Antique ammo
Without modern torpedoes, the submarine fleet does not make sense.
At the beginning of the 70 of the last century, the West came to a new ideology of torpedism, which provided a dramatic increase in the effectiveness of this weapons at much greater distances, giving it the opportunity to take into account the real tactical situation and difficult environmental conditions. Domestic approaches to solving this issue can be called "locomotive". The theory of tele-controlled torpedoes developed by our scientists was obviously unreal, and the fleet did not master it, did not understand and did not appreciate it.
Remote-controlled torpedoes have been developed in the world since the end of the 19th century. These works were brought to a practically significant result in Germany during the Second World War.
Kriegsmarine worked out two types of remote-controlled torpedoes (TTs) - with the Lerche self-homing system and a remote-controlled version of the straight-on G7e. The latter were in large numbers in service with coastal batteries, but they did not have combat use.
Lerche largely determined the subsequent half-century development of not only torpedoes, but also submarines (submarines). The main reason for the start of its development was the massive use of Foxers, the first towed anti-torpedo traps. At that level of development of this type of underwater weapon, it was practically impossible to detect and classify a target autonomously on the “board” of a torpedo. The task of circumventing the trap was solved by the operator, who had data not only from the torpedo head, but also from the hydroacoustic station (GAS) of the submarine, as well as information about the tactical situation.
By the end of World War II, the Germans did not have time to bring not only the “Lerche”. Low reliability was demonstrated even by quite widely used self-guided TV in military operations. However, the potential of the German developments was very high, as evidenced by their long life in the domestic post-war torpedoes SAET-50, SET-53M, SAET-60M, the main solutions for the homing system (CCH) which were borrowed from TV. On the one hand, these torpedoes managed to be brought to a very high level of reliability, on the other hand, the categorical conclusion of the Germans, based on combat experience, regarding the need for telecontrol (TU) to ensure noise immunity of the volley was not taken into account.
In the United States, with the advent of the first self-guided specimens, they began to create hydroacoustic countermeasures (SCPD), which ensured the active destruction of attacking torpedoes. The great success achieved in the production of the SCPD led to the cessation of the development of torpedo destruction weapons in the 60-s, and only in the 90-s were these works resumed.
From the beginning of the 50-ies, the US Navy began to conduct research exercises with the extensive involvement of submarines and anti-submarine forces, as well as the massive use of torpedoes and countermeasures. The most fundamental conclusion made then was the following: the timely use of the SFDS virtually guarantees protection against torpedoes. That is, the technological level of those years did not allow creating a CLA capable of providing an effective classification of targets. Three principal consequences resulted from this:
1. The need for large ammunition anti-submarine weapons on the ship (reaching the 60 torpedoes) to repel multiple attacks of the submarine.
2. The noise immunity of a torpedo salvo in a duel situation can be reliably ensured only at the expense of the DUT. From this point on, all submarine torpedoes in the US Navy became remote-controlled.
3. The timely use of the SCPD makes it possible to reliably evade the enemy's first sudden volley of an even more noisy submarine.
The last statement was the basis for the termination of the construction of diesel-electric submarines in the USA. Atomic ships of the US Navy received reliable means of hydroacoustic counteraction. At the same time, the effectiveness of remote-controlled torpedoes of the USA was obviously higher than domestic ones.
To the full extent
A serious problem with the first serial remote-controlled torpedoes - significant limitations on maneuvering and number in the salvo due to the use of a "towed" carrier telecontrol coil.
TT has two inertia-free coils - one in the torpedo, the other remains on the carrier, providing its sublimation maneuver submarine, that is, the wire itself is almost stationary relative to water. The towed boat reel (BLK) in case of use “falls out” together with the torpedo outside and hangs on the cable-rope (commensurate with the length of the submarine). Due to the impact of the oncoming flow, the BLK performs oscillatory movements that significantly reduce the reliability of the telecontrol, limit the submarine in speed and maneuver, and most importantly, make it impossible to use more than one remote-controlled torpedo in the salvo.
The first patent on a telecontrol hose reel dates back to December 2 1965. The following application filed by 15 July 1970-th, corresponds to the actual design of the telecontrol system of the upgraded torpedoes Mk 37 Mod 1 with the introduction of a hose boat coil (CLS). It can be assumed that initially the idea of the SLK came from the Germans in the process of “binding” the Mk 37 Mod 1 to the torpedo tubes of the new German submarines of the 205 project. The development was tested, and at the end of the 60-x - the beginning of the 70-s was implemented in all Western TTs. SHLK dramatically increased the reliability of remote control, speed and maneuverability of the firing submarine, and most importantly - the ability to perform multi-torpedo volleys with remote control. This significantly increased the effective shooting distances and entailed significant changes in the design of both torpedoes with new sophisticated CLS and high-precision navigation systems, and submarines with the introduction of airborne paths and modes of using the sonar system (ASM).
The first domestic TT was TEST-68, created in 1968, on the basis of the antisubmarine torpedoes SET-53М with passive (noise-finding) CCH. Even then, several fundamental errors were made:
1. TEST-68 could and should have been universal (with the possibility of defeat and surface targets). Passive CLO and electromagnetic proximity fuze completely provided work on the ships, since they were created on the basis of the SAET-50 anti-ship torpedo equipment. Fixing the top of the anti-subdivision depth pendulum did not allow the torpedo to reach the target above the artificially introduced limit. The mass of the warhead (90 kg) from the point of view of classic anti-ship torpedoes that had 300 kilograms of explosives seemed insufficient, but as a self-defense torpedo and for firing at escort ships TEST-68 was quite suitable.
2. The low-speed channel TU provided the control of the torpedo only in the horizontal plane, excluding the possibility of changing the depth and effective use of difficult environmental conditions.
3. The TU algorithms that were completely divorced from life and required, among other things, significant hardware costs (on the upgraded submarines of the 641 project, the ship part of the Dolphin telecontrol system occupied the cabin).
4. The same algorithms ensured the use of only one torpedo in the salvo, despite the fact that in some submarines of the 641 project, under the TT, half of the torpedo tubes (TA) were being developed - two in the bow and four in the stern.
Shooting artisanal
The most effective solution for the 641 submarine of the project could be the implementation of a set of TUs as part of a small-sized command transmitter, but with manual calculation of TU data in a navigational way. Since the accuracy of the target data generation by the ship combat crew of the submarine was rather high, it actually required only a few corrections along the telecontrol line for each torpedo. Two operators could provide a multi-torpedo salvo (one on the plotter, the second on the small command transmitter).
Thus, the current fleet was really able to correct the mistakes of military and civilian scientists, but this did not happen. Attitude to TEST-68 on navy remained very ambiguous. Sometimes it came to the point that of the two submarines with telecontrol that were part of the compound, only TEST-68 fired - the one that had the most trained personnel capable of certain “makeshift modifications”. Such a situation developed, for example, in the late 70s in the 182nd brigade of the submarine in Bechevinka (Pacific Fleet), where all the firing of the TEST-68 was carried out by the B-101.
The proposal of the flagship mineral of the Polarinskaya brigade of the Submarine (SF) of Captain 2-rank Rank Yevgeny Penzin to conduct research exercises with TEST-68 firing at ships was directly prohibited by the head of the Directorate of anti-submarine weapons (UPV) of the Navy Sergei Butov.
A serious mistake of the Navy was the rejection of the use of remote-controlled torpedoes on nuclear submarines. The only exception is a small series of modified submarines of the 671 project with torpedoes TEST-71M. The well-known image from the TEST-71М sticking out of the submarine reflected all the problems of our TU, when an 2-generation nuclear-powered submarine was put up against the multi-purpose 1-made submarine of the 28 generation, which was very complex in accordance with the developer’s design. Neither the customer with his weapons institute (SRI-XNUMX), nor the developer (Central Research Institute AG and Central Research Institute Gidropribor) thought about firing remote-controlled torpedoes at low-noise submarines. All surveys made in this direction were initiated from operating fleets.
The telecontrol complex of the new torpedo TEST-71 repeated all the shortcomings of the TEST-68. But what about TEST-71, if Delphine’s erroneous solutions are still present in the “newest” TE-2 (remote-controlled electric universal self-guided torpedo) and UGST (universal deep-water self-guided torpedo).
Nevertheless, on diesel submarines, remote-controlled torpedoes were mastered quite well, which was greatly facilitated by the Knot combat information management system (CICS). Moreover, tactical techniques were developed that ensured high efficiency in dueling situations.
The idea was being introduced that atomic submarines, which had great speed, did not need remote control, only a torpedo complex in the form of an “automaton” was needed, which could literally fill up the sea with torpedoes. Nobody thought how much such an expenditure of ammunition, as well as a submarine of increased displacement would cost: a rich country, we will demand it will. But the main thing is not this, but the fact that having abandoned the telecontrol on the submarine, we agreed to a decrease in the effective firing distances to “pistol” - obviously smaller than that of the enemy. In addition, the noise immunity of the volley torpedoes of the USSR Navy against foreign ones using SCPD was obviously not provided in most tactical situations. In the case of the third world without the use of nuclear weapons, we were awaited by extremely heavy losses in underwater duels without the possibility of causing any serious damage to the enemy.
Automatic fixation
The former commander of the submarine forces of the US Navy, Admiral Bruce de Mars, estimated the likely loss ratio of the US and USSR / Russian submarines as 1 to 5. This estimate falls on the middle of the 90-s of the last century, that is, given in a situation where the Clinton administration was literally holding the US submarine shipbuilding. All statements by US Navy officials during this period had a pronounced hue of maximal and exaggerated advertising of the capabilities of the Russian Navy for withdrawing funds from the congress.
The main reason for what happened is the “theory of efficiency” (exactly in quotes) of the domestic torpedo weapon that is not related to reality and, accordingly, the erroneous mathematical models that justified this half-century lag of the national torpedoism. Moreover, this self-deception was inherent not only in the high metropolitan leadership and the people of pure science. Real torpedo firing was extremely rarely carried out in our fleet under the conditions of counteraction precisely because of the unwillingness to bring down the reported figures.
The low efficiency and reliability of American torpedoes demonstrated at the beginning of World War II in the United States were the subject of a “big torpedo scandal” followed by hard conclusions for the future. We were engaged in fraud and lied to each other, lulling ourselves with the thought that there would be no war anyway.
The current fleet was silent. Military science wrote regular dissertations and mastered new topics, limited to the truth no further than smoking. The industry had a universal answer to everything: we do, as the customer said (fleet).
For the first time, an automatic torpedo complex, which severely limited us further with remote control, was justified in the 705 project. His initial intent seemed very logical in the 60's. Since the third world was considered, of course, nuclear, the torpedoes in the 705 complex of the armament of the project were evaluated as purely secondary, and the main weapons were to be nuclear anti-submarine missiles (RDR) and Squall. In this case, the PCR 81P and "Squall" formed an effective weapon complex, where the "Squall" blocked the dead zone of the PCR, that is, the destruction of targets with high-speed nuclear weapons was ensured. The very high speed and maneuverability of the nuclear submarines of this project really allowed the US Navy to drive away from the Sabrok.
However, as early as the end of 60, the realization of the unacceptability of nuclear war between the superpowers came. At the beginning of the 70-ies appeared torpedo Mk 48, 55-nodal course which leveled the speed and maneuverability of the 705 project. Under these conditions, a serious reworking of the project with the introduction of non-nuclear PLR, remote-controlled (with SLK) universal torpedoes, was required. But moral strength, as well as the displacement reserve of the 705 project, was not enough. To admit the fallacy of the chosen direction of SPbM “Malachite” could not, continuing to promote the vicious idea of the “machine gun” into the armaments of subsequent projects.
The half-century lag of domestic torpedo developments is not a consequence of technical, but purely organizational reasons. The proof of this is our individual successes. For example, the world's first serial aviation (Helicopter) VTT-1 remote-controlled torpedo (developed by the design bureau of the Dagdiesel plant). Or a magnificent channel of remote control (telemetry) of the torpedo "Tapir". Nevertheless, the overall result is depressing. The third generation nuclear submarines did not receive the telecontrol prescribed by him, which led to a sharp decrease in their effectiveness (the fake mathematical models of Malachite do not take into account the real counteraction at all). Will they get it in the modernization process? And if so, which one? Modern fiber optic providing multi-torpedo volleys, or the repetition of erroneous concepts of the 60s of the last century?
Today, the telecontrol of even “new” torpedoes of the type TE-2 and UGST corresponds to the technical level of Western developments of the 60-s of the last century. This situation does not seem to worry the officials in charge, as well as the costs to the country and the fleet of displaying antique solutions on modern weapon export models.
Little draw
A modern telecontrol system is a fiber optic system that provides multi-torpedo salvos at a distance of over 40 kilometers with the ability to effectively maneuver and dodge firing submarines. The high speed of transmission of the communication line should guarantee the information "joint" of the SSN of the torpedo with the SJC PL.
It is necessary to introduce telecontrol not only for torpedoes of a submarine caliber 53 centimeter, but also on the torpedoes of the “Package” complex of surface ships of the Navy, which is already happening in the West today. The same TT should be applied from a helicopter. The storage system of torpedo ammunition on the ships of the Navy should be done according to the western scheme, when the cellar is universal. This solution provides a multiple increase in the combat effectiveness of the “Package” complex both in case of a submarine defeat (especially for ships that do not have anti-submarine missiles) and for self-defense against torpedoes.
All the technical prerequisites for creating modern domestic torpedo telecontrol systems with high performance characteristics are available. Only one example - the complex of fiber-optic telecontrol developed by the VNII KP, developed a decade ago (OCD) was successfully surpassed in its performance characteristics by the best foreign analogue - TU in the German DM2A4 torpedo.
Of course, some alternative innovative solutions are possible. But it is necessary to clearly understand that these complexes need not just to be drawn on paper, but in fact to work out and hand over with all the related problems. Alternatives are good in terms of disbursement of funds and writing dissertations, but they leave the fleet without telecontrol for many years, which is necessary for practicing the proposed solutions.
In the West, not a single heavy torpedo is complete without a modern TU; moreover, it is being deployed on small-sized torpedoes. Without telecontrol, not only can there not be effective firing over long distances, even at short distances (“dagger”), it dramatically increases the effectiveness of the volley.
Without good telecontrol, there can be no modern torpedoes. Decisions must be made to ensure the elimination of our shameful half a century behind. All the technical prerequisites for this. Without addressing this issue, the construction of submarine forces of the Navy does not make sense.
At the beginning of the 70 of the last century, the West came to a new ideology of torpedism, which provided a dramatic increase in the effectiveness of this weapons at much greater distances, giving it the opportunity to take into account the real tactical situation and difficult environmental conditions. Domestic approaches to solving this issue can be called "locomotive". The theory of tele-controlled torpedoes developed by our scientists was obviously unreal, and the fleet did not master it, did not understand and did not appreciate it.
Remote-controlled torpedoes have been developed in the world since the end of the 19th century. These works were brought to a practically significant result in Germany during the Second World War.
Kriegsmarine worked out two types of remote-controlled torpedoes (TTs) - with the Lerche self-homing system and a remote-controlled version of the straight-on G7e. The latter were in large numbers in service with coastal batteries, but they did not have combat use.
Lerche largely determined the subsequent half-century development of not only torpedoes, but also submarines (submarines). The main reason for the start of its development was the massive use of Foxers, the first towed anti-torpedo traps. At that level of development of this type of underwater weapon, it was practically impossible to detect and classify a target autonomously on the “board” of a torpedo. The task of circumventing the trap was solved by the operator, who had data not only from the torpedo head, but also from the hydroacoustic station (GAS) of the submarine, as well as information about the tactical situation.
By the end of World War II, the Germans did not have time to bring not only the “Lerche”. Low reliability was demonstrated even by quite widely used self-guided TV in military operations. However, the potential of the German developments was very high, as evidenced by their long life in the domestic post-war torpedoes SAET-50, SET-53M, SAET-60M, the main solutions for the homing system (CCH) which were borrowed from TV. On the one hand, these torpedoes managed to be brought to a very high level of reliability, on the other hand, the categorical conclusion of the Germans, based on combat experience, regarding the need for telecontrol (TU) to ensure noise immunity of the volley was not taken into account.
In the United States, with the advent of the first self-guided specimens, they began to create hydroacoustic countermeasures (SCPD), which ensured the active destruction of attacking torpedoes. The great success achieved in the production of the SCPD led to the cessation of the development of torpedo destruction weapons in the 60-s, and only in the 90-s were these works resumed.
From the beginning of the 50-ies, the US Navy began to conduct research exercises with the extensive involvement of submarines and anti-submarine forces, as well as the massive use of torpedoes and countermeasures. The most fundamental conclusion made then was the following: the timely use of the SFDS virtually guarantees protection against torpedoes. That is, the technological level of those years did not allow creating a CLA capable of providing an effective classification of targets. Three principal consequences resulted from this:
1. The need for large ammunition anti-submarine weapons on the ship (reaching the 60 torpedoes) to repel multiple attacks of the submarine.
2. The noise immunity of a torpedo salvo in a duel situation can be reliably ensured only at the expense of the DUT. From this point on, all submarine torpedoes in the US Navy became remote-controlled.
3. The timely use of the SCPD makes it possible to reliably evade the enemy's first sudden volley of an even more noisy submarine.
The last statement was the basis for the termination of the construction of diesel-electric submarines in the USA. Atomic ships of the US Navy received reliable means of hydroacoustic counteraction. At the same time, the effectiveness of remote-controlled torpedoes of the USA was obviously higher than domestic ones.
To the full extent
A serious problem with the first serial remote-controlled torpedoes - significant limitations on maneuvering and number in the salvo due to the use of a "towed" carrier telecontrol coil.
TT has two inertia-free coils - one in the torpedo, the other remains on the carrier, providing its sublimation maneuver submarine, that is, the wire itself is almost stationary relative to water. The towed boat reel (BLK) in case of use “falls out” together with the torpedo outside and hangs on the cable-rope (commensurate with the length of the submarine). Due to the impact of the oncoming flow, the BLK performs oscillatory movements that significantly reduce the reliability of the telecontrol, limit the submarine in speed and maneuver, and most importantly, make it impossible to use more than one remote-controlled torpedo in the salvo.The first patent on a telecontrol hose reel dates back to December 2 1965. The following application filed by 15 July 1970-th, corresponds to the actual design of the telecontrol system of the upgraded torpedoes Mk 37 Mod 1 with the introduction of a hose boat coil (CLS). It can be assumed that initially the idea of the SLK came from the Germans in the process of “binding” the Mk 37 Mod 1 to the torpedo tubes of the new German submarines of the 205 project. The development was tested, and at the end of the 60-x - the beginning of the 70-s was implemented in all Western TTs. SHLK dramatically increased the reliability of remote control, speed and maneuverability of the firing submarine, and most importantly - the ability to perform multi-torpedo volleys with remote control. This significantly increased the effective shooting distances and entailed significant changes in the design of both torpedoes with new sophisticated CLS and high-precision navigation systems, and submarines with the introduction of airborne paths and modes of using the sonar system (ASM).
The first domestic TT was TEST-68, created in 1968, on the basis of the antisubmarine torpedoes SET-53М with passive (noise-finding) CCH. Even then, several fundamental errors were made:
1. TEST-68 could and should have been universal (with the possibility of defeat and surface targets). Passive CLO and electromagnetic proximity fuze completely provided work on the ships, since they were created on the basis of the SAET-50 anti-ship torpedo equipment. Fixing the top of the anti-subdivision depth pendulum did not allow the torpedo to reach the target above the artificially introduced limit. The mass of the warhead (90 kg) from the point of view of classic anti-ship torpedoes that had 300 kilograms of explosives seemed insufficient, but as a self-defense torpedo and for firing at escort ships TEST-68 was quite suitable.
2. The low-speed channel TU provided the control of the torpedo only in the horizontal plane, excluding the possibility of changing the depth and effective use of difficult environmental conditions.
3. The TU algorithms that were completely divorced from life and required, among other things, significant hardware costs (on the upgraded submarines of the 641 project, the ship part of the Dolphin telecontrol system occupied the cabin).
4. The same algorithms ensured the use of only one torpedo in the salvo, despite the fact that in some submarines of the 641 project, under the TT, half of the torpedo tubes (TA) were being developed - two in the bow and four in the stern.
Shooting artisanal
The most effective solution for the 641 submarine of the project could be the implementation of a set of TUs as part of a small-sized command transmitter, but with manual calculation of TU data in a navigational way. Since the accuracy of the target data generation by the ship combat crew of the submarine was rather high, it actually required only a few corrections along the telecontrol line for each torpedo. Two operators could provide a multi-torpedo salvo (one on the plotter, the second on the small command transmitter).
Thus, the current fleet was really able to correct the mistakes of military and civilian scientists, but this did not happen. Attitude to TEST-68 on navy remained very ambiguous. Sometimes it came to the point that of the two submarines with telecontrol that were part of the compound, only TEST-68 fired - the one that had the most trained personnel capable of certain “makeshift modifications”. Such a situation developed, for example, in the late 70s in the 182nd brigade of the submarine in Bechevinka (Pacific Fleet), where all the firing of the TEST-68 was carried out by the B-101.
The proposal of the flagship mineral of the Polarinskaya brigade of the Submarine (SF) of Captain 2-rank Rank Yevgeny Penzin to conduct research exercises with TEST-68 firing at ships was directly prohibited by the head of the Directorate of anti-submarine weapons (UPV) of the Navy Sergei Butov.
A serious mistake of the Navy was the rejection of the use of remote-controlled torpedoes on nuclear submarines. The only exception is a small series of modified submarines of the 671 project with torpedoes TEST-71M. The well-known image from the TEST-71М sticking out of the submarine reflected all the problems of our TU, when an 2-generation nuclear-powered submarine was put up against the multi-purpose 1-made submarine of the 28 generation, which was very complex in accordance with the developer’s design. Neither the customer with his weapons institute (SRI-XNUMX), nor the developer (Central Research Institute AG and Central Research Institute Gidropribor) thought about firing remote-controlled torpedoes at low-noise submarines. All surveys made in this direction were initiated from operating fleets.
The telecontrol complex of the new torpedo TEST-71 repeated all the shortcomings of the TEST-68. But what about TEST-71, if Delphine’s erroneous solutions are still present in the “newest” TE-2 (remote-controlled electric universal self-guided torpedo) and UGST (universal deep-water self-guided torpedo).
Nevertheless, on diesel submarines, remote-controlled torpedoes were mastered quite well, which was greatly facilitated by the Knot combat information management system (CICS). Moreover, tactical techniques were developed that ensured high efficiency in dueling situations.
The idea was being introduced that atomic submarines, which had great speed, did not need remote control, only a torpedo complex in the form of an “automaton” was needed, which could literally fill up the sea with torpedoes. Nobody thought how much such an expenditure of ammunition, as well as a submarine of increased displacement would cost: a rich country, we will demand it will. But the main thing is not this, but the fact that having abandoned the telecontrol on the submarine, we agreed to a decrease in the effective firing distances to “pistol” - obviously smaller than that of the enemy. In addition, the noise immunity of the volley torpedoes of the USSR Navy against foreign ones using SCPD was obviously not provided in most tactical situations. In the case of the third world without the use of nuclear weapons, we were awaited by extremely heavy losses in underwater duels without the possibility of causing any serious damage to the enemy.
Automatic fixation
The former commander of the submarine forces of the US Navy, Admiral Bruce de Mars, estimated the likely loss ratio of the US and USSR / Russian submarines as 1 to 5. This estimate falls on the middle of the 90-s of the last century, that is, given in a situation where the Clinton administration was literally holding the US submarine shipbuilding. All statements by US Navy officials during this period had a pronounced hue of maximal and exaggerated advertising of the capabilities of the Russian Navy for withdrawing funds from the congress.
The main reason for what happened is the “theory of efficiency” (exactly in quotes) of the domestic torpedo weapon that is not related to reality and, accordingly, the erroneous mathematical models that justified this half-century lag of the national torpedoism. Moreover, this self-deception was inherent not only in the high metropolitan leadership and the people of pure science. Real torpedo firing was extremely rarely carried out in our fleet under the conditions of counteraction precisely because of the unwillingness to bring down the reported figures.
The low efficiency and reliability of American torpedoes demonstrated at the beginning of World War II in the United States were the subject of a “big torpedo scandal” followed by hard conclusions for the future. We were engaged in fraud and lied to each other, lulling ourselves with the thought that there would be no war anyway.
The current fleet was silent. Military science wrote regular dissertations and mastered new topics, limited to the truth no further than smoking. The industry had a universal answer to everything: we do, as the customer said (fleet).
For the first time, an automatic torpedo complex, which severely limited us further with remote control, was justified in the 705 project. His initial intent seemed very logical in the 60's. Since the third world was considered, of course, nuclear, the torpedoes in the 705 complex of the armament of the project were evaluated as purely secondary, and the main weapons were to be nuclear anti-submarine missiles (RDR) and Squall. In this case, the PCR 81P and "Squall" formed an effective weapon complex, where the "Squall" blocked the dead zone of the PCR, that is, the destruction of targets with high-speed nuclear weapons was ensured. The very high speed and maneuverability of the nuclear submarines of this project really allowed the US Navy to drive away from the Sabrok.
However, as early as the end of 60, the realization of the unacceptability of nuclear war between the superpowers came. At the beginning of the 70-ies appeared torpedo Mk 48, 55-nodal course which leveled the speed and maneuverability of the 705 project. Under these conditions, a serious reworking of the project with the introduction of non-nuclear PLR, remote-controlled (with SLK) universal torpedoes, was required. But moral strength, as well as the displacement reserve of the 705 project, was not enough. To admit the fallacy of the chosen direction of SPbM “Malachite” could not, continuing to promote the vicious idea of the “machine gun” into the armaments of subsequent projects.
The half-century lag of domestic torpedo developments is not a consequence of technical, but purely organizational reasons. The proof of this is our individual successes. For example, the world's first serial aviation (Helicopter) VTT-1 remote-controlled torpedo (developed by the design bureau of the Dagdiesel plant). Or a magnificent channel of remote control (telemetry) of the torpedo "Tapir". Nevertheless, the overall result is depressing. The third generation nuclear submarines did not receive the telecontrol prescribed by him, which led to a sharp decrease in their effectiveness (the fake mathematical models of Malachite do not take into account the real counteraction at all). Will they get it in the modernization process? And if so, which one? Modern fiber optic providing multi-torpedo volleys, or the repetition of erroneous concepts of the 60s of the last century?
Today, the telecontrol of even “new” torpedoes of the type TE-2 and UGST corresponds to the technical level of Western developments of the 60-s of the last century. This situation does not seem to worry the officials in charge, as well as the costs to the country and the fleet of displaying antique solutions on modern weapon export models.
Little draw
A modern telecontrol system is a fiber optic system that provides multi-torpedo salvos at a distance of over 40 kilometers with the ability to effectively maneuver and dodge firing submarines. The high speed of transmission of the communication line should guarantee the information "joint" of the SSN of the torpedo with the SJC PL.
It is necessary to introduce telecontrol not only for torpedoes of a submarine caliber 53 centimeter, but also on the torpedoes of the “Package” complex of surface ships of the Navy, which is already happening in the West today. The same TT should be applied from a helicopter. The storage system of torpedo ammunition on the ships of the Navy should be done according to the western scheme, when the cellar is universal. This solution provides a multiple increase in the combat effectiveness of the “Package” complex both in case of a submarine defeat (especially for ships that do not have anti-submarine missiles) and for self-defense against torpedoes.
All the technical prerequisites for creating modern domestic torpedo telecontrol systems with high performance characteristics are available. Only one example - the complex of fiber-optic telecontrol developed by the VNII KP, developed a decade ago (OCD) was successfully surpassed in its performance characteristics by the best foreign analogue - TU in the German DM2A4 torpedo.
Of course, some alternative innovative solutions are possible. But it is necessary to clearly understand that these complexes need not just to be drawn on paper, but in fact to work out and hand over with all the related problems. Alternatives are good in terms of disbursement of funds and writing dissertations, but they leave the fleet without telecontrol for many years, which is necessary for practicing the proposed solutions.
In the West, not a single heavy torpedo is complete without a modern TU; moreover, it is being deployed on small-sized torpedoes. Without telecontrol, not only can there not be effective firing over long distances, even at short distances (“dagger”), it dramatically increases the effectiveness of the volley.
Without good telecontrol, there can be no modern torpedoes. Decisions must be made to ensure the elimination of our shameful half a century behind. All the technical prerequisites for this. Without addressing this issue, the construction of submarine forces of the Navy does not make sense.
Information