According to Vladimir Dorofeev, General Director of the Malachit St. Petersburg Marine Engineering Bureau, for the first time in the Navy, the nuclear submarine can perform the function of strategic non-nuclear deterrence through the use of Caliber cruise missiles.
The question is the effectiveness of such deterrence due to the notorious inability of the nuclear submarines to provide cruise missiles with massive missile targets. For a serious adversary and 20-30 KR almost nothing, even without taking into account effective air defense. For comparison: the Severodvinsk missile carrying capacity is comparable to two or three strategic bombers, which have incomparably higher capabilities for tactical and operational mobility, speed of solving problems, and the ability to deliver repeated strikes. Also armed with our distant aviation there are cruise missiles with higher performance characteristics than limited by the size of the caliber torpedo launcher. Of course, the Project 885 nuclear submarines also have some strengths. For example, they can turn stealthily and strike from an unexpected direction. However, the fact of shock disarmament of the 885th project is evident.
The criterion of "cost-effectiveness"
The solution to this problem (with minimal changes to the project) is possible with the transition naval KR for increased dimension (standard size of anti-ship missiles "Onyx" and torpedo tubes of 65 cm caliber) with a cluster warhead, ensuring the defeat of several targets. This is relevant not only for the 885th project, but also for the modernized nuclear submarines of project 971 (which ensures a multiple increase in their combat potential) and all ships - carriers of the Kyrgyz Republic (modernized cruisers of project 1144M, corvettes of project 20385, frigates of project 22350, MRK of project 21632) ...
Interesting assessments on the large-size efficiency-to-cost criterion were presented in an article by Robert Lynch (Robert A. Lynch) in the US Naval Institute Proceedings (No. 4, 1993). The multiple increase in the efficiency of the CR of 1 and 2 variants over the Tamahawk per unit (see table) was achieved due to the possibility of hitting a large number of targets. Wherein:
- The most expensive elements of the Kyrgyz Republic are “saved” - the engine and control system;
- a significant increase in the flight range and mass of the warhead is possible;
- dramatically improved (and cheaper) opportunities for the use of stealth technology.
To ensure accurate use of submunitions cassette warheads must be included in the radar control system millimeter range.
At the same time, the 1 variant of the alternative CD designated in the article by Robert Lynch is close to us in terms of the size of the Onyx - the torpedo tube 65. Considering that today either “Onyx” or a smaller “Caliber” can be loaded into a single cell of a vertical start-up (CIP), the transition to the CD of the size of “Onyx” provides more than fourfold gain according to the “cost-effectiveness” criterion enhancing the capabilities of the Navy carriers to ensure non-nuclear deterrence.
The US Navy does not have such an opportunity, since the size of the CWP cell was primarily determined by the size of the ER Standard missile defense system, which certainly has its advantages (a single PU for almost all missiles), but also the aforementioned efficiency deficiencies.
In the Navy of the Russian Federation, the dimension of the CWD cell was determined primarily by the size of the Onyx PKR transport container, which made it necessary to make a separate CWP for the anti-aircraft missile system, but ensured the presence of attack missiles with sharply improved performance characteristics in the ammunition. However, the situation is such that there are anti-ship missiles with maximum performance characteristics, and according to the CD we have a clear lack of equipment, since it was made for a smaller size (53 cm) of the torpedo tube.
But we have the necessary scientific and technical groundwork for the development of such a CD in a short time.
The creation and adoption of the nuclear submarine and surface ships of the Navy of a large "Caliber" will provide a qualitatively new level of non-nuclear deterrence, when the threat from being demonstrated becomes one that potential adversaries can no longer ignore.
The Piranha Project
Unfortunately, the development of SMPL in the Navy of the USSR clearly followed the erroneous way of applying to small submarines a number of requirements for large ones. This led to the creation of a double-hulled SMPL project "Piranha" with a huge displacement and extremely low TTX. Usually, the submarine of the 941 project was called a water carrier in our fleet. They not only had a record displacement, but also carried on themselves huge volumes of seawater. However, the criticism of the 941 project was largely unfounded. Within the strict conditions and requirements that put its developers in 70-s, the project turned out to be the most successful and talented. And even seemingly flaws (the same "water content") eventually worked for the cause, ensuring high missile readiness in the Arctic due to the ability to break thick ice.
The use of the two-part architecture for the SMPL project 865 killed him. Comparison of the performance characteristics of the 80-s with the 205-project (FRG) 60-s is amazing. Practically in all TTX our submarine is not just lagging behind, but completely unsatisfactory. With a close displacement (319 tons versus 450 tons in “Germans”), the maximum speed is 6,5 node versus 17, two torpedo tubes for small torpedoes against eight for the 53 caliber centimeter, etc. And this is despite the use of titanium and expensive alloys for the body of titanium alloys. silver-zinc rechargeable batteries on the Piranha.
Here, for example, are some simple questions that developers find it difficult to answer at the salons. Which one weapon going to put on a new "Piranha"? Torpedoes "Latush", which had TTX on the level of German TV during the Second World War? What hydroacoustics, RES?
The “Piranha” variants of increased displacement do not have any advantages over the Amur submarine versions of the Rubin Design Bureau.
SMPL is extremely necessary for the Navy, but instead of the really desired and possible fleet, some fantastic searchlights are offered. Though in Iran or North Korea SMPL buy.
According to the well-known and respected specialist in the anti-torpedo defense of submarines of Rear Admiral Anatoly Nikolaevich Lutsky, the current means of anti-torpedo defense of domestic submarines are ineffective compared to modern foreign torpedoes. “The submarines of the Ash and Borey projects being built,” Lutsky believes, “are proposed to be equipped with anti-torpedo protection systems, the development specifications of which were compiled as early as the 80-s of the last century, the results of studies of the effectiveness of these means against modern torpedoes indicate extremely low probabilities of non-affecting evading submarines. "
Unlike the western analogue, the Malachite launcher, demanding a considerable displacement, is incapable of salvo application and excludes the use of “long” products (self-propelled, with high performance characteristics). That is, it has obviously unsatisfactory efficiency and therefore is unable to provide adequate resistance to modern torpedoes. The patent date - 20.11.2009 shows that this is a new, but morally years outdated development on 20.
The level of remote control of torpedoes of the type UGST and ТЭ2 corresponds to the western end of the 60-s of the last century. The reason for the de facto half-century lag of telecontrol of domestic torpedoes from the western ones is Malachite itself. It was here in the 60-s that the torpedo complex of the 705 submarine of the project in the form of a machine gun on the torpedo deck was “grounded” (which excluded the use of effective telecontrol). The vicious ideology of this complex is still pushed through to the fleet. Effective telecontrol is not only and not so much a torpedo as a torpedo tube and a ship complex, for which the Malachite is responsible.
We have not had any technical problems with the remote control of the torpedoes.
The magnificent channel of telecontrol (telemetry) was performed at the beginning of the 80-s of the last century by the Research and Development Institute of Marine Technology for testing the Tapir torpedoes.
More than a decade ago, the VNIIKP was successfully completed the design and development work on the creation of a domestic fiber-optic telecontrol complex with extremely high performance characteristics. As a result, the fabricated hardware collects dust on the shelf.
It has also been more than ten years since the Central Research Institute Gidropribor passed a product with a telecontrol hose reel to a foreign customer. After that, this foreign customer began a massive transition to a hose reel, including for his old torpedoes.
Axiom of modern torpedism
In June, Malachite spread the information that more than thirty rocket launches of two missile systems, Caliber and Onyx, various types of torpedoes and self-defense weapons were made in total.
Why so little ?!
The breakdowns by type of tested products were not given, so let's talk about torpedoes in relation to the state procurement of 2012, “Maintenance of torpedoes“ Physicist-1 ”, reprocessing practical products”. So, seven shots "separately" in the course of "additional extended tests" and six on the order number 160 (head submarine project "Ash").
The analysis of materials of the US Navy shows a number of technical problems with damage and vehicles, and torpedoes, which they received on board the TA and for a long time eliminated them. Taking into account the fundamentally different torpedo complex and the new torpedo, the following (minimal!) List of only “valid” tests of the “Physicists” from “Ash” was suggested:
- shooting of all torpedo tubes at maximum firing speed without remote control;
- shooting of all torpedo tubes at maximum firing speed with remote control;
- in combination with shooting at various targets, single and salvo (including remote control) under hydroacoustic counteraction (GPA), recording and measuring the noise of gunfire and torpedoes (including - and this is very important - discrete components).
A separate issue is testing with the use of torpedoes in the Arctic, similar to the regularly conducted US Navy anti-submarine exercises with ICEX torpedo firing (followed by lifting of the shot torpedoes from under the ice).
Taking into account the inevitable overlays of the tests of the new ship, this should have amounted to dozens of shots (and this is only the torpedo “Physicist-1”). Instead, six from “Ash” and seven shots of modified torpedoes on additional extended tests.
For comparison, by adopting the Mk2006 mod.48 torpedo in 7 (about the same time as the X-Physic-1 state tests), the US Navy for 2011 – 2012 had time to make more than 300 shots with MkXNNXX torpedoes mod.48 X 7 4-th modification of the software 4-th model of the torpedo). This is not counting the shots of the previous "mods" Mk7 of the modifications of the latest model (mod.48 Spiral 7-1).
Mass torpedo firing is an axiom of modern torpedism. Unfortunately, western. The reason for this requirement is the complex and changing environment in which torpedoes are used. The unitary breakthrough of the US Navy, that is, the adoption of the Mk60 and Mk70 torpedoes with sharply improved TTXs at the end of the 46-x and the beginning of the 48-s, was associated with the need to shoot a lot to develop and develop new complex homing, control and telecontrol systems. According to its characteristics, OTO-2 unitary fuel was frankly average and was inferior in terms of energy to the peroxide-kerosene pair already successfully mastered in the US Navy by more than 30 percent. But this fuel made it possible to significantly simplify the device of torpedoes, and most importantly - dramatically, reduce the cost of the shot by an order of magnitude. This ensured the mass shooting, successful development and development of new torpedoes with high performance characteristics in the US Navy.
With regard to the submarine "Severodvinsk" and its torpedo complex, we have a clearly insufficient amount of testing. Of course, some of them can be fully carried out only as part of the Navy, already having a crew that has been worked out during combat training. The question is what must be done. The situation with the 3 generation of nuclear submarines, when the most serious flaws in the industry for the torpedo armament of new submarines have not been eliminated, should not be repeated.
The exceptionally high cost of a shot by torpedoes "Physicist-1" (especially for work in the north of Severodvinsk - more than eight million rubles) also attracts attention. In fact, such a cost "kills" the torpedo "Physicist-1", excluding its effective modernization and normal development in the fleet due to the exorbitant cost of testing and combat training.
These fantastic rates appeared after 2009, when Gidropribor concern was appointed the only supplier of Physics. After that, "suddenly" the cost of the product itself took off and, most importantly, the shot. Prices should be revised, and the re-preparation of torpedoes after the shooting should be carried out in the fleet with the participation of industry representatives, but under the supervision of naval specialists. The torpedo “Physicist-1” itself must be returned to the competitive field of the tender for production between the relevant enterprises, including the Zlatoust machine-building plant, which took part in the tenders 2008 of the year.
In addition, it is necessary to restore the practice of one hundred percent shooting (shooting) of all thermal torpedoes released. This will give statistics and reliability, and confident development of new weapons.
After working out all coursework tasks, it is necessary to conduct ice tests similar to those of the American ICEX with firing of new torpedoes and countermeasures.
It is of concern that not a single photograph of the Severodvinsk submarine imperceptibly has a multiply charged outboard launcher for anti-torpedo protection. Suppression of modern noise-resistant homing torpedoes requires massive use of drifting, and most importantly, self-propelled GPA instruments. The consequence of the need for salvo use of such devices in conditions of limited time is multi-barreled outboard launchers (ZPU), offhand - at least 40 ZPU caliber not less than 200 millimeters.
References to some Western self-defense complexes with products of smaller caliber (for example С303S) are untenable, as they were developed to counter the torpedoes of previous generations and against new torpedoes are ineffective.
Anti-torpedoes began to play an exceptional role in modern PTZ circuits. We were the first in this direction, but last year the US Navy already published press releases about successful mass firing by anti-torpedoes in the navy.
Navy submarines are required to have effective means of PTZ.
It seems expedient to check the nuclear submarine "Severodvinsk" with the SJSC "Irtysh-Amfora" in a dueling situation against nuclear submarines equipped with the prefix "Delta-PM".
And the last. The practice of operating the submarine of the 671РТМ project in ice conditions showed a high probability of damage to the GRS nose fiberglass fairing with serious consequences. Instead of tempting fate once again, especially given the significant increase in the area of acoustic antennas, the 885 submarine of the 206 submarine needs a removable ice spacer to ensure the safety of the fairings when stationary and leaving the base in ice conditions. A similar solution has long been used on some western submarines, for example in the German project XNUMX.
Today we simply have no right to be weak.