Zbignev Brzezinski on Russian Policy (“The American Interest”, USA)
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke at a conference at the Wilson Center, which was held on June 16 and was held under the heading “Mutual Security in Question? Russia, the West and the European Security Architecture ”(Mutual Security on Hold? Russia, the West, and European Security Architecture). Below is a transcript of his speech.
Let me try to reveal the possible consequences of the Ukrainian crisis for the architecture of European security in the light of relations between Russia and the West. What we are seeing in Ukraine now is, from my point of view, not just a quarrel, but a symptom of a more serious problem - namely, the gradual and steady rise of Russian quasi-mystical chauvinism, which has been going on for six or seven years. Putin played a major role in this, and the content of this new concept is fully determined by Russia's relations with the world in general and with the West in particular.
Recently, the Russian Council on International Affairs, a Moscow institute, whose members are extremely respected and distinguished scholars — not dissidents, not independent thinkers who now also exist in Moscow — in collaboration with RIA-News»And the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy published a joint article on the transformation of Russian national identity and the new foreign policy doctrine. It covers in some detail the process of creating a completely new conceptual framework for defining Russia’s relations with the world — relations that Russians consider they need after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the partial disintegration of the Russian empire.
This is a rather long article, but you should definitely read it for those interested in international relations. In particular, it deals with several key concepts that are part of this new world view. The world view, determined by the need that the Russians surrounding Putin and Putin himself is acutely felt by the need for a more comprehensive interpretation of the nature and position of Russia in the world and its relations with the world and with the West in particular. It is in this context that the Ukrainian question acquires special significance.
This report deals with four key concepts: first, the concept of a “divided people”, secondly, the theme of “protecting citizens abroad”, thirdly, the theme of the “Russian world”, fourthly, the importance of recognizing and preserving , acceptance and promotion of the "Great Russian Civilization". I mentioned this because I believe that it would be a mistake to consider the crisis in the Crimea and Ukraine the product of a sudden outburst of anger. In a sense, they can be considered as such, but it would be much smarter on the part of Russia to crank up what it had just turned, in about 10 years. By that time, she would have become stronger and stronger in economic terms.
But everything has already happened, and these concepts have played a significant role in this. The concept of a divided people is the starting point for chauvinistic statements that Russia's sovereignty applies to all Russian people, wherever they are. And those who are familiar with history Europe before the start of World War II, these statements will inevitably seem frighteningly familiar. Of course, this concept leads us to the idea of protecting citizens living abroad. And this is of particular importance for those states in whose territories ethnic Russians live and which border Russia. The concepts of a divided people and the protection of fellow citizens abroad lead us to the idea of the Russian world. By this is meant the organic, integral unity of all Russian people, regardless of their place of residence. And these places of residence can be changed by reuniting ethnic Russians. Think of the Baltic countries.
No less important is the conviction that Russia is not part of Western civilization. It is also not part of China. It is not part of the Muslim world. It is believed that Russia itself is a great civilization. The concept of "world civilization" includes a number of principles, some of which are still unknown in our society, such as, for example, a strong commitment to a particular religious teaching, much stronger than in the West, where religion is part of a more complex social structure. . The bottom line is that the great Russian civilization upholds certain basic values, not only religious, but also values relating to interpersonal relationships - for example, condemnation of changes in the relations between the sexes and within the sexes that are currently taking place in the world. As a result, Russia protects the preservation of certain basic beliefs that have always characterized Christianity, but from the point of view of Russians, Christianity today is betraying its fundamental principles. So, we are dealing with a full-fledged worldview - an ambitious worldview that justifies the claim that Russia is a world power. And nothing in the international dialogue with the West touched Mr. Putin as much as the words of President Obama, who called Russia a strong regional power. He could not give more offensive characteristics.
Understanding the doctrinal basis of Putin’s worldview is an important starting point for considering the Ukrainian issue. The Ukrainian crisis is not the result of a sudden quarrel, as I said, but a symptom of a more serious problem: the emergence of politics, packed within a larger philosophical concept. So what should we expect? If Ukraine is just a symptom of a problem, then it will be extremely difficult to solve this problem. I think it will take some time to solve it. But the solution to this problem should not be one-sided, since the West has its own interests there. And these interests should take the form of a reasonable policy. If the Ukrainian problem is localized, over time it will probably lose its urgency. Especially if the Russian, increasingly cosmopolitan middle class, which is now raising its head, but still remains rather weak, will become more politically significant, perhaps tired of feeling vulnerable and disappointed in Putin, and will assume a more significant political role, when Putin retires. But when will this happen? This is impossible to predict. Maybe soon. Maybe not. But much also depends on whether Ukraine will become a symptom of success or the collapse of Putin’s worldview. In short, the stakes are high.
By these rates, I mean, among other things, the question that the use of force in Crimea and the ongoing attempts to destabilize the situation in certain regions of Ukraine are a serious threat to international treaties concluded after World War II, and in particular for the idea of inadmissibility forces in resolving territorial disputes. This idea became the fundamental principle of the European order, which was formed after the Second World War. And Russia was part of it - thanks in part to the agreements that it signed. But now she challenges them. And this is a serious threat, an actual threat - at least in a psychological sense, but potentially, especially considering the events in the Crimea, also in the military. This is a threat to the Baltic countries, Georgia, Moldova. It is also a threat - not too pronounced, but perhaps even more dangerous - for Belarus, because Belarus has no external protection. Other states that I mentioned have it, albeit to varying degrees.
From the foregoing it follows that the Ukrainian problem is a threat that the West needs to fight on three levels. We must resolutely resist the temptation to use the force that the Russian leadership faces. Simply put, we must prevent the use of force.
Secondly, we must achieve a cessation of deliberate attempts by Russia to destabilize the situation in the eastern regions of Ukraine. It is very difficult to say how ambitious these goals are, but it is no coincidence that in the part of Ukraine dominated by Russians, the use of force turned out to be so sophisticated. The participants in armed conflicts turned out to be well-armed, they had an effective anti-aircraft weapon and even Tanks. Even the most deeply disappointed citizens of Ukraine, who are hostile to its government and do not feel attachment to this country, will not keep such weapons in the basements and attics of their homes. This weapon was provided to them, so that they formed units capable of withstanding powerful military formations. This is a form of interstate aggression. This can not be called otherwise. How would you feel if, say, drug gangs in the United States began to receive weapons from abroad, from our southern neighbor, to fuel a conflict of this magnitude on an ongoing basis? This is a serious threat. And this is our second task.
Our third task is to insist and then discuss the final compromise formula with the Russians, which prohibits open and large-scale use of force and attempts to destabilize the situation. In turn, this means the following - and I will be very frank in expressing my thoughts on this matter. Ukraine needs to be supported if it resists. If Ukraine does not resist, if the turmoil inside the country persists and the government fails to organize an effective national defense system, then the Ukrainian problem will need to be solved unilaterally, but this may entail consequences that are likely to have a destabilizing effect on vulnerable states and on the relationship between East and West as a whole. And the forces of chauvinism inside Russia will become even more decisive. These forces in fact represent the most negative aspects of modern Russian society: a kind of thirst for nationalism, self-realization, satisfaction from the exercise of power. However, these features are not typical of the new middle class, which in the long run may become an acceptable alternative.
If Ukraine needs to be supported in its attempts to resist, Ukrainians should know that the West is ready to help them. And there is no reason to hide this readiness. It is much more useful to declare it, inform the Ukrainians and those who threaten them, that if Ukraine resists, she will receive a weapon. And we will provide this weapon even before the act of invasion itself is accomplished. Because in the absence of these weapons with the temptation to invade and get ahead of the rest it will be extremely difficult to fight. But it also matters which weapon we provide. From my point of view, this should be a weapon, especially effective in a resistance war in the conditions of large cities. There is no point in trying to arm the Ukrainians in such a way that they can confront the Russian army in open space: the Russian army is thousands of tanks and commanders who are ready to use crushing force. We should turn to the lessons we learned from episodes of resistance in the conditions of cities during the Second World War and the war in Chechnya, whose capital was the site of fierce fighting for three months. The bottom line is that in order for intrusion attempts to be successful in a political sense, it is necessary to capture the largest cities. If large cities, such as Kharkov or Kiev, begin to resist and fighting in urban conditions will not be avoided, the conflict will be prolonged and entail enormous costs. And the main thing is that it is in this sense that the start of this crisis is of great importance - that Russia is not yet ready to take such a step. Such a move would entail serious human losses and huge financial costs. He needs to spend a lot of time, and he will cause increased pressure from the international community.
I believe that we should let the Ukrainians understand that if they are ready to resist, judging by their statements and actions (although not very effective), we will provide them with anti-tank guns, hand-guns, anti-tank guns, hand-held rockets - that is, a weapon that can be used in the conditions of the city. It is not about arming the Ukrainians to attack Russia. It is impossible to attack a country such as Russia, having only defensive weapons. But if you have a defensive weapon and access to it, if you know that you will have it, you are more likely to accept resistance. Thus, it begins to act as a deterrent, also allowing more efficient operations to end the violence sponsored by individuals on the border between Ukraine and Russia. This, in my view, will in any case help reduce the risk and avoid the temptation to solve this crisis with a weapon. On the Russian side, given the euphoria around the success of the operation in Crimea, which turned out to be swift and decisive and which did not meet with any resistance, the temptation to repeat this success can be very serious for a leader who is striving to achieve large-scale victories.
At the same time, we must take part in the search for possible compromise solutions. Especially if it becomes clear to the Russians and Mr. Putin that the destabilization of Ukraine and its violent seizure are a serious threat and may turn out to be unattainable. Thus, containment should be accompanied by attempts to participate in the dialogue. What is the formula for a possible compromise? I think it is quite simple: Ukraine should continue the movement, publicly supported by the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians, towards membership in the European Union. But it is a long process. Turks, for example, have been waiting for entry into the European Union for 60 years. In other words, it takes time. Thus, the danger for Russia cannot be called close, and the negative consequences are not too destructive.
At the same time, we must convince Russia that Ukraine will not become a member of NATO. I believe that this is important for a number of political reasons. If you look at the map, you will understand that for Russia this is very important from a psychological and strategic point of view. Thus, Ukraine should not become a member of NATO. But for the same reason, Russia must understand that Ukraine will not become a member of the mythical Eurasian Union, which President Putin is trying to promote based on the idea of Russia's special place in the world. Ukraine will not be a member of the Eurasian Union, but it can conclude a separate trade agreement with Russia, especially taking into account the fact that some forms of exchange and trade between them are mutually beneficial. For example, agricultural products supplied by Ukraine to Russia. The industrial goods that Russia needs are also produced in Ukraine. Not many people realize that some of the newest Russian missiles, most of the aircraft engines of the Russian civil aviation and even part of the missiles used in the USA are manufactured in Ukraine. This is a profitable and successful industrial enterprise. And it must be supported by concluding a separate agreement between Russia and Ukraine.
I believe that this can become truly attractive over time. And this aspect should be voiced in the context of open, rather than secret, attempts to convince Russians that any use of force will have negative and long-term consequences for Russia itself, not threatening its security, but implying an increase in the cost of defending its authority through Ukraine’s independence. From my point of view, in this context, NATO should also act more decisively in the matter of protecting the security of those NATO members who border Russia and where many Russian communities live, constituting roughly 25% of their population. In particular, I mean Latvia and Estonia. America confirmed its military presence there. I believe that it would be much better if leading European states, such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom, also deployed their troops there. That on a regular basis there was not only America. This will prove that NATO members are holding together. In international politics, symbolism has the same meaning as decisiveness, and often it can prevent more radical measures.
Given the current implications of the massive expansion of NATO over the past few decades to 28 members, it would be right in the light of current events to reassess the structure of this alliance. In particular, I speak of the historical paradox contained in the most important Article 5 of its charter. Article 5 talks about the procedure for a military response to aggression directed against the entire bloc or its individual members. Undoubtedly, you will recall that in Article 5 there is a line that decisions regarding participation in conflicts must be taken unanimously. In other words, this means that any country has the right of veto. It was the United States who insisted on the inclusion of this condition in the NATO charter. The US government insisted on this in order to get the support of the isolationists in the US Congress. They feared that an alliance of this kind would violate the American tradition of refusing to participate in conflicts on the territory of foreign states. Unfortunately, today, given the fact that NATO consists of 28 states that are to varying degrees committed to fulfilling the conditions of security, the situation has been reversed. It is the new members of NATO that in certain circumstances begin to refer to Article 5. The veto of one state does not guarantee that NATO will not use military force, because I am convinced that if this happens after long debates, strong indignation and mutual threats, this state will have to either agree or withdraw from the alliance.
One possible option would be to accept the condition that those countries that do not systematically fulfill the obligations stipulated by the NATO charter cannot have veto power. Some members of this alliance do not fulfill their obligations at all, so their membership in NATO is in fact a ticketless ticket. Why should a member of an alliance that does not fulfill its obligations have the right to prevent other NATO members from exercising collective self-defense? This is an anomaly and a potential source of problems and confusion. As this crisis is gradually approaching a solution, I hope that NATO will reconsider its statute and once again discuss the issue of admitting new members to the alliance. A country in which NATO is interested in security does not necessarily have to become a member of the alliance. NATO may be involved in ensuring its security, but not accepting it into its ranks. Now there is talk of new members of the European Union. Some of them may want to join NATO, and over the past few years, some states have managed to join NATO, despite the fact that they are geographically remote from possible conflicts on the dividing line between East and West. I believe that additional discussions on this issue can be of some benefit, increase the authority of NATO and put pressure on those members who want to be active members to make more efforts to fulfill their obligations.
Finally, looking far ahead, I believe that, one way or another, subject to a compromise solution, or in his absence, the Crimea will be a heavy economic burden for Russia. There is no reason to believe that the kind of economic activity that Crimea conducted quite successfully - being a resting place for tourists, where international airliners arrived and foreign tourists arrived - would be preserved. Since the international community did not formally recognize the annexation of Crimea to Russia, the development of underwater resources on the territory of Crimea will become impossible for international companies, because they will be the objects of claims of various interested parties. In short, Russia will have to invest huge sums in the economic development of the Crimea. Since the Crimea was annexed to Russia, prices there have tripled. All this imposes additional obligations on Russia, whose economy remains rather weak.
Moreover, there is another aspect that will be of great importance in the development process of Ukraine: Russia, by its actions, has turned against itself about 40 millions of people. Unlike other Slavs, Ukrainians in the past never treated Russia with hostility. The hostile attitude of Ukrainians towards Russia is a new phenomenon, and every day its intensity is growing. Thus, in this respect, Ukraine over time will not only become a serious problem for Russia, but it also threatens with the final loss of a huge territory - the greatest territorial loss in the history of Russia's imperial expansion. And this in turn can destroy a new mythology concerning the place and role of Russia in the world with which I began my report. Reality can disprove this mythology. That is why I very much hope that the developing Russian middle class will understand that the mythology that Putin is imposing and which is adopted by a significant part of less educated and more chauvinistic Russians is a road to nowhere, that the real purpose of Russia is to become a powerful European country. And they will remember this every time they look to the east and ask themselves: what is the significance of China for the future of Russia?
Thank you.
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