blessed memory of those who died in battles for the Motherland in the tragic 1941 year.
  12. +1
    5 January 2015 15: 10
    However, Stalin did not give permission to withdraw troops.


    In my opinion, it was Kirponos and Khrushchev who convinced Stalin that Kiev could be kept.
    1. +5
      5 January 2015 15: 21
      Quote: Aleksander
      In my opinion, it was Kirponos and Khrushchev who convinced Stalin that Kiev could be kept.

      One version looks like this.
      Budyonny was the first to notice the danger of the boiler. He shared his doubts with Shaposhnikov. The latter notified the IVS. Stalin, through a direct connection, Bode asked Kirponos directly whether he would keep the Kiev SD. Here then for Kirponos the hour of truth has come ... He answered that he would keep it.
  13. -3
    5 January 2015 16: 44
    Quote: andrew42
    The inadequate qualifications of the commanders of the middle and top echelons of the Red Army is the talk of the town. What was, what was. But you shouldn't forget your opponent either. In France, for example, there was no such repression and emasculation of the command staff ... And the point is not in "repression", I believe that under the Tukhachevskys, Yakirs, Egorovs, Uborevichs it would have been even worse.

    The trouble is that in the wake of Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Egorov, Uborevich, many other Red Army commanders, around 40000, fell under the rink of repression.
    1. 0
      5 January 2015 19: 32
      Quote: Vadim2013
      many other commanders of the Red Army, about 40000.

      belay Those. almost everything? what
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. 0
        5 January 2015 21: 27
        Look in the article: "According to I.Kh. Baghramyan's recollections, only the Kiev Special Military District lacked 30 thousand servicemen." 40000 officers are cited in many sources.
        1. The comment was deleted.
        2. -1
          5 January 2015 21: 50
          The first study of repression in the Red Army in 1937-38. It seems that Lieutenant General Todorsky was engaged. Based on the roll-call lists, he calculated the number of repressed senior command personnel. According to estimates made by General A.I. Todorsky, the Stalinist repressions carried away:
          from 5 Marshals of the Soviet Union - 3, of which died - 3
          from 5 commanders of I rank - 3, of which died - 3
          of 10 rank II commanders - 10, of which died - 10
          from 67 comcor - 60, of which died - 57
          from 199 divisors - 136, of which died - 125
          from 397 brigades - 221, of which died - 200
          This is the highest command, painted on the shelves. In total, we have: from 683 commanders from brigade commander and higher, 433 was repressed (of which 398 died, 35 survived).
          http://temezhnikov.narod.ru/vifrg/84163.htm
          Meanwhile, the phrase Vasilevsky is widely known:
          "Without the thirty-seventh year, perhaps, there would have been no war at all in the forty-first year. In the fact that Hitler decided to start the war in the forty-first year, an assessment of the degree of defeat of military personnel that we had had played an important role."
          1. 11111mail.ru
            -2
            6 January 2015 09: 28
            Quote: Vadim2013
            433 were repressed (of them 398 died,

            They pinched the Trotskyists.
        3. 11111mail.ru
          0
          6 January 2015 09: 26
          Quote: Vadim2013
          40000 officers are cited in many sources

          This figure has long been refuted.
    2. 0
      7 January 2015 19: 28
      Quote: Vadim2013
      The trouble is that in the wake of Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Egorov, Uborevich, many other Red Army commanders, around 40000, fell under the rink of repression.

      The reason for the lack of com staff was primarily the army increased over 2 years by 2-3 times. It is impossible to get such a number of officers quickly. Hence the unprofessionalism of the Red Army. Repression is only secondary.
  14. +3
    5 January 2015 20: 26
    The author of the article did not mention the actions of Kirponos in December 1939 - January 1940 and the losses in the units subordinate to him. And since most members of the forum are related to the Army, we recall the charter where it is clearly stated that the COMMANDER RESPONSES FOR EVERYTHING. And it turns out in all our failures and boilers (the Germans never had such large-scale boilers for the entire war (Stalingrad is about 300 tons. We can’t compare with our losses near Kiev, no one is guilty. Kirponos was unable to fulfill the task in his sector of the front, and the means and time were.)
    1. 0
      5 January 2015 20: 43
      Quote: mimrikov3
      the Germans did not have such large-scale boilers for the entire war

      When the American forces attacked in 1944 in Northern France, the scale of encirclement was about the same, and the number of prisoners was at least no less ... I can lie and tell lies .. But I seem to remember correctly. This offensive began at a time when the British Cannes stormed unsuccessfully ...
  15. +4
    5 January 2015 21: 12
    In the Museum of the History of the Kiev Military District (now the Museum of the Armed Forces of Ukraine) in a window dedicated to the beginning of the Second World War several years ago, a telegram from the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army about bringing KOVO troops to full combat readiness and a possible attack by fascist Germany lay on public display.
    The most interesting thing is the time stamps for the delivery of this archive telegram addressed to the commander of the KOVO Kirponos and his deputies. A telegram of the highest series of importance and urgency (“Air”) was sent from Moscow late in the evening of 21.06.1941/3/6, received by the appropriate duty officer 7 hours before the attack of the Nazis, handed to Commander Kirponos (with a time stamp) something around noon, i.e. XNUMX-XNUMX hours after the war began, but he was at headquarters and, most likely, was not at home.The women walked and were afraid to disturb.
    These are not the latest memoirs, not the shaher-maher of "historians". This telegram is an authentic and impartial document.
    With such lateness, the necessary orders were given, and here - lateness, losses, panic, etc. This is a direct crime.
    Guilt of Kirponos is obvious.
    Fact. Who is there in Kiev? - look at this document in the museum, which is in the House of Officers.
    Therefore, for sure, especially after the criminally missed start of the war and the mediocre command of the front, he had to wait for punishment, like Pavlov. It was better to die ...
  16. +3
    6 January 2015 00: 38
    "On July 14, I went by car to Kiev ... in the morning I introduced myself to the front commander, Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos. I was extremely surprised by his sharply conspicuous confusion ... In those minutes I finally came to the conclusion that I was too much this person has such voluminous, complex and responsible duties, and woe to the troops entrusted to him. " (Rokossovsky K.K. "Soldier's Duty")
  17. 0
    6 January 2015 04: 53
    And what is the "glorified" commander Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko famous for? hi
  18. 11111mail.ru
    -1
    6 January 2015 14: 29
    Read an interesting book: Mukhin Yu. "The General's Mafia - from Kutuzov to Zhukov." In it, in particular, there is a whole chapter dedicated to the "heroic" death of this person.
    "All Soviet generals in general praise the bravery of Kirponos, who became a Hero of the Soviet Union in the war with the Finns, but even these eulogies stick out oddities. In particular:
    1. On the eve of the war, Kirponos tried to prevent the troops of the Kiev Special Military District from being put on alert. Let me remind you that the chief of staff of the district, General Purkaev, recalled that Kirponos forbade the withdrawal of divisions to the border of the unfinished and weapons-free Vladimir-Volyn fortified area.
    2. It was Kirponos and Burmistenko who convinced Stalin that, contrary to Budyonny’s proposal, it was not necessary to leave Kiev and withdraw the troops of the Southwestern Front to the borders of the Psel River.
    3. Kirponos ignored Tymoshenko’s order to withdraw the front armies for Psel, citing this refusal as a formal reason for the lack of a written order, although the front lines were already assigned to this line.
    4. When Kirponos nevertheless gave the order for a breakthrough from the troops' water, he immediately beheaded the front, ceasing to command it.
    5. Kirponos did not leave the encirclement, but actually waited for as many people as possible entrusted to him to die in the column of the headquarters, and by this he actually set them up for the Germans to destroy.
    If the last three points can somehow be explained by the cowardice and meanness of Kirponos in the face of the impending defeat of the troops entrusted to him, then how to understand the first two points - after all, Kirponos harmed the Soviet people even when there was no threat of defeat for the troops entrusted to him. And the question remains: is it just Kirponos's cowardly meanness or a pre-war plan to help the Germans? "
    1. -1
      7 January 2015 16: 09
      The commanders betrayed the theory and quotes taken out of context are uninteresting to read.
      He has nothing to do with the army. this "politician" wrote about 25 books on various topics. I don't read amateurs, there is more worthy literature.
      It is on the wiki, unfortunately the link is not correctly inserted.
      "Yuri Ignatievich (Mukhin) is an extravagant man: for example, he has Hitler - the greatest commander of all times and peoples, not only Zhukov is more talented than Napoleon and Suvorov combined. Now, Nemtsov is a fine fellow! I think that the majority of Russian citizens do not share his opinion "
  19. Ygorez
    0
    6 January 2015 16: 25
    article - minus. exalts the talent of commander Kirponos, but no special talent was noticed behind him. died in battle, honor and praise, but the front is about ... l. It's not the squad leader, but by position, STRATEG
    1. +1
      7 January 2015 16: 06
      Ygorez Yesterday, 16:25
      article - minus. exalts the talent of commander Kirponos, but no special talent was noticed behind him. died in battle, honor and praise, but the front is about ... l. It's not the squad leader, but by position, STRATEG
      And you in his place at that time and at that hour of death? minus from me think that you write dead to blame easy
  20. +4
    6 January 2015 16: 27
    People! What are you writing here !? These people were Dying for their homeland. Who are we to wash their bones now? And who do you think is General Karbyshev? Which of us is capable of such an act? For yourself, answer not for me.
    1. Ygorez
      +3
      6 January 2015 16: 35
      These are not people, they are leaders. Since you have been given rights, be kind enough to fulfill your duties
      1. 0
        7 January 2015 21: 41
        The leader is always a competent MAN and no higher mind. And he fulfilled duties to the end and died during a breakthrough. No need to rush phrases from KOBa, especially not in the case.
  21. +2
    6 January 2015 22: 30
    He was the commander of that turbulent and difficult pre-war period, when they were afraid to fight on their own initiative. And they often feared not the enemy anymore, but their "vigilant" ones.
    His bust stands in Chernigov on the Alley of Heroes. Sane people remember him. And nat. hoopoes often and trash him. For them, the hero is only a Bandera request
  22. Major Whirlwind
    +2
    7 January 2015 10: 21
    Greetings, friends! Merry Christmas everyone! The topic of Kiev is sad "with regards to the boiler", but the memoirs and statements of other participants in this operation are the opposite. Specifically, General Vlasov ...
  23. +2
    7 January 2015 16: 01
    It is a pity that the article can be put only one plus, it is worthy of a fat plus, at least for these words
    The names of famous marshals and generals, who became direct blacksmiths of the Great Victory, are known to many. Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev, Malinovsky ... It is unlikely that there is anyone in Russia who does not know these names. The merits of these and many other Soviet military leaders were repeatedly described in the historical and memoir literature. Much less lucky in this regard were those Soviet commanders (as well as ordinary officers and soldiers) who fell in the first days, weeks, and months of the war without knowing the joy of victory over the Nazis. But we are all obliged to them no less than those who reached Berlin. After all, these people, real heroes and patriots of their homeland, fought to the last, trying to restrain the onslaught of the enemy superior in weaponry and technical equipment on the frontiers of the Soviet country. In this article we will talk about one of these heroes.
  24. tonicio
    0
    7 January 2015 16: 14
    The main reason for the defeat is Help Germany. Instead of standing and waiting in May-June 1940 for the Germans to destroy France, it was necessary to hit them from the east, then the French would not have lost and Trey Reich would have collapsed in 1940.
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  28. 0
    11 January 2015 18: 53
    You can put pros or cons to the author of the article as you like. Another thing is important: the longer the time span moves us from those terrible days of the first months of the war, the more publications of all kinds of historians, military and non-military, appear who try to “allegedly” shed light on the events of that time, tell us that “for one reason or another "Has so far been hidden. They are echoed by “couch strategists” who have read a wide variety of books, for the most part, who did not serve in the army, due to flat feet, myopia, and inborn cowardice. Both those and others forgot the main principle of the writer: “Write the truth!”. It never occurred to you that the authors of numerous military memoirs are high-ranking military leaders - commanders of divisions, corps, armies, fronts and there are no memoirs of those who were then the commander of a platoon, company, battalion and at the end of the war became commander of a regiment or division. Why? Everything is simple - some did not survive in this meat grinder, and those that survived and survived this horror preferred to be silent better.
  29. 0
    11 January 2015 18: 54
    As a child, I also read K.Senko’s memoirs and, asking my grandfather about the fighting in the south-west direction, I heard from him: “This Khrushchev’s favorite will not write the whole truth, otherwise he should not be printed, but judged” ... ..
    In Soviet literature, the correlation of forces before the war was written, and I asked my father, a regular military officer, senior officer, how could it happen that 1470 German tanks were opposed by 6600 Soviet tanks, and 1320 German aircraft were our numerous air forces, where there were only 16 I-800s, but the enemy was not stopped and by September 1941 approached Moscow. There were many more of these my “whys” and the answers to them, both “standard-book” and more frank. With a warning: “You don’t especially talk about it” ... ..
  30. 0
    11 January 2015 18: 55
    I tried from memory to restore what I heard and it turned out this:
    “The whole army is divided into those who give orders and who execute them. The higher the rank of the commander giving the order, the less he knows about the actual state of affairs in subordinate units or divisions. Therefore, the executor of the order, even in peacetime, is not able to fulfill it exactly, and even more so in wartime. You can’t imagine, son, how many platoon, company, and battalion commanders were shot in these terrible first days ... "... Yes, there were tanks, but they, both old and new, mostly had no spare parts, fuel and ammunition . The lack of personnel was felt. Yes, there were planes. There were so many of them that there were not enough airfields and was often based on one of 3-4 regiments. To hide or disguise such a quantity was impossible. "The Germans, taking advantage of the surprise, destroyed most of the aircraft precisely at the airfields, and not in air battles."
  31. 0
    11 January 2015 18: 56
    “Here you are, son, you will become a military man and you will understand that the commander is primarily the organizer and must be ready at any time to fulfill the order. If a person is able to fulfill an order, he has no price in peacetime and wartime. "Those who are unable to carry out the order in wartime are shot or they, for fear, go over to the side of the enemy."
    Having become a military man, and having served the first six months in an officer position, I noticed that of all that I was taught, I can do 30 percent, and the remaining 70 percent do not know or do not know at all, they demand from me, but there is nowhere to read.
    A year later, I came to visit my native school, brought a long list of questions that, in my opinion, need to be taught and in a very insulting form spoke about the teachers of some departments, saying that they are parasites and that is why they write to me in certification: “Service knows little of the troops .... "
    The head of the department, a colonel and a participant in the war, told me:
    “I went to the front as a volunteer and in 1943 came under Kharkov. Before the fight, the political instructor presented me with a small trophy Walther. I carried it in the right pocket of my tunic. We met hand-to-hand with the SS men from the Dead Head division. A hefty bugger dumped me and began to choke me. I, already losing consciousness, felt for this "Walter" from the last forces, shot and killed the German. And so you lieutenant will survive after the first battle, quickly understand everything and learn everything ”... ..
  32. 0
    11 January 2015 18: 57
    I remembered this and although it was difficult, I studied, diligently and firmly, on my own and others' mistakes, overcoming laziness, stupidity and inertness of some, hostility and arrogance of others. Experience, confidence, perseverance, a sense of newness appeared. This was reflected in career growth. I heard people say behind me: “How does he know so much!” Once I noticed that some soldier was walking behind me. When I asked why he was doing this, the soldier replied: “My commander sent me to track and record everything that you are doing today, because in our part, only you know really what needs to be done, how and when! ”

    Of course, General Kirponos was a smart and competent commander, but in a combat situation he was held hostage to a situation that developed not in his favor and not through his fault. There was no time for ambition in this massacre. Even if he did not die, and as some authors write, he shot himself, we must pay tribute to his courage. He could lose his life, but General Vlasov could not in a similar situation ... ..